Loehr v. Colonial Van Lines Inc.

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 JAMES LOEHR, Case No. 3:23-cv-00534-ART-CSD 5 Plaintiff, Order Granting and Denying Cross- 6 v. Motions for Summary Judgment in Part 7 COLONIAL VAN LINES, INC., (ECF Nos. 24, 25) 8 Defendant. 9 10 Plaintiff James Loehr hired Defendant Colonial Van Lines to transport his 11 belongings from North Carolina to Reno. While in transport, many of Loehr’s 12 possessions were lost or damaged. Loehr sued Colonial under the Carmack 13 Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. 14 § 14706, et seq, for the value of his lost and damaged goods. Loehr seeks 15 summary judgment that Colonial is liable for losing his possessions, which 16 Colonial concedes. (ECF No. 25.) Both parties also seek summary judgment on 17 whether the Carmack Amendment’s Limitation of Liability provision applies. (ECF 18 Nos. 24, 25.) 19 I. Factual Background 20 The following facts are undisputed except as otherwise noted. 21 A. Colonial Gives Loehr a Quote to Store His Belongings in Climate- Controlled Storage and Ship Them to Reno. 22 23 In early 2022, James Loehr sought a quote from Colonial Van Lines 24 (“Colonial”) to move his belongings from Wilmington, North Carolina, to a house 25 in Reno, Nevada, that he expected to finish building the following year. (ECF No. 26 25 at 5.) In his Affidavit, Loehr states that while he was obtaining a quote from 27 Colonial, its moving coordinator Tracey Brown told him that Colonial would place 28 his belongings in climate-controlled storage owned by Colonial in Charlotte, 1 North Carolina, until he was ready for them to be moved to Reno. (ECF No. 26-1 2 at 3.) A different Colonial representative later told Loehr that Colonial would 3 instead store his belongings in climate-controlled storage owned by Colonial in 4 Reno. (Id. at 4.) 5 Loehr’s correspondence with Colonial employees show that his belongings 6 were not sent to Charlotte or Reno, and evidence on the record suggests that 7 Colonial did not own climate-controlled storage in either Charlotte or Reno. (See 8 id. at 5; see also e.g., ECF No. 26-10 at 2.) 9 B. Loehr Chooses Limited Coverage for His Belongings. 10 In its estimate, Colonial presented Loehr with two options to indemnify his 11 shipment: Standard Value Protection and Full Value Protection. The former 12 provided 60 cents per pound per article up to $20,000 and was included in the 13 price listed in Colonial’s estimate. (ECF No. 24 at 2.) The latter required additional 14 payment and needed to be purchased from a third-party insurer, 15 MovingInsurance.com. (Id.) Loehr chose Standard Value Protection. (Id.) 16 Loehr confirmed his choice in Colonial’s final contract, the Interstate Bill 17 of Lading, which included a summary of coverage called the Valuation 18 Addendum. The Valuation Addendum stated that the Standard Value Protection 19 “provides only minimal protection that is considerably less than the average value 20 of household goods. Under this option, a claim for any article that may be lost, 21 destroyed, or damaged while in your mover’s custody will be settled based on the 22 weight of the individual article multiplied by 60 cents.” (ECF No. 24-2 at 4.) It 23 then provides an example: a ten-pound audio component valued at $1,000 would 24 be reimbursed at $6.00. (Id.) It then states, “COMPLETE THIS PART ONLY if you 25 wish to WAIVE the full (Replacement) Level of Protection included in the higher 26 cost estimate . . . and instead select the LOWER Released Value.” (Id. (emphasis 27 in original).) Loehr wrote by hand “60 cents per pound per article” between his 28 initials and signature affirming that he wished to waive the lower level. (Id.) The 1 Valuation Addendum recommends purchasing Full Value Protection. (See id.) 2 C. Loehr’s Items Are Lost and Damaged in Colonial’s Possession. 3 Over the next several months, various mishaps led to Colonial moving 4 Loehr’s belongings to Oklahoma, Atlanta, Los Angeles, and Carson City. (See ECF 5 No. 25 at 10–13.) Loehr contacted Colonial at several points to verify if his 6 belongings had reached a climate-controlled warehouse. (See ECF No. 26-1 at 6; 7 see also e.g., ECF No. 26-10 at 2.) 8 Colonial delivered Loehr’s remaining belongings to Reno in February 2023. 9 Both parties agree that many of Loehr’s belongings were stolen, lost, or otherwise 10 damaged while in Colonial’s possession. (See ECF No. 24 at 4.) 11 II. Procedural History 12 Loehr sued Colonial in this Court under the Carmack Amendment. (ECF 13 No. 1.) Colonial filed an Answer soon after, and the parties have diligently engaged 14 in discovery. (ECF Nos. 5, 13.) 15 III. Standard of Review 16 A party moving for summary judgment must show that there is no genuine 17 issue as to any material fact in the claims or defenses for which it seeks summary 18 judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322- 19 23 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the 20 nonmoving party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 21 for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). The Court 22 resolves disputed facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most 23 favorable to the non-moving party. Behrend v. San Francisco Zen Ctr., Inc., 108 24 F.4th 765, 768 (9th Cir. 2024). For cross-motions for summary judgment, the 25 Court considers each party's evidence without considering which motion provided 26 the evidence. Las Vegas Sands, LLC v. Nehme, 632 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir. 2011). 27 IV. Analysis 28 Loehr argues that Colonial is undisputably liable for his lost and damaged 1 possessions, and Colonial concedes this point. Loehr argues that Colonial 2 undisputably failed to limit its liability under the Carmack Act, while Colonial 3 argues that it undisputably succeeded. 4 In the language of the Carmack Amendment, Loehr is a “shipper,” and 5 Colonial is a “carrier.” 6 A. Colonial is Liable to Loehr under the Carmack Act. 7 The Carmack Amendment holds carriers “liable for damage occurring to 8 such goods that were tendered to it in good condition and arrived in damaged 9 condition, unless the carrier establishes that the loss or damage was due to (a) 10 the act of God; (b) the public enemy; (c) the act of the shipper himself; (d) public 11 authority; (e) or the inherent vice or nature of the goods.” See Missouri P. R. Co. 12 v. Elmore Stahl, 377 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1964) (internal citations omitted); see 49 13 U.S.C. §§ 14706(a), 14706(f)(2). Loehr has provided evidence, which Colonial does 14 not dispute, that at least some of his items were lost or damaged while Colonial 15 was transporting them. 16 Accordingly, the Court grants Loehr’s unopposed motion for summary 17 judgment that Colonial is liable to Loehr for Loehr’s items that were lost or 18 damaged while in Colonial’s possession. 19 B. Both Parties Seek Summary Judgment on the Carmack Amendment’s Limitation of Liability Provision. 20 21 Under the Carmack Amendment, a carrier is fully liable for lost or damaged 22 property unless it can show : (1) that it gave the shipper a reasonable opportunity 23 to choose between two or more levels of liability; (2) that the shipper agreed to a 24 particular liability limit; and (3) that the carrier issued a bill of lading that reflects 25 the agreement to the shipper before moving the shipment. See Hughes Aircraft 26 Co. v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 970 F.2d 609, 611–12 (9th Cir. 1992); see Dynascan 27 Tech., Inc. v. Allstates WorldCargo, Inc., No. CV-08-03281-MMM-RNBX, 2009 WL 28 10699015, at *6 n.41 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2009) (explaining that 1995 Interstate 1 Commerce Commission Termination Act removed requirement discussed in 2 Hughes to have a compliant tariff on file with the Interstate Commerce 3 Commission). 4 1. Colonial Provided a Reasonable Opportunity to Choose Between Levels of Liability. 5 6 To show that the shipper had a reasonable opportunity to choose between 7 different levels of liability coverage, the carrier must show “reasonable notice of 8 the liability limitation” and an “opportunity to obtain information necessary to 9 making a deliberate and well-informed choice.” Hughes, 970 F.2d at 612. 10 There is no genuine dispute of fact that Colonial offered Loehr a reasonable 11 opportunity to choose between levels of liability. Colonial’s Valuation Addendum 12 to the Bill of Lading explains Full Value Protection’s total coverage, states that 13 the cheaper rate “provides only minimal protection that is considerably less than 14 the average value of household goods,” and provides an example of how the 15 reimbursement rate applies for a lightweight, expensive item. 16 Loehr argues that Colonial’s misrepresentations regarding climate- 17 controlled storage in Charlotte or Reno justify finding a dispute of fact here, citing 18 Gallo v. Bekins A-1 Movers, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-00866-RLH-GWF, 2007 WL 817622. 19 In Gallo, the Court found that a misrepresentation mattered to this factor because 20 the carrier incorrectly told the shipper that full value protection covered “damages 21 caused only by ‘acts of God.’” 2007 WL 817622 at *2. Colonial did not 22 misrepresent the nature of Full Value Protection or Standard Value Protection to 23 Loehr, so this argument does not apply to this element. 24 Accordingly, the Court grants Colonial summary judgment on this element 25 of its claim to limit liability. 26 2. Disputed Facts Prevent Summary Judgment on Question of Whether Loehr Agreed to Liability Limit. 27 28 Colonial argues that Loehr indisputably agreed to limit Colonial’s liability 1 by signing the Valuation Amendment, while Loehr argues that he is entitled to 2 summary judgment on this element because Colonial made material 3 misrepresentations to induce Loehr to agree to limit liability. 4 A shipper may negate acceptance of a liability limit by showing that the 5 carrier fraudulently induced the shipper to limit liability. In Gallo v. Bekins A-1 6 Movers, Inc., the court held that plaintiff’s testimony suggesting defendants had 7 told the plaintiff that the moving truck carrying plaintiff’s belongings would be 8 locked and parked in a warehouse, when in fact it was not, was enough to create 9 a question of fact about whether the plaintiff actually agreed to limit her liability. 10 2007 WL 817622, at *3; see also Gummer v. Am. Choice Van Lines, LLC, No. 3:11- 11 CV-00808-SC, 2011 WL 5599854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2011) (suggesting 12 fraud in the inducement may be used as a defense to liability limit); see also 13 Dynascan Tech., 2009 WL 10699015, at *5 n.39 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2009) (same). 14 Viewed in the light most favorable to Loehr, a reasonable juror could find 15 that Colonial materially misrepresented the moving plan to induce Loehr to select 16 Standard Value Protection. See Gallo, 2007 WL 817622, at *3 (fraudulent 17 inducement requires a knowing misrepresentation made to induce claimant’s 18 justified reliance) (internal citation omitted). Loehr’s affidavit shows that while 19 providing Loehr a quote, two Colonial agents told him that his belongings would 20 be stored in a climate-controlled warehouse. One said they would be stored in 21 Charlotte and the other said Reno. The record evidence indicates that these 22 statements were arguably false because Colonial did not have climate-controlled 23 warehouses in either city, nor did Colonial take Loehr’s belongings to a climate- 24 controlled warehouse. While Colonial argues that any false statements regarding 25 climate-controlled storage were immaterial to Loehr’s decision on coverage, Loehr 26 testified that he declined Full Value Protection because he believed his belongings 27 would be stored in one of these warehouses. From these facts, a reasonable juror 28 could infer that Colonial’s agents’ statements about climate-controlled storage 1 made Loehr consider Colonial a lower-priced option, making it more likely that 2 he would choose Colonial as his carrier. A reasonable juror could find Colonial’s 3 agents fraudulently induced Loehr to select Standard Value Protection instead of 4 Full Value Protection. 5 Alternatively, viewed in the light most favorable to Colonial, a reasonable 6 juror could find that Colonial’s misrepresentations about climate-controlled 7 storage were not material to the coverage issue. See Gallo, 2007 WL 817622, at 8 *3 (materiality of misrepresentation to shipper’s decision to limit liability a 9 question of fact). Colonial’s paperwork recommended purchasing Full Value 10 Protection and explained the consequences of selecting Standard Value 11 Protection. 12 Accordingly, disputed material facts prevent granting summary judgment 13 to either Loehr or Colonial on whether Loehr agreed to limit liability. 14 3. Colonial’s Liability Limit Appeared in the Bill of Lading. 15 The third factor Colonial must prove for summary judgment on its 16 limitation of liability claim is that it provided Loehr a bill of lading reflecting their 17 agreement to limit liability. See Hughes Aircraft, 970 F.2d at 611–12 (carrier must 18 issue “a bill of lading that reflects the agreement to the shipper before moving the 19 shipment”). Colonial provided its Valuation Amendment to the Interstate Bill of 20 Lading to Loehr before beginning to move, but, for the reasons stated in the 21 previous section, disputed material facts prevent finding that a valid agreement 22 existed between Loehr and Colonial. Accordingly, the Court declines to consider 23 this factor. 24 V. Conclusion 25 Accordingly, the Court grants and denies both motions in part. 26 The Court grants Loehr’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 25) in 27 part, holding that Colonial is liable to Loehr under the Carmack Amendment for 28 items lost or damaged while in Colonial’s possession. 1 The Court grants Colonial’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 24) 2 || in part, finding that Colonial provided Loehr a reasonable opportunity to choose 3 || between levels of liability. 4 The Court denies both motions for summary judgment in part because 5 || disputed issues of fact exist regarding the remaining factors. 6 7 Dated this 29th day of July, 2025. 8 ° Ana . lose 10 ANNE R. TRAUM 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28