MARTZ v. WILLIAMS

              UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                           
             SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA                            
                 INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION                               

TYLER MARTZ,                       )                                      
                              )                                      
             Plaintiff,       )                                      
                              )                                      
           v.                 )    No. 1:24-cv-02001-RLY-TAB         
                              )                                      
JONI WILLIAMS, et al.,             )                                      
                              )                                      
                              )                                      
                              )                                      
             Defendants.      )                                      



 ORDER ON DEFENDANT CRANE'S MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA                 
          AND FOR ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE ORDER                          


Defendant Judge Kit C. Dean Crane seeks an order quashing a subpoena for his deposition 
and a protective order shielding him from providing testimony in this case.  [Filing No. 47.]  
Plaintiff Tyler Martz issued a subpoena for Crane's deposition and opposes Crane's motion.  [Filing 
No. 55.]  Both Crane and Martz have submitted lengthy briefs to the Court.  However, the Court 
need not delve into those substantive arguments because the parties have failed to comply with 
S.D. Ind. Local Rule 37-1 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).  Before a party files a motion raising a 
discovery dispute, it must fulfill two prerequisites: (1) "meet and confer" with opposing counsel 
and (2) request a conference with the presiding magistrate judge.  Local Rule 37-1(a), (b).  Crane 
has  not  fulfilled  those  prerequisites,  and  his  motion  does  not  contain  the  meet-and-confer 
certification required by Local Rule 37-1(b) and Federal Rule 26(c)(1).  Therefore, Plaintiff's 
motion [Filing No. 47] is denied.                                         
Local Rule 37-1(a) outlines the actions that parties must take before involving the Court in 
a discovery dispute and states as follows:                                
     Prior to involving the court in any discovery dispute, including 
     disputes involving depositions, the parties must confer in a good 
     faith attempt to resolve the dispute.  If any such dispute cannot be 
     resolved  in  this  manner,  one  or  both  parties  shall  contact  the 
     chambers of the assigned Magistrate Judge to determine whether the 
     Magistrate Judge is available to resolve the discovery dispute by 
     way of a telephone conference or other proceeding prior to a party 
     filing a formal discovery motion.                               

Local Rule 37-1(a) creates a meet-and-confer requirement that mandates a "real-time interaction" 
between counsel.  Loparex, LLC v. MPI Release Techs., LLC, No. 1:09-CV-1411-JMS-TAB, 2011 
WL 1871167, at *2 (S.D. Ind. May 16, 2011).  Email exchanges are not sufficient.  "An electronic 
ultimatum is not a good faith attempt to resolve a discovery dispute.  Rather, the local rule 
contemplates  an  actual  meeting  with  a  date,  time,  and  place—whether  by  telephonic, 
videoconference, or (if counsel's location permits) preferably face-to-face."  Id.  The parties' 
briefing is vague as to what meet and confer has occurred.  Crane's supporting brief notes only that 
counsel for Crane "attempted" to meet and confer with Martz's counsel on this issue.  [Filing No. 
48, at ECF p. 3.]  Crane has not shown that he fulfilled the meet-and-confer prerequisite.   
Moreover, Local Rule 37-1(b) authorizes a party to file a discovery dispute motion only 
after the parties attempt to resolve the dispute at a conference with the magistrate judge.  No party 
has contacted this Court to request a conference to discuss the propriety of deposing Crane.  The 
second prerequisite to filing a discovery dispute motion—the request for a conference with the 
Court—is clearly unmet.                                                   
Furthermore, Crane's motion fails to contain information required by Federal Rule 26(c)(1) 
and Local Rule 37-1(b).  Federal Rule 26(c)(1) requires motions seeking protective orders from 
discovery to contain "a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to 
confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action."  Local 

Rule 37-1(b) further specifies the mandatory content of meet-and-confer certifications in all 
discovery dispute motions.  It requires discovery dispute motions to contain "a statement setting 
forth the efforts taken to resolve the dispute, including the date, time, and place of any discovery 
conference and the names of all participating parties."  Local Rule 37-1(b) also authorizes courts 
to deny discovery dispute motions that do not contain such a statement.  Martz's response brief 
notes that Crane failed to submit a Federal Rule 26(c)(1) and Local Rule 37-1(b) disclosure of 
meet-and-confer efforts.  [Filing No. 55, at ECF p. 17-18.]  However, other than attaching a short 
email exchange between counsel, Martz does not state what meet and confer occurred between the 
parties.  Crane's reply brief notes that Martz's counsel had previously issued subpoenas for Crane's 
deposition in two related lawsuits, Shipley v. Williams, et al., No. 1:24-cv-766-RLY-MJD, and 

Moore v. Williams, et al., No. 1:25-cv-96-RLY-MJD, and those past subpoenas led to unspecified 
discussions of the parties' respective positions.  [Filing No. 56, at ECF p. 6.]  However, the briefing 
fails  to  set  forth  any  substance  of  those  past  discussions  or  otherwise  conform  with  the 
requirements of Local Rule 37-1 or Federal Rule 26(c)(1).  Due to non-compliance with those 
rules, the Court denies Crane's motion to quash subpoena and for entry of protective order.  [Filing 
No. 47.]                                                                  
Pushing past these procedural defects, the Court provides insight into some substantive 
issues raised by the parties.  Although Crane is a judge, he is also a party to this lawsuit.  Judges, 
like presidents and other high-ranking officials, are not immune from discovery and may be 
required to sit for depositions.  See Trump v. Vance, 591 U.S. 786, 810-11 (2020) (requiring 
President Trump to produce records in response to a subpoena); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 
704-5 (1997) (discussing several examples of past presidents' compliance with discovery requests 
and depositions and allowing a civil case to proceed that required President Clinton to sit for a 

deposition); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714 (1974) (requiring President Nixon to 
produce evidence in response to a subpoena); In re A Subpoena to Testify at A Deposition in A Civ. 
Action Addressed to the Hon. Kirstjen Nielsen, 713 F. Supp. 3d 589, 595 (N.D. Ca. Jan. 24, 2024) 
(requiring the Secretary of Homeland Security to sit for a deposition).  While courts have precluded 
judges from testifying about the mental processes behind their judicial decisions, judges are not 
otherwise entitled to special protections from discovery, especially when they are parties to 
lawsuits.  See In re Cook, 49 F.3d 263, 265 (7th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that judges may not be 
compelled to testify about their judicial deliberations or rationale).    
 Furthermore, the risk that an attorney might ask a deponent about privileged or irrelevant 
information is not a sufficient basis for barring a deposition.  Attorneys routinely handle issues that 

arise during depositions—such as privilege, work product, and other improper questions—by 
raising objections during depositions and, when appropriate, advising their clients not to answer.  
See Donald v. Outlaw, No. 2:17-cv-32-TLS-JPK, 2019 WL 3335031, at *2 (N.D. Ind. July 24, 
2019)  ("[R]egarding  matters  of  privilege,  instead  of  disallowing  a  deposition,  '[t]he  more 
appropriate method is to allow the deposition to be taken and permit the attorney to claim privilege 
in the face of certain questions, if necessary.'").  Moreover, Local Rule 37-1(a) permits parties to 
recess a deposition and contact the magistrate judge's chambers when an objection raised during a 
deposition threatens to prevent the completion of the deposition.         
 The Court expects the parties to comply with Federal Rule 26(c)(1) and Local Rule 37-1 
when handling future discovery disputes, including any such disputes remaining regarding the 
requested deposition of Crane.  Crane's motion to quash subpoena and for entry of protective order 
[Filing No. 47] is denied. 
 Date:  5/30/2025 

                           ul Sh 
                         Tim A. Baker 
                         United States Magistrate Judge 
                         Southern District of Indiana 
Distribution: 
All ECF-registered counsel of record via email