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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS PEORIA DIVISION JAYMOâS SAUCES LLC, ) ) Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant, ) v. ) ) Case No. 1:19-cv-01026 THE WENDYâS COMPANY, ) ) Defendant/Counterclaim-Plaintiff, ) ) and ) ) QUALITY IS OUR RECIPE LLC, ) ) Counterclaim-Plaintiff. ) ORDER & OPINION This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant/Counterclaim-Plaintiff The Wendyâs Company (Wendyâs) and Counterclaim-Plaintiff Quality is Our Recipe LLC (QIOR). (Doc. 81). The Motion has been fully briefed and is therefore ripe for review. For the following reasons, the Motion is granted. BACKGROUND1 This case involves a dispute over use of a term for which both Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant Jaymoâs Sauces LLC (Jaymoâs) and Wendyâs2 claim trademark rights. In September 2015, Jaymoâs owner, Jamison Shefts, âconceived the idea of branding his sauces as âSâAwesomeâ while conducting a product demonstrationâ during which a little girl said, â âthis sauce is awesome, itâs SâAwesome.â â (Doc. 103 at 4). The precise date on which Jaymoâs began using the term âSâAwesomeâ is disputed, but the parties appear to agree Jaymoâs has used the term since January 2016. (See doc. 106 at 3â4).3 In January 2019, days before filing the instant lawsuit, Jaymoâs obtained an Illinois state trademark for the term âSâAwesome.â (Doc. 103-4). QIOR owns a federal trademark registration for the mark âItâs Saucesome!â with a filing date of December 7, 2010, and a registration date of July 5, 2011. (Doc. 81 at 2).4 QIOR also owns a federal trademark registration for the mark âSide of 1 Consistent with the summary judgment standard, the following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated. Additionally, the facts in this section are limited to those necessary to resolve the instant Motion. 2 QIOR is an entity affiliated with Wendyâs (doc. 76 at 6), so the Court will refer to them collectively unless otherwise specified, consistent with the memoranda. 3 Wendyâs repeatedly cites Jaymoâs Illinois Certificate of Registration of the term âSâAwesomeâ (doc. 103-4), which indicates a first-use date of January 12, 2016, to refute Jaymoâs allegation it began using the term in 2015. (Doc. 106 at 3). Wendyâs does not expressly dispute Jaymoâs allegations it was using the term âSâAwesomeâ in January 2016 but rather disputes its characterization of its products as â âSâAwesomeâ Sauces.â (Doc. 106 at 3â4). 4 Jaymoâs alleges QIOR purchased this trademark from an entity who purchased it from the original owner; the original owner sold âapproximately 1,500 bottles of sauce from 2010â2017 and stopped supplying stores with its product displaying that mark SâAwesomeâ with a filing date of July 11, 2017, and a registration date of April 9, 2019. (Doc. 81 at 2). The terms âSaucesomeâ and âSâAwesomeâ are phonetically identical. (Doc. 81 at 3). Wendyâs has used both marks in connection with the same sauce and was using the phrase âItâs Saucesomeâ in October 2017.5 (Docs. 72 at 10; 76 at 6). Jaymoâs filed suit against Wendyâs for its use of the phrase âSide of SâAwesomeâ. The Complaint asserts five claims: (1) Illinois trademark infringement under 765 ILCS 1036/60; (2) Illinois dilution under 765 ILCS 1036/65; (3) federal trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (4) federal dilution under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); and (5) a claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505 et seq.6 (Doc. 72 at 13â19). To remedy these claims, Jaymoâs seeks injunctive relief, disgorgement of profits, actual damages, punitive damages, federal and state statutory damages, and attorneyâs fees. (Doc. 72 at 20â21). In response, Wendyâs maintains Jaymoâs claims are barred by the doctrine of laches and also that Jaymoâs Illinois dilution claim is barred by federal law, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(6). (Doc. 76 at 12). Wendyâs, along with its affiliate QIOR, further asserts more than a yearâ before QIOR purchased of the mark. (Docs. 103 at 11; 106 at 8). Wendyâs objects to the evidence cited for this allegation, asserting the evidence is not authenticated; it alternatively admits the allegation but maintains it is immaterial. (Doc. 106 at 8). 5 Wendyâs date(s) of first use of the terms âSaucesomeâ and âSâAwesomeâ is disputed. 6 The Complaint does not identify which provision of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Trade Practices Act Wendyâs is alleged to have violated; the only specific provision cited therein is 815 ILCS 505-1, the definitions provision. (Doc. 72 at 18â 19). eight counterclaims against Jaymoâs in the alternative7 based on Jaymoâs alleged infringement of QIORâs federally registered trademarks of the phrases âItâs Saucesomeâ and âSide of SâAwesomeâ (one set of the following four claims per mark): (1) federal trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (Counts I, V); (2) federal unfair competition (Counts II, VI); (3) common law and state law trademark infringement (Counts III, VII); and (4) common law and state law unfair competition (Counts IV, VIII).8 To remedy their claims, Wendyâs and QIOR seek injunctive relief, disgorgement of profits, attorneyâs fees, costs, and an order pursuant to 765 ILCS 1036/45 invalidating Jaymoâs Illinois state trademark for the term âSâAwesome.â (Doc. 76 at 21â22). In the instant Motion, Wendyâs and QIOR move for summary judgment on each of Jaymoâs claims. (Doc. 81). LEGAL STANDARD âThe court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.â Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). âA genuine dispute of material fact exists âif the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.â â Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting 7 According to Wendyâs, its counterclaims only come into play âif the fact-finder determines that there is a likelihood of confusion or any other violation of rights based on the partiesâ respective uses.â (Doc. 76 at 12). 8 Wendyâs and QIOR similarly do not identify the specific provisions of Illinois law at issue with respect to their unfair competition claims or their state law trademark infringement claims. (Doc. 76 at 19â21). Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The record is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and the Court must draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the nonmovantâs favor. BRC Rubber & Plastics, Inc. v. Continental Carbon Co., 900 F.3d 529, 536 (7th Cir. 2018). Nevertheless, â[t]he nonmovant bears the burden of demonstrating that such genuine issue of material fact exists,â particularly where, as here, the nonmovant bears the burden of proof on one or more issues at trial.9 Aregood v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 904 F.3d 475, 482 (7th Cir. 2018); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). âThe parties must support their assertions that a fact is disputed or cannot be genuinely disputed by citing to admissible evidence in the record.â Horton v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941, 948 (7th Cir. 2018). DISCUSSION Qui prior est tempore potior est jure.10 Courts considering trademark disputes often resort to this legal maxim to answer the ultimate question: who has priority in a disputed mark? See 2 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 16:1 (5th ed.). Here, the partiesâ âIllinois statutory and common law trademark infringement and unfair competition claims are based on the same set of facts and analyzed under the same legal standards as [their] Lanham Act claims.â SportFuel, Inc. v. PepsiCo, 9 It is Jaymoâs burden to prove it owns common law trademark rights in the term âSâAwesomeâ. See Ty Inc. v. Softbellyâs Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 530 (7th Cir. 2003). 10 âHe who is earlier in time is stronger in law.â priority of time, Oxford Reference, https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100346573 (last visited Sept. 30, 2021). Inc., No. 16-C-7868, 2018 WL 2984830, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 2018), affâd, 932 F.3d 589 (7th Cir. 2019). Jaymoâs must therefore ultimately prove â(1) its mark is protectable and (2) the defendantsâ use of the mark is likely to cause confusion among consumers.â Anago Franchising, Inc. v. IMTN, Inc., 477 Fed. Appâx 383, 385 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 638 (7th Cir. 2001)). âNot every single word, phrase, design or picture that appears on a label, webpage or in an advertisement qualifies as a protectable mark[.]â 1 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 3:4 (5th ed.). âWords or phrases function as trademarks âwhen [they are] used by a source of a product to identify itself to the public as the source of its product and to create in the public consciousness an awareness of the uniqueness of the source and of its products.â â SportFuel, Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 932 F.3d 589, 596 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Sorensen v. WD-40 Co., 792 F.3d 712, 722 (7th Cir. 2015)). âThe party seeking to establish appropriation of a trademark must show first, adoption, and second, âuse in a way sufficiently public to identify or distinguish the marked goods in an appropriate segment of the public mind as those of [the adopter of the mark].â â Johnny Blastoff, Inc. v. Los Angeles Rams Football Co., 188 F.3d 427, 433â34 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting New W. Corp. v. NYM Co. of California, 595 F.2d 1194, 1200 (9th Cir. 1979)). Accordingly, the threshold question here is whether Jaymoâs used the term âSâAwesomeâ as a trademark, an issue hotly disputed by Wendyâs.11 11 Wendyâs places much stock in its federal registration of the phrases âItâs Saucesomeâ and âSide of SâAwesome.â However, this argument runs thin. âNeither The Seventh Circuit has directed courts to look âto multiple factors in how a defendant employs a challenged term or phrase to determine whether it serves as a source indicator and therefore is used as a trademark.â Id. (citing Quaker Oats, 978 F.2d at 954); see also Johnny Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 433 (âThe determination of whether a party has established protectable rights in a trademark is made on a case by case basis, considering the totality of the circumstances.â). A wide variety of sources may demonstrate âuseâ sufficient for public identification of a mark, including advertising brochures, catalogs, newspaper ads, and articles in newspapers and trade publications, as well as in media outlets such as television and radio. So long as the trademarked goods or services are actually provided through or in connection with it, a website that bears a trademark may constitute a bona fide use in commerce. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Nutraceutical Corp., 835 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). McCarthy also provides instructive insight on the relevant factors for consideration: Some of the common markers of whether a word, phrase or picture is being used as a trademark are: larger-sized print, all capital letters or initial capitals, distinctive or different print style, color, and prominent position on label or in advertising. There must be something which differentiates the designation claimed as a trademark from all the surrounding material. In addition, a designation is not likely to be application for nor registration of a mark at the federal level wipes out the prior nonregistered, common law rights of others. The nonregistered rights of a senior user continue and are not erased by the later federal registration of a junior user. This is true even if the registration has achieved âincontestableâ status.â 2 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 16:18.50 (5th ed.); see also Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 954 (7th Cir. 1992) (â[T]rademark rights derive from the use of a mark in commerce and not from mere registration of the mark[.]â). perceived as a mark of origin unless it is repetitively used, as opposed to only infrequent or sporadic appearance. 1 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 3:4 (5th ed.) (internal citations omitted). To establish trademark use, â[i]t is enough . . . if the article with the adopted brand upon it is actually a vendible article in the market, with intent by the proprietor to continue its production and sale. It is not essential that its use has been long continued, or that the article should be widely known, or should have attained great reputation.â S.C. Johnson, 835 F.3d at 666 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, the inquiry is focused on how the alleged mark is used. The ultimate question is: âHas the designation claimed as a protectable mark been used in such a way as to make such a visual impression that the viewer would see it as a symbol of origin separate and apart from everything else?â 1 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 3:4 (5th ed.). Wendyâs argument for summary judgment boils down to the notion that Jaymoâs has submitted insufficient evidence to render a triable issue of fact as to whether Jaymoâs was using âSâAwesomeâ as a trademark.12 To submit this issue to a factfinder, there must be more than âa scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffâs position.â Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252. The Court must therefore consider âwhether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is 12 If Jaymoâs were to establish trademark use, the question would then become whether that use established common law trademark rights prior to Wendyâs national priority date(s). The evidence submitted by the parties is thus largely focused on the time period prior to Wendyâs application for federal trademark registration of the phrase âSide of SâAwesomeâ in July 2017. entitled to a verdictââwhether there is [evidence] upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.â Jd. (quoting Schuylkill & Dauphin Imp. Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871)) (emphasis in original). Jaymoâs argues it has repeatedly and consistently marketed its product as âSâAwesome Sauceâ. In support of this position, Jaymoâs first sauces its argument with its product labels: >» ââââââ | Sean TER Vaysâ vs NT | ose Wee es mea Sie bl i | = &L eae ett fe) paes F (Doc. 103-8). According to Jaymoâs, it has sold âthousands upon thousands of bottles of its âSâAwesomeâ sauce beginning in 2015â in several midwestern states.!* (Doc. 103 at 13). Jaymoâs further argues it sells its sauces âin live, in[-]person, grocery store demonstrations across the Midwest.â (Doc. 103 at 13). Wendyâs maintains this is 13 This argument misses the mark; â[e]vidence of actual sales is not necessary to establishâ trademark use. Johnny Blastoff, 188 F.3d at 434. Rather, the proper focus is on how the alleged mark is used and presented. insufficient to prove trademark use, arguing the placement of the term on Jaymoâs product label does not evince the intent for the term to be source identifying, particularly in comparison to the presentation of the house mark: âJaymoâs Sauces.â (Doc. 81 at 9-10). The Seventh Circuitâs decisions in Quaker Oats and SportFuel are useful bookends on this point. In Quaker Oats, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial courtâs summary-judgment decision that the phrase âThirst Aidâ was used as a trademark in the slogan âGatorade is Thirst Aidâ, which was widely used to market Gatorade products. In so deciding, the court reasoned: Quakerâs ads do not simply use the words âThirst Aidâ in a sentence describing Gatorade, but as an âattention-getting symbol.â In many of the ads, the words âThirst Aidâ appear more prominently and in larger type than does the word âGatorade.â Further, given the rhyming quality of âGatoradeâ and âThirst Aid,â the association between the two terms created by Quakerâs ads is likely to be very strong, so that âThirst Aidâ appears as part of a memorable slogan that is uniquely associated with Quakerâs product. Quaker presented no evidence that its âThirst Aidâ ads do not have this effect on consumers. Quaker Oats, 978 F.2d at 954 (internal citations omitted). Conversely, the following use of âSports Fuelâ in the slogan âGatorade The Sports Fuel Companyâ was held to not constitute trademark use. 2/c3 = nN esAOieaLN) len Che ae ie 7 \ Eads » te ef âdi a | oan = fi Vesta) 0) eee 20) See) IS kg Tee belie 10 In SportFuel, the district court distinguished Quaker Oats, finding: âIn almost all of the instances in which Gatorade uses the slogan âGatorade The Sports Fuel Company,â the word Gatorade appears above the words âThe Sports Fuel Companyâ and in noticeably largerâand bolderâtype.â SportFuel, 2018 WL 2984830, at *3. âThe fact that the Gatorade house mark appears more prominently than the rest of the slogan reduces the likelihood that Gatorade is using âSports Fuelâ as an indicator of source.â Id. at *4. The district court further found the sparing use of the phrase âSports Fuelâ on product packaging and labeling weighed against a finding of trademark use because â[t]hat is where a consumer would most expect to find source identifiers.â Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning: As in Quaker Oats, here Gatorade used the term âSports Fuelâ in conjunction with its house mark. But the similarities end there. The productsâ individual packaging and displays feature Gatoradeâs house mark and G Bolt logo more prominently. Gatorade rarely uses the term âSports Fuelâ directly on product packaging, except for where the company labeled a âSports Fuel Drinkâ with the term. Instead, it primarily features the slogan on in-store displays and other advertisementsâappearing almost as a subtitle to the house mark. Additionally, the âSports Fuelâ slogan lacks the catchy, rhyming play- on-words at issue in Quaker Oats. Nothing about Gatoradeâs use in this context suggests that consumers would view âSports Fuelâ as a source indicator. SportFuel, 932 F.3d at 598. The instant case bears similarities to both Quaker Oats and SportFuel. Like in Quaker Oats, the term âSâAwesomeâ is a catchy, unique play-on-words. Further, the term âSâAwesomeâ has been depicted on each label on Jaymoâs sauce bottles since at least 2016, which is seemingly similar to the frequency of use in Quaker Oats and dissimilar to that in SportFuel. But unlike in Quaker Oats and similar to SportFuel, the display of the term on the product label is in smaller, less distinct font than Jaymoâs house mark, which appears in highly stylized font and is displayed much more prominently. Significantly, âSâAwesomeâ unlike âThirst Aidâ in Quaker Oats is not tethered to the house mark. In fact, âSâAwesomeââ blends into a smattering of text on the label style used on most of Jaymoâs sauces; only on the discontinued label! does âSâAwesomeâ somewhat stand out due to the âSâ being connected to both âsauceâ and âSâAwesome.â But even then, the terms âsauceâ and âJaymoâsâ are significantly more prominent and attention-grabbing than âSâAwesomeââ. The placement of âSâAwesomeââ on Jaymoâs product label is very similar to that of âinhibitorâ on the label at issue in Sorenson, in which the Seventh Circuit concluded use of the term âinhibitorâ was non-trademark use. 792 F.3d at 724. âWD-40 amsstiein NC. aT We a qc, a Fi ae a 14 Jaymoâs appears to have discontinued use of the label style featured on the leftmost bottle in the picture of the sauce bottles (doc. 103-8)âthe label that most clearly ties âSâAwesomeâ to the house mark in an attention-grabbing mannerâaround the time Wendyâs began using the slogan âSide of S Awesomeâ in September 2017 in favor of the style on the right. (See docs. 78 at 16; 77 at 3). 15 When the Court copied the photo of the WD-40 can appearing in the Seventh Circuitâs opinion and pasted it into this Order and Opinion, the result was very 12 The Sorenson court reasoned: [W]e believe that no reasonable juror looking at a bottle of Long-Term Corrosion Inhibitor could conclude that the word is used as an indicator of source. Compared to other features in the bottleâs design, the word âinhibitorâ is much less prominent or noticeable. It is much smaller than the bright and eye-catching WD-40 shield. It is also smaller than the stylized and colored word âSpecialistâ and the colorful crosshair mark. Finally, the word âinhibitorââwhich is written in relatively small, white typeâis less attention-grabbing than even the word âCorrosion,â which is larger and colored in orange. Due to the wordâs small size, plain color, and non-privileged placement on the bottle, we find that âinhibitorâ is not an âattention-getting symbol,â and does not function as a source indicator. Id. (citations omitted). In attempting to distinguish Sorenson, which dealt with the fair use defense,16 Jaymoâs conflates the âdescriptivenessâ analysis with the âuseâ analysis despite the Seventh Circuitâs explicit words of caution in that regard, see id. at 723 (âIn [Quaker Oats], we cautioned against conflating these two elements of the fair use defense.â). Thus, much of Jaymoâs attempt to distinguish the case is unhelpful. However, as Jaymoâs correctly notes, its position is notably stronger than that of the claimant in Sorenson because âSâAwesomeâ appears on every bottle label, not just one product in a line of similar products. See id. at 723 (âSorensenâs argument would be much blurry. Therefore, the Court found an identical, but clear, picture pasted here on Google Images by searching âwd-40 specialist long term corrosion inhibitorâ. See Google Images, https://www.google.com/search?q=wd- 40+specialist+long+term+corrosion+inhibitor&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS915US915&sxsr f=AOaemvJ0qM1hwtTDJlBzI- 6xWOWYlvETAA:1633019013754&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi CmufxjafzAhUOGFkFHVjXAU4Q_AUoAnoECAIQBA&biw=767&bih=712&dpr=1.2 5#imgrc=LE_zDDgSHoH40M (last visited Sept. 30, 2021). 16 âTo prevail on a fair use defense, a defendant must show that: (1) it did not use the mark as a trademark; (2) the use is descriptive of its goods or services; and (3) it used the mark fairly and in good faith.â Sorensen,792 F.3d at 722. stronger if âinhibitorâ appeared on all of the products in the Specialist line.â). It is similarly stronger than the proponent in SportFuel because, there, âGatorade specifically disclaimed exclusive use of the phrase âThe Sports Fuel Companyâ in its trademark application for âGatorade The Sports Fuel Company,â â 932 F.3d at 598, whereas both parties here claim full trademark rights in the contested term. Nevertheless, the analyses of the placement and characteristics of the contested terms in Sorenson and SportFuel on the respective marketing materials are highly persuasive given the plain similarities to the placement and characteristics of âSâAwesomeâ on Jaymoâs bottle labels. This is especially true in considering the distinctions between Jaymoâs use of âSâAwesomeâ to the use of âThirst Aidâ in Quaker Oats, where the challenged mark was essentially tethered to the house mark and, in some instances, featured even more prominently than the house mark. Application of these analyses compels the finding that the bottle labels themselves fail to give rise to a triable issue of fact on whether Jaymoâs used âSâAwesomeâ as a trademark. While there are inherent attention-grabbing qualities in the unique term âSâAwesomeâ,17 the nonprivileged placement and emphasis on other terms coupled with the comparatively small, plain font of the term fail to adequately demonstrate it is being used as a source indicator on the bottle labels. See Sorenson, 792 F.3d at 724; SportFuel, 932 F.3d at 598; 1 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 3:4 (5th ed.). 17 One could argue the inherent uniqueness of âSâAwesomeâ is similar to that of âSports Fuelâ as a descriptor of Gatorade. Examination of Jaymoâs proffered marketing materials further supports a finding of non-trademark use. According to Jaymoâs, it âmarkets its âSâ Awesomeâ sauce with cardboard product sale advertisements, on its website, on twitter, Instagram, and through paid targeted geographic advertising on Facebook.â (Doc. 103 at 13). In support of these allegations Jaymoâs cites the deposition testimony of its marketing consultant, Travis Platt (hired in early 2017), indicating âSâAwesomeâ sauce was âalways hashtaggedâ (doc. 103 at 13 (citing doc. 103-6 at 13-20)) and provides screenshots of an Instagram post, its Facebook Page, and a Tweet, each of which are pictured below. @ aves. sauces - Fottowing âi Cad Ll s SAWESO Mg om % J } S Vs * + M4 OE pgon'âą 15 ve Like = 5\ Follow @ Share === © Send Message SEN @ @e @ pe Based on the opinion of 27 > orn RUE July 5, 2016 -@ MS / A ra mie RSA Jaymo's Sauces @ = a 5 @iaymos allpurposesauce . = me 4 aa ro âĄâĄ Pies acs elie About Jaymo's SâAwesome Story Photos Over 20 years ago, Jaymo was working as a Reviews eee EXECUTIVE and spent Videos i = Sinn tine Posts Community Community See All 1 ÂŁ1 Invite your frends to ike this Page J wh 1,275 people like this = 1.288 people follow this Py tC XL Nicole Davis Meyer Ives this or has checked i. oe ⥠âĄâĄ = @ 2checkins = About See All Ls 3 7S 2 ae. >> 10023 N Knawviltie Ave 2 = Peoria, lings 61975 Scott Meade Jaymoâs Sauces ae Ww © Tweet 7 Home âĄâĄ Jaymo's Sauces # Explore Why limit yourself? Jaymo's is the perfect sauce for anything. We will be releasing recipes for everything, (2 Notifications yes even fruit! #Grilling #Sauce Messages a [J Bookmarks Sl SE ae UN A. Seat ae tf \\ ââââ aiâ âi= oot ns = =) Lists ap TNS a5 of 15 Pa E gi Phi e+ RB Profile ⥠LYON ee a =p. ⥠a fi Pe © More ae Hy eae CUR ad ate re te a 7:58 PM - Jun 10, 2017 - Twitter Web Client 3Retweets 3 Likes 9 ⥠9 a (Doc. 103-5). These depictions of Jaymoâs social media activity, taken together, do not evince a cohesive effort to hold out its products as âSâAwesome Sauces,â as argued in the Response. To start, the profile picture on each of the social media accounts is a logo reading âJaymoâs Saucesâ in highly stylized white font on a red field; the term âSâAwesomeâ is entirely omitted. The names and handles for each account also omit any mention of âSâAwesomeâ and are instead a combination of âJaymoâs Saucesâ, â@jaymosallpurposesaucesâ, and @jaymos_saucesâ. The screenshot of the Facebook page only features the term âSâAwesomeâ once: in the âAboutâ section heading entitled âJaymoâs SâAwesome Storyâ. It does not feature the phrases âSâAwesome Sauceâ or âAll-Purpose SâAwesome Sauceâ18 at all. The Tweet caption omits the term âSâAwesomeâ entirely, and âSâAwesomeâ is not hashtagged, contrary to Plattâs deposition testimony. The logo-type graphic embedded in the graphic featured in the Tweet does contain the term âSâAwesomeâ, but it is so small that it is barely visible even when the Tweet is sized to fit full screen. Only the Instagram post arguably presents the term âSâAwesomeâ as an attention- grabber, given that it, like âJaymoâs Saucesâ, appears in red font while the other words appear in an orange/yellow color. Nevertheless, the term isâagainâin significantly smaller, plainer font than the house mark. And one Instagram post is insufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to whether the term is operating as a source indicator, even when coupled with the bottle labels here. 18 Nor does it contain the phrase âSâAwesome All Purpose Sauceâ as depicted on the bottle label. Having considered the only evidence proffered by Jaymoâs on the issue of trademark use (see doc. 103 at 12â15),19 the Court finds Jaymoâs has failed to identify a triable issue of fact as to an issue on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. In the Courtâs view, Jaymoâs position is based on the mistaken premise that simply using a term on its product labels and occasionally in marketing materials is sufficient to demonstrate protectable rights in that term. Not so. While presentation of an alleged mark on a product label may, in some cases, establish trademark use, the manner in which Jaymoâs presents the term on its label fails to do so. That coupled with the de minimus use of the term in the proffered marketing materials demonstrates Jaymoâs has not been using the term in a manner sufficient to render it an indicator of source. At the end of the day, â[i]f it takes extended analysis and legalistic argument to attempt to prove that a designation has been used in a trademark sense, then it has not.â 1 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 3:4 (5th ed.). This finding is bolstered by consideration of the evidence proffered by Wendyâs on the issue of use. (Docs. 81-7, 81-9, 81-10). Additional posts on Jaymoâs Instagram page show pictures of in-store displays and demos; the signage does not advertise the products as âSâAwesome Sauceâ or otherwise depict the term âSâAwesome.â (Doc. 81- 9). And while the term is hashtagged in some Instagram posts, none of the captions refer to the product as âSâAwesome Sauce[s]â; rather the product is consistently called âJaymoâs Sauce[s]â. (Doc. 81-9). 19 Excepting a parenthetical stating â(Bottles Photo)â (doc. 103 at 14), Jaymoâs argument section fails to actually cite any evidence in the record, which was very unhelpful in analyzing this issue. Wendyâs also submits a report from Dr. Robert M. Frank, owner of a company specializing âin research, consultancy and expert witness testimony with respect to trademark infringement matters.â (Doc. 81-8). The report analyzed, inter alia, Wendyâs research efforts prior to adopting and trademarking the phrase âSide of SâAwesomeâ. (Doc. 81-8). This report has significance because it opines that any serious effort by Jaymoâs to hold out the term âSâAwesomeâ as a source indicator would have been revealed in Wendyâs pre-registration researchâeven if such use would have only given rise to an arguable possibility of being classified as trademark use.20 (See doc. 81-8 at 5â7). Dr. Frank considered both the results of the two comprehensive trademark searches ordered by Wendyâs as well as his own independent research and found minimal use of the term âSâAwesomeâ by Jaymoâs. Jaymoâs had not applied for federal or state protection of the alleged mark, circulated any press releases containing the term, or meaningfully promoted the term on its website. (Doc. 81-8 at 7). âA review of the sub-pages (âproducts,â ârecipesâ and âtestimonialsâ) from Jaymoâs website in April 2016 . . . find[s] no use of the word âSâAwesome.â â (Doc. 81-8 at 23 (emphasis in original)). This directly contradicts Jaymoâs allegation that it began marketing its products as âSâAwesome Sauceâ on its website in January 2016 (doc. 72 at 5). Indeed, as of January 2021, Dr. Frank reports only one instance of âSâAwesomeâ appearing in 20 It is worth noting that Jaymoâs does not appear to contest the validity of the comprehensive trademark searches undertaken by Wendyâs prior to its registration of the phrase âSide of SâAwesomeâ; rather, Jaymoâs provides a copy of the resulting Trademark Research Report as evidence and refers to Wendyâs efforts as âdue diligenceâ. (Docs. 95; 103 at 11, 16). the text on Jaymoâs website. (Doc. 81-8 at 24). This is in addition to one banner graphic depicting âItâs SâAwesomeâ and pictures of the bottle labels analyzed above; but as Dr. Frank explains, searches of Internet sites only examine textâthey cannot recognize text within graphicsâso it is highly unlikely, or even impossible, for Jaymoâs website to have been revealed in a search of the term âSâAwesomeâ, even today. (Doc. 81-8 at 24â25). This report thus suggests Jaymoâs use of the term has been insufficient to put the public and other entities on notice of its intent to appropriate the term as a trademark. See ZAZU Designs v. LâOreal S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting notice to competitors is a relevant consideration). Finally, the record contains mixed evidence on consumerâs perception of the term. Jaymoâs serves up a list of 120 people, most of whom are reportedly friends, family, and business associates of Jaymoâs owner, who would allegedly testify they associate the term âSâAwesomeâ with Jaymoâs products and expressed confusion when Wendyâs began using the term (see doc. 103-1 at 58â93),21 while Wendyâs has submitted consumer testimonials and recipes from Jaymoâs website, none of which employ the term âSâAwesomeâ but rather refer to the products as âJaymoâs sauce[s]â, âJaymoâs classic sauceâ, âJaymoâs Classic All-Purpose barbeque sauceâ, âJaymoâs Premium All Purpose Sauceâ, etc. (docs. 81 at 4; 81-10). Indeed, there is no evidence of any testimonial or review featured on Jaymoâs website containing the term âSâAwesomeâ. (Docs. 81-8; 81-10). It is further undisputed that consumers and retailers, including Kroger, have perceived the term as âawesomeâ rather than 21 Though, only a handful would testify. (Doc. 103-1 at 89â90). âSâAwesomeâ. (Docs. 77 at 3; 81-7). While the evidence suggests Jaymoâs representatives repeatedly corrected this misunderstanding of the term during live demos (docs. 81-5 at 7; 103-11 at 6), this evidence of confusion as to the term suggests it was not operating as a source identifier. In light of the dearth of evidence from disinterested consumers connecting the term âSâAwesomeâ with Jaymoâs products, the Court finds the evidence on consumer perception of Jaymoâs use of the term âSâAwesomeâ militates against a finding of trademark use. This remains true in light of the 120 friends, family, and business associates who would testify they associate the term âSâAwesomeâ with Jaymoâs products; such evidence simply does not evince âpublic consciousnessâ that âSâAwesomeâ is an identifier of Jaymoâs products. See SportFuel, 932 F.3d at 596. Jaymoâs has undoubtedly used the term âSâAwesomeâ as a slogan or catchphrase in its marketing efforts. However, not every slogan is a protectable mark. The evidence submitted by Jaymoâsânamely, its bottle labels and some marketing materialsâis insufficient to give rise to a triable question of fact on the issue of trademark use, a conclusion affirmed by consideration of the evidence submitted by Wendyâs on this issue. Consequently, on careful, holistic review of the evidence submitted and cited by the parties, the Court finds no reasonable jury could find Jaymoâs has used the term âSâAwesomeâ as a trademark. Its claims must therefore fail. As Wendyâs counterclaims are made in the alternative (doc 76 at 12), they are dismissed without prejudice. CONCLUSION IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant and Counterclaim-Plaintiffs The Wendyâs Company and Quality is our Recipe LLC (doc. 81) is GRANTED and their counterclaims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. This matter is TERMINATED. SO ORDERED. Entered this 8th day of October 2021. s/ Joe B. McDade JOE BILLY McDADE United States Senior District Judge
Case Information
- Court
- C.D. Ill.
- Decision Date
- October 8, 2021
- Status
- Precedential