Marr v. United States

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                           
              WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN                           
                   SOUTHERN DIVISION                                 
                         ______                                      

CRAIG JAMES MARR,                                                         

Defendant-Movant,             Case No. 1:24-cv-978                   

v.                                 Honorable Paul L. Maloney              

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                                 

Plaintiff-Respondent.                                                
____________________________/                                             

                  OPINION AND ORDER                                  
Currently  pending  before  the  Court  is  Defendant-Movant  Craig  James  Marr 
(“Defendant”)’s pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to
28 U.S.C.  
§ 2255
. (ECF No. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion will be denied. 
I.   Background                                                           
On May 18, 2021, a grand jury returned an Indictment charging Defendant with: (1) being 
a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922
(g)(1); (2) possession with intent 
to distribute 5 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841
(a)(1); and (3) 
possession  of  a  firearm  in  furtherance  of  drug  trafficking,  in  violation  of
18  U.S.C.  
§ 924
(c)(1)(A)(i). See Indictment, United States v. Marr, No. 1:21-cr-101 (W.D. Mich.) (ECF No. 
1). Attorney Scott Graham was appointed to represent Defendant in his criminal proceedings. 
On August 16, 2021, the Government filed an Information and Notice of Prior Serious 
Violent Felony Conviction. See Information,
id.
(ECF No. 23). This Information set forth that in 
2001, Defendant had been convicted of second-degree murder, in violation of
Mich. Comp. Laws 
§ 769.317
. See
id.
(ECF No. 23, PageID.58). The Information noted that if Defendant were 
convicted of Count Two of the Indictment, which charged him with possession with intent to 
distribute methamphetamine, his prior violent felony conviction would subject him to a mandatory 
minimum of 10 years and a maximum of life imprisonment.
Id.
On August 17, 2021, Defendant, through counsel, filed a motion to suppress “evidence 
seized in the course of a police stop and search on the night between April 27 and 28, 2021, in 

Lansing, Michigan.” See Mot. to Suppress,
id.
(ECF No. 25, PageID.60). The Court conducted a 
hearing regarding the motion on October 8, 2021, and entered an order denying the motion to 
suppress that same day. See Order,
id.
(ECF No. 28).                      
Ultimately, following a three-day trial, Defendant was convicted of all three counts set 
forth in the Indictment. See Jury Verdict,
id.
(ECF No. 50). With respect to Count Two, the jury 
concluded that Defendant was responsible for 5 grams or more but less than 50 grams of 
methamphetamine. See
id.
(ECF No. 50, PageID.319). On February 16, 2022, the Court sentenced 
Defendant to a total of 180 months’ incarceration, consisting of concurrent terms of 120 months 
for Counts One and Two, and a consecutive term of 60 months for Count Three. See J.,
id.
(ECF 

No. 64).                                                                  
Defendant appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress and the admission of 
opinion testimony at trial from a Government agent. See United States v. Marr, No. 22-1104,
2023 
WL 6240105
, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 26, 2023). Defendant also claimed that the Government 
presented insufficient evidence for the jury to convict him of possession with intent to distribute 
methamphetamine and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. See
id.
The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit set forth the following summary of the facts 
underlying Defendant’s convictions:                                       
After serving 20 years in state prison for a second-degree-murder he committed as 
a teenager, Marr was released on parole in September 2020. Following his release, 
Marr returned to his hometown of Lansing, Michigan. About seven months later, 
in April of 2021, a confidential informant (“CI”) advised John Cosme, a Lansing 
police officer, that Marr was selling drugs and was often seen with a firearm. The 
CI also told Cosme that Marr was on parole, which Cosme verified. After this initial 
contact from the CI, but before Marr’s arrest in this case, Cosme stopped Marr for 
a traffic violation. During this initial stop, Marr also informed Cosme that he was 
on parole.                                                           
Subsequently, in the late hours of April 27 or the early hours of April 28, 2021, the 
same CI called Cosme and told him that he had seen Marr with a firearm and 
methamphetamine. Cosme and at least one other Lansing police officer followed 
up by traveling in unmarked vehicles to the location provided by the CI. The 
officers saw Marr get into his car and start driving. “Based on the information” and 
“the parole history,” the officers decided to conduct “a dynamic contact,” i.e., block 
Marr’s vehicle so he could not flee. (R. 30, Suppression Hrg. Tr., PageID.106.) 
Police officers and Michigan State Police troopers effectuated the stop. 
A state trooper searched Marr and found a loaded handgun tucked in his waistband. 
After placing Marr in a patrol car, the trooper asked Marr if he had anything else 
on him. Marr confessed to having a magazine for a firearm in his pants, which the 
trooper  recovered,  and  a  “little  bag  of  dope.”  Once  Marr  was  taken  to  jail, 
authorities discovered a baggie hidden between layers of his clothing; the baggie 
contained 21.5 grams of crystal methamphetamine.
Id.
at *1–2. The Sixth Circuit rejected Defendant’s arguments and affirmed his convictions and 
sentences.
Id. at *1
. Defendant did not petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari.                                                               
Defendant filed his § 2255 motion (ECF No. 1) and memorandum in support thereof (ECF 
No. 2) on September 19, 2024. In an order (ECF No. 4) entered on October 18, 2024, the Court 
directed the Government to file a response to the motion. The Government subsequently moved 
for an extension of time and an order authorizing release of information subject to attorney-client 
privilege. (ECF No. 5.) The Court granted that motion on February 10, 2025. (ECF No. 10.) The 
Government filed an affidavit from attorney Scott Graham (ECF No. 11) on March 20, 2025, and 
filed its response (ECF No. 14) to the § 2255 motion on March 28, 2025. The Court received 
Defendant’s reply (ECF No. 15) on May 1, 2025.                            
II.  Standard of Review                                                   
A.   Merits                                                          
A prisoner may move to vacate his sentence under
28 U.S.C. § 2255
if he can demonstrate 
that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, that the 
court lacked jurisdiction to impose such a sentence, that the sentence was in excess of the 
maximum authorized by law, or that it “is otherwise subject to collateral attack.”
28 U.S.C. § 2255
. 

However, “Section 2255 does not provide relief for just any alleged error.” Bullard v. United 
States,
937 F.3d 654, 658
(6th Cir. 2019). To prevail on a § 2255 motion, “a petitioner must 
demonstrate the existence of an error of constitutional magnitude which had a substantial injurious 
effect or influence on the guilty plea or the jury’s verdict.” Humphress v. United States,
398 F.3d 
855, 858
(6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Griffin v. United States,
330 F.3d 733, 736
(6th Cir. 2003)). 
“Where a defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct review, the 
claim may be raised in habeas only if the defendant can first demonstrate either ‘cause’ and actual 
‘prejudice,’ or that he is actually innocent.’” Bousley v. United States,
523 U.S. 614, 622
(1998) 
(quoting Murray v. Carrier,
477 U.S. 478, 485
(1986)).                    
B.   Ineffective Assistance of Counsel                               

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must prove that: (1) 
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) counsel’s 
deficient performance prejudiced the defendant in a way that led to an unreliable or fundamentally 
unfair outcome. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984). A court “must judge the 
reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, and viewed as 
of the time of counsel’s conduct, and judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly 
deferential.” Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.460, 477 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Counsel is not ineffective unless he or she “made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning 
as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687
. 
To establish prejudice, a movant must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.”
Id. at 694
; see also 
United States v. Morrow,
977 F.2d 222, 229
(6th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“[T]he threshold issue is 
not whether [movant’s] attorney was inadequate; rather, it is whether he was so manifestly 

ineffective that defeat was snatched from the hands of probable victory.”). 
C.   Evidentiary Hearing                                             
The Court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the issues and make findings of 
fact and conclusions of law “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively 
show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.”
28 U.S.C. § 2255
(b). No hearing is required if 
Defendant’s allegations “cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record, 
inherently incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of fact.” Arredondo v. United States,
178 F.3d 778, 782
(6th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted).                    
III.  Discussion                                                          
Defendant raises the following grounds for relief in his § 2255 motion: 
I.   Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to and/or challenge the 
     illegal arrest of Defendant.                                    
II.  Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the hearsay utilized 
     by the Government’s main witness at trial on Confrontation Clause grounds. 
III.  Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present a defense to persuade 
     the jury that Defendant possessed only a user-level amount of narcotics and 
     not a distributive amount[] as alleged by the Government at trial. 
(§ 2255 Mot., ECF No. 1, PageID.4–7.) The Government contends that Defendant’s grounds for 
relief are meritless. (ECF No. 14.)                                       
A.   Ground I—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Suppression Proceedings 
Defendant first contends that attorney Graham was ineffective for “failing to object and/or 
challenge the illegal arrest of Defendant.” (§ 2255 Mot., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) According to 
Defendant,  counsel  should  have  argued  that  a  warrantless  search  of  Defendant,  despite 
Defendant’s parole status, was unreasonable. (Id., PageID.13–14.) Defendant suggests further that 

counsel should have subpoenaed witnesses to testify at the suppression hearing; namely, Parole 
Officer Dayton Driver and Police Officer Nancy Hamilton. (Memo. Supp. § 2255 Mot., ECF No. 
2, PageID.35.) According to Defendant, had counsel rendered effective assistance, there was a 
reasonable probability that the courts would have concluded that the stop in question constituted 
an arrest and not a “Terry stop.” (Id.)                                   
The Fourth Amendment safeguards “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” and mandates that “no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. 
IV. The Supreme Court has noted that “[w]here defense counsel’s failure to litigate a Fourth 

Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must 
also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable 
probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to 
demonstrate actual prejudice.” Kimmelman v. Morrison,
477 U.S. 365, 375
(1986); see also 
Richardson v. Palmer,
941 F.3d 838, 857
(6th Cir. 2019).                  
On August 17, 2021, attorney Graham filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during 
the “police stop and search on the night between April 27 and 28, 2021, in Lansing, Michigan.” 
See Mot., United States v. Marr, No. 1:21-cr-101 (W.D. Mich.) (ECF No. 25, PageID.60). In 
support, counsel argued that: (1) the Government had not provided any records suggesting that 
Defendant had a parole term that diminished his privacy expectations; and (2) even if Defendant 
had a diminished expectation of privacy because of his parole, the circumstances for such did not 
arise in Defendant’s case. See
id.
(ECF No. 25, PageID.62). Attorney Graham contended that the 
CI’s  tip  contained  no  predictions  regarding  Defendant’s  actions,  and  that  officers  did  not 
corroborate the CI’s tip other than to just conduct brief surveillance and look up the vehicle 

registered to Defendant. See
id.
(ECF No. 25, PageID.64). Overall, counsel argued, the CI’s tip 
failed to provide reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant.
Id.
(ECF No. 25, PageID.65). 
The Court conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding Defendant’s motion to suppress on 
October 8, 2021. See Mot. Hr’g Tr.,
id.
(ECF No. 30). Lansing Police Officer John Cosme testified 
at that hearing. Officer Cosme testified that on April 28, 2021, he received a call from one of his 
CIs who was part of the Lansing Police Department’s “special operations division, [the] narcotics 
division.”
Id.
(ECF No. 30, PageID.96). Officer Cosme testified that this CI had provided reliable 
information to him in the past.
Id.
(ECF No. 30, PageID.97).              
Prior to the CI’s call on April 28, 2021, the CI had told Officer Cosme that Defendant was 

“actively participating in the sales of illegal narcotics and often seen with a firearm.”
Id.
(ECF No. 
30, PageID.97–98). The CI had told Officer Cosme that he had seen Defendant with those items 
before and that Defendant was on parole.
Id.
(ECF No. 30, PageID.98). The CI specifically 
mentioned that Defendant was involved in selling crystal meth.
Id.
(ECF No. 30, PageID.99). 
Officer Cosme testified that after he received that information from the CI, an analysis 
verified Defendant’s name, criminal history, and parole status.
Id.
(ECF No. 30, PageID.100). He 
noted that he had previously encountered Defendant during a traffic stop that “happened way 
before the 28th.”
Id.
Officer Cosme testified that Defendant was in a Chevrolet Malibu when that 
stop occurred.
Id.
(ECF No. 30, PageID.101). Officers located a vehicle registered to Defendant 
that matched that description, and the CI also told Officer Cosme that Defendant had a tan Malibu.
Id.
Officer Cosme testified further that Defendant’s parole conditions included a condition that 
Defendant voluntarily consented to searches of his person and property “upon demand by a peace 
officer or parole officer.”
Id.
(ECF No. 30, PageID.102).                 
Officer Cosme testified that on April 28, 2021, the CI called and told him that Defendant 

“was in the area, the 300 block of West Cesar Chavez, that he was in possession of a firearm, and 
possession of crystal methamphetamine.”
Id.
(ECF No. 30, PageID.104). The CI told Officer 
Cosme that he had personally been with Defendant that day, and had seen Defendant with the 
firearm and narcotics.
Id.
(ECF No. 30, PageID.105). Officer Cosme then contacted his team, and 
the team drove unmarked vehicles to the area indicated by the CI.
Id.
They conducted surveillance 
of the area, during which the CI again contacted Officer Cosme and told him that Defendant “was 
still in the area.”
Id.
Surveillance units were able to locate a vehicle believed to be Defendant’s, 
and Defendant was seen getting into that vehicle.
Id.
Ultimately, Defendant’s vehicle was stopped, and state troopers who were assisting Officer 

Cosme’s team contacted and secured Defendant.
Id.
(ECF No. 30, PageID.107). Troopers found a 
firearm and magazine under Defendant’s pants, and they also located crystal methamphetamine.
Id.
After the contraband was found, Officer Cosme contacted the parole agent embedded with the 
unit, Nancy Hamilton, and told her that Defendant had been found in possession of a firearm and 
narcotics.
Id.
(ECF No. 30, PageID.107–108). Officer Hamilton “had the authority to place a 
detainer on [Defendant], and he was transported to Ingham County lockup facility.”
Id.
(ECF No. 
30, PageID.108).                                                          
On cross-examination, attorney Graham asked Officer Cosme about the prior traffic stop 
during which he encountered Defendant.
Id.
Officer Cosme acknowledged that he did not issue 
Defendant a ticket.
Id.
(ECF No. 30, PageID.109). During that stop, Defendant told Officer Cosme 
that he was on parole.
Id.
(ECF No. 30, PageID.110). Attorney Graham then asked Officer Cosme 
if it was his policy to search a vehicle if the driver indicated that he or she was on parole.
Id.
Officer 
Cosme responded, “I search everyone’s car if I stop them.”
Id.
Officer Cosme acknowledged that he had not seen Defendant’s parole paperwork before 

the day of the suppression hearing.
Id.
(ECF No. 30, PageID.111). He testified that he thought he 
had probable cause to stop and search Defendant, and that Defendant just so happened to be in a 
vehicle at the time.
Id.
(ECF No. 30, PageID.113). At the end of cross-examination, Officer Cosme 
clarified that when the CI called him on April 28, 2021, the CI told him that he was with Defendant 
at the time.
Id.
(ECF No. 30, PageID.115). On redirect, Officer Cosme testified that both the call 
from the CI and the stop of Defendant occurred well within the same hour.
Id.
(ECF No. 30, 
PageID.116).                                                              
After Officer Cosme testified, attorney Graham argued that there was no credible testimony 
regarding when Defendant’s parole status was verified because Officer Cosme “said he didn’t 

contact MDOC until after the stop, and then later said that he contacted and got information that 
there was a search condition.”
Id.
(ECF No. 30, PageID.123). Attorney Graham also argued that 
“what happens at the time of the search or what is found can’t be used to bootstrap the credibility 
of an informant in this case.”
Id.
(ECF No. 30, PageID.125). Ultimately, the Court denied the 
motion.
Id.
(ECF No. 30, PageID.128).                                     
On appeal, Defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that Officer 
Cosme “was not aware of [Defendant’s] parole condition before authorities stopped and searched 
him, so the parole condition did not render their search and seizure reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.” Marr,
2023 WL 6240105
, at *2. The Sixth Circuit rejected Defendant’s argument, 
stating:                                                                  
Regardless of whether Cosme was aware of the search condition prior to conducting 
the traffic stop, the district court did not err in denying Marr’s motion to suppress. 
We thus find it unnecessary to address the broader question of whether the existence 
of the parole condition alone sufficed to justify the search. This is because under 
the totality of circumstances, both the stop and the search were reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment.                                                
“Although the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability 
embodied in the term ‘probable cause,’ a lesser degree satisfies the Constitution 
when the balance of governmental and private interests makes such a standard 
reasonable.” United States v. Knights,
534 U.S. 112, 121
(2001). Due to his status 
as a parolee, Marr’s liberty was restricted. And even if Cosme did not know of 
Marr’s search condition, he certainly knew Marr was a parolee. So instead of the 
typical probable-cause analysis, we employ the totality-of-circumstances approach 
here. See United States v. Smith,
526 F.3d 306, 308
(6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he warrant 
and probable cause requirements generally do not apply to searches of parolees, 
probationers or their residences.”). Under this approach, we “assess[ ], on the one 
hand, the degree to which” the search intruded upon Marr’s privacy “and, on the 
other, the degree to which [the search was] needed for the promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests.” Samson v. California,
547 U.S. 843, 848
(2006) (quoting 
Knights,
534 U.S. at 119
).                                           
First consider Michigan’s legitimate interests. “[A] State’s interests in reducing 
recidivism and thereby promoting reintegration and positive citizenship among 
probationers and parolees warrant privacy intrusions that would not otherwise be 
tolerated  under  the  Fourth  Amendment.”  Id.  at  853  (“[A]  State  has  an 
‘overwhelming interest’ in supervising parolees because ‘parolees . . . are more 
likely to commit future criminal offenses.’”) (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. 
Scott,
524 U.S. 357, 365
(1998)). Without question, Michigan had an interest in 
supervising Marr, specifically. To begin, Cosme knew that Marr was a parolee for 
a homicide. Further, a CI who had (1) completed the Lansing Police Department’s 
credibility protocol, (2) provided the Department with reliable information in the 
past, (3) provided specific information about Marr that Cosme had corroborated, 
and (4) twice informed Cosme that he had seen Marr with a firearm and crystal 
methamphetamine—most recently, on the day of the stop. As Cosme explained, 
“[b]ased on the information, based on the parole history, we decided to do a 
dynamic contact, which means blocking the vehicle from having the opportunity to 
flee.” (R. 30, Suppression Hrg. Tr., PageID.106.)                    
On  the  other  side  of  the  scale,  Marr’s  expectation  of  privacy  was  “severely 
diminished.” Samson,
547 U.S. at 852
. In Samson, the Supreme Court noted that 
California parolees’ liberty can be restricted not only by the suspicionless search 
condition at issue in that case but also in several other ways, including “mandatory 
drug tests, restrictions on association with felons or gang members,” “mandatory 
meetings  with  parole  officers,”  employment  updates,  limits  on  travel,  and 
restrictions on the possession of weapons.
Id.
at 851–52. “The extent and reach of 
these conditions,” the Supreme Court explained, “clearly demonstrate that parolees 
like petitioner have severely diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their 
status alone.”
Id. at 852
. Marr was subject to similar parole conditions: he had to 
comply with drug testing as ordered by his parole officer, he could not associate 
with people with a felony conviction, he had to meet with his parole officer, he 
could not change employment without permission from his parole officer, he could 
not travel outside of Michigan without permission, and he could not possess a 
firearm or use any object as a weapon. Thus, Marr had a “severely diminished 
expectation[ ] of privacy by virtue of [his] status [as a parolee] alone.”
Id.
On balance, the officers’ search of Marr was not an unreasonable search or seizure 
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment—even if Cosme was unaware of Marr’s on-
demand search condition.                                             
In resisting this result, Marr suggests that this is a “reverse stalking horse” scenario. 
In a traditional stalking-horse scenario, police use a parole officer’s authority to 
conduct a search to circumvent the warrant requirement and further their own 
investigation. See United States v. Goliday,
145 F. App’x 502, 505
(6th Cir. 2005) 
(collecting cases). Marr’s argument is not entirely clear, but to the extent he 
contends that this is a reverse stalking horse scenario because the police (as opposed 
to the parole agent) conducted the search using Marr’s parole conditions it fails. 
There was no subterfuge here. As explained, irrespective of whether Cosme knew 
about the search condition, the record clearly shows that he was aware of Marr’s 
parole status and possessed concerning information from a reliable CI that Marr 
possessed narcotics and a gun—items which are illegal for parolees to possess. The 
authorities therefore did not use any type of subterfuge to stop and search Marr and 
this argument does not undermine our conclusion that the search was reasonable 
under the totality of the circumstances.                             
Marr,
2023 WL 6240105
, at *2–4.                                           
Defendant now faults attorney Graham for failing to “subpoena available [witnesses] or 
cross examine police officers or provide available evidence” to show that Defendant was illegally 
arrested. (§ 2255 Mot., ECF No. 1, PageID.13.) Defendant faults counsel for not researching case 
law regarding when a warrantless search of a parolee is reasonable. (Id.) According to Defendant, 
attorney Graham should have presented testimony from the CI, Defendant’s parole officer Dayton 
Driver, and Parole Officer Nancy Hamilton at the suppression hearing, and that such testimony 
would have established the illegality of his arrest. (Memo. Supp. § 2255 Mot., ECF No. 2, 
PageID.35.)                                                               
As  an  initial  matter,  although  Defendant  faults  attorney  Graham  for  not  calling  the 
individuals mentioned above as witnesses at the suppression hearing, “whether to call a witness 
and how to conduct a witness[’s] testimony are classic questions of trial strategy that merit 

Strickland deference.” Rayborn v. United States,
489 F. App’x 871, 878
(6th Cir. 2012). Defendant 
offers nothing but his own speculation that these individuals would have provided testimony 
establishing the alleged illegality of Defendant’s arrest. That speculation alone is insufficient to 
establish that counsel was ineffective. See Tinsley v. Million,
399 F.3d 796, 810
(6th Cir. 2005) 
(affirming denial of an ineffective assistance claim based on counsel’s failure to call witnesses 
where a petitioner did not “introduce [ ] affidavits or any other evidence establishing what they 
would have said”); United States v. Ashimi,
932 F.2d 643, 650
(7th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he testimony 
of a putative witness must generally be presented in the form of actual testimony by the witness or 
on affidavit; [a] defendant cannot simply state that the testimony would have been favorable, [as] 

self-serving speculation will not sustain an ineffective assistance claim.”) (footnote omitted). 
In his affidavit, attorney Graham states that the “search issue based on the traffic stop was 
fully evaluated and presented to this Court and was fully considered by this Court and the court of 
appeals.” (ECF No. 11, PageID.58, ¶ 15.) Attorney Graham is “unaware of any other facts that 
could have been presented in support of the motion to suppress.” (Id., ¶ 16.) This Court agrees 
with attorney Graham’s assessment of the record. The foregoing discussion demonstrates that 
attorney  Graham  challenged  the  credibility  of  any  testimony  regarding  Officer  Cosme’s 
knowledge of Defendant’s parole status and challenged the reliability of the CI’s tip. The Sixth 
Circuit rejected Defendant’s arguments on appeal, concluding that Officer Cosme was personally 
aware of Defendant’s parole status, even if he had not corroborated it until after the traffic stop, 
and that the CI’s information was sufficiently reliable and credible.     
Given the Sixth Circuit’s conclusions, Defendant fails to demonstrate, and the Court fails 
to discern, how any further argument by attorney Graham would have caused both this Court and 
the Sixth Circuit to conclude that the traffic stop was not a permissible Terry stop and instead was 

an illegal arrest. Defendant simply fails to “prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious 
and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different.” See 
Kimmelman,
477 U.S. at 375
. Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to relief with respect to habeas 
ground I.                                                                 
B.   Ground II—Ineffective Assistance Regarding Hearsay              
Next,  Defendant  faults  counsel  for  “failing  to  object  to  the  hearsay  utilized  by  the 
[G]overnment’s main witness at trial on [C]onfrontation [C]lause grounds.” (§ 2255 Mot., ECF 
No. 1, PageID.5.) Specifically, Defendant believes that attorney Graham should have objected to 
Officer  Cosme’s  testimony  during  the  suppression  hearing  regarding  the  CI’s  out-of-court 
statements on the basis that those statements were testimonial and used for the truth of the matter 

asserted. (Memo. Supp. § 2255 Mot., ECF No. 2, PageID.37–38.) Defendant argues further that 
Officer Robert Forbis’ testimony at trial was presented in violation of Defendant’s Confrontation 
Clause  rights  because  his  testimony  regarding  the  CI’s  statements  to  Officer  Cosme  also 
constituted inadmissible hearsay. (Id., PageID.38.)                       
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment gives the accused the right “to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend VI. “The central concern of the 
Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by 
subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.” 
Maryland v. Craig,
497 U.S. 836, 845
(1990). The Confrontation Clause, therefore, prohibits the 
admission  of  an  out-of-court  testimonial  statement  at  a  criminal  trial  unless  the  witness  is 
unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. See 
Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 59
(2004).                           
Not every out-of-court statement at trial, however, implicates the Confrontation Clause. As 
the Supreme Court stated in Crawford:                                     

The text of the Confrontation Clause . . . applies to “witnesses” against the 
accused—in other words, those who “bear testimony.” 2 N. Webster, An American 
Dictionary of the English Language (1828). “Testimony,” in turn, is typically “[a] 
solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving 
some fact.”
Ibid.
An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers 
bears  testimony  in  a  sense  that  a  person  who  makes  a  casual  remark  to  an 
acquaintance does not. The constitutional text, like the history underlying the 
common-law right of confrontation, thus reflects an especially acute concern with 
a specific type of out-of-court statement.
Id. at 51
. The Crawford Court had no need to decide whether the Confrontation Clause applies to 
nontestimonial statements, though the Court suggested, in dicta, that the clause does not apply to 
such statements. Subsequently, the Supreme Court considered the question left open in Crawford 
and explicitly decided that the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay. See Davis 
v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813
, 823–24 (2006).                               
First, Defendant’s contention that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated at the 
suppression hearing is wholly meritless. The Supreme Court has suggested that the Confrontation 
Clause does not apply to pretrial hearings, repeatedly explaining that “[t]he right to confrontation 
is basically a trial right.” Barber v. Page,
390 U.S. 719, 725
(1968); see also Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie,
480 U.S. 39
, 52–53 (1987). Specifically, the Supreme Court has concluded “that the 
interests at stake in a suppression hearing are of a lesser magnitude than those in the criminal trial 
itself.” United States v. Raddatz,
447 U.S. 667, 679
(1980). Thus, “[a]t a suppression hearing, the 
court may rely on hearsay and other evidence, even though that evidence would not be admissible 
at trial.”
Id.
As the Sixth Circuit has stated, “the Supreme Court has rejected Confrontation Clause 
challenges to the use of incompetent testimony during suppression hearings.” United States v. 
Sissler, No. 91-2113,
1992 WL 126974, at *2
(6th Cir. June 10, 1992) (citing cases); see also 
United States v. Davis,
361 F. App’x 632, 636
(6th Cir. 2010) (suggesting that the Confrontation 
Clause does not apply to suppression hearings). Counsel is “not required to raise meritless 
arguments to avoid a charge of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Ludwig v. United States,
162 

F.3d 456, 459
(6th Cir. 1998); see also Coley v. Bagley,
706 F.3d 741, 752
(6th Cir. 2013) (noting 
that “[o]mitting meritless arguments is neither professionally unreasonable nor prejudicial”). For 
the reasons set forth above, any Confrontation Clause challenge to Officer Cosme’s testimony at 
the suppression hearing would have been wholly futile. Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to 
relief with respect to this assertion of ineffective assistance.          
With respect to Defendant’s contention regarding trial testimony, at trial, Lansing Police 
Department Officer Robert Forbis testified for the Government. Officer Forbis testified that during 
the relevant time period, he was on a special assignment to the Violent Crime Impact Team. See 
Trial Tr. II, United States v. Marr, No. 1:21-cr-101 (W.D. Mich.) (ECF No. 71, PageID.564). At 

the beginning of direct examination, the Government asked Officer Forbis: “Now, a confidential 
informant had provided a tip that the defendant had a pistol and methamphetamine; is that right?”
Id.
Officer Forbis responded, “Yes.”
Id.
Officer Forbis testified further that the CI had told officers 
that Defendant “was located at a particular apartment building.”
Id.
(ECF No. 71, PageID.565). 
Upon review of the record, the Court agrees with the Government that Officer Forbis’s 
testimony regarding what information the CI provided to law enforcement was not offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted. The Sixth Circuit has held that “background information that explains 
how law enforcement came to be involved might not be hearsay because it is offered not for the 
truth of the matter asserted, but rather to show why the officers acted as they did.” United States 
v. Nelson,
725 F.3d 615, 620
(6th Cir. 2013). With respect to CIs, the Sixth Circuit has recognized 
that “statements by CIs are generally testimonial in character.” See United States v. Powers,
500 
F.3d 500, 508
(6th Cir. 2007). In reaching that generalization, the Sixth Circuit has noted: 
Tips provided by confidential informants are knowingly and purposely made to 
authorities, accuse someone of a crime, and often are used against the accused at 
trial. The very fact that the informant is confidential-i.e., that not even his identity 
is disclosed to the defendant-heightens the dangers involved in allowing a declarant 
to bear testimony without confrontation. The allowance of anonymous accusations 
of crime without any opportunity for cross-examination would make a mockery of 
the Confrontation Clause.                                            
United States v. Cromer,
389 F.3d 662, 675
(6th Cir. 2004).               
However, “[t]his is not to say that every CI’s statement offered through a police officer at 
trial amounts to a Confrontation Clause violation.” Powers,
500 F.3d at 508
. For example, in 
Cromer, the Sixth Circuit held that the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause were not 
violated by the admission of testimony that set forth background as to why law enforcement had 
begun investigating the defendant. Cromer,
389 F.3d at 676
. Notably, in Cromer, the officer’s 
testimony “at least arguably did not even put before the jury any statements made by the CI.”
Id.
Building upon Cromer, the Sixth Circuit has also rejected a Confrontation Clause challenge 
to  an  officer’s  testimony  that  included  statements  regarding  why  law  enforcement  was 
investigating the defendant, as well as statements regarding that a CI knew the defendant and where 
he lived, concluding that such testimony was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. See 
United States v. Reynolds,
684 F. App’x 510
, 514–16 (6th Cir. 2017). On the other hand, the Sixth 
Circuit has held that an officer’s testimony at trial that a CI notified a narcotics task force that the 
defendant “was trafficking in significant quantities of cocaine” and “was a well-known cocaine 
dealer,” and that this information was used to trigger a sting operation, violated the defendant’s 
rights under the Confrontation Clause because details about the defendant’s past activities “were 
not necessary to set the context of the sting operation for the jury.” United States v. Powers,
500 
F.3d 500, 503, 504, 510
(6th Cir. 2007).                                  
Arguably, Officer Forbis’ testimony that the CI had provided a tip that Defendant had been 
seen  in  possession  of  a  pistol  and  methamphetamine  presents  a  close  question.  While  this 
information  provided  the  background  for  why  law  enforcement  officials  investigated  and 

ultimately arrested Defendant, the CI’s tip was the impetus for beginning the investigation into 
Defendant’s  activities.  Nevertheless,  even  if  Officer  Forbis’s  testimony  regarding  the  CI’s 
statements  were  testimonial  in  nature  and,  therefore,  their  admission  violated  Defendant’s 
Confrontation Clause rights, Defendant has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced in any way 
by counsel’s failure to raise a Confrontation Clause challenge at trial. Even setting aside Officer 
Forbis’s testimony regarding the CI, the Government presented overwhelming evidence that 
Defendant possessed a quantity of methamphetamine equivalent to an amount usually intended for 
distribution, that he possessed a firearm despite his status as a felon, and that he possessed the 
firearm in connection with drug trafficking. In light of that, Defendant fails to show, and the Court 

fails to discern, how any Confrontation Clause objection raised by attorney Graham would have 
changed the outcome of Defendant’s trial in any way. Defendant, therefore, is not entitled to relief 
with respect to habeas ground II.                                         
C.   Ground III—Ineffective Assistance for Failing to Present a Defense 
As his third and final ground for relief, Defendant faults counsel for “failing to present a 
defense to persuade the jury that Defendant possessed only a user-level amount of narcotics and 
not a distributive amount[] as alleged by the government at trial.” (§ 2255 Mot., ECF No. 1, 
PageID.7.) In support of his claim, Defendant contends that               
just because the government would equate purity and quantities over a few grams 
as dealer amounts . . . doesn’t make it so today because according to the law and 
media today providing that methamphetamine is not only prevalent throughout the 
country, but almost 100% pure in most cases, making purchasing quantities of an 
ounce or less as common.                                             
(Mem. Supp. § 2254 Mot., ECF No. 2, PageID.38–39.) Defendant suggests that had counsel 
presented this defense, he would have been acquitted of Count Two of the Indictment. (Id., 
PageID.39.)                                                               
In the sworn declaration he has attached to his § 2255 motion, Defendant avers that counsel 
should have called the CI to testify that if he had seen Defendant with drugs, that Defendant was 
using them, not selling them. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.28.) Notably, however, given that the CI was 
the individual who told Officer Cosme that Defendant had been selling drugs, any testimony 
otherwise by the CI would have placed the CI’s credibility severely in question. In any event, 
Defendant offers nothing but his own speculation that the CI would have testified in his favor at 

trial, and as discussed supra, that speculation is insufficient to establish an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim. See Tinsley,
399 F.3d at 810
; Ashimi,
932 F.2d at 650
; see also United States v. 
Tilghman, No. 07-cr-138-KSF,
2013 WL 4735578
, at *10 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 3, 2013) (noting that 
“[w]hen a defendant claims that his attorney failed to call a witness at trial, he must ‘[a]t the very 
least . . . submit sworn affidavits from each of the individuals he has identified as uncalled 
witnesses stating whether they were in fact available to appear at trial and able to give testimony 
favorable to [the] defense’” (quoting Talley v. United States, No. 1:00-cv-74,
2006 WL 3422997
, 
at *10 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 27, 2006))).                                      
Attorney Graham has also addressed Defendant’s assertions in his affidavit. Attorney 

Graham “recognized before trial that one of the issues in the case was whether the 21.5 grams of 
methamphetamine that [Defendant] possessed was a ‘distribution’ amount or could have been a 
‘user’ amount.” (ECF No. 11, PageID.59, ¶ 17.) Attorney Graham consulted with at least two 
potential experts about this issue, but “[n]either expert had an opinion consistent with [attorney 
Graham’s] theory about possible use.” (Id., ¶¶ 19–21.) Attorney Graham also researched cases and 
conferred with other attorneys regarding their experiences with the issue. (Id., ¶¶ 22–23.) At trial, 
attorney Graham “tried to present the theory that the amount of drugs was just as likely for use as 
it was for distribution through the testimony of government witnesses.” (Id., ¶ 24.) He also 
“requested a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of possession of methamphetamine.” 

(Id., ¶ 26.) However, the jury ultimately rejected the defense’s user-level theory and convicted 
Defendant of possession with intent to distribute.                        
Attorney Graham also avers that prior to trial, the Government advised him that “it intended 
to have a police officer opine that 21.5 grams of methamphetamine is consistent with distribution 
and not mere use.” (Id., PageID.60, ¶ 33.) Attorney Graham filed a motion in limine to prevent 
this opinion testimony, but the motion was denied by the Court. (Id., ¶ 34–35.) Attorney Graham 
challenged the testimony during cross-examination, and challenged its admission on direct appeal. 
(Id., ¶ 36–37.)                                                           
The record before the Court entirely corroborates attorney Graham’s statements. On 

October 22, 2021, attorney Graham did file a motion in limine seeking to exclude the testimony 
noted above, arguing that such testimony “certainly falls within the realm of common sense and 
the ken of most people who would be in the jury pool.” See Mot., United States v. Marr, No. 1:21-
cr-101 (W.D. Mich.) (ECF No. 38, PageID.207). The Court, however, denied that motion. See 
Order,
id.
(ECF No. 44).                                                  
At trial, the Government presented testimony from DEA Special Agent Melissa Kazik. 
Special Agent Kazik testified that based upon her training and experience, it was common for 
methamphetamine users to typically purchase a gram at a time. See Trial Tr., II,
id.
(ECF No. 71, 
PageID.642). She noted that the user “could potentially make that gram last one to two days, and 
use that one gram amount . . . several times a day.” (Id.) Special Agent Kazik testified that the 21.5 
grams of 99% pure methamphetamine that was found in Defendant’s possession was a “larger 
distribution quantity” based on her experience.
Id.
(ECF No. 71, PageID.643). She testified that 
she would not expect a methamphetamine user who did not intend to distribute to be in possession 
of that amount.
Id.
When asked why, Special Agent Kazik stated:           

There are multiple reasons. Somebody who is a user is basically driven day-to-day 
by their addiction, so each day they go out and purchase their user amount or every 
couple days they go and purchase user amount, multiple reasons, typical users don’t 
maintain a job, they struggle to find a financial source to pay for their drug use 
every single day, so every single day they are looking for money to even purchase 
a small amount of drug to use just to fuel their addiction day-to-day. Typical users 
also don’t purchase in bulk such as over 20 grams of methamphetamine, their fear 
of being robbed, a lot of times by other users or people in their homes, and the 
typical methamphetamine or drug user in general has a really hard time with self-
control. And once again, like I mentioned before, their addiction really fuels their 
activities day to day. A lot of the time a methamphetamine or drug user cannot even 
maintain this amount of drug at one time, and also the company they keep, being 
surrounded by other users, they might get robbed, it might get stolen.
Id.
(ECF No. 71, PageID.643–644). Special Agent Kazik testified that she had never been involved 
in an investigation where a user had, for personal use only, “a quantity of 99 percent pure 
methamphetamine  comparable  to  the  21.5  grams  involved  in  this  case.”
Id.
(ECF  No.  71, 
PageID.645). Special Agent Kazik testified further that the sheer amount involved in Defendant’s 
case convinced her that it was for distribution purposes, despite the fact that Defendant may not 
have had a cell phone, was not in possession of a scale at the time of his arrest, and did not have 
any plastic baggies or cash on his person when arrested.
Id.
(ECF No. 71, PageID.651–653). 
On cross-examination, attorney Graham was able to have Special Agent Kazik admit that 
she had never “testified in a court as an expert witness as [she was]” that day.
Id.
(ECF No. 71, 
PageID.655). She also admitted that a user could consume more than a gram of methamphetamine 
per day.
Id.
(ECF No. 71, PageID.660). Special Agent Kazik noted further that in her experience, 
drug dealers are often found with cell phones, scales, packaging materials, ledgers, and rental cars.
Id.
(ECF No. 71, PageID.661–663).                                         
Moreover, attorney Graham is entirely correct that the Court instructed the jury regarding 
the lesser-included offense of possession of methamphetamine.
Id.
(ECF No. 71, PageID.711). 
The Court instructed the jury that if it found Defendant not guilty of possession with intent to 

distribute, it must consider the lesser charge.
Id.
(ECF No. 71, PageID.711–712). During jury 
deliberations, the jury sent a note to the Court indicating that it could not reach a unanimous 
agreement on Count 2-A, and asking if it was required to check the not guilty box.
Id.
(ECF No. 
71, PageID.727). After consulting with counsel, the Court called the jury in and provided the 
following further instruction:                                            
I’m going to ask you to return to the jury room and deliberate further on Count 2-
A. I realize that you are having some difficulty reaching unanimous agreement, but 
that is not unusual, and sometimes after further discussion, jurors are able to work 
out their differences and agree. Please keep in mind how very important it is for 
you to reach unanimous agreement. If you cannot agree, and if this case is tried 
again, there is no reason to believe that any new evidence will be presented or that 
the next 12 jurors will be any more conscientious and impartial than you are. 
Let me remind you that it is your duty as jurors to talk with each other about the 
case, to listen carefully and respectfully to each other’s views, and to keep an open 
mind as you listen to what your fellow jurors have to say.           
And let me remind you that it is your duty to make every reasonable effort you can 
to reach unanimous agreement. Each of you, whether you are in the majority or the 
minority, ought to seriously reconsider your position in light of the fact that other 
jurors who are just as conscientious and impartial as you are, have come to a 
different conclusion. Those of you who believe that the government has proved the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt should stop and ask yourselves if the 
evidence is really convincing enough, given that other members of the jury are not 
convinced. And those of you who believe that the government has not proved the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, should stop and ask yourselves if the 
doubt you have is a reasonable one, given that other members of the jury do not 
share your doubt. None of you should hesitate to change your mind, if after 
reconsidering things, you are convinced that other jurors are right, and that your 
original position was wrong. But remember this: Do not ever change your mind just 
because other jurors see things differently or just to get the case over with. As I told 
you before, in the end, your vote must be exactly that, your own vote. As important 
as it is for you to reach unanimous agreement, it is just as important you do so 
honestly and in good conscience.                                     
What I have just said is not meant to rush or pressure you into agreeing on a verdict. 
Take as much time as you need to discuss things. There is no hurry. I remind you 
that any verdict of the jury must be unanimous.
Id.
(ECF No. 71, PageID.732–734). Ultimately, as set forth above, the jury convicted Defendant 
of all three charges set forth in the Indictment, including possession with intent to distribute. 
Here, the record from Defendant’s criminal proceedings, as well as attorney Graham’s 
affidavit, refute Defendant’s suggestion that counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a user-
level defense. On the contrary, the record is clear that attorney Graham did present such a defense 
during trial. As set forth above, Defendant believes that counsel should have called the CI to refute 
Special Agent Kazik’s opinion testimony, but Defendant provides nothing but his own speculation 
to suggest that the CI would have been available and would have testified in his favor. Defendant 
also suggests that counsel should have “effectively” cross-examined Special Agent Kazik. (ECF 
No. 15, PageID.79.) As set forth above, attorney Graham did effectively cross-examine Kazik, and 
Defendant fails to explain how further cross-examination would have been beneficial to his 
defense.                                                                  
Ultimately, Defendant has failed to demonstrate that attorney Graham made an error “so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687
. Moreover, Defendant has not demonstrated prejudice, 
at it is patently clear that despite attorney Graham presenting evidence and arguing that Defendant 
possessed the 21.5 grams of methamphetamine for his personal use, the jury rejected that argument 
and unanimously concluded that Defendant had intended to distribute that amount. Defendant, 
therefore, is not entitled to relief with respect to habeas ground III.1  
In sum, the record before the Court supports a conclusion that all of Defendant’s grounds 
for relief are meritless, and there is no need for the Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. 
Accordingly, Defendant’s § 2255 motion (ECF No. 1) will be denied.        

IV.  Certificate of Appealability                                         
Under
28 U.S.C. § 2253
(c)(1)(B), the Court must determine whether a certificate of 
appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Defendant has demonstrated a 
“substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.”
28 U.S.C. § 2253
(c)(2).  
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of a 
certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio,
263 F.3d 466, 467
(6th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 
Rather, the district court must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine 
whether a certificate is warranted.
Id.
Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth 
by the Supreme Court in Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473
(2000). Murphy,
263 F.3d at 467
. 
Consequently, this Court has examined Defendant’s claims under the Slack standard. Under Slack, 


1 Within ground III, Defendant also vaguely mentions that counsel “unprofessionally failed to 
investigate or present the strongest issues available to [Defendant] for his direct appeal and failed 
to preserve viable issues for collateral review.” (§ 2255 Mot., ECF No. 1, PageID.16.) Defendant, 
however, fails to explain what issues he believes counsel should have raised on direct appeal. 
Defendant’s conclusory allegation is insufficient to justify federal habeas relief. See Workman v. 
Bell,
178 F.3d 759, 771
(6th Cir. 1998) (noting that conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance 
of counsel do not justify habeas relief); see also Wogenstahl v. Mitchell,
668 F.3d 307
, 335–36 
(6th Cir. 2012) (citing Workman and affirming the denial of habeas relief for conclusory claims). 
Defendant also mentions that counsel “labored under [an] actual conflict of interest,” and that 
counsel “owed a ‘duty’ other than to [him].” (§ 2255 Mot., ECF No. 1, PageID.16.) Defendant 
provides no facts to support this alleged conflict of interest. Attorney Graham has averred that he 
did not represent anyone with interests contrary to Defendant’s. (ECF No. 11, PageID.60, ¶ 40.) 
By failing to point to specific instances suggesting an actual conflict or impairment of his interests, 
see McElrath v. Simpson,
595 F.3d 624
, 624–25 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted), Defendant 
fails to show that he is entitled to relief premised upon any alleged conflict of interest.
529 U.S. at 484
, to warrant a grant of the certificate, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that 
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable 
or wrong.”
Id.
“A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists of reason could 
conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-
El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 327
(2003). In applying this standard, the Court may not conduct a 

full merits review, but must limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit 
of Defendant’s claims.
Id.
The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not conclude that this Court’s dismissal of 
Defendant’s claims was debatable or wrong. Therefore, the Court will deny Defendant a certificate 
of appealability. Moreover, although Defendant has failed to demonstrate that he is in custody in 
violation of the Constitution and has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a 
constitutional right, the Court does not conclude that any issue Defendant might raise on appeal 
would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States,
369 U.S. 438, 445
(1962).  
V.   Conclusion                                                           
For the foregoing reasons,                                           

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence 
pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255
(ECF No. 1) is DENIED.                       
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED. 
A separate judgment will follow. See Gillis v. United States,
729 F.3d 641, 643
(6th Cir. 
2013) (requiring a separate judgment in habeas proceedings).              


Dated:   May 29, 2025              /s/ Paul L. Maloney                    
                              Paul L. Maloney                        
                              United States District Judge