Martinez v. Padilla

             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO                               

REBECCA MARTINEZ,                                                         

Plaintiff,                                                           

v.                                                        Civ. No. 19-889 JCH/GJF 

CHRISTOPHER JAMES PADILLA, et al.,                                        

Defendants.                                                          

          ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING                         
         IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL                        

THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Plaintiff’s “Motion to Compel Discovery” [ECF 
22] (“Motion”). The Motion is fully briefed. See ECF 43 (Response); ECF 45 (Reply). The Court 
heard oral argument on September 17, 2020, at the end of which the Court rendered its decision. 
ECF 49 (Order Setting Hearing); ECF 52 (Clerk’s Minutes). For the reasons stated below, the 
Court now memorializes its decision to GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART Plaintiff’s 
Motion.                                                                   
I.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND                                                 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Christopher Padilla, a correctional officer at the Springer 
Correctional Center (“SCC”), engaged in numerous instances of sexual misconduct towards her 
while she was incarcerated there. ECF 1-2 at 1, 4–13. In making these allegations, Plaintiff sued 
four defendants: (1) Defendant Padilla; (2) Defendant John Sanchez, former SCC Warden; (3) 
Defendant Christopher Biddle, former SCC Deputy Warden; and (4) Defendant Robert Gonzales, 
SCC Security Chief. ECF 1-2 at 3.                                         
In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleged five counts: (I) “False Arrest and Seizure in Violation 
of the Fourth Amendment” against Defendant Padilla; (II) “Cruel and Unusual Punishment in 
Violation of the Eighth Amendment” against Defendant Padilla; (III) “Failure to Protect in 
Violation of the Eighth Amendment” against Defendants Sanchez, Biddle, and Gonzales; (IV) 
“Retaliation in Violation of First Amendment” against all Defendants; and (V) “Spoliation of 
Evidence” against all Defendants. ECF 1-2 at 14–18.                       
Plaintiff filed the present Motion on March 3, 2020. ECF 22. On March 10, 2020, however, 

the parties stipulated to dismissing Count V with prejudice. ECF 23. Shortly thereafter, Defendants 
Sanchez and Gonzales moved to dismiss the remaining claims against them, Counts III and IV, 
and the Court granted this request. See ECFs 24, 36, 38. On April 22, 2020, the parties again 
stipulated to a dismissal with prejudice, this time with respect to Count IV as it pertained to 
Defendants Padilla, Gonzales, and Sanchez. ECF 32. The scope of the case has thus narrowed 
since Plaintiff originally filed her Motion. The only remaining claims are: (I) “False Arrest and 
Seizure in Violation of the Fourth Amendment” against Defendant Padilla; (II) “Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment in Violation of the Eighth Amendment” against Defendant Padilla; (III) “Failure to 
Protect in Violation of the Eighth Amendment” against Defendant Biddle; and (IV) “Retaliation 

in Violation of First Amendment” against Defendant Biddle.  ECF 1-2 at 14–17.  
Plaintiff now requests that the Court compel Defendants to produce information and 
documentation that Plaintiff requested in December 2019. See ECF 22 at 1.  
II.  RELEVANT SUBSTANTIVE LAW                                             
A.  Scope of Discovery                                               
The scope of discovery as defined by Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is 
familiar:                                                                 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to 
any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering 
the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the 
parties’  relative  access  to  relevant  information,  the  parties’  resources,  the 
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or 
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within 
this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.  

Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.  26(b)(1)  (emphasis  added).  The  language  of  Rule  26  should  be  “liberally 
construe[d],” Anaya v. CBS Broad., Inc., 251 F.R.D. 645, 649 (D.N.M. 2007), so that trial may be 
“less a game of blind man’s bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed 
to the fullest practicable extent.” United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958); 
see also Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Bok Fin. Corp., Civil No. 11-1132 RB/LFG, 2013 
WL 12047029, at *11 (D.N.M. Jan. 25, 2013) (same). But, at the same time, the Court must avoid 
permitting “plaintiff to engage in a ‘fishing expedition’ in the hope of supporting [her] claim.” 
Landry v. Swire Oilfield Servs., L.L.C., 323 F.R.D. 360, 375 (D.N.M. 2018) (quoting McGee v. 
Hayes, 43 Fed.Appx. 214, 217 (10th Cir. 2002) (unpublished)). And “Rule 26 vests the trial judge 
with broad discretion to tailor discovery narrowly.” Murphy v. Deloitte & Touche Group Ins. Plan, 
619 F.3d 1151, 1163 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998)).  
B.  Attorney-Client Privilege                                        
“The attorney-client privilege protects ‘confidential communications by a client to an 
attorney made in order to obtain legal assistance’ from the attorney in his capacity as a legal 
advisor.’” In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d 1172, 1182 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued on June 9, 1982, 697 F.2d 277, 278 (10th Cir. 1983)). 
The attorney-client privilege must be “strictly construed.” Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 
50  (1980).  “[T]he  mere  fact  that  an  attorney  was  involved  in  a  communication  does  not 
automatically  render  the  communication  subject  to  the  attorney-client  privilege.”  Motley  v. 
Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1550–51 (10th Cir. 1995). Instead, the “communication between 
a lawyer and client must relate to legal advice or strategy sought by the client.” United States v. 
Johnston, 146 F.3d 785, 794 (10th Cir. 1998).                             
C.  Work Product Doctrine                                            
“The  work  product  privilege  protects  against  disclosure  of  the  ‘mental  impressions, 
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning 

the litigation.’” Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dabney, 73 F.3d 262, 266 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)). The work product doctrine guards only against “divulging the attorney’s 
strategies and legal impressions” and not the “facts concerning the creation of work product or 
facts contained within work product.” Id. Materials protected by the work product doctrine may 
be subject to discovery if (1) they are otherwise discoverable and (2) the party seeking disclosure 
“shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue 
hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(i)-(ii).  
D.  Inspection of Public Records Act                                 
Under New Mexico’s Inspection of Public Records Act (“IPRA”), N.M. Stat. § 14-2-1, 

every person has a right to inspect the public records of the state of New Mexico and its agencies. 
Several types of government records, however, may not be inspected, including “letters or 
memoranda that are matters of opinion in personnel files.” § 14-2-1(C) (emphasis added).  
The New Mexico Supreme Court has had a single opportunity to address whether an 
exception to the general rule permitting public record inspection also amounts to a discovery 
privilege in civil litigation. In Estate of Romero ex rel. Romero v. City of Santa Fe, 137 P.3d 611, 
613 (N.M. 2006), the court answered whether a particular IPRA provision, which excepts from 
public inspection “law enforcement records that reveal confidential sources, methods, information 
or individuals accused but not charged with a crime,” also created a separate civil discovery 
privilege. Id. at 617; see generally N.M. Stat. § 14-2-1(A)(4). The court determined that IPRA 
exceptions are indicative of the New Mexico State Legislature’s “intent to protect from disclosure” 
certain types of government records.  Romero, 137 P.3d at 617. In other words, IPRA exceptions 
represent “vitally important public policy concern[s]” which may lead to “an immunity from 
discovery for some . . . materials in civil litigation.” Id. at 618. Notably, however, the court held 

that such “immunity is not absolute.” Id. Rather, “the party seeking to preclude disclosure has the 
burden of proving the information sought to be protected is confidential under a policy interest 
which may make the information immune from discovery.” Id.                
III. DISCUSSION                                                           
Plaintiff requests that the Court compel Defendants to supplement their responses to certain 
interrogatories and requests for production. ECF 22. Plaintiff’s six specific requests are discussed 
in turn.                                                                  
A.  Interrogatory Number 11                                          
     1.  The Parties’ Arguments                                      

Plaintiff requested that Defendants:                                 
identify all persons charged with the responsibility of hiring, training, and making 
decisions  regarding  the  promotion  and/or  retention  of  NMCD  [New  Mexico 
Corrections Department] staff at facilities operated by NMCD for the five years 
prior to the incident in this case to the present.                   

ECF 22-5 at 2–3 (emphasis in original). Defendants responded:             
Defendants object to this Interrogatory, as it is irrelevant and not reasonably 
calculated to lead to admissible evidence. None of the Defendants in in [sic] the 
instant case are accused of any negligence in staffing, and they are not responsible 
for staffing decisions . . . NMCD states that there is a centralized screening process. 
Vincente Caballero is the acing [sic] section chief.                 

ECF 22-5 at 3.                                                            
Plaintiff took issue with Defendants’ response as failing to “explain what the screening 
process is or what entity or office the identified individual apparently presides over.” ECF 22 at 3. 
Plaintiff argues that the request was relevant because she alleged that Defendant Biddle (as well 
as Defendants Gonzales and Sanchez, neither of whom remains a party to this dispute) “violated 
the Eighth Amendment by creating [a] dangerous environment at SCC and thereby failing to 

protect [Plaintiff] from abuse.” Id. at 4. In addition, Plaintiff argues that the interrogatory is 
relevant to her claims against Defendant Padilla because Plaintiff alleges that the SCC had a culture 
that “empowered correctional officers to use their positions of power to sexually abuse women in 
NMCD custody,” which “emboldened Defendant Padilla, making him believe he could abuse 
[Plaintiff] without consequence.” Id.                                     
Defendants, for their part, argue that the interrogatory is no longer relevant after the Court 
dismissed “Plaintiff’s claims for supervisory liability.” ECF 43 at 6.    
     2.  The Information Sought Is Not Relevant to the Remaining Claims    

Discovery requests must be relevant to a party’s claims or defenses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(b)(1). As a preliminary matter, Interrogatory Number 11 is overbroad in two ways. First, it 
requests the names of personnel charged with certain employment functions at every NMCD 
facility—not just the SCC. ECF 22-5 at 2–3. Second, the interrogatory is not limited to the time 
frame in which the alleged incidents took place; rather, the request extends five years prior to the 
relevant incidents in question. Id.                                       
More importantly, Interrogatory Number 11 is not relevant to Plaintiff’s claims against 
either of the two remaining defendants. Plaintiff has not shown how establishing the identities of 
all NMCD employees who were responsible for staff employment decisions—for the five years 
prior to the incident in question— makes it more or less probable that Defendant Padilla engaged 
in the alleged sexual misconduct. Furthermore, although Plaintiff’s failure to protect and retaliation 
claims against Defendant Biddle remain, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant Biddle was in 
any way responsible for or connected to the types of employment decisions described in her 
interrogatory. Therefore, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s request to have Defendants supplement 
their response to Plaintiff’s Interrogatory Number 11.                    

B.  Request for Production Number 10                                 
     1.  The Parties’ Arguments                                      

Plaintiff asked Defendants to “produce all NMCD Human Resource Manuals that were in 
effect at SCC from July 2014 through the present.” ECF 22-5 at 8. Defendant objected to the 
request as irrelevant on the grounds that this case “is not an employment dispute; rather, it concerns 
alleged interactions between an inmate and an officer.” Id. At oral argument, Plaintiff explained 
that the request was relevant because human resource manuals would provide information about 
how SCC officers are expected to behave and how informal discipline is applied at NMCD 
facilities. ECF 52 at 2.                                                  
Like Defendants’ response to Plaintiff’s Interrogatory Number 11, Defendants take the 
position that this interrogatory was rendered moot once the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s remaining 
claims against Defendants Sanchez and Gonzales. ECF 43 at 5. And, with respect to Defendant 
Biddle, Defendants assert that the request is not relevant because Defendant Biddle was not 
responsible for disciplining Defendant Padilla. ECF 52 at 2.              
     2.  Plaintiff’s Request Is Relevant to Her Failure to Protect Claim against 
       Defendant Biddle                                              

Because Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Failure to protect claim against Defendant Biddle 
survives, the SCC’s culture in place at the time of the disputed incidents in this case is relevant. It 
therefore follows that human resource manuals—which often detail an institution’s policies and 
disciplinary procedures—may be relevant.                                  
At the same time, however, Plaintiff’s interrogatory, as written, is overbroad because it 
requests disclosure of manuals in use at all NMCD facilities and for manuals in use after the 
relevant time period. Accordingly, the Court will only grant Plaintiff’s motion to compel to the 

extent it relates to the disclosure of human resources manuals in use at the Springer Correctional 
Center for the three-year period that ended with the culmination of the investigation of the incident 
giving rise to this lawsuit.                                              
C.  Request for Production Number 11                                 
     1.  The Parties’ Arguments                                      

Plaintiff sought “all documents that address the job duties and/or any restrictions that apply 
to correctional officers at SCC, including, but not limited to, all documents pertaining to the hiring 
and/or termination of correctional officers in effect at SCC at the time of the incidents at issue in 
this  lawsuit.”  ECF  22-5  at  8.  Defendants  again  objected  to  the  request  as  irrelevant.  Id. 
Notwithstanding that objection, however, Defendants directed Plaintiff to a website at which she 
could access the NMCD’s policies. Id.                                     
During oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel further explained that Defendant’s answer to this 
interrogatory was insufficient because Plaintiff, upon information and belief, understood there to 
be documents responsive to this request that are not publicly available through the website 
provided by Defendants. ECF 52 at 3. When asked by the Court whether such non-public 
documents exist, defense counsel advised that to the best of his knowledge the only documents 
applicable to the request are those available through the website. Id.  At this point, Plaintiff’s 
counsel stressed the fact that the request was specifically targeted at documents in place at the time 
of the disputed incidents and that because the link provided only contains up-to-date documents, 
the policies provided may not be entirely responsive to this request.  Id. 
     2.  Defendants’ Response Was Insufficient                       

Like Plaintiff’s Request for Production Number 11, Request for Production Number 10 is 
relevant because Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim against Defendant Biddle is alive—meaning 
that the SCC’s culture may be relevant. Moreover, the documents described in this request directly 
relate to the SCC’s culture. The Court further agrees with Plaintiff that Defendants’ responses were 
insufficient because the policies identified via the website are not necessarily those in place during 
the time period relevant to this litigation.                              
Thus, the Court will order defense counsel to conduct another good faith search for 
documents responsive to Plaintiff’s Request for Production Number 11, limited specifically to the 
Springer Correctional Center. The Court will further order defense counsel to file with the Court 
a certificate of compliance advising that the renewed search either yielded new responsive 
documents that have been disclosed or yielded no new responsive documents. 

D.  Interrogatory Number 15 and Requests for Production Numbers 1, 2, and 8 
     1.  The Parties’ Arguments                                      

This set of requests raises the issue whether an NMCD Office of Professional Standards 
Report (“OPS Report”), created in response to Plaintiff’s allegations, is discoverable.  
Interrogatory Number 15 requested:                                   
[e]xcept for your attorney, identify every individual with whom each Defendant has 
communicated about Plaintiff’s allegations, including employees or supervisors of 
the New Mexico Corrections Department, Summit staff, and law enforcement, and 
please describe the form or type of such communication (i.e., orally or in writing), 
the date of such communication, a summary of the communication, the purpose of 
the communications, and whether or not it was recorded.              

ECF 22-5 at 4. Defendants objected to the request on the grounds that:    
all such communications were in connection with investigations carried out by the 
New Mexico Department of Public Safety and the Department of Corrections’ 
Office  of  Professional  Standards  .  .  .  The  Office  of  Professional  Standards 
investigation is protected by attorney client privilege and the work product doctrine. 

Id. In their briefing, Defendants asserted that the OPS Report was also protected by a public policy 
privilege created by IPRA. ECF 43 at 7–9; see generally N.M. Stat. § 14-2-1(C).1 
Plaintiff takes the position that OPS Reports are not protected by the attorney client 
privilege because they are not created for the purpose of soliciting or delivering legal advice and 
because the OPS Report was not intended to be kept confidential, considering that OPS reports are 
sometimes disclosed to law enforcement agencies under NMCD policy. ECF 22 at 8; see also 
N.M. Dep’t Corr. Pol’y 031800.2 Plaintiff further contends that the OPS Report is not protected 
by the work product doctrine because it was not created in anticipation of litigation—but, instead, 
the report’s primary function was to memorialize an investigation into “allegations of staff 
misconduct.” ECF 22 at 10.                                                
Plaintiff insists that the OPS Report is discoverable under IPRA. Id. at 10. Under New 
Mexico case law, Plaintiff says, IPRA does not in and of itself create a discovery privilege. Id. at 
11–12. Instead, Plaintiff continues, IPRA is more properly interpreted to act as a guide to courts 
in determining whether a policy interest exists that may make certain materials immune from 
discovery. Id. at 12. Plaintiff concludes that because “Defendants have provided no explanation of 
a public policy that would favor keeping the OPS [R]eport confidential,” IPRA does not protect it 
from disclosure. ECF 45 at 5.                                             


1 Armed with the knowledge of the OPS Report’s existence, Plaintiff also seeks the report on the basis that it is 
responsive to her Requests for Production Numbers 1, 2, and 8. ECF 22 at 5. Broadly speaking, these requests sought 
documents created in response to the incident at issue and documents held in Plaintiff’s inmate file. See ECF 22-5 at 
5–7.                                                                      

2 NMCD policies may be found at https://cd.nm.gov/policies/.              
     2.  The Non-Opinion Portions of the OPS Report Are Discoverable   

The OPS Report is not protected by either the attorney client privilege or the work product 
doctrine. “The attorney-client privilege protects ‘confidential communications by a client to an 
attorney made in order to obtain legal assistance’ from the attorney in his capacity as a legal 
advisor.’” In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d at 1182. Similarly, “[t]he work product 
privilege protects against disclosure of the ‘mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal 
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.’” Resolution 
Trust Corp. 73 F.3d at 266. The OPS Report, reviewed by the Court in camera, does not contain 
confidential communications between a client and a lawyer. Although the OPS Report is shared 
with a member of the NMCD’s Office of General Counsel, the report is created by a non-lawyer 
for consumption primarily by other non-lawyers.                           
The OPS Report was not made with the intention of seeking legal advice. NMCD Policy 
031801(E) ¶ 16(a)-(c) identifies three types of cases in which an OPS report must be shared with 

certain NMCD personnel: (1) Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) cases; (2) use of force 
(“UOF”) cases, and; (3) equal employment opportunity cases. Of the three, only EEO cases require 
consultation with the NMCD Office of General Counsel. N.M. Corr. Dep’t Pol’y 031801(E) 
¶ 16(a). In contrast, PREA cases (of which the OPS Report is most readily classified as)3 do not 
require consultation with a member of the NMCD Office of General Counsel and instead require 
consultation only with a “designated PREA subject matter expert.” Id. At oral argument, defense 

3 Broadly, PREA was enacted to establish “a zero-tolerance standard for . . . prison rape.” 34 U.S.C. § 30302(1).  
“Rape” as defined in PREA includes “sexual fondling of a person, forcibly or against that person’s will.” 34 U.S.C. 
§ 30309(9)(A). “PREA Cases,” within the context of NMCD policy, are those in which a PREA “subject matter 
expert” must determine whether PREA violation occurred. N.M. Corr. Dep’t Pol’y 031801(E) ¶ 16(a). Because the 
OPS Report details an investigation into an alleged sexual assault, the report is best classified as a “PREA case” under 
NMCD policy.                                                              
counsel confirmed that the SCC’s PREA subject matter expert was not a lawyer. ECF 52 at 3–4. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the OPS Report is not protected by the attorney client privilege 
or the work product doctrine because the report was not created to obtain legal advice or in 
anticipation of litigation.                                               
Defendants’ alternative ground for nondisclosure is that exceptions identified in IPRA 

provide a basis for nondisclosure. The relevant provision reads: “[e]very person has a right to 
inspect public records of this state except: . . . letters or memoranda that are matters of opinion in 
personnel  files.”  N.M.  Stat.  §  14-2-1(A)  (emphasis  added).  Without  reaching  whether  that 
exception to IPRA’s general rule of disclosure equates to a discovery privilege, the Court, having 
reviewed the OPS Report, has found only a few sentences that may fairly be considered “opinion.” 
The Court, therefore, will order Defendants to produce the OPS Report with the following 
redactions (referencing the OPS Report’s pagination):                     
  •  Page 20—the entire sentence beginning with the words: “The administrative 
     investigation.”                                                 
  •  Page 21—the portion of the first sentence of the first paragraph beginning after 
     the comma.                                                      
  •  Page 21—the entire first sentence of the fourth paragraph.4     
  •  Page 21—the entire fifth paragraph.                             

E.  Request for Production Number 15                                 
     1.  The Parties’ Arguments                                      

Plaintiff sought “NMCD policies, practices, trainings, or guidelines in place at the time of 
the incidents at issue in this lawsuit pertaining to the introduction of contraband by NMCD staff 

4 Note that this redaction is in addition to those identified during oral argument. The Court inadvertently omitted to 
include this excerpt in its discussion of permitted redactions. ECF 52 at 4. 
into NMCD facilities.” ECF 22 at 6.5 Defendants objected to the request as irrelevant because 
Plaintiff did not allege that Defendant Padilla ever attempted to introduce contraband into the SCC. 
See ECF 22-3 at 3.                                                        
Plaintiff  maintains  that  the  request  is  relevant  because  it  is  connected  to  Plaintiff’s 
allegation that Defendants “fostered [a] culture of abuse” at the SCC which was, in part, due to the 

practice of “failing to properly screen correctional officers entering SCC, allowing them to bring 
special items to curry favor with certain prisoners.” ECF 22 at 6; ECF 1-2 ¶ 100(c). Accordingly, 
Plaintiff says, “introduction of contraband into NMCD facilities is directly relevant to Plaintiff’s 
claim that” Defendant Biddle “failed to protect her from abuse when they created a dangerous 
environment at SCC through acts and omissions outlined in the Complaint.” ECF 22 at 6.  
     2.  The Documents Sought Are Not Relevant                       

Although the scope of discovery is broad, the Court is not required to allow Plaintiff to 
engage in a “fishing expedition” with the hope that something will turn up to support her claim. 
See S.E.C. v. Goldstone, 301 F.R.D. 593, 643 (D.N.M. 2014). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that 
Defendant Padilla ever tried to smuggle contraband into the SCC with the hope of currying favor 
with any inmate—let alone Plaintiff. Moreover, it is unclear to the Court how—if Defendant 
Padilla is not alleged to have brought contraband into the SCC—this implicit policy of allowing 
correctional officers to bring contraband into the facility relates to Defendant Biddle’s alleged 
failure to protect Plaintiff from Defendant Padilla. Thus, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion to 
compel Defendants to provide documents responsive to Plaintiff’s Request for Production Number 
15.                                                                       



5 Because the parties sufficiently briefed this issue, the Court did not separately question them about it at oral 
argument.                                                                 
F.  Rule 37 Sanctions                                                
Finally, Plaintiff requests an award of her reasonable fees pursuant to Rule 37(a). ECF 22 
at 13. Because the Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion in part and denies it in part, the Court “may, 
after giving an opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion.” Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(c) (emphasis added). Exercising its discretion and finding that each side to this 

Motion had defensible legal positions, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s request, with each party to 
bear their own expenses.                                                  
IV. CONCLUSION                                                            
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion [ECF 22] is GRANTED IN 
PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:                                       
1.  Plaintiff’s Interrogatory Number 11, Request for Production Number 15, and request 
  for fees are DENIED.                                               

2.  Plaintiff’s remaining requests are GRANTED in that, no later than October 2, 2020, 
  Defendants shall:                                                  

     a.  Produce human resource manuals in use at the Springer Correctional 
       Center for the three-year period that ended with the culmination of the 
       investigation of the incident that gave rise to this lawsuit; 

     b.  Conduct a good faith search for documents responsive to Plaintiff’s 
       Request for Production Number 11, limited specifically to the Springer 
       Correctional Center. Defense counsel shall also file with the Court a 
       certificate of compliance advising that the renewed search either yielded 
       new responsive documents that have been disclosed or yielded no new 
       responsive documents.                                         

     c.  Produce the OPS Report with the following redactions (referencing the 
       Report’s pagination):                                         

          i.  Page 20—the entire sentence beginning with the words: “The 
            administrative investigation.”                           
      li.  Page 21—the portion of the first sentence of the first paragraph 
          beginning after the comma. 
      iii.  Page 21—the entire first sentence of the fourth paragraph. 
      iv.  Page 21—the entire fifth paragraph. 
SO ORDERED. 

                             wee, /] 
                           a           MAAAA 
                         fHE HONORABLE GREGORY J. FOURATT 
                         UNITED $     ES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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