Janna Schudde, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Dream Games Teknoloji Anonim Şirketi

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 3 4 JANNA SCHUDDE, individually and on Case No. C24-1215RSM 5 behalf of all others similarly situated, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS 6 Plaintiff, FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 7 v. 8 DREAM GAMES TEKNOLOJİ ANONİM 9 ŞİRKETİ, a foreign corporation, 10 Defendant. 11 12 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Dream Games Teknoloji Anonim 13 Şirketi’s Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2), 12(b)(6), 14 and 9(b). Dkt. #18. Plaintiff Janna Schudde opposes with two briefs after receiving leave of 15 16 the Court to conduct jurisdictional discovery. Dkts. #24 and 41. The Court has determined 17 that it can rule without oral argument. 18 The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant is the developer, publisher, owner, 19 operator, and proprietor of a game called “Royal Match.” Dkt. #17 at 2. Defendant is a 20 Turkish mobile gaming company with offices in Istanbul and London. Id. at 9. Consumers 21 22 play Royal Match on Apple iOS devices, Android devices, and Amazon devices. Through 23 Royal Match, Defendant offers several “match-3” or “tile-matching” games, where the player 24 usually completes levels by matching three (or more) of the same type of object in a line. 25 There is allegedly an element of chance in such games. “Coins” in Royal Match can be 26 27 purchased to extend game play. Id. at 3. These and other facts form the basis for Plaintiff’s 28 claim that Defendant’s game violates certain Washington State anti-gambling laws. The Amended Complaint states that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Dream Games 1 2 Teknoloji Anonim Şirketi “because it conducts substantial business and directs its activities 3 into this District, including activities that form the basis for the claims here, and a substantial 4 part of the acts and omissions complained of occurred in this District.” Id. at 5. It goes on to 5 allege that “[o]n information and belief, Defendant localizes Royal Match for each market 6 where it is distributed, including the United States,” and that “Defendant has sold millions of 7 8 dollars of virtual items to thousands of Washington residents, most of which are repeat 9 purchases by the same customers, by contracting with the customers to sell virtual coins and 10 other goods in exchange for legal tender.” Id. at 6. Defendant allegedly “has the capability to 11 determine where its customers are from, including whether purchases are being made from 12 13 Washington.” Id. The Amended Complaint also alleges that Defendant contracted with 14 Amazon, headquartered in this District, and uses Amazon Web Services for operating Royal 15 Match. The Amended Complaint includes several other references to contacts between 16 Defendant and various businesses and individuals located in the United States. See id. at 7–8. 17 A. Motion to Dismiss for lack of Personal Jurisdiction under 12(b)(2) 18 19 When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears 20 the burden of demonstrating that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant. Pebble Beach 21 Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154, (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs. v. 22 Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2003)). However, this demonstration 23 requires that the plaintiff “make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand 24 25 the motion to dismiss.” Id. (citing Doe v. Unocal, 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal 26 citations omitted)). Moreover, for the purpose of this demonstration, the court resolves all 27 disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff. Id. 28 The general rule is that personal jurisdiction over a defendant is proper if it is permitted 1 2 by a long-arm statute and if the exercise of that jurisdiction does not violate federal due process. 3 Id. Washington’s general long-arm statute encompasses acts committed personally “or through 4 an agent.” RCW § 4.28.185. Jurisdiction can be established by general or specific jurisdiction. 5 The Ninth Circuit relies on a three-prong test for analyzing a claim of specific personal 6 jurisdiction: (1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or 7 8 consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof, or perform some act by which 9 he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby 10 invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of 11 or relates to the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must 12 13 comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable. Schwarzenegger v. 14 Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802, (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 15 1421 (9th Cir. 1987)). The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of the 16 test. Id. If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either of these prongs, personal jurisdiction is not 17 established in the forum state. If the plaintiff succeeds in satisfying both of the first two 18 19 prongs, the burden then shifts to the defendant to “present a compelling case” that the exercise 20 of jurisdiction would not be reasonable. Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 21 462, 476-78, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985)). “A showing that a defendant 22 purposefully availed himself of the privilege of doing business in a forum state typically 23 consists of evidence of the defendant’s actions in the forum, such as executing or performing a 24 25 contract there.” Id. The reasonableness determination requires the consideration of several 26 factors, including (1) the extent of the defendant’s purposeful interjection into the forum state, 27 (2) the burden on the defendant in defending in the forum, (3) the extent of the conflict with the 28 sovereignty of the defendant’s state, (4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, (5) 1 2 the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy, (6) the importance of the forum to the 3 plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief, and (7) the existence of an alternative 4 forum. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2000), 5 holding modified by Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 6 1199 (9th Cir. 2006). 7 8 For claims sounding in tort, like the claims here, courts most often employ a “purposeful 9 direction” analysis. To analyze whether the tort was purposefully directed to the forum state, 10 the Court looks to the “Calder effects” test, which “focuses on the forum in which the 11 defendant’s actions were felt, whether or not the actions themselves occurred within the forum.” 12 13 Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1228 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Yahoo! 14 Inc., 433 F.3d at 1206). 15 The effects test is drawn from the Supreme Court’s decision in Calder v. Jones, 465 16 U.S. 783, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1984). There, the Court found that a California 17 Superior Court had specific personal jurisdiction over the National Enquirer, a Florida 18 19 corporation with its principal place of business in Florida. The newspaper’s reporter and editor 20 also resided in Florida, but their allegedly libelous story was distributed in California, and was 21 about a well-known actress who resided in California and was alleged to have injured her 22 causing emotional distress and harming her reputation. Id. at 784-86. The Supreme Court 23 reasoned that the defendants’ intentional and allegedly tortious actions “were expressly aimed at 24 25 California,” that the defendants knew of the article’s “potentially devastating impact” upon the 26 actress, and that the “brunt of that injury would be felt [by the actress] in the State in which she 27 lives and works.” Id. at 789-90. Under those circumstances, the defendants “must ‘reasonably 28 anticipate being haled into court [in California]’ to answer for the truth of the statements made 1 2 in [their] article.” Id. at 790 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 3 297 (1980)). 4 The purposeful direction test requires that the defendant (1) commit an intentional act 5 that is (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, and (3) which causes harm that the defendant 6 knows will be suffered in the forum state. Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 7 8 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010). This test does not require that the defendant be physically 9 present in the forum state, as “it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a 10 substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across 11 state lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which business is 12 13 conducted.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985). “So long as a 14 commercial actor’s efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ toward residents of another State, [the 15 Supreme Court has] consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can 16 defeat personal jurisdiction there.” Id. 17 “An interactive platform ‘expressly aims’ its wrongful conduct toward a forum state 18 19 when its contacts are its ‘own choice’ and not ‘random, isolated, or fortuitous,’ even if that 20 platform cultivates a ‘nationwide audience[] for commercial gain.’” Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., 135 21 F.4th 739, 758 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 22 351, 359, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 209 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2021)); Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 23 647 F.3d 1218, 1230 (9th Cir. 2011). 24 25 Plaintiff argues that “[u]nder Briskin, Defendant clearly expressly aimed its conduct at 26 Washington when it executed millions of transactions with over a hundred thousand individuals 27 it knew to be in Washington.” Dkt. #41 at 5. 28 The Court agrees. Resolving all disputed facts in favor of the Plaintiff, the Court finds 1 2 that her allegations connecting this Defendant with consumers in Washington State are 3 sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s jurisdictional 4 discovery has allowed her to sufficiently allege that Defendant has knowledge of users’ 5 locations at the time of in-game purchases via IP addresses. See Dkt. #42 (“Salik Supp. 6 Decl.”), ¶¶ 3 and 4; Exs. 2-3. IP addresses are sufficiently reliable to put Defendant on notice 7 8 of user locations. See Wilson v. Playtika, Ltd., 349 F.Supp.3d 1028, 1036 (W. D. Wash. 2018) 9 (“it can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge of its user base because it is aware 10 that individuals with Washington IP addresses have purchased virtual coins.”). Plaintiff has 11 sufficiently demonstrated that Defendant engages in millions of in-app transactions with 12 13 Washingtonians via its agent Apple. See Dkt. #41 at 10. Plaintiff has also sufficiently 14 demonstrated that Defendant “had control over whether Washingtonians would view 15 Defendant’s advertisements, as its ad partners allow geotargeting by state.” Id. (citing Dkts. 16 #25-8 through #25-11; Salik Supp. Decl., Exs. 4-6.). 17 The Court agrees with Plaintiff that under Briskin Defendant can no longer argue that its 18 19 Washington activities were not express aiming because those activities were equally directed to 20 all states. See Dkt. #41 at 11 (citing 2025 WL 1154075, at *13). 21 After considering the above factors, the Court finds that exercising jurisdiction over 22 Defendant would be reasonable under the circumstances of this case, given the significant 23 revenue Defendant has generated from Washington residents, Defendant’s overall business 24 25 model, and Washington State’s interest in the legal issues at stake. 26 Given all of the above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) will be 27 denied. 28 B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim under 12(b)(6) 1 2 Defendant moves to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s First Claim is brought 3 under RCW § 4.24.070 for recovery of money lost at gambling. That section provides: 4 “All persons losing money or anything of value at or on any illegal 5 gambling games shall have a cause of action to recover from the dealer or player winning, or from the proprietor for whose benefit 6 such game was played or dealt, or such money or things of value won, the amount of the money or the value of the thing so lost.” 7 8 RCW § 4.24.070. 9 Defendant argues that “Royal Match is a puzzle game, not a gambling game.” Dkt. #18 10 at 22. Defendant states “Plaintiff did not stake or risk anything when she played Royal Match. 11 She claims to have used coins to obtain lives which were then wagered to play the game.” Id. 12 13 (citing FAC ¶¶ 140-42.). Defendant goes on in this fashion. Defendant also argues that 14 Plaintiff did not lose anything: 15 Although Plaintiff alleges that she somehow “wagered” and “lost 16 over $900 at Royal Match’s games of chance” (FAC ¶ 112), she admits elsewhere that these coins actually were purchased and 17 used “to continue playing[.]” FAC ¶¶ 70-73. Plaintiff did not “wager” $900, she spent $900 in exchange for playing a mobile 18 game and receiving digital items, which she used in-game to 19 enhance her gameplay. 20 Id. at 24. 21 In making a 12(b)(6) assessment, the court accepts all facts alleged in the complaint as 22 true and makes all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Baker v. 23 Riverside County Office of Educ., 584 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). 24 25 However, the court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion couched as a factual 26 allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 27 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 28 true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 678. This requirement is met 1 2 when the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 3 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The complaint need not include 4 detailed allegations, but it must have “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 5 recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Absent 6 facial plausibility, a plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed. Id. at 570. 7 8 Defendant repeatedly argues facts contrary to the allegations. The allegations of the 9 Amended Complaint, taken as true, clearly demonstrate that Plaintiff staked things of value 10 within Royal Match and lost money doing so. For example, Plaintiff pleads: 11 Players of Royal Match stake or risk something of value when 12 playing a level in Royal Match. Specifically, players stake or risk a 13 life in Royal Match to play a level or coins to continue playing a level after they have exhausted their moves. The levels in Royal 14 Match are a contest of chance. If a player wins the level in Royal Match, they retain the life they staked or risked and win additional 15 coins, which can be converted into lives. If a player loses that 16 game of chance, they lose the life and coins they staked or risked. This distinguishes Royal Match from traditional videogames, 17 where a user expends a life or coin to play a game and that life or coin is lost irrespective of the outcome of the game. In Royal 18 Match, users may keep their life and gain more things of value 19 (coins), or lose their life/coins, depending on the outcome of Royal Match’s games of chance. 20 Dkt. #17 at 12. The Amended Complaint states, “Royal Match is akin to real world casino 21 22 games known as ‘I-Slots’ or interactive slots, which are recognized forms of gambling that 23 allows players to influence the outcome through choices and gameplay.” Id. at 13. Specific to 24 the named Plaintiff, the Amended Complaint states: 25 In 2024, Plaintiff began playing Royal Match through her Apple 26 device after viewing one of Defendant’s advertisements in 27 Washington. Plaintiff downloaded Royal Match from her residence in Washington. After losing her initial allocation of free lives and 28 coins, she began purchasing lives and coins from Defendant for 1 use in Royal Match…. 2 Overall, Plaintiff has wagered and lost over $900 at Royal Match’s 3 games of chance. She lost the lives and coins (which she converted to lives) she purchased from Defendant by wagering them in Royal 4 Match’s games of chance. 5 Id. at 18. 6 Defendant argues that its game is different than what is alleged. But the Court must 7 8 accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true for purposes of this Motion and make all 9 inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Defendants’ arguments are best 10 saved for summary judgment or even trial. 11 Defendant next argues that the Amended Complaint fails to plead a violation of the 12 13 Washington Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”). “To prevail in a private CPA claim, the 14 plaintiff must prove (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) occurring in trade or 15 commerce, (3) affecting the public interest, (4) injury to a person's business or property, and (5) 16 causation.” Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 166 Wn.2d 27, 37, 204 P.3d 885, 889 17 (2009). “A plaintiff need not show the act in question was intended to deceive, only that it had 18 19 the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public.” Id. at 894. The CPA is to be 20 “liberally construed that its beneficial purposes may be served.” RCW 19.86.920. “The first 21 CPA element may be predicated on a per se violation of a statute or an unfair act or practice not 22 regulated by statute but in violation of public interest.” Greenberg v. Amazon.com, Inc., 3 23 Wn.3d 434, 454 (2024). “If a defendant’s act or practice is not per se unfair, then the plaintiff 24 25 must show the conduct is unfair ‘under a case-specific analysis of those terms.’” Id. “By 26 broadly prohibiting ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or 27 28 commerce,’ the legislature intended to provide sufficient flexibility to reach unfair or deceptive 1 2 conduct that inventively evades regulation.” Panag, 166 Wn.2d at 49. 3 Plaintiff points out: 4 In addition to violating Washington’s gambling law (a per se 5 violation under CPA), the FAC alleges that Defendant engages in unfair case-specific conduct by (1) manipulating the odds in 6 [Royal Match], and (2) advertising purported time-limited sales that are not actually limited in time. As a threshold matter, 7 Defendant’s arguments primarily dispute whether it engages in the 8 underlying conduct, which cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. 9 10 Dkt. #24 at 25. The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Accepting all facts alleged in the complaint as 11 true for purposes of this Motion, and making all inferences in the light most favorable to the 12 non-moving party, this claim is plausible and adequately pleaded. 13 Over a short couple of pages, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining claims 14 for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and negligence, essentially arguing 15 16 again that the facts are not what Plaintiff pleads them to be. See Dkt. #18 at 28–29. The Court 17 has already explained that this kind of argument ignores the applicable legal standard for a Rule 18 12(b)(6) motion. Defendant’s briefing on these claims is otherwise lacking. The strength of 19 these claims can be tested at a later date. 20 C. Remaining Issues 21 22 Defendant moves to dismiss claims alleging fraud for a failure to state these claims with 23 particularity as required by Rule 9(b). The Court has reviewed the Amended Complaint and 24 finds that Plaintiff includes a screenshot and describes how she was deceived by allegedly false 25 advertising within Royal Match offering a sale with a countdown timer, only for the same or 26 27 similar sale to appear shortly thereafter. This allegedly happened in 2024. Considering the 28 nature of Defendant’s product, this satisfies Rule 9(b). See Moore v. Mars Petcare US, Inc., 966 F.3d 1007, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Plaintiffs’ complaint satisfies the Rule 9(b) 1 2 heightened pleading standard in alleging the basic premise of what is false or misleading about 3 a statement, and why it is false.”). The potential for never-ending sales advertising to violate 4 Washington State law is something that is currently being litigated in many cases before this 5 Court. Rule 9(b) is satisfied here. 6 Finally, the Court declines to review evidence external to the Amended Complaint or to 7 8 take judicial notice of such. The Court will deny Defendant’s Motion asking the Court to take 9 judicial notice of (1) a website showing the Terms of Service (“Terms”) for Royal Match, (2) 10 two YouTube videos, (3) an Amazon Web Services webpage, (4) a webpage containing 11 Apples’ terms of service, and (4) an iPhone loaded with a version of Royal Match. The Court 12 13 finds these exhibits irrelevant for the Court’s reasoning above and inappropriate for review at 14 this stage, generally agreeing with the arguments in Plaintiff’s opposition brief. See Dkt. #26. 15 Having reviewed the relevant pleadings, the declarations and exhibits attached thereto, 16 and the remainder of the record, the Court hereby finds and ORDERS that Defendant Dream 17 Games Teknoloji Anonim Şirketi’s Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint pursuant 18 19 to Rules 12(b)(2), 12(b)(6), and 9(b), Dkt. #18, is DENIED. Defendant’s Request for Judicial 20 Notice, Dkt. #20, is DENIED. 21 DATED this 10th day of November, 2025. 22 A 23 24 RICARDO S. MARTINEZ 25 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 26 27 28