Karls v. State of Florida

[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"11018221","type":"010combined","part":"opinion","author":"per curiam","source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT


                          RICKY LEE KARLS, JR.,

                                 Appellant,

                                      v.

                           STATE OF FLORIDA,

                                  Appellee.


                             No. 2D2024-0325



                                May 7, 2025

Appeal from the County Court for Pinellas County; Cathy McKyton,
Judge.

J. Andrew Crawford of J. Andrew Crawford, P.A., Saint Petersburg, for
Appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Nicole Rochelle
Smith, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.
      Ricky Lee Karls, Jr., appeals from his judgment and sentence for
driving while under the influence with property damage. See §
316.193(3)(c)1, Fla. Stat. (2022). Following a guilty jury verdict, the trial
court sentenced him to 270 days in county jail, followed by twelve
months of probation and a ten-year suspension of his driver's license.
Mr. Karls raises five issues on appeal. Finding merit in his first issue, 1
we reverse.
     The underlying facts can be summarized succinctly. In the late
afternoon or early evening of December 9, 2022, Mr. Karls took a nap at
his mother's house for three to four hours. After he ate dinner, he rode
his motorcycle to Safety Harbor because he had plans to meet a friend.
While driving around a curve on Philippe Parkway, he crashed into a
white car that was blocking the road.
     A significant amount of evidence—including eyewitness testimony,
bodycam footage of Mr. Karls' incoherent responses to sheriff's deputies'
questions, a failed field sobriety test, and a positive urine test—indicated
that Mr. Karls was likely under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the
time of the accident. To counter this evidence, during his case in chief,
defense counsel attempted to call Mr. Karls' mother, Beverly Karls. The
State objected on the ground of relevance. Through a proffer, the court
learned that Ms. Karls would have testified that she and her son had
been in her house until about "8:30, 9:00[,] [p]robably closer to 9:00,"
after which Mr. Karls left on his motorcycle. During their time in the
house, Ms. Karls said she did not see her son drink alcohol or ingest any
drugs or medications. The trial court was bothered by the fact that the
accident occurred at approximately 9:30 p.m., leaving a half-hour gap in
time between when Ms. Karls had last seen her son and when the
accident occurred. Ultimately, the court sustained the State's relevance
objection and did not allow Ms. Karls to testify.
     We review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for
an abuse of discretion; that discretion, however, is limited by the rules of
evidence and applicable case law. See Thomas v. State,
363 So. 3d 1153
,

     1 We do not address any of the other issues.

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1154 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (citing Jackson v. State,
107 So. 3d 328, 339
(Fla. 2012)). As we explained in Mateo v. State,
932 So. 2d 376
(Fla. 2d
DCA 2006):
            Florida law is clear that "where evidence tends in any
      way, even indirectly, to establish a reasonable doubt of
      defendant's guilt, it is error to deny its admission." Rivera v.
      State,
561 So. 2d 536, 539
(Fla. 1990). This principle is
      based, in part, on the U.S. Supreme Court's holding that "[f]ew
      rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to
      present witnesses in his own defense." Chambers v.
      Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284, 302
,
93 S.Ct. 1038
,
35 L.Ed. 2d
      297
(1973). Thus, as a general proposition, any evidence that
      tends to support the defendant's theory of defense is
      admissible, and it is error to exclude it. Dean v. State,
916 So.
      2d 962
(Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Vannier v. State,
714 So. 2d 470,
      472
(Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
Id.
at 379–80 (alteration in original).
      In a criminal case, a defendant has a constitutional right to present
witnesses in his or her defense. See Olson v. Blasco,
676 So. 2d 481, 482
(Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (first citing Amend. V, U.S. Const.; and then citing
art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.). Mr. Karls' mother's testimony that she did not
see any evidence of her son being under the influence during the time
they were together in her house may or may not have been particularly
persuasive to a jury. But it could have been probative on an issue the
State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt—whether
Mr. Karls was under the influence at the time of the accident. Her
testimony was relevant, and Mr. Karls had a right to put that testimony
before his jury. See Panaro v. State,
398 So. 3d 1115
, 1119 (Fla. 2d DCA
2024) (noting that a defendant is entitled to "the benefit of any doubt" on
the relevance of proffered testimony); Vannier v. State,
714 So. 2d 470,
472
(Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ("If there is any possibility of a tendency of
evidence to create a reasonable doubt, the rules of evidence are usually

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construed to allow for its admissibility." (citing collected cases)); see also
Mateo,
932 So. 2d at 380
("[T]he question of what is relevant to show a
reasonable doubt may present different considerations than the question
of what is relevant to show the commission of the crime itself." (quoting
Vannier,
714 So. 2d at 472
)).
      It falls to the State to show that this error was harmless. See Davis
v. State,
347 So. 3d 315
, 323 (Fla. 2022) ("The harmless error test
focuses on the effect of the error on the trier of fact and 'places the
burden on the state . . . to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict . . . .' " (quoting
State v. DiGuilio,
491 So. 2d 1129, 1135
(Fla. 1986))). The State has not
met that burden here. Accordingly, we reverse Mr. Karls' judgment and
sentence and remand for a new trial.2
      Reversed and remanded.


KELLY, MORRIS, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM,3 JJ., Concur.




Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.




      2 Mr. Karls also asks us to remand this case with an instruction

that it be assigned to a different trial judge. We see no need to do so at
this time. We are confident that the same judge can, if necessary,
preside over any further proceedings in this case fairly, impartially, and
professionally.
      3 Judge Rothstein-Youakim has been substituted for Judge Lucas,

who was on the original panel. She has viewed a recording of the oral
argument.

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