Karrie Gurwood v. GCA Services Group, Inc.

[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"11143382","type":"010combined","part":"opinion","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
   CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
        EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

                    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
                        In The Court of Appeals

            Karrie Gurwood and Howard Gurwood, Appellants,

            v.

            GCA Services Group, Inc. and GCA Services Group of
            North Carolina, Inc., Respondents.

            Appellate Case No. 2019-001403


                        Appeal From Charleston County
                      Alex Kinlaw, Jr., Circuit Court Judge


                    Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-321
              Submitted August 1, 2025 – Filed September 24, 2025


                       REVERSED AND REMANDED


            Karrie Gurwood and Howard Gurwood, of Charleston,
            pro se.

            Robert T. Lyles, Jr., of Lyles & Associates, LLC, of Mt.
            Pleasant, for Respondents.


PER CURIAM: In this slip-and-fall case, a jury found that Respondents GCA
Services Group, Inc. and GCA Services Group of North Carolina, Inc. (collectively,
GCA) and Appellant Karrie Gurwood (Karrie) were each 50% at fault and awarded
Karrie half of her current medical expenses but nothing for pain and suffering or
future medical costs. Additionally, the jury denied Appellant Howard Gurwood's
(Howard) claim for loss of consortium. The Gurwoods appealed, arguing the trial
court erred by (1) denying their new trial motions; (2) granting GCA's motion for a
directed verdict as to punitive damages; (3) allowing GCA's expert witness to testify;
(4) excluding testimony by their expert witness; (5) allowing GCA to introduce
evidence of Karrie's medical insurance for impeachment purposes; and (6) denying
their motion for a directed verdict on the issue of assumption of the risk and sending
this question to the jury. Initially, this court found the trial court erroneously granted
GCA's motion for a directed verdict as to punitive damages and reversed and
remanded for a new trial. 1 Our supreme court affirmed the reversal but remanded
the case to this court to address the remaining five issues on appeal. 2 We now
reverse and remand for a new trial based on the erroneous admission of unreliable
expert testimony.

I.    Dr. Hartman's Expert Testimony

       The trial court allowed Dr. Leah Hartman—GCA's expert in human factors
psychology—to testify as to her opinion that based on certain behaviors she observed
in video footage of the fall, Karrie had some awareness that the floor was slippery.
We hold the substance of Dr. Hartman's testimony was unreliable and the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting the testimony.

       "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Rule 702, SCRE. "All expert testimony
must meet the requirements of Rule 702, regardless of whether it is scientific,
technical, or otherwise." 3 Graves v. CAS Med. Sys., Inc.,
401 S.C. 63, 74
,
735 S.E.2d
650, 655
(2012). "The qualification of a witness as an expert is within the discretion
of the [trial] court, and we will not reverse absent an abuse of that discretion."
Id.
"An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack

1
  Gurwood v. GCA Servs. Grp., Inc., Op. No. 2022-UP-462,
2022 WL 17828222
(S.C. Ct. App. filed Dec. 21, 2022), aff'd as modified,
445 S.C. 324
,
914 S.E.2d 149
(2025).
2
  Gurwood v. GCA Servs. Grp., Inc.,
445 S.C. 324
,
914 S.E.2d 149
(2025).
3
  The parties disagree as to whether Dr. Hartman's testimony constituted scientific
expert testimony or nonscientific expert testimony. The trial court did not specify
whether it considered Dr. Hartman's testimony to be scientific or nonscientific—
regardless, we hold the testimony was unreliable either way.
evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law." State v. Pagan,
369 S.C.
201, 208
,
631 S.E.2d 262, 265
(2006).

       For all expert testimony, the trial court must execute its "gatekeeping function
in ensuring the proposed expert testimony meets a reliability threshold for the jury's
ultimate consideration." State v. White,
382 S.C. 265, 270
,
676 S.E.2d 684, 686
(2009). "Trial courts are tasked only with determining whether the basis for the
expert's opinion is sufficiently reliable such that it may be offered into evidence[,]"
and if so offered, "whether to accept the expert's opinions or not is a matter for the
jury to decide." State v. Jones,
423 S.C. 631
, 639–40,
817 S.E.2d 268, 272
(2018)
(emphasis added) ("There is always a possibility that an expert witness's opinions
are incorrect.").

             The substance of an expert's testimony is reliable if it
             adheres to the rigors of the method. As long as the trial
             court is satisfied the expert's testimony consists of a
             reliable method faithfully and reliably applied, the gate of
             admissibility should be opened.

State v. Warner,
430 S.C. 76
, 86–87,
842 S.E.2d 361
, 366 (Ct. App. 2020), aff'd in
part and remanded,
436 S.C. 395
,
872 S.E.2d 638
(2022) (citation omitted). A trial
court does not abuse its discretion by excluding expert testimony if the "conclusions
[are] not supported by the data and experiments upon which [the expert] relied." Id.
at 86, 842 S.E.2d at 366 ("A court may conclude that there is simply too great an
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." (quoting Gen. Elec. Co.
v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136, 146
(1997))).4

      "The test for reliability for expert testimony does not lend itself to a
one-size-fits-all approach." Watson v. Ford Motor Co.,
389 S.C. 434
, 450 n.3,
699
S.E.2d 169
, 177 n.3 (2010). When assessing the reliability of scientific expert
testimony, the trial court must consider four factors, as outlined in State v. Council:

             (1) the publications and peer review of the technique; (2)
             prior application of the method to the type of evidence

4
 This analysis draws on federal caselaw and discussions of the Daubert standard.
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579
, 594–95 (1993). While
"South Carolina has not adopted [the Daubert framework] by name" nor "revised
Rule 702, SCRE, to incorporate the Daubert framework[,]" we have followed an
"extraordinarily similar" approach. Warner, 430 S.C. at 86, 842 S.E.2d at 365–66.
             involved in the case; (3) the quality control procedures
             used to ensure reliability; and (4) the consistency of the
             method with recognized scientific laws and procedures.
335 S.C. 1, 19
,
515 S.E.2d 508, 517
(1999). "However, these factors 'serve no useful
analytical purpose' for nonscientific evidence." Graves,
401 S.C. at 74
, 735 S.E.2d
at 655–56 (quoting White,
382 S.C. at 274
,
676 S.E.2d at 688
). "Due to the wide
range of nonscientific fields and topics, our supreme court has declined to set forth
general reliability guidelines, instead opting to consider each case on its facts."
Warner, 430 S.C. at 85–86, 842 S.E.2d at 365.

        Applying the Council factors, we hold the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting the testimony because Dr. Hartman failed to provide evidence of any prior
application of her method to the type of evidence in this case. Council,
335 S.C. at
19
,
515 S.E.2d at 517
("In considering the admissibility of scientific evidence . . . the
[c]ourt looks at several factors, including . . . prior application of the method to the
type of evidence involved in the case . . . ."); Pagan,
369 S.C. at 208
,
631 S.E.2d at
265
("An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either
lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law."). Dr. Hartman
watched a 37-second video of Karrie's fall and concluded that "behaviors
demonstrated in the video indicate[d] [Karrie] had some form of awareness that she
was walking into a slippery environment." In particular, Dr. Hartman observed that
Karrie's initial steps in the video—her pre-fall steps—resembled her final steps in
the video—her post-fall steps—and opined that Karrie likely had some awareness of
the slippery floor before she slipped; otherwise, Dr. Hartman would have expected
to see a difference between Karrie's initial steps and those that occurred after she fell
and discovered the floor was slippery. While this methodology—comparing pre-fall
steps with post-fall steps—resembles the technique used in "calibration-type"
experiments cited by Dr. Hartman, Dr. Hartman provided no evidence of when a
conclusion of this sort has been reached from video footage alone. Dr. Hartman did
not "adhere to the rigors of the method" or "faithfully and reliably" apply the method
by basing her conclusion on a 37-second video and a comparison between three pre-
fall steps and four post-fall steps. Warner, 430 S.C. at 86–87, 842 S.E.2d at 366
("The substance of an expert's testimony is reliable if it adheres to the rigors of the
method. As long as the trial court is satisfied the expert's testimony consists of a
reliable method faithfully and reliably applied, the gate of admissibility should be
opened." (citation omitted)). In other words, there is "too great an analytical gap"
between the data—in this case, the very short video—and Dr. Hartman's conclusion.
Id. at 86, 842 S.E.2d at 366 ("A court may conclude that there is simply too great an
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." (quoting Gen. Elec. Co,
522 U.S. at 146
)).

       Even if the testimony was nonscientific, Dr. Hartman's testimony still lacks
sufficient indicia of reliability. Warner, 430 S.C. at 85–86, 842 S.E.2d at 365 ("Due
to the wide range of nonscientific fields and topics, our supreme court has declined
to set forth general reliability guidelines, instead opting to consider each case on its
facts."). Dr. Hartman's conclusion in this case relies on the converse of the premise
established by her research, but the truth of the converse requires independent
verification. While we do not doubt the research cited by Dr. Hartman indicating
that if someone is aware of a slippery surface, they will exhibit certain behaviors,
this research does not necessarily validate the converse inference that if someone
exhibits certain behaviors, they are aware of a slippery surface. 5 Without
independent verification, Dr. Hartman's conclusion is unreliable; reliability requires
empirical verification that the specific inference relied on by the expert has been
successful. Id. at 88, 842 S.E.2d at 367 ("The reliability of experience-based [i.e.,
nonscientific] expertise is often proven by its success."); see 1 McCormick on
Evidence § 13 (8th ed.) (2020) ("[T]he [court] should insist on a foundation
demonstrating that the expert's technique [] 'works' . . . . The foundation must
include a showing of the results when the technique was used on prior occasions.").

       Thus, because Dr. Hartman provided neither evidence of a prior application
of her method to the type of evidence in this case nor evidence to validate the success
of her inference, her testimony was not sufficiently reliable, and the trial court erred
by admitting her expert testimony.

       Moreover, we hold this error was prejudicial as the evidence likely influenced
the jury. "Reversal of a trial [court]'s qualification of an expert witness requires the
complaining party to prove both an abuse of discretion and prejudice." Austin v.
Stokes-Craven Holding Corp.,
387 S.C. 22, 37
,
691 S.E.2d 135, 142
(2010).
"Prejudice is a reasonable probability that the jury's verdict was influenced by the
challenged evidence." Watson,
389 S.C. at 448
,
699 S.E.2d at 176
. Here, there is a
reasonable probability that the jury's verdict was influenced by Dr. Hartman's
testimony. The jury found Karrie to be 50% at fault and thus her damages award

5
  The truth of a statement does not imply the truth of its converse. Testimony
presented by Karrie's expert in human factors psychology, Dr. Hejzlar, alludes to
this problem, because he presented an alternative explanation for Karrie's behaviors
in the video: perhaps Karrie's initial steps indicate she was coming around a corner
and not that she had an awareness of a slippery environment.
was reduced by 50%. Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co.,
303 S.C. 243, 245
,
399 S.E.2d
783, 784
(1991) ("[A] plaintiff in a negligence action may recover damages if his or
her negligence is not greater than that of the defendant. The amount of the plaintiff's
recovery shall be reduced in proportion to the amount of his or her negligence.").
Her knowledge about the dangerous condition was a contested fact relevant to the
jury's assessment of her comparative fault. Given that Dr. Hartman provided the
only evidence as to Karrie's actual knowledge of the slippery floor, there is a
reasonable probability that Dr. Hartman's testimony influenced the jury's
determination of comparative fault, especially considering the instruction that
assumption of the risk—which requires actual knowledge of the dangerous
condition—could be compared with the defendant's negligence. Davenport v.
Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Prop. Regime,
333 S.C. 71
, 78–79,
508 S.E.2d
565, 569
(1998) ("[T]here are four requirements to establishing the defense of
assumption of risk: (1) the plaintiff must have knowledge of the facts constituting a
dangerous condition; (2) the plaintiff must know the condition is dangerous; (3) the
plaintiff must appreciate the nature and extent of the danger; and (4) the plaintiff
must voluntarily expose himself to the danger."). For this reason, we hold the
Gurwoods were prejudiced by the admission of this testimony.

       In sum, we hold the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Dr. Hartman's
expert testimony because the evidence in the record is insufficient to show that the
substance of her testimony was reliable, and we hold this error prejudiced the
Gurwoods. For this reason, we reverse as to this issue and remand to the trial court
for a new trial.

II.   New Trial Motions

       The Gurwoods argue the trial court abused its discretion by denying their new
trial motions because "[t]he jury's verdict of damages only for past medical bills
incurred is clearly inconsistent with the evidence presented and reflects the jury's
confusion." We disagree.

      A. New Trial Absolute

      "[T]he decision to grant a new trial is left to the sound discretion of the trial
court and generally will not be disturbed on appeal." Wright v. Craft,
372 S.C. 1,
36
,
640 S.E.2d 486, 505
(Ct. App. 2006). "South Carolina's thirteenth juror doctrine
allows the [trial] court . . . to grant a new trial absolute when [it] finds the evidence
does not justify the verdict." Trivelas v. S.C. Dep't of Transp.,
357 S.C. 545, 551
,
593 S.E.2d 504, 507
(Ct. App. 2004). "Similarly, the [court] may grant a new trial
if the verdict is inconsistent and reflects the jury's confusion." Vinson v. Hartley,
324 S.C. 389, 404
,
477 S.E.2d 715
, 722 (Ct. App. 1996). "The thirteenth juror
doctrine is not the proper vehicle for ordering a new trial on a singular issue such as
damages." Howard v. Roberson,
376 S.C. 143, 156
,
654 S.E.2d 877, 884
(Ct. App.
2007). Additionally, "[t]he trial [court] must grant a new trial absolute if the amount
of the verdict is grossly inadequate or excessive so as to shock the conscience of the
court and clearly indicates the figure reached was the result of passion, caprice,
prejudice, partiality, corruption[,] or some other improper motives." Vinson,
324
S.C. at 404
,
477 S.E.2d at 723
.

       South Carolina law does not require a jury that awards damages for medical
costs to also award damages for future medical expenses or pain and suffering. See
Nestler v. Fields,
426 S.C. 34
, 39–42,
824 S.E.2d 461
, 464–65 (Ct. App. 2019)
(upholding a trial court's denial of a new trial absolute, new trial based on the
thirteenth juror doctrine, and new trial nisi when a jury only awarded the plaintiff
the amount of his medical bills despite hearing evidence of "permanent impairment,
pain and suffering, and other non-economic damages"). Damages evidence, like all
evidence, is subject to the jury's assessment of credibility. See Black v. Hodge,
306
S.C. 196, 198
,
410 S.E.2d 595, 596
(Ct. App. 1991) ("The fact that testimony is not
contradicted directly does not render it undisputed. There remains the question of
the inherent probability of the testimony and the credibility of the witness or the
interests of the witness in the result of the litigation.").

        We hold the jury's verdict is consistent with the evidence presented and the
amount of the verdict is not so grossly inadequate as to indicate the jury was
motivated by passion, caprice, prejudice, or another improper motive. The parties
presented contradictory testimony regarding the legitimacy and severity of Karrie's
chronic pain diagnosis and whether it resulted from the fall, and there were
inconsistences among the Gurwoods' accounts of Karrie's chronic pain and how her
symptoms affected her life. As in Nestler, the jury could have found "serious
credibility gaps" in the Gurwoods' damages evidence. 426 S.C. at 41,
824 S.E.2d at
465
. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Gurwoods'
motion for a new trial absolute. Wright,
372 S.C. at 36
,
640 S.E.2d at 505
. ("To
warrant a new trial, the verdict must be so grossly [inadequate] as to clearly indicate
the influence of an improper motive on the jury."). For the same reasons, the trial
court did not err in denying the Gurwoods' motion for a new trial under the thirteenth
juror doctrine. Trivelas,
357 S.C. at 551
,
593 S.E.2d at 507
("South Carolina's
thirteenth juror doctrine allows the [trial] court . . . to grant a new trial absolute when
[it] finds the evidence does not justify the verdict"); see also Howard,
376 S.C. at
156
,
654 S.E.2d at 884
("The thirteenth juror doctrine is not the proper vehicle for
ordering a new trial on a singular issue such as damages.").

       B. New Trial Nisi Additur

        "A trial [court] may grant a new trial nisi additur whenever [it] finds the
amount of the verdict to be merely inadequate." Green v. Fritz,
356 S.C. 566, 570
,
590 S.E.2d 39, 41
(Ct. App. 2003). "The [trial court's] decision will not disturbed
on appeal unless it clearly appears the exercise of discretion was controlled by a
manifest error of law." Welch v. Epstein,
342 S.C. 279, 303
,
536 S.E.2d 408, 420
(Ct. App. 2000). A trial court may grant a new trial nisi additur when a jury's verdict
fails to account for the plaintiff's pain and suffering. Waring v. Johnson,
341 S.C.
248, 260
,
533 S.E.2d 906
, 912–13 (Ct. App. 2000); see also Howard,
376 S.C. at
157
,
654 S.E.2d at 884
("[T]he trial court should have ruled on [the plaintiff's]
motion for a new trial nisi additur, and in its discretion, increased damages for pain
and suffering."). However, it may also decline to do so. Nestler, 426 S.C. at 41–42,
824 S.E.2d at 465
("Although some cases have held a trial court abuses its discretion
when it refuses to grant a new trial nisi additur when the jury's verdict is less than a
party's medical bills . . . or fails to account for pain and suffering, . . . the trial court
here found no compelling reason to impose its will on the parties and invade the
jury's domain. We must accord the trial court's decision 'great deference[]' and
respect its superior position to gauge credibility and the field of evidence." (internal
citations omitted)).

       Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Gurwoods'
motion for a new trial nisi additur. Our review of the record affirms the trial court's
finding that the damage award was adequate. In any event, the trial court had a
"better-informed view" of the damages evidence presented at trial. Waring,
341 S.C.
at 257
,
533 S.E.2d at 911
. ("The trial [court that] heard the evidence and is more
familiar with the evidentiary atmosphere at trial possesses a better-informed view of
the damages than this [c]ourt."). Because we must "respect [the trial court's] superior
position to gauge credibility and the field of evidence," we hold the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in deciding not to order a new trial nisi additur. Nestler, 426
S.C. at 41,
824 S.E.2d at 465
; see also Welch,
342 S.C. at 303
,
536 S.E.2d at 420
("The [court]'s decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears the
exercise of discretion was controlled by a manifest error of law.").

III.   Dr. Hejzlar's Expert Testimony
       The Gurwoods contend a new trial is warranted because the trial court abused
its discretion in excluding Dr. Zdenek Hejzlar's, an expert in human factors
psychology, testimony as to how the dangerous condition in this case could have
been eliminated or guarded against. We hold the trial court erred in excluding this
testimony but the Gurwoods were not prejudiced by its exclusion.

      "The admission of evidence is a matter left to the discretion of the trial [court]
and, absent clear abuse, will not be disturbed on appeal." Osterneck v. Osterneck,
374 S.C. 573, 579
,
649 S.E.2d 127, 131
(Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Carlyle v. Tuomey
Hosp.,
305 S.C. 187
, 193,
407 S.E.2d 630, 633
(1991)). "In order for this court to
reverse a case based on the erroneous admission or erroneous exclusion of
evidence[,] the plaintiff must show error and prejudice."
Id.
(quoting Timmons v.
S.C. Tricentennial Comm'n,
254 S.C. 378, 405
,
175 S.E.2d 805, 819
(1970)).

       "Whether a defendant has acted negligently is a mixed question of law and
fact." Nelson v. Piggly Wiggly Cent., Inc.,
390 S.C. 382, 391
,
701 S.E.2d 776, 780
(Ct. App. 2010). Once the court determines as a matter of law whether a duty exists,
the jury then determines whether the defendant breached that duty by failing to
adhere to a particular standard of care. See
id. at 391
,
701 S.E.2d at 781
. When
making this determination, a jury may consider "relevant standards of care from
various sources . . . ." Madison ex rel. Bryant v. Babcock Ctr., Inc.,
371 S.C. 123,
140
,
638 S.E.2d 650, 659
(2006);
id.
("The standard of care in a given case may be
established and defined by the common law, statutes, administrative regulations,
industry standards, or a defendant's own policies and guidelines.").

      "An expert's opinion testimony may be based upon a hypothetical
question." Gazes v. Dillard's Dep't Store, Inc.,
341 S.C. 507, 514
,
534 S.E.2d 306,
310
(Ct. App. 2000). "Even though the hypothetical question must be based on facts
supported by the evidence, counsel may pose the hypothetical 'on any theory which
can reasonably be deduced from the evidence and select as a predicate for it such
facts as the evidence proves or reasonably tends to prove.'"
Id.
at 514–15,
534 S.E.2d
at 310
(quoting Gathers v. South Carolina Elec. and Gas Co.,
311 S.C. 81
, 82–83,
427 S.E.2d 687
, 688 (Ct. App. 1993)).

      Initially, we hold the court erred in excluding Dr. Hejzlar's testimony
regarding potential methods GCA could have employed to eliminate or guard against
the hazard created by the waxed floor. This testimony would have provided the jury
with a source it could consider when determining whether GCA breached its
standard of care. See Madison,
371 S.C. at 140
,
638 S.E.2d at 659
("The factfinder
may consider relevant standards of care from various sources in determining whether
a defendant breached a duty owed to an injured person in a negligence case. The
standard of care in a given case may be established and defined by . . . industry
standards, or a defendant's own policies and guidelines."). Additionally, the
Gurwoods' proposed hypothetical questions to Dr. Hejzlar—including whether fans
or barricades could have eliminated or guarded against the hazard—were predicated
on their theory that GCA breached the standard of care by failing to adhere to the
safety hierarchy, which requires using available techniques to eliminate or guard
against a hazard. See Gazes, 341 S.C. at 514–15,
534 S.E.2d at 310
("[C]ounsel may
pose the hypothetical 'on any theory which can reasonably be deduced from the
evidence and select as a predicate for it such facts as the evidence proves or
reasonably tends to prove.'" (quoting Gathers, 311 S.C. at 82–83,
427 S.E.2d at
688
)). Further, the proposed testimony—that the danger could have been eliminated
more quickly by a fan or guarded against by a barricade—was not speculative
because it was based on Dr. Hejzlar's undisputed expertise and experience. See
Warner, 430 S.C. at 88, 842 S.E.2d at 367 (discussing that Rule 702 permits
experience-based expert testimony). For these reasons, the trial court erred in
excluding this testimony.

        However, we hold this error did not prejudice the Gurwoods. Dr. Hejzlar was
still permitted to describe the safety hierarchy in general and to provide his opinion
that it comprised the standard of care applicable to, and breached by, GCA.
Ultimately, the jury found GCA negligent. Thus, the Gurwoods were not prejudiced
by this error, and it does not warrant a new trial.

IV.   Collateral Source Testimony

       The Gurwoods argue they should receive a new trial because the trial court
abused its discretion in allowing GCA to impeach Karrie with evidence of her
medical insurance, which was highly prejudicial, not very probative, and violative
of the collateral source doctrine. We disagree.

      "Under the 'collateral source rule', a [tortfeasor] has no right to any mitigation
of damages because of payments or compensation received by the injured person
from an independent source." Young v. Warr,
252 S.C. 179, 197
,
165 S.E.2d 797,
806
(1969). "This rule has been liberally applied in South Carolina to preclude the
reduction of damages." Gibson v. Wright,
403 S.C. 32, 44
,
742 S.E.2d 49, 55
(Ct.
App. 2013) (quoting In re W.B. Easton Constr. Co.,
320 S.C. 90, 92
,
463 S.E.2d 317
,
318 (1995)). However, "[w]here such evidence has relevance to the witness's
credibility, it has been held admissible." Bonaparte v. Floyd,
291 S.C. 427, 443
,
354
S.E.2d 40, 50
(Ct. App. 1987) (affirming the admission of evidence of the plaintiff's
medical insurance to impeach the plaintiff's testimony that she did not go to follow
up visits with her surgeon and psychiatrist because she could not afford the visits);
see also Rhodes v. Spartanburg County,
262 S.C. 644, 650
,
207 S.E.2d 85, 88
(1974)
(holding that evidence that a plaintiff received payments from her father's business
during her period of disability was "clearly admissible as bearing upon the credibility
of [the] plaintiff's testimony that she performed no services for which she received
pay for a period of twenty-six weeks following her injury"); Campbell v. Bi-Lo, Inc.,
301 S.C. 448, 454
,
392 S.E.2d 477, 481
(Ct. App. 1990) (concluding that testimony
about the plaintiff's worker's compensation settlement and the payment of her
medical bills was properly elicited for the purpose of impeachment after she stated
she lost her house and car after losing her job).

       We hold the trial court did not err in admitting testimony about Karrie's
Medicare coverage because Karrie opened the door to this evidence by testifying she
had not received recommended medical treatment because she could not afford it.
South Carolina cases have made clear that there is an exception to the collateral
source rule for the purpose of impeachment. Bonaparte,
291 S.C. at 443
,
354 S.E.2d
at 50
("Where such evidence has relevance to the witness's credibility, it has been
held admissible."). Therefore, it was proper for the trial court to allow GCA to
impeach Karrie regarding her ability to pay for the recommended treatment by
asking her if she had insurance that would help her pay for the treatment.6
Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in admitting testimony of Karrie's
medical insurance and affirm as to this issue.

V.    Assumption of the Risk

       The Gurwoods argue the trial court abused its discretion in denying their
directed verdict motion and charging the jury on assumption of risk because no
evidence was presented at trial that Karrie knew of the waxed floor when she fell or
that she "appreciated the nature and extent" of the dangers of the waxed floor. We
disagree.

      "When ruling on a directed verdict . . . motion, the trial court must view the
evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn from it in the light most

6
  The Gurwoods argue their case differs from Bonaparte because in that case, the
plaintiff could receive her medical treatment locally. However, this fact does not
render the Bonaparte holding sufficiently distinguishable, particularly because
Karrie admitted she could have received the recommended treatment in North
Carolina but preferred to receive the treatment in Chicago.
favorable to the nonmoving party." Hamilton v. Reg'l Med. Ctr.,
440 S.C. 605
, 626,
891 S.E.2d 682
, 693 (Ct. App. 2023), cert. denied (May 1, 2024). "The appellate
court will reverse the trial court's ruling . . . only when no evidence supports the
ruling or when an error of law controls the ruling." Law v. S.C. Dep't of Corr.,
368
S.C. 424
, 434–35,
629 S.E.2d 642, 648
(2006).

        "An appellate court will not reverse the trial [court]'s decision regarding
a jury charge absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Marin,
415 S.C. 475, 482
,
783
S.E.2d 808, 812
(2016) (quoting State v. Mattison,
388 S.C. 469, 479
,
697 S.E.2d
578, 584
(2010)). "In reviewing jury charges for error, we must consider the
court's jury charge as a whole in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial."
Id.
(quoting State v. Brandt,
393 S.C. 526, 549
,
713 S.E.2d 591, 603
(2011)). "The
trial court is required to charge only the current and correct law of South Carolina."
Pope v. Heritage Communities, Inc.,
395 S.C. 404, 415
,
717 S.E.2d 765, 771
(Ct.
App. 2011).

       "In order for the doctrine of assumption of the risk to apply in a particular
case, the injured party must have freely and voluntarily exposed himself to a known
danger which he understood and appreciated." Cole v. Raut,
378 S.C. 398
, 404–05,
663 S.E.2d 30, 33
(2008). While our supreme court "effectively abolished the
affirmative defense of assumption of the risk in Davenport v. Cotton Hope
Plantation," 7 it held "a plaintiff[']s conduct in assuming a risk can be compared with
the defendant's negligence." Davenport,
333 S.C. at 86
,
508 S.E.2d at 573
.

        We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Gurwoods'
directed verdict motion as to assumption of the risk because the evidence supports
an inference that Karrie understood and voluntarily exposed herself to the dangers
of the waxed floor when she entered the school. See Steinke v. S.C. Dep't of Lab.,
Licensing & Regul.,
336 S.C. 373
, 386,
520 S.E.2d 142
, 148 (1999) ("The trial court
must deny [a directed verdict motion] when the evidence yields more than one
inference or its inference is in doubt. This [c]ourt will reverse the trial court only
when there is no evidence to support the ruling below."). The Gurwoods admitted
at trial, and we agree, that an inference arises from the evidence presented that Karrie
knew the floor was waxed and voluntarily exposed herself to the known danger.
Moreover, Karrie testified that had she known the floors were being waxed, she
would not have come into the school, indicating she knew and understood the
dangers of a waxed floor.


7
    Cole,
378 S.C. at 405
n.2,
663 S.E.2d at 33
n.2.
        Likewise, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in charging the jury on
assumption of the risk. Based on the evidence presented, the issue was appropriately
before the jury. Additionally, the trial court charged the jury as to the correct law
on assumption of the risk, noting it was not a "separate or complete defense from
comparative negligence . . . [but] a plaintiff's conduct in assuming a risk can be
compared with the defendant's negligence." See Marin,
415 S.C. at 482
,
783 S.E.2d
at 812
("In reviewing jury charges for error, we must consider the
court's jury charge as a whole in light of the evidence and issues presented at
trial." (quoting Brandt,
393 S.C. at 549
,
713 S.E.2d at 603
)); Pope,
395 S.C. at 415
,
717 S.E.2d at 771
("The trial court is required to charge only the current and correct
law of South Carolina."); see also Cole,
378 S.C. at 405
n.2,
663 S.E.2d at 33
n.2;
Davenport, 333 S.C. at 86–87,
508 S.E.2d at 573
. Accordingly, we affirm as to this
issue.

CONCLUSION

      Because we hold the admission of Dr. Hartman's expert testimony was a
prejudicial error, the decision of the trial court is

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 8

WILLIAMS, C.J., and GEATHERS and TURNER, JJ., concur.




8
    We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.