Leslie Galloway, III a/k/a Leslie Galloway a/k/a Leslie "Bo" Galloway, III v. State of Mississippi

Serial: 258402                                                                     FILED
                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI                            SEP 11 2025
                                                                              OFFICE OF THE CLERK
                                 No. 2025-DR-00129-SCT                          SUPREME COURT
                                                                               COURT OF APPEALS


LESLIE GALLOWAY, III A/KIA LESLIE                                                  Petitioner
GALLOWAY A/KIA LESLIE "BO"
GALLOWAY, III

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI                                                             Respondent


                                    EN BANC ORDER

       Before the Court, en bane, is the Motion for Leave to File Successive Petition for

Post-Conviction Collateral Relief, filed by counsel for Leslie Galloway, III. The State

subsequently filed a motion to dismiss Galloway's successive post-conviction filing, to which

Galloway filed a response.

       In 2010, Galloway was convicted and sentenced to death by lethal injection by a

Harrison County jury of his peers for the capital murder of Shakeylia Anderson. Galloway

v. State, 122 So. 3d 614, 625 (Miss. 2013). The Court affirmed Galloway's conviction and

sentence on direct appeal. Id. at 682. Galloway's first petition for post-conviction collateral

relief was denied by the Court in Galloway v. State, 374 So. 3d 452 (Miss. 2023).

       Now before the Court is Galloway's second petition for post-conviction collateral

relief. Leave to proceed should be granted only if Galloway's petition, exhibits, and the prior

record show that his claims are not procedurally barred and that they "present a substantial

showing of the denial of a state or federal right[.]" Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-27(5) (Rev.
2020); see also Ronk v. State, 267 So. 3d 1239, 1247 (Miss. 2019). "Direct appeal [is] the

principal means of reviewing all criminal convictions and sentences .... " Miss. Code Ann.

§ 99-39-3(2) (Rev. 2020). Review at this stage, with certain exceptions, is limited to issues

that could not or should not have been reviewed at trial and in the direct appeal. Id.; Moffett

v. State, 351 So. 3d 936, 942 (Miss. 2022); Brown v. State, 798 So. 2d 481, 491 (Miss.

2001).

         Galloway must overcome several procedural or substantive bars. First, the mandate

in Galloway's direct appeal issued on October 13, 2013. Galloway's successive petition was

filed on February 6, 2025. This filing is subject to the one-year time bar. Miss. Code Ann.

§ 99-39-5(2)(b) (Rev. 2020); see also Brown v. State, 306 So. 3d 719, 729 (Miss. 2020);

Jordan v. State, 213 So. 3d 40, 42 (Miss. 2016); Havard v. State, 86 So. 3d 896, 899 (Miss.

2012). Unless Galloway can show that his claims are excepted, the petition is barred as

untimely.

         Second, as mentioned above, Galloway has filed a previous petition for post-

conviction collateral relief.   The claims raised in that petition were ultimately denied or

dismissed. The petition now before the Court is subject to the successive-writ bar set out in

Mississippi Code Section 99-39-27(9) (Rev. 2020). "Absent an applicable exception, a

successive motion for post-conviction relief is procedurally barred." Brown, 306 So. 3d at

729. Unless Galloway meets an exception to the successive-writ bar, his claims are

precluded at this point.




                                              2
       Third, Galloway is prohibited from reraising claims that have been addressed in prior

proceedings. "The doctrine of res judicata shall apply to all issues, both factual and legal,

decided at trial and on direct appeal." Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3) (Rev. 2020). "Res

judicata also extends to those claims that could have been raised in prior proceedings but

were not." Ambrose v. State, 323 So. 3d 482, 493 (Miss. 2021) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Brown, 306 So. 3d at 730).

       One of the exceptions to the time bar and the successive-writ bar are those cases in

which a petitioner can demonstrate "that there has been an intervening decision of the

Supreme Court of either the State of Mississippi or the United States that would have actually

adversely affected the outcome of his conviction or sentence .... " Miss. Code Ann.§§ 99-

39-5(2)(a)(i), -27(9) (Rev. 2020). Galloway seeks to revisit the issue regarding the Sixth

Amendment Confrontation Clause he raised on direct appeal. He asserts that the United

States Supreme Court opinion in Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 144 S. Ct. 1785, 219 L.

Ed. 2d 420 (2024), is an intervening case. 1 After a thorough review of Galloway's claim, we

find that the intervening-decision exception affords Galloway no relief, as Smith is not an

intervening case. Further, assuming arguendo, if Smith were an intervening case, we find


       1
       At the time Galloway filed his successive post-conviction petition, his federal habeas
corpus petition was pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi, Southern Division, case number 1:24-cv-121-CWR. The federal district court
denied Galloway's request to stay his federal habeas corpus proceedings, specifically finding
that Smith does not apply retroactively. Memorandum Opinion and Order, Galloway v.
Cain, No. 1:24-cv-121-CWR (S.D. Miss. Jan. 29, 2025) ("[I]f the Court assumes that Smith
announced a new rule of criminal procedure and that a retroactive change in the law
applicable to one of a petitioner's claims can provide good cause for a Rhines [v. Weber, 544
U.S. 269, 125 S. Ct. 1528, 161 L. Ed. 2d 440 (2005)] stay, ... a stay is still unavailable here
because Smith does not apply retroactively.").

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that it would not apply retroactively. Because Galloway has failed to demonstrate an

exception, his successive petition is barred by time, res judicata, and as a successive writ.

See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-5(2)(b ), -21 (3 ), -27(9) (Rev. 2020). Notwithstanding the bars,

the Court finds no merit to Galloway's claim. Accordingly, we find that the State's motion

to dismiss the successive petition should be granted.

           IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Galloway's Succesive

Motion for Leave to Proceed in the Trial Court with Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is

granted.

       SO ORDERED, this the 11th day of September, 2025.



                                               ~
                                              DAVID P. SULLIVAN, JUSTICE
                                              FOR THE COURT


TO GRANT: ALL JUSTICES.