Marvin Rodney Pitman v. First Presbyterian Church of San Mateo, et al.

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MARVIN RODNEY PITMAN, Case No. 24-cv-02852-SI 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 9 v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 10 FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF SAN MATEO, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 51 11 Defendants. 12 13 Plaintiff Marvin Rodney Pitman filed this lawsuit against The First Presbyterian Church of 14 San Mateo (“the Church”) and Shannon Pappas, the Pastor and Head of Staff at the Church. Dkt. 15 No. 1. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims. Dkt. No. 51. For 16 the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion. 17 18 BACKGROUND 19 I. Events Preceding Plaintiff’s February 17, 2023 Phone Call 20 From approximately 1972 until 1990, plaintiff’s father was Pastor at the Church. Dkt. No. 21 51-2 (“Pappas Decl.”) ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 51-3, Ex. D (“Pl. Dep.”) at 46:13-19. Plaintiff alleges that after 22 his father’s health deteriorated, a member of the Church married his father and exerted influence to 23 alter his father’s estate plans to her benefit. Dkt. No. 56 (“Opp.”) at 4. Plaintiff became concerned 24 that his father was vulnerable to elder abuse. Id. In 2015, plaintiff communicated with Shannon 25 Pappas, Pastor of the Church. Id.; Dkt. No. 51-3, Ex. E (“Pappas Dep.”) at 11:25-12:7.1 Plaintiff 26 27 1 The parties attached overlapping and distinct portions of the following individuals’ 1 also alleges that his father’s new wife prevented plaintiff from having contact with his father and 2 excluded plaintiff from his father’s memorial service in 2022. Opp. at 4. 3 4 II. The February 17, 2023 Phone Call 5 Plaintiff acknowledges that on February 17, 2023, he telephoned Pastor Pappas in a “roiling 6 of emotional outrage.” Opp. at 4; Pl. Dep. at 65:8-12. The parties’ descriptions of the phone call 7 vary slightly. 8 Plaintiff describes the conversation as a “dramatic and histrionic rant” during which plaintiff 9 “demanded that the church be held to account for what he perceived to be complicity in the abuse 10 and demise of his father, either by legal action (mentioning attorneys) or divine retribution 11 (referencing Jesus, the devil and purgatory).” Opp. at 4. Plaintiff admits that during this phone call 12 he asked Pastor Pappas for the addresses of prior pastors and became frustrated when he did not get 13 the information he requested. Dkt. No. 51-3, Ex. A (“Pl. Ans. RFAs”) Nos. 7, 8. Plaintiff also 14 acknowledges that he raised his voice during the conversation. Pl. Dep. at 75: 20-22. Plaintiff does 15 not dispute that he described a devil with a pitchfork to Pastor Pappas but states that he did so in a 16 joking manner. Pl. Ans. RFAs Nos. 1, 2; Pl. Dep. at 74:9-75:7. Plaintiff also denies ever physically 17 threatening Pastor Pappas. Opp. at 4. 18 Pastor Pappas similarly describes a 45-minute2 phone conversation during which plaintiff 19 expressed his anger at the Church and demanded personal contact information of Church leadership. 20 Pappas Decl. ¶¶ 4-5. According to Pastor Pappas, when he refused to provide plaintiff with the 21 requested information, plaintiff became angry and stated, “if you do not help me, things will not go 22 well for you.” Pappas Dep. at 137:18-138:1; Pappas Decl. ¶ 4.3 Pastor Pappas did not perceive 23 plaintiff’s statements about the devil and using a pitchfork as lighthearted or joking. Pappas Dep. 24 at 147:22-153:20. Plaintiff also mentioned that he had been watching Pastor Pappas’s sermons on 25 YouTube, which was unsettling to Pastor Pappas. Id. at 135:24-136:15. Pastor Pappas described 26 2 Plaintiff estimated that the phone call with Pastor Pappas lasted less than thirty minutes. 27 Pl. Dep. at 65:13-19. 1 the tone of the conversation as “ominous” and “borderline threatening.” Pappas Decl. ¶ 5. 2 During the phone call, Pastor Pappas sent a text message to a now deceased Church Elder, 3 stating that he was scared for his safety. Pappas Decl. ¶ 5; Dkt. No. 51-2, Ex. A (“Feb. 17, 2023 4 Text Messages”). Shortly after the phone call, Pastor Pappas sent a summary of the conversation 5 with plaintiff to members of the Church leadership, again expressing concerns about safety. Pappas 6 Decl. ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 51-2, Ex. B (“Feb. 17, 2023 Email”). Church Elder John Tastor directed Pastor 7 Pappas to report the conversation to the police because he was concerned there was a potential for 8 violence. Dkt. No. 51-3, Ex. C (“Tastor Dep.”) at 32:3-33:9, 49:21-50:7, 54:8-55:4. 9 10 IIII. The February 20, 2023 Police Report 11 On February 20, 2023, Pastor Pappas reported the incident to the San Mateo Police 12 Department, as directed by Church leadership. Pappas Decl. ¶ 7, Dkt. No. 56-1; Ex. 2b (“Police 13 Incident Report”). Pastor Pappas described the phone call to the San Mateo police, explaining that 14 he was unsettled by the call, but that he “no longer felt that plaintiff was an immediate threat, at 15 least not to the degree [he] had felt three days earlier.” Pappas Decl. ¶ 8. Pastor Pappas noted to 16 police that he wanted to make sure there was a record of the incident for documentation purposes. 17 Dkt. No. 56-1, Ex. 2a (“Garcia Dep.”) at 54:9-15. Plaintiff was contacted by Officer Garcia and the 18 Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC) was notified to conduct a threat 19 assessment. Garcia Dep.; Police Incident Report. 20 21 IV. Procedural Background 22 On May 11, 2024, plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the Church and Pastor Pappas. Dkt. No. 23 1. Defendants answered on June 14, 2024. Dkt. No. 17. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint, 24 which defendants answered. Dkt. Nos. 28 (“Am. Compl.”), 32. Plaintiff asserts two claims: (1) 25 intentional infliction of emotional distress by both defendants, and (2) aiding and abetting of Pastor 26 Pappas by the Church. Defendants filed the present motion for summary judgment on September 27 8, 2025. Dkt. No. 51 (“Mot.”) Plaintiff responded on September 22, 2025, and defendants filed a 1 reply on September 30, 2025. Opp.; Dkt. No. 60.4 2 3 LEGAL STANDARD 4 Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, 5 and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant 6 is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those which 7 may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 8 The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material 9 fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party, however, has no burden 10 to disprove matters on which the non-moving party will have the burden of proof at trial. The 11 moving party need only demonstrate to the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support the 12 non-moving party’s case. Id. at 325. 13 Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to 14 “designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting then 15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). To carry this burden, the non-moving party must “do more than simply show 16 that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. 17 Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . 18 will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the 19 [nonmoving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. 20 In deciding a summary judgment motion, the Court must view the evidence in the light most 21 favorable to the non-moving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 255. 22 “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences 23 from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for summary judgment 24 . . . .” Id. However, conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient 25 to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Gen. 26 4 Plaintiff requested to substitute attorney and proceed pro se on September 16, 2025, shortly 27 before the opposition to defendants’ motion was due. Dkt. No. 53. The Court held a status 1 Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). The evidence the parties present must be 2 admissible. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 3 4 DISCUSSION 5 I. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 6 A cause of action for IIED requires proof of: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the 7 defendant with the intention of causing, or in reckless disregard of the probability of causing, 8 emotional distress, (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress, and (3) the 9 defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the severe 10 emotional distress. Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 903 (1991). A defendant’s 11 conduct is considered outrageous if it is “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated 12 in a civilized community.” Id. (quoting Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 209 13 (1982)). Liability for emotional distress “does not extend to ‘mere insults, indignities, threats, 14 annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.’” Cochran v. Cochran, 65 Cal. App. 4th 488, 15 494 (1998) (quoting Rest. 2d Torts, § 46, com. d). “Severe emotional distress means . . . emotional 16 distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society 17 should be expected to endure it.” Fletcher v. Western Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 397 18 (1970). 19 Defendants contend that plaintiff has not met his burden to present sufficient evidence on 20 two elements of his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress: first, that Pastor Pappas’s 21 action was extreme and outrageous, and second, that plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress. 22 Mot. at 5. 23 As to the first element of his IIED claim, Plaintiff alleges that Pastor Pappas’ conduct in 24 reporting his February 17, 2023 phone call to the police “was outrageous and demonstrated his 25 complete disregard for plaintiff.” Am. Compl. ¶ 11. However, plaintiff presents no evidence to 26 suggest that reporting the phone call to police was an outrageous action. It is undisputed that 27 plaintiff excoriated Pastor Pappas during a hostile phone call on February 17, 2023. Opp. at 4. It is 1 to be complicity in his father’s elder abuse, threatening legal action and divine retribution. Id. 2 Plaintiff does not provide any evidence to suggest that what Pastor Pappas subsequently reported to 3 the police was offensive or false, let alone outrageous. Responding to an unsettling phone call by 4 notifying the police, even if unreasonable, is certainly not so extreme or outrageous as to exceed all 5 bounds of that tolerated in a civilized society. 6 Plaintiff points to only one case to suggest otherwise. In Crouch v. Trinity Christian Center 7 of Santa Ana, Inc., the Court of Appeal held that berating a 13-year-old rape victim that the assault 8 was her fault was extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to recover for IIED. 39 Cal. App. 5th 9 995, 1007-08 (2019). The court emphasized that defendant’s conduct was “made all the more 10 outrageous by her knowledge of [the victim’s] plight.” Id. at 1008. (“The extreme and outrageous 11 character of the conduct may arise from the actor’s knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible 12 to emotional distress, by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity. The conduct 13 may become heartless, flagrant, and outrageous when the actor proceeds in the face of such 14 knowledge[.]”) (quoting Rest. 2d Torts § 46, com. f). Here, plaintiff argues that Pastor Pappas and 15 the Church knew that plaintiff was vulnerable due the issues surrounding his father’s death and that 16 making the police report was therefore outrageous. Opp. at 7. However, this is a conclusory 17 statement for which plaintiff provides no evidence. Furthermore, in Crouch both the vulnerability 18 of the plaintiff and the defendant’s action were far more extreme than in the present case. Therefore, 19 Crouch is inapposite. 20 Plaintiff’s opposition also argues that there are triable issues of fact regarding whether Mr. 21 Pitman’s phone call to Pastor Pappas constituted a physical threat and whether the filing of a police 22 report three days after the phone call was for insurance purposes. Opp. at 5. However, a fact is 23 “material” only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson, 477 24 U.S. at 248-49. Factual disputes that are “irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. 25 Here, even assuming that plaintiff did not threaten Pastor Pappas during the February 17, 2023 26 phone call and that Pastor Pappas filed the police report to limit the church’s liability, no reasonable 27 jury could find Pastor Pappas’ action to be extreme and outrageous. 1 protective measure to ensure coverage against speculative harm,” plaintiff also argues that it can be 2 “reasonably inferred from the circumstances that the police report was intended to discredit and 3 intimidate” plaintiff. Opp. at 4. Plaintiff presents no evidence of defendants’ alleged intent to 4 discredit or intimidate. This is merely a conclusory conjecture.5 5 Therefore, the Court find that no reasonable jury could find intentional infliction of 6 emotional distress and GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 7 8 II. Aiding and Abetting 9 California has adopted the common law rule for subjecting a defendant to liability for aiding 10 and abetting a tort. Casey v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 127 Cal. App. 4th 1138, 1144 (2005). “Liability may 11 . . . be imposed on one who aids and abets the commission of an intentional tort if the person (a) 12 knows the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or 13 encouragement to the other to so act or (b) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing 14 a tortious result and the person’s own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty 15 to the third person.” Id. 16 Plaintiff alleges that the Church aided and abetted Pastor Pappas because leaders of the 17 Church counseled Pastor Pappas to make the police report. Am. Compl. ¶ 18. Defendants argue 18 that the claim fails as a matter of law because there is no evidence that the police report was 19 wrongful, and therefore there is no underlying tortious activity that the Church could have aided and 20 abetted. Mot. at 8. The Court agrees and GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 21 22 23 5 As to the second element of his IIED claim, plaintiff relies on an expert examination conducted on August 8 and August 9 (or perhaps on August 11), 2025 to argue that there is a triable 24 issue of fact as to whether plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress due to the police report. Opp. 25 at 7-8; Dkt. No. 56-1, Ex. 4 (“Expert Report”). The Court finds the expert report to be irregular and of dubious value. With this said, even if the police report Pastor Pappas made did cause plaintiff to 26 suffer extreme emotional distress, plaintiff’s IIED claim would still fail because there is no evidence whatsoever of extreme and outrageous conduct. “Summary judgment is proper if a claim cannot 27 reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery.” Schneider v. TRW, 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’ 3 motion for summary judgment. 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 || Dated: October 21, 2025 Site WU tee 7 ceNeae™ eee SUSAN ILLSTON 8 United States District Judge 9 10 11 a 12 15 16 it Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28