J.D.N.B. v. State of Alabama

Rel: November 7, 2025




Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.




                 Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
                               OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
                                _________________________

                                         CR-2024-0211
                                   _________________________

                                                 J.D.N.B.

                                                      v.

                                         State of Alabama

                          Appeal from Morgan Circuit Court
                                     (CC-23-601)


COLE, Judge.

        J.D.N.B. appeals the Morgan Circuit Court's judgment adjudicating

him a youthful offender based on the underlying charge of receiving

stolen property in the second degree, a violation of § 13A-8-18, Ala. Code

1975.
CR-2024-0211



                      Facts and Procedural History

         On April 14, 2023, J.D.N.B. was indicted for second-degree

receiving stolen property, in violation of § 13A-8-18, Ala. Code 1975. (C.

5-6.) On August 8, 2023, J.D.N.B. filed an application for youthful-

offender status, which was granted.1 The case was then set for a bench

trial.

         On April 10, 2022, Officer Jacob Wooldridge, with the Decatur

Police Department, was on patrol and observed a stationary vehicle in

the middle of the road. Off. Wooldridge conducted a traffic stop on the

vehicle and encountered two females and J.D.N.B. J.D.N.B. was seated

in the rear, driver's side seat of the vehicle. While speaking with the

driver, Off. Wooldridge observed the barrel of a handgun "sticking out"

from underneath "the rear driver's seat" in front of J.D.N.B.         Off.

Wooldridge then pulled J.D.N.B. and the other two passengers out of the

vehicle, detained them, and retrieved the handgun.        (R. 5-7.)   Off.

Wooldridge put the handgun's serial number into the National Crime




         1BecauseJ.D.N.B. was granted youthful-offender status, he is
referred to by his initials in this opinion. Rule 52, Ala. R. App. P.
                                    2
CR-2024-0211

Information Center ("NCIC") database and got a "return," indicating that

the handgun was reported stolen. (R. 7.) Off. Wooldridge then arrested

J.D.N.B. and read him his Miranda2 rights.            J.D.N.B. told Off.

Wooldridge that the handgun fell out of his waistband when the vehicle

was coming to a stop and that he bought the handgun from "an unknown

subject … off the street" for $300. (R. 8.)

     At J.D.N.B.'s bench trial, J.D.N.B. made a "hearsay" objection to

Off. Wooldridge's testimony about the NCIC database indicating that the

gun was stolen, but the trial-court judge said that it would allow the

testimony for the sole purpose of showing the officer's subsequent actions,

not to show that the gun was stolen. (R. 7-8.) J.D.N.B. subsequently

made a hearsay objection to Off. Wooldridge testifying about his contact

with the "originating agency," the Houston Police Department ("HPD")

in Houston, Texas, that confirmed that the handgun was stolen. (R. 9.)

J.D.N.B. also objected and argued that the incident reports from the HPD

were hearsay. (R. 10-11.) After a lengthy discussion, the trial court

permitted the State to introduce the HPD's police reports into evidence,




     2Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).



                                     3
CR-2024-0211

over J.D.N.B.'s multiple hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections

and his assertion the reports were hearsay and "actually double hearsay,"

to prove that the handgun was, in fact, stolen. (R. 11-16.)

     At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court adjudicated

J.D.N.B. a youthful offender and subsequently sentenced J.D.N.B. to two

years in the Morgan County Community Corrections Program. (R. 27,

31.) This appeal follows.

                               Discussion

     J.D.N.B. argues on appeal that the trial court erroneously denied

his motion for a judgment of acquittal because "the only evidence that the

gun was stolen was erroneously admitted over objection." (J.D.N.B.'s

brief, p. 10.)   That argument is premised on J.D.N.B.'s underlying

argument that the HPD reports, indicating that the gun in J.D.N.B.'s

possession had been stolen, "should have been denied admission into

evidence" because they were inadmissible hearsay and were not properly

authenticated.    (J.D.N.B.'s brief, p. 20.)   Thus, before addressing

J.D.N.B.'s argument that the trial court erroneously denied his motion

for a judgment of acquittal, we must first address whether the HPD




                                    4
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reports were erroneously admitted because they were not authenticated

and because they were inadmissible hearsay evidence.

                            I. Authentication

     J.D.N.B. argues for the first time on appeal that the HPD reports

were inadmissible because they were not certified copies and, thus, were

not properly authenticated. The law is clear that " '[r]eview on appeal is

restricted to questions and issues properly and timely raised at trial' "

and that " '[a]n issue raised for the first time on appeal is not subject to

appellate review because it has not been properly preserved and

presented.' " Ex parte Coulliette, 857 So. 2d 793, 794 (Ala. 2003) (quoting

Newsome v. State, 570 So. 2d 703, 717 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) and Pate

v. State, 601 So. 2d 210, 213 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)).         Because no

argument was presented to the trial court as to authentication, J.D.N.B.

failed to preserve this argument for appellate review.

     Moreover, J.D.N.B.'s hearsay objections did not preserve his

appellate argument that the HPD reports were not properly

authenticated. It is well settled that the " 'authentication requirement is

totally separate' " from other requirements laid out in the hearsay

exceptions. Oaks v. Parkerson Constr., LLC, 303 So. 3d 1141, 1146 (Ala.


                                     5
CR-2024-0211

2020) (quoting Hampton v. Bruno's, Inc., 646 So. 2d 597, 599 (Ala. 1994)).

See also Hampton, 646 So. 2d at 599 (holding that "[t]he offering party

must always meet the requirements of the business records exception in

addition to the authentication requirement, if the other party makes the

proper objection"), and Thomas v. State, 302 So. 3d 720, 728 (Ala. Crim.

App. 2019) (holding that, "[b]ecause Thomas's sole objection to the bank

statements at trial was on authentication grounds, she is bound by that

objection and may not now argue on appeal that the statements were

hearsay").   Thus, J.D.N.B. is not entitled to relief on his improper-

authentication claim.

                               II. Hearsay

     J.D.N.B. also argues on appeal that the only evidence presented

below to show that the handgun was stolen was hearsay that did not meet

any exceptions to the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence.

More specifically, J.D.N.B. argues that the HPD reports constituted

neither a public record under Rule 803(8), Ala. R. Evid., nor a business

record under Rule 803(6), Ala. R. Evid. (J.D.N.B.'s brief, pp. 15-23.)

     We first note that Rule 801(c), Ala. R. Evid., defines hearsay as "a

statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the


                                     6
CR-2024-0211

trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter

asserted." In this case, the sole evidence offered by the State to prove

that the handgun was, in fact, stolen was the HPD reports. Although Off.

Wooldridge testified that he got a "return," after an NCIC search, which

indicated that the handgun was stolen, the State asserted that it was not

offering this testimony by Off. Wooldridge for the "truth of the matter,"

and the trial court admitted that testimony to show Off. Wooldridge's

subsequent actions only. (R. 7-8.) Furthermore, Off. Wooldridge testified

that he spoke with an HPD representative, who confirmed that the

handgun was stolen, but the State again asserted that it was "not offering

[this evidence] for the truth of the matter asserted." (R. 9.) Contrary to

the State's arguments at trial, the reports of the HPD that were admitted

as State's Exhibit 1 were offered for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e.,

to establish that the handgun had been stolen, and they were offered

against a defendant in relation to a criminal charge. Off. Wooldridge did

not have firsthand knowledge of the events described in the HPD reports

or that the handgun had actually been stolen. Likewise, there was no

evidence that the HPD officer who composed the HPD reports had

firsthand knowledge regarding the stolen handgun. Moreover, there was


                                     7
CR-2024-0211

no testimony from anyone with firsthand knowledge that the handgun

had been stolen.     The HPD officer simply recorded a statement

identifying the serial number, make, and model of the handgun from the

person who allegedly reported that his pistol had been stolen. (See C. 43-

48 (State's Exhibit 1, the HPD police reports).) Thus, the HPD reports

constituted hearsay, and the victim's statements that the handgun was

stolen in the burglary of a motor vehicle and providing the serial number

of the allegedly stolen handgun was hearsay within hearsay or, as

J.D.N.B. argued below, "double hearsay."

     Moreover,

     "Alabama courts have acknowledged the general principle
     that police reports, whether of accidents or other events, may
     be excluded as hearsay. See Gardner v. Williams, 390 So. 2d
     304, 307 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980) (noting that 'the reports of
     investigating officers are not ordinarily admissible as they are
     deemed hearsay'); Nettles v. Bishop, 289 Ala. 100, 105, 266
     So. 2d 260, 264 (1972) (noting the apparent general rule that
     'the report of an investigating officer is not admissible in
     evidence as being hearsay'); and Vest v. Gay, 275 Ala. 286,
     290, 154 So. 2d 297, 300 (1963) (acknowledging 'the settled
     rule in our jurisdiction that the reports of investigating
     officers are not admissible in evidence, as being hearsay')."

Crusoe v. Davis, 176 So. 3d 1200, 1203 (Ala. 2015) (footnote omitted). In

short, the contents of a report that do not reflect what the testifying



                                    8
CR-2024-0211

officer observed must qualify for a hearsay exception to be admissible.

See id.

     In this case, Off. Wooldridge did not have firsthand knowledge of

the information contained in the HPD reports, so the State sought to have

the reports admitted under the public-records exception to the hearsay

rule. Relying on Charles W. Gamble et al., McElroy's Alabama Evidence

§ 266.01(5) (7th ed. 2020), the State argued at trial that the HPD reports

were admissible under Rule 803(8), Ala. R. Evid. J.D.N.B., however,

objected repeatedly that the HPD reports and their contents were

"hearsay." (R. 7-11, 15.) The trial court ultimately admitted the HPD

reports, also citing McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 266.01(5). (R. 16.)

     J.D.N.B. argues on appeal that the HPD reports did not satisfy the

public-records exception under Rule 803(8), which states that "the

following are not excluded by the hearsay rule":

     "Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any
     form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the
     activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed
     pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there
     was a duty to report, excluding, however, when offered
     against the defendant in criminal cases, matters observed by
     police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in
     civil actions and proceedings and against the state or
     governmental authority in criminal cases, factual findings
     resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority

                                    9
CR-2024-0211

     granted by law, unless the sources of information or other
     circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness."

(Emphasis added.)

     We agree with J.D.N.B. that, under the plain language of the rule,

the HPD reports were not admissible under the public-records exception,

Rule 803(8), because they were not based on the testifying officer's

firsthand knowledge and were offered against a defendant in a criminal

case. We further note that the State cites no Alabama case for the

proposition that a police report constitutes a public record under Rule

803(8); nor have we found one. 3

     J.D.N.B. also asserts on appeal that the HPD reports were not

admissible under the business-records exception found in Rule 803(6),




     3On appeal, the State continues to rely solely on McElroy's Alabama

Evidence in arguing that the HPD reports were not hearsay because, the
State contends, the reports were public records under Rule 803(8).
Notably, McElroy's cites no Alabama case for the proposition that a police
report satisfies the public-records exception to hearsay. McElroy's
commentary on Rule 803(8) notes that some "modern authority" in other
jurisdictions have held that introduction of a police report is admissible
"if the person making the report is produced in court and subject to cross-
examination." However, no one from the HPD testified at J.D.N.B.'s
trial. Also, despite the lack of authority for its public-records argument,
the State does not argue on appeal that the HPD reports were admissible
under any other hearsay exception.
                                    10
CR-2024-0211

Ala. R. Evid., which states that the "following are not excluded by the

hearsay rule":

     "A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any
     form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made
     at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a
     person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly
     conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice
     of that business activity to make the memorandum, report,
     record, or data compilation, all as shown by testimony of the
     custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that
     complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12), or a statute
     permitting certification, unless the source of information or
     the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of
     trustworthiness."

(Emphasis added.)

     The Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 803(6) state:

           " As a condition precedent to admissibility under this
     hearsay exception, the proponent must call a witness to lay
     the prescribed foundation.        This is largely the same
     foundation applicable under pre-rules case law and includes
     testimony that the record was kept in the course of a regularly
     conducted business activity and that it was the regular
     practice of that business activity to make the record. See Ex
     parte Frith, 526 So. 2d 880 (Ala. 1987). There is no
     requirement that the authenticating witness be the
     custodian, entrant, or maker of the record. See Hammett v.
     State, 482 So. 2d 1330, 1334 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985). Not only
     must the record be relevant to regularly conducted business,
     but it must be shown that the generation of such a record is
     regularly conducted activity of the business. It is this latter
     requirement that has caused courts to exclude certain records
     made solely in anticipation of, and in preparation for, pending


                                   11
CR-2024-0211

     litigation. See, e.g., United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 761
     (D.C. Cir. 1979)."

     The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals has further explained:

           "The rationale for the business-records exception to the
     hearsay rule is that reliability is assured because the maker
     of the record relies on the record in the regular course of
     business activities. See Ex parte Firth, 526 So. 2d 880, 882
     (Ala. 1987). The 'regular course' of business 'must find its
     meaning in the inherent nature of the business in question
     and in the methods systematically employed for the conduct
     of the business as a business.' Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S.
     109, 115, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L. Ed. 645 (1943). When an
     organization does not rely upon particular records for the
     performance of its functions, those records are not business
     records within the meaning of the Rule 803(6) exception to the
     hearsay rule. See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. at 114, 63 S.
     Ct. 477 (holding that grade-crossing accident reports
     prepared for a railroad were not business records because
     they were not prepared 'for the systematic conduct of the
     enterprise as a railroad business'; rather, '[the] reports are
     calculated for use essentially in the court, not in the business.
     Their primary utility is in litigating, not in railroading.'). It
     is not enough to qualify under the business-records exception
     to show that the records are regularly prepared; instead, a
     court must evaluate 'the character of the records and their
     earmarks of reliability … acquired from their source and
     origin and the nature of their compilation.' Palmer v.
     Hoffman, 318 U.S. at 114, 63 S. Ct. 477."

T.C. v. Cullman Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 899 So. 2d 281, 288 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2004). In short, "[a] declarant's statement must have been made

pursuant to a routine business duty in order for it to be excluded from

the hearsay rule." Reeves v. King, 534 So. 2d 1107, 1110 (Ala. 1988)

                                    12
CR-2024-0211

(emphasis added). "[T]he business records exception [does not] operate

like an umbrella, shielding all statements embodied in the record from

the hearsay rule." Id.

     In Ingmire v. State, 215 So. 3d 592 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016), this

Court held that "NCIC" reports of a stolen four-wheeler were

inadmissible hearsay that "did not fall within the business-records

exception [under Rule 803(6)] -- or any other exception --to the hearsay

rule." Id. at 597. In so holding, we noted that the testifying officer did

not testify to any facts that would show the "regularity of the preparation

of the NCIC reports," that the reports were "regularly relied on," or that

the reports were "trustworthy." Id. Off. Wooldridge's testimony similarly

failed to establish that the HPD reports satisfied the qualifications for a

business record.

     Finally, even if Off. Wooldridge's testimony had established that

the reports made by the HPD were business records, the reports contain

additional hearsay statements from the victim who initially reported that

the handgun was stolen and later provided the serial number of the

allegedly stolen handgun. Although incident reports may be made in the

regular course of police business, the victim's statements were not made


                                    13
CR-2024-0211

in the regular course of any regular business activity.      The victim's

statements in the initial report could arguably satisfy a "present sense

impression" or "excited utterance" exception to hearsay, under Rule 803

(1) and (2), Ala. R. Evid. However, no such argument has been advanced

by the State, and neither of those exceptions appears to be plausible.

Although the theft was allegedly discovered at 6:00 a.m. on November 25,

2020, and reported minutes later at 6:12 a.m., the serial number, which

was used to identify J.D.N.B.'s handgun as the stolen handgun, was not

reported to HPD until December 2, 2020. (C. 43-45, 46-48.)

     Accordingly, we hold that, based upon the hearsay contained in the

HPD reports and the reports themselves, which were also hearsay, the

trial court erred by admitting the HPD reports over J.D.N.B.'s multiple

hearsay objections.   Furthermore, as in Ingmire, "we cannot say that

the admission of the [HPD-reports] testimony was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt." 215 So. 3d at 598. "[T]he charge against [J.D.N.B.]

required the State to prove that the [handgun] was, in fact, stolen, and

the only testimony that the [handgun] was actually stolen was [Off.

Wooldridge's] impermissible hearsay." Id. Accordingly, we must reverse

J.D.N.B.'s adjudication and sentence as a youthful offender.        This


                                  14
CR-2024-0211

conclusion does not, however, require us to render judgment in J.D.N.B.'s

favor, as he suggests.

                     III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

     J.D.N.B. contends that, because the HPD reports were erroneously

admitted, there was insufficient evidence presented to the trial court to

support his youthful-offender adjudication for receiving stolen property

in the second degree. J.D.N.B. then contends that this Court should

therefore "reverse his [youthful-offender adjudication] and render a

judgment of acquittal." (J.D.N.B.'s brief, pp. 13-24.)

     To support his contention that a judgment of acquittal should be

rendered, J.D.N.B. relies on Harmon v. State, 404 So. 3d 286 (Ala. Crim.

App. 2024).     However, in Harmon this Court reversed Harmon's

conviction and rendered a judgment in his favor because the trial court

had erred in denying Harmon's motion for judgment of acquittal because

there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to establish that

Harmon had constructively possessed a short-barreled shotgun, not

because Harmon's conviction relied upon improperly admitted evidence.

Here, although the HPD reports, which provided the evidence proving

that the handgun was stolen, were erroneously admitted into evidence,


                                    15
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the evidence admitted at trial was sufficient to support the trial court's

adjudication that J.D.N.B. was guilty of receiving stolen property in the

second degree.

     Under § 13A-8-16, Ala. Code 1975, "[a] person commits the crime of

receiving stolen property if he intentionally receives, retains or disposes

of stolen property knowing that it has been stolen or having reasonable

grounds to believe it has been stolen, unless the property is received,

retained or disposed of with intent to restore it to the owner." "Direct

evidence is not required to prove the corpus delicti of receiving stolen

property; rather, it may be shown by facts and circumstances from which

the [fact-finder] may infer that the offense has been committed."

Anderson v. State, 533 So. 2d 694, 696 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988). Although

J.D.N.B. does argue on appeal that there was no admissible evidence

regarding the identity of the owner of the handgun, the only actual

element of the offense that he contests on appeal is whether the State

established that the handgun was stolen. J.D.N.B. correctly asserts that

the only evidence establishing that the handgun was, in fact, stolen, was

the inadmissible HPD reports. However, as the Alabama Supreme Court

explained in Lindley v. State, 728 So. 2d 1153 (Ala. 1998), an appellate


                                    16
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court's consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence must include even

the erroneously admitted evidence.

     In Lindley, as here, "[t]he only evidence connecting Lindley to the

crimes [charged] consisted of a statement made to an investigating officer

by Billy Joe Scott, a friend of Lindley's, in which Scott stated that Lindley

had told him he had thrown the tear gas bomb." 728 So. 2d at 1154. This

Court held that Scott's statement was erroneously admitted into

evidence, reversed his conviction, and rendered a judgment in Lindley's

favor. Id. at 1154-55. The State sought certiorari review in the Alabama

Supreme Court. Id. at 1155. The Alabama Supreme Court agreed that

Scott's previous statement was erroneously admitted into evidence as a

"past recollection recorded."    Id. at 1156.    Thereafter, the Alabama

Supreme Court addressed "whether double jeopardy considerations

prevent[ed] the State from retrying Lindley" when the evidence would

have been insufficient to support Lindley's conviction absent the

erroneously admitted statement. Id.         The Alabama Supreme Court

explained:

           "With respect to an appellate court's reversal of a
     conviction, the Supreme Court long has embraced the general
     rule that when a reversal is based on procedural trial error,
     the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial. United

                                     17
CR-2024-0211

    States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 16 S. Ct. 1192, 41 L. Ed. 300
    (1896). The Supreme Court has provided a narrow exception
    to the general rule allowing retrial. Where a conviction is
    reversed solely on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence,
    retrial is barred because such a reversal is equivalent to an
    acquittal by the trial court. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S.
    1, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978).

          "In Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S. Ct. 285, 102
    L. Ed. 2d 265 (1988), the Supreme Court considered whether
    the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a retrial when an
    appellate court's correction of a trial error involving an
    evidentiary ruling render[ed] the remaining evidence
    insufficient to support the conviction….

          "On certiorari review, the Supreme Court recognized
    that although the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial when
    a conviction is reversed solely on the basis of an insufficiency
    of the evidence, it does not bar retrial when a conviction is
    reversed based on trial error:

               " 'Burks was careful to point out that reversal
         based solely on evidentiary insufficiency has
         fundamentally different implications, for double
         jeopardy purposes, than a reversal based on such
         ordinary "trial errors" as the "incorrect receipt or
         rejection of evidence." 437 U.S., at 14-16, 98 S. Ct.
         2141. While the former is in effect a finding "that
         the government has failed to prove its case"
         against the defendant, the latter "implies nothing
         with respect to the guilt or innocence of the
         defendant," but is simply "a determination that
         [he] has been convicted through a judicial process
         which is defective in some fundamental respect."
         Id. at 15, 98 S. Ct. 2141 (emphasis added [in
         Lockhart]).



                                  18
CR-2024-0211

                  " 'It appears to us to be beyond dispute that
           this is a situation described in Burks as reversal
           for "trial error" -- the trial court erred in admitting
           a particular piece of evidence, and without it there
           was insufficient evidence to support a judgment of
           conviction. But clearly with that evidence, there
           was enough to support the sentence…. The basis
           for the Burks exception to the general rule [of
           allowing retrial after trial error] is that a reversal
           for insufficiency of the evidence should be treated
           no differently than a trial court's granting a
           judgment of acquittal at the close of all the
           evidence. A trial court in passing on such a motion
           considers all of the evidence it has admitted, and
           to make the analogy complete it must be this same
           quantum of evidence which is considered by the
           reviewing court.'

     "Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 40-42, 109 S. Ct. 285 (quoting Burks,
     437 U.S. at 14-16, 98 S. Ct. 2141) (last emphasis added; other
     emphasis in Lockhart). Thus, the Supreme Court held that
     'where the evidence offered by the State and admitted by the
     trial court -- whether erroneously or not -- would have been
     sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict, the Double Jeopardy
     Clause does not preclude retrial.' Id. at 34, 109 S. Ct. 285."

Lindley, 728 So. 2d at 1156-57 (footnote omitted).

     Relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lockhart

v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988), the Alabama Supreme Court thus held:

     "In this present case, the trial court erroneously admitted
     hearsay evidence -- Scott's prior inconsistent statement -- as
     substantive evidence of Lindley's guilt. The total evidence
     offered by the State and admitted by the trial court, however,
     whether erroneously admitted as substantive evidence or not,
     was sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. Thus, the Double

                                     19
CR-2024-0211

     Jeopardy Clause does not preclude the State from retrying
     Lindley."

Lindley, 728 So. 2d at 1158 (footnote omitted).

     Here, J.D.N.B. argues that the evidence of his guilt was insufficient

based on the State's inadmissible evidence being the only proof that the

handgun was, in fact, stolen.4 (J.D.N.B.'s brief, p. 13-14.) However,

although the HPD reports were erroneously admitted, the reports were

nonetheless admitted into evidence and provided proof that the handgun

was stolen. Based on Lindley, we must consider all the evidence admitted

before the trial court at the time of J.D.N.B.'s motion for judgment of

acquittal.   Because the State's evidence was sufficient to sustain

J.D.N.B.'s youthful-offender adjudication, J.D.N.B. is not entitled to a

judgment of acquittal and a rendering of the circuit court's verdict.

"While the State cannot on retrial submit [the erroneously admitted

evidence], it should have the opportunity to submit other evidence of

[J.D.N.B.'s] guilt." Lindley, 728 So. 2d at 1158. "If the State has no




     4J.D.N.B. further alleges that the State also had to prove that the

handgun was "the property of Jarvell Mitchell," the alleged victim in
Houston, Texas; however, no such proof is required. See § 13A-8-16(a),
Ala. Code 1975, and § 13A-8-18(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975. See also Wasp v.
State, 647 So. 2d 81, 82-83 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994).
                                   20
CR-2024-0211

additional evidence, then the trial court should enter a judgment of

acquittal." Id.

                                Conclusion

     For these reasons, J.D.N.B.'s adjudication and sentence as a

youthful offender is reversed, and this cause is remanded for action

consistent with this opinion.

     REVERSED AND REMANDED.

     Windom, P.J., and Kellum and Anderson, JJ., concur. Minor, J.,

concurs in part and concurs in the result in part, with opinion.




                                   21
CR-2024-0211

MINOR, Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the result.

     I concur in all parts of the Court's opinion except for Part III of the

"Discussion" section; as to Part III, I concur in the result.




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