Jane Street Holding, LLC v. Aspen American Insurance

 14-392 Jane Street Holding, LLC v. Aspen Am. Ins. Co. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 4 on the 16th day of October, two thousand fourteen. 5 6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, 7 GUIDO CALABRESI, 8 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, 9 Circuit Judges. 10 11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 12 Jane Street Holding, LLC, 13 Plaintiff-Appellant, 14 15 -v.- 14-392 16 17 Aspen American Insurance Company, 18 Defendant-Appellee. 19 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 20 21 FOR APPELLANT: ADAM S. ZIFFER (with Robin L. 22 Cohen, Burt M. Garson, on the 23 brief), Kasowitz, Benson, Torres 24 & Friedman, New York, New York. 25 26 FOR APPELLEE: WAYNE R. GLAUBINGER (with Hilary 27 M. Henkind, on the brief), Mound 1 1 Cotton Wollan & Greengrass, New 2 York, New York. 3 4 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District 5 Court for the Southern District of New York (Sweet, J.). 6 7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 8 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be 9 AFFIRMED. 10 11 Jane Street Holding, LLC, appeals from the judgment of 12 the United States District Court for the Southern District 13 of New York (Sweet, J.), granting summary judgment in favor 14 of defendant-appellee Aspen American Insurance Company. On 15 appeal, Jane Street argues principally that the district 16 court misconstrued the insurance policy at the center of 17 this litigation. We assume the parties’ familiarity with 18 the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues 19 presented for review. 20 21 On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy destroyed Jane 22 Street’s $2.2 million generator in the basement of One New 23 York Plaza. Aspen insured Jane Street against flood damage. 24 The dispute is whether the policy insured Jane Street’s 25 property in the basement. 26 27 The policy defined the “covered location” as Jane 28 Street’s corporate headquarters, specifically: “One New York 29 Plaza, 33rd Floor, New York NY 10004.” Jane Street 30 submitted a claim, but Aspen refused to pay any more than 31 $50,000--the policy’s sublimit for property not in a covered 32 location. Jane Street sued Aspen for breach of contract, 33 breach of fiduciary duty, and bad faith. The district court 34 granted Aspen’s motion for summary judgment as to all three 35 causes of action, on the ground that the policy covered 36 property only on the 33rd floor and did not extend to the 37 basement where the generator had been located. Jane Street 38 appeals the district court’s judgment with respect to the 39 breach of contract and bad faith claims. 40 41 We review de novo both a district court’s grant of 42 summary judgment, see, e.g., Terwilliger v. Terwilliger, 206 43 F.3d 240, 244 (2d Cir. 2000), and its interpretation of a 44 contract, see, e.g., Capital Ventures Int’l v. Republic of 45 Argentina, 552 F.3d 289, 293 (2d Cir. 2009). Summary 46 judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there 47 is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 2 1 is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 2 P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 3 323 (1986). 4 5 The insurance policy defined the covered property as 6 Jane Street’s “business personal property in buildings or 7 structures at a ‘covered location’ or in the open (or in 8 vehicles) on or within 1,000 feet of a ‘covered location.’” 9 The contract’s definition of a “covered location” explains 10 that “if the Scheduled Locations Endorsement is added to 11 this policy, ‘covered location’ means a location that is 12 described on the Location Schedule.” Jane Street and Aspen 13 did include a Scheduled Locations Endorsement to the policy, 14 and it describes the “Covered Location” as “One New York 15 Plaza, 33rd Floor, New York NY 10004.” The text preceding 16 that location reads: “Coverage provided by the [policy] 17 applies only to the ‘covered locations’ described below.” 18 Although the policy insured against “direct physical loss” 19 to Jane Street’s property “at locations that are not 20 described on the Locations Schedule,” the policy limited 21 Aspen’s obligations to $50,000 “in any one occurrence for 22 each unscheduled location.” 23 24 The plain meaning of the policy is that: property 25 inside a building or structure that is on the 33rd floor of 26 One New York Plaza is covered (along with property in the 27 open, or in vehicles, on or within 1,000 feet thereof), 28 while for all other property a $50,000 limit applies.1 Cf. 29 T&G Knitwear Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 548 N.Y.S.2d 29, 30 (App. 30 Div. 1989) (holding that an insurance policy’s definition of 31 a covered location as the second and third floors of a 32 building rendered property in the sixth floor of the 33 building “not in an insured location”). Jane Street’s 34 flood-damaged generator was located in One New York Plaza’s 35 (unscheduled) basement and not on the building’s (covered) 36 33rd floor. The policy required no more of Aspen than the 37 $50,000 payment that it tendered to Jane Street. 38 39 Having concluded that the policy did not entitle Jane 40 Street to more than what Aspen has paid, we agree with the 41 district court that Jane Street’s claim of bad faith is 1 This straightforward interpretation applies with equal force to the policy’s Flood Endorsement, which “cover[s] direct physical loss to covered property at ‘covered locations’ caused by ‘flood’” (emphasis added). 3 1 without merit. See Sukup v. State of N.Y., 227 N.E.2d 842, 2 844 (N.Y. 1967) (holding that, to support a claim of bad 3 faith, the insured must demonstrate that “no reasonable 4 carrier would, under the given facts” have denied coverage). 5 6 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in Jane 7 Street’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of 8 the district court. 9 10 FOR THE COURT: 11 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK 12 4