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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
FELIX JONES-HILL, 2:23-CV-10928-TGB-KGA
Petitioner, HON. TERRENCE G. BERG
v.
CATHERINE S. BAUMAN, OPINION DENYING
PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
Respondent.
Felix Jones-Hill filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2254. Jones-Hill is serving a mandatory life sentence and
lesser terms for his Wayne Circuit Court jury trial conviction of one count
of first-degree murder, MCL § 750.317, three counts of assault with
intent to commit murder, MCL § 750.83, and related firearms offenses,
MCL §§ 750.224f, 750.227b. This petition raises four claims challenging
Jones-Hillâs state convictions.
For the following reasons, Jones-Hillâs request for habeas relief is
DENIED.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
A § 2254 habeas petition is governed by the heightened standard of
review outlined in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(âAEDPAâ). 28 U.S.C. § 2254. To obtain relief, habeas petitioners who
raise claims adjudicated by state courts must âshow that the relevant
state-court decision (1) was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, or (2) was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceedings.â Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). The focus of this standard âis not whether
a federal court believes the state courtâs determination was incorrect but
whether that determination was unreasonableâa substantially higher
threshold.â Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007).
âAEDPA thus imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating
state-court rulings and demands that state-court decisions be given the
benefit of the doubt.â Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, â[a] state courtâs
determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so
long as âfair-minded jurists could disagreeâ on the correctness of the state
courtâs decision.â Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Additionally, a state
courtâs factual determinations are presumed correct on federal habeas
review, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), and review is âlimited to the record that
was before the state court.â Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).
II. BACKGROUND
Jones-Hill and Turon Reaves were charged and tried jointly in
connection with the shooting death of Taef Al-Saoor. During the early
morning hours of October 14, 2018, Al-Saoor and three other individuals
were driving on Eight Mile Road in Detroit, Michigan, when they were
shot at by a passing vehicle. A bullet struck Al-Saoor in the head and
killed him.
Investigators swiftly focused their investigation on Jones-Hill and
Reaves. Shortly before the shooting, the two men were seen turning onto
Eight Mile from the parking lot of a nightclub armed with an assault
rifle, apparently looking to settle a score with a man driving a car similar
in appearance to Al-Saoorâs. Parts of the incident were caught on
surveillance video obtained from various businesses along that stretch of
Eight Mile, enabling police to get the license plate number of the suspect
vehicle.
Samuel Bryant testified at trial that he was a security guard at the
Ace of Spades Gentlemanâs Club on Eight Mile. ECF No. 7-10,
PageID.563â64. Bryant was working the night of October 13-14, 2018. Id.
Bryant knew Jones-Hill and recognized him as one of the people involved
in an altercation earlier that night in the parking lot. Id. at PageID.566.
Bryant identified the other man as someone he knew as âO,â who he
described as âa little hot headâ who âwas always starting something.â Id.
at 567. When Bryant saw Jones-Hill exit the club simultaneously with O,
he suspected O might try to start something with Jones-Hill. Id. at
PageID.568â69.
Bryant saw O walk to his âwet-grayâ Dodge Charger, reach inside,
and arm himself with a handgun. Id. at PageID.570, 572â73. Bryant
turned around when he heard a gun racking behind him, and he saw that
Jones-Hill had armed himself with an assault rifle he retrieved from a
white Ford Fusion. Id. at PageID.570â71.
Bryant stood between the men to defuse the situation. Id. at
PageID.571â72. Meanwhile, O got into his Charger and exited the lot
while âspitting racial slursâ at Jones-Hill. Id. at PageID.572â73. Jones-
Hill told Bryant he was going back inside to get his friend. Id. at
PageID.571â73. Jones-Hill handed the rifle to Bryant, who put it in the
backseat of the Fusion. Id. at PageID.574.
Less than five minutes later, Jones-Hill came out of the club with
Reaves. Id. at PageID.575. Jones-Hill asked Bryant if he knew where O
was, and Bryant replied that he was gone. Id. at PageID.576. Jones-Hill
climbed into the back of the Fusion where Bryant had put the rifle, and
Reaves got into the driverâs seat. Id. at PageID.576. They turned
eastbound on Eight Mile, the same direction O had left. Id. at
PageID.579.
At trial, the prosecution played surveillance video obtained from
the Ace of Spades club. Id. at PageID.600. According to Bryant, the
footage showed the interaction between Jones-Hill and O in the parking
lot. Id. at PageID.601. It showed O leaving the lot in his car at 1:48 a.m.
Id. at PageID.604. It showed Jones-Hill and Reaves entering the Fusion
and exiting the lot at 1:52 a.m. Id. at PageID.606â07.
Toma Al-Saoor testified that on October 14, 2018, sometime
between 1:40 a.m. and 1:55 a.m., he was driving his vehicle, a shiny
brand-new gray Dodge Charger, on Eight Mile. Id. at PageID.659â62,
685. His brother, Taef Al-Soor, was in the rear passenger seat. His friend,
Rami, and Taefâs girlfriend, Mireya, were also in the car. Id. at
PageID.661. They had just left Trumpps Nightclub on Eight Mile and
were headed to the casino. Id. at PageID.678-79. As they drove, they
passed the Ace of Spades. Id. at PageID.668.
Toma noticed a white Ford Fusion driving very slowly on Eight Mile
in front of him. Id. at PageID.661â62. After he passed the Fusion, Toma
heard gunshots, and Rami yelled, âTheyâre shooting bullets!â Id. at
PageID.663. Toma was shot in the armpit. Id. at PageID.664â65. He
looked to his left and saw that the Fusion had pulled alongside the
driverâs side of his car and was firing. Id. at 664. Toma brought the
vehicle to a halt, at which point the Fusion stopped in front of him,
continuing the bombardment from the passenger side. Id. at PageID.665,
677, 669.
Toma then drove to a nearby liquor store and asked for help. Id. at
PageID.668. Toma saw that his brother had been shot in the head and
was unconscious. Mireya had been shot in the nose. Id. at PageID.664â
65. Police and emergency responders arrived, and Toma was taken to the
hospital. Id. at PageID.665.
On cross-examination, Jones-Hillâs counsel repeatedly asked Toma
about the relative position of the two vehicles before and after the
shooting. The trial court eventually directed counsel to move to another
topic. Id. at PageID.688â93. This ruling forms the basis for Jones-Hillâs
first habeas claim.
The other two survivors of the shooting gave similar accounts. Rami
Hadaya testified they were driving on Eight Mile, heading for a
downtown casino. Somewhere between the Southfield and Lodge
Freeways, a car on their left started shooting at them. After the shooting,
Toma drove to a nearby liquor store, where he saw that the three other
people in the vehicle had been shot. Id. at PageID.696â701.
Mireya Jurado testified that the four drove down Eight Mile after
leaving a club. She did not know where on Eight Mile the shooting
occurred or where the shots were coming from. She was shot in the left
cheek and on the side of the nose. Id. at PageID.707â12.
Assistant Wayne County Medical Examiner Lokman Sung testified
that he performed the autopsy on Taef Al-Saoor. ECF No. 7-11,
PageID.724â25. Al-Saoor had been shot on the left side of the head. Id.
at PageID.727. The entrance wounds suggested the bullet first passed
through another medium, like glass. The extent of the destruction made
it likely that the bullet was shot at high velocity. Id. at PageID.727â30.
A deformed bullet jacket and core fragment were recovered from Al-
Saoorâs head. Id. at PageID.731. A single autopsy photo depicting the
fatal injury was admitted over objection. Id. at PageID.732â33.
Admission of the photo forms the basis of Jones-Hillâs third habeas claim.
Detroit Police Officer Michael Roby testified that he and his partner
were called to the liquor store. When Officer Roby arrived, he discovered
that three of four individuals in a Dodge Charger had been shot, and one
of them had a gunshot wound to the head. Officer Roby called for EMS,
and all three injured occupants were taken to the hospital. Id. at
PageID.737â40. Other officers walked up and down Eight Mile trying to
find the scene of the shooting, but they were unsuccessful. Id. at
PageID.744â52.
Michelle Douglas, an evidence technician, processed the Dodge
Charger at the garage. She observed several bullet impacts on the front
and driverâs side, as well as blood throughout the interior. Id. at
PageID.757â63.
Relevant to Jones-Hillâs fourth habeas claim, the prosecutor sought
admission of a report authored by MSP Forensic Scientist Brain
Grabowski. ECF No. 7-11, PageID.782. Before admitting the report, the
trial court inquired whether the prosecution had complied with the notice
provisions of Michigan Court Rule 6.202. The prosecution indicated that
an e-mail and e-filing of the report had been sent to defense counsel on
November 4, 2019, indicating their intention to admit the report. Id. at
PageID.782â83.
When the court asked defense counsel whether they agreed that the
prosecution had complied with the rule, Jones-Hillâs counsel responded
cryptically, âYes, no, yes, no.â Id. at PageID.783. The court found that the
prosecutor complied with the rule. Id. at PageID.783â84. The court gave
defense counsel a second opportunity before admission to object, but
counsel declined the offer to place anything else on the record. Id. at
PageID.788.
The report was thereafter admitted. It indicated that Grabowski
examined one portion of a fired metal jacket, one portion of a lead core,
and another fired metal jacket. He could not determine whether the
fragments were fired from the same firearm. One fragment displayed
conventional rifling, but it could not be further classified. One fragment
was consistent with being fired from either a .22 caliber or 5.56 mm
weapon with rifling. Id. at PageID.789â90.
Detroit Police Sergeant Lance Sullivan testified that he obtained
surveillance video footage from the liquor store, the Ace of Spades, and a
car dealership located at the scene of the shooting. Videos and still frames
were admitted as trial exhibits. ECF No. 7-11, PageID.792â815.
Detective Sergeant James Plummer, an MSP evidence technician,
testified that he was among the group of officers who discovered the
shooting scene at Southfield Quality Cars on Eight Mile. Four vehicles
inside a fenced-in lot and the fence had been struck with bullets. The
bullets penetrated too deeply to be recovered. This indicated to Plummer
that the bullets had been fired at a high velocity consistent with a
5.56mm rifle; there was too much damage for the rounds to have been
fired from a .22 caliber weapon. ECF No. 7-12, PageID.892â902.
Plummer also obtained and reviewed surveillance video from
several businesses east of the Ace of Spades on Eight Mile, including the
car dealership. On the tapes, he spotted a white Ford Fusion driving east
on Eight Mile twenty-seven seconds before noting the victimsâ vehicle
pass. Plummer could see that the Fusion bore a license plate later
determined to belong to Reavesâ mother. Id. at PageID.915â18.
Further evidenceâaside from the direct testimony provided by the
Ace of Spades security guardâlinked the Ford Fusion seen in the video
to co-defendant Reaves and then linked Reaves to Jones-Hill. ECF No. 7-
12, PageID.963â70. The license plate was registered to Reavesâ mother
and hidden under her nightstand. Reavesâ mother testified that Reaves
told her that he had scrapped the car. ECF No. 7-11, PageID.862â69; ECF
No. 7-12, PageID.953â57. Rifle ammunition compatible with the bullets
used in the shooting was found in her basement. ECF No. 7-12,
PageID.973â74. A security guard from an apartment complex where
Reaves stayed with his girlfriend recorded the Fusion entering the
complex the night before the shooting and then again in the early
morning hours after the shooting. ECF No. 7-11, PageID.841â46.
Clothing matching what Reaves was wearing the night of the incident
was found in the apartment, and clothing matching what Jones-Hill was
wearing was found in another bedroom, along with papers bearing his
name. ECF No. 7-12, PageID.918â19, 943â47, 974â81.
During closing arguments, the prosecution played a video montage
for the jury, asserting it showed Reaves and Jones-Hill pull out of the Ace
of Spades lot in the Fusion, accelerate past the victimsâ vehicle
somewhere in front of the car dealership, ultimately blocking the path
ahead, and forcing the victimsâ car to stop and reverse. ECF No. 7-12,
PageID.1026â29.
Upon providing jury instructions, the trial court prefaced the
âaiding and abettingâ instruction by stating that the evidence had one
occupant of the Fusion driving while the other occupant fired. ECF No.
7-13, PageID.1091. Defense counsel objected. This exchange forms the
basis of Jones-Hillâs second habeas claim.
The jury found both defendants guilty on all counts.
Following sentencing, Jones-Hill filed a claim of appeal in the
Michigan Court of Appeals. His first appellate counsel filed a brief raising
one issue; substitute counsel filed a supplemental brief raising four
additional claims:
I. The theory of the defense at trial was that the police had
misidentified the Fusion that they were in that night as the
vehicle the person who shot the victims was riding in. The
trial judge limited questioning about the circumstances of the
shooting, and then mischaracterized the evidence in the
aiding and abetting instruction it gave to the jury, violating
Mr. Jones-Hillâs due process right to a fair trial.
II. Appellant Felix Jones-Hill was denied a fair trial and due
process when the prosecution was allowed to introduce the
gruesome, inflammatory autopsy photo of the head of the
deceased who died as a result of gunshot wound to the head.
III. The trial court prejudiced appellant when it interrupted
defense counselâs cross-examination without justification and
impermissibly denigrated counsel.
IV. There is plain error where a police officer not qualified as
an expert is allowed to give expert opinion.
V. Appellantâs objection to the admission of a laboratory
report pursuant to MCR 6.202 should have been sustained.
Subsequent admission violated his right of confrontation, and
this error is not harmless.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion.
People v. Jones-Hill, No. 352354, 2021 WL 4239024, at *1â2 (Mich. Ct.
App. Sept. 16, 2021). Jones-Hill, raising the same claims, applied for
leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Courtâwhich the supreme
court denied. People v. Jones-Hill, 977 N.W.2d 533 (Mich. 2022) (Table).
Now, Jones-Hillâs habeas petition raises four of the five claims
presented on direct appeal, omitting the claim concerning the police
officerâs qualification to give expert testimony.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Cross-Examination of Toma Al-Saoor
Jones-Hill first claims that the trial court exhibited bias,
denigrated defense counsel, and prevented him from presenting a
complete defense when it cut short defense counselâs cross-examination
of Toma Al-Saoor regarding the position of the two vehicles before and
during the shooting.
After reciting the relevant standard and quoting the challenged
exchange in the transcript, the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the
claim:
Although Jones-Hill argues that there was no justification for
the trial court to interrupt defense counselâs cross-
examination of the witness, the court had already allowed
defense counsel an opportunity to question Toma about the
positioning of the Fusion before and during the shooting, and
it intervened only when it believed that counselâs questioning
had become excessiveâon a subject it believed was only
marginally relevant to the asserted defense theoryâand the
witness had already admitted being unable to recall many of
the details.
***
We do not believe that the trial courtâs interruption of defense
counselâs cross-examination either prevented Jones-Hill from
presenting his defense or pierced the veil of judicial
impartiality. The court intervened only after repeated
questioning regarding the positioning of the Fusion leading
up to the shooting and where the witness had already
admitted that he did not know exactly where the Fusion came
from before the shooting started, a subject the court also
believed had only limited relevance given the defense that
Jones-Hill was not involved in the shooting. The trial court
had discretion to exercise reasonable control over the
interrogation to avoid harassment or needless consumption of
time. The court gave counsel an opportunity to explain why
continued questioning regarding the positioning of the Fusion
was necessary and she did not do so.
Further, the courtâs comments to defense counsel, while
seemingly hostile, did not pierce the veil of judicial
impartiality. Admittedly, the courtâs remarks reflected its
impatience with counselâs repeated questioning on a subject
that had already been covered and had apparent limited
relevance, but the courtâs remarks were directed at its efforts
to understand the relevancy of the questioning and did not
involve personal attacks on defense counsel. Moreover,
because this exchange was isolated and the courtâs remarks
were limited to inquiring about the relevancy of the repeated
line of questioning, it was not reasonably likely to create an
appearance of partiality against Jones-Hill. Stevens, 498 Mich
at 171. Accordingly, Jones-Hill is not entitled to a new trial
with respect to this issue.
Jones-Hill, 2021 WL 4239024, at *18â20.
â[T]he Due Process Clause clearly requires a fair trial in a fair
tribunal before a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or
interest in the outcome of his particular case.â Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S.
899, 904â05 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). An
impartial judge is a necessary component of a fair trial. In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). The Supreme Court established the standard
for assessing claims of judicial bias in Liteky v. United States. 510 U.S.
540 (1994). A judgeâs remarks that are âcritical or disapproving of, or even
hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a
bias or partiality challenge.â Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555.
The Michigan Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply this
standard. A fair reading of the record shows that Al-Saoor testified
repeatedly and clearly that when he first passed the Fusion, it was on his
right; and when the Fusion passed him, it did so on his left. Despite his
consistent account regarding the positioning of the two vehicles, defense
counsel returned to the subject multiple times, prompting the courtâs
intervention.
On direct examination, Al-Saoor testified that he first saw the
Fusion driving very slowly in front of him. ECF No. 78-10, PageID.662.
He was shown surveillance video footage and photos and indicated where
they showed his car traveling down Eight Mile. Id. at PageID.669â76.
After Al-Saoor passed the Fusion, it came up to his left side as shots were
fired at his vehicleâshots coming out of the Fusionâs passenger side. Id.
at PageID.633, 677. Al-Saoor then stopped his vehicle and started to
reverse. Id. at 668. He indicated where one of the videos showed his car
backing up on Eight Mile while it was being fired upon. Id. at
PageID.676â77.
On cross-examination, Al-Saoor testified repeatedly that when he
first came up on the Fusion, he passed it on its driverâs side so his
passengerâs side was closest to the car. Id. at PageID.688â89. Defense
counsel asked Al-Saoor if that was when the shooting occurred; he
answered that it was not. Id. at PageID.689. Al-Saoor explained that the
shooting occurred âafter I passed it, he came from the driverâs side and
started.â Id. Defense counsel proceeded to ask Al-Saoor about the relative
position of the vehicles when he first passed the Fusion no less than seven
times. Id. at PageID.688â89.
Al-Saoor testified that after he passed the Fusion, it then came up
to his driverâs side and started shooting. Id. at PageID.690. Counsel then
asked Al-Saoor no less than five more times about whether and how the
Fusion came up on his driverâs side after he passed it. Id. at PageID.690â
91. At that point, the trial court directed defense counsel to move on to a
different topic, finally stating, âI donât think there is anything more you
can do with him on this.â Id. at PageID.691â93.
At no point in his testimony did Al-Saoor equivocate about which
side he passed the Fusion, and on which side the Fusion passed him. In
any event, much of the episode was caught on video, and the location of
the bullet holes in Al-Saoorâs car indicated the direction of the shots.
â[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basisâ for a
claim of bias or partiality. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Here, the trial court
directing defense counsel to move on did not evidence bias or partiality.
Trial courts have âwide latitudeâ to exclude questioning that is repetitive,
marginally relevant, or poses a risk of harassment. Crane v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 683, 689 (1986); United States v. Hynes, 467 F.3d 951, 960 (6th
Cir. 2006). The trial court reasonably exercised its discretion by directing
defense counsel to move on from the repetitive line of questioning.
The Court has little trouble concluding that the Michigan Court of
Appeals reasonably found the state trial courtâs ruling did not indicate
bias or partiality nor deny Jones-Hill an opportunity to present a defense
regarding the position of the vehicles.
Portions of Jones-Hillâs habeas brief also assert that the trial courtâs
conduct prevented defense counsel from subjecting the prosecutionâs case
to meaningful adversarial testing, resulting in an alleged violation of the
Sixth Amendment under United States v. Chronic. 466 U.S. 648, 659
(1984).
Despite some references to the right to counsel in Jones-Hillâs state
court brief, the Court finds this argument was not developed to the
requisite extent: it was not fairly presented or exhausted on the stateâs
direct review. See ECF No. 7-15, PageID.1272â77. Therefore, it cannot
form the basis for granting habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).
At any rate, the claim is without merit. See § 2254(b)(2). A
constructive denial of counsel under Cronic occurs when â(1) the
defendant âis denied the presence of counsel at âa critical stageâ and
suffers âthe complete denial of counsel,â or (2) when âcounsel entirely fails
to subject the prosecutionâs case to meaningful adversarial testing.ââ See
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695â96 (2002). Defense counsel was present
during the prosecutionâs cross-examination of Al-Saoor and performed
meaningful adversarial testing. The trial courtâs ruling directing defense
counsel to move to another topic after repetitive questioning about the
position of the vehicles did not result in a constructive denial of counsel.
Jones-Hillâs first habeas claim is without merit.
B. Comment Preceding Aiding & Abetting Instruction
Jones-Hillâs second claim asserts that the jury instructions
impermissibly directed the jury to find that the passenger of the Focus
shot at the victims while another man drove it. The Michigan Court of
Appeals rejected the claim, finding that âviewing the instructions as a
whole and in contextâŠ[the challenged comments were] merely an
explanation for why the court was providing an instruction on aiding or
abetting.â Jones-Hill, 2021 WL 4239024, at *3.
For habeas corpus relief to be warranted based on incorrect jury
instructions, a petitioner must show more than that the instructions
were undesirable, erroneous, or universally condemned. Instead, taken
as a whole, the instructions must be so infirm that they rendered the
entire trial fundamentally unfair. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72
(1991); Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). Stated differently,
a jury instruction is not judged in artificial isolation; it must be
considered in the context of the instructionsâ entirety and the trial record.
Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 391 (1999); Grant v. Rivers, 920 F.
Supp. 769, 784 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
Where an instruction is ambiguousâthough not necessarily
erroneousâit can only run afoul of the Constitution provided there is a
reasonable likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way
that violates it. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72â73 n.4; Boyde v. California,
494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990). A habeas petitioner must show that the
challenged instruction had a substantial and injurious effect or influence
on the juryâs verdict. Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 61â62 (2008).
Jones-Hill takes issue with a statement made by the trial court in
a prelude to instructing the jury on the elements of aiding and abetting.
âI also need to explain to you another concept known as aiding and
abetting because the evidence, as youâve heard it, had one occupant of the
Fusion doing the shooting and the other apparently doing the driving.â
ECF No. 7-13, PageID.1091 (emphasis added). The court then instructed
the jury on the elements of aiding and abetting, which included requiring
the prosecution to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
PageID.1091â92.
Jones-Hill asserts that the introductory remark instructed the jury
to find that the passenger of the Fusion perpetrated the shooting while
another individual drove. Defense counsel objected; there was testimony
from one witness that he could not tell whether the driver or passenger
was the shooter (thereby suggesting the possibility of a merely present
passenger). Id. at PageID.1101â02. The trial court overruled the
objection, stating in error, âI think I said that was the Peopleâs theory;
didnât I put it that way?â Id.
Viewed in isolation, the court stated that the evidence âhadâ one
occupant of the Fusion driving and the other occupant shooting.
However, noting that the evidence âhadâ something differs from directing
the jury to decide that the evidence established something beyond a
reasonable doubt. In addition to the challenged statement, the jury was
repeatedly instructed on the prosecutionâs burden of proof. Id. at
PageID.1076â77, 1080, 1086, 1090â93.
Furthermore, before the challenged statement, the jury was
instructed, âAs jurors, you must decide what the facts of the case are[;]
[y]ou must decide what happened and this is your job and no one elseâs[.]
What you decide about any fact in this case is final[.]â Id. at PageID.1075.
The jury was also instructed to only consider the evidence and that the
courtâs âcomments, rulings, questions, and instructions are also not
evidence[.] [W]hen I make a comment or give an instruction, I am not
trying to influence your vote or express a personal opinion about the case.
If you believe that I have an opinion about how you should decide the
case, pay no attention to that opinion. You are the only judges of the facts,
and you must decide this case only from the evidence.â Id. at
PageID.1078. Similar admonitions were made before trial. ECF No. 7-10,
PageID.541.
Reading all of the instructions together, as established Supreme
Court law mandates, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury
believed it was directed to make a factual finding that one person drove
the Fusion while the other person engaged in the shooting. Instead, as
the trial court believed it had made explicit, the jury would have
understood that it was being instructed on aiding and abetting because
the evidence presented at trial made the instruction relevant.
This was not the only place in the instructions where the trial court
prefaced a legal concept, the court also instructed the jury on transferred
intent. Before doing so, the court explained that the instruction was
relevant âbecause nobody is claiming that the Defendants had a motive
to shoot up the car that contained the four complainants in this case. The
motive here, if any, would be that either one or both of the Defendants
had a motive to commit the crime against the originally intended target.
That is, O.â Id. at PageID.1083.
Given the courtâs repeated and clear statements that the facts were
something for the jury alone to determine, as well as to disregard any
statement it thought indicated an opinion of the court on the matter,
there is no reasonable probability that the jury understood the
challenged comment to direct it to make a particular factual finding. See
United States v. Jennings, 40 F. Appâx. 1, 5 (6th Cir. Feb. 26, 2002). If
there was any error in the trial courtâs prefatory statementâgiven the
clear and overwhelming evidence regarding the circumstances of the
shootingâit did not have a substantial impact on the trialâs result.
Hedgpeth, 555 U.S. at 61â62. Accordingly, the Michigan Court of Appeals
reasonably rejected this claim.
Jones-Hill has, again, failed to demonstrate entitlement to habeas
relief.
C. Autopsy Photograph
Jones-Hill next asserts that his trial was rendered fundamentally
unfair in violation of due process by the admission of an autopsy photo.
Jones-Hill attached a copy of the color photo to the petition. It is a closeup
shot of the back of the deceasedâs partially shaven head, depicting a
relatively large and irregularly shaped open wound with more minor
irregular wounds around it. The wounds and skin appear clean, and no
excess blood or gore is visible. ECF No. 1-5, PageID.71.
The U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled that the admission of
crime scene or autopsy photographs violates due process. Rather, it has
stated that just because a photograph âis shocking to the sensibilities of
those in the courtroomâ does not alone ârender its reception a violation of
due process.â Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 228 (1941).
As a result, the Sixth Circuit has held that a challenge to the
admission of a gruesome photo does not present a question of
constitutional magnitude under clearly established Supreme Court law.
See Cooey v. Coyle, 289 F.3d 882, 893â94 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Gerlaugh
v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1032 (9th Cir. 1997)); see also Franklin v.
Bradshaw, 695 F.3d 439, 456â57 (6th Cir. 2012) (admission of eighteen
autopsy photographs of victims did not render state criminal trial
fundamentally unfair); Biros v. Bagley, 422 F.3d 379, 391 (6th Cir. 2005)
(affirming district courtâs denial of habeas relief on claim challenging the
admission of victim photographs); Skrzycki v. Lafler, 347 F. Supp. 2d 448,
455 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (âThe admission of relevant photographs of a crime
scene or a victim, even if gruesome, does not deprive a criminal defendant
of a fair trial.â).
The Michigan Court of Appeals found that the photo admitted here
was relevant and admissible. The provided purpose of the exhibit was to
show that the bullet was fired by a high-velocity weapon and must have
passed through glass or some other medium and brought that material
with it to create the constellation of wounds. ECF No. 7-11, PageID.734â
35. A critical factual issue at trial was the identity of the shooter. The
fact that a high-velocity weapon caused the wound was relevant because
of evidence that Jones-Hill had an assault rifle shortly before the
shooting and because corresponding ammunition was found at Reaveâs
motherâs house.
Additionally, the evidence indicated that there were four people
inside the deceased victimâs vehicle. Evidence that the bullet that killed
the deceased victim came from outside the vehicle and brought glass or
debris with it was relevant to exclude any hypothesis that someone inside
the car fired the fatal shot.
Finally, at issue here is a single, color photo of the fatal wound.
Despite Jones-Hillâs characterization of the exhibit as âgruesome and
repulsive,â ECF No. 1, PageID.30, the image does not appear to the Court
to be overly bloody or gory but instead seems more clinical. The admission
of far more gruesome photos has been upheld on federal habeas review.
See Biros, 422 F.3d at 391 (state court decision affirming the admission
of âthree photographs - depicting [the victimâs] severed head, her severed
head held near her torso and severed breast, and her torso with the
severed head and severed breast replaced on torso,â was not
unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent).
Given these circumstances, the state appellate court reasonably
rejected the claim. Accordingly, habeas relief is not warranted on this
claim either.
D. Admission of Laboratory Report
Jones-Hillâs last claim asserts that his rights under the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause were violated when the ballistics lab
report was admitted in place of live testimony and subject to cross-
examination. On direct appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals found that
Jones-Hill waived his right to confront and cross-examine the report's
author when he failed to demand live testimony after the prosecutor filed
a notice that it would present the report under Michigan Court Rule
6.202. Jones-Hill, 2021 WL 4239024, at *5.
The Confrontation Clause generally prohibits the admission of
testimonial out-of-court statements at trial. Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 53â54 (2004). Testimonial statements include, among other
things, pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be
used in a prosecutionâtypically including forensic reports generated in
connection with a criminal investigation. Id. at 51; see Bullcoming v. New
Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 567â78 (2011) (defendant has the right to cross-
examine the person who performed testing or examination of evidence
obtained from defendant); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305,
310â11 (2009) (expert report is âfunctionally identicalâ to testimonial
statement when presented to prove truth of its content).
Nevertheless, clearly established Supreme Court law allows a State
to impose a timely Confrontation Clause objection on the defendant. The
Supreme Court has approved so-called ânotice-and-demand procedures,â
like the one found in Rule 6.202. According to the Supreme Court, these
rules âtypically ârenderâŠotherwise hearsay forensic reports admissible[,]
while specifically preserving a defendantâs right to demand that the
prosecution call the author/analyst of [the] report.ââ Bullcoming, 564 U.S.
at 666 (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 326â27). Notice-and-demand
procedures are sufficient under established law to protect a defendantâs
rights where they âpermit the defendant to assert (or forfeit by silence)
his Confrontation Clause right after receiving notice of the prosecutionâs
intent to use a forensic analystâs report.â Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 326.
Rule 6.202 is such a rule. Rule 6.202(B) and (C)(1) provide that,
within 14 days of receipt, the prosecutor must state its intention to
present the forensic report at trial and serve a copy of the report to
defense counsel. Under Rule 6.202(C)(2), the defense has 14 days to file
a written objection. If an objection is filed, the report is not admissible.
Id. If no objection is filed, the report is admissible. Id.
The prosecution notified Jones-Hill of its intent to offer the
ballistics report in lieu of live testimony from Grabowski under Rule
6.202, and Jones-Hill did not file an objection. The trial court held a
hearing before the report's admission, and it inquired from both defense
attorneys whether the prosecutor had complied with the requirements of
Rule 6.202. Jones-Hillâs counsel did not make a coherent objection,
replying only âyes, no, yes, no.â ECF No. 7-11, PageID.783. A second offer
to record any objection was declined. Id. at PageID.788.
The Court will not question the Michigan Court of Appealsâ
determination that defense counselâs responses were inadequate to
constitute an objection. The state court of appeals reasonably found that
Jones-Hill waived his Confrontation Clause rights by failing to make a
timely objection under Rule 6.202(C)(2) and then failing to make a
coherent objection when asked if the prosecution complied with the rule.
Nevertheless, Jones-Hill asserts his claim was preserved when
defense counsel initially objected to the report's admission because
Grabowski was not listed on the prosecutorâs witness list. ECF No. 7-11,
PageID.778. Yet that objection came too late to constitute a âdemandâ for
live testimony under Rule 6.202(C)(2), and it was made on different
grounds. Jones-Hill offers no state authority standing for the proposition
that notice under Rule 6.202(B) and (C) must be accompanied by listing
the reportâs author on the witness list. Indeed, the whole point of offering
notice under Rule 6.202 is to inform the defendant that the report's
author will not be testifying.
Accordingly, the Michigan Court of Appeals, consistent with the
dictates of clearly established Supreme Court law, reasonably found that
Jones-Hill waived his Confrontation Clause claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
None of Jones-Hillâs claims merit habeas relief. Consequently, his
petition is DENIED.
Before Jones-Hill may appeal this decision, the Court must
determine whether to issue a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(A); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A certificate of appealability may be
issued âonly if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right.â 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
To satisfy § 2253(c)(2), Jones-Hill must show âthat reasonable
jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition
should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.â
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court finds that reasonable jurists would
not debate the resolution of any of Jones-Hillâs claims. The Court will,
therefore, deny a certificate of appealability.
For the reasons above, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is
DENIED WITH PREJUDICE, and a certificate of appealability is
likewise DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 14, 2024 s/Terrence G. Berg
TERRENCE G. BERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Case Information
- Court
- E.D. Mich.
- Decision Date
- May 14, 2024
- Status
- Precedential