Just City, Inc. v. Bonner

[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"10753150","type":"100trialcourt","part":"opinion","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                        
             FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE                       
                       WESTERN DIVISION                                  


JUST CITY, INC.,                )                                        
                                )                                        
     Plaintiff,                 )                                        
                                )     No. 2:24-cv-02540-TLP-tmp          
v.                              )                                        
                                )                                        
SHERIFF FLOYD BONNER, JR., et al.,  )                                    
                                )                                        
     Defendants.                                              )          


 ORDER DENYING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MOTIONS TO DISMISS             


    Just City, Inc. sued Sheriff Bonner, Judge Lee Wilson,1 and the Shelby County judicial 
commissioners in their official capacities to prevent enforcement of HB 1719, a Tennessee 
statutory amendment that prohibits a judicial officer from considering a detainee’s “ability to 
pay” when setting bail.  Just City moved for a preliminary injunction and expedited declaratory 
relief, arguing that the statute is unconstitutional.  (ECF No. 2.)  Defendants opposed the motion 
on the grounds that neither form of requested relief is appropriate.  (ECF No. 37.)  The State of 
Tennessee then intervened and also opposed the motion, contending that Just City lacks standing 
to assert these claims and that the Younger abstention doctrine applies.  (ECF No. 40-1.)  
Defendants and the State then separately moved to dismiss for lack of standing, Younger 
abstention, and failure to state a claim.  (ECF Nos. 44, 52.)             


1 Just City originally sued Bill Anderson as the Presiding Shelby County General Session 
Criminal Court Judge, but, because the suit brings only official-capacity claims, later substituted 
Anderson for Lee Wilson under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).      
                               1                                         
                         BACKGROUND                                      
    Just City is a nonprofit organization “dedicated to fighting discrimination based on race, 
ethnicity, and income in Shelby County criminal proceedings.”  (ECF No. 1 at PageID 3.)  As 
part of its mission, Just City operates a charitable bail fund.  And in 2022, Just City and others 

entered a “Memorandum of Understanding” (“Agreement”) with Shelby County to create 
procedural safeguards for detainees in Shelby County jail.  (Id.; ECF No. 2-6.)  Among the 
anticipated reforms was the requirement that the County use a specific written assessment to 
calculate and “evaluate the arrestee’s ability to pay” when setting bail.  (ECF No. 2-6 at PageID 
98.)  But shortly after Just City and Shelby County formalized the Agreement, the Tennessee 
legislature passed HB 1719, which amended
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-118
(b), the bail statute, to 
require judicial officers setting bail to consider a detainee’s “financial condition; provided, that, 
the defendant’s ability to pay shall not be considered.”2  Just City alleges that this amendment 

2 Tennessee’s bail statute states that,                                   

    [i]n determining the amount of bail necessary to reasonably assure the appearance 
    of the defendant while at the same time protecting the safety of the public, the 
    magistrate shall consider the following:                             
       (1) The defendant’s length of residence in the community;         
       (2) The defendant’s employment status and history and financial condition; 
         provided, that, the defendant's ability to pay shall not be considered; 
       (3) The defendant’s family ties and relationships;                
       (4) The defendant’s reputation, character and mental condition;   
       (5) The  defendant’s  prior  criminal  record,  record  of  appearance  at  court 
         proceedings, record of flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at 
         court proceedings;                                              
       (6) The nature of the offense and the apparent probability of conviction and the 
         likely sentence;                                                
       (7) The defendant’s prior criminal record and the likelihood that because of 
         that record the defendant will pose a risk of danger to the community; 
       (8) The identity of responsible members of the community who will vouch for 
         the defendant’s reliability; however, no member of the community may 
         vouch for more than two (2) defendants at any time while charges are still 
         pending or a forfeiture is outstanding; and                     
                               2                                         
made “Shelby County officials abandon their constitutional obligations and the terms of the 
[A]greement,” and it sued here.  (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.)                 
    In fact, Just City alleges HB 1719 violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing judicial officers from considering a detainee’s 

ability to pay when setting a bail amount.  (Id. at PageID 12–13.)  It seeks an expedited 
declaratory judgment that the statute is unconstitutional and a preliminary injunction to prevent 
enforcement of bail orders entered without considering the detainee’s ability to pay.  (Id. at 
PageID 13.)  Defendants and State oppose both forms of relief and have each moved to dismiss.  
(ECF Nos. 37, 40-1, 44, 52.)                                              
    In opposition to the preliminary injunction, the State argues that Just City lacks standing 
for its claims (ECF No. 40-1 at PageID 378–82) and that Younger abstention prohibits the Court 
from deciding the matter (id. at 382–86).  And the State and Defendants contend that declaratory 
and injunctive relief are inappropriate.  (Id. at 386–95; ECF No. 37 at 350–360.)  The State and 
Defendants repeat the standing and Younger abstention arguments in their motions to dismiss.  

(ECF No. 44 at PageID 409–12; ECF No. 52-1 at PageID 484–93.)  And the State also argues 
Just City has failed to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  (ECF No. 
52-1 at PageID 493–500.)  Lastly, Defendants ask the Court to dismiss the official capacity 
claims and restyle the action “as against only Shelby County Government.”  (ECF No. 44 and 
PageID 412–13.)  The Court will address each of these motions, and the arguments related to 
them, in turn.                                                            

       (9) Any other factors indicating the defendant’s ties to the community or 
         bearing on the risk of the defendant's willful failure to appear, including, 
         but not limited to, whether the defendant is lawfully present in this state.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-118
(b).                                           
                               3                                         
                    PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION                               
    Preliminary injunctions are an “extraordinary remedy.”  Enchant Christmas Light Maze 
& Mkt. v. Glowco, LLC,
958 F.3d 532, 535
(6th Cir. 2020).  They “preserve the status quo until a 
trial on the merits” and courts should not award them without “a clear showing that the plaintiff 

is entitled to such relief.”  S. Glazer’s Distribs. of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing, Co.,
860 
F.3d 844
, 848–49 (6th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks and citations omitted).  In determining 
whether to grant a preliminary injunction, courts in the Sixth Circuit consider “(1) the movant’s 
chances of succeeding on the merits; (2) if the movant would likely be permanently harmed 
absent the injunction; (3) whether the injunction would cause substantial harm to third parties; 
and (4) whether the injunction would serve the public interest.”  McGirr v. Rehme,
891 F.3d 603, 
610
(6th Cir. 2018).                                                      
    The court must balance these factors.  Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, 
L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp.,
511 F.3d 535, 542
(6th Cir. 2007) (“These four considerations are factors 
to be balanced, not prerequisites that must be met.”  (quotation marks and citation omitted)).  But 

“[i]n constitutional cases, the first factor is typically dispositive.  That’s because ‘[w]hen 
constitutional rights are threatened or impaired, irreparable injury is presumed.’  And no 
cognizable harm results from stopping unconstitutional conduct, so ‘it is always in the public 
interest to prevent violation of a party’s constitutional rights.’”  Vitolo v. Guzman,
999 F.3d 353
, 
360 (6th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted).  The Court next considers the factors.   
I.   Likelihood of Success on the Merits                                  
    The first factor to consider in a preliminary injunction analysis is the movant’s likelihood 
of success on the merits of its claim.  McGirr,
891 F.3d at 610
.  The movant need not “prove his 
case in full” to show a right to a preliminary injunction, but he still “must show more than a mere 
                               4                                         
possibility of success.”  Ne. Ohio Coalition v. Husted,
696 F.3d 580, 591
(6th Cir. 2012) 
(quotation marks and citation omitted).  And, because this factor “is generally the most important 
one,” “[i]f a movant is highly unlikely to succeed on the merits, there is little reason for a court 
to take the drastic step of enjoining the opposing party at the onset of a suit.”  Higuchi Int’l Corp. 

v. Autoliv ASP, Inc.,
103 F.4th 400
, 404 (6th Cir. 2024).  This is especially true in constitutional 
cases.  See Vitolo, 999 F.3d at 360 (“In constitutional cases, the first factor is typically 
dispositive.”).                                                           
    When a “plaintiff has raised questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult, 
and doubtful as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus for more deliberate 
investigation,” Ne. Ohio Coalition,
696 F.3d at 591
(quoting Six Clinics Holding Corp., II v. 
Cafcomp Sys., Inc.,
119 F.3d 393
, 402 (6th Cir. 1997)), that plaintiff may be able to show enough 
of a likelihood of success for a preliminary injunction.  But at the same time—and particularly in 
cases that raise federalism concerns—doubt surrounding an outcome may be the exact reason a 
plaintiff cannot show likelihood of success.  See L.W. v. Skrmetti,
73 F.4th 408
, 415–16 (6th Cir. 

2023) (explaining that when the movant “seek[s] to extend the constitutional guarantees to new 
territory[,] . . . it does suggest that the key premise of a preliminary injunction—likelihood of 
success on the merits—is missing”).                                       
    With that in mind, the State claims that Just City is unlikely to succeed because this Court 
should abstain from hearing the case under the Younger abstention doctrine.  The Court will 
therefore turn to that argument.                                          
    A.    Younger Abstention                                             
    The State argues that Younger abstention applies, meaning that this Court should refrain 
from deciding the issues here.  (ECF No. 40-1 at PageID 382–86; ECF No. 52-1 at PageID 488–
                               5                                         
93.)   And of course, when resolving the question of whether a party is likely to succeed on the 
merits of its claims, a court has to consider how likely it can, or will, hear the claim rather than 
abstain from hearing the case.  See Rainey v. Perkins Twp. Bd. of Trs., No. 24-3564,
2024 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 19960
, at *4–6 (6th Cir. Aug. 7, 2024) (beginning an analysis of success on the 

merits with a discussion of Younger abstention).  For that reason, the Court will first consider 
whether the Younger abstention doctrine applies here.                     
    Generally, when a federal court has jurisdiction over a claim, it has a “virtually 
unflagging” obligation to exercise that jurisdiction and to resolve the case.  Sprint Commc’ns, 
Inc. v. Jacobs,
571 U.S. 69, 77
(2013).  But the Younger abstention doctrine, which originates 
from principles of comity and equity, provides an exception to that rule and allows federal courts 
to abstain from deciding the matter.  Id.; see also Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37
(1971).  
Younger abstention applies only to three types of cases, known as NOPSI category cases: (1) 
ongoing criminal prosecutions, (2) certain civil enforcement proceedings that “are akin to 
criminal prosecutions,” and (3) “civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in 

furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.”  Doe v. Univ. of Ky.,
860 F.3d 365
, 368–69 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Sprint,
571 U.S. at 72
; New Orleans Pub. Serv., 
Inc. v. Council of New Orleans,
491 U.S. 350, 368
(1989) (“NOPSI”)).      
    When one of these three NOPSI category cases arises, the court next looks to see whether 
the case also meets the Middlesex factors.  See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State 
Bar Ass’n,
457 U.S. 423
, 432–34 (1982).  Under Middlesex, the federal court will abstain from 
exercising jurisdiction only when “(1) state proceedings are currently pending; (2) the 
proceedings involve an important state interest; and (3) the state proceedings will provide the 

                               6                                         
federal plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims.” Doe,
860 F.3d at 
369
; see also Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432–34.                              
    Even when a federal court may properly abstain under the NOPSI categories and 
Middlesex factors, it will not abstain from hearing a case when there are “extraordinary 

circumstances” justifying federal intrusion.  Younger,
401 U.S. at 45
(citation omitted).  These 
circumstances include “bad faith, harassment, flagrant unconstitutionality, or another unusual 
circumstance warranting equitable relief.”  See Tindall v. Wayne Cnty. Friend of the Ct.,
269 
F.3d 533
, 538 (6th Cir. 2001).  The Court will next address the NOPSI categories and the 
Middlesex factors in turn.                                                
         1.   NOPSI Categories                                           
    The three types of cases in which Younger abstention may be appropriate—state criminal 
prosecutions, some civil enforcement proceedings, and proceedings involving inherently judicial 
functions—are known as the NOPSI categories.  See Doe, 860 F.3d at 368–69 (quoting Sprint,
571 U.S. at 72
; NOPSI,
491 U.S. at 368
); see also Younger,
401 U.S. at 44
.  If a case falls outside 

these categories, abstention is inappropriate.  See Doe,
860 F.3d at 369
.  The parties here do not 
argue that this case implicates the second or third NOPSI category, but they disagree about 
whether the state bail proceedings constitute an ongoing criminal prosecution for abstention 
purposes.  The State and Defendants argue that the bail proceedings are integral to criminal 
prosecutions, so they fall within the first NOPSI category.  (See ECF No. 40-1 at PageID 382–
84; ECF No. 44 at PageID 410–11.)  But Just City counters that the bail proceedings are 
collateral to, and will not affect the merits of, the criminal prosecutions, so this case falls outside 
the scope of the first NOPSI category.  (ECF No. 45 at PageID 419–20 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103
(1975)).)                                                    
                               7                                         
    There is some guidance about when a case interferes with an ongoing criminal 
prosecution under the first NOPSI category.  In Gerstein v. Pugh, the Supreme Court explained 
that Younger abstention did not apply to the plaintiff’s challenge to pretrial detention hearings 
because                                                                   

    [t]he injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such, but only at the 
    legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing, an issue that could not be 
    raised in defense of the criminal prosecution.  The order to hold preliminary 
    hearings could not prejudice the conduct of the trial on the merits. 

Gerstein,
420 U.S. at 108
n.9.  Relying on Gerstein, some circuits have similarly refused to apply 
Younger to challenges to pretrial proceedings.  See Walker v. City of Calhoun,
901 F.3d 1245
, 
1254–55 (11th Cir. 2018) (determining that Gerstein covered plaintiff’s suit for “prompt bail 
determinations for himself and his fellow class members”); Arevalo v. Hennessy,
882 F.3d 763, 
766
(9th Cir. 2018) (“[B]ecause the question of whether the petitioner is entitled to a 
constitutional bail hearing is separate from the state prosecution, and would not interfere with 
those proceedings, Younger abstention is not appropriate.”); Stewart v. Abraham,
275 F.3d 220, 
225
(3d Cir. 2001) (not applying Younger when “the equitable relief requested is not aimed at 
state prosecutions, but at the legality of the re-arrest policy and the pretrial detention of a class of 
criminal defendants”); Campbell v. McGruder,
580 F.2d 521
, 525–26 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (not 
applying Younger where “plaintiffs could not raise as a defense to the criminal charges pending 
against them in [state court] the unconstitutionality of the conditions of their confinement”). 
    But the State cites O’Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488
(1974), and Parker v. Turner,
626 
F.2d 1
(6th Cir. 1980),3 to challenge what looks like a classic Gerstein-type case here.  (ECF No. 
52-1 at PageID 489; ECF No. 63 at PageID 654.)  In O’Shea, plaintiffs alleged that a county 

3 The State cited this case in its Reply in support of its Motion to Dismiss rather than to oppose 
the preliminary injunction.  But the Court will consider it here.         
                               8                                         
judge violated the constitutional rights of defendants in setting bonds, sentences, and trial fees.  
Id. at 492.  And the district court in O’Shea awarded, or at least contemplated, very broad relief.4  
The Supreme Court ruled that the district court should have applied the Younger abstention 
doctrine, reasoning,                                                      

    Respondents do not seek to strike down a single state statute, either on its face or 
    as applied; nor do they seek to enjoin any criminal prosecutions that might be 
    brought under a challenged criminal law. . . . What they seek is an injunction aimed 
    at controlling or preventing the occurrence of specific events that might take place 
    in the course of future state criminal trials. . . . Apparently the order would 
    contemplate  interruption  of  state  proceedings  to  adjudicate  assertions  of 
    noncompliance by petitioners.  This seems to us nothing less than an ongoing 
    federal audit of state criminal proceedings which would indirectly accomplish the 
    kind of interference that Younger v.
Harris, supra,
and related cases sought to 
    prevent.                                                             

O’Shea,
414 U.S. at 500
.5  But that is not the situation here.            

4 The district court, Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and Supreme Court are somewhat 
vague about what specific relief was sought or awarded.  O’Shea,
414 U.S. at 493
n.1 (“While 
the Court of Appeals did not attempt to specify exactly what type of injunctive relief might be 
justified, it at least suggested that it might include a requirement of ‘periodic reports of various 
types of aggregate data on actions on bail and sentencing.’” (quoting Littleton v. Berbling,
468 
F.2d 389, 415
(7th Cir. 1972))).                                          
5 The Fifth Circuit recently ruled that the federal court should abstain from reviewing the Texas 
bail system.  See Daves v. Dallas Cnty.,
64 F.4th 616, 621
(5th Cir. 2023) (en banc).  That court 
relied on O’Shea, instead of Gerstein and cases applying it, in its second en banc review of a 
constitutional challenge to Texas’s offense-based bail schedule that “allegedly prevented 
consideration of the defendants’ ability to pay” when setting bail.
Id. at 621
.  In Daves, the 
plaintiffs sought “a variety of fundamental alterations in the pretrial decisional process” and “the 
appointment of a federal monitor over the Dallas County criminal justice system” who would 
receive “periodic reports.”
Id.
at 621–22.  In its analysis of the Middlesex factors (rather than as 
part of the NOPSI discussion), the Fifth Circuit determined Younger abstention was proper: 
“categorically excluding from the ambit of Younger abstention . . . constitutional claims 
involving bits and pieces of the criminal process, e.g., bail bonding . . . , is fundamentally at odds 
with comity and federalism.”
Id.
at 626 n.17.                            
    But Daves and O’Shea are dramatically different from this case because they sought 
much more invasive relief.  Indeed, the facts of Daves presented a simple analogy to O’Shea.  
And even though the en banc Fifth Circuit overturned its own precedent, distinguishing the case 
from Gerstein, questioning subsequent out-of-circuit cases relying on it, and expanding the scope 
of O’Shea, see generally
id.,
this Court sees no need to make such a sweeping rule.  Rather, this 
Court recognizes that the Supreme Court applied Younger in O’Shea because the movant 
                               9                                         
    Unlike O’Shea, the relief Just City seeks is discrete.  Just City moves for a declaration 
that a single statute is unconstitutional and for an injunction to prevent state officials from 
enforcing bail decisions made without considering the defendant’s ability to pay.   It is not 
requesting ongoing supervision over state court proceedings.  O’Shea,
414 U.S. at 500
.  And like 

Gerstein, whether the state court considers a detainee’s ability to pay during the state pretrial bail 
hearing would “not prejudice the conduct of the trial on the merits” of the criminal case.  
Gerstein,
420 U.S. at 108
n.9.                                            
    And in Parker, the plaintiffs challenged civil contempt proceedings for nonpayment of 
child support and alimony.
626 F.2d at 2
.  Despite the factual dissimilarities between Parker and 
this case, the State still asserts that “the Sixth Circuit clarified long ago [in Parker] that Gerstein 
only avoided Younger abstention because the ‘existence of a hearing right was at issue’ and that 
issue ‘could not be raised in any pending state proceeding.’”  (ECF No. 63 at PageID 654 
(quoting Parker,
626 F.2d at 8
).)  But the State overlooks the thrust of the Sixth Circuit’s 
opinion.  Only two paragraphs later, the Sixth Circuit added that “[t]he critical questions are 

whether the issue raised is collateral to the principal state proceeding and whether state court 
relief is available.  For example, where hearing rights are clearly set out in a statute or court rule, 
a federal court can pass upon their constitutional adequacy.”  Parker,
626 F.2d at 8
(citing 
Fernandez v. Trias Monge,
586 F.2d 848
, 851 n.2 (1st Cir. 1978) (“The instant claim addresses 
the statutory procedure [for pretrial detention], not its daily administration; relief, fashioned 
after Gerstein v. Pugh, [
420 U.S. at 123
,] would outline only the minimum due process standard, 
leaving the choice of procedures and the operational details to the Commonwealth [of Puerto 


essentially requested an “ongoing federal audit” of state proceedings and acknowledges that Just 
City does not seek similar relief here.                                   
                              10                                         
Rico].”)).  And based on that language, the Sixth Circuit found that claims like those here are 
exactly the type to trigger Gerstein.  Just City challenges pretrial detention procedures “collateral 
to the principal state proceeding” and the “constitutional adequacy” of “hearing rights . . . clearly 
set out in” Tennessee’s bail statute.  See Parker,
626 F.2d at 8
(citations omitted).  

    Just City’s position aligns with how most circuits have applied the Younger analysis to 
pretrial proceedings.  And so, based on Gerstein and the differences between this case, O’Shea, 
and Parker, the Court finds that Younger abstention does not apply here.  
         2.   Middlesex Factors                                          
    When a case falls within one of the NOPSI categories, the court then applies the 
Middlesex factors6 to see whether abstention is appropriate.  See Sprint,
571 U.S. at 78
(“We 
have not applied Younger outside these three ‘exceptional’ categories, and today hold, in accord 
with NOPSI, that they define Younger’s scope.”).  Since this case falls outside the NOPSI 
categories, the Court need not examine the Middlesex factors.  But for the same reason this case 
does not present an ongoing criminal proceeding for purposes of NOPSI, there is no ongoing 

criminal proceeding under Middlesex.  See Gerstein,
420 U.S. at 108
n.9.  And even if the first 


6 Under Middlesex, federal courts abstain from hearing a case when “(1) state proceedings are 
currently pending; (2) the proceedings involve an important state interest; and (3) the state 
proceedings will provide the federal plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to raise his 
constitutional claims.”  Doe,
860 F.3d at 369
; see also Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432–34.  Only if 
the case meets all three factors does Younger abstention apply and the federal court would 
decline to exercise jurisdiction.  Doe,
860 F.3d at 369
; see also Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432–34.  
Of course, the process for setting bail involves important state interests because pretrial 
detention, and release, protects the public and ensures a defendant’s presence for trial.  And the 
state proceedings provide adequate opportunity for a detainee to challenge the constitutionality 
of his detention through state appeals.  See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-144
(“The actions by a trial 
court . . . in granting, denying, setting or altering conditions of the defendant’s release shall be 
reviewable in the manner provided in the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.”). 
                              11                                         
factor were met, satisfying the Middlesex factors is not enough for abstention when this case falls 
outside the NOPSI categories.7                                            
    For those reasons, Just City’s challenge to pretrial bail proceedings does not persuade the 
Court to refrain from deciding the case because Younger seldom applies to challenges to pretrial 

procedures that do not affect the merits of the criminal prosecution.  See Gerstein,
420 U.S. at 
108
n.9.  Since the Court is not applying it, Younger abstention does not weigh against Just City 
in the preliminary injunction analysis.  Next the Court will consider whether Just City has 
standing to assert the claim here.                                        
    B.    Standing                                                       
    The State argues that the Court should deny the motion for preliminary injunction 
because Just City lacks standing to bring its claims.  (ECF No. 40-1 at PageID 378–82; ECF No. 
52-1 at PageID 484–88.)  Whether a party can succeed on the merits of its claims of course 
depends on whether the party has standing to bring the claims in the first place.  See Fischer v. 
Thomas,
52 F.4th 303, 307
(6th Cir. 2022) (“To establish a likelihood of success in a lawsuit, a 

plaintiff must, of course, have standing to bring it.”); see also Tenn. Conf. of the NAACP v. Lee,
105 F.4th 888, 901
(6th Cir. 2024) (per curiam) (explaining, in the context of staying a 
preliminary injunction, that “the ‘merits’ in this likelihood-of-success context include what 
otherwise seems like a non-merits question: Does the plaintiff have standing to raise the claims 
on which it won an injunction?”).                                         

7 Sometimes when a case satisfies NOPSI and Middlesex, courts may determine that 
“extraordinary circumstances” warrant exercising jurisdiction over a matter even though 
abstention would ordinarily be appropriate under NOPSI and Middlesex.  Younger,
401 U.S. at 
45
; see Tindall, 269 F.3d at 538.  These circumstances may include “bad faith, harassment, 
flagrant unconstitutionality, or another unusual circumstance warranting equitable relief.”  See 
Tindall, 269 F.3d at 538.  But since the abstention argument fails under NOPSI and Middlesex, 
the Court finds that abstention is not otherwise appropriate here.        
                              12                                         
    For starters, under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts only have jurisdiction 
over “Cases” and “Controversies.”  FDA v. All. For Hippocratic Med.,
602 U.S. 367
, 378 
(2024); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.  To ensure compliance with this requirement, courts have 
developed the standing doctrine to limit who can bring suit to enforce a right.  FDA, 602 U.S. at 

379.  For standing, a plaintiff must show “(i) that she has suffered or likely will suffer an injury 
in fact, (ii) that the injury likely was caused or will be caused by the defendant, and (iii) that the 
injury likely would be redressed by the requested judicial relief.”  Id. at 380 (citation omitted). 
    An injury in fact must be “concrete” and “particularized.”  Id. at 381 (quoting 
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,
594 U.S. 413, 424
(2021)).  And an injury in fact must be more 
than an ideological offense or harm, no matter how deeply held the plaintiff’s belief or 
conviction.
Id.
(“Nor may citizens sue merely because their legal objection is accompanied by a 
strong moral, ideological, or policy objection to a government action.”).  The injury must also 
“be actual or imminent, not speculative—meaning that the injury must have already occurred or 
be likely to occur soon.  And when a plaintiff seeks prospective relief such as an injunction, the 

plaintiff must establish a sufficient likelihood of future injury.”
Id.
(citations omitted).  “In sum, 
to sue in federal court, a plaintiff must show that he or she has suffered or likely will suffer an 
injury in fact.”  Id. at 382.                                             
    For causation, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s conduct caused, or likely will 
cause, the plaintiff’s injury.  Id.  When a plaintiff “challenges the government’s unlawful 
regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily 
substantially more difficult to establish.  That is often because unregulated parties may have 
more difficulty establishing causation—that is, linking their asserted injuries to the government’s 
regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else.”  Id. at 382–83 (quotation marks and citations 
                              13                                         
omitted).  For courts to find standing based on an injury from government regulation, that injury 
cannot be too attenuated or speculative.  Id. at 383.                     
    Just City argues it has standing to bring this action on three separate grounds.  First, Just 
City claims that it has organizational standing to bring the action on its own behalf because HB 

1719 interferes with the Agreement between Just City and Shelby County.  (ECF No. 45 at 
PageID 418.)  Second, Just City argues that it has organizational standing because the 
modification to the bail statute has led to increased bail amounts which, in turn, hinders Just 
City’s ability to post bail for qualified detainees.  (Id. at PageID 423.)  Third, Just City contends 
it has third-party standing to sue on behalf of the detainees because “(1) it has a close 
relationship with the arrestees and (2) there is a hindrance to the arrestees’ ability to protect their 
own interests.”  (Id. at PageID 417.)                                     
    As discussed below, it seems Just City’s interest in enforcing its Agreement with Shelby 
County cannot support standing because Just City is not suing on the contract.  And its other 
arguments to establish organizational or third-party standing are questionable because recent 

case law casts doubt about whether Just City has suffered an injury in fact.   
         1.    Organizational Standing                                   
    Generally, an entity or organization “may have standing ‘to sue on their own behalf for 
injuries they have sustained.’”  FDA, 602 U.S. at 393 (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,
455 U.S. 363
, 379 n.19 (1982)).  Organizational standing requires the plaintiff organization to 
show the same elements of standing that individual plaintiffs must show: injury in fact, 
causation, and redressability.
Id.
at 393–94.  Just City claims organizational standing through its 
Agreement with the County and its increased post-amendment costs.         

                              14                                         
               a.    Contract                                            
    As noted above, in 2022, Just City and others agreed with Shelby County to create 
procedural safeguards for detainees in Shelby County jail.  (ECF No. 2-6.)  According to Just 
City, when the Tennessee legislature passed HB 1719, it left Shelby County with a choice: it 

could either violate state law or violate that Agreement with Just City.  So far, it has allegedly 
violated the Agreement by failing to use the ability-to-pay calculator, thereby directly harming 
Just City.  As a result, Just City alleges it has standing.  To be sure, as a party to the Agreement, 
Just City has Article III standing to sue on the Agreement.  For instance, Just City has standing to 
allege breach of contract against Shelby County for violating the Agreement’s provisions.  But 
whether the contract gives it standing to assert a claim based on an alleged Fourteenth 
Amendment violation, and not on the Agreement, is a different question.8  See Town of Chester v. 
Laroe Estates, Inc.,
581 U.S. 433, 439
(2017) (“[S]tanding is not dispensed in gross.  To the 


8 Just City asks the Court to “declar[e] that HB 1719 violates the Fourteenth Amendment” and to 
“enjoin[] the Shelby County Sheriff from enforcing secured bail orders that are issued without a 
determination of ability to pay . . . .”  (ECF No. 1 at PageID 13.)  But this is not a contract claim 
on the Agreement.  Just City is not requesting specific performance, that the Court reinstitute the 
terms of the Agreement, or that the County use the specific ability-to-pay calculator negotiated in 
the Agreement.  Without a logical connection between the factual basis for standing (the breach 
of the Agreement) and the alleged claims (Due Process and Equal Protection violations), Just 
City cannot show it has suffered an injury in fact.  See Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc.,
581 U.S. 433, 439
(2017) (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to 
press . . . .” (quotation marks and citations omitted)).                  
    One conceivable basis for a constitutional challenge based on the breach of the 
Agreement could arise under the Contracts Clause, but that claim would also fail under these 
circumstances.  “The Contracts Clause restricts the power of States to disrupt contractual 
arrangements. It provides that ‘[n]o state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts.’”  Sveen v. Melin,
584 U.S. 811, 818
(2018) (quoting U.S. Const., Art. I, §10, cl. 1).  
But Just City did not sue the state directly, and it did not assert a claim under the Contracts 
Clause for state impairment of its Agreement.  Instead it seeks, via § 1983, to invalidate the law 
on Fourteenth Amendment grounds.  Contracts Clause claims are not cognizable under § 1983 
anyway, Kaminski v. Coulter,
865 F.3d 339, 347
(6th Cir. 2017), so the Clause could not 
somehow create standing for Just City’s § 1983 claim.                     
                              15                                         
contrary, a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each 
form of relief that is sought.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)).   
    Just City cites Springer v. Cleveland Clinic Emp. Health Plan Total Care in support of its 
position that the denial of “a specific contractual right” or the loss of the benefit of the bargain 
creates standing.9
900 F.3d 284
, 287–88 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing cases from the Fifth, Ninth, and 

Eleventh Circuits).  But Springer and the cases it cites (“Springer cases”) are unpersuasive.  The 
facts in the Springer cases differ greatly from the facts here.  For example, the Springer cases 
relate to private contracts governing healthcare insurance, and none challenge the 
constitutionality of a statute affecting those contractual rights.  The cases “held that the denial of 
plan benefits is a concrete injury for Article III standing even when patients were not directly 
billed for their medical services.”
Id. at 287
.  And Springer explained that, “like any private 
contract claim,” the plaintiff’s injury created standing when the plaintiff lost the benefit of the 
bargain.
Id.
Just City’s claims do not deal with a private contract, or even with a contract claim.  

Springer clarifies the standing requirements for a contracting party to sue under ERISA.  But it 
does not support Just City’s assertion that its Agreement with the County creates Article III 
standing for an Equal Protection or Due Process challenge to a state statute that arguably impacts 



9 Just City’s briefs in opposition to the motions to dismiss include additional cases that rely on 
Springer or argue that the breach of a contract that protects the interests of a third party is enough 
for Article III standing.  (ECF No. 51 at PageID 460; ECF No. 62 at PageID 627.)  But these 
suffer from the same shortcomings as the ERISA cases it cited in support of a preliminary 
injunction.  (See ECF No. 45 at PageID 418.)  The Court agrees that breach of a contract could 
give rise to Article III standing for claims on the contract.  But the Fourteenth Amendment 
claims here are not claims on the Agreement.  The Court therefore finds the cited authority 
unpersuasive.                                                             
                              16                                         
the County’s performance under the Agreement.  Next the Court will consider Just City’s other 
arguments supporting standing.                                            
               b.    Increased Bail Amounts                              
    Just City can show organizational standing like any other individual plaintiff: injury in 

fact, causation, and redressability.  See FDA, 602 U.S. at 393–94.  Redressability refers to 
whether “the injury likely would be redressed by the requested judicial relief,” which essentially 
asks whether the court can render relief that would resolve the plaintiff’s problem.  See
id. at 
380
.  With this in mind, Just City asserts that the injury it suffers is an increased cost in posting 
bail for qualified detainees because HB 1719 prohibits state judges from considering an 
individual’s ability to pay.  (ECF No. 1 at PageID 11.)  And if this Court grants the requested 
relief—which is declaring the statute unconstitutional—then, according to Just City, state judges 
could consider a defendant’s ability to pay bail again, and bail amounts would decrease.  (See
id.
at PageID 11–13.)  Just City thus alleges redressability here, though it has a harder time showing 
causation and injury in fact.                                             

    For example, Just City argues that by removing any consideration of a detainee’s ability 
to post bail, the challenged statute has caused judges to increase bail amounts for defendants and, 
as a result, Just City has diverted its resources or paid more from its bail fund to post bail.  (See
id.
at PageID 11.)  But this alleged causal link between HB 1719 and Just City’s harm is 
questionable.  Just City provided no evidence of the cause of the increased bail costs beyond 
Josh Spickler’s affidavit claiming the statute has caused judicial commissioners to set higher bail 
amounts.  (See ECF No. 2-3 at PageID 46.)  To be sure, the statute may have caused the bail-
setting judges to increase the bail amounts.  But other causes might also be responsible.  Because 
the statute calls for an individual assessment based on many factors, the increased costs of bail 
                              17                                         
may stem from any of the factors listed in the statute.  See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-118
(b).  By 
way of example, the bail amounts may be higher because of the nature of crimes charged and the 
likelihood of conviction, or the detainees’ criminal history and the danger the detainees pose to 
the community or their risk of flight.  And because Just City has not provided evidence of 

causation, it has not shown it likely has standing.                       
    Also whether the allegedly higher bail amounts have injured Just City is similarly unclear 
because the law on whether an organization may show an injury based on diverting its resources 
has undergone recent shifts.  The diversion-of-resources theory on which Just City relies first 
arose in Havens, but the 2024 Supreme Court decision in FDA has questioned the viability of the 
approach moving forward.  See FDA, 602 U.S. at 396 (“Havens was an unusual case, and this 
Court has been careful not to extend the Havens holding beyond its context.”).  And the Sixth 
Circuit echoes these uncertainties in Tenn. Conf. of the NAACP v. Lee,
105 F.4th 888
(2024) (per 
curiam).                                                                  
    In Havens, the plaintiff, Housing Opportunities Made Equal (“HOME”), sued Havens 

Realty under the Fair Housing Act,
42 U.S.C. § 3604
, for engaging in racial steering.  Havens, 
455 U.S. at 366–67.  Racial steering is a practice by which housing complexes provide 
inaccurate information about available units in an effort to “steer” people of different racial 
backgrounds away from certain residences.
Id.
at 366 n.1.  After receiving information that 
Havens Realty was engaging in racial steering, HOME sent one black and one white “tester” 
employee to a Havens Realty property to ask about the availability of apartments in the complex.
Id. at 368
.  Havens Realty told the black “tester” employee that there were no available units, but 
it informed the white “tester” employee that there were apartments for rent.
Id.
As a result of 
Havens Realty’s misrepresentation about housing availability, HOME expended resources that 
                              18                                         
otherwise could have been allocated to their “counseling and referral services for low- and 
moderate-income home-seekers.”  See
id. at 379
.  And the Court reasoned that, because Havens 
Realty’s racial steering practices “frustrated” and “perceptibly impaired” HOME’s “counseling 
and referral services, with a consequent drain on resources,” there was enough to confer standing 

on HOME.
Id. at 369, 379
.  This approach has become known as the diversion-of-resources 
theory of standing.                                                       
    That said, the theory has limited application outside of Havens’s “unusual” facts—
especially after the Supreme Court’s June ruling in FDA.  In FDA, multiple medical associations 
brought a challenge under the Administrative Procedures Act against an FDA regulation that 
relaxed restrictions on the abortion drug mifepristone.  FDA, 602 U.S. at 372–73.  The medical 
associations argued that “FDA has ‘impaired’ their ‘ability to provide services and achieve their 
organizational missions.’”
Id. at 394
.  They also contended that the FDA’s new regulation 
required the associations to “‘expend considerable time, energy, and resources’” to oppose, 
research, and educate on mifepristone and the regulation, thereby draining resources that could 

have been allocated to other activities.
Id.
The Court reasoned that “an organization that has not 
suffered a concrete injury caused by a defendant’s action cannot spend its way into standing 
simply by expending money to gather information and advocate against the defendant’s action.”
Id.
It thus decided that the associations lacked standing to challenge the regulation.
Id.
The Court also explained why, despite plaintiffs’ arguments, Havens did not govern the 
facts of that situation.  The Court emphasized,                           
    Critically, HOME not only was an issue-advocacy organization, but also operated 
    a housing counseling service.  And when Havens gave HOME’s employees false 
    information about apartment availability, HOME sued Havens because Havens 
    “perceptibly impaired HOME’s ability to provide counseling and referral services 
    for low- and moderate-income home-seekers.”  In other words, Havens’s actions 
                              19                                         
    directly  affected  and  interfered  with  HOME’s  core  business  activities—not 
    dissimilar to a retailer who sues a manufacturer for selling defective goods to the 
    retailer.                                                            
         That is not the kind of injury that the medical associations have alleged here.  
    FDA’s actions relaxing regulation of mifepristone have not imposed any similar 
    impediment to the medical associations’ advocacy businesses.         
    . . .                                                                
         Havens was an unusual case, and this Court has been careful not to extend 
    the Havens holding beyond its context.  So too here.
Id.
at 395–96 (citations omitted).                                        
    Only weeks after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in FDA, the Sixth Circuit issued 
an opinion in NAACP about where to draw the line between FDA and Havens.  See FDA,
602 
U.S. 367
(decided June 13, 2024); NAACP,
105 F.4th 888
(decided June 28, 2024).  In NAACP, 
the NAACP sued Tennessee election administrators to challenge voter registration laws and 
registration forms that impacted felons.  NAACP,
105 F.4th at 890
.  The District Court for the 
Middle District of Tennessee granted summary judgment for the NAACP and enjoined certain 
registration practices shortly before the election.
Id.
On emergency motion, the Sixth Circuit 
stayed the injunction under Purcell v. Gonzalez,
549 U.S. 1
, 4–5 (2006) (per curiam) (instructing 
courts to not interfere with state elections when close in time to the election), and on standing 
grounds.  NAACP,
105 F.4th at 890
, 901–05.                                
    The Sixth Circuit acknowledged how the Supreme Court in FDA said that “pocketbook” 
harm was not enough to support standing and emphasized that the Supreme Court found standing 
in Havens based on its “unusual” facts and the effect on HOME’s “core business activities.”
Id.
at 903–05.  The Sixth Circuit then placed the facts of NAACP somewhere between FDA and 
                              20                                         
Havens before side-stepping the diversion-of-resources standing issue and deciding the case on 
other grounds.10                                                          
    Still, the Sixth Circuit reflected on the three cases and explained how applying the 
diversion-of-resources standing theory may be harder post-FDA.  See generally
id.
After all, 

“[i]f the associations’ expenditures did not suffice in [FDA], why should the NAACP’s 
expenditures suffice in this one?”
Id. at 905
.  And yet, “[i]f a customer’s expenditure for the 
commodity sufficed to give it standing, why shouldn’t the NAACP’s expenditure for its voter-
registration efforts?”
Id.
(noting FDA’s “approving[]” citations to “many other cases in which 
the Court has allowed ‘unregulated’ parties to sue a defendant even though the defendant’s 
conduct harmed those parties indirectly”).                                
    Like NAACP, this case seems to fall somewhere between Just City trying to “spend its 
way into standing” by voluntarily posting bail for qualified detainees (which did not establish 
standing for the plaintiff associations in FDA) and HB 1719 “perceptibly impair[ing] [Just 
City]’s ability to” perform its “core business activit[y]” of posting bail (which satisfied the 

standing requirements in Havens).  FDA, 602 U.S. at 394–95 (quoting Havens,
455 U.S. at 379
).  
The uncertain legal landscape that NAACP paints about the diversion-of-resources theory 
undermines Just City’s position that it has standing for purposes of preliminary injunctive relief, 
which also casts doubt on whether it will likely succeed on the merits.  The Court will next 
address Just City’s claim that it has third-party standing.               



10 The Sixth Circuit explained that “whether or not the NAACP’s standing theory remains 
tenable, its president’s declaration likely fails to” show standing at the summary judgment stage.  
Id. at 905.  Of course, this case is not at the summary judgment stage, so this portion of the 
NAACP opinion has limited application to Just City’s claims.              
                              21                                         
         2.    Third-Party Standing                                      
    Just City argues that it has third-party standing to bring its claims.  Although a party may 
typically assert only its own rights, the limited doctrine of third-party standing allows a plaintiff 
to “raise a constitutional claim on behalf of a third party.”  Moody v. Mich. Gaming Control Bd.,
847 F.3d 399, 402
(6th Cir. 2017).  To do so, the plaintiff must show (1) its own injury in fact, 
(2) a close relationship between itself and the third party whose rights it intends to assert, and (3) 
an obstacle or hindrance to the third party raising his own claim.  Id.; see also FDA,
602 U.S. 
393
n.5 (explaining that in third-party standing cases, “the litigants themselves still must have 
suffered an injury in fact . . . .  The third-party standing doctrine does not allow doctors to 
shoehorn themselves into Article III standing simply by showing that their patients have suffered 
injuries or may suffer future injuries”).                                 
    Just City argues that it has third-party standing to assert the rights of detainees because 
“(1) it has a close relationship with the arrestees and (2) there is a hindrance to the arrestees’ 
ability to protect their own interests.”  (ECF No. 45 at PageID 417.)  As support for this claim, it 

cites another bail fund case: Nashville Cmty. Bail Fund v. Gentry,
496 F. Supp. 3d 1112
(M.D. 
Tenn. 2020) (“NCBF”).                                                     
    In NCBF, a bail fund much like Just City’s sued the Criminal Court Clerk under the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  The bail fund alleged that the Clerk subtracted fees and 
charges from the posted bail amount and, at the end of the case, returned only that reduced sum 
(rather than the full sum) to whoever posted bail.
Id. at 1122
.  The court explained that a third 
party has a “close relationship” when the relationship between the parties allows the plaintiff to 
be “as effective a proponent of the right as the” third party.
Id. at 1130
.  Because NCBF shared 

                              22                                         
an interest in low bail amounts and offered charitable services to the detainees it assisted, the 
court found that NCBF met the “close relationship” requirement for third-party standing.
Id.
For the hindrance requirement, the court noted that the Sixth Circuit has recognized 
“imminent mootness of a case, or systemic practical challenges to pursuing one’s own rights” as 

sufficient hindrances.
Id.
(collecting cases).  According to the court, the plaintiff showed 
“imminent mootness” because a detainee’s “pretrial release might end during litigation, leaving 
him with no redressable injury” and rendering the case moot.
Id. at 1131
.  And the recipients of 
NCBF’s bail fund services, “by definition, have extremely limited resources,” creating a 
“systemic practical challenge[]” for those detainees to assert their own rights.  See
id. at 1130
. 
    The NCBF court’s analysis on the “close relationship” and hindrance requirements for 
third-party standing is persuasive.  This Court finds that Just City meets those two requirements 
as well.  But the court in NCBF also found that the plaintiff suffered an injury in fact.  And so we 
return to the same question for third-party standing as for organizational standing: Has Just City 
suffered its own injury in fact?  And as the discussion about the Havens, FDA, and NAACP cases 

in the organizational standing section explains, Just City cannot show that it likely has suffered 
an injury in fact at this stage in the litigation.                        
    In sum, Just City may have a difficult time showing causation.  And as far as an injury in 
fact, its breach-of-contract argument does not support organizational standing for its Fourteenth 
Amendment claims.  And even though Just City has presented a real, viable argument for 
organizational and third-party standing, it asserts an injury in fact under the diversion-of-
resources theory, which similarly might not be enough.  Recent precedent—and the uncertainty 
of applying it—casts doubt on the diversion-of-resources theory and suggests that Just City may 
lack standing to bring its claims, making it unlikely that it would succeed on the merits.  See 
                              23                                         
L.W., 73 F.4th at 415–16 (considering the novel nature of a constitutional inquiry as suggesting 
there was not a likelihood of success on the merits).  Not only has Just City failed to show 
likelihood of success on these standing issues, but a closer look at the constitutional questions 
reveals Just City may have similar problems proving likelihood of success on the merits of the 

substantive claims.                                                       
    C.    Constitutionality                                              
    Just City asserts two Fourteenth Amendment challenges to HB 1719.  The first count 
alleges that the procedures for a bail hearing are fundamentally unfair in violation of the Due 
Process Clause.  (ECF No. 1 at PageID 12–13.)  The second count alleges that the amendment 
leads to wealth-based detentions that violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.  (Id. 
at PageID 13.)  For neither claim has Just City shown a likelihood of success on the merits to 
support preliminary injunctive relief because Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent and 
canons of statutory interpretation favor the State and Defendants.  The Court will first address 
the binding cases that guide review of challenges to wealth-based detentions. 

         1.    Level of Scrutiny – Due Process or Equal Protection       
    The law surrounding detention of indigent defendants is somewhat confusing.  See, e.g., 
Walker,
901 F.3d at 1265
(debating the proper level of scrutiny, analytical framework, and 
minimum requirements of due process and noting that “[t]he confusion is perhaps unsurprising 
because . . . Bearden . . . is [not] a model of clarity in setting out the standard of analysis to 
apply”).  In Bearden v. Georgia, the Supreme Court addressed the revocation of probation for 
failure to pay a fine.
461 U.S. 660
(1983).  The Court explained that    
    [d]ue process and equal protection principles converge in the Court’s analysis in 
    these cases.  See Griffin v. Illinois, [
351 U.S. 12, 17
(1956)].  Most decisions in this 
    area have rested on an equal protection framework, although Justice Harlan in 
                              24                                         
    particular has insisted that a due process approach more accurately captures the 
    competing concerns. See, e. g., [id.] at 29–39 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Williams v. 
    Illinois, [
399 U.S. 235
, 259–66 (1970)] (Harlan, J., concurring).  As we recognized 
    in Ross v. Moffitt, [
417 U.S. 600
, 608–09 (1974)], we generally analyze the fairness 
    of relations between the criminal defendant and the State under the Due Process 
    Clause, while we approach the question whether the State has invidiously denied 
    one class of defendants a substantial benefit available to another class of defendants 
    under the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 665
.  The Court added that, “[w]hether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due 
process, the issue . . . requires a careful inquiry into such factors as ‘the nature of the individual 
interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between 
legislative means and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the 
purpose . . . .’”
Id.
at 666–67 (quoting Williams,
399 U.S. at 260
(Harlan, J., concurring)).   
    The Fourteenth Amendment contains a “right not to lose [one’s] liberty due to 
indigency.”  Alkire v. Irving,
330 F.3d 802, 816
(6th Cir. 2003); see also Bearden,
461 U.S. 660
.  
And, in some cases, courts have found that “fundamental fairness requires a court to inquire into 
whether a criminal defendant is able to pay a fine.”  Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Def. 
Comm’n,
501 F.3d 592, 608
(6th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bearden,
461 
U.S. at 673
).  But while courts recognize these principles, they have not created an unqualified 
right for an indigent defendant to receive treatment identical to wealthier defendants at all stages 
of litigation.  For example, indigent defendants do not have a constitutional right to counsel for 
discretionary appeals but defendants with more financial resources can certainly hire one.  See, 
e.g., Ross, 417 U.S. at 616–18.  The courts therefore ask whether the indigent person suffers “an 
absolute deprivation of the desired benefit” rather than a diminished or delayed benefit.  See San 
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1
, 23–24 (1973).         
                              25                                         
    The Supreme Court has not yet extended these rulings to pretrial bail proceedings.  
Although it may be logical to do so, given that some differential treatment based on wealth may 
be permissible, the answer is unclear.  This lack of clarity suggests there is not a likelihood of 
success based on these binding cases alone.  And Sixth Circuit caselaw on assessing likelihood 

of success, which the Court will discuss next, agrees.                    
         2.    Sixth Circuit’s Approach to Injunctions in Constitutional Cases 
    When a case presents a novel issue or one that falls outside established precedent, courts 
may be wise to refrain from issuing an injunction.  The Sixth Circuit in L.W. v. Skrmetti, a case 
challenging a law prohibiting certain healthcare treatments for transgender minors under the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, clarified that,                 
    while the challengers do invoke constitutional precedents of the Supreme Court and 
    our Court in bringing this lawsuit, not one of them resolves these claims.  In each 
    instance, they seek to extend the constitutional guarantees to new territory.  There 
    is nothing wrong with that, to be sure.  But it does suggest that the key premise of 
    a preliminary injunction—likelihood of success on the merits—is missing.  The 
    burden of establishing an imperative for constitutionalizing new areas of American 
    life is not—and should not be—a light one, particularly when “the States are 
    currently engaged in serious, thoughtful” debates about the issue.  Washington v. 
    Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 719
,
117 S. Ct. 2258
,
117 S. Ct. 2302
,
138 L. Ed. 2d 
    772
(1997).                                                          

73 F.4th at 415–16.  The Sixth Circuit then stayed the preliminary injunction that the district 
court had entered.                                                        
    Just City challenges the constitutionality of HB 1719 through questions “so serious, 
substantial, difficult, and doubtful as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus for more 
deliberate investigation.”  Ne. Ohio Coalition,
696 F.3d at 591
(citation omitted).  But because 
neither the Constitution nor any binding courts hold that a bail-setting court must consider the 
detainee’s ability to pay, Just City is asking this Court to recognize a constitutional right beyond 
                              26                                         
the scope of existing precedent.  In other words, it “seek[s] to extend the constitutional 
guarantees [of the Fourteenth Amendment] to new territory,” on an issue about which Tennessee, 
and the 47 other States whose bail statutes or rules refer to a detainee’s ability to pay or financial 
situation,11 “are currently engaged in serious, thoughtful debates.”  L.W., 73 F.4th at 415–16 


11 Just City claims that “[f]orty-one states explicitly require consideration of ability to pay,” but 
this description is not precise.  (ECF No. 2-1 at PageID 30.)  In fact, twenty-one states explicitly 
require considering the detainee’s ability to pay as part of the analysis.  See
Alaska Stat. § 
12.30.011
(c)(8) (2024) (“assets available to the person to meet monetary conditions of release”); 
In re Humphrey, 11 Cal. 5th at 143;
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 804-9
(2024) (“defendant’s financial 
ability to afford bail”);
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-33-8-4
(b)(2) (2024) (“defendant’s ability to give 
bail”); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 431.525(1)(e) (2024) (“financial ability of the defendant”); La. C.Cr.P. 
Art. 316(4) (2024) (“ability of the defendant to give bail”); 15 Me. Rev. Stat. § 1026(4)(C)(4) 
(2024) (“defendant’s financial resources, including the ability of the defendant to afford a 
financial condition”); Md. R. 4-216.1(b)(2) (“the ability of the defendant to meet a special 
condition of release with financial terms”); Mich. Ct. R. 6.106(F)(1)(f) (employment and 
financial history “insofar as these factors relate to the ability to post money bail”); Mo. R. Crim. 
P. 33.01(e) (“financial resources, including ability to pay”);
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-9-301
(6) 
(2023) (“financial ability of the accused”);
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-901
(3) (2024) (“defendant’s 
financial ability to pay a bond”);
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 178.498
(2) (2023) (“financial ability of 
the defendant to give bail”);
N.Y. CLS CPL § 510.10
(1)(f) (2024) (“principal’s individual 
financial circumstances, and, in cases where bail is authorized, the principal’s ability to post bail 
without posing undue hardship”); R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 46(c) (“financial ability of the 
defendant to give bail”); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 17.15(a)(4) (2023) (“ability to make bail”);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-205
(7)(a) (2024) (“the individual’s ability to pay”); 13 Vt. Stat. Ann. § 
7554(b)(1) (2024) (“accused’s ability to post bail”);
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-121
(A) (2024) 
(“financial resources of the accused or juvenile and his ability to pay bond”);
W. Va. Code § 62
-
1C-1a(a)(3)(A) (2024) (“[t]he ability of the arrested person to give bail”); Wyo. R. Crim. P. 
46.1(d)(3)(A) (“financial resources”).                                    
    And another twenty states require considering a detainee’s financial condition or 
resources.  See
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3967
(B)(7) (2024) (“financial resources”); Ark. R. Crim. P. 
9.2(c)(ii) (“his employment status, history and financial condition”);
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16
-
4- 103(3)(a) (2024) (“the person’s financial condition”);
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54
-3b(b)(6) (2024) 
(“defendant’s financial resources”);
Fla. Stat. § 903.046
(2)(c) (2024) (“financial resources”);
Ga. 
Code Ann. § 17-6-1
(e)(2)(A)-(C) (2024) (“financial resources and other assets, including 
whether any such assets are jointly controlled;” “earnings and other income;” and “financial 
obligations, including obligations to dependents”); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/110-5(a)(3)(A) 
(2024) (“financial resources”);
Iowa Code § 811.2
(2) (2024) (“financial resources”);
Kan. Stat. 
Ann. § 22-2802
(8) (2024) (“financial resources”);
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 276, § 57
(2024) 
(“the person’s financial resources”); Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.02(2)(e) (“financial resources”); Miss. 
R. Crim. P. 8.2(a)(13) (“defendant’s financial condition”); N.M. R. Crim. P. Dist. Ct. 5-401(C) 
(“financial resources”); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-534(c) (2023) (“financial resources”); N.D. R. 
                              27                                         
(quotation marks omitted).  And an effort to extend a constitutional right “suggest[s] that the key 
premise of a preliminary injunction—likelihood of success on the merits—is missing.”  Id. at 
415.                                                                      
         3.   Just City’s Authority                                      

    Even though Just City invokes Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent in support of 
its position, it cites no case that directly resolves its claims here.  Instead, the cases occur in 
different procedural stages, challenge bail schemes unlike Tennessee’s, or seek varying types of 
relief.  Just City cites eight cases for its claim that “[c]ourts in Tennessee, and across the country, 
have applied this requirement [that courts must consider the defendant’s ability to pay] to bail 
determinations.”  (ECF No. 2-1 at PageID 31.)  These cases suggest that Just City has an 
argument which might prevail in the end, but they fail to show likelihood of success on the merits 
because no binding case recognizes “ability to pay” as the constitutional touchstone for setting 
bail.12                                                                   

Crim. P. 46(a)(3)(C) (“financial resources”);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2937.011
(E)(4) (2023) 
(“financial resources”); 234 Pa. Code Ch. 5, Rule 523(A)(2) (2024) (“financial condition”); Brill 
v. Gurich,
965 P.2d 404, 406
(Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (“financial condition”); S.D. Codified 
Laws § 23A-43-4 (2024) (“financial resources”); Rev. Code Wash. § 10.21.050(3)(a) (2024) 
(“financial resources”).                                                  
    Six other states explicitly allow, but do not require, similar considerations.  See Ala. R. 
Crim. P. Rule 7.2(a)(3)(xiii) (“defendant’s financial condition”); Idaho Crim. R. 46(c)(1) 
(“financial condition”);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 597:2
(III)(b)(3) (2024) (“all relevant factors 
bearing upon a person’s ability to post bail”); N.J. Stat. § 2A:162-20(c)(1) (2024) (“financial 
resources”);
S.C. Code Ann. § 17-15-30
(A)(3) (2024) (“financial resources”);
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 
969.01
(4) (2024) (“the ability of the arrested person to give bail”).  And two states do not 
address the issue.  See 11 Del. C. § 2104 (2019); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 135.265 (2024).  Tennessee’s 
statute is the only one that prohibits consideration of a detainee’s ability to pay.  See
Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 40-11-118
(b).                                                      

12 It is particularly difficult to believe that “ability to pay” is the constitutional touchstone when it 
is a permissible, but not mandatory, consideration in so many statutes across the country.  Even 
still, the change to the Tennessee statute is troublesome.  It is one thing for the statute to guide 
judges’ discretion by suggesting that the bail-setting court need not base the amount of bail 
                              28                                         
    For example, the Tennessee cases Just City cites relate to bail schemes or procedural 
postures quite different from the one challenged here because HB 1719 had not been enacted at 
the time those cases arose.  See Torres v. Collins, No. 2:20-CV-00026-DCLC-CRW,
2023 WL 
6166523
, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 21, 2023) (“[B]ail is set solely based on the arrestee’s charges 

and criminal history [in an ex parte proceeding]; bail-setters do not know the arrestee’s 
employment status, financial condition, family ties and relationships, or ties to the community.”); 
McNeil v. Cmty. Probation Servs., LLC, No. 1:18-cv-00033,
2019 WL 633012
, at *15 (M.D. 
Tenn. Feb. 14, 2019), aff’d,
945 F.3d 991
(6th Cir. 2019) (finding the bail system 
“constitutionally deficient in failing to provide notice and an opportunity for the arrestee to be 
heard, and for failing to provide oral and written findings regarding the arrestee’s ability to pay, 
alternative conditions of release, and the need for pre-revocation detention.”); Weatherspoon v. 
Oldham, No. 17-cv-2535-SHM-cgc,
2018 WL 1053548
, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 26, 2018) (“The 
state trial court violated [the habeas petitioner’s] procedural Due Process rights by failing to 
consider non-monetary conditions of release” even though it considered the other factors of
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-118
).  Although these cases refer to an indigent arrestee’s “ability to 
pay,” the challenged practices in these cases lack discussion of other parts of the statute that bail-
setters consider here—like financial condition, financial ties, and the need for detention based on 
flight risk or danger to the community.  And so these cases suggest that considering a detainee’s 
ability to pay is enough to pass constitutional muster when other considerations are absent, but 
they do not show it is a requirement.                                     


solely on a detainee’s ability to pay.  But HB 1719 goes further than any other state statute of 
which the Court is aware and removes any consideration of the detainee’s ability to pay from the 
bail-setting court’s analysis.  Perhaps that step is unconstitutional, but at this point, we do not 
know.                                                                     
                              29                                         
    Similarly, the out-of-circuit opinions Just City cites have limited value here and fail to 
show a likelihood of success.  For example, in ODonnell v. Harris Cty., the Fifth Circuit 
addressed a “custom and practice” of using a predetermined bail schedule that “did not achieve 
any individualized assessment in setting bail.”
892 F.3d 147, 153
(5th Cir. 2018) (“ODonnell 

I”).  Such a bail scheme does not exist here, and, even if it did, the Fifth Circuit recently 
overturned ODonnell I on abstention grounds.  Daves v. Dallas Cnty.,
64 F.4th 616, 631
(5th Cir. 
2023) (en banc) (“[W]e hold that pursuant to Younger, O’Shea, Tarter [v. Hury,
646 F.2d 1010
(5th Cir. 1981)], and Wallace [v. Kern,
520 F.2d 400
(2d Cir. 1975)], neither ODonnell I nor this 
case should have been adjudicated in federal court.  We overrule ODonnell I’s holding against 
abstention.”).  And because the Tennessee statute here requires an individual evaluation of the 
statutory factors for each detainee, ODonnell I suffers from the same shortcomings as the 
Tennessee cases cited above.                                              
    Just City also cites In re Humphrey, in which the California Supreme Court holds that 
“the court must consider the arrestee’s ability to pay the stated amount of bail—and may not 

effectively detain the arrestee ‘solely because’ the arrestee ‘lacked the resources’ to post bail.”
11 Cal.5th 135, 143
(Cal. 2021) (quoting Bearden, 461 U.S. at 667–68).  But In re Humphrey is 
a habeas case and presented a novel issue for that court.  See
id. at 149
(“Neither this court nor 
the United States Supreme Court has yet held that a judge must consider what an arrestee can 
pay when fixing the amount of money bail.”).  Lastly, Black v. Decker,
103 F.4th 133
(2d Cir. 
2024), and Hernandez v. Sessions,
872 F.3d 976
(9th Cir. 2017), may support Just City’s position 
but are habeas cases addressing bond proceedings in immigration court.    
    The most useful case Just City cites is Walker v. City of Calhoun,
901 F.3d 1245
(11th 
Cir. 2018), which analyzes the scope of Bearden, an indigent detainee’s liberty rights, and what 
                              30                                         
standards to apply to wealth-based detentions.  In Walker, the plaintiff challenged a standing 
order in the Municipal Court of the City of Calhoun, Georgia, that set cash bail at “amount[s] 
represent[ing] the expected fine” and required hearings within 48 hours of arrest for those who 
did not obtain release under the bail schedule.
Id. at 1252
.  Those hearings gave detainees the 

“opportunity to object to the bail amount . . . , including any claim of indigency.”
Id.
The district court in Walker enjoined the use of the standing order, finding the plaintiff 
was likely to succeed on his constitutional challenges to it.
Id. at 1257
.  And the Eleventh 
Circuit reversed after reviewing that conclusion and addressing the appropriate scrutiny and 
analysis for Equal Protection and Due Process challenges.  See
id.
at 1258–65.  The Eleventh 
Circuit explained that, for claims that allege wealth-based discrimination, the court “generally 
analyze[s] the fairness of relations between the criminal defendant and the State under the Due 
Process Clause, while [it] approach[es] the question whether the State has invidiously denied one 
class of defendants a substantial benefit available to another class of defendants under the Equal 
Protection Clause.”
Id.
at 1259 (quoting Bearden,
461 U.S. at 665
).  And it rejected arguments 

that heightened scrutiny was appropriate for either claim.
Id.
at 1262–63 (explaining that “[t]he 
district court was wrong to apply heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause” and 
that the governing cases on Due Process used an analysis that was “a far cry from strict—or even 
intermediate—scrutiny”).                                                  
    For the Due Process claims, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that “[t]he fundamental 
requirement . . . is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”
Id.
at 1265 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 333
(1976)).  And on the Equal 
Protection front, it explained that “the Bearden line of cases [meant] that wealth-based sanctions 
are impermissible when they are ‘not merely disproportionate in impact,’ but ‘[r]ather, they are 
                              31                                         
wholly contingent on one’s ability to pay.’”
Id.
at 1261 (quoting M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,
519 U.S. 102, 
127
(1996)).  Essentially, “differential treatment by wealth is impermissible only where it results 
in a total deprivation of a benefit because of poverty.”
Id.
In other words, treating people 
differently based on their ability to pay a fee is not a constitutional problem in every instance.13   

    The Eleventh Circuit also acknowledged a constitutional right to be free from wealth-
based detentions and held that using a hearing-based method of determining indigency within 48 
hours of arrest did not violate that right.  See
id.
at 1265–69.  But it emphasized how “the 
Supreme Court has recognized that state systems of criminal procedure vary widely in the nature 
and number of pretrial procedures they provide, and it has noted that there is no single preferred 
approach.”  Id. at 1268 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
500 U.S. 44, 53
(1991) (quoting Gerstein,
420 U.S. at 123
)).  Given the flexibility granted to 
states in creating pretrial procedures and that Walker is a single, non-binding case, it does not 
show a likelihood of success on the merits here.                          
    Just City presents strong arguments about the liberty rights associated with setting bail, 

especially for indigent defendants.  But the cases it cites acknowledging (or, perhaps, creating) 
those liberty rights materially differ from the facts here and do not bind the Court, so Just City 
seeks to extend these cases to the situation here.  And as the Sixth Circuit held in L.W. v. 
Skrmetti, when a party sues to expand constitutional rights, it “does suggest that the key premise 

13 The Eleventh Circuit cautions that interpreting this standard in a constitutional context can be 
tricky because “[a]ny government benefit or dispensation can be framed in artificially narrow 
fashion to transform a diminishment into total deprivation.”  Walker,
901 F.3d at 1264
.  For 
example, detainees may argue that Equal Protection is violated when “[t]he person who has 
money pays it and walks away” but “[t]he indigent can’t pay, so he goes to jail.”
Id. at 1263
.  
But the Walker court noted that one could similarly argue that “[t]he person who has money pays 
it and gets express postal service” while “[t]he indigent can’t pay, so he goes with snail mail.”
Id. at 1264
.  In the end, this shows that not all wealth-based differences amount to constitutional 
violations.                                                               
                              32                                         
of a preliminary injunction—likelihood of success on the merits—is missing.”  73 F.4th at 415–
16.  So too here, Just City fails to show likelihood of success on its constitutional claims.  The 
Court next addresses how the canons of statutory interpretation similarly suggest Just City is not 
likely to succeed on its constitutional claims.                           

    D.   Statutory Interpretation                                        
    Given the parties’ disagreement about how to interpret the statutory terms “financial 
condition” and “ability to pay,” the Court must look to the canons of statutory construction.  And 
those canons of statutory construction do not erase the doubt around the likelihood of success for 
Just City.  Where “financial condition” ends and “ability to pay” begins is unclear, and so is 
whether the point between the two has constitutional significance.  But when (or if) the Court 
must decide that issue, interpretive principles favor Defendants and the State.14  For example, the 
canon against surplusage means that “every word and every provision is to be given effect [and 
that n]one should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another 
provision or to have no consequence.”  Donovan v. Firstcredit, Inc.,
983 F.3d 246, 257
(6th Cir. 

2020) (citation omitted).  And so, were the Court to apply the canon against surplusage, the 
Court would not interpret the phrases to be redundant and fail to give meaning to one or the 
other.  Instead, it would likely find that the two phrases refer to different subjects and it would 
need to carefully determine what each phrase means.                       
    And the canon of constitutional avoidance, which recognizes a court’s duty to interpret 
statutes in a way that avoids constitutional questions, would favor interpreting “financial 

14 Statutory interpretation is a legal issue that the Court could consider and decide now.  See 
Roger Miller Music, Inc. v. Sony/ATV Publ’g, LLC,
672 F.3d 434, 437
(6th Cir. 2012).  But 
without knowing whether Just City has standing to challenge the statute, the Court believes it 
unwise to opine on its meaning until the parties develop the record more fully and the Court can 
assure itself of its jurisdiction.                                        
                              33                                         
condition” and “ability to pay” in a way that does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment if 
possible.  Bevan & Assocs., LPA v. Yost,
929 F.3d 366, 374
(6th Cir. 2019).  Under this canon, 
“[w]hen ‘a serious doubt’ is raised about the constitutionality of an Act of Congress, ‘it is a 
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly 

possible by which the question may be avoided.’”  Jennings v. Rodriguez,
583 U.S. 281, 296
(2018) (citation omitted).  And this applies equally to interpreting state statutes because “[s]tate 
statutes, like federal ones, are entitled to the presumption of constitutionality until their invalidity 
is judicially declared.”  Freed v. Thomas,
81 F.4th 655
, 660 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).  
“Therefore, state statutes which have not been authoritatively construed by state courts should be 
interpreted by federal courts so as to avoid constitutional questions.”15  Berger v. Sup. Ct. of 
Ohio,
861 F.2d 719
(6th Cir. 1988) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (citing Dale 
Baker Oldsmobile v. Fiat Motors of N. Am., Inc.,
794 F.2d 213, 221
(6th Cir.1984)).   
    Courts will even use this interpretive approach to avoid constitutional questions when the 
reading that preserves the statute is “plainly not the best” one if it “is at least a possible one.”  

Bevan, 929 F.3d at 376–77 (quoting Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc.,
570 U.S. 1, 18
(2013)).  The constitutional avoidance canon “comes into play only when, after the application of 
ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be susceptible of more than one construction.” 
Jennings,
583 U.S. at 296
(citation omitted).  But it likely applies in this case in which the scope 
of the phrase “financial condition” is unclear and there is no clear case law identifying “ability to 

15 This is doubly true here because Tennessee also recognizes and applies the canon when 
interpreting its own statutes.  State v. White,
362 S.W.3d 559, 566
(Tenn. 2012) (“[W]e presume 
that an enactment of the General Assembly is constitutional.  We have a duty to adopt a 
construction which will sustain a statute and avoid constitutional conflict if any reasonable 
construction exists that satisfies the requirements of the Constitution.” (citations and quotation 
marks omitted)); see also Bevan, 929 F.3d at 376–77 (applying the canon to interpreting an Ohio 
statute when Ohio law would do the same).                                 
                              34                                         
pay” as the constitutional standard for bail proceedings.  To that end, if possible, the Court will 
likely interpret the statute in a way that preserves it, which casts doubt on Just City’s likelihood 
of success on the merits.                                                 
    For the reasons discussed above, Just City has not shown it is likely to succeed on the 

merits of its claims.  The difficulty (and uncertainty) of the standing, the constitutionality, and 
the interpretation questions convinces the Court that it should deny the motion for preliminary 
injunction here.  The Court will now address the remaining factors for preliminary injunction.    
II.  Irreparable Harm Absent the Injunction                               
    The second factor courts consider for a preliminary injunction is whether a party will 
suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief.  McGirr,
891 F.3d at 610
.  Irreparable harm is 
an “indispensable” requirement before a court can issue an injunction.  D.T. v. Sumner Cty. Sch.,
942 F.3d 324, 327
(6th Cir. 2019).  Although the test for preliminary injunctions balances each 
factor, “[i]f the plaintiff isn’t facing imminent and irreparable injury, there’s no need to grant 
relief now as opposed to at the end of the lawsuit.”
Id.
“Thus, although the extent of an injury 

may be balanced against other factors, the existence of an irreparable injury is mandatory.”
Id.
But “[w]hen constitutional rights are threatened or impaired, irreparable injury is presumed.”  
Vitolo, 999 F.3d at 360 (quoting Obama for Am. v. Husted,
697 F.3d 423, 436
(6th Cir. 2012)). 
    The right to be free from unconstitutional detention thus amounts to an irreparable injury.  
And the relief Just City seeks here would terminate allegedly unconstitutional detentions and 
preclude the state court from ordering additional unconstitutional detentions, which favors 
injunctive relief.  But as noted above, Just City has not shown that it likely has standing for its 
claims or that the bail statute here is likely unconstitutional.  For that reason, the detainees may 
not be suffering any harm.                                                
                              35                                         
III.  Harm to Third Parties                                               
    For the third factor for preliminary injunctive relief, courts assess harm to third parties if 
the court were to enter an injunction.  McGirr,
891 F.3d at 610
.  Of course, “no cognizable harm 
results from stopping unconstitutional conduct.”  Vitolo, 999 F.3d at 360.  But if the conduct is 

not unconstitutional—and Just City has not shown it likely is—then a court that grants such 
requested relief would create significant administrative and social harm.  An injunction here 
would require Defendants to release detainees or conduct new bail hearings for them, and it 
would prevent the State from enforcing its own law in the administration of its own criminal 
proceedings and justice system.  So the social and political consequences of ruling HB 1719 
unconstitutional include interfering with Tennessee’s criminal justice system and invalidating a 
properly enacted statute of Tennessee’s legislature.  The ongoing federalism and comity 
concerns and Just City’s limited or uncertain likelihood of success all point to denying injunctive 
relief.  This is especially true when it is unclear whether Just City even has standing to bring its 
claims.                                                                   

IV.  Public Interest                                                      
    The final factor courts consider when ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction is 
whether that injunction would further the public interest.  McGirr,
891 F.3d at 610
.  Of course, 
“it is always in the public interest to prevent violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” Vitolo, 
999 F.3d at 360 (quoting Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson 
Cnty.,
274 F.3d 377, 400
(6th Cir. 2001)).                                
    But Just City has not shown that it can bring this claim under Article III standing, and it 
has not shown that the statute likely violates the constitution.  And absent a likely violation of a 
detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment liberty rights, denying an injunction serves other public 
                              36                                         
interests.  It does so by preserving a bail system that makes individual decisions on grounds 
including financial condition, risk of harm to the community, family relationships, criminal 
record, and alleged crime.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-118
(b).  This bail-setting process ensures 
the safety of the public and the presence of the detainee at trial.       

    For all these reasons, the Court DENIES Just City’s request for a preliminary injunction.  
The Court will now turn to the request for Expedited Declaratory Judgment.   
         MOTION FOR EXPEDITED DECLARATORY JUDGMENT                       
    Just City also seeks expedited declaratory judgment against the Sheriff, the Presiding 
Shelby County General Sessions Criminal Court Judge, and the Shelby County Judicial 
Commissioners under the Declaratory Judgment Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2201
, and Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 57, which “govern[s] the procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment.”    
    The Declaratory Judgment Act allows a federal court to “declare the rights and other 
legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration” “[i]n a case of actual controversy 
within its jurisdiction.”
28 U.S.C. § 2201
(a).  The district court has discretion to grant 

declaratory judgment.  Cardinal Health, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA,
29 
F.4th 792, 796
(6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.,
515 U.S. 277, 286
(1995)).  
The Sixth Circuit focuses on five factors in deciding whether declaratory judgment is 
appropriate.
Id.
at 796–97 (quoting Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp.,
746 F.2d 
323, 326
(6th Cir. 1984)).  The Grand Trunk factors are                   
    (1) whether the declaratory action would settle the controversy;     
    (2) whether the declaratory action would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the 
      legal relations in issue;                                          
    (3) whether  the  declaratory  remedy  is  being  used  merely  for  the  purpose  of 
      “procedural fencing” or “to provide an arena for a race for res judicata[”;] 
    (4) whether the use of a declaratory action would increase friction between our 
      federal and state courts and improperly encroach upon state jurisdiction; and 
                              37                                         
    (5) whether there is an alternative remedy which is better or more effective.
Id.
at 796–97 (quoting Grand Trunk,
746 F.2d at 326
).                     
    A ruling that the statute is unconstitutional—which is the declaratory relief Just City 
requests—would essentially decide the ultimate issue in this case and “settle the controversy.”  
But, as discussed above, it is unclear whether Just City has standing here or if it is likely to 
succeed on the merits of its claims, making declaratory relief inappropriate at this preliminary 
injunction stage.  And deciding that Tennessee’s bail procedures are unconstitutional without any 
discovery on the standing issue and on other factual issues would “increase friction” with the 
state courts by prematurely interfering with their criminal proceedings.  The Court thus defers 
ruling on the declaratory relief issue for now.                           
                      MOTIONS TO DISMISS                                 
    Defendants and the State move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1), arguing Younger abstention and lack of standing require dismissal. 16 (ECF Nos. 44, 
52.)  The State also moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted.  (ECF No. 52.)  The Court thoroughly discussed Younger abstention in the 

16 Defendants also asked the Court to restyle the case as against the County only and to remove 
the official-capacity defendants.  (ECF No. 44 at PageID 412–13.)  But a “plaintiff is master of 
her complaint—she decides who to sue, where to sue, how to sue, and what to sue about.”  
Rogers v. Webstaurant Store, Inc.,
774 F. App’x 278
, 282 (6th Cir. May 23, 2019) (citations 
omitted).  And Just City alleges a factual basis for its official-capacity claims.  (ECF No. 1 at 
PageID 10 (“The Judicial Commissioners started using new bail forms that did not reference 
ability to pay bail, which . . . [were] drafted at the General Sessions Judges’ direction.  The 
Judicial Commissioners stopped considering ability to pay when setting bail.  The Sheriff began 
enforcing the resulting unconstitutional bail orders . . . .).)  It also has legal grounds to assert 
those claims.  See Morgan v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn.,
63 F.4th 510, 
515
(6th Cir. 2023) (“Under Ex parte Young, [
209 U.S. 123
(1908),] ‘suits against state officials 
seeking equitable relief for ongoing violations of federal law are not barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment.’  This doctrine applies only when the plaintiff sues for ‘prospective [injunctive] 
relief to end a continuing violation of federal law.’” (citations omitted)).  The Court therefore 
DENIES Defendants’ motion to restyle the case as against Shelby County only. 
                              38                                         
likelihood of success section above, and that analysis—in which the Court ruled that abstention 
was improper here—applies with equal force to these motions to dismiss.   
    The discussion of standing and the constitutionality of the Tennessee bail statute above 
are similarly relevant here, but the standard for a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss is less 

demanding than for a plaintiff to show it is entitled to a preliminary injunction.  See NAACP, 105 
F.4th at 906–07 (explaining that different procedural stages of litigation have different 
requirements and that a plaintiff “had to prove that it likely had standing” to obtain a preliminary 
injunction but “that it actually had standing” for summary judgment); see also Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 561
(1992) (“[E]ach element [of standing] must be 
supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, 
i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.”).  
Unlike a preliminary injunction, the pleading standard to survive a motion to dismiss merely 
requires the plaintiff to plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007).  And the Court accepts all factual 

allegations in Just City’s complaint as true at this stage.  Kovalchuk v. City of Decherd,
95 F.4th 
1035, 1037
(6th Cir. 2024) (“When considering a motion to dismiss, we must accept as true all 
factual allegations but need not accept any legal conclusions.”).  So even though Just City has 
not shown it is likely to succeed on the merits of its claims, it has plausibly alleged enough to 
survive dismissal.                                                        
    On the matter of standing, Just City must plausibly plead an injury in fact, causation, and 
redressability.  See FDA, 602 U.S. at 380.  Just City alleges Tennessee’s new bail statute has 
resulted in unconstitutional pretrial detentions and higher bail amounts, which interferes with 
Just City’s mission.  (ECF No. 1 at PageID 10–12.)  For example, Just City claims that “HB 
                              39                                         
1719 has inhibited Just City’s mission by prohibiting judges from considering the possibility of 
Just City’s contribution to the arrestee’s ability to pay.”  (Id. at PageID 11.)  These allegations 
show plausible causation between the Defendants’ action and Just City’s harm, plausible 
redressability of that harm by enjoining enforcement of the statute and certain bail orders, and a 

plausible injury-in-fact under the diversion-of-resources theory of standing.  (See id. at PageID 
10–12.)  See Havens,
455 U.S. at 369, 379
.                                
    Additional discovery about the reason for increased bail amounts, potential future harm, 
individual detainees Just City intends to assist, and similar facts may be relevant to deciding the 
issue of standing at summary judgment, but that level of detail is unnecessary to defeat a motion 
to dismiss.  See NAACP,
105 F.4th at 903
(“On summary judgment, the plaintiff must produce 
evidence showing the ‘specific facts’ that support its standing.  We thus have granted summary 
judgment against similar nonprofit entities that failed to back up their diversion-of-resources 
allegations with adequate proof.” (citations omitted));
id. at 907
(determining the NAACP’s 
“‘conclusory allegations’ may well not suffice to withstand summary judgment” when “the 

NAACP did not identify any specific voters, or even the number of voters, that it had helped in 
the past.  Nor did it provide any similar detail about its plans to help voters register in the 
future.”)                                                                 
    And on the constitutional front, Just City alleges that indigent detainees remain in jail just 
because they lack resources.  Tennessee state judges must issue bail orders without considering 
their ability to pay.  (ECF No. 1 at PageID 12–13.)  See also
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-118
(b).  
And that “[t]he Sheriff began enforcing the resulting unconstitutional bail orders to detain 
arrestees who are unable to pay for their release.”  (ECF No. 1 at PageID 10.)  If such orders are 
unconstitutional as wealth-based detentions—which existing case law suggests might be true, 
                              40                                         
see, e.g., Bearden,
461 U.S. 660
; Walker, 901 F.3d 1245—then these alleged facts state a 
plausible claim to relief on Just City’s constitutional challenge to the statute.  For these reasons, 
the Court denies Defendants’ motions to dismiss.                          
                          CONCLUSION                                     

    In sum Just City has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims.  That 
said, it has presented real, viable arguments for standing, but the law around finding an injury in 
fact for diversion of resources is in flux.  Similarly, the unclear path forward in the analysis of 
HB 1719’s constitutionality casts doubt on Just City’s ability to succeed on its claims.  To be 
sure, the risk of harm associated with arguably unconstitutional detentions and the public interest 
in fair and constitutional treatment of indigent detainees favor issuing a preliminary injunction.  
But Just City has not shown that the Tennessee statute is likely unconstitutional or that it likely 
has standing to bring the action.  On balance, the Court finds that it should not employ the strong 
remedy of a preliminary injunction here.                                  
    Even though these challenging questions do not support preliminary injunctive relief, Just 

City has alleged enough to survive a motion to dismiss.  Just City plausibly alleges harm to the 
organization and to indigent defendants for standing purposes.  And it alleges facts about HB 
1719’s modification to prohibit courts from considering ability to pay when setting bail that 
raises a plausible question about the statute’s constitutionality.        
    For the above reasons, the Court DENIES the motion for preliminary injunction and 
expedited declaratory relief (ECF No. 2), and also DENIES the motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 
44, 52).                                                                  


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SO ORDERED, this 29th day of November, 2024.                         
                         s/Thomas L. Parker                         
                        THOMAS L. PARKER                            
                        UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE                





















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