Maynor v. USA 2255

[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"11127882","type":"100trialcourt","part":"other","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                          
                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND                             

MARLAND MAYNOR,                  *                                         

    Petitioner,                 *                                         

        v.                      *       Criminal Action No. RDB-17-280    
                                        Civil Action No. RDB-24-3181      
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,        *                                         

        Respondent.                                            *          

  *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *         *           
                     MEMORANDUM OPINION                                   
     On  August 8, 2018,  a  jury  convicted  Petitioner  Marland  Maynor  (“Petitioner”  or 
“Maynor”) of one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of
18 
U.S.C. § 922
(g)(1).  (ECF No. 106.)  On November 13, 2018, this Court sentenced Maynor 
under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”),
18 U.S.C. § 924
(e), to the mandatory 
minimum term of 180 months’ imprisonment, with credit for time served in federal custody 
since June 12, 2017, to be followed by five years of supervised release.  (ECF No. 130 at 2–3.)  
Maynor appealed, challenging the ACCA enhancement, and the  United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.  United States v. Maynor,
776 F. App’x 126
(4th Cir. 
2019) (per curiam).  Maynor then petitioned for a rehearing, arguing in part that he was entitled 
to relief under Rehaif v. United States,
588 U.S. 225
(2019).  While the Fourth Circuit granted 
that petition, United States v. Maynor,
826 F. App’x 287
(4th Cir. 2020), the Supreme Court 
subsequently issued its decision in Greer v. United States,
593 U.S. 503
(2021), which foreclosed 
Maynor’s Rehaif claim.  Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Maynor’s sentence.  United 
States v. Maynor, No. 18-4835,
2023 WL 4181229
(4th Cir. June 26, 2023) (per curiam), cert. 
denied,
144 S. Ct. 238
(2023).                                            
    Maynor has subsequently filed numerous pro se motions seeking miscellaneous forms 

of post-conviction relief, including a pro se Motion for Compassionate Release, (ECF No. 159), 
which this Court denied, (ECF No. 163).  Presently pending before this Court is Maynor’s pro 
se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255
(Ҥ 2255 
Motion”) (ECF Nos. 177; 178),1 along with three other pro se motions: a Motion for Relief for 
Evidentiary Hearing and Reopen Hearings Held from Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 60(d)(3) (“Rule 60(d)(3) Motion”) (ECF No. 176); a Motion to Conduct Discovery (ECF 

No. 179); and a Motion for Entry of Default (ECF No. 181).                
    The Government responded in opposition of Petitioner’s § 2255 Motion (ECF No. 
185), and Maynor replied (ECF No. 186).  While the Government has not responded to 
Petitioner’s additional pending motions (ECF Nos. 176; 179; 181), the Court finds that a 
response is not necessary.  The Court has reviewed the relevant filings and finds that a hearing 
is not necessary.  See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2023).  For the reasons that follow, Maynor’s 

Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255
(ECF Nos. 
177; 178) is DENIED; his Motion for Relief for Evidentiary Hearing and Reopen Hearings 
Held from Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3) (ECF No. 176) is DENIED; his 
Motion to Conduct Discovery (ECF No. 179) is DENIED AS MOOT; and his Motion for 
Entry of Default (ECF No. 181) is DENIED AS MOOT.                         



1 This Court considers ECF Nos. 177 and 178 to comprise the § 2255 Motion.  
                         BACKGROUND                                      
 I.   The Offense of Conviction.                                         
    A summary of the evidence adduced during Maynor’s three-day trial in August 2018 
follows.  (ECF Nos. 138, 139, 140.)  At approximately 11:00 PM on November 26, 2016, 

Baltimore Police Department officers had been watching the 500 block of Normandy Avenue 
in Baltimore when they observed a man, later identified as Maynor, enter the block and 
approach another man standing in the road.  One of the officers had taken a covert position 
and had a clear view of Maynor and the man as they conversed, and from that vantage, the 
officer observed Maynor lift the side of his hoodie, exposing what the officer recognized as 
the brown grip of a handgun.                                              

    The officer alerted the three officers working with him, who then approached Maynor.  
One officer started to speak to Maynor and signaled him to put his hands up, while two other 
officers approached him from both sides.  After one of the approaching officers raised 
Maynor’s hands over his head, another officer was able to see the handle of the firearm under 
the hooded sweatshirt, at which point a loaded revolver was recovered.  Maynor resisted the 

officers’ attempts to put him in handcuffs and made several statements to officers as they 
continued to try and secure his hands.  At trial, Maynor elected to testify and claimed that he 
did not have the gun and that he believes the gun was planted by the officers. 
 II.  Procedural History.                                                
    On  May 23, 2017,  Maynor  was  charged  as  the  sole  defendant  in  a  single-count 
indictment for Felon in Possession of a Firearm related to the November 26, 2016 incident, 
in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922
(g)(1) (“Count I”).  (ECF No. 1.)  Before proceeding to trial, 
Maynor filed two separate motions to suppress.  (See ECF Nos. 18; 19.)  More specifically, 
Maynor moved to suppress his post-arrest statements, claiming he was not given proper 
warnings under Miranda v. Arizona,
440 U.S. 934
(1996), in violation of his Fifth Amendment 

rights.  (ECF No. 18.)  Additionally, Maynor moved to suppress evidence of the firearm, 
alleging that law enforcement officers lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop 
and arrest him.  (ECF No. 19.)  Following a hearing on February 6, 2018, this Court denied 
both motions.  (See ECF No. 66.)                                          
    The case subsequently proceeded to a jury trial, commencing on August 6, 2018, with 
Maynor stipulating to a prior qualifying conviction and his status as a prohibited person.2  

(ECF No. 93.)  The Government produced several pieces of evidence in support of their case, 
including testimony from officers at the scene, recordings of the arrest, and subsequent 
statements made by officers and Maynor himself.  (ECF Nos. 138; 139; 140.)  The defense 
called a private investigator and recalled one of the arresting officers, and Maynor also elected 
to testify.  (ECF Nos. 138; 139; 140.)  On August 8, 2018, after a three-day trial, a jury found 
Maynor guilty of Count I of the indictment.  (ECF No. 106.)               

    On  November 13, 2018,  this  Court  sentenced  Maynor  under  the  Armed  Career 
Criminal  Act,
18  U.S.C.  § 924
(e),3  to  the  mandatory  minimum  term  of  180  months’ 

2 To sustain a conviction for a violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922
(g)(1), the government must prove, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant “knowingly”: (1) belonged to one of the nine categories of individuals 
prohibited from possessing a firearm or ammunition; (2) the defendant knowingly possessed, transported, 
shipped, or received the firearm; and (3) the possession was in or affecting commerce, because the firearm had 
traveled in interstate or foreign commerce at some point during its existence.  Here, Maynor stipulated to the 
fact of a prior felony conviction.  Under Old Chief v. United States,
519 U.S. 172
(1997), when a defendant offers 
to stipulate to the fact of a prior felony conviction, further proof of the nature of that conviction becomes 
irrelevant and should be excluded.
Id. at 185
.                           
3 The Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 mandates that a defendant who violates § 922(g) and has three 
previous convictions for either violent felonies or serious drug offenses “shall be fined under this title and 
imprisoned not less than fifteen years, and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not 
imprisonment, with credit for time served in federal custody since June 12, 2017, to be 
followed by five years of supervised release.  (ECF No. 130 at 2–3.)      
    Maynor appealed, challenging the ACCA enhancement.  As relevant background, the 

Presentence Report (“PSR”) specified that Maynor had three or more prior convictions for 
violent felonies or serious drug offenses, including a 2009 “serious drug offense” conviction 
for Distribution of Cocaine in the Circuit Court of Maryland for Baltimore City.  (ECF No. 
129 *SEALED* ¶¶ 34–61, 40).  On appeal, Maynor argued, and continues to maintain, that 
this 2009 conviction was incorrectly cited in the PSR as a distribution-related offense when it 
was in fact for simple possession.  (ECF No. 178 at 2, 3–4.)  The Fourth Circuit affirmed.  

United States v. Maynor,
776 F. App’x 126
(4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).  In brief, the Fourth 
Circuit explained that this Court “was entitled to rely on the PSR, and the court’s finding that 
Maynor’s prior conviction was for distribution of cocaine, rather than possession, is not clearly 
erroneous.”  (ECF No. 151 at 2–3.)  The Fourth Circuit further explained that Maynor failed 
to satisfy his affirmative duty and explain why the PSR’s description lacked “sufficient indicia 
of reliability.”  (Id.)                                                   

    Maynor then petitioned for a rehearing, arguing in part that he was entitled to relief 
under Rehaif v. United States,
588 U.S. 225
(2019).  While the Fourth Circuit granted that 
petition,  United  States  v.  Maynor,
826  F.  App’x  287
(4th  Cir.  2020),  the  Supreme  Court 
subsequently issued its decision in Greer v. United States,
593 U.S. 503
(2021), which foreclosed 
Maynor’s Rehaif claim.  Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Maynor’s sentence.  United 


suspend the sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence to, such person with respect to the conviction under 
section 922(g).”
18 U.S.C. § 924
(e).                                     
States v. Maynor, No. 18-4835,
2023 WL 4181229
(4th Cir. June 26, 2023) (per curiam), cert. 
denied,
144 S. Ct. 238
(2023).                                            
    Maynor continues to challenge his sentence on various bases.  On June 11, 2020, 

Maynor filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255
, 
in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif.  (ECF No. 155.)  This Court dismissed 
Maynor’s motion after he failed to respond to a show cause order.  (ECF Nos. 168; 169.)  
After Maynor appealed, the Fourth Circuit once again affirmed this Court’s decision.  (ECF 
No. 170.)  Maynor also filed a pro se Motion for Compassionate Release, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582
(c)(1)(A)(i) (ECF No. 159), which was denied by this Court.  (ECF No. 163.)  

    Maynor has four pro se motions presently pending before this Court. (See ECF Nos. 
176; 177; 178; 179; 181.)  In the order filed, presently pending is Maynor’s Motion for Relief 
for Evidentiary Hearing and Reopen Hearings Held from Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(d)(3) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (ECF No. 176); a second § 2255 Motion (ECF Nos. 
177; 178); a Motion to Conduct Discovery (ECF No. 179); and a Motion for Entry of Default 
(ECF No. 181).  The Government responded in opposition to Maynor’s § 2255 Motion, (ECF 

No. 185), and Maynor replied, (ECF No. 186).  Maynor’s motions are now ripe for review.   
                     STANDARD OF REVIEW                                  
    As Maynor has filed his Motion pro se, his Motion will be “liberally construed” and 
“held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”  Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (citation omitted).  For the purposes of this Memorandum Opinion, 
this Court will first discuss the standard of review for a § 2255 Motion before addressing the 

standard of review for a Rule 60(d)(3) Motion.                            
 I.   § 2255 Motion.                                                     
    Under
28 U.S.C. § 2255
, a prisoner in custody may seek to vacate, set aside or correct 
his sentence where: (1) “the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of 
the United States;” (2) “the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence;” (3) “the 

sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law;” or (4) the sentence is “otherwise 
subject to collateral attack.”
28 U.S.C. § 2255
(a).  “[A]n error of law does not provide a basis 
for  collateral  attack  unless  the  claimed  error  constituted  ‘a  fundamental  defect  which 
inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’”  United States v. Addonizio,
442 U.S. 178, 
185
(1979) (quoting Hill v. United States,
368 U.S. 424, 428
(1962)).     
 II.  Rule 60(d)(3) Motion.                                              

    Rule 60 permits relief from a judgment or order of this court to correct clerical 
mistakes, oversights, and omissions.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a).  A party may also be granted relief 
from judgment on motion for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not 
have  been  discovered  in  time  to  move  for  a  new  trial  under  Rule 59(b);  (3)  fraud, 
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the 

judgment has been satisfied, release or discharged; (6) any other reason that justifies relief.  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).  Furthermore, cited to by the Petitioner in the present case, the “savings 
clause” in Rule 60(d)(3) provides that, “[t]his rule does not limit a court’s power to . . . (3) set 
aside a  judgment for fraud on the court.”   Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3).  A motion under 
Rule 60(d)(3) requires a party to meet a very high standard, involving “corruption of the 
judicial process itself.”  Fox v. Elk Run,
739 F.3d 131, 136
(4th Cir. 2014).  
                           ANALYSIS                                      
 This Court first addresses Maynor’s § 2255 Motion before discussing his Rule 60(d)(3) 
Motion (ECF No. 176), Motion to Conduct Discovery (ECF No. 179), and Motion for Entry 

of Default (ECF No. 181).                                                 
 I.   § 2255 Motion.                                                     
    It is well-settled that a § 2255 motion is not a means to circumvent a proper ruling on 
appeal.  United States v. Dyess,
730 F.3d 354, 360
(4th Cir. 2013).  A § 2255 motion does not 
enable the defendant to “recast, under the guise of collateral attack, questions fully considered 
by [the Circuit Court on direct appeal].”  Boeckenhaupt v. United States,
537 F.2d 1182, 1183
(4th 
Cir. 1976).  Furthermore, as a general rule, “claims not raised on direct appeal may not be 

raised on collateral review.”  Massaro v. United States,
538 U.S. 500, 504
(2003).  However, an 
exception to this rule applies where a petitioner demonstrates both “cause” and “actual 
prejudice.”  Bousley v. United States,
523 U.S. 614, 622
(1998).          
    Maynor appears to advance five arguments in support of his § 2255 Motion.4 The 
arguments are as follows:                                                 
    1.   Petitioner advances several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
    such  as:  (a)  failure  to  properly  challenge  the  credibility  of  a  Government 
    witness—specifically, the police officer who first reported seeing Maynor with 
    the firearm; (b) failure to challenge the presentencing report’s description of 
    Petitioner’s 2009 conviction; (c) failure to raise a Rogers5 error; and (d) failure to 
    challenge stipulated facts in the proposed plea bargain;             

4 This Court considers the arguments set forth in Petitioner’s § 2255 Motion (ECF Nos. 177; 178). 
5 In United States v. Rogers,
961 F.3d 291
(4th Cir. 2020), the district court included 22 discretionary conditions 
of supervised release—which were in a Standing Order in effect in that District, but which had not been orally 
pronounced or incorporated by reference at the sentencing hearing—to the written judgment.  In reversing and 
remanding for resentencing, the Fourth Circuit held: (1) that discretionary (“nonmandatory”) conditions of 
supervised release must be orally pronounced at sentencing,
id.
at 295–99; and (2) while the court could have 
    2.   Petitioner asserts that this Court improperly suppressed impeachment 
    material regarding the police officer who first reported seeing Maynor with the 
    firearm;                                                             
    3.   Petitioner claims that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights, 
    contending law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk him 
    pursuant to Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1
(1968);                        
    4.   Petitioner  argues  that  this  Court  erred  in  admitting  his  post-arrest 
    statements as he was not given proper warnings under Miranda v. Arizona,
440 
    U.S. 934
(1996), in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights; and     
    5.   Petitioner  asserts  that  the  Court’s  imposition  of  the  conditions  of 
    supervised release constituted an error under the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
    United States v. Rogers,
961 F.3d 291
(4th Cir. 2020).               
As explained in detail below, this Court concludes that Maynor’s various § 2255 arguments are 
unavailing.  While Maynor may assert ineffective assistance of counsel claims for the first time 
on collateral review, these claims fail because he has not shown that his counsel’s performance 
was deficient under the Strickland6 standard, let alone any prejudice resulting therefrom.  The 
remainder of Maynor’s claims are procedurally-barred because Petitioner failed to raise them 
on direct appeal and is now unable show cause and actual prejudice, or actual innocence.  
 A. Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.                         
    A freestanding claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be asserted for 
the first time in a § 2255 petition.  United States v. DeFusco,
949 F.2d 114
, 120–21 (4th Cir. 1991).  
In order to successfully challenge a sentence of imprisonment under
28 U.S.C. § 2255
based 
on a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must satisfy the 
two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668
, 687–88 (1984).  First, the 

simply incorporated the conditions by reference, the “fact [that he] did not incorporate the Standing Order into 
[the defendant’s] oral sentence” was reversible error.
Id.
at 295–301 (emphasis in original).  
6 Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668
(1984).                          
petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was not “within the range of competence 
normally demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,” and was “below an objective standard of 
reasonableness,” measured by “prevailing professional norms.”
Id.
“Keenly aware of the 

difficulties inherent in evaluating counsel’s performance, the Supreme Court has admonished 
that courts ‘must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance.’”  Lawrence v. Branker,
517 F.3d 700, 708
(4th Cir. 
2008) (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689
).                              
    Second, the petitioner must show that counsel’s deficient performance “prejudiced 
[his] defense.”  Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687
.  To satisfy the “prejudice prong,” a petitioner must 

show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Id. at 697
; see Lockhart v. Fretwell,
506 U.S. 
364, 369
(1993) (stating that, under the second prong, the petitioner must prove that the “result 
of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable”).  A court may determine whether 
prejudice has been shown before judging counsel’s conduct for deficiencies.  Indeed, “[i]f it is 
easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, that 

course should be followed.”  Strickland,
466 U.S. at 670
.                 
    In this case, Maynor is not entitled to relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel, 
as he fails to clear either prong of the Strickland test.  His claims cannot overcome the “strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance,” Yarbrough v. Johnson,
520 F.3d 329, 337
(4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. 
at 689
) (internal quotations omitted), and he has wholly failed to show prejudice. 
 1.  Failure to Properly Challenge Law Enforcement Officer’s Credibility.  
    Maynor argues that he was never in possession of the gun in question, and he alleges 
that the police officer who first observed the gun—who was later the Government’s “star 

witness”—lied about seeing a weapon on the Petitioner’s person.  (ECF No. 129 ¶ 16.)  
Maynor contends that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to challenge the 
police officer’s credibility.  (ECF No. 178 at 33.)  Specifically, Petitioner claims that during the 
trial, his counsel failed to properly question the witness on recent Internal Affairs Division 
(“IAD”) investigations into his conduct.  (Id.)                           
    This allegation is contradicted by a review of the record.  (See ECF No. 138 at 36.)  

During trial, Maynor’s counsel cross-examined the officer and questioned him on being the 
subject of an IAD investigation on false arrest. (Id. at 36:7–9.)  While Maynor takes issue with 
the shortness of counsel’s questioning on this topic, this is not enough to show that counsel’s 
assistance was ineffective in any way.  See United States v. Mason,
774 F.3d 824, 828
(4th Cir. 
2014) (“Attorneys need not raise every possible claim to meet the constitutional standards of 
effectiveness.  They are permitted to set priorities, determine trial strategy, and press those 

claims with the greatest chances of success.”)  Consequently, Maynor fails to satisfy the two 
prongs of the Strickland test: counsel’s conduct did not fall outside the range of reasonable 
professional assistance, and thus Petitioner is unable to demonstrate that but for these 
unprofessional errors, the outcome of his case would have been different.  
 2.  Failure to Challenge Prior 2009 Conviction.                         
    Maynor also claims counsel was ineffective with respect to his being sentenced as an 

Armed Career Criminal pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 924
(e).  (ECF No. 178 at 36–38, ECF No. 
186 at 4–5.)  Maynor argues that his counsel failed to challenge the PSR’s description of his 
2009 prior conviction as a “serious drug offense” of distribution rather than a reduced charge 
of simple possession.  This led to Maynor receiving an enhanced sentence equal to the 

mandatory minimum term of 15 years’ imprisonment under § 924(e).  (ECF No. 178 at 36–
37; ECF No. 130 at 2.)  The basis for this objection is that Maynor’s four-year sentence for 
this prior conviction was consistent with the statutory maximum for simple possession of 
cocaine under Maryland law.  (ECF No. 178 at 38.)                         
    Maynor fails to meet either prong of the Strickland test with respect to this allegation.  
First and foremost, on appeal, counsel challenged the PSR’s description on the same ground 

that Maynor presently attempts to relitigate his § 2255 Motion.  See Maynor, 776 F. App’x at 
126–27.  This argument was rejected by the Fourth Circuit on appeal.  See id. at 127 (“[T]he 
fact that Maynor received a sentence that is consistent with a conviction for simple possession, 
and that is not inconsistent with a conviction for distribution, does not satisfy Maynor’s 
affirmative  duty  to  establish  that  the  PSR  incorrectly  described  his  prior  conviction.”).  
Counsel set forth this argument despite Petitioner’s own testimony at trial where Maynor 

admitted that he was convicted of distribution of cocaine during cross-examination.  (ECF 
No. 139 at 116:23–25.)  This “serious drug offense” conviction, coupled with Maynor’s prior 
convictions for violent felonies and serious drug offenses (see e.g., ECF No. 129 *SEALED* ¶ 
36–38), subjected Maynor to a sentence enhancement under § 924(e) for the offense of 
conviction.    Thus,  with  respect  to  this  claim,  the  record  clearly  shows  that  counsel’s 
performance was in no way deficient.                                      
 3.  Failure to Raise a   Error.                                         
    Maynor asserts that he received ineffective counsel as his attorney failed to raise a Rogers 
error on his behalf.  (ECF No. 178 at 38.)  Maynor claims that he was not allowed to have 

legal papers at the jail, and that he did not have a copy of the written judgment while 
represented by appellate counsel, which is why he was unable to raise this error to the court 
himself.  (ECF No. 178 at 38.)  Petitioner, however, fails to demonstrate that the district court 
committed a Rogers error in the first place, therefore his argument is without merit.7  As such, 
Maynor fails to satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test.  See Mason, 774 F.3d at 828–29 
(“Effective assistance of appellate counsel ‘does not require the presentation of all issues on 

appeal that may have merit.’”) (quoting Lawrence v. Branker,
571 F.3d 700
, 709 (4th Cir. 2008)).   
 4.  Failure to Challenge Stipulated Facts of Proposed Plea Bargain.     
    Lastly, Maynor raises a claim of ineffective assistance on the basis that counsel failed 
to challenge the stipulated facts of a potential plea bargain wherein the Government allegedly 
offered him 10 years (or 120 months) if he pled guilty to possession of a stolen firearm, in 
violation,
18 U.S.C. § 922
(j).  (ECF No. 178-1 at 37.)  To be clear, Maynor was charged as a 

felon in possession, (ECF No. 1)—not possession of a stolen firearm, and
18 U.S.C. § 922
(g) 
and § 922(j) are distinct, though it is possible, as Maynor suggests, that the Government 
offered to file a superseding indictment charging him with possession of a stolen firearm, in 
violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922
(j), in exchange for his plea.  In short, the crux of Maynor’s 
challenge to this alleged plea offer—or rather, his challenge to his counsel’s handling of this 
plea offer—is that “the firearm was in fact registered and legal and not stolen,” and that his 


7 Maynor’s argument that the district court committed a Rogers error is discussed in more detail below.  
counsel’s refusal to contest these facts “forced Defendant to go to trial.”  (ECF No. 178-1 at 
37.)  He further faults his appellate counsel for not raising this argument on appeal.  (Id.)  
Simply stated, Maynor’s theory fails to satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test, as he cannot 

overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance,” Yarbrough,
520 F.3d at 337
(quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 
689
) (internal quotations omitted), nor can he satisfy the prejudice prong.   
 B. Procedurally-Barred Claims.                                          
    In addition to his various claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Maynor advances 
a variety of new claims.  Specifically, he claims alleged suppression of impeachment material, 

lack  of  reasonable  suspicion,  improper  Miranda  warnings  and  admission  of  post-arrest 
statements, and an alleged Rogers error.  As noted above, it is well-settled that a § 2255 motion 
is not a vehicle to circumvent a proper ruling on appeal, United States v. Dyess,
730 F.3d 354, 
360
(4th Cir. 2013), and a defendant will not “be allowed to recast, under the guise of collateral 
attack, questions fully considered by [the Circuit Court on direct appeal].”  Boeckenhaupt v. 
United States,
537 F.2d 1182, 1183
(4th Cir. 1976) (citing Herman v. United States,
227 F.2d 332
(4th Cir. 1955)).                                                         
    Additionally, if a defendant waives an issue by failing to raise it on direct appeal and 
then later attempts to raise it as a collateral attack, that motion is procedurally-barred.  See 
Massaro v. United States,
538 U.S. 500, 504
(2003); Bousley v. United States,
523 U.S. 614, 622
(1998).  An exception to this rule applies where a petitioner demonstrates both “cause” and 
“actual prejudice,” Murray v. Carrier,
477 U.S. 478, 485
(1986); Wainwright v. Sykes,
443 U.S. 72
, 

87 (1977), or where a petitioner can demonstrate that he is “actually innocent.”  United States 
v. Pettiford,
612 F.3d 270, 280
(4th Cir. 2010); see Dretke v. Haley,
541 U.S. 386, 393
, (2004); Reed 
v. Farley,
512 U.S. 339
, (1994); United States v. Mikalajunas,
186 F.3d 490
, 492–93 (4th Cir. 1999).  
Also, “questions of sufficiency of evidence are not reviewable in a § 2255 proceeding.”  Epps 

v. United States,
728 F. Supp. 1236, 1239
(D. Md. 1990).                  
    Here, Maynor’s additional claims—discussed in turn below—are procedurally-barred 
because they were not presented on direct appeal, and Maynor fails to show cause and actual 
prejudice, or actual innocence, to justify hearing his claims for the first time on collateral 
review.                                                                   
 1.  Alleged Suppression of Impeachment Material.                        

    Maynor claims that this Court and prosecutors erred in suppressing impeachment 
material in the form of IAD files involving the Government’s “star witness.”  (ECF No. 178 
at 25.)  This argument was not presented on appeal, and Maynor has failed to show cause and 
actual prejudice, or actual innocence, that would justify hearing his claim for the first time on 
collateral review.  Simply stated, this argument was available to him for his earlier appeal.  
    Furthermore, no prejudice results in denying his § 2255 Motion on this basis, as 

Maynor’s narrative is readily contradicted upon review of the record.  (ECF No. 77.)  During 
the pre-trial motions hearing held on February 6, 2018, this Court explained that, in adherence 
with the Supreme Court’s decisions in in Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83
(1963) and more 
importantly, Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150
(1972), it is this Court’s policy that the 
Government must “provide to [the Court] any internal affairs files with respect to any police 
officer who testifies either at a preliminary hearing or at trial before [the Undersigned Judge].”   

(ECF No. 77 at 15:23–16:2.)  Upon an extensive in camera review, the Court then determines 
if there is any Giglio material to disclose to the defendant or defense attorney.  (Id. at 16:17–
24.)  The Court explained that it was the Undersigned Judge’s policy not to permit “any 
defendant or defense attorney just to rummage through internal affairs files of the Baltimore 

City Police Department,” as doing so “would defeat the very purpose of internal review.”  (Id. 
at 16:20–24.)  The Court recognized the Government’s compliance with this policy and 
following a “fairly extensive review of all the material” determined that certain IAD files would 
be disclosed to and summarized for Maynor and his defense counsel.  (ECF No. 77 at 17:11–
13, 18:10–19:3.)                                                          
    At bottom, both this Court and the Government properly adhered to the Court’s 

protocol in determining what evidence in this case constituted Giglio material.  Maynor is 
incorrect in his assertions that this Court erred by not providing the actual contents of the 
released IAD files to himself or his attorneys to share with the jury.  By no means is the Court 
or prosecution mandated to provide the defendant and its counsel unfettered access to 
confidential, internal police documents to impeach a government witness.  See United States v. 
Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 675
(1985) (explaining that the purpose of the Brady rule is “to ensure 

that a miscarriage of justice does not occur” and “the prosecutor is not required to deliver his 
entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if 
suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial”).  Maynor and his counsel were free 
to—and in fact—did use the information disclosed in the approved IAD files during trial, 
specifically on cross-examination.  Thus, no prejudice results from denying Maynor’s § 2255 
Motion on this basis.  In sum, Maynor’s challenge with respect to the suppression of IAD files 

is procedurally-barred.                                                   
 2.  Alleged Lack of Reasonable Suspicion.                               
    Maynor also argues that, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement 
officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the search and seizure of his person pursuant to 

Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1
(1968).  (ECF No. 178 at 29.)  Maynor contests the first officer’s ability 
to have seen the butt of a firearm in his waistband given the time of day, lighting, and distance 
between them.  (Id. at 29, 30, 31.)  This argument was presented during pre-trial motions 
concerning the officer’s credibility.  (ECF Nos. 77; 78.)  Based on the evidence presented, this 
Court concluded that the officer’s account of events was credible and therefore there was 
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop.8  Nevertheless, Petitioner’s counsel 

presented this theory once again during trial,9 but given the jury’s unanimous guilty verdict, it 
is clear jurors did not accept this version of events.  (ECF No. 178 at 29–31.)  Once again, 
Maynor failed to raise this argument on direct appeal, and is unable to show cause or actual 
prejudice, or actual innocence, in attempting to challenge his sentencing through this § 2255 
Motion.    Accordingly,  Maynor’s  allegation  that  officers  lacked  reasonable  suspicion  is 
procedurally-barred.                                                      

 3.  Improper      Warnings and Admission of Post-Arrest Statements.     
   Thirdly, Maynor asserts that the district court improperly determined that his post-arrest 
statements were admissible as it found that Maynor made these statements voluntarily, and 

8 The Court determined from videotape evidence that the area in which Maynor was spotted with the butt of a 
firearm in his waistband by the first officer was “very well lit . . . and there’s no difficulty seeing any of the 
people on the camera in terms of where the arrest occurred.”  (ECF No. 77 at 60:7–13.)  As a result, the Court 
was satisfied that the officer was in a good position to observe Petitioner, and therefore found his testimony to 
be credible.  (Id. at 60:13–23.)                                          
9 In support of this argument, Petitioner’s counsel relied on testimony from a private investigator, and former 
DEA Special Agent, attempting to reenact the scenario from the night in question to disprove the first officer’s 
testimony. (ECF No. 139 at 73–80.)                                        
not as part of a police interrogation. (ECF No. 178 at 26.)  Maynor argues that officers did in 
fact conduct an interrogation, and due to their failure to give proper Miranda warnings, these 
statements should not have been admissible.  (ECF No. 178 at 26.)  Maynor presented this 

very argument as the basis for his pre-trial Motion for Suppression of Statements (ECF No. 
18), which this Court denied,10 (ECF No. 66).  Maynor failed to challenge this ruling on direct 
appeal and is unable to show cause that he was incapable of doing so.  Furthermore, Maynor 
does  not  provide  evidence  of  actual  prejudice  or  innocence,  therefore  this  claim  is 
procedurally-barred.                                                      
 4.  Alleged    Error.                                                   

    Here, Maynor argues that “[t]he written judgment contained discretionary special 
conditions of supervised release not pronounced orally.”  (ECF No. 178 at 9, 20, 33, 38.)  
According to Maynor, this means this Court’s imposition of the conditions of supervised 
release did not comport with the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Rogers.  In United States v. Rogers,
961 F.3d 291
, 299 (4th Cir. 2020), the Fourth Circuit held that a district court must orally 
pronounce all nonmandatory conditions of supervised release at the sentencing hearing, either 

expressly  or  “through  incorporation—by  incorporating,  for  instance,  all  [Sentencing] 
Guidelines ‘standard’ conditions.”  A review of the Judgment (ECF No. 130) and the transcript 
of his sentencing hearing (ECF No. 140) show that this argument is unavailing.  At Maynor’s 
November 8, 2018, sentencing hearing, the Court incorporated the standard conditions of 


10 In denying this motion, the Court found that Petitioner’s statements “were not made in response to any 
police interrogation and were voluntary”—that is, the officers were not required to give Miranda warnings.  
(ECF No. 78 at 70, 71:10–14.)  Regardless, one officer still advised Maynor of his right to remain silent but was 
unable to complete the rest of the Miranda warnings as Maynor continued to express his anger.  (Id. at 70:13–
19.)                                                                      
supervised release by referencing the “standard conditions of supervision adopted by the 
Court.”  (ECF No. 140 at 95.)  The Court further orally announced additional conditions of 
supervised release, which are fully consistent with the additional conditions that appear in the 

written Judgment:                                                         
    (1) That he shall satisfactorily participate in a vocational program as deemed 
      necessary by the probation officer.                                
    (2) That he shall participate in a mental health treatment program as deemed 
      necessary by the probation officer.                                
    (3) That he shall participate in any substance abuse treatment program as 
      deemed necessary, and shall submit to substance abuse testing as deemed 
      necessary during this five-year period of supervised release.      
(Compare
id.
with ECF No. 130 at 4.)  At bottom, Maynor cannot demonstrate a Rogers error.  
 II.  Rule 60(d)(3) Motion.                                              
   Through his filing at ECF No. 176—which Maynor explicitly claims, “is not a first 
section 2255 motion of ineffective assistance of counsel,” but rather a motion for relief from 
judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3) (id. at 1 (cleaned up))—Maynor contends “that 
he has and can produce evidence in the record that proves [the Government] provided 
fraudulent  documents  and  committed  fraud  upon  the  court  causing  this  Court  to  be 
influenced” (id. (cleaned up)).  Specifically, he alleges that the “manufactured” trial testimonies 
of officers and personal phone records submitted into evidence are incompatible with the 
police report and pre-trial testimony.  (Id. at 3.)  He further requests an evidentiary hearing on 
this matter. (Id. at 1.)                                                  
   In brief, Maynor’s reliance on Rule 60(d)(3) is misplaced.  Rule 60(d)(3) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that Rule 60(b) does not limit a court’s power to set aside a 
judgment for “fraud on the court.”  Rule 60 does not provide relief from a judgment in a 
criminal case.  As such, the Court need not address Maynor’s argument set forth in ECF 
No. 176 further.  Accordingly, Maynor’s Rule 60(d)(3) Motion (ECF No. 176) is DENIED.  
 III.  Additional  Motions:  Motion  to  Conduct  Discovery  (ECF  No.  179)  and 
      Motion for Entry of Default (ECF No. 181).                         
    In addition to his § 2255 Motion and Rule 60(d)(3) Motion, Maynor filed two other 
motions presently pending before the Court: a Motion to Conduct Discovery (ECF No. 179) 
and a Motion for Entry of Default (ECF No. 181).  These additional motions however are 

dependent upon this Court granting Maynor’s § 2255 Motion.  Given this Court’s denial of 
Maynor’s § 2255 Motion for the reasons discussed above, Petitioner’s Motion to Conduct 
Discovery (ECF No. 179) and Motion for Entry of Default (ECF No. 181) are both DENIED 
AS MOOT.                                                                  
                         CONCLUSION                                      
    For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED this 26th day of August, 2025, that 

Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255
(ECF Nos. 177; 178) is DENIED; his Motion for Relief for Evidentiary Hearing and Reopen 
Hearings  Held  from  Judgment  Pursuant  to  Fed.  R.  Civ.  P. 60(d)(3)  (ECF  No.  176)  is 
DENIED; his Motion to Conduct Discovery (ECF No. 179) is DENIED AS MOOT; and 
his Motion for Entry of Default (ECF No. 181) is DENIED AS MOOT.          
    Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Proceedings under
28 U.S.C. § 2255
, 

the Court is required to issue or deny a Certificate of Appealability when it enters a final order 
adverse to the applicant.  “A Certificate of Appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has 
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
28 U.S.C. § 2253
(c)(2).  
Where the court denies petitioner’s motion on its merits, the petitioner “‘must demonstrate 
that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims 
debatable or wrong,’” Tennard v. Dretke,
542 U.S. 274, 282
(2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel,
529  U.S.  473,  484
(2000)),  or  that  “the  issues  presented  were  ‘adequate  to  deserve 

encouragement to proceed further,’” Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322
, 335–36 (2003) (quoting 
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463, U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).  Because Maynor’s motions provide no basis 
for the issuance of a Certificate of Appealability, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. 
    A separate Order follows.                                            
                                   /s/                                   
                                  Richard D. Bennett                     
                                  United States Senior District Judge