Lindsey v. Bradshaw

             IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                        
              FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO                         
                      EASTERN DIVISION                                  

CARL LINDSEY,                                                             

        Petitioner,                                                     
                                 Case No. 1:03-cv-702                   
   v.                            Judge Sarah D. Morrison                
                                 Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers  
WARDEN, Chillicothe Correctional                                          
Institution                                                             

        Respondent.                                                     


                     OPINION AND ORDER                                  

   Petitioner, a prisoner sentenced to death by the State of Ohio, has pending before this 
Court a habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  This matter is before the Court 
upon the habeas Petition (ECF No. 9), the Amended Petition (ECF No. 38), the Return of Writ 
(ECF No. 12), the Traverse (ECF No. 20), and the Third Amended Petition, setting forth lethal 
injection claims.  This matter is also before the Court on Petitioner’s Notice of Withdrawal of 
Grounds for Relief (ECF No. 63), Petitioner’s Final Merit Brief (ECF No. 75), Respondent’s 
Merit Brief (ECF No. 80), and Petitioner’s Reply (ECF No. 81).  This Court has thoroughly 
reviewed all the remaining claims in this habeas action, and upon said review, finds Petitioner’s 
claims lack merit.  Habeas relief is DENIED and this action is DISMISSED.   
             I.   Factual Background and Procedural History             
   After a trial by jury in Brown County, Ohio, Petitioner Carl Lindsey was convicted of 
Aggravated Murder and sentenced to death for the February 10, 1997, murder of Donald Ray 
“Whitey” Hoop.  On direct review, the Ohio Supreme Court set forth the facts and procedural 

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history of this case:                                                     
   In the early morning hours of February 10, 1997, appellant, Carl Lindsey, was at 
   Slammers Bar near Mt. Orab along with Kathy Kerr, Kenny Swinford, A.J. Cox, 
   and Joy Hoop, one of the bar owners.  According to the testimony at trial, Joy had 
   wanted her husband, Donald Ray “Whitey” Hoop, dead, and that night appellant 
   told her “he would do him in.”  Joy then handed a small gun to appellant, and 
   appellant left the bar.  Kathy Kerr also decided to leave the bar at that point, but 
   heard a banging noise.  As she left she saw Whitey lying on the ground, covered 
   with blood, and appellant standing by the door.    According to investigators, 
   Whitey had been shot once in the face while seated inside his vehicle.    He 
   apparently then left his vehicle and remained in the parking lot where he was shot 
   again in the forehead.  Upon seeing Whitey on the ground, Kerr immediately left 
   for her home, which was only a few hundred feet away. Appellant followed her in 
   his pickup truck, and she allowed him into her trailer to take a shower. 

   At approximately the same time that these events were occurring, Brown County 
   Deputy Sheriff Buddy Moore was on patrol and passed Slammers Bar.  He noticed 
   and was suspicious of a pickup truck in the parking lot and followed it from the bar 
   south to the Kerr residence.  A couple minutes later, he received a police dispatch 
   that a shooting had been reported at Slammers and headed back toward the bar.  
   On the way, Moore noticed a car pass him at a high speed going south.  When he 
   arrived at Slammers, he found Whitey Hoop’s body lying in the parking lot.  When 
   backup arrived, Moore instructed a state trooper to go to Kerr’s trailer, look for the 
   pickup, and make sure that no one left the premises. Moore also left for Kerr’s 
   trailer.                                                             

   When Moore arrived at the Kerr residence, he found appellant in the bathroom, 
   soaking his clothes in a tub full of red-tinted water.  He also found a box of .22 
   caliber ammunition on the sink.  At that point, Moore took appellant into custody.  
   Upon a search of the premises, police seized from the Kerr trailer appellant’s wallet, 
   the ammunition, the clothing in the tub, and a .22 caliber Jennings semiautomatic 
   pistol, which they discovered behind the bathroom door. They also found and 
   seized Whitey’s wallet, which was in a wastebasket in the bathroom.  When 
   discovered, Whitey’s wallet was empty, although an acquaintance of Whitey’s 
   testified that Whitey habitually carried about $1,000 with him.  Police also found 
   $1,257 in appellant’s wallet, although he had been laid off in late December 1996. 

   The crime laboratory tested the bloodstains on the items seized by police and found 
   the stains on appellant’s jacket, jeans, boot, truck console, steering-wheel cover, 
   driver’s seat, driver’s-side door, and door handle all to be consistent with Whitey’s 
   blood.  One of the stains on the Jennings .22 pistol was also consistent with 
   Whitey’s blood.                                                      


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   Appellant was indicted on two counts of aggravated murder, one under R.C. 
   2903.01(A) (prior calculation and design) and one under R.C. 2903.01(B) (felony-
   murder),  each  count  carrying  a  death  specification  for  felony–murder  (R.C. 
   2929.04(A)(7)) and the first count also carrying a specification for murder for hire 
   (R.C. 2929.03(A)(2)). He was also indicted on one theft count and two aggravated 
   robbery counts. At the close of the evidence, the trial court granted appellant’s 
   Crim.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal on the murder-for-hire specification.  
   A jury then found appellant guilty on all counts and all remaining specifications 
   and, after a penalty hearing, recommended death.  The trial judge merged the two 
   aggravated murder counts and imposed the death sentence.             

State v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio St.3d 479, 721 N.E.2d 995 (2000).  Joy Hoop, who was tried in a 
separate and subsequent proceeding, was convicted of two counts of complicity in the 
commission of the aggravated murder, and was sentenced to a term of life in prison with parole 
eligibility after serving twenty-five years.  State v. Hoop, No. CA2000-11-034, 2001 WL 
877296, *1 (Ohio App. 12th Dist. Aug. 6, 2011).                           
   After the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentence on direct 
review, the United States Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.  
Lindsey v. Ohio, 531 U.S. 838 (2000).  Petitioner filed his original petition for post-conviction 
relief on September 21, 1998, and an amended petition on April 3, 1999.  The trial court denied 
the post-conviction petition on January 15, 2002, without a hearing.  (Appx., ECF No. 152-10, 
at PAGEID # 8674-8690.)  The Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the 
trial court and denied post-conviction relief.  State v. Lindsey, No. CA2002-02-002, 2003 WL 
433941 (Ohio App. 12th Dist. Feb. 24, 2003).                              
   On April 30, 1999, Petitioner filed a motion for a new trial in the state trial court, based 
on a new witness who testified at Joy Hoop’s trial that Hoop confessed to firing the second and 
fatal shot that killed Whitey Hoop.  The trial court denied the motion for a new trial on July 15, 
2003, and the Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed.  State v. Lindsey, No. CA2003-07-

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010, 2004 WL 1877734 (Ohio App. 12th Dist. Aug. 23, 2004).                
   On October 10, 2003, after exhausting his state court remedies, Petitioner filed the 
instant Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, raising ten claims for relief.  (Petition, ECF No. 9.)  
On January 13, 2005, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition, removing all references to actual 

innocence, and abandoning all but sub-part (C) of his First Claim for Relief.  (Am. Petition, 
ECF No. 38.)  Additionally, on September 7, 2006, Petitioner filed a Notice of Withdrawal of 
Grounds for Relief from Habeas Petition, voluntarily withdrawing the claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel set forth in his Fifth and Eighth Claims for Relief.  (ECF No. 63.)  
Accordingly, eight claims for relief remain pending before the Court; subpart (C) of Petitioner’s 
First Claim for Relief, and Claims Two, Three, Four, Six, Seven, Nine and Ten remain before the 
Court for a decision on the merits.                                       
   As an additional matter, the Court notes that Petitioner has made several attempts to 
amend his petition to add claims for relief challenging Ohio’s lethal injection protocol.  Those 
proposed claims have been the subject of years of litigation in this Court and will be addressed in 

the final section of this Opinion and Order.                              
                      II.  Standards of Review                          
   Because this is a habeas corpus case, provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) that became effective prior to the filing of the instant petition, apply to 
this case.  See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).  The AEDPA limits the 
circumstances under which a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus with respect to any 
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in a state court proceeding.  Specifically, the AEDPA 
directs this Court not to grant a writ unless the state court adjudication “resulted in a decision 

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that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “was 
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 
State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).  Section 2254(d)(1) circumscribes a federal 

court’s review of claimed legal errors, while § 2254(d)(2) places restrictions on a federal court’s 
review of claimed factual errors.                                         
   Under § 2254(d)(1), “[a] state court’s adjudication of a claim is ‘contrary to’ clearly 
established federal law ‘if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the 
Supreme Court on a question of law, or if the state court decides a case differently than the 
Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.’”  Stojetz v. Ishee, 892 F.3d 175, 
192-93 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Van Tran v. Colson, 764 F.3d 594, 604 (6th Cir. 2014)).  A state 
court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court precedent if the state 
court identifies the correct legal principle from the decisions of the Supreme Court but 
unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the petitioner’s case.  Id. (citing Henley v. 

Bell, 487 F.3d 379, 384 (6th Cir. 2007)).  A federal habeas court may not find a state 
adjudication to be “unreasonable” simply because the court concludes in its independent 
judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously 
or incorrectly.  Williams v. Coyle, 260 F.3d 684, 699 (6th Cir. 2001).  Rather, for purposes of 
2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law includes only the holdings of the Supreme Court, 
excluding any dicta; and, an application of these holdings is ‘unreasonable’ only if the petitioner 
shows that the state court’s ruling ‘was so lacking in justification that there was an error well 
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded 

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disagreement.’”  Stojetz, 892 F.3d at 192-193 (quoting White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415 (2014)).  
See Shinn v. Kayer, ___ S.Ct ___, 2020 WL 7327827, *3 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2020) (“The prisoner 
must show that the state court’s decision is so obviously wrong that its error lies ‘beyond any 
possibility for fair-minded disagreement.’”) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 

(2011)).                                                                  
   Further, § 2254(d)(2) prohibits a federal court from granting an application for habeas 
relief on a claim that the state courts adjudicated on the merits unless the state court adjudication 
of the claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 
in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).  In 
this regard, § 2254(e)(1) provides that the findings of fact of a state court are presumed to be 
correct and a petitioner bears the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and 
convincing evidence.  The Sixth Circuit recently remarked on the hurdles a petitioner must 
overcome regarding a state court’s factual findings:                      
   To prove that a state court’s factual assessment was ‘unreasonable,’ a petitioner 
   must show that ‘a reasonable factfinder must’ disagree with the state court’s 
   assessment.”  Woods v. Smith, 660 F. App’x 414, 424 (6th Cir 2016) (quoting Rice 
   v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341, 126 S.Ct. 969, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006).  Meeting 
   this standard requires Pollini to do more than show an alternative way to view the 
   facts.  Franklin v. Bradshaw, 695 F.3d 439, 447-48 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[A] state-
   court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas 
   court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.”) (quoting 
   Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010)).                            

Pollini v. Robey, 981F.3d 486, 497 (6th Cir. 2020).  Lastly, this Court’s review is limited to the 
record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.  Cullen v. 
Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011).                                          
   A state prisoner who seeks a writ of habeas corpus in federal court does not have an 

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automatic right to appeal a district court’s adverse decision unless the court issues a certificate of 
appealability (“COA”).  28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).  When a claim has been denied on the merits, a 
COA may be issued only if the petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 
constitutional right.  To make such a showing, a petitioner must show “that reasonable jurists 

could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a 
different manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to 
proceed further.’”  Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 
463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).  Recently, the Sixth Circuit vacated a COA and dismissed an 
appeal, on the basis that a district court did not appropriately apply the correct standard for 
granting a COA.  Moody v. United States, 958 F.3d 485 (6th Cir. 2020).  In Moody, the Sixth 
Circuit cautioned that “a court should not grant a certificate without some substantial reason to 
think that the denial of relief might be incorrect,” and “[t]o put it simply, a claim does not merit a 
certificate unless every independent reason to deny the claim is reasonably debatable.”  Id. at 
488 (emphasis in original).  With respect to a claim that a state court has previously rejected on 

the merits pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the Sixth Circuit advised “[f]or that claim to warrant 
appeal, there must be a substantial argument that the state court’s decision was not just wrong 
but objectively unreasonable under the stringent requirements of § 2254(d) (commonly known as 
‘AEDPA’ deference).”  Id. (emphasis in original).                         
   Keeping these standards of review in mind, the Court has carefully reviewed the Petition, 
the Amended Petition (as it relates to Petitioner’s First Claim for Relief), the state court record, 
the decisions of the state courts, and the merits briefing of the parties.  For the reasons that 
follow, the Court finds Petitioner is not entitled to relief in this habeas corpus action.  

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                      III.  Petitioner’s Claims                         
                      First Claim for Relief:                           

        The evidence used to support Lindsey’s convictions and sentences 
        is insufficient.                                                

   In subpart C of his First Claim for Relief, as amended, Petitioner argues the evidence of 
his guilt was legally insufficient to support his convictions and sentence, and the state court 
findings to the contrary are unreasonable.  (ECF No. 38, at PAGEID # 511.)  Specifically, 
Petitioner contends this “was a case of circumstantial evidence, with questionable testimony by 
incredible witnesses with unclear and undisclosed motives,” and the State of Ohio “cannot, and 
did not, submit the degree of proof that is sufficient to uphold Lindsey’s aggravated murder 
conviction and death sentence.”  (Id. at PAGEID # 516.)  The crux of Petitioner’s argument is 
that the State’s case hinged on the “patently incredible witness” Kathy Kerr, and “no reasonable 
juror would have found Lindsey guilty based upon the ever-changing statements of a woman 
who had unexplained blood on her hands after the murder of Whitey Hoop.”  (Id. at PAGEID # 
512.)  Initially, Petitioner asserted a claim of actual innocence as part of his First Claim for 
Relief, but he withdrew that assertion in his Amended Petition, wherein he stated he was 
amending his first claim “by removing paragraphs 24-38 and any reference to actual innocence.”  
(Id. at PAGEID # 511.)                                                    
   Petitioner raised his insufficient evidence claim on direct appeal, and Respondent does 
not allege the claim is barred by procedural default.  The Ohio Supreme Court decided this 
claim in conjunction with its discussion of whether the verdicts were against the manifest weight 
of the evidence, holding:                                                 
   B.  Sufficiency of the Evidence                                      

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Appellant argues in his fourteenth proposition that the evidence presented at trial 
was legally insufficient to support his conviction of aggravated murder.  The 
relevant question in determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, “after 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational 
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  (Emphasis deleted.)  Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 
307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573.                  

Appellant insists that the state failed to prove that he acted with purpose to kill 
under R.C. 2903.01.  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, we are convinced that it is sufficient to support that element of the 
offense.  Witnesses testified that after Joy said she wanted Whitey dead, appellant 
said he would “take care of it” or “do him in.”  Furthermore, Whitey was shot 
twice in the head at close range, the second time while he was lying on the ground.  
As we have repeatedly held, multiple gunshots to a vital area at close range tend to 
demonstrate purpose to kill.  See State v. Palmer (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 543, 562, 
687 N.E.2d 685, 702; State v. Otte (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 555, 564, 660 N.E.2d 711, 
720.    This  evidence,  taken  together,  is  sufficient  to  demonstrate  appellant’s 
purpose to murder Whitey Hoop.                                       

We similarly reject appellant’s second argument, that the state failed to prove 
appellant’s identity as the murderer.  Appellant was heard to say he would do 
Whitey in and was caught right after the shooting in Kerr’s bathroom soaking his 
bloodstained clothes in her tub.  Police also discovered in the bathroom Whitey’s 
wallet and a Jennings .22 with a bloodstain on it consistent with Whitey’s blood.  
Lindsey’s clothing and truck were also heavily stained with blood consistent with 
Whitey’s  blood.    Viewing  this  evidence  in  a  light  most  favorable  to  the 
prosecution, we are convinced that any rational trier of fact could have found 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  appellant  committed  the  aggravated  murder.  
Appellant’s fourteenth proposition of law is overruled.              

C.  Manifest Weight                                                  

Appellant’s fifteenth proposition of law challenges his conviction for aggravated 
murder as against the manifest weight of the evidence.  In considering a manifest-
weight claim, “‘[t]he court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and 
all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines 
whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and 
created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed 
and a new trial ordered.  The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be 
exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against 
conviction.’”  State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, 
547, quoting State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 20 OBR 215, 219, 

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   485 N.E.2d 717, 720–721.                                             

   Appellant contends that circumstantial evidence pointed to suspects other than 
   himself and that such evidence outweighed the state’s evidence as to appellant’s 
   identity.  In particular, appellant focuses upon Deputy Sheriff Moore’s supposed 
   testimony that an unidentified vehicle was seen leaving the parking lot of Slammers 
   at high speed.  In fact, Moore testified only that a vehicle was seen driving at a 
   high speed past him as he returned to the bar, not that it left from Slammers.  
   Appellant also points to the fact that Swinford claimed he left the bar before the 
   shooting but that no one saw him drive away and that no gunshot residue tests were 
   taken from Swinford.  Finally he emphasizes that Kathy Kerr was seen to have 
   blood on her but that police failed to sample it.                    

   This evidence by itself is weak and cannot be said to implicate any of the above as 
   the murderer.  Moreover, considered in the context of the remaining identity 
   evidence, this case most definitely does not fall into the category of the “exceptional 
   case  in  which  the  evidence  weighs  heavily  against  the  conviction.”   State  v. 
   Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d at 547.  Rather, the evidence 
   shows that appellant stated he would kill Whitey, that he was seen standing near 
   his  dead  body,  that  police  found  him  shortly  after  the  shooting  soaking  his 
   bloodstained clothing in a bathroom that also contained Whitey’s wallet and the 
   same type of gun that killed Whitey, and that his truck was heavily stained with 
   blood consistent with Whitey’s.  This evidence persuades us that the jury neither 
   lost its way nor created a manifest miscarriage of justice in convicting appellant of 
   aggravated murder.  Appellant’s fifteenth proposition of law is overruled. 

State v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio St. 3d 479, 482-84 (2000).                      
   An insufficient evidence claim, as opposed to a freestanding claim of actual innocence, 
states a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); 
Johnson v. Coyle, 200 F.3d 987, 991 (6th Cir. 2000); Bagby v. Sowders, 894 F.2d 792, 794 (6th 
Cir. 1990) (en banc).  In order for a conviction to be constitutionally sound, every element of 
the crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. 
   [T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 
   favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
   elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .  This familiar standard gives 
   full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the 

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   testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic 
   facts to ultimate facts.                                             

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.  The Jackson standard “‘must be applied with explicit reference to the 
substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law.’”  Thompson v. Skipper, 
981 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324).     
   In a case such as this, filed after the enactment of the AEDPA, two levels of deference to 
state court decisions is required:                                        
   In an appeal from a denial of habeas relief, in which a petitioner challenges the 
   constitutional sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him, we are thus bound 
   by two layers of deference to groups who might view facts differently than we 
   would.  First, as in all sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, we must determine 
   whether, viewing the trial testimony and exhibits in the light most favorable to the 
   prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
   crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 
   S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).  In doing so, we do not reweigh the evidence, 
   re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of the 
   jury.  See United States v. Hilliard, 11 F.3d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 1993).  Thus, even 
   though we might have not voted to convict a defendant had we participated in jury 
   deliberations, we must uphold the jury verdict if any rational trier of fact could have 
   found the defendant guilty after resolving all disputes in favor of the prosecution.  
   Second, even were we to conclude that a rational trier of fact could not have found 
   a petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, on habeas review, we must still defer 
   to  the  state  appellate  court’s  sufficiency  determination  as  long  as  it  is  not 
   unreasonable.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).                           

Brown v. Konteh, 567 F.3d 191, 205 (6th Cir. 2009).  Thus, on habeas review of a sufficiency of 
the evidence claim, deference should be given to the trier-of-fact’s verdict under Jackson v. 
Virginia and then to the appellate court’s consideration of that verdict, as required by the 
AEDPA.  Tucker v. Palmer, 541 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 2008); accord Davis v. Lafler, 658 F.3d 525, 
531 (6th Cir. 2011) (en banc).  Stated another way:                       
   We  have  made  clear  that  Jackson  claims  face  a  high  bar  in  federal  habeas 
   proceedings because they are subject to two layers of judicial deference.  First, on 
   direct appeal, “it is the responsibility of the jury – not the court – to decide what 

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   conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial.  A reviewing court 
   may set aside the jury’s verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no 
   rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.”  Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 
   1, 2 (2011) (per curiam).  And second, on habeas review, “a federal court may not 
   overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge 
   simply because the federal court disagrees with the state court.  The federal court 
   instead may do so only if the state court decision was ‘objectively unreasonable.’”  

Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651 (2012) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted).  See 
also Tackett v. Trierweiler, 956 F.3d 358, 367 (6th Cir. 2020) (noting in light of Jackson and 
AEDPA’s two layers of deference, “a federal court’s review of a state court conviction for 
sufficiency of the evidence is very limited”).  In applying the deference that is due, the AEDPA 
“requires a habeas court to review the actual grounds on which the state court relied.”  
Thompson, 981 F.3d at 480 (citing Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1191-92 
(2018)).                                                                  
   Here, in rejecting Petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence claim on the merits, the Ohio 
Supreme Court correctly identified Jackson v. Virginia as the correct constitutional standard.  
Accordingly, no basis for habeas relief exists unless the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision involved 
an unreasonable application of Jackson, and even then, that application “must be ‘objectively 
unreasonable,’ not merely wrong; even ‘clear error’ will not suffice.”  Thompson, 981 F.3d at 
479 (quoting Smith v. Nagy, 962 F.3d 192, 199 (6th Cir. 2020)).  Petitioner has not cleared this 
hurdle.  In applying Jackson, the Ohio Supreme Court cited specific evidence of record from 
which a reasonable jury could infer that Petitioner acted with the requisite purpose to kill Whitey 
Hoop.  As to his purpose, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that on the night of the murder, and in 
response to Joy Hoop saying she wanted her husband dead, Petitioner stated he would “take care 
of it” or “do him in.”  Lindsey, 97 Ohio St. 3d at 483.  Shortly thereafter, Petitioner was seen 

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standing near Whitey Hoop’s body.  As to Petitioner’s intent to kill, Whitey Hoop was shot 
twice at close range, with both shots to the vital head/face area of his body.  Additional evidence 
strongly implicated Petitioner as the murderer.  Law enforcement observed Petitioner’s truck 
leaving the scene of the murder.  Petitioner was found a short time later in a nearby residence 

soaking bloodstained clothes in a bathroom, where the victim’s wallet and a gun consistent with 
the murder weapon were also found.  As the Ohio Supreme Court noted, the gun had “a 
bloodstain on it consistent with Whitey’s blood” and “Lindsey’s clothing and truck were also 
heavily stained with blood consistent with Whitey’s blood.”  Id.  The facts recited by the Ohio 
Supreme Court are sufficient to support Petitioner’s convictions, and Petitioner has not 
established that the state court’s decision was contrary to or an objectively unreasonable 
application of clearly established federal law.  Petitioner’s First Claim for Relief is without 
merit.                                                                    
   Further, the Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find the resolution of 
Petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence claim to be debatable or wrong.  The Court declines to 

issue a certificate of appealability.                                     
                      Second Claim for Relief:                          

   The State of Ohio withheld material exculpatory evidence of witness immunity in 
   violation of Mr. Lindsey’s due process rights and allowed perjured testimony at Mr. 
   Lindsey’s trial.  U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V, VI, XIV.                    

   In his Second Claim for Relief, Petitioner argues the prosecution suppressed material, 
exculpatory evidence of purported witness immunity and other compensation.  (Petition, ECF 
No. 9-1, at PAGEID # 167.)  Specifically, Petitioner claims the state failed to disclose that it had 
granted key witness Kathy Kerr testimonial immunity and compensated her for her testimony, in 

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the form of lost wages and a hotel room during the pendency of Petitioner’s trial.  Petitioner 
further contends the prosecutor suborned perjury by failing to correct Kerr when she testified that 
she would “do her time” for testifying falsely before the Grand Jury.  (Id. at PAGEID # 169.)  
Respondent acknowledges that Petitioner presented this claim to the state courts during his post-

conviction proceedings and the claim is properly before this Court on habeas review.   
   On appeal from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, the Twelfth District 
Court of Appeals disposed of Petitioner’s claim regarding Kerr’s testimony in two short 
paragraphs:                                                               
        In appellant’s first, second and sixth grounds for relief he argued that “Kerr 
   was induced to testify against [appellant] with a purported grant of testimonial 
   immunity,” a state-paid hotel room, and reimbursement of her lost wages during 
   the trial.  As a result, appellant argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by 
   concealing the impeachment evidence that [he] could have used to reveal the bias 
   of the state’s witness.                                              
        However, the state did not grant, or attempt to grant any immunity to 
   witness Kerr.  See R.C. 2945.44.  Kerr’s belief that she would be reimbursed for 
   lost wages has not been established as fact, and in any event, would not arise to the 
   level of prosecutorial misconduct.  Furthermore, providing a hotel room to Kerr 
   would not be potential impeachment evidence of such magnitude or significance as 
   to provide postconviction relief.  Therefore, appellant has alleged no operative 
   facts to indicate that the state concealed impeachment evidence relating to Kerr 
   from the defense.                                                    

State v. Lindsey, No. CA2002-02-002, 2003 WL 433941, *5-6 (Ohio App. 12th Dist. Feb. 24, 
2003).                                                                    
   In his merit brief in support of the instant habeas petition, Petitioner sets forth two 
reasons why this Court should question the decision of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, the 
last state court to issue a decision on this matter.  First, Petitioner argues the decision by the 
court of appeals “summarily rejected” his claims regarding Kerr, “without any citation to, or 
discussion of, clearly established federal law on failure to disclose material evidence and 

                             14                                         
suborned perjury.”  (ECF No. 75, at PAGEID # 1111.)  Secondly, Petitioner contends the state 
court made incorrect and unreasonable findings of fact by concluding that immunity was not 
offered to Kerr.  According to Petitioner:                                
   Astonishingly, when presented with Lindsey’s Brady and suborned perjury claims, 
   the Ohio[] appellate court made the determination that the state did not grant or 
   attempt to grant any immunity to witness Kerr. The state appellate court ended any 
   analysis  of  the  issue  presumptively  because  once  they  found  there  was  no 
   immunity, there was an implicit finding that the prosecutor did not fail to disclose 
   evidence and that there was no perjury by Kerr. Clearly, the Ohio court of appeals’ 
   finding  on  this  fact  was  incorrect  and  was  unreasonable.    (internal  citation 
   omitted).                                                            

(Id.)                                                                     
   This Court must first decide the appropriate level of deference due to the state appellate 
court’s decision.  The Court has reviewed Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief, his 
second amended petition for post-conviction relief, and the accompanying exhibits.  (Appx., 
ECF No. 152-8, at PAGEID # 7127; ECF 152-10, at PAGEID # 8544.)  Petitioner raised his 
claims regarding the purported grant of immunity to witness Kerr as his first and second grounds 
for relief.  Petitioner argued:                                           
   The State, through the prosecuting attorney, has a duty to disclose to the defense all 
   evidence favorable to the accused and material to either guilt or punishment.  Ohio 
   R. Crim. P. 16; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 
   419 (1995); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Giglio v. United States, 405 
   U.S.  150  (1972).    The  State  breached  its  duty  and  violated  Mr.  Lindsey’s 
   constitutional rights by concealing evidence that Kathy Kerr had been induced to 
   testify by a purported grant of immunity and other valuable consideration, thereby 
   depriving  Mr.  Lindsey  his  rights  to  a  fair  trial  and  due  process  of  law  and 
   undermining his right to confront the State’s witnesses.  U.S. Const. amends. V, 
   VI, XIV; Ohio Const., art. §§ 19, 10, 16.                            

(Appx., ECF No. 152-10, at PAGEID # 8564.)  There is no question that Petitioner presented 
the essence of a federal constitutional Brady claim to the state courts.  In so doing, Petitioner 

                             15                                         
cited applicable United States Supreme Court precedent and principles.  The Twelfth District 
Court of Appeals, on the other hand, did not seemingly address Petitioner’s constitutional claim.  
The appellate court (and the trial court for that matter), analyzed whether the prosecutor had 
granted (or could grant) Kerr enforceable transactional immunity under the Ohio immunity 

statute, set forth as Section 2945.44 of the Ohio Revised Code.  Applying only Ohio law, the 
court of appeals determined the prosecutor had not granted Kerr transactional immunity, 
something only a court could do.  The state court did not address the potential impeachment 
value of Kerr believing she had immunity, or whether the prosecutor made promises to her 
regarding any future prosecution arising out of her testimony.  By ending the inquiry upon the 
finding of no official grant of transactional immunity, the state courts bypassed consideration of 
the substance of Petitioner’s Brady claim.  The state courts did not acknowledge Petitioner 
included a federal Brady claim, nor did they rely on federal law or use language suggesting the 
materiality of this potential impeachment evidence was considered.  Given these circumstances, 
this Court concludes the Twelfth District Court of Appeals did not address the federal claim 

Petitioner Lindsey raised post-conviction.                                
   If a state court does not rule on a federal claim before it, federal review of that claim is de 
novo rather than deferential.  Hawkins v. Coyle, 547 F.3d 540, 546 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting when 
a prisoner “‘properly raised a claim in state court, yet that court did not review the claim’s 
merits, AEDPA deference does not apply, and the federal habeas court reviews legal issues de 
novo’”) (quoting Vazquez v. Jones, 496 F.3d 564, 569 (6th Cir. 2007)); Matthews v. Ishee, 486 
F.3d 883 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding where state court denied Brady claim exclusively on state law 
grounds the claim was “fairly presented but not reviewed on the merits by a state court” and thus 

                             16                                         
“we review the claim de novo”); McKenzie v. Smith, 326 F.3d 721, 727 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating 
when there are “no results, let alone reasoning, to which this court can defer . . ., any attempt to 
determine whether the state court decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of clearly established Federal law . . . would be futile”).  Thus, this Court addresses 

Petitioner’s Brady claim regarding the Kerr impeachment material de novo.      
   In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court held that the State has a 
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense under the Due Process Clause.  “There are 
three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the 
accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have 
been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.”  
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999).  With regard to the first element, “the 
Supreme Court has held that the duty to turn over favorable evidence encompasses impeachment 
evidence as well as exculpatory evidence.”  Eakes v. Sexton, 592 F. App’x. 422, 427 (6th Cir. 
2014) (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)).  Evidence is material only if 

there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had 
the evidence been disclosed.  LaMar v. Houk, 798 F.3d 405, 415 (6th Cir. 2015).  A violation is 
established by showing that the favorable evidence “could reasonably be taken to put the whole 
case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”  VanHook v. 
Bobby, 661 F.3d 264, 267 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)).  
“The materiality of Brady evidence depends almost entirely on the value of the undisclosed 
evidence relative to the other evidence produced by the state.”  Eakes, 592 F. App’x at 427 
(citing United States v. Sipe, 388 F.3d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 2004)).  That is, the materiality 

                             17                                         
analysis necessarily involves weighing the value of the undisclosed evidence against other 
evidence produced by the state.  Chinn v. Warden, 3:02cv512, 2020 WL 2781522, *11 (S.D. 
Ohio May 29, 2020) (citing Bethel v. Bobby, 2:10-CV-391, 2018 WL 1516778, at *2 (S.D. Ohio 
Mar. 28, 2018) (report and recommendation)).  “Where the undisclosed evidence merely 

furnishes an additional basis on which to challenge a witness whose credibility has already been 
shown to be questionable or who is subject to extensive attack by reason of other evidence, the 
undisclosed evidence may be cumulative, and hence not material.”  United States v. Ramer, 883 
F.3d 659, 672 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bales v. Bell, 788 F.3d 568, 574 (6th Cir. 2015)).    
   The crux of Petitioner’s Brady claim is that the state made and failed to disclose an 
agreement with witness Kathy Kerr that she would be granted testimonial immunity regarding 
her testimony at his trial.  Respondent argues the state courts correctly determined the 
prosecutor did not legally grant or attempt to grant official immunity to Kerr.  According to 
Respondent, under Ohio law, only a court may grant immunity upon a written request by the 
prosecuting attorney.  (ECF No. 80, at PAGEID # 1159) (citing State v. Tammerino, No. L-82-

345, 1983 Ohio App. Lexis 14904 (6th Dist. Aug. 26, 1983) (“It is important to note that police 
officers and prosecuting attorneys cannot grant immunity.  A grant of immunity must be 
approved by a judge and must also meet the requirements set forth in R.C. 2945.44.”)).  
Respondent acknowledges that police officers or prosecutors do sometimes promise immunity 
without first obtaining judicial approval, and in those circumstances, “there is a risk that the 
statements obtained from the individual are involuntary and inadmissible at trial.” Id.  
Respondent notes “the potential harm to the State in eliciting testimony under a false promise of 
immunity would not have raised itself in Petitioner or his co-conspirators’ trials, but would have 

                             18                                         
become an issue if Kerr had been criminally charged.”  Id.  What Respondent does not 
recognize is that a purported yet unenforceable grant of immunity to Kerr could also be an issue 
in Petitioner’s case, if it was not disclosed to Petitioner.  If Kerr believed she was being offered 
some form of immunity in exchange for her testimony, this fact should have been disclosed to 

Petitioner’s counsel.                                                     
   Here, a reasonable view of the state court record indicates a strong likelihood that the 
prosecutor offered Kathy Kerr testimonial immunity.  This offer was memorialized in a letter 
dated July 8, 1997, approximately two months before Petitioner’s September, 1997 trial.  The 
letter, attached to Petitioner’s post-conviction petition as Exhibit 45B, appears to bear the 
signature of the prosecuting attorney, Thomas Grennan, and states as follows: 
   Re:  Grant of Testimonial Immunity                                   
   Dear Ms. Kerr:                                                       
        This is to advise you that I, as the Brown County Prosecutor, am hereby 
   granting you testimonial immunity for your truthful testimony and cooperation in 
   the prosecution in the matter of State of Ohio v. Carl Lindsey and State of Ohio vs. 
   Joy Hoop, which resulted in the homicide death of Donald Ray Hoop on February 
   10, 1997.                                                            

(PC Exh. 45B, ECF No. 152-9, at PAGEID # 8122.)  Petitioner’s trial counsel, Bruce Wallace, 
swore an Affidavit attesting that he was not made aware of this grant of testimonial immunity 
prior to the trial.  (PC Exh. 13, ECF No. 152-8, at PAGEID # 7529.)  In the State’s Response to 
Petitioner’s post-conviction petition, the State characterized the issue as follows: 
   The State of Ohio did not grant Kathy Kerr immunity from prosecution in exchange 
   for her testimony.  The Prosecutor granted Ms. Kerr testimonial immunity.  In 
   other words the State would not use anything Ms. Kerr said against her should she 
   be charged with committing a crime.                                  

(ECF No. 152-10, at PAGEID # 8639.)                                       
   It is well settled that Brady contemplates the disclosure of impeachment information, 

                             19                                         
including any consideration given for a witness’s testimony.  The Sixth Circuit has noted: 
   The extent to which the rule of Brady requires disclosure not just of evidence of 
   formal cooperation agreements, but also evidence of informal communications 
   between the prosecution and a witness, has received significant attention in recent 
   Sixth Circuit case law. In Bell v. Bell, the court noted that “[i]t is well established 
   that an express agreement between the prosecution and a witness is possible 
   impeachment material that must be turned over under Brady.” 512 F.3d at 233. 
   However, “[t]he existence of a less formal, unwritten or tacit agreement is also 
   subject to Brady’s disclosure mandate.” Id. (citing Wisehart v. Davis, 408 F.3d 
   321,  323-24  (7th  Cir.  2005)).  “Brady is  not  limited  to  formal  plea  bargains, 
   immunity deals  or  other  notarized  commitments.  It  applies  to  ‘less  formal, 
   unwritten, or tacit agreement[s],’ so long as the prosecution offers the witness a 
   benefit in exchange for his cooperation, ... so long in other words as the evidence 
   is ‘favorable to the accused.’ ” Harris v. Lafler, 553 F.3d 1028, 1034 (6th Cir. 2009) 
   (quoting Bell, 512 F.3d at 233, and Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678).        

   Yet, the mere fact that a witness desires or expects favorable treatment in return for 
   his testimony is insufficient; there must be some assurance or promise from the 
   prosecution that gives rise to a mutual understanding or tacit agreement.  

Akrawi v. Booker, 572 F.3d 252, 262-63 (6th Cir. 2009).  Although the existence of an informal, 
or implicit agreement should be disclosed, the failure to do so, without more, is not enough to 
merit relief.  A State’s violation of its Brady duty of disclosure warrants habeas relief only if 
there is “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different.”  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-34.   
   Petitioner has satisfied the first two prongs of the Brady inquiry by establishing there was 
an agreement regarding testimonial immunity, the agreement was likely not disclosed to the 
defense, and that agreement could have been used for impeachment purposes.  Petitioner, 
however, cannot prevail on his Brady claim, because he has not established that the evidence was 
material to the outcome of his trial.  Accordingly, this Court cannot conclude Petitioner was 
prejudiced by the prosecution’s conduct in omitting this information.  Petitioner’s trial counsel 
subjected witness Kerr to lengthy cross-examination at trial, establishing her history of making 

                             20                                         
conflicting and untruthful statements to both the investigators and the Grand Jury, as well as her 
lack of forthrightness.  (ECF No. 153-4, at PAGEID # 11330-11348.)  There is no reason to 
believe that disclosure of this additional impeachment evidence would have so altered the jury’s 
assessment of Kerr’s credibility as to give rise to a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 

trial would have been different.  Accordingly, the Court finds the undisclosed evidence is 
“cumulative, and hence not material.”  Ramer, 883 F.3d at 672.  See also Akrawi, 572 F.3d at 
264 (finding that defense counsel’s cross examination might have been “more effective if 
evidence if the mutual understanding had been disclosed prior to trial, but only incrementally 
so”) (emphasis in original).  It is also important to note that based on the letter from the 
prosecutor, attached as an exhibit to the post-conviction petition, the prosecutor offered only 
testimonial immunity to Kerr, not immunity for any involvement in the crime.  This appears to 
have been a limited agreement by the prosecutor not to use Kerr’s testimony against her in any 
subsequent proceedings.                                                   
   As to Petitioner’s argument that the state agreed to pay Kerr for her lost wages, Petitioner 

has not pointed to evidence of record to support this allegation.  “Unsupported assumptions and 
unfounded speculation” are insufficient to support a Brady claim on habeas review.  Hill v. 
Mitchell, 842 F.3d 910, 933 (6th Cir. 2016).  See also Brown v. Boyd, 3:20-CV-00241, 2020 
WL 6566012, at *18 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 9, 2020) (“Allegations that are merely conclusory or 
which are purely speculative cannot support a Brady claim.”) (quoting Burns v. Lafler, 328 F. 
Supp. 2d 711, 724 (E.D. Mich. 2004)).  This portion of Petitioner’s claim also lacks merit, as it 
is bereft of substance and evidentiary support.  Likewise, the Court does not view the fact that 
the State may have facilitated Kerr’s testimony by providing a hotel room during the trial to be 

                             21                                         
compelling impeachment material.  In a death penalty prosecution, the State may choose to 
secure accommodations for a witness for any number of reasons, including security concerns.   
   Moreover, “[i]n determining whether ‘withheld information was material and therefore 
prejudicial,’ a reviewing court considers “it in light of the evidence available for trial that 

supports the petitioner’s conviction.’”  See Jalowiec v. Bradshaw, 657 F.3d 293, 305 (6th Cir. 
2011) (quoting Jells v. Mitchell, 538 F.3d 478, 502 (6th Cir. 2008); Towns v. Smith, 395 F.3d 
215, 260 (6th Cir. 2005) (same).  Here, there was other evidence of Petitioner’s guilt.  A. J. Cox 
testified that he saw Joy Hoop with a gun, and heard Petitioner Lindsey say “I’ll take care of it.”  
(Trial Tr. at 727-728, 733; ECF No. 153-4, at PAGEID # 11836-11837, 11841.)  Shortly before 
receiving the call about the murder, Brown County Sherriff’s Deputy Buddy Moore, on routine 
patrol, observed Petitioner’s truck leave the parking lot of Slammer’s Bar.  The truck was 
discovered a short time later at Kathy Kerr’s residence, next to the bar.  Petitioner was 
discovered inside this residence, in Kerr’s bathroom, soaking his bloodstained clothes.  (Trial 
Tr. 70-79, 530-536; ECF No. 153-4, at PAGEID # 11175-11184, 1638-11644.)  A pistol was 

found behind the bathroom door and Whitey Hoop’s wallet was found in the bathroom trashcan. 
(Trial Tr. 702-712; ECF No. 153-4, at PAGEID # 11810-11820.).  Petitioner’s truck was 
examined, and blood consistent with the victim’s was found on the door handle and leather 
steering wheel cover.  Swabs of Petitioner’s hands indicated the presence of gun shot residue.  
(Trial Tr. 430-431; ECF No. 153-4, at PAGEID # 430-431.)  In sum, Petitioner cannot establish 
cognizable prejudice sufficient to support his Brady claim, even on de novo review.  
   Finally, Petitioner claims the prosecutor suborned perjury by not correcting Kerr when 
she stated on cross-examination that she would do her time for testifying falsely before the 

                             22                                         
Grand Jury.  (ECF No. 153-4, at PAGEID # 11334.)  To prevail on a false-testimony claim in 
habeas corpus, Petitioner must show “(1) that the prosecution presented false testimony (2) that 
the prosecution knew was false, and (3) that was material.”  Akrawi v. Booker, 572 F.3d 252, 
265 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Abdus-Samad v. Bell, 420 F.3d 614, 625 (6th Cir. 2005)).  See also 

Burnside v. Rewerts, No. 19-2074, 2020 WL 5592695, *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 29, 2020) (citing 
Akrawi).  “The subject statement must be ‘indisputably false’ rather than ‘merely misleading.’”  
Akrawi, 572 F.3d at 265 (quoting Abdus-Samad, 420 F.3d at 625).  Petitioner has not satisfied 
this standard.  The statement of Kerr was not indisputably false, as Petitioner has produced no 
evidence of any agreement exempting Kerr from prosecution for perjury.    
   To warrant a COA, a petitioner must make a substantial showing that he was denied a 
constitutional right.  28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 
(1983); Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority, 105 F.3d 1063, 1073 (6th Cir. 1997).  “Where a 
district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy 
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) is straightforward:  The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists 

would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.”  
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).  The Court is cognizant of this “gatekeeping 
process for federal habeas appeals,” Moody v. U.S., 958 F.3d 485, 488 (6th Cir. 2020), and 
declines to issue a COA as to this claim.  Reasonable jurists would not find debatable or wrong 
this Court’s resolution of Petitioner’s Brady claim.                      
                      Third Claim for Relief:                           

        The Prosecution used inconsistent theories of prosecution to procure 
        convictions of Mr. Lindsey and Joy Hoop, violating Mr. Lindsey’s 
        right to fundamental fairness and due process.  U.S. CONST. AM. 
        V, VI, VIII, XIV.                                               

                             23                                         
        A.   Two trials, two theories                                   
        B.   Manipulated evidence at Mr. Lindsey’s trial                
        C.   New witness at Joy Hoop’s trial                            

   In his Third Claim for Relief, Petitioner challenges the State of Ohio’s use of inconsistent 
theories regarding who fired the fatal shot that killed Whitey Hoop, in the separate prosecutions 
of Petitioner and co-defendant, Joy Hoop.  Specifically, at Hoop’s subsequent trial, the State 
presented a new witness, Thomas Merriman, an acquaintance of Petitioner Lindsey.  Merriman 
testified that Joy Hoop told him Lindsey “didn’t finish the job and she had to go out and shoot 
[Whitey] a second time in the head.”  (ECF No. 152-9, at PAGEID # 7714-7745.)  
   Petitioner argues the use of factually contradictory theories violates the principles of due 
process, as well as the Eighth Amendment.  (Petition, ECF No. 9-1, at PAGEID # 172.)  
According to Petitioner:                                                  
        The following theories were consistent at both Mr. Lindsey’s and his 
   codefendant’s trials:  (1) Joy Hoop enlisted Mr. Lindsey to kill her husband when 
   he came to Slammer’s bar to pick her up; (2) Whitey Hoop was shot twice in the 
   bar parking lot, with some time passing between the first and second shot; (3) of 
   the two gunshot wounds sustained by the victim, only the second one to his 
   forehead was fatal; (4) the victim was in his vehicle when he sustained the first shot 
   in his cheek; (5) the victim exited his vehicle and ambulated around the parking lot 
   for some period of time; (6) the victim was flat on his back near the bar wall when 
   the second shot was fired at point blank range.  (Tr. T.p. 29-41, 813-820; P.C. Exh. 
   32 at 1047-1082).                                                    
        But the critical inconsistency was who fired the fatal shot.  (Tr. T.p. 31, 
   834; P.C. Exh. 32 at 1076).  Mr. Lindsey allegedly fired the fatal shot at his trial, 
   but at Joy Hoop’s trial she was allegedly the principal offender.    

(Id. at PAGEID # 171.)  Petitioner also claims there was a discrepancy or “manipulation” of 
Kathy Kerr’s testimony between the two trials, regarding whether Kerr heard any additional 
shots as she ran home after seeing Petitioner next to Whitey Hoop’s body.  (Id. at PAGEID # 
173.)                                                                     

                             24                                         
   Petitioner presented this inconsistent theories claim to the state courts in both his post-
conviction proceedings and in a motion for a new trial.  In connection with the post-conviction 
proceedings, the trial court rejected Petitioner’s claim, making lengthy findings of fact:  
        As to the Third Ground for Relief, which alleges inconsistent theories of 
   prosecution in the Carl Lindsey and Joy Hoop trials, pertaining to Kathy Kerr’s 
   testimony in the Hoop trial that she may have heard gun shots on her way home 
   after leaving the Slammer’s bar, and further as developed by the testimony of 
   Thomas Merriman regarding certain alleged admissions to him by Joy Hoop as to 
   a second gun being involved and Joy Hoop’s telling him that she fired the fatal shot, 
   this Court once again finds no entitlement to post-conviction relief on behalf of the 
   Petitioner Lindsey.                                                  
        At the [Hoop] trial, Mr. Thomas Merriman apparently was found or came 
   forward, and provided an alternative possibility that Joy Hoop may have fired the 
   fatal shot.  Mr. Merriman was arguably not a very credible witness in the first 
   instance, and the jury in Hoop may have accordingly discounted this alternate 
   testimony-theory presented through Mr. Merriman.  Merriman admitted he was 
   “burnt out” and a drug addict.  He also identified in the courtroom a female 
   Assistant Prosecuting Attorney as being the Defendant Joy Hoop.  Additionally, 
   he was an admitted long time friend of Carl Lindsey.  As to his credibility, the jury 
   must reasonably have asked the following query:  “Why would Joy Hoop confide 
   in someone she didn’t really know all that well, and even ostensibly admit to that 
   casual acquaintance the commission of a murder?”  Additionally, Merriman was 
   unknown to the State as a witness in Lindsey.  It is further significant that the 
   State’s prosecution of Joy Hoop was not as a principal offender but as compliciter.  
   Thus,  while  Merriman’s  testimony  was  offered  by  the  State,  it  has  all  the 
   appearances  of  having  been  “thrown  in”  because  Mr.  Merriman  had  been 
   discovered.                                                          
        Regarding Kathy Kerr’s “variant” testimony regarding possibly hearing 
   shots on the way home in Hoop, and not having so testified regarding such shots in 
   the Lindsey trial, Ms. Kerr stated in Hoop regarding the shots “I’m not certain.”  It 
   was brought out in regard to Ms. Kerr that her story had changed from statement to 
   statement, and from time to time.  It was for the jury to assess her credibility, as 
   one of the pieces of the puzzle presented by the State.  This Court cannot say that 
   the outcome of Mr. Lindsey’s trial would have been different had Ms. Kerr testified 
   at Lindsey as she subsequently did at Hoop.  In any event, Ms. Hoop was not 
   charged  as  a  principal  offender,  and  this  testimony  was  in  some  respects 
   superfluous.   In the testimony of Dr. Timothy McKinley, the Brown County 
   Coroner, the first shot to Whitey Hoop occurred in the vehicle, and this first shot 
   was to the mouth/cheek area and was not fatal, unless Hoop bled out which would 
   take  approximately  one  to  one  and  one-half  hours  at  the  minimum.    Dr. 
   McKinley’s testimony was further that Whitey Hoop would have been able to and 

                             25                                         
   in fact did continue to move around/struggle etc., as indicated by the blood on the 
   ground in the parking lot and the blood on the wall of the building above Whitey 
   Hoop’s body.  The second shot to the forehead was the fatal shot, and would have 
   put Whitey Hoop down immediately, would have been almost instantaneously fatal, 
   and would have rendered Whitey Hoop unconscious immediately.  Accordingly, 
   Whitey was from the testimony of Dr. McKinley laying flat when the second shot 
   was fired, due to the blood flowing back over the forehead, as occasioned by the 
   gravity pull.  At the Lindsey trial Dr. McKinley opined, that the fatal shot occurred 
   with Whitey on the ground.  At the Hoop trial, Dr. McKinely said that it was 
   “possible” that Whitey may have been standing up, since it would take a few 
   seconds for the blood to stop flowing and that Whitey may have fallen and the blood 
   would have begun flowing downward over the forehead after he fell from a shot in 
   a standing position.  If Whitey Hoop were standing, Joy Hoop would not have been 
   the shooter, since Kathy Kerr testified she saw Whitey on the ground and bloody, 
   with the Defendant Lindsey nearby.  Likewise, even if Whitey Hoop were on the 
   ground when the fatal shot was fired, the other evidence of Whitey being on the 
   ground when Kathy Kerr came out and Lindsey standing nearby would essentially 
   eliminate Joy Hoop as the shooter, since the first shot would not have put Whitey 
   on the ground, and only the second fatal shot would have put him on the ground.  
   Since he was already on the ground, prior to Joy Hoop exiting the Slammer’s Bar, 
   the only reasonable conclusion is that the Defendant Lindsey fired the second and 
   fatal shot.  Dr. McKinley further admitted during the Hoop trial that if Whitey 
   Hoop was shot while standing, regarding the fatal shot in the forehead, that he 
   would “probably” be on the ground in three seconds, and that as to whether Whitey 
   was standing or flat on the ground when shot the second time that “it could be either 
   way”.  Dr. McKinley also testified that there were no specific areas, or notation of 
   injuries, that would have accounted for Whitey being on the ground, thus leaving 
   to the conclusion that Whitey was on the ground when Kathy Kerr exited, and 
   before Joy Hoop exited, by reason of having been shot the second and fatal time by 
   the Defendant Lindsey.                                               
        There is also credible testimony/evidence in the Lindsey trial which was 
   presented to the jury as to Lindsey being the principal offender, including Whitey’s 
   wallet being in the bathroom at Kathy Kerr’s with the Defendant Lindsey, the 
   bloodstained clothes present in the tub in the same bathroom, the .22 caliber pistol 
   with bloodstain consistent with Whitey Hoop’s blood, and in the same bathroom 
   with  the  Defendant  Lindsey  bullets  in  a  box  that  were  consistent  in  class 
   characteristics with the spent shells involved in the shooting and killing of Whitey 
   Hoop.  Thus, the decedent’s wallet, the bloodstained clothing, the same type of 
   pistol  utilized  with  the  decedent’s  blood,  and  bullets  with  consistent  class 
   characteristic all support the jury’s finding of Lindsey as the principal offender. 

(Appx., ECF No. 152-10, at PAGEID # 8674-8690.)                           
   Petitioner appealed the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief and the Twelfth 

                             26                                         
District Court of Appeals affirmed, finding in relevant part:             
   Appellant argues in his third and fifth grounds for relief that the state presented two 
   different theories of the crime in the trials of appellant and co-defendant, Joy Hoop.  
   Appellant argues “the evidence adduced at Joy Hoop’s trial coupled with the record 
   in [appellant’s] case lead to the inescapable conclusion that appellant is actually 
   innocent of the crime for which he was sentenced to death.”          

   However, the “State’s presentation of varying theories in different cases involving 
   individual defendants does not rise to the crest of violating basic tenets and 
   consideration of due process.”  State v. Cohen (Apr. 29, 1988), Lake App. No. 12-
   011, at *17.  Therefore, we find nothing in the record that would lead us to 
   conclude that the prosecutor engaged in any misconduct that deprived appellant of 
   a fair trial.  Also, there were no operative facts set forth to demonstrate that the 
   presentation of a different theory of the crime in the trial of the co-defendant, Joy 
   Hoop, prejudiced appellant.                                          

State v. Lindsey, No. CA2002-02-002, 2003 WL 433941, *7 (Ohio App. 12th Dist. Feb. 24, 
2003).                                                                    
   The state courts also considered the inconsistent theories issue in connection with 
Petitioner’s motion for a new trial.  The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals 
affirmed.  After setting forth a detailed recitation of the facts, the court of appeals determined: 
   On May 29, 1997, Joy Hoop was indicted on four counts alleging her participation 
   in  aggravated  murder,  with  two  death  penalty  specifications.    The  first 
   specification charged that the aggravated murder was a murder for hire (R.C. 
   2929.04[A][2]).  The second specification charged that the aggravated murder was 
   done during the commission of or in flight from the commission of an aggravated 
   robbery, and that appellant was the principal offender or that the aggravated murder 
   was committed with prior calculation and design (R.C. 2929.04[A][7]). 

   Hoop filed a motion seeking to require that the state choose between the alternative 
   allegations in the second specification.  The trial court granted the motion and the 
   state chose to proceed on the alternative that the aggravated murder was committed 
   during the commission of or in flight from the commission of an aggravated robbery 
   and with prior calculation and design.  That part of the specification which alleged 
   that appellant [Hoop] was the principal offender was dismissed.      

   At  Hoop’s  trial,  the  state  elicited  testimony  from  Thomas  Merriman,  an 
   acquaintance of appellant.  He testified that Hoop told h[im] that appellant “didn’t 

                             27                                         
finish the job and she had to go out and shoot [Whitey] a second time in the head.”  
Based on this testimony, appellant filed a motion for a new trial.  He alleged that 
the witness and his testimony was not disclosed to him, or known by him, at the 
time of his trial, and in fact did not become known to him until the conclusion of 
Hoop’s trial.  He argued that the testimony contradicts his conviction with a 
specification that he was the principal offender, and that he is thus entitled to a new 
trial.                                                               

The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the newly discovered evidence 
did not disclose a strong possibility that the result of a new trial would likely be 
different.  He appeals raising one assignment of error in which he alleges that the 
trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial.             

In order to be granted a new trial on the basis of newly-discovered evidence, the 
defendant must show that the new evidence (1) discloses a strong probability that 
it will change the result if a new trial is granted, (2) has been discovered since the 
trial, (3) is such as could not in exercise of due diligence have been discovered 
before the trial, (4) is material to the issues, (5) is not merely cumulative to former 
evidence, and (6) does not merely impeach or contradict the former evidence.  State 
v. Petro (1947), 148 Ohio St. 505, 76 N.E.2d 370, syllabus.          

“Where the case has been tried to a jury, the task for the trial judge is to determine 
whether it is likely that the jury would have reached a different verdict if it had 
considered the newly discovered evidence.”  Dayton v. Martin (1987), 43 Ohio 
App.3d 87, 90, 539 N.E.2d 646.  “The task of the reviewing court is then to 
determine  whether  the  trial  judge  abused  its  discretion  in  making  this 
determination.”  Id.  Likewise, “the decision on whether the motion warrants a 
hearing also lies within the trial court’s discretion.”  State v. Smith (1986), 30 Ohio 
App.3d 138, 139, 506 N.E.2d 1205.  An abuse of discretion connotes more than an 
error of law or judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, 
arbitrary or unconscionable.  State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 158, 404 
N.E.2d 144.  “When applying the abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court 
may  not  substitute  its  judgment  for  that  of  the  trial  court.”    State  v. 
Morton, Summit App. No. 21047, 2002–Ohio–6458, at ¶ 42, citing Pons v. Ohio 
State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621, 614 N.E.2d 748, 1993–Ohio–122. 

We note that the trial court properly found that the newly-discovered evidence met 
the  second  and  third  criteria  under Petro as  Merriman’s  statements  were  not 
discovered until Hoop’s trial, several months after appellant’s trial.  However, “the 
mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the 
defense,  or  might  have  affected  the  outcome  of  the  trial  does  not  establish 
materiality in the constitutional sense.”  State v. Agurs (1976), 427 U.S. 104, 109–
110, 96 S.Ct. 2392.  Where there is “no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or 
not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial.”  

                        28                                         
   Id. at 112–113; State v. Baker (Oct. 15, 2001), Clinton App. No. CA2000–08–018. 

   In the present matter, there is no reasonable doubt regarding appellant’s guilt, even 
   considering the new evidence.  Appellant was overheard saying he would kill 
   Whitey.  He was followed from the scene of the crime by a police officer, and was 
   later found soaking blood stained clothes in a bathtub.  Police found Whitey’s 
   wallet, the murder weapon and ammunition nearby.  Bloodstains consistent with 
   the victim’s blood were found on appellant’s clothing and in his truck.  Evidence 
   further indicated that he had recently fired a gun.  At trial, appellant never raised 
   the defense that he now posits, that he did not fire the fatal shot but instead 
   abandoned his attempt to kill Whitey after firing once.              

   Considering this same evidence on appeal of the denial of appellant’s petition for 
   postconviction relief, this court stated: “the State’s presentation of varying theories 
   in different cases involving individual defendants does not rise to the crest of 
   violating basic tenets and consideration of due process. * * * [T]here were no 
   operative facts set forth to demonstrate that the presentation of a different theory of 
   the crime in the trial of the co-defendant, Joy Hoop, prejudiced appellant.”  State 
   v. Lindsey, Brown App. No. CA2002–02–002, 2003–Ohio–811, ¶ 33–34 (citations 
   omitted).                                                            

   Reviewing this same evidence with regard to appellant’s motion for a new trial 
   leads to the same conclusion.  Appellant has failed to present evidence disclosing 
   a strong probability that the result of a new trial, if granted, would be different.  
   We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
   the motion for a new trial without a hearing.  The assignment of error is overruled. 

State v. Lindsey, No. CA2003-07-010, 2004 WL 1877734, *2-4 (Ohio App. 12th Dist. Aug. 23, 
2004).  This decision constitutes the last reasoned state court decision on this issue. 
   The Warden’s merit brief sets forth two arguments as to why this Court should deny 
Petitioner’s Third Claim for Relief.  First, Respondent asserts that even if the state presented 
contradictory testimony between the two trials, “the United States Supreme Court has never held 
that the Due Process Clause precludes the state from pursuing separate prosecutions for the same 
crime under contradictory theories or inconsistent factual premises at trial,” and therefore 
“Petitioner cannot demonstrate that the decisions of the Ohio courts were contrary to or an 
unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.”  (Brief, ECF No. 80, 

                             29                                         
at PAGEID # 1168.)  Secondly, Respondent argues the State did not proceed with two separate 
theories regarding the actual shooter, because Petitioner Lindsey was charged as the principal 
offender in the case, and Joy Hoop was charged under theories of conspiracy and complicity.  
(Id. at PAGEID # 1166.)  This Court agrees.                               

   Indisputably, Petitioner’s habeas claims are governed by the AEDPA, and therefore relief 
is available only if the decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals was contrary to or an unreasonable 
application of “clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  The United States Supreme Court has never held that 
the use of inconsistent theories of prosecution raises a due process violation.  Thus, even if the 
State of Ohio presented inconsistent theories about who fired the fatal shot, habeas relief is 
denied, as there is no clearly established federal law supporting Petitioner’s inconsistent theories 
claim.  Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 190 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“This Court 
has never hinted, much less held, that the Due Process Clause prevents a State from prosecuting 
defendants based on inconsistent theories.”).  See also Stumpf v. Robinson, 722 F.3d 739, 751 

(6th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (“A criminal defendant has the right to a fair proceeding in front of an 
impartial factfinder based on reliable evidence.  He does not have the right to prevent a 
prosecutor from arguing a justifiable inference from a complete evidentiary record, even if the 
prosecutor has argued for a different inference from the then-complete evidentiary record in 
another case.”); Blalock v. Wilson, 320 F. App’x 396, 418 n.26 (6th Cir. 2009) (there is no 
“clearly established Supreme Court . . . precedent showing that such a prosecutorial strategy 
would violate a defendant’s due process rights”); Melton v. Klee, No. 11-14634, 2019 WL 
1315723, at *8-10 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2019) (“There is no clearly established federal law 

                             30                                         
supporting Petitioner’s inconsistent theories claim.”).  In sum, it cannot be said that the state 
court’s denial of this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established 
Supreme Court precedent, where there is no clearly established federal law on this issue.  
Habeas relief is denied on this basis.                                    

   Additionally, it is well established that in the absence of some underlying constitutional 
violation, a federal habeas court may not review a state court’s denial of a motion for a new trial 
based on newly discovered evidence.  Pudelski v. Wilson, 576 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2009).  In 
conducting this limited constitutional review, the Court owes considerable deference to the 
extensive factual findings of the state courts and Petitioner has presented no evidence that those 
determinations were unreasonable or wrong within the strict confines of the AEDPA.  Petitioner 
Lindsey was charged as the principal offender and the state courts determined the evidence of his 
guilt was overwhelming.  Three witnesses testified at his trial that he willingly agreed to kill 
Whitey Hoop shortly before the murder.  When Kathy Kerr exited the bar, Whitey Hoop was on 
the ground and Petitioner Lindsey was standing nearby.  A Sherriff’s deputy observed Petitioner 

leave the scene of the murder and head to the Kerr residence a short distance away.  When 
Petitioner was found there shortly after the murder, he was soaking his blood-stained clothes, 
was in possession of a firearm consistent with the murder weapon, and Whitey Hoop’s empty 
wallet was in the trash can.  Blood consistent with the victim’s was found in Petitioner’s truck.  
The fact that the state presented a new witness at Joy Hoop’s trial, who provided questionable 
testimony in the form of an alleged statement by Hoop, does not negate the overwhelming 
evidence of Petitioner’s guilt, nor does it call into question whether Petitioner fired the initial 
shot into Whitey Hoop’s face.                                             

                             31                                         
   Under Ohio law, an aider and abetter is treated the same as a principal offender, “so long 
as the aiding and abetting is done with the specific intent to cause death.”  Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 
545 U.S. 175, 184 (2005) (relying on In re Washington, 81 Ohio St.3d 337, 691 N.E.2d 285, 
286-87 (1998)).  Consistent with this, the state argued during closing arguments in Hoop’s trial 

that the evidence was uncertain as to whether Hoop or Lindsey fired the fatal shot, and that for 
purposes of convicting Joy Hoop, it did not matter.  (ECF No. 152-9, at PAGEID # 7874-7936.)  
The prosecution always maintained that Petitioner Lindsey agreed to kill Whitey Hoop at the 
request of Joy Hoop, and that Petitioner shot Whitey Hoop in the face.  The testimony of the 
new witness, if believed, did not negate Petitioner’s liability for the crime.  As the Twelfth 
District Court of Appeals determined, “there is no doubt regarding appellant’s guilt, even 
considering the new evidence.”  Lindsey, 2004 WL 1877734, *4.  Furthermore, the Court notes 
that Petitioner has failed to offer proof of any deliberate attempt to deceive the court or the jury, 
or effort by the prosecutor to keep the factfinder from making an informed decision.  
Petitioner’s Third Claim for Relief is DENIED.                            

   In the absence of clearly established federal law on this issue, the Court cannot conclude 
that a certificate of appealability is warranted on Petitioner’s Third Claim for Relief.    
                      Fourth Claim for Relief:                          

        The trial court failed to ensure that the culpability phase of Mr. 
        Lindsey’s capital trial was constitutionally fair and reliable.  

   In his Fourth Claim for Relief, Petitioner argues the trial court improperly admitted 
hearsay evidence under Ohio’s co-conspirator exception.  (Petition, ECF No. 9-1, at PAGEID # 
175-178.)  Initially, Petitioner also alleged the trial court erroneously overruled his objections to 
the qualifications of the Brown County Coroner and gave an erroneous instruction regarding the 

                             32                                         
definition of “purpose.”  (Id. at PAGEID # 178-180.)  In his Traverse, Petitioner withdrew the 
allegations concerning the trial court’s instruction on purpose, ECF No. 20, at PAGEID # 375, 
and stated the allegations concerning the coroner’s qualifications were addressed in connection 
with his Fifth Claim for Relief, which has also been withdrawn.  (Id. at PAGEID # 375; ECF 

No. 63.)  Thus, only the allegations regarding the co-conspirator statements remain as part of 
Petitioner’s Fourth Claim for Relief.                                     
   Petitioner claims the trial court improperly admitted hearsay statements of co-defendant 
Joy Hoop under Ohio’s co-conspirator exception, Ohio Evidence Rule 801(D)(2)(e), through the 
testimony of witnesses Kenny Swinford, A.J. Cox and Kathy Kerr.  Petitioner asserts the 
statements were not admissible under Ohio’s co-conspirator exception, because “the prosecution 
failed to first establish a prima facie case of conspiracy, necessary for the introduction of co-
conspirator statements under Ohio Evid. R. 801(D)(2)(e).”  (ECF No. 75, at PAGEID # 1122.)  
Petitioner contends the erroneous admission of this hearsay evidence had a “substantial and 
injurious effect” on the jury’s verdict, because the hearsay provided the jury with a motive for 

the murder and bolstered the prosecution’s theory of murder-for-hire.  (Id. at PAGEID # 1127.)  
According to Petitioner, “[m]otive strongly influences a jury, which the prosecutor well knew as 
he relied upon these statements repeatedly in closing argument.  With full use of hearsay 
statements, he was able to perpetuate that scenario even though the murder-for-hire charge had 
been dismissed and there was no charge of conspiracy.”  (Id.)  Petitioner argues the admission 
of these statements violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause and his due process rights 
to a fundamentally fair trial.  (Petition, ECF No, 9-1, at PAGEID # 176.)  Respondent counters 
that Petitioner’s arguments regarding Swinford’s testimony are defaulted, because Petitioner 

                             33                                         
failed to object at trial and the Ohio Supreme Court enforced that default, reviewing the 
testimony only for plain error.  (ECF No. 12, at PAGEID # 294.)           
   On direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court determined the co-conspirator statements were 
properly admitted, and that prima facie evidence of a conspiracy existed regardless of the fact 

that the murder-for-hire specification was dismissed:                     
        In his thirteenth proposition of law, appellant contests the trial court’s 
   admission of certain witnesses’ testimony.  He argues first that the trial court erred 
   by  admitting  the  hearsay  statements  of  Joy  Hoop,  appellant’s  alleged  co-
   conspirator, without a proper foundation under the co-conspirator exception in 
   Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e).  Specifically, appellant challenges the testimony of witness 
   A.J. Cox that, after laying a knife on the bar, Joy said: “If that ain’t good enough, 
   this right here should take care of it, I got this.”  The witness did not see what 
   “this” was but heard a sound like a heavy, metallic object.          
        Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e) provides: “A statement is not hearsay if * * * [t]he 
   statement is offered against a party and is * * * a statement by a co-conspirator of 
   a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy upon independent 
   proof of the conspiracy.”  Under this rule, the * * * statement of a co-conspirator 
   is not admissible until “the proponent of the statement has made a prima facie 
   showing of the existence of the conspiracy by independent proof.”    State v. 
   Carter (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 550, 651 N.E.2d 965, 972.          
        Appellant argues that the trial court improperly admitted the testimony of 
   Cox before a prima facie case of conspiracy had been made.  At the time Cox’s 
   testimony was admitted, however, the state had presented the testimony of Kathy 
   Kerr, which was sufficient to set forth a prima facie showing of conspiracy.  The 
   offense of conspiracy is defined in R.C. 2923.01 as the agreement to accomplish a 
   particular unlawful object, coupled with an overt act in furtherance thereof, whether 
   remuneration  is  offered  or  not.    Kerr  testified  that  appellant  and  Joy  were 
   romantically involved, that while discussing Whitey, appellant told Joy “he would 
   do him in,” and that she saw Joy give appellant a gun.  From this testimony it is 
   reasonable to conclude that a conspiracy existed to kill Whitey and that the transfer 
   of the gun was an overt act in furtherance thereof.   We are unpersuaded by 
   appellant’s contention that Kerr’s impeachment on cross-examination undermines 
   the conspiracy evidence, as Kerr’s veracity was a question for the trier of fact.   
        Nor do we agree with appellant’s next argument.  Appellant contends that 
   because the trial court dismissed the murder-for-hire specification, the state could 
   not have demonstrated the existence of a conspiracy.  Conspiracy, however, is not 
   the equivalent of murder for hire.  Rather, under R.C. 2929.04(A)(2), murder for 
   hire  requires  proof  of  an  additional  element  not  contained  in  the  offense  of 
   conspiracy, specifically, that the murder “was committed for hire.”  Because the 

                             34                                         
   state  failed  to  present  any  evidence  of  compensation,  the  murder-for-hire 
   specification was dismissed.  But, as set forth in the statute, a conspiracy may exist 
   without  regard  to  whether  remuneration  is  offered.    Accordingly,  a  lack  of 
   evidence as to compensation has no bearing on the existence of the conspiracy.  
   Appellant’s argument is therefore without merit.                     
        Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony 
   of witness Kenny Swinford.  Appellant disagrees with the admission of Swinford’s 
   statement that he participated in a conversation with Joy Hoop, Kathy Kerr, and a 
   third person whose identity he did not know.  Appellant contends that because 
   Swinford never identified appellant as the unknown man, his testimony about that 
   conversation  was  inadmissible.    Similarly,  appellant  argues  that  Swinford 
   improperly testified to what “they” were saying without identifying the individuals 
   speaking.                                                            
        Appellant, however, failed to object on either of these grounds at trial and 
   therefore waived all but plain error.  See State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 
   604, 605 N.E.2d 916, 925.  Plain error consists of an obvious error or defect in the 
   trial  proceedings  that  affects  a  substantial  right.  Crim.R.  52(B).    Under  this 
   standard, reversal is warranted only if the outcome of the trial clearly would have 
   been different absent the error.  State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 
   178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph two of the syllabus.  Upon review of Swinford’s 
   testimony in the plain error context, we are unpersuaded that the outcome would 
   have been different had Swinford not testified.  Accordingly, appellant’s thirteenth 
   proposition of law is overruled.                                     

State v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio St. 3d 479, 481-82 (2000).                      
   As an initial matter, the Court notes that on direct appeal, as his thirteenth proposition of 
law, Petitioner raised a purely state law claim regarding the hearsay statements.  Petitioner 
argued the statements at issue did not meet the additional admissibility safeguards established by 
state law:                                                                
   Case law has established that before any co-conspirator statements can be admitted, 
   the State must independently prove a conspiracy existed.  State v. Carter (1995), 
   72 Ohio St.3d 545, 651 N.E.2d 965.  In this respect, the Ohio Rule differs from the 
   Federal Rule, which does not require independent proof of a conspiracy prior to 
   admission of the statements.  Independent proof of a conspiracy must be made by 
   a prima facie showing.                                               

(Appx., ECF No. 152-7, at PAGEID # 6875.)  Petitioner’s entire proposition of law was 
couched in terms of state evidentiary law, with no citation to federal case law or reference to the 

                             35                                         
United States Constitution.  Petitioner made no reference to the Confrontation Clause, or even 
due process.  Likewise, the Ohio Supreme Court resolved the merits of the claim on purely state 
law grounds.                                                              
   In order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement in habeas corpus, a petitioner must fairly 

present the substance of his federal constitutional claim to the state courts.  Anderson v. 
Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971).  Although the fair 
presentment requirement is a rule of comity, not jurisdiction, see Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 
346, 349 (1989); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844–45 (1999), it is rooted in principles 
of comity and federalism designed to allow state courts the opportunity to correct the State’s 
alleged violation of a federal constitutional right that threatens to invalidate a state criminal 
judgment.  A petitioner fairly presents the “substance of his federal habeas corpus claim” when 
the state courts are afforded sufficient notice and a fair opportunity to apply controlling legal 
principles to the facts bearing upon the constitutional claim.  Harless, 459 U.S. at 6.  Although 
a certain degree of tinkering is permissible, a petitioner does not fairly present a claim if he 

presents an issue to the state courts under one legal theory and set of facts, and then presents the 
issue to the federal courts under a different legal theory or a different set of facts.  McMeans v. 
Brigano, 228 F.3d 674, 681 (6th Cir. 2000).  Rather, he must present to the federal court 
essentially the same facts and legal theories that were considered and rejected by the state courts.  
See Lott v. Coyle, 261 F.3d 594, 607 (6th Cir. 2001).  The Sixth Circuit has held that a petitioner 
fairly presents his federal claim to the state courts in one of four ways: (1) relying on federal 
cases employing constitutional analysis; (2) relying on state cases that employ federal 
constitutional analysis; (3) phrasing the claim in terms of constitutional law or in terms 

                             36                                         
sufficiently particular to allege a denial of a specific constitutional right; or (4) alleging facts that 
are well within the mainstream of constitutional law.  Whiting v. Burt, 395 F.3d 602, 613 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (quoting McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F.3d 674, 681 (6th Cir. 2000)).  Where the 
petitioner did not present the federal claim but instead presented a purely a state-law claim, the 

federal claim is not exhausted.  When any attempt now to return to state court to exhaust the 
federal issue would fail as untimely or as barred by res judicata, the federal claim is procedurally 
defaulted.                                                                
   The Court finds Petitioner failed to fairly present his Fourth Claim for Relief to the state 
courts as a federal constitutional claim.  The Court notes, however, that Respondent did not 
raise this particular procedural default defense.  Nevertheless, this Court is within its authority 
to reject this claim on the basis of procedural default sua sponte.  In Sheppard v. Bagley, 604 F. 
Supp. 2d 1003 (S.D. Ohio 2009), aff'd, 657 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2011), the district court noted that 
although it may be “unusual” for a habeas court to raise a procedural default sua sponte, it may 
be “particularly appropriate to do so where the petitioner explicitly argued in the state courts that 

state law provided him with more protections tha[n] the corresponding federal law, and where he 
rested his state claims exclusively on state law.”  Id. at 1010.  Here, as in Sheppard, “[b]y 
arguing that state law afforded him greater protection than federal law, . . . Petitioner actually 
deprived rather than provided the state courts an opportunity to remedy the constitutional 
violation that Petitioner allege[s] in his habeas petition.”  Sheppard, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 1009.  
See also Ahmed v. Houk, No. 2:07-CV-658, 2014 WL 2709765 (S.D. Ohio June 16, 2014) 
(Report and Recommendation noting the court had “been reluctant to raise the defense sua 
sponte except in cases where an expressly defederalized claim was presented to the state 

                             37                                         
courts”), report and recommendation adopted, Ahmed v. Houk, No. 2:07-CV-658, 2020 WL 
5629622 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2020).                                       
   To be sure, the concern with raising procedural default sua sponte, is that Petitioner has 
not had an opportunity to respond.  See, e.g., Howard v. Bouchard, 405 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2005) 

(“The main concern with raising procedural default sua sponte is that a petitioner not be 
disadvantaged without having had an opportunity to respond.”) (citing Lorraine v. Coyle, 291 
F.3d 416, 426 (6th Cir. 2002)).  That concern is not present here, because even if this claim was 
not defaulted, it plainly lacks merit.  “To the extent Petitioner argues that this testimony was 
improperly admitted hearsay or was not properly authenticated, those are state law claims and 
not cognizable on federal habeas review.”  Lash v. Sheldon, 1:19-CV-1616, 2020 WL 6712165, 
at *18–19 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 20, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, Lash v. Turner, 1:19-
CV-1616, 2020 WL 6702051 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2020).  See also Moreland v. Bradshaw, 699 
F.3d 908, 923 (6th Cir. 2012) (generally, “alleged errors in evidentiary rulings by state courts are 
not cognizable in federal habeas review”); Smith v. Jones, 326 F. App’x 324, 330 (6th Cir. 2009) 

(claim that trial court improperly admitted statements under a hearsay exception is a state 
evidentiary law issue not cognizable on federal habeas review); Graves v. Romanowski, No. 
2:07-10463, 2008 WL 362990, *5 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 11, 2008) (finding a petitioner’s claim that 
the trial court violated his right to a fair trial by admitting recorded telephone conversations 
under a co-conspirator exception to the state’s hearsay rules raised only a non-cognizable issue 
of state law).  It is only when an evidentiary ruling is so fundamentally unfair that it rises to the 
level of a due-process violation is it cognizable on federal habeas review.  See Estelle v. 
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Bey v. Bagley, 400 F.3d 514, 522 (6th Cir. 2007).  

                             38                                         
   Petitioner argues the admission of Joy Hoop’s statements, through the testimony of 
witnesses Swinford, Cox and Kerr, violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights.  
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) does not apply here, because Crawford was not 
decided until 2004, and the Ohio Supreme Court rendered the last state judgment on the merits of 

this claim in 2000.  Crawford does not apply retroactively on collateral review.  Whorton v. 
Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 409 (2007).  The then governing law was Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 
(1980), which required as a matter of Confrontation Clause law that, as to an unavailable 
declarant, hearsay could be admitted if it bore particularized guarantees of trustworthiness or fell 
within a firmly-rooted hearsay exception.  549 U.S. at 412.  Here, the Ohio Supreme Court 
concluded that the evidence was sufficient to prove the existence of a conspiracy so as to permit 
the introduction of the Hoop statements as an exception to the hearsay rule.  What is or is not 
hearsay in a state court trial is governed by state law.  To the extent Petitioner contends the 
Hoop statements were hearsay, this Court must defer to the Ohio Supreme Court’s factual 
determination that the State laid a proper foundation such that the challenged statements 

constituted declarations of a co-conspirator, and were, therefore, admissible as non-hearsay 
under Evid. R. 801(D)(2).  The decision of the Ohio Supreme Court is not contrary to clearly 
established federal law as it existed at the time of Petitioner’s convictions and appeal.    
   For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby denies Petitioner’s Fourth Claim for Relief.  
Because two independent reasons exist for denying relief on this claim, the Court finds that a 
certificate of appealability shall not issue.                             
                      Sixth Claim for Relief:                           

        Egregious  prosecutorial  misconduct  at  both  the  culpability  and 
        mitigation phase violated Mr. Lindsey’s right to due process, a fair 

                             39                                         
        trial,  and  the  effective  assistance  of  counsel.    U.S.  CONST. 
        AMENDS V, VI, VIII, XIV.                                        

   In his Sixth Claim for relief, Petitioner complains of “egregious prosecutorial 
misconduct” at both phases of his trial.  With respect to the guilt phase of his trial, Petitioner 
repeats his complaints regarding suppressed impeachment evidence, the use of perjured 
testimony from Kathy Kerr, and the state’s use of inconsistent theories of prosecution.  As to the 
penalty phase of his trial, Petitioner contends the prosecutor argued improper aggravating 
circumstances during closing argument.  Finally, Petitioner argues the cumulative effect of 
prosecutorial misconduct throughout his trial warrants habeas relief.  (Petition, ECF No. 9-2, at 
PAGEID # 189-196.)                                                        
   Respondent argues that Petitioner’s guilt phase arguments of prosecutorial misconduct 
lack merit, and for the reasons discussed in connection with Petitioner’s Second and Third 
Claims for Relief, this Court agrees.  With respect to Petitioner’s argument that the prosecutor 
improperly argued the nature and circumstances of the offense during the penalty phase closing 
argument, Respondent contends this allegation is procedurally defaulted because Petitioner failed 
to object at trial, and as a result of that waiver, the Ohio Supreme Court reviewed the claim only 
for plain error.  Finally, Respondent asserts Petitioner has never presented his cumulative effect 
argument regarding prosecutorial misconduct to the state courts.  (Return, ECF No. 12, at 
PAGEID # 304-305.)  Respondent is equally correct regarding these defaults.   

   Petitioner raised his argument challenging the prosecutor’s penalty phase closing 
argument on direct appeal as his first proposition of law.  The Ohio Supreme Court found the 
claim waived due to Petitioner’s failure to object at trial, and reviewed the claim only for plain 
error:                                                                    

                             40                                         
   Appellant’s first proposition of law concerns the prosecutor’s conduct in the 
penalty phase of the trial. Appellant challenges the following statements made by 
the prosecutor:                                                      

   (1) “I guess that they said he grew up in a bad home, although it 
   improved with his grandparents; he was gone from the home for a 
   period of time; and he has an alcohol problem. Do they outweigh 
   what he did?”                                                   

   (2) “We have Al Nehus here. I’m not sure what he said other than 
   he’s  been  a  good  prisoner.  I  don’t  see  how  that  in  any  way 
   mitigates what he’s done in this case, how that mitigates murdering 
   somebody coldbloodedly in the course of a robbery, and that’s what 
   this is about.”                                                 

   (3) “There is nothing that has been presented to you that outweighs 
   what he did to Whitey Hoop, nothing. * * * [T]he circumstances of 
   the offense itself outweigh those mitigating factors that have been 
   presented here today.”                                          

   (4)  “[W]hat  you  have  to  go  back  and  decide  is  whether  the 
   Defendant’s having taken a gun during the course of a robbery, held 
   it to Mr. Hoop’s face, pulled the trigger once, struggled with him, 
   taking his wallet, and then place that gun to his forehead an eighth 
   of an inch away or closer and pulled that trigger ending his life, 
   whether that outweighs the fact that he didn’t come from a perfect 
   home. That’s the issue which you have to decide.”               

   As appellant argues, portions of the above comments improperly suggested 
that the nature and circumstances of the offense were to be viewed by the jury as 
aggravating circumstances. R.C. 2929.04(B) allows the nature and circumstances 
of the offense to be involved in the weighing of aggravating circumstances against 
mitigating factors only on the side of mitigation. State v. Wogenstahl (1996), 75 
Ohio St.3d 344, 356, 662 N.E.2d 311, 322. As we explained in Wogenstahl, “the 
‘aggravating circumstances’ against which the mitigating evidence is to be weighed 
are limited to the specifications of aggravating circumstances set forth in R.C. 
2929.04(A)(1) through (8) that have been alleged in the indictment and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.” “[I]t is improper for prosecutors in the penalty phase 
of  a  capital  trial  to  make  any  comment  before  a  jury  that  the  nature  and 
circumstances of the offense are ‘aggravating circumstances.’” Id.   

   Appellant, however, failed to object to the prosecutor’s comments at the 
time they were made. Accordingly, appellant waived any error except to the extent 
it constitutes plain error. Viewed in this context, the prosecutor’s remarks did not 

                        41                                         
   alter the outcome of the trial and therefore did not rise to the level of plain error. 

        Nor do we believe that the prosecutor’s misstatement of the burden of proof 
   in the weighing process constituted plain error. The prosecutor did ask whether the 
   mitigating factors outweighed what appellant did, improperly suggesting that the 
   defense  had  the  burden  of  showing  that  mitigating  factors  outweighed  the 
   aggravating circumstances.  See State v. Bey (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 495–496, 
   709 N.E.2d 484, 494.  But this misstatement occurred only twice in the context of 
   various  other  times  throughout  his  argument  where  he  presented  the  correct 
   standard.                                                            

        Furthermore, the trial court correctly instructed the jury on both of these 
   issues.  As a result, any confusion caused by the prosecutor’s misstatements was 
   cured.  See id.  Appellant’s first proposition of law is overruled.  

Lindsey, 87 Ohio St. 3d at 485-486 (emphasis in original).                
   The procedural default doctrine relied on by Respondent, is described by the Supreme 
Court as follows:                                                         
   In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court 
   pursuant to an adequate and independent state procedural rule, federal habeas 
   review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause of the 
   default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law; or 
   demonstrate  that  failure  to  consider  the  claims  will  result  in  a  fundamental 
   miscarriage of justice.                                              

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); see also Simpson v. Jones, 238 F.3d 399, 406 
(6th Cir. 2000).  A petitioner may not raise in federal habeas corpus a federal constitutional 
claim he could not raise in state court because of a procedural default.  Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 
U.S. 72 (1977); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 110 (1982).  “Absent cause and prejudice, ‘a 
federal habeas petitioner who fails to comply with a State’s rules of procedure waives his right to 
federal habeas corpus review.’” Boyle v. Million, 201 F.3d 711, 716 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Gravley v. Mills, 87 F.3d 779, 784-85 (6th Cir. 1996)).  “[A] federal court may not review 
federal claims that were procedurally defaulted in state court – that is, claims that the state court 

                             42                                         
denied based on an adequate and independent state procedural rule.”  Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 
2058, 2064 (2017).  Once the court determines that a state procedural rule was not complied 
with and the rule was an adequate and independent state ground, then the petitioner must 
demonstrate that there was “cause” for him to not follow the procedural rule and that he was 

actually prejudiced by the alleged constitutional error.  Theriot v. Vashaw, ___ F.3d ___, No. 
20-1029, 2020 WL 7379397, *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 16, 2020); Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 
(6th Cir. 1986); accord, Hartman v. Bagley, 492 F.3d 347, 357 (6th Cir. 2007), quoting Monzo v. 
Edwards, 281 F.3d 568, 576 (6th Cir. 2002).                               
   Applying that analysis, the Court finds that Ohio has a relevant procedural rule, requiring 
a contemporaneous objection to trial court error; parties must preserve errors for appeal by 
calling them to the attention of the trial court at a time when the error could have been avoided or 
corrected.  State v. Glaros, 170 Ohio St. 471 (1960), paragraph one of the syllabus; see 
also State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St. 3d 144, 162 (1998).  In this case, the Ohio Supreme Court 
enforced that rule by reviewing Petitioner’s penalty phase claim of prosecutorial misconduct 

under the plain error standard.  An Ohio appellate court’s review for plain error is enforcement, 
not waiver, of a procedural default, such as a failure to make a contemporaneous objection at 
trial.  Neil v. Forshey, No. 20-3491, 2020 WL 6498732, at *4 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 2020) (noting 
that “plain error review constitutes enforcement of the contemporaneous objection rule”).  See 
also Wogenstahl v. Mitchell, 668 F.3d 307, 337 (6th Cir. 2012); Jells v. Mitchell, 538 F.3d 478, 
511 (6th Cir. 2008); Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 765 (6th Cir. 2006).  The Sixth Circuit 
has repeatedly held that Ohio’s contemporaneous objection rule is an adequate and independent 
basis of state court decision.  Wogenstahl, 668 F.3d at 334 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Keith v. 

                             43                                         
Mitchell, 455 F.3d 662, 673 (6th Cir. 2006)); Goodwin v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 301, 315 (6th Cir. 
2011); Smith v. Bradshaw, 591 F.3d 517, 522 (6th Cir. 2010).  Although a procedural default 
can be excused by an adequate showing of cause and prejudice, Petitioner proffers no excusing 
cause, instead arguing that this Court can consider even defaulted claims of prosecutorial 

misconduct as part of a cumulative error review of the actions of the prosecutor.  What is 
lacking, however, is any supporting case law to that effect.  The Court finds Petitioner’s penalty 
phase prosecutorial misconduct claim procedurally defaulted.              
   In the alternative, Petitioner’s claim is also without merit.  It is well settled that “[t]o 
grant habeas relief based on prosecutorial misconduct that does not violate a specific guarantee 
under the bill of Rights, the misconduct must be so egregious as to deny the Petitioner due 
process.” Lorraine v. Coyle, 291 F.3d 416, 439 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Donnelly v. 
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643-45 (1974)).  A reviewing court must first determine whether 
prosecutorial misconduct occurred, and if so, whether the misconduct was prejudicial.  In so 
doing, the reviewing court should consider the challenged remarks within the context of the 

entire trial to determine whether any improper remarks were prejudicial.  Cristini v. McKee, 526 
F.3d 888, 901 (6th Cir. 2008).  It bears reminding, with respect to prosecutorial misconduct 
claims, that the “[p]etitioner’s burden on habeas review is quite a substantial one.”  Byrd v. 
Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 529 (6th Cir. 2000).  Even misconduct that is universally condemned 
does not warrant habeas corpus relief unless the misconduct was so flagrant and egregious as to 
deny the petitioner a fundamentally fair trial.  Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643-54.  Finally, 
prosecutorial misconduct during the penalty phase of a capital trial may be “cured by appellate 
reweighing.”  LaMar v. Houk, 798 F.3d 405, 431 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding that “all the alleged 

                             44                                         
prosecutorial misconduct during the penalty phase was cured when the Ohio Supreme Court 
independently reweighed aggravation and mitigation”) (citing Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d 
754, 783 (6th Cir. 2006)); Trimble v. Bobby, 804 F.3d 767, 783 (6th Cir. 2015) (“While we 
independently believe that any prosecutorial misconduct did not tip the scales against Trimble 

during the penalty phase, the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision to reweigh the aggravating and 
mitigating factors definitively cures any potential error from the alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct.”).                                                            
   In a death penalty case, the state has some leeway to refer to the facts and circumstances 
of the crime to dispel the mitigating circumstances.  However, assuming, as the Ohio Supreme 
Court did, that the argument of the prosecutor concerning the facts and circumstances of the 
crime was improper, the trial court properly instructed the jurors regarding the aggravating 
circumstance they could consider and the weighing process.  The trial court’s complete charge, 
ECF No. 153-5, at PAGEID # 12192-12208, was a correct statement of the law and mitigated 
any misstatements by the prosecutor.  Additionally, the Ohio Supreme Court cured any error by 

conducting a thorough and independent reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors, 
finding “the aggravating circumstance of aggravated robbery conclusively outweighed the 
mitigating factors.”  State v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio St. 3d 479, 491-492 (2000).  Finally, 
consideration of a non-statutory aggravating circumstance, even if contrary to state law, does not 
violate the United States Constitution.  Nields v. Bradhsaw, 482 F.3d 442, 451 (6th Cir. 
2007), quoting Smith v. Mitchell, 348 F.3d 177, 210 (6th Cir. 2003).  This sub-claim is without 
merit.                                                                    
   The Court hereby denies Petitioner’s Sixth Claim for relief.  Because reasonable jurists 

                             45                                         
would not find the Court’s resolution of this claim to be debatable or wrong, and two 
independent reasons exist to deny the claim, the Court declines to issue a COA.   
                     Seventh Claim for Relief:                          

        The trial court failed to ensure that the mitigation phase of Mr. 
        Lindsey’s capital trial was constitutionally fair and reliable.   

   In his Seventh Claim for Relief, Petitioner argues the actions of the trial court during the 
penalty phase of his trial denied him a fair trial.  According to Petitioner, the trial court erred by 
readmitting all of the guilt phase evidence during the penalty phase, by sustaining the 
prosecutor’s objection to testimony from Petitioner’s wife that Petitioner did not like himself 
when he abused drugs, and by refusing to provide additional instruction to the jury in response to 
a question regarding the definition of the aggravating circumstances.  Respondent acknowledges 
that each of these separate issues were raised on direct appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, were 
considered by that court on the merits, and are properly before this Court on habeas review.  
Petitioner also asserts that the prosecutor improperly argued non-statutory aggravating factors 
during closing arguments, but that claim was resolved in the previous section of this Opinion and 
Order resolving Petitioner’s Sixth Claim for Relief.                      
   A.  Improperly Admitted Guilt Phase Evidence                         
   Petitioner asserts that at the outset of the mitigation phase, the trial court permitted the 
prosecution to admit all evidence from the guilt phase of the proceedings, over the objection of 
the defense.  (Petition, ECF No. 9-2, at PAGEID # 197.)  The trial court gave the jury a limiting 
instruction regarding this evidence, instructing the jury to consider “only those exhibits and only 
that evidence presented at the trial phase which are relevant to the specific aggravating 
circumstance for which the Defendant was found guilty.”  (ECF No. 153-5, at PAGEID # 

                             46                                         
12197, 12194-12195.)  The Ohio Supreme Court reviewed this claim, finding the trial court 
erred by readmitting all of the evidence, but determining Petitioner did not suffer prejudice as a 
result of the error:                                                      
        In his sixth proposition of law, appellant takes issue with the trial court’s 
   admission of all the guilt-phase evidence into the penalty phase of the proceedings. 
   Specifically in contention is the trial court’s failure to determine which of the guilt-
   phase  evidence  was  relevant  to  the  penalty  phase.  Instead  of  making  that 
   determination, the court instructed the jury to consider only that evidence relevant 
   to the specific aggravating circumstance at issue.                   

        While R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) permits the reintroduction of much or all of the 
   guilt-phase evidence during the penalty phase, it does not relieve the trial court of 
   its  duty  to  determine  the  evidence  relevant  for  consideration.    See  State  v. 
   Getsy (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 201, 702 N.E.2d 866, 887. In Getsy, we held that 
   the trial court’s admission of all the evidence from the trial phase—with an 
   instruction to the jury to consider “all the evidence, including exhibits presented in 
   the first phase of this trial which you deem to be relevant”—was error. Id. As we 
   explained there, it is the trial court’s responsibility, during the penalty phase, to 
   identify and admit only the evidence relevant to that phase. Under the same 
   reasoning, the trial court’s admission here of all the guilt-phase evidence with a 
   similar instruction to the jury was also error. In so doing, the trial court improperly 
   delegated to the jury the court’s duty to determine the evidence relevant to the 
   penalty phase.                                                       

        As in Getsy, however, the admission of the specific evidence challenged as 
   prejudicial  and  irrelevant  did  not  prejudice  the  outcome  of  the  trial.    Here, 
   appellant points to bloody photographs of the victim, the bloodstains in appellant’s 
   vehicle, and the bloodstains on the premises of Slammer’s bar as irrelevant and 
   prejudicial to appellant. These items, however, were relevant to the aggravated 
   robbery, the aggravating circumstance of which appellant was found guilty, as they 
   demonstrated  the  element  of  serious  physical  harm  to  the  victim.    R.C. 
   2911.01(A)(3), R.C. 2929.03(D)(1). While the trial court should have exercised its 
   responsibility to determine the relevance of the evidence admitted, the evidence 
   contested was neither irrelevant nor prejudicial to the penalty phase.  Accordingly, 
   we overrule appellant’s sixth proposition of law.                    

State v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio St. 3d at 484-485.  The Ohio Supreme Court determined that much of 
the evidence of which Petitioner complains, was relevant to the aggravating circumstance of 
aggravated robbery.  This determination is not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of 

                             47                                         
federal law.  Although Ohio law may limit the evidence that may be considered in aggravation, 
federal law has no such requirement, apart from considerations of fundamental fairness.  See 
Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 12 (1994) (“The Eighth Amendment does not establish a 
federal code of evidence to supersede state evidentiary rules in capital sentencing proceedings.”)  

“The question is whether the allegedly improper evidence ‘so infected the sentencing proceeding 
with unfairness as to render the jury’s imposition of the death penalty a denial of due process.’”  
Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. 108, 109 (2016) (quoting Romano, 512 U.S. at 12).  Petitioner has 
made no such showing.  See also Cowans v. Bagley, 624 F.Supp.2d 709, 813 (S.D. Ohio 2008) 
(finding trial court’s readmission in the penalty phase of all culpability phase evidence 
insufficient to warrant habeas relief, and noting the absence of any clearly established Supreme 
Court precedent on the issue).                                            
   B.  Objection to Pamela Lindsey’s Testimony                          
   Petitioner complains that the trial court improperly limited the mitigation phase testimony 
of Pamela Lindsey, Petitioner’s wife.  (Traverse, ECF No. 20, at PAGEID # 393-394.)  

Specifically, Petitioner alleges that Mrs. Lindsey was not permitted to testify that Petitioner did 
not like himself when he was using drugs.  The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this claim on the 
merits, finding any error harmless because the evidence was cumulative:   
        In his fourth proposition of law, appellant challenges the trial court’s 
   exclusion of a statement made by appellant’s wife.  During that portion of her 
   testimony, appellant’s wife was discussing appellant’s disappointment with himself 
   about  his  substance-abuse  problem.    When  asked  how  she  knew  he  was 
   disappointed, she responded: “Because he said that he did not like himself like 
   that.”  The trial court sustained the state’s objection to this statement without 
   providing a basis for the exclusion, but both parties assume it was on hearsay 
   grounds.                                                             

        Appellant  argues  that  this  information  was  crucial  to  his  defense  and 

                             48                                         
   therefore it was error to exclude it.  Even assuming that the exclusion was error, 
   however, it was harmless. Appellant’s wife had already testified that appellant “was 
   disappointed in himself” when he resumed his substance abuse.  The further 
   statement that he “said that he did not like himself like that” was cumulative and 
   added nothing additional to the defense’s point.  Appellant’s fourth proposition of 
   law is overruled.                                                    

Lindsey, 87 Ohio St. 3d at 484.  The finding by the Ohio Supreme Court that the additional 
testimony was cumulative is a finding of fact entitled to deference by this Court.  Moreover, 
“[t]he Sixth Circuit has consistently recognized the United States Supreme Court’s reluctance, 
even in light of its cases holding that the sentencer in a capital case cannot be precluded from 
considering or giving effect to relevant mitigating evidence, to hold that the Eighth Amendment 
forbids a state court from applying state evidentiary rules or exercising discretion in limiting the 
introduction of evidence as irrelevant or unduly prejudicial.”  Sheppard v. Bagley, 604 F. Supp. 
2d 1003, 1018 (S.D. Ohio 2009).  See also Scott v. Houk, No. 4:07cv0753, 2011 WL 5838195, 
*28 (N.D Ohio Nov. 18, 2011) (noting “the Supreme Court overtly has held that the issue of the 
admissibility of evidence in capital sentencing trials is one reserved specifically to a state’s rules 
of evidence”).  This sub-claim is plainly without merit.                  
   C.  Failure to Answer Jury Question                                  
   Finally, Petitioner argues that during the penalty phase deliberations, the jurors sent a  
question to the trial court, requesting clarification regarding the aggravating circumstance.  The 
Ohio Supreme Court considered and rejected this claim on the merits:      
        Appellant’s  fifth  proposition  of  law  also  challenges  the  trial  court’s 
   instructions to the jury.  Specifically, appellant argues that the court erred when it 
   refused to provide further oral instruction to the jury upon  request.    During 
   deliberations, the jury asked, “When weighing the mitigating evidence versus the 
   aggravating circumstances, what are the aggravating circumstances? Is it solely the 
   aggravated  robbery  or  the  combination  of  the  aggravated  robbery  and  the 
   aggravated murder?’                                                  

                             49                                         
        Rather than instructing the jury orally on this point, the trial court referred 
   the jury to the written instructions that contained the court’s original instruction on 
   that issue:                                                          

        It would be improper for you to weigh in this balance against the 
        mitigating factors the aggravated murder itself as an aggravating 
        circumstance. This is because the sentencing laws of Ohio have  
        already  incorporated  consideration  of  the  commission  of  the 
        aggravated murder itself in setting the sentence now available to 
        you. In other words, the sentences you are to consider have already 
        been increased beyond that which would have been imposed for the 
        aggravated murder itself due to the presence of the aggravating 
        circumstance in this case.                                      

        Appellant contends that the trial court had a duty to reinstruct the jury based 
   upon that question. However, as we held in State v. Carter (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 
   545, 651 N.E.2d 965, paragraph one of the syllabus, “[w]here, during the course of 
   its deliberations, a jury requests further instruction, or clarification of an instruction 
   previously given, a trial court has discretion to determine its response to that 
   request.” In Carter we concluded that the trial court acted within the scope of its 
   discretion when it referred the jury to a written copy of the instructions rather than 
   giving further oral instructions. Id. at 553.                        

        The same conclusion is warranted here. The trial judge referred the jury to 
   the written instructions, which clearly and comprehensively answered the question. 
   Even appellant admits that this instruction was a good statement of the law. 
   Accordingly, the trial court’s decision to refer the jury to that instruction rather than 
   giving further oral instruction was appropriate and within the scope of its discretion. 
   Appellant’s fifth proposition of law is overruled.                   

Lindsey, 87 Ohio St. 3d at 487-488.  The Ohio Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in 
the trial court’s handling of the jury’s question.  Additionally, the Ohio Supreme Court 
determined the trial court’s written instructions, to which the jury was directed, were a correct 
statement of Ohio law, and Petitioner makes no argument to the contrary.  To challenge a 
legally accurate jury instruction, Petitioner must show that the instruction was ambiguous and 
there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a way that violated the 
United States Constitution.  Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 190-91 (2009).  This, 

                             50                                         
Petitioner has not done.  See Rashad v. Lafler, 675 F.3d 564, 569 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Generally 
speaking, a state court’s interpretation of the propriety of a jury instruction under state law does 
not entitle a habeas claimant to relief.”)                                
   For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Petitioner’s Seventh Claim for Relief lacks 

merit.  Because this claim relates primarily to issues of state law, the Court finds a certificate of 
appealability is not warranted.  Reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s resolution of this 
claim for relief to be debatable or wrong.                                
                      Ninth Claim for Relief:                           

        The trial court violated Mr. Lindsey’s due process rights when it 
        denied  Mr.  Lindsey’s  post-conviction  petition  without  first 
        affording him the opportunity to conduct discovery and funding for 
        an expert.                                                      

   In his Ninth Claim for Relief, Petitioner argues the trial court violated his right to due 
process by denying his petition for post-conviction relief without affording him the opportunity 
to conduct discovery and funding for an expert.  Petitioner alleges specifically that the trial court 
erred by denying his request for access to the prosecutor’s complete files related to the 
prosecutions of both Petitioner and Joy Hoop.  He further asserts the trial court erred in denying 
his request for funding to employ a neuropsychological expert.            
   Respondent acknowledges that Petitioner raised a general challenge to the adequacy of 
Ohio’s post-conviction process in his appeal of the trial court’s decision denying post-conviction 
relief, and that this claim is not procedurally defaulted.  (Return, ECF No. 12, at PAGEID # 
316.)  Respondent argues, however, that the claim is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus 
and should be dismissed on that basis.                                    
   The Sixth Circuit has consistently held that challenges to Ohio’s post-conviction process 

                             51                                         
are not a proper basis for habeas corpus relief.  Leonard v. Warden, 846 F.3d 832, 854-55 (6th 
Cir. 2017) (“This Court has held that ‘habeas corpus cannot be used to mount challenges to a 
state’s scheme of post-conviction relief.’”).  See also Cornwell v. Bradshaw, 559 F.3d 398, 411 
(6th Cir. 2009) (holding petitioner’s claim that state court improperly denied him an evidentiary 

hearing is not cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings).  As noted by the Sixth Circuit in 
Leonard v. Warden:                                                        
   More to the point, in the absence of Supreme Court precedent evaluating the 
   constitutional  adequacy  of  state  post-conviction  review  proceedings,  Leonard 
   cannot establish the necessary precondition for issuance of the writ – namely, that 
   the decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals, which clearly evaluated the merits of his 
   claim,  ‘was  contrary  to,  or  involved  an  unreasonable  application  of,  clearly 
   established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’ 

Leonard, 846 F.3d at 855.                                                 
   Because Petitioner’s Ninth Claim for Relief is not cognizable in these habeas 
proceedings, the Court hereby denies relief on this claim and declines to issue a COA. 
                      Tenth Claim for Relief:                           

        The cumulative effects of the errors and omissions presented in 
        this habeas petition constitute constitutional violations that merit 
        relief.                                                         

   Petitioner sets forth a claim of cumulative error as his Tenth Claim for Relief.  
Specifically, Petitioner argues “[p]rosecutorial misconduct, the ineffectiveness of counsel, and 
court errors, considered in context with each other, compel the conclusion that the state courts 
unreasonably applied federal constitutional principles in determining that Mr. Lindsey’s 
conviction and death sentence were the result of a fair and reliable process.”  (Traverse, ECF 
No. 20, at PAGEID # 431.)  The Warden contends this claim is both procedurally defaulted and 
not cognizable in habeas corpus.  (Return of Writ, ECF No. 12, at PAGEID # 317.)  This Court 

                             52                                         
agrees.                                                                   
   To be sure, “‘federal courts are not required to address a procedural-default issue before 
deciding against the petitioner on the merits,’” as it may sometimes be “more economical for the 
habeas court to simply review the merits of the petitioner’s claims.”  Cowan v. Huss, No. 2:19-

11917, 2020 WL 6286265, *8 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 27, 2020) (quoting Hudson v. Jones, 351 F.3d 
212, 215 (6th Cir. 2003)).  Generally, cumulative error is not a basis for habeas corpus relief, 
even in a capital case.  See Webster v. Horton, 795 F. App’x 322, 327-28 (6th Cir. 2019) 
(“Webster argued that the trial court’s cumulative errors entitled him to habeas relief.  As stated 
by the district court, such claims of cumulated trial errors are not cognizable under § 2254.”)  
See also Moreland v. Bradshaw, 699 F.3d 908, 931 (6th Cir. 2012) (“‘[P]ost-AEDPA, not even 
constitutional errors that would not individually support habeas relief can be cumulated to 
support habeas relief.’”) (quoting Hoffner v. Bradshaw, 622 F.3d 487, 513 (6th Cir. 2010)); 
Sheppard v. Bagley, 657 F.3d 338, 348 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Finally, Sheppard argues that the 
cumulative effect of these errors rendered his trial fundamentally unfair.  Post-AEDPA, that 

claim is not cognizable.”); Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 816 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he law 
of this Circuit is that cumulative error claims are not cognizable on habeas because the Supreme 
Court has not spoken on this issue.”); Burnside v. Rewerts, No. 19-2074, 2020 WL 5592695, *2 
(6th Cir. Apr. 29, 2020) (noting that post-AEDPA, a cumulative error claim is not cognizable in 
a federal habeas petition).  Furthermore, even if this claim were cognizable, there is no error to 
cumulate, as each of Petitioner’s claims for relief lack merit, or have been withdrawn by 
Petitioner.                                                               
   The Court hereby DENIES Petitioner’s Tenth Claim for Relief, and because reasonable 

                             53                                         
jurists would not find this decision debatable or wrong, the Court will not issue a COA.  
                     IV.  Lethal Injection Claims                       
   As a final matter, it appears Petitioner still has lethal injection claims remaining.  For the 
past eight years, Petitioner has made multiple attempts to amend his habeas petition to add 

claims challenging the constitutionality of Ohio’s lethal injection method of execution.  On 
March 8, 2012, Petitioner sought leave to amend his Petition to add claims Eleven and Twelve, 
in order to assert a challenge to Ohio’s lethal injection execution protocol.  (ECF No. 90.)  The 
Court granted that motion on July 5, 2012 (ECF No. 94), and Petitioner filed his Second 
Amended Petition adding those two claims on August 3, 2012.  (ECF No. 95.)  On April 20, 
2015, Petitioner filed a Third Amended Petition, replacing his two general method-of-execution 
claims with ten detailed method-of-execution claims that essentially mirrored claims being 
litigated in a separate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action captioned In re: Ohio Execution Protocol 
Litigation, Case No. 2:11-cv-1016.  (ECF No. 123.)  No additional amendments were 
permitted.  This Court last denied Petitioner leave to amend in an Opinion and Order dated 

September 27, 2018, ECF No. 154, finding amendment would be futile in light of In re: 
Campbell, 874 F.3d 454 (6th Cir. 2017).  Campbell held that claims attacking the 
constitutionality of Ohio’s lethal injection protocol were not cognizable in habeas corpus.  Id. at 
467.  See also In re Smith, 806 F. App’x 426 (6th Cir. 2020) (finding “Campbell controls” and 
“is the law of this Circuit”); Bays v. Warden, 807 F. App’x 481, 482 (6th Cir. 2020) (discussing 
the Sixth Circuit’s evolving position regarding the proper “procedural vehicle” for lethal 
injection claims and finding “this court’s precedent in In re Campbell, 874 F.3d 454 (6th Cir. 
2017), forecloses Bay’s argument that his lethal injection claims are cognizable in habeas rather 

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than as a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”).                                 
   To the extent that Petitioner has lethal injection method of execution claims remaining, 
the Court finds those claims non-cognizable in federal habeas corpus.  The Court hereby 
DISMISSES Petitioner’s lethal injection claims, set forth in his Third Amended Petition as 

claims Eleven through Twenty, and DENIES Petitioner a certificate of appealability.  
V.   Conclusion                                                           
   For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s habeas corpus Petition.  The 
Court hereby DISMISSES this action.  The Court DENIES a certificate of appealability on all 
claims.                                                                   
   IT IS SO ORDERED.                                                    
                                      _/s Sarah D. Morrison_______      
                                      SARAH D. MORRISON                 
                                      United States District Judge      











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