L'Hommedieu v. Ram Aircraft

Me. Super. Ct9/24/2013
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 STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT CUMBERLAND, ss Location: Portland Docket No.: .B· CD-CV-13:31 .. / .,/ LtJv- {'u/}J - cr;~o l_.,()' :s ) E. CHRIS L'HOMMEDffiU and HEATHER ) PERREAULT, Personal Representatives of ) the ESTATE OF BDWARD ) L'HOMMEDIEU, STEPHEN M. MYERS, ) and KIM C. MYERS, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ) RAM AIRCRAFT, L.P. CESSNA ) AIRCRAFT COMPANY d/b/a ) DECISION AND ORDER MCCAULEY PROPELLER SYSTEMS, ) (Motion to Set Aside Defa\llt!Motlon for MAINE AVIATION SALES, INC., ) Leave to File Late Answer) AIRCRAFT MAlNTENANCE OF MAINE, ) INC., YANKEE AVIATION SERVICES, ) INC., NEW ENGLAND PROPBLLOR ) SERVIC, INC., ENGINE COMPONENTS ) INTERNATIONAL, INC., and CHAMPION ) AEROSPACE, LLC, ) ) Defendants ) ) Tllis 11111ttet' is before the Coutt on Defendant Champion Aerospace LLC's (Defendant Champion) Motion to Set Aside Default and Motion for Leave to File Late Answet·. The record reflects that Plaintiffs set·ved the complaint and summons on Defendant Champion's agent, CT Cot·poratlon Systems, on May 3, 2013. When Defendant Champion did not file an answer to the complaint, on June 10,2013, Plaintiffs requested and obtained a default against Defendant Champion. The clerk nlso entered default judgment against Defendant Champion. The fimll default was entet·ed on June I7, 2013. On Juue 24, 2013, Defendant Champion flied a late answet', a motion for leave to file late answer, and a motion to set aside the default and default judgment. DisC\lssion M.R. Civ. P. 55(c) provides that n[f]ot· good cause shown the cout1 may set aside an entry of default and, If a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b)." "To meet the 'good cause' standard of R\lle 55(c) a patiy must show 'both a good excuse for his untimeliness in pleading ... and the existence of a meritorio\IS defense"'. Hammondv. Thomas RealtyAssocfales, 617 A.2d 562,563-64 (Me. 1992) (clflng, Design Build ofMaine v. Paul, 601 A.2d 1089, 1091 (Me. 1992)). In addition, the Court should be mindful of the law's preference for t·esolvlng c!'lses on the merits, mther than ou a procedural basis. See, Thomas v. Thompson, 653 A.2d 417, 420 (Me. 1995); 3 Harvey, Maine Civil Pmct/ce § 55.7 at 207 (2012-2013). Preliminarily, given that the clerk is only authorized to enter a default judgment "for a sum certain ot• fot· a S\ltn which can by computation be made certain," and given that Plaintiffs' claim cannot is not one fot• a sum certain, the clerk was not authorized to enter a default judgment. M.R. Civ. P. 55(b)(l). Accordingly, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b), the Court will grant Defendant Champion's •·equest for relief fi'Om the default judgment and will vacate the judgment. As mentioned above, in its assessment of Defendant Champion's request to set aside the default, the Court must determine whether Defendant Champion has demonsiJ·ated a good excuse fm· its failure to file an answe1· to the complaint within 20 days of the service of the complaint and smmnons, and a meritol'ious defense to Plaintiffs' claim. Based upon a review ofPIHintiffs' complaint, and the affidavit of James Liddle, Defendant Champion's president, the Com1 2 concludes that the cause of the airplane crash that is the subject of this case, including Defendant Champion's potential responslbiUty for the crash, is very much in dispute. The Court is convinced, therefore, tbat Defendant Champion has a meritorious defense to Plaintiff's claim, The issue thus becomes whethet· Defendant Champion has demonstrated a good excuse fol' its failure to file timely its response to Plaintiffs' complaint, First, the Cout·t notes that after leaming of the entry of default through a mailing from the Cumberland County Court, Defendant Champion, through Its counsel, promptly filed an answer and the pleadings by which Defendant Champion seeks to remove the default. Defendant Champion's prompt actions suggest that Defendant Champion's failure to file timely an answet· was not the product of its disregard for the judicial process. In addition, the Court is convinced that Defendant Champion's failure to file the answer resulted fi·om a brenkdown in the process established by TransDigm, Defendant Champion's parent company, to assUI'e that complaints are managed properly. The breakdown flpparently resulted from a combination of factot·s in TransDigm 's office during the tin1e that the complaint was received, which factors include the recent relocation of the office of one of the individuals responsible for handling the complaint, and several othet• pressing business matters. The fact that Defendant Champion, through its parent compnny, has an established proced\lre for handling complaints is ftwther evidence that Defendant Champion did not intend to disreg1ml or disrespect the process. In short, the Co\lli is perslladed that Defendnnt Champion's faihll'e to tile was likely caused by inadvertence rather than an intentional disregard for the cou1t process. Under these circ\lmstanccs, which include Defendant Champion's prompt efforts upon learning of the defa\llt to answer the complaint and to seek removal of the defnult, the Court conchtdes that Defendant Champion has demonstrated a good exc\ISe fo•· the faih1re to file an answer to the complaint. The 3 Cout·t believes that this conclusion is consistent with "the policy of the Jaw to favor, wherever possible, a hearing on the merUs ... " Westcott v. Allstate, 397 A.2d !56, 163 (Me. 1979). 1 Conclusion Based on the foregoing annlysis, the Court grants Defendant Champion's Motion to Set Aside Defa\dt, and grants Defendant Champion's Motion for Leave to File Late Answe1·. Accordingly, the Court vacates the judgment against Defendant Champion, sets aside the default entered ngnlnst Defendant Champion, and Rllows the flUng of the lftte answer. Pursuant to M.R. Clv. P. 79(a), the Clerk shall incorporate this Decision and Ordet· into the docket by reference. Date: r/46I{:1 J hu C. Nivison J tstice, Maine Business & Consumer Court 1 Allhough perhAps not onlfroly rolovant to the Court's "good cnuse" Analysis, tho fact that the cnso is In Its lnflmt stages and involves mul!iplo DofendRnts finther convinces tho Court that removal of tho default Is AppropriAte. 4 E. Chris L'Hommedieu et al v. RAM Aircraft, LP et al BCD-RE-13-33 PLAINTIFFS COUNSEL (NAME AND ADDRESS) Lance E. Walker, Esq. Kim C. Myers Norman Hanson & DeTroy P.O. Box 4600 E. Chris L'Hommedieu Portland, Maine 04112-4600 Heather Perreault E. Chris L'Hommedleu and Philip M. Coffin, Ill, Esq. Heather Perrault as Co- Lambert Coffin Personal Representatives 477 Congress Street of the Estate of Edward P.O. Box 15215 L'Hommedleu Portland, Maine 04112-5215 DEFENDANTS COUNSEL (NAME AND ADDRESS\ RAM Aircraft, L.P. Christopher C. Dinan, Esq. Monaghan Leahy, LLP 95 Exchange Street P.O. Box 7046 Portland, Maine 04112-3906 Cessna Aircraft Company Martha C. Gaythwaite, Esq. d/b/a McCauley Friedman Gaythwalte Wolf, LLP Propeller Services 25 Pearl Street P.O. Box4726 Portland, Maine 04112-4726 Maine Aviation Safes, Noreen A. Patient, Esq. Inc. and Aircraft Eaton Peabody Maintenance of Maine 167 Park Row, P.O. Box 9 Brunswick, Maine 04011 Yankee Aviation Services James B. Haddow, Esq. Petruccelli Martin & Haddow, LLP Two Monument Sq., Ste. 900 P. 0. Box 17555 Portland, Maine 04112-8555 New England Propeller Phillip E. Johnson, Esq. Service, Inc. Johnson & Webbert, L.L.P. 160 Capitol St., Ste. 3 : P.O. Box 79 Augusta, Maine 04332-0079 Engine Components Daniel R. Mawhinney, Esq. International, Inc. Thompson & Bowie, LLP Three Canal Plaza P.O. Box 4630 Portland, Maine 04112 Champion Aerospace, LLC JohnS. Whitman, Esq. Richardson Whitman Large & Badger 465 Congress Street P.0. Box 9545 ftJfOl!Wj) .N/1/?}Jl;- tJ'f;!;l.- 95':1~- STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT CUMBERLAND, ss Location: Portland · Docke~No.: BCDMCVM13-3J / (" j 1 I _ · !' :• '~\ v -· ,,- r. ' -· i I ' .,_I ' thro\tgh its conduct, could reasonably anticipate litigation in Maine). 2. Specific Jurfsdicfion In support of theh· claim of specific jurisdiction, Plaintiffs assert that the work that Yankee performed on the Aircraft over a four-month period in Massachusetts (Cmuter Aff. , 11), the inherent mobllity of airplanes, and the relatlve close proximity of Massachusetts and Maine show that Yankee could reasonably have anticipated Utigation itt Maine regarding the work it performed. Plaintiffs compare the present case to Mahon v. East Moline Metal Products, 579 2 Plalntlffil assort, In tholr memorandum, that since this litigation began, Yankeo has deactivated Its website. (Opp'n M, Dismiss S.) Plalnllft's have not, however, submitted an affidavit setting forth tho contents oftho website or how tho website affects tho COurt's mlnlrmmt contacts analysis. See Dotf. 1999MB 133,1,1 13, 73S A.2d 984 (requiring a plaintiff opposing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction to "go beyond tho pleadings nnd mako affirmative proof' based "on speolllc fncts set forth In tho record" (quotation marka omitted)). 6 A.2d 255 (Me. I 990), where the Law Court concluded that East Moline, an Illinois company with no office or agent in Maine, was nonetheless subject to personal jurisdiction in Maine after a Maine resident was killed in an accident in Maine by a countet·weight on a hoist manufactured by the defendant. Plaintiffs assert Mahon is instructive because, as in the p1·esent case, the Mahon defendant only advertised in national publications, had limited contact with Maine, and the accident occurred in Maine. The Cmtrt, howevet', concludes that Mahon is not controlling in the present case. In Mahon, the Law Colltt reasoned that ••[b]ecause of the intended purpose for which the hoist was manufactured, East Moline must have anticipated its removal from site to site. In fact, East Moline was aware of its use In Maine." Id. (emphasis added). The knowledge of the defendant that its product would be used in Maine comports with the concept of purposeful availment. As explained in World· Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, u[t]he forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its pt·oducts Into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State." 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980). The Law Cm1rt fmmd personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant in Mahon beca\tse it was aware its hoist was being used in Mahle. 579 A.2d at 256. In contrast, Plaintiffs have not shown that Yankee had knowledge that the Aircraft would be used in Maine or even travel to MHine. At the time the service was performed, a Massachusetts LLC owned the Aircraft. (Conner Aff. ~ 11.) Services performed in Massach\tsetts on a plane owned by a Massachusetts LLC could not provide Yankee with any notice of future suit in Maine t·egardlng those services. 7 Furthermore, the mobility of the Aircraft does not suppo11 the exercise of jurisdiction of Maine courts over Yankee. The Supreme Court addressed this same argument in World-Wide Volkswagen and rejected the notlon that because a motor vehicle is mobile, it is foreseeable that it will cause injury in another forum. See 444 U.S, at 295-98. The foreseeabillty or 11 likelihood that a product wUl find its way into (a] forum" is not the focus of the inquiry: the inquiry is on 11 the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State ... such that he could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." 444 U.S. at 297. Plaintiffs have not shown how Yankee should have known or anticipated the Aircraft would travel into Maine at the time Yankee performed the sel'Vices in Massachusetts. Finally, the Court does not find the reasoning of cases involving products in the stream of commerce particuiarly helpful when the conduct at issue is the performance of sel'Vices in a single forum, The First Circuit has distinguished between the rendering of services and the sale of goods in interstate commerce, concluding that the alleged tortious rendition of services in one state does not create a "portable tort which can be deemed to have been committed wherever the consequences foreseeably were felt." Harlow, 432 F.3d at 63 (quoting Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d 287, 289-90 (9th Cir. 1972)). Although the First Circuit was addressing the pl'Ovlslon of medical care, which is a personal service, the reasoning applies equally to other sel'Vices rendered within a forum when the effects of those seL·vlces are felt outside the fomm. The appropriate inquiry is to the defendant's conduct and connection to the forum. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at297. CONCLUSION In sum, the Plaintiffs have failed to satisfY their burden on the second prong of the due process test. Based on the current record, Yankee could not have anticipated litigation Jn Maine 8 when performing services in Massachusetts. Yankee has insufficient contacts with the state of Maiue to juslifY the exercise of either geneml or specific jurisdiction. Accordingly, and based on the foregoing analysis, the Court GRANTS Yankee Aviation Services, Inc.'s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion is granted without prejudice. Pursuant to M.R. Clv. P. 79(a), the Clerk shall incorporat6 this Decision and Order into the docket by reference. .. Date: <tj;:~jtJ \1--- ol n C. Nivison Ju lice, Maine Business & Consumer Court Entered on DocJ<et.&_i/a the Copies sent via Mall_ Elect onlcally;,(' 9 E. Chris L'Hommedieu et al v. RAM Aircraft, LP et al BCD-RE-13-33 PLAINTIFFS COUNSEl (NAME AND ADDRESS) Lance E. Walker, Esq. Kim C. Myers Norman Hanson & DeTroy P.O. Box 4600 E. Chris L'Hommedieu Portland, Maine 04112-4600 Heather Perreault E. Chris L'Hommedleu and Philip M. Coffin, Ill, Esq. Heather Perrault as Co- lambert Coffin Personal Representatives 477 Congress Street of the Estate of Edward P.O. Box 15215 L'Hommedleu Portland, Maine 04112-5215 DEFENDANTS COUNSEL (NAME AND ADDRESS) RAM Alrcraf~, L.P. Christopher C. Dinan, Esq. Monaghan Leahy, LLP 95 Exchange Street P.O. Box 7046 Portland, Maine 04112-3906 Cessna Aircraft Company Martha C. Gaythwaite, Esq. d/b/a McCauley Friedman Gaythwalte Wolf, LLP Propeller Services 25 Pearl Street P.O. Box4726 Portland, Maine 04112-4726 Maine Aviation Sales, Noreen A. Patient, Esq. Inc. and Aircraft Eaton Peabody · Maintenance of Maine 167 Park Row, P.O. Box 9 Brunswick, Maine 04011 Yankee Aviation Services James B. Haddow, Esq. Petruccelli Martin & Haddow, LLP Two Monument Sq., Ste. 900 P. 0. Box 17555 Portland, Maine 04112-8555 New England Propeller Phillip E. Johnson, Esq. Service, Inc. Johnson & Webbert, L.L.P. 160 Capitol St., Ste. 3 : P.O. Box 79 Augusta, Maine 04332-0079 Engine Components Daniel R. Mawhinney, Esq. International, Inc. Thompson & Bowie, LLP Three Canal Plaza P.O. Box 4630 Portland, Maine 04112 Champion Aerospace, LLC JohnS. Whitman, Esq. Richardson Whitman Large & Badger 465 Congress Street P.O. Box 9545 _ ty(),'fJ:/?PtJ 11'!111rePI!~~ _q.5'Is 

Case Information

Court
Me. Super. Ct
Decision Date
September 24, 2013
Status
Precedential
L'Hommedieu v. Ram Aircraft | Tortwell