McConico v. Village of Carol Stream

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                              
          FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS                         
                     EASTERN DIVISION                                   

KYENNA MCCONICO, ET AL.,                                                


         Plaintiffs,                                                    
                                   No. 24 CV 1654                       


      v.                                                                
                                   District Judge Kness                 


VILLAGE OF CAROL STREAM, ET AL.,                                        
                                   Magistrate Judge McShain             


          Defendant.                                                    


                MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                            

   Pending  before  the  Court  is  defendants’  motion  to  compel  discovery  of 
decedent’s mental health and substance abuse treatment records and for entry of 
HIPAA/mental health protective order. [169].1 For the following reasons, the motion 
is denied.                                                                

                         Background                                     

   This is a civil-rights and wrongful-death case that arises from the death of 
Isaac Goodlow III, who was killed by a Carol Stream police officer during a response 
to a domestic disturbance call at Goodlow’s apartment. See [33]. Plaintiffs, who are 
Goodlow’s sisters and the administrators of his estate, allege that the defendant 
police officers entered the apartment “without consent, without warning, without a 
warrant, and without probable cause.” [Id.] at 2. According to plaintiffs, one of the 
officers, defendant Daniel Pfingston, kicked open Goodlow’s bedroom door and shot 
Goodlow, who was unarmed, without justification. [Id.] at ¶¶ 25-27; see also [169-7] 
2. Plaintiffs bring multiple claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983
and Illinois tort law against 
the officers and the Village of Carol Stream. See [33] 14-35.             


1 Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket. Referenced page numbers 
are taken from the CM/ECF header placed at the top of filings. To resolve this motion, the 
Court has had to review and discuss a sealed filing, but the Court has attempted to avoid 
unnecessary discussion of any privileged information. To the extent the Court has discussed 
such material, however, the Court has done so because it is necessary to explain the path of 
its reasoning. See In re Specht,
622 F.3d 697, 701
(7th Cir. 2010); Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. 
Leavell,
220 F.3d 562, 568
(7th Cir. 2000).                               
   At issue in the pending motion is whether defendants may discover Goodlow’s 
mental-health treatment records.2                                         

   Defendants Steven Cadle and the Village of Carol Stream served written 
discovery requests seeking the identities of Goodlow’s medical providers and the 
corresponding treatment records. See [169-2] 6-7 (Cadle’s interrogatories 9 and 11); 
[169-3] 8, 17-18 (Cadle’s RFPs 8 and 45); [169-4] 8 (Carol Stream’s RFPs 11 and 12). 
Plaintiffs objected to these requests to the extent they related to Goodlow’s “mental 
health [and] therapy history,” contending that their claims had not put Goodlow’s 
mental condition at issue. [169-2] 6. According to plaintiffs, they are seeking to 
recover for only the “garden variety” type of emotional distress that Goodlow would 
have experienced between the time defendant Pfingston “kicked open the door to his 
bedroom,  pointed  his  handgun  at  Isaac,  and  shot  him.”  [169-7]  2.  Defendants 
maintained  that  the  treatment  records  were  “relevant  to  Plaintiffs’  claims,  Mr. 
Goodlow’s  mental  and  physical  health,  and  his  relationship  with  his  family 
members.” [171] 3-4. In support, defendants pointed to allegations in the complaint 
that “Defendants’ misconduct caused Goodlow to suffer various injuries,” including 
“mental anguish,” “emotional anguish,” “fear,” “anxiety,” and “emotional distress.” 
[Id.] 2.  Defendants  also  argued  that Goodlow’s  health,  his physical  and  mental 
characteristics, and his relationship with his next of kin were relevant to calculating 
the damages for plaintiffs’ claims under Illinois’s Wrongful Death Act. [Id.]. Finally, 
defendants noted that certain medical records produced by plaintiffs (large portions 
of which were redacted, based on plaintiffs’ privilege claim) revealed that Goodlow 
had been admitted to Central DuPage Hospital in May 2021, where he was prescribed 
quetiapine and “endorsed homicidal ideation with a non-specific plan to harm his 
sister.” [Id.] 3.                                                         

   The parties met and conferred on this issue in accordance with the Court’s 
protocol  for  discovery  motions  in  this  case,  see  [158],  but  could  not  reach  an 
agreement. See [171] (defendants’ Local Rule 37.2 letter); [169-7] (plaintiffs’ Local 
Rule 37.2 response); [169-8] (transcript of parties’ April 16, 2025, meet-and-confer 
session).                                                                 


2 It is unclear from the parties’ briefing whether this discovery dispute concerns a discrete 
category of documents concerning Goodlow’s substance-abuse treatment (if any). Two of the 
discovery requests at issue seek information related to any substance-abuse treatment 
Goodlow might have undergone. See [169-2] 6 (Cadle’s interrogatory 9); [169-4] 8 (Village’s 
RFP 11). In the briefing and meet-and-confer materials, however, the parties essentially 
lumped  each  discovery  request  at  issue  under  the  general  category  of  mental-health 
treatment and focused on whether such records were relevant and/or privileged. There was 
no discussion of any substance-abuse records or the standard applicable to such records, 
separate and apart from the parties’ discussion of whether Goodlow’s mental-health records 
were  relevant  or  privileged,  during  the  parties’  meet-and-confer  session.  See  [169-8]. 
Accordingly, this  decision  addresses  only  whether  Goodlow’s  mental-health  records  are 
privileged.                                                               
                        Legal Standard                                  

   “In ruling on a motion to compel, the discovery standard set forth in Rule 26(b) 
applies.” Mendez v. City of Chicago, 18-cv-6313,
2020 WL 4736399
, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 
Aug. 14, 2020). Rule 26 “governs the scope of civil discovery and allows parties to 
obtain discovery regarding any matter that is: (1) nonprivileged; (2) relevant to any 
party’s claim or defense; and (3) proportional to the needs of the case.” Barnes-Staples 
v. Murphy, Case No. 20-cv-3627,
2021 WL 1426875
, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2021). 
“[T]he resolution of discovery disputes is committed to the court’s extremely broad 
discretion.”  Chicago  Reg.  Council  of  Carpenters  Pension  Fund  v.  Celtic  Floor 
Covering, Inc.,
316 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1046
(N.D. Ill. 2018).              

                          Discussion                                    

   Defendants’ motion presents three issues for the Court to resolve: (1) what 
standard the Court should apply to determine if plaintiffs have impliedly waived the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege by putting Goodlow’s mental-health treatment at 
issue;  (2)  whether  plaintiffs’  allegations  and  the  damages  they  seek  have  put 
Goodlow’s mental state at issue under the controlling standard; and (3) whether 
Goodlow or his attorneys expressly waived the privilege.                  

   A.   Implied Waiver                                                  

        1.   Applicable Standard                                        

   The parties agree that this privilege dispute is governed by the federal common 
law psychotherapist-patient privilege,3 which “prevents disclosure of confidential 
communications between a licensed psychotherapist or social worker and a patient 
in the course of diagnosis or treatment.” Coleman v. City of Chicago, Case Nos. 17-
CV-8696 & 18-CV-998,
2019 WL 7049918
, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2019). “The 
privilege serves to protect the relationship of confidence and trust on which effective 
psychological treatment depends and thus ‘serve[s] a public good transcending the 
normally  predominant  principle  of  utilizing  all  rational  means  for  ascertaining 
truth.’” Flowers v. Owens,
274 F.R.D. 218, 223
(N.D. Ill. 2011) (quoting Jaffee v. 
Redmond,
518 U.S. 1, 15
(1996)). The existence of the privilege “is not contingent 
upon a trial judge’s later evaluation of the relative importance of the patient’s interest 

3  Federal privilege  law  applies  because  plaintiffs  have  brought  federal-question  claims 
against defendants. See Murdock v. City of Chicago,
565 F. Supp. 3d 1037
, 1042 (N.D. Ill. 
2021) (“Evidence Rule 501 provides that federal common law, not state law, governs a claim 
of privilege in federal question suits.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is the case 
even though plaintiffs have also brought state-law claims. See Awalt v. Marketti,
287 F.R.D. 
409
, 414 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (applying federal psychotherapist-patient privilege in case where 
plaintiff brought § 1983 claims and claims under Illinois law).           
in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure[.]” Jaffee,
518 U.S. at 17
. But the 
privilege “is not absolute,” and “plaintiffs waive the privilege by placing their mental 
health at issue.” Laudicina v. City of Crystal Lake,
328 F.R.D. 510
, 512 (N.D. Ill. 2018) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).                                       

   There is a split of authority among the district courts in Illinois (and across the 
country) as to how a court should decide if a plaintiff has placed his mental health at 
issue and waived the privilege.                                           

   Some courts have concluded that there are three approaches to determining if 
a waiver has occurred: “(1) a broad application of waiver; (2) a narrow application; 
and (3) a middle ground.” Glidwell v. Southern Illinois Univ., Case No. 22-1100-DWD,
2023 WL 2895147
, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2023). “Under the broad application, the 
plaintiffs waive the privilege merely by seeking damages for emotional distress.” 
Laudicina, 328 F.R.D. at 513. “Under the narrow application, the plaintiffs must 
place an affirmative reliance on the psychotherapist-patient communication to waive 
the privilege.” Id. Finally, under the middle-ground approach, “no waiver occurs if 
the plaintiffs are only seeking ‘garden variety’ damages.” Id. “Although there is no 
single definition for ‘garden variety’ damages, at least one court in this Circuit has 
defined ‘garden variety’ damages as meaning: the negative emotions that plaintiff 
experienced essentially as the intrinsic result of the defendant’s alleged conduct, but 
not the resulting symptoms or conditions that she might have suffered.” Coleman,
2019 WL 7049918
, at *1 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).   

   Other  courts  have  concluded  that  the  Seventh  Circuit  adopted  the  broad 
approach in Doe v. Oberweis Dairy,
456 F.3d 704
(7th Cir. 2006). There, in a case 
raising claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Illinois law, the 
Seventh Circuit held that the district court “was correct to allow the defendant access 
to the plaintiff’s psychiatric records.” Doe,
456 F.3d at 718
. The court explained that, 
“[i]f  a  plaintiff  by  seeking  damages  for  emotional  distress  places  his  or  her 
psychological state in issue, the defendant is entitled to discover any records of that 
state.”
Id.
Two decisions from the Northern District of Illinois have concluded that 
Doe  “tells  us  precisely  when”  a  waiver  occurs:  “a  plaintiff  places  his  or  her 
psychological state in issue ‘by seeking damages for emotional distress.’” Taylor v. 
Chicago, 14 C 737,
2016 WL 5404603
, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2016) (quoting Doe,
456 F.3d at 718
); see also Laudicina, 328 F.R.D. at 514 (“This Court believes that the 
Seventh  Circuit  in  Doe  applied  waiver  of  the  psychotherapist-patient  privilege 
broadly.”). Decisions from the Central and Southern Districts of Illinois are to the 
same effect. See Kreuger v. Petrak, Case No. 1:22-cv-1016,
2025 WL 354990
, at *23-
24 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2025); Glidwell,
2023 WL 2895147
, at *4. Defendants urge the 
Court to follow these cases and hold that Doe adopted the broad approach, while 
plaintiffs  ignore  the  Doe  issue  and  urge  the  Court  to  apply  the  middle-ground 
approach.                                                                 
   The Court respectfully parts ways from Taylor, Laudicina, and the related 
cases and concludes that Doe did not adopt the broad approach to waiver.  

   The difficulties in trying to parse Doe for an answer to whether the Seventh 
Circuit adopted the broad approach stem from the fact that the court addressed the 
waiver question almost in passing. Nowhere in its opinion did the Seventh Circuit 
discuss the three approaches for deciding whether a claim for emotional distress 
waives the privilege, and nowhere did the court explain why it found the broad 
approach to be the preferable approach (if that is what the court was deciding) or 
consider whether it was consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Jaffee. The 
court simply asserted that “[i]f a plaintiff by seeking damages for emotional distress 
places his or her psychological state in issue, the defendant is entitled to discover any 
records of that state.” Doe,
456 F.3d at 718
. In the undersigned’s view, “the lack of 
any in-depth analysis of the issue is easily”–and best–“explained if the [Doe] opinion 
is read narrowly as holding only that a waiver occurs if an emotional distress claim 
puts a person’s psychological state in issue.” Hess v. Garcia, Case No. 3:21-CV-101-
JD-MGG,
2024  WL 2846474
,  at  *8  n.14  (N.D. Ind.  June 4, 2024)  (emphasis in 
original); cf. Flowers, 224 F.R.D. at 224 (acknowledging that “[i]t is not clear” whether 
Doe adopted broad approach). Under that reading, Doe merely recognizes that a claim 
for emotional-distress damages can place the claimant’s psychological state at issue, 
but it does not elaborate on what kind of emotional-distress claim results in an at-
issue waiver. As a result, courts must decide on a case-by-case basis whether a claim 
for emotional-distress damages places a claimant’s mental state at issue. Accord 
Awalt,
287  F.R.D.  at  417
(quoting  key  language  from  Doe  and  observing  that 
“[w]hether a plaintiff has placed their psychological state at issue in the litigation by 
claiming  damages  for  emotion  distress  is  a  heavily  fact-intensive,  case-by-case 
inquiry into the nature of the damages claimed and the extent to which the plaintiff 
has put their psychological state at issue”) (emphasis added); Estate of DiPiazza v. 
City of Madison, 16-cv-60-wmc,
2017 WL 1828920
, at *3 (E.D. Wis. May 5, 2017) 
(quoting  key  language  from  Doe  but  observing  that  “[w]hat  this  commonsense 
principle means in practice however, and how it applies to the specific facts of a 
particular discovery dispute, varies”). In the absence of a more explicit discussion of 
the waiver issue, the Court concludes that Doe did not adopt the broad approach to 
waiver.                                                                   

   With  no  binding  authority  on  this  issue,  the  Court  rejects  defendants’ 
argument that the broad approach to waiver applies and holds, for purposes of this 
case, that a claim for emotional-distress damages will not waive the psychotherapist-
patient privilege if the damages are limited to “the negative emotions that plaintiff 
experienced essentially as the intrinsic result of the defendant’s alleged conduct” and 
do not include “the resulting symptoms or conditions that [the plaintiff] might have 
suffered.”4 Coleman,
2019 WL 7049918
, at *1 (internal quotation marks and brackets 

4 Because plaintiffs’ damages are classic examples of “garden variety” damages, see infra 6-
7, this case does not implicate any of the definitional uncertainties that plague the middle-
omitted). A waiver will occur, however, if the plaintiff “seeks damages for emotional 
distress  for  which  they  later  sought  psychotherapeutic  treatment  or  otherwise 
affirmatively puts the privileged communication directly at issue in the lawsuit[.]” 
Awalt,
287 F.R.D. at 418
.                                                 

   Several considerations support the undersigned’s decision to reject the broad 
approach and apply the middle-ground approach. First, the broad approach affords 
essentially no value to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Effective psychotherapy 
“depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing 
to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears,” and 
“the  mere  possibility  of  disclosure  may  impede  development  of  the  confidential 
relationship necessary for successful treatment.” Jaffee,
518 U.S. at 10
. But if this 
privilege is “automatically waived whenever a plaintiff seeks any type of damages for 
emotional  distress”–regardless  of  how  tenuous  the  relationship  between  such 
damages and the claimant’s mental state is–“the privilege loses value.” Apollo v. 
Stasinopoulos, No. 18 C 6475,
2020 WL 995094
, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2000). As other 
courts have observed, “that notion of waiver is too sweeping.” Estate of DiPiazza,
2017 
WL 1828920
, at *3. Second, finding a waiver whenever a claim for emotional-distress 
damages is made is inconsistent with the concept of a waiver itself. A waiver is “an 
intentional and voluntary act of disclosure of a confidential communication or, at 
least, an intentional and voluntary act that places the communication ‘in issue.’” 
Swan v. Miss Beau Monde, Inc.,
566 F. Supp. 3d 1048
, 1058 (D. Or. 2021) (emphasis 
in  original).  Under  the  broad  approach,  the  psychotherapist-patient  privilege  is 
waived whenever a plaintiff claims damages for emotional distress, regardless of 
whether  the  plaintiff’s  claim  depends  on  a  confidential  communication  with  a 
therapist  or  whether  the  specifics  of  the  claim  actually  inject  the  plaintiff’s 
psychological state into the case. Third, the Court gives some weight to the fact that 
the broad approach is “[b]y far the most common approach, both within and outside” 
the Seventh Circuit. Hess,
2024 WL 2846474
, at *7.                        

        2.   Goodlow’s Mental State Is Not at Issue.                    

   In this case, plaintiffs seek to recover damages for the emotional distress that 
Goodlow experienced in “the period from when Officer Pfingston kicked open the door 
to his bedroom, pointed his handgun at [Goodlow], and shot him.” [169-7] 2. In their 
complaint,  plaintiffs  alleged  that  Pfingston’s  and  the  other  defendants’  conduct 
caused Goodlow to experience “mental anguish,” “emotional anguish,” “anxiety,” and 
“emotional distress.” See [33] at ¶¶ 48, 59, 64, 84. These kinds of allegations reflect 
“garden variety” damages for emotional distress and do not waive the privilege. See 
Estate of DiPiazza,
2017 WL 1828920
, at *3 (holding, in § 1983 wrongful-death case, 

ground approach. And because plaintiffs’ damages have nothing to do with either Goodlow’s, 
plaintiffs’, or plaintiffs’ heirs’ mental-health treatment, the Court need not decide whether it 
should adopt the narrow approach to waiver (which is also an argument that neither side has 
addressed).                                                               
that damages “limited to the emotional distress experienced by Ms. DiPiazza in the 
last few moments of her life” were “garden variety” damages that did not waive 
privilege); Awalt,
287 F.R.D. at 419
(holding, in wrongful-death case with claims 
under § 1983 and Illinois law, that privilege was not waived where plaintiff “has not 
made any claims for damages for [decedent’s] psychological treatment, condition or 
symptoms resulting from the alleged misconduct of the Defendants”).       

   Plaintiffs also seek damages for the loss of society and companionship that was 
caused by defendants’ wrongful conduct and Goodlow’s resulting death. In their 
wrongful-death claims under Illinois law, plaintiffs allege that they and Goodlow’s 
other heirs “have suffered pecuniary damages, including mental suffering, grief, loss 
of  companionship,  support,  comfort,  love,  affection,  protection  and  society  of 
[Goodlow].” [33] at ¶ 69; see also [id.] at ¶ 123. The Court concludes that these 
damages, too, represent no more than “garden variety” damages that do not waive 
the privilege. On this point, the Court finds Awalt persuasive. The plaintiff in that 
case brought claims under § 1983 and Illinois tort law, seeking damages for loss of 
consortium and severe emotional distress after her husband died while in custody at 
a county jail.
287 F.R.D. at 411-12
, 414 n.3. Defendants moved to compel plaintiff to 
produce records of her and her husband’s mental-health treatment, contending that 
her damages claim injected plaintiff’s own mental state into the case.
Id. at 412
. The 
district court denied the motion, finding that plaintiff’s damages claims were “of the 
‘garden variety’” because they did not “put her specific psychological state at issue in 
this suit nor any psychological treatment she received as a result of [her husband’s] 
untimely death.”
Id. at 419
.5 Likewise, the Court found that evidence of her husband’s 
mental-health treatment remained privileged because plaintiff had not injected her 
husband’s “psychological treatment, condition or symptoms into this case.”
Id.
Awalt is on all fours with this case. As in that case, plaintiffs are alleging 
“garden variety” damages–in the form of their own sadness, grief, loss of society, and 
loss of companionship–that defendants caused by allegedly killing Goodlow without 
justification. These are the kind of “negative emotions” that can arise “essentially as 
the intrinsic result of the defendant’s alleged conduct,” Coleman,
2019 WL 7049918
, 
at *1, and that do not necessarily depend on or relate to one’s psychological condition 
or any ensuing mental-health treatment. Furthermore, nothing in the complaint 
alleges,  and  nothing  in  the  parties’  briefing  suggests,  that  plaintiffs  intend  to 

5 Defendants also sought discovery of records of plaintiff’s counseling sessions with the 
Guardian Angels, which plaintiff attended after her minor daughter was sexually assaulted. 
Awalt,
287 F.R.D. at 422-23
. Defendants argued that “because such traumatic incidents often 
have a significant impact on every member of the family and every relationship therein,” 
these records were relevant to plaintiff’s emotional state and her relationship with her 
husband.
Id. at 422
. The district court rejected this argument, too, finding that plaintiff had 
not “put her counseling or mental state into issue” beyond alleging garden-variety emotional 
damages, which “is not sufficient to find a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.”
Id.
introduce testimony from a psychiatrist or psychologist to establish their damages. 
See Kronenberg v. Baker & McKenzie,
747 F. Supp. 2d 983, 990
(N.D. Ill. 2010) (no 
waiver where plaintiff “is not relying upon any of his mental health records” or 
“presenting any testimony from any of his healthcare professionals with whom he 
may have consulted about mental health issues” to prove claim). Finally, it is not lost 
on the Court that the records defendants seek may be relevant to establishing the 
quality of Goodlow’s relationship with plaintiffs and his other heirs. See Estate of 
DiPiazza,
2017 WL 1828920
, at *3 (suggesting that “psychological evidence” may be 
“highly relevant” in “wrongful death claim brought under state law by a surviving 
spouse or relative”). But defendants’ desire to introduce such psychological evidence 
to  rebut  plaintiffs’  damages  claims  is  irrelevant  because  “the  very  nature  of  a 
privilege is that it prevents disclosure of information that may be relevant to the case, 
in order to serve interests that are of over-arching importance.” Hucko v. City of Oak 
Forest,
185 F.R.D. 526, 530
(N.D. Ill. 1999). Thus, defendants here are in “no different 
position than any other litigant eager to obtain relevant evidence to which it cannot 
have access because the evidence falls within the scope of some testimonial privilege.” 
Kronenberg,
747 F. Supp. 2d at 990
.                                       

   For all these reasons, the Court holds that plaintiffs have not waived the 
psychotherapist-patient  privilege  by  seeking  to  recover  for  the  garden-variety 
emotional-distress  damages  that  they  and  Goodlow  experienced  because  of 
defendants’ alleged conduct.                                              

   B.   Express Waiver                                                  

   An express waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege occurs “primarily 
when information that would otherwise be privileged is not kept confidential.” Patrick 
v. City of Chicago,
154 F. Supp. 3d 705, 711
(N.D. Ill. 2015); see also In re Pebsworth,
705 F.2d 261, 262
(7th Cir. 1983) (“An express waiver is the intentional, voluntary 
relinquishment of a known right.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants 
argue that  the  psychotherapist-patient  privilege  was expressly  waived when  (1) 
Goodlow discussed “his mental health, diagnoses, and medication status” with during 
an encounter with a Wheaton police officer in January 2021, and (2) one of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys made comments about Goodlow’s mental health–including stating that 
Goodlow suffered from bipolar disorder and alleging he was suffering “some form of 
mental health crisis” at the time of the shooting–during a press conference in early 
February 2024. See [171] 4. The Court rejects both arguments. Defendants have cited 
no  authority  to  support  their  contention  that  Goodlow  waived  the  privilege–
essentially for all time and for all purposes–when he discussed his mental health with 
a police officer more than three years before this case was filed. Nor can the Court 
see how an attorney’s statement during a pre-suit press conference that his client 
suffers from bipolar disorder and may have been experiencing a mental-health crisis 
when he was shot waives the privilege. Given the lack of any authority or explanation 
as  to  how  these  two  incidents  resulted  in  a  privilege  waiver,  the  Court  rejects 
defendants’  express-waiver  arguments.  See  Promier Prods.,  Inc.  v.  Orion  Capital 
LLC, Case No. 21 CV 1094,
2023 WL 6907958
, at *12 (N.D. IIL. Sept. 22, 2023) (failure 
to develop argument results in forfeiture). 
                               Conclusion 
    Defendants’ motion to compel [169] is denied. 
                                 Meath   A   Me 
                                    AMM         FY.         LM 
                                  HEATHER K. McSHAIN 
                                  United States Magistrate Judge 

DATE: June 10, 2025