In re: Linder Oil Company, A Partnership; Lucy G. Sikes, Chapter 7 Trustee and the Cadle Company, II, Inc. v. Crescent Bank & Trust; Consolidated Reserves Company, L.C.; Roger D. Linder; G. Miles Biggs, Jr.; Louisiana General Oil Company; and Linder Energy Company

W.D. La.9/30/2025

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| See □□
SO ORDERED. a Sane, □□
SIGNED September 30, 2025. Sy MP EES
"STRICT OFS

Ww: Kohe—
Ww. KOLWE
ED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
In re: Case No. 17-51323
Linder Oil Company, A Partnership,
Debtor
Lucy G. Sikes, Chapter 7 Trustee and Chapter 7
the Cadle Company, II, Inc.,
Plaintiffs
Judge John W. Kolwe
v.
Crescent Bank & Trust; Consolidated Adv. Proc. No. 19-5105
Reserves Company, L.C.; Roger D.
Linder; G. Miles Biggs, Jr.; Louisiana
General Oil Company; and Linder
Energy Company
Defendants

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PRETRIAL MOTIONS
The District Court has withdrawn the reference in this and a few related
adversary proceedings to allow for a trial by jury. Once before the District Court, the
parties collectively filed 12 pre-trial motions, which the District Court has referred to
this Court. All of these motions concern the scope of evidence to be permitted at trial,
whether motions in limine or Daubert motions. The Court has considered each Motion

and is now prepared to rule. The Court is issuing this ruling as a Report and
Recommendation.
THE MOTIONS
Defendants G. Miles Biggs, Jr., Roger Linder, Consolidated Reserves
Company, L.C., Louisiana General Oil Company, and Linder Energy Company
(collectively, the “Non-Bank Defendants”) have filed two motions:
• Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Inconsistent with Plaintiffs’
Complaint at Trial (ECF #492) (D.Ct. #25);
• Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Sought to Be Introduced at Trial
for an Improper Purpose (ECF #493; D.Ct. #26).
The Plaintiffs, Lucy G. Sikes, Trustee (the “Trustee”) for the Chapter 7 Estate
of Linder Oil Company, A Partnership (the “Debtor”), and The Cadle Company II,
Inc. (“Cadle”), have filed nine motions:
• Motion to Introduce Deposition Testimony of Roberta Linder Cuccia at
Trial (ECF #494; D.Ct. #27);
• Motion to Introduce Deposition Testimony of Fred B. Morgan, III at
Trial (ECF #495; D.Ct. #28);
• Motion to Introduce Deposition Testimony of Bonnie Higgins at Trial
(ECF #496; D.Ct. #29);
• Motion to Exclude or, Alternatively, Limit the Expert Report and
Testimony of Defendants’ Expert, Thomas M. Talley, P.G. (ECF #497;
D.Ct. #30);
• Motion to Exclude or, Alternatively, Limit the Expert Report and
Testimony of Defendants’ Expert, H. Kenneth Lefoldt, Jr., CPA (ECF
#498; D.Ct. #31);
• Motion to Exclude or, Alternatively, Limit the Expert Report and
Testimony of Defendants’ Expert, Joseph H. Neely (ECF #499; D.Ct.
#32);
• Motion to Exclude or, Alternatively, Limit the Expert Report and
Testimony of Defendants’ Expert, Ralph A. Litolff, Jr. at Trial (ECF
#500; D.Ct. #33);
• Motion in Limine Regarding Cadle’s Acquisition of the Loans and Other
Litigation (ECF #501; D.Ct. #34); and
• Motion in Limine to Bar Evidence Relating to Enterprise Insolvency,
Including Expert Testimony, at Trial (ECF #502; D.Ct. #35).
Finally, both the Non-Bank Defendants and Defendant Crescent Bank & Trust
have filed a Motion to Introduce Deposition Testimony of Daniel Cadle at Trial (ECF
#506; D.Ct. #43).
Thus, there are a total of 12 Motions before the Court: four Daubert motions,
four motions concerning the use of deposition testimony at trial, and four motions
dealing with other issues. However titled, all of these motions are motions in limine
subject to the same general standard, addressed in the next section. For the
background facts and jurisdictional analysis, the Court adopts its Ruling on Motions
for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF #475).
GENERAL STANDARD FOR MOTIONS IN LIMINE
All twelve motions are motions in limine, which is “any motion, whether made
before or during trial, to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence
is actually offered.”1 “Motions in limine are intended to prevent allegedly prejudicial
evidence from being so much as whispered before a jury prior to obtaining the Court's
permission to broach the topic.”2 “The grant or denial of a motion in limine is
considered discretionary, and thus will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion and
a showing of prejudice.”3 Although it is common for parties to file motions in limine,
courts have routinely noted that they are often used to raise issues that would be

1 Luce v. United States,
469 U.S. 38
, 40 n.2,
105 S. Ct. 460, 462
,
83 L. Ed. 2d 443
(1984).
2 Cramer v. Sabine Transp. Co.,
141 F. Supp. 2d 727, 733
(S.D. Tex. 2001).
3 Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
396 F.3d 632
, 643 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Buford v. Howe,
10 F.3d
1184, 1188
(5th Cir. 1994)).
better reserved for the actual trial of the case, as Judge Doughty in the Western
District recently noted:
“It is well settled that motions in limine are disfavored.”
Auenson v. Lewis,
1996 WL 457258
, at *1 (E.D. La.
8/12/1996) (citing Hawthorne Partners v. AT&T
Technologies, Inc.,
831 F. Supp. 1398, 1400
(N.D. Ill.
1993)). “Motions in limine are frequently made in the
abstract and in anticipation of some hypothetical
circumstance that may not develop at trial.” Collins v.
Wayne Corp.,
621 F.2d 777, 784
(5th Cir. 1980) (superseded
on other grounds). “An order in limine excludes only clearly
inadmissible evidence; therefore, evidence should not be
excluded before trial unless it is clearly inadmissible on all
potential grounds.” Rivera v. Robinson,
464 F. Supp. 3d
847
, 853 (E.D. La. 2020) (quoting Auenson,
1996 WL
457258
, at *1) (emphasis added). Instead, courts should
reserve evidentiary rulings until trial so that questions as
to the evidence “may be resolved in the proper context.”
Auenson,
1996 WL 457258
, at *1. Last, a motion “set[ting]
forth a [ ] laundry list of matters, most of them of a highly
vague nature ... constitutes an improper ‘shotgun’ motion
which fails to meet this court’s standards for motions in
limine.” Estate of Wilson v. Mariner Health Care, Inc.,
2008
WL 5255819
, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2008).4
Accordingly, unless evidence meets the stringent standard for exclusion at the
pretrial stage, denial of a motion in limine is without prejudice to reasserting
objections at trial as appropriate under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The Court will now address each set of motions.
DAUBERT MOTIONS
Daubert Standard
In determining the admissibility of expert testimony, this Court is guided by
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the standard established in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
509 U.S. 579
(1993), as interpreted by the Fifth

4 United States v. Brown-Manning, No. 3:23-CR-00213,
2025 WL 242205
, at *1 (W.D. La. Jan. 17,
2025).
Circuit Court of Appeals. Under Daubert, district courts serve as gatekeepers, tasked
with ensuring that expert testimony is both relevant and reliable before it may be
presented to the jury.5
The Fifth Circuit has emphasized that expert testimony must be assessed for
both its reliability and relevance.6 Reliability requires an assessment of whether the
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid, while
relevance requires that the testimony “assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”7
To determine reliability, courts may consider the non-exclusive Daubert
factors:
1. Whether the theory or technique has been tested;
2. Whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication;
3. The known or potential rate of error;
4. The existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s
operation; and
5. Whether the methodology is generally accepted within the relevant scientific
community.8
Expert testimony must also be based on more than “subjective belief or
unsupported speculation.”9 Even a qualified expert may offer an opinion that is
inadmissible if the opinion lacks a reliable foundation or if the expert has not reliably
applied the methodology to the facts of the case.10 “Although the Daubert analysis is
applied to ensure expert witnesses have employed reliable principles and methods in
reaching their conclusions, the test does not judge the expert conclusions

5 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137, 147
(1999); Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc.,
151
F.3d 269
, 275–76 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
6 United States v. Ebron,
683 F.3d 105, 139
(5th Cir. 2012).
7 Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine Inc.,
482 F.3d 347, 352
(5th Cir. 2007).
8 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94; Johnson v. Arkema, Inc.,
685 F.3d 452, 459
(5th Cir. 2012).
9 Daubert,
509 U.S. at 590
.
10 See Kumho Tire,
526 U.S. at 153-54
.
themselves.”11 Ultimately, the burden is on the party offering the expert to establish
admissibility.12
In this case, the four Daubert motions generally do not attack the reliability of
the expert testimony, i.e., the reasoning or methodology of the experts, which is
typically the more complicated determination for a Daubert motion and the prong
that benefits most from deciding in advance of trial to save the jury’s time. Instead,
the motions primarily focus on the relevance of the expert testimony, placing these
motions squarely within the typical motion in limine analysis. The Court now turns
to each of the Plaintiffs’ Daubert motions.
Motion Regarding Thomas M. Talley, P.G. (ECF #497; D.Ct. #30)
The Plaintiffs challenge the use of Thomas M. Talley, a geologist who issued
an expert report, on the grounds that his opinions on the so-called “group insolvency”
or “enterprise insolvency” theory are irrelevant to this trial based on this Court’s
rejection of that theory in its Ruling on multiple Motions for Partial Summary
Judgment.13 The Plaintiffs refer to a series of oil-and-gas reserves reports prepared
by Collarini Associates in 2015-2016 (the “Collarini Reports”), and the Plaintiffs
argue that Crescent is trying to use Talley to vouch for the reliability of those third-
party reports, with the “apparent objective [being] to enable its second expert, H.
Kenneth Lefoldt, Jr., CPA…to use the Collarini Reports as the basis for his opinion
that the Linder Group was solvent at the relevant times, and thereby refute the
Trustee’s claims.”14

11 Guy v. Crown Equip. Corp.,
394 F.3d 320, 325
(5th Cir. 2004) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594–
95) (emphasis in Guy).
12 See Moore,
151 F.3d at 276
.
13 See Ruling on Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, pp. 19-23 (ECF #23).
14 See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support, pp. 2-3 (ECF #497-1). Remarkably, neither the
Plaintiffs nor the Defendants actually attached Mr. Talley’s opinions. The Plaintiffs have submitted a
13-page Expert Report from Mr. Talley dated June 21, 2024 (ECF #503) that does not contain a single
opinion, only Mr. Talley’s qualifications and information on his employer. The Defendants submitted
excerpts from a deposition transcript with their Opposition, as did the Plaintiffs with their Reply, but
that is the extent of the evidence before the Court.
In connection with its March 31, 2025 Ruling on Motions for Partial Summary
Judgment (ECF #475), this Court rejected Crescent’s “group insolvency” theory.15
Crescent’s theory is that solvency for purposes of the Louisiana revocatory action
should be determined by reference to several companies that are legally related to
the Debtor, but not directly liable to the creditors, rather than the solvency of just the
Debtor, which is the only entity liable to the unsecured creditors. The Court found
that the theory has no support in Louisiana statutory or case law and therefore
rejected it. That Ruling remains the law of the case, and thus the Defendants may
not rely on Mr. Talley’s report or testimony that is contrary to the Court’s previous
Ruling. Thus, to the extent Mr. Talley’s testimony seeks to address the “group
insolvency” theory for purposes of the Louisiana revocatory action, the Court
recommends that this motion be granted in part. Otherwise, to the extent the
Defendants might use Mr. Talley’s testimony for any other proper purpose, the Court
recommends that this motion be denied in part so that the Defendants may address
any such argument at trial.
Motion Regarding H. Kenneth Lefoldt, Jr., CPA (ECF #498; D.Ct.
#31)16
The Plaintiffs seek to exclude the testimony of H. Kenneth Lefoldt, Jr., CPA,
proposed expert witness for the Non-Bank Defendants. First, they attack the
reliability of his testimony to the extent he relies on the contents of the Collarini
Reports referenced above. As the Plaintiffs note, Fed. R. Evid. 703 permits experts to
base their opinions on facts or data from other sources, but they argue that Mr.
Lefoldt is simply parroting the findings of the Collarini Reports. Put another way,
they claim Mr. Lefoldt is not providing an original opinion. In response, Crescent
argues that courts have allowed experts to rely on reserve reports in rendering expert
opinions, and the extent of Mr. Lefoldt’s reliance on the reports goes to the weight of

15 See Ruling on Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, pp. 19-23 (ECF #475).
16 The Plaintiffs initially attached the wrong Memorandum in Support to their motion but
submitted the correct Memorandum in Support as a separate filing. See Memorandum in Support of
Lefoldt Motion (ECF #504).
his testimony, not its admissibility.17 This Court agrees with Crescent on this point
and does not find Mr. Lefoldt’s report or anticipated testimony to be unreliable on
that basis.
The Plaintiffs’ primary argument with respect to Mr. Lefoldt is that his
testimony is not relevant because it concerns the “group insolvency” theory that the
Court rejected. The Court agrees and recommends treating this motion the same as
the motion concerning Mr. Talley’s testimony: granting it in part to the extent the
testimony concerns the “group insolvency” theory in the context of the Louisiana
revocatory action but otherwise denying it in part and determining in the context of
trial whether it may be relevant to any other issue in the case.18
Motion Regarding Joseph H. Neely (ECF #499; D.Ct. #32)
The Plaintiffs have also filed a Daubert Motion concerning the use of Joseph
H. Neely’s proposed expert testimony. Mr. Neely is the former director of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation in Washington, D.C., and the former commissioner of
the Department of Banking and Consumer Finance for the State of Mississippi. His
expert report, dated June 6, 2024, sets out four opinions regarding the banking
relationships among the various parties, including the Debtor and Crescent,
specifically:
• Opinion #1: There is no basis to suggest that Linder’s personal
relationship with Crescent executives compromised the business
relationship to the benefit of Consolidated and/or Crescent.
• Opinion #2: In this case, Plaintiffs’ allegations that Crescent lacked
concern for intercompany transfers, source of payments and other

17 See Crescent’s Opposition, pp. 6-8 (ECF #524).
18 For its part, Crescent argues that the group insolvency theory may be relevant to supposed
Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act (“LOWLA”) claims by the three putative predicate creditors in this case.
Id. at pp. 10-11 (ECF #524). As Crescent is well aware, no such LOWLA claims have ever been at issue
in this case, so the Court is doubtful that evidence of the solvency of the entire so-called Linder Oil
Group would be relevant to any issue or would do anything other than confuse the jury.
relationships does not support the conclusion that Crescent departed
from acceptable banking practices or breached any banking regulations.
• Opinion #3: There is no evidence to suggest that the Debtor was in
concert with Crescent Bank and Consolidated to defraud the Debtor’s
creditors, including First NBC.
• Opinion #4: The purchaser in a loan sale transaction with the FDIC
assumes the position of the former lender, via the receivership transfer,
regarding the former lender’s contractual relationship with the
borrower.
See Neely Expert Report (ECF #512-1). Mr. Neely explains these opinions with
extensive discussion in his report.
The Plaintiffs claim Mr. Neely’s opinions should be excluded because they
opine on legal matters which are better handled by the Court. For Opinion #2, which
opines that Crescent did not breach banking regulations, the Plaintiffs argue that
that point has never even been alleged and that the opinion should be excluded on
that basis. The Defendants point out that experts are permitted to discuss applicable
laws and regulations in reaching their own opinions, and Mr. Neely’s opinions are not
necessarily simply pure legal conclusions.
Although a close call, particularly with respect to Opinion #4 the Court tends
to agree with the Defendants, and finds, based on the record before it, that Mr. Neely’s
opinions are not, on their face, improper, and potential problems could be alleviated
with appropriate jury instructions. Certainly Mr. Neely is qualified to opine on
banking matters based on his extensive experience, and the Court cannot say at this
time that his opinions are unreliable or irrelevant in the abstract, as presented in
these pretrial motions.
The Court therefore recommends that this motion be denied, and any specific
objection the Plaintiffs’ may have can be addressed at trial.
Motion Regarding Ralph A. Litolff, Jr. at Trial (ECF #500; D.Ct. #33)
The Plaintiffs attack the anticipated testimony of Ralph A. Litolff, Jr., whom
the Non-Bank Defendants have retained to opine on the solvency of the Debtor during
the period of 2010-2016, on the grounds that he is not an expert on statutory
insolvency standards and that he bases his valuation opinions on the Debtor’s tax
returns. In the Plaintiffs’ view, his expert testimony should go beyond the tax returns
and rely on other independent facts to prove the Debtor’s solvency. In opposition, the
Non-Bank Defendants essentially argue that Mr. Litolff does have experience with
the statutory insolvency standards and that the Plaintiffs’ arguments really go to the
weight of Mr. Litolff’s testimony, which the jury should be able to decide.
The Court agrees with the Non-Bank Defendants’ position. The Court does not
find that Mr. Litolff’s methodology is flawed on its face or that it should be excluded
simply because he relied on the Debtor’s filed tax returns. Instead, the Court finds
that the Plaintiffs’ argument primarily goes to the weight of Mr. Litolff’s anticipated
testimony, and that is a matter that can certainly be addressed through cross-
examination before the jury. Accordingly, the Court recommends that this motion be
denied.
MOTIONS CONCERNING USE OF DEPOSITION TESTIMONY AT TRIAL
The Court now turns to the four motions concerning the use of deposition
testimony at trial. The admissibility of deposition testimony at trial is governed by
Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 32(a)(4), a party may use
deposition testimony in lieu of live testimony at trial if the witness is unavailable,
including when the witness is outside the court’s subpoena power. Specifically, Rule
32(a)(4)(B) provides, in relevant part:
A party may use for any purpose the deposition of a
witness, whether or not a party, if the court finds: (B) that
the witness is more than 100 miles from the place of
hearing or trial... unless it appears that the absence was
procured by the party offering the deposition….
The 100-mile limitation aligns with the subpoena power of the Court as
outlined in Rule 45(c)(1)(A), which generally limits subpoenas for trial attendance to
persons within 100 miles of the courthouse or within the state if certain conditions
are met. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c).
Pre-recorded video deposition testimony or the reading of deposition testimony
are “acceptable substitute[s] for oral testimony when in-court observation of the
witness is extremely difficult or virtually impossible.”19 “The party who wishes to use
the deposition has the burden of showing the unavailability of the witness.”20
The requisite showing to permit deposition testimony over
live testimony is steep. Deposition testimony is prohibited
unless “live testimony from the deponent is impossible or
highly impracticable.” [Swearingen v. Gillar Home Health
Care, L.P.),
759 Fed. Appx. 322
, 324 (5th Cir. 2019]
(quoting McDowell v. Blankenship,
759 F.3d 847, 851
(8th
Cir. 2014)). This standard has been likened to when “the
witness [is] unavailable to testify because he is dead.”
Ruelas v. W. Truck & Trailer Maint., Inc.,
2019 WL
13150106
at *2 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2019) (internal marks
omitted). The burden of attending trial must be more than
mere inconvenience. See Swearingen, 759 Fed. Appx. at
324 (seeing little relevance in the fact that a witness would
miss work); see also Ruelas,
2019 WL 13150106
at *2
(denying use of doctor’s deposition at trial because “he is a
currently practicing orthopedic surgeon and requiring him
to appear live in lieu of treating patients is not
warranted.”). A showing of one of the Rule 32(a)(4)
exceptions is also strictly enforced. See Swearingen, 759
Fed. Appx. at 322 (witness located 95.5 miles away was not
“sufficiently close” to satisfy Rule 32(a)(4)(B)).21
Significantly, the exceptions are alternative, so a party need only prove that
one of the exceptions exists, such as the witness being located more than 100 miles

19 Greinstein v. Granite Servs. Int’l, Inc., No. 2:18-CV-208-Z-BR,
2023 WL 3943231
, at *1 (N.D.
Tex. June 9, 2023) (quoting Swearingen v. Gillar Home Health Care, L.P.),
759 Fed. Appx. 322
, 324
(5th Cir. 2019)).
20 Swearingen v. Gillar Home Health Care, L.P.,
759 F. App’x 322
, 324 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Jauch
v. Corley,
830 F.2d 47, 50
(5th Cir. 1987)).
21 Greinstein, id. at *2.
away, to satisfy the exception to the use of deposition testimony. However, the
proponent of the deposition must still prove that the evidence is admissible:
In considering the use of depositions at a trial or hearing,
it is helpful to remember that the problem has two aspects.
First, the conditions set forth in Rule 32(a) must be
satisfied before the deposition can be used at all. Second,
when it is found that these conditions authorize the use of
the deposition, it must be determined whether the matters
contained in it are admissible under the rules of evidence.
Under some circumstances state law may be determinative
of the second point. But state law has no bearing on the
first, which is controlled solely by Rule 32(a) itself.22
In this case, all four motions involve witnesses who live more than 100 miles
from the courthouse, so Rule 32(a)(4)(B)’s exception is satisfied, leaving the issue of
whether that testimony is admissible.
Motion to Introduce Deposition Testimony of Roberta Linder Cuccia
(ECF #494; D.Ct. #27)
The Plaintiffs seek to use portions of the deposition of Roberta Linder Cuccia
at trial because she testified that she received benefits and paychecks from the Debtor
even though she was not actually employed by the Debtor, and she purportedly
invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in the deposition,
which under case law cited by the Plaintiffs makes the deposition available for use at
trial.
In response, the Defendants argue that the only reason the Plaintiffs seek to
introduce the testimony is to point to her invocation of the Fifth Amendment, and the
Fifth Circuit has held that invoking the right is an ambiguous response. Therefore,
the Defendants argue that the deposition testimony would be unfairly prejudicial or
misleading to the jury.

22 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (3d ed.), § 2142 (General Principles Relating
to the Use of a Deposition) (footnotes omitted).
Based on the Court’s review of the submitted deposition excerpts and the
arguments of the parties, the Court recommends that the Plaintiffs’ motion be denied
in part and granted in part as follows:
Denied in Part. The Court agrees with the Defendants
that any reference to Ms. Cuccia’s invocation of the Fifth
Amendment in her deposition testimony would be unfairly
prejudicial and could possibly mislead the jury. Thus, the
Court recommends that the Plaintiffs’ motion to use Ms.
Cuccia’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment be denied in
part.
Granted in Part. Since Ms. Cuccia’s testimony regarding
the status of her employment with the Debtor and the
benefits and paychecks she received from the Debtor
appear to be relevant, and thus admissible, the Court
recommends that this motion be granted in part.
Motion to Introduce Deposition Testimony of Fred B. Morgan, III (ECF
#495; D.Ct. #28);
The Court previously denied the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Deposition of
Fred Morgan by Order dated July 17, 2024 (ECF #390), in large part because Crescent
argued that he had already given an extensive Rule 2004 Examination deposition on
behalf of Crescent in Debtor’s main bankruptcy case, and because any additional
deposition would be a burden on Mr. Morgan, who was in poor health at the time
(undergoing major cancer treatments) and was not expected to be able to testify at
trial. The Court’s denial of that motion to compel a second deposition was premised
on the fact that Mr. Morgan’s Rule 2004 Examination testimony might be used at
trial in lieu of live testimony.
Thus, the Court recommends that the Plaintiffs’ motion be granted, that the
Defendants be allowed to counter-designate testimony from the deposition for their
own use at trial as set out in Exhibit A to their Opposition (ECF #527-1), and that
the Plaintiffs’ own designations be allowed as set out in their Reply (ECF #560) and
the Exhibit thereto (ECF #560-1).
Motion to Introduce Deposition Testimony of Bonnie Higgins (ECF
#496; D.Ct. #29)
There was no objection to this Motion, and the Court recommends that it be
granted, allowing the Plaintiffs to use the deposition testimony of Bonnie Higgins at
trial, subject to any proper evidentiary objections raised at trial.
Motion to Introduce Deposition Testimony of Daniel Cadle (ECF #506;
D.Ct. #43).
Finally, there was no objection to this Motion, and the Court recommends that
it be granted, allowing the Plaintiffs to use the deposition testimony of Daniel Cadle
at trial, subject to any proper evidentiary objections raised at trial and subject to the
caveat, as explained below in connection with Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine Regarding
Cadle’s Acquisition of the Loans and Other Litigation (ECF #501; D.Ct. #34), that any
reference to the purchase price should be excluded except to the extent that the
Plaintiffs make it a live issue by referring to the Defendants’ attempted purchase of
the same debt for a low price.
REMAINING MOTIONS
The Court now turns to the remaining four motions, which concern more
general issues.
Non-Bank Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence
Inconsistent with Plaintiffs’ Complaint at Trial (ECF #492) (D.Ct. #25)
The Non-Bank Defendants seek to exclude evidence allegedly inconsistent with
the Plaintiffs’ Complaint at trial. First, they argue that the Complaint states that
Cadle is the successor to First NBC Bank (“FNBC”) and is a secured creditor, so any
evidence contrary to those assertions must be excluded. (The Non-Bank Defendants
also argue that Cadle is imputed with FNBC’s knowledge, but that assertion is
beyond the scope of this motion, which only seeks to exclude evidence inconsistent
with the Complaint, not to make legal determinations.) In response, the Plaintiffs
argue that this Court has already ruled on these matters multiple times, and this
motion in limine effectively represents a third bite at the apple. Regardless of that
issue, the Plaintiffs correctly point out that Cadle’s Proofs of Claim only assert that
$4.17 million of its claim, a tiny percentage, is secured, and the Complaint never
states that Cadle is fully secured. Thus, the motion should be denied to the extent it
seeks to exclude evidence that Cadle is only partially secured.
Furthermore, there is no question that Cadle is a successor in interest to
FNBC, and Cadle has never claimed otherwise. The real significance to the
Defendants of Cadle’s status as FNBC’s successor in interest is their argument that
that status imputes FNBC’s knowledge to Cadle and therefore destroys certain claims
by the Plaintiffs. The Court has not previously addressed the question of whether any
knowledge imputed to Cadle could affect the Trustee’s claims. Thus, to the extent the
motion seeks to preclude Cadle from arguing that it is not a successor in interest to
FNBC, it should be granted, but to the extent the motion seeks to preclude the
Plaintiffs from making any argument regarding knowledge supposedly imputed to
Cadle and its effect on the case, it should be denied, as that question remains open,
and any evidence on that point cannot be said to be clearly inadmissible prior to trial.
The Non-Bank Defendants also argue that the Plaintiffs should not be able to
recover the so-called Partner Distributions beyond what they identified in the
Amended Complaint. Paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint alleges that Mr.
Linder and Mr. Biggs made distributions of almost $9 million in 2009 and 2010.23
Paragraph 55 states: “The Debtor’s financial statements also reveal that the Debtor
made ‘partners [sic] distributions’ in 2009 of $4,374,000 and in 2010 of $4,568,500
(the ‘Partner Distributions’).”24 The Defendants argue that these are the only Partner
Distributions the Plaintiffs may seek to recover.
The Plaintiffs argue that there were similar distributions made from 2010
through 2017 and that this is really a disguised motion for summary judgment rather
than a mere evidentiary motion. The Court respectfully disagrees. First, the Plaintiffs

23 Amended Complaint, ¶ 13 (ECF #74).
24 Id., ¶ 55).
specifically defined the Partner Distributions to be those made in 2009 and 2010 in
their own Amended Complaint. Second, the Defendants have not waived this
argument. The Non-Bank Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, for example, argues that the Amended Complaint overstated
the amount of Partner Distributions in 2009 and 2010.25
Based on the case law cited by the Non-Bank Defendants,26 it seems that the
Partner Distributions, as defined in the Amended Complaint, include only
distributions made in 2009 and 2010, and any evidence of Partner Distributions from
outside that time period should be excluded from consideration of any award to or
recovery by the Plaintiffs based on Partner Distributions specifically. However, the
Court does not believe that a flat exclusion of all evidence of such distributions should
be made prior to trial. It seems clear to the Court that the nature of the Plaintiffs’
claims, including the allegations of a pattern of fraud, may require reference to
distributions and other transactions for other purposes. It is not proper to effectively
close off any reference to evidence because one use might not be permissible (i.e., it
should not be used in determining any award to or recovery by the Plaintiffs) if it
could be permissible for other purposes. Thus, with respect to Partner Distributions,
the Court recommends that this motion be granted in part and denied in part.
Non-Bank Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Sought
to Be Introduced at Trial for an Improper Purpose (ECF #493; D.Ct.
#26)
In this motion, the Non-Bank Defendants seek to exclude a 2011 DOI letter
and 2009 misdemeanor conviction involving the Debtor, as well as the deposition of
Roberta Linder Cuccia, because that evidence’s probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

25 See Non-Bank Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
pp. 16-18 (ECF #423-1).
26 See Cunningham v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc.,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163635
, *34-35
(E.D. Tx. 2010); In re Corland Corp.,
967 F.2d 1069, 1079
(5th Cir. 1992); and United States ex rel.
Ghaprial v. Quorum Health Resources, Inc.,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 325
, *12-13 (E.D. La. 1999).
First, the Defendants argue that the Debtor’s 2009 misdemeanor conviction for
failing to implement sufficient safeguards to detect and prevent the discharge of
produced water into a body of water is more than 10 years old and therefore, under
Fifth Circuit case law, by definition unduly prejudicial. The Defendants argue that
this evidence is not even relevant, so any prejudice would outweigh its probative
effect. The Plaintiffs argue that the Debtor’s actions in connection with the 2009
misdemeanor conviction could be used to impeach the testimony of defendants Mr.
Linder and Mr. Biggs to the extent they assert that they did not have authority over
the Debtor. Given that there are numerous other ways to prove that those individuals
exercised control and that the 2009 misdemeanor for failing to implement certain
environmental controls does not relate to any of the claims at issue here, the Court
finds that any probative value would be substantially outweighed by potential
prejudice. The Court recommends that this motion be granted in part with respect to
the 2009 misdemeanor conviction.
Similarly, the Defendants argue that a 2011 letter to the Debtor from the U.S.
Department of the Interior concerning civil penalties for violation of a regulation
should be excluded on the same basis. The Court agrees. The Plaintiffs argue that the
circumstances surrounding the issuance of the 2011 letter demonstrates alleged false
statements by Mr. Biggs and Mr. Linder and shows that they exercised control over
the Debtor. The Court finds that the letter is not relevant to the Plaintiffs’ claims
because the circumstances giving rise to the letter are not at issue in this dispute,
while the suggestion that the individual Defendants made false statements is
prejudicial. Furthermore, it is not seriously disputed that Mr. Biggs and Mr. Linder
exercised control over the Debtor, and there are many other ways to prove that fact.
Because the main use of this otherwise irrelevant evidence seems to be to suggest
that the individual Defendants are generally untrustworthy, the Court finds that the
prejudicial effect of the 2011 letter outweighs any probative value and should
therefore be excluded. The Court therefore recommends that the motion be granted
in part with respect to the letter.
Finally, the Defendants seek to exclude the deposition and text messages of
Roberta Linder Cuccia, Mr. Linder’s daughter and a non-party to this proceeding. The
Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs will seek to use the deposition solely to point to
her invocation of the Fifth Amendment, which would be unduly prejudicial. In
connection with the Plaintiff’s Motion to Introduce Deposition Testimony of Roberta
Linder Cuccia (ECF #494; D.Ct. #27), discussed above, the Court already found that
referring to Ms. Cuccia’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment would indeed be unduly
prejudicial, and this motion should be granted with respect to the Fifth Amendment
invocation. However, the deposition and text messages contain other evidence beyond
the limited invocation of the Fifth Amendment, and that evidence could be
admissible. Thus, the Court recommends that this motion be denied in part as to the
deposition and text messages unrelated to the Fifth Amendment issue.
Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine Regarding Cadle’s Acquisition of the Loans
and Other Litigation (ECF #501; D.Ct. #34)
In this motion, the Plaintiffs seek to exclude any evidence regarding Cadle’s
acquisition of the FNBC loans for less than face value and evidence of other related
litigation, on the ground that what Cadle paid for the loans is irrelevant, and the
evidence regarding Cadle’s litigation practices in other matters would not only be
irrelevant but would be unfairly prejudicial in painting Cadle as litigious.
The Defendants argue that the evidence of what Cadle paid for the loans is
relevant because the Amended Complaint seeks to portray Crescent in a bad light for
attempting to buy the loans for a relatively small sum (which was, as the Defendants
acknowledge, less than what Cadle paid), and because Crescent’s status as holder in
due course is at issue.
First, the Court thinks the probative value of the facts concerning Cadle’s
purchase is very low, given that Cadle purchased the debt after the petition date, and
Cadle’s actions are not really in question. Furthermore, Crescent’s status as holder
in due course has never really been at issue throughout the entire course of this
protracted adversary proceeding, whether in the Defendants’ various answers to the
complaint or in their motions. Thus, evidence of Cadle’s acquisition of the debt does
not seem relevant, while there is a risk of jury confusion and prejudice to Cadle, and
the Court would recommend granting this motion absent any other factors.
However, in the interest of fair play, to the extent the Plaintiffs might attempt
to suggest fraudulent intent from the fact that the Defendants sought to purchase the
debt for a low price, then the Defendants should be able to counter that inference by
presenting evidence that Cadle itself purchased the debt for a similarly low price. Out
of an abundance of caution, the Court recommends granting this motion except to the
extent the Plaintiffs seek to introduce evidence of the Defendants’ attempted
purchase of the debt.
Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine to Bar Evidence Relating to Enterprise
Insolvency, Including Expert Testimony, at Trial (ECF #502; D.Ct.
#35)
The Plaintiffs seek to exclude any evidence of the Defendants’ “enterprise
insolvency” or “group insolvency” theory, which is a theory put forward by the
Defendants that insolvency must be determined not for the individual Debtor but for
the entire group of Debtor-affiliated companies for purposes of satisfying the
insolvency element of the Plaintiffs’ claims. The Plaintiffs based this motion on the
fact that this Court, in its Ruling on Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, this
rejected the group insolvency theory altogether. Because the Court has already
rejected the group insolvency theory, any evidence pertaining to it is irrelevant and
should be excluded with respect to the insolvency element of the Plaintiffs’ claims.
Tellingly, the Defendants’ opposition continues to assert the group insolvency
theory and amounts to a collateral attack on the Court’s Ruling on Motions for Partial
Summary Judgment. The Court will not reverse that decision, and the Defendants
should not be able to confuse the jury with reference to a concept that has no legal
basis.27
The Court is therefore inclined to recommend that this motion be denied.
However, the Court is mindful of the fact that references to the financial health of

27 See also footnote 18, supra.
the Debtor and generally affiliated entities may be relevant to other defenses in this
case, such as Crescent’s reasoning in deciding to lend to certain entities in the first
place, and it is impossible to predict in advance whether there might be some proper
purpose or how to appropriately limit the scope of such evidence. Accordingly, out of
an abundance of caution, the Court recommends that this motion be granted in part
to the extent the Defendants seek to discuss “group insolvency” in the context of the
Louisiana revocatory action but otherwise denied in part, allowing the parties to take
up the issue at trial in the context of a live dispute.

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION OF EACH MOTION
For the reasons set out above,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude or,
Alternatively, Limit the Expert Report and Testimony of Defendants’ Expert, Thomas
M. Talley, P.G. (ECF #497; D.Ct. #30) be GRANTED IN PART with respect to
testimony regarding the “group insolvency” theory in connection with the Louisiana
revocatory action but otherwise DENIED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude or,
Alternatively, Limit the Expert Report and Testimony of Defendants’ Expert, H.
Kenneth Lefoldt, Jr., CPA (ECF #498; D.Ct. #31) be GRANTED IN PART with respect
to testimony regarding the “group insolvency” theory in connection with the
Louisiana revocatory action but otherwise DENIED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude or,
Alternatively, Limit the Expert Report and Testimony of Defendants’ Expert, Joseph
H. Neely (ECF #499; D.Ct. #32) be DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude or,
Alternatively, Limit the Expert Report and Testimony of Defendants’ Expert, Ralph
A. Litolff, Jr. at Trial (ECF #500; D.Ct. #33) be DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Introduce
Deposition Testimony of Roberta Linder Cuccia at Trial (ECF #494; D.Ct. #27) be
DENIED IN PART as to her invocation of the Fifth Amendment but otherwise
GRANTED IN PART, permitting the Plaintiffs to use her testimony concerning, inter
alia, the status of her employment with the Debtor and the benefits and paychecks
she received from the Debtor.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Introduce
Deposition Testimony of Fred B. Morgan, III at Trial (ECF #495; D.Ct. #28) be
GRANTED, that the Defendants be allowed to counter-designate testimony from the
deposition for their own use at trial as set out in Exhibit A to their Opposition (ECF
#527-1), and that the Plaintiffs’ own designations be allowed as set out in their Reply
(ECF #560) and the Exhibit thereto (ECF #560-1).
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Introduce
Deposition Testimony of Bonnie Higgins at Trial (ECF #496; D.Ct. #29) be
GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Defendants’ Motion to Introduce
Deposition Testimony of Daniel Cadle (ECF #506; D.Ct. #43) be GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Non-Bank Defendants’ Motion in
Limine to Exclude Evidence Inconsistent with Plaintiffs’ Complaint at Trial (ECF
#492) (D.Ct. #25) be GRANTED IN PART insofar as the Plaintiffs seek to recover
damages under their Partner Distributions claim for distributions before 2009 or
after 2010 but otherwise DENIED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Non-Bank Defendants’ Motion in
Limine to Exclude Evidence Sought to Be Introduced at Trial for an Improper
Purpose (ECF #493; D.Ct. #26) be GRANTED IN PART with respect to the 2009
misdemeanor conviction, the 2011 Department of the Interior letter, and Roberta
Linder Cuccia’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment, but otherwise DENIED IN
PART.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine
Regarding Cadle’s Acquisition of the Loans and Other Litigation (ECF #501; D.Ct.
#34) be GRANTED except to the extent the Plaintiffs seek to introduce evidence of
the Defendants’ attempted purchase of the debt.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine to
Bar Evidence Relating to Enterprise Insolvency, Including Expert Testimony, at Trial
(ECF #502; D.Ct. #35) be GRANTED IN PART with respect to testimony regarding
the “group insolvency” theory in connection with the Louisiana revocatory action but
otherwise DENIED IN PART.

In re: Linder Oil Company, A Partnership; Lucy G. Sikes, Chapter 7 Trustee and the Cadle Company, II, Inc. v. Crescent Bank & Trust; Consolidated Reserves Company, L.C.; Roger D. Linder; G. Miles Biggs, Jr.; Louisiana General Oil Company; and Linder Energy Company

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