Noramco LLC v. Dishman USA, Inc.

              IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                        
                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE                            


NORAMCO LLC,                    §                                         
                               §                                         
    Plaintiff,                 §                                         
                               §                                         
    v.                         §                                         
                               §      Civil Action No. 21-1696-WCB       
DISHMAN USA, INC.,              §                                         
                               §                                         
    Defendant.                 §                                         
                               §                                         

                MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                             

    This contract dispute case is before the court on remand from the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals and is set for trial in January 2026.  The plaintiff, Noramco LLC (“Noramco”), has filed 
a motion to exclude the opinion testimony of Dr. Rino Coladangelo, an expert witness for the 
defendant, Dishman USA, Inc. (“Dishman”).  Noramco has filed an opening brief in support of its 
motion, Dkt. No. 157; Dishman has responded, Dkt. No. 176; and Noramco has filed a reply, Dkt. 
No. 180.  For the reasons set forth below, the motion to exclude the opinion testimony of Dr. 
Coladangelo is GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART.                        
I.  BACKGROUND                                                            
    Noramco and Dishman entered into a contract (“the Supply Agreement”) under which 
Dishman agreed to provide Noramco with a large amount of olivetol, an ingredient used in the 
manufacture of pharmaceutical products.  Noramco LLC v. Dishman USA, Inc., No. 23-1396, 2024 
WL 3423711 *1 (3d Cir. July 16, 2024).  The Supply Agreement required Dishman to supply 
Noramco with olivetol manufactured at Dishman’s facilities in India.  The Agreement represented 
that those facilities were “c-GMP compliant,” i.e., compliant with the current Good Manufacturing 
Practice standards set by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.  Id.; Dkt. No. 69-2 §§ 1.4, 1.7, 
2.1, 4.1, 10.2.1.                                                         
    In February 2020, the European Directorate for the Quality of Medicines & HealthCare 
(“EQDM”) inspected Dishman’s facility in India where the olivetol was manufactured.  The 
EQDM subsequently informed Dishman on March 19, 2020, that the facility had failed the 

inspection and was not compliant with cGMP.  Noramco, 2024 WL 3423711, at *1.   
    The batches of olivetol at issue in this case were manufactured by Dishman after the failed 
inspection.  The were shipped by Dishman on March 26, 2020, and received by Noramco on April 
2, 2020.  Noramco LLC v. Dishman USA, Inc., No. 21-1696, 2023 WL 1765566 *1 (D. Del. Feb. 
3, 2023).  After an exchange of emails between the parties regarding the effect of the failed 
inspection, Noramco rejected the olivetol and sought a refund of the amount Noramco had paid 
for the product.  When Dishman refused to accept the return of the olivetol and to return the funds 
Noramco had paid for the olivetol, Noramco brought this action seeking damages for breach of 
contract.                                                                 

    I granted summary judgment to Noramco on its breach of contract claim, and Dishman 
appealed.  On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed as to Dishman’s breach of the Supply Agreement.  
Noramco, 2024 WL 3423711, at *4. The Third Circuit remanded the case, however, to resolve 
factual disputes with regard to two other issues: (1) “whether Noramco timely rejected the olivetol 
under § 4.3.1 of the Supply Agreement” and (2) “whether Noramco failed to mitigate damages.”  
Id.  at *3–6.  On remand, I denied the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment and set the 
case for trial because I determined that genuine disputes of material fact remain with regard to 
both issues.  Dkt. No. 191.                                               
II.  DISCUSSION                                                           
    A.  The Dispute over Dr. Coladangelo’s Testimony                     
    Dishman proposes to call Dr. Rino Coladangelo, a medical doctor with experience in the 
field of pharmaceutical compliance, as an expert witness at trial.  Dkt. No. 176 at 1–2.  Noramco 
challenges Dr. Coladangelo’s qualifications as an expert and argues that his reports “lack reliable 

methodology, are based on unsupported speculation, offer legal conclusions, opine on Plaintiff’s 
state of mind, and do not establish the expert’s qualifications in the relevant subject matter.”  Dkt. 
No. 157 at 10.  Accordingly, Noramco asks the court to exclude Dr. Coladangelo’s opinion 
testimony at trial.  Dkt. No. 156 at 1.  Dishman responds that “Dr. Coladangelo’s background and 
experience are directly on point with the subject for which he seeks to proffer an opinion[,]” that 
his opinions “are grounded in verifiable facts,” and that “his analysis is reliable.”  Dkt. No. 176 at 
6.                                                                        
    B.  The Governing Legal Standard                                     
    Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the proponent of an expert witness must demonstrate 

that the witness is “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” 
by demonstrating that each of four requirements is met.  First, the proponent of the evidence must 
show that “the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”  Second, the proponent must show 
that “the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data.”  Third, the proponent must show that “the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods.”  Finally, the proponent must show 
that the expert’s opinion “reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts 
of the case.”  Fed. R. Evid. 702(a)–(d).                                  
    In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993), the Supreme 
Court emphasized the importance of the gatekeeping function of the trial judge in “ensuring that 
an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.”  The 
Court explained that such testimony “must be supported by appropriate validation—i.e., ‘good 
grounds,’ based on what is known,” id. at 590, and that it must have “a valid scientific connection 

to the pertinent inquiry” in order to assist the trier of fact, id. at 592.  The Court has made clear 
that those principles are not limited to scientific testimony, but extend to all expert testimony.  
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 148–49 (1999).                
    The Third Circuit has characterized the showing that the sponsor of an expert witness must 
make under Rule 702 and the Daubert case as consisting of three components: (1) the witness must 
be a qualified expert in the field relating to his testimony; (2) the expert must testify about matters 
requiring scientific, technical or specialized knowledge; and (3) the expert’s testimony must be 
reliable, and that reliable testimony must assist the trier of fact by fitting the issues in the case, a 
requirement more demanding than bare relevance.  Kannankeril v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 128 F.3d 

802, 806, 809–10 (3d Cir. 1997); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741–43, 745 & 
n.13 (3d Cir. 1994).  Moreover, the trial judge is not required “to admit opinion evidence that is 
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.”  Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 
136, 146 (1997).  To the contrary, “[i]t is an abuse of discretion to admit expert testimony which 
is based on assumptions lacking any factual foundation in the record.”  Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter 
Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 414 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Elcock v. Kmart, 233 F.3d 734, 756 n.13 
(3d Cir. 2000).                                                           
    C.   The Limits of Dr. Coladangelo’s Qualifications                  
    Noramco challenges Dr. Coladangelo’s qualifications as an expert witness, arguing that he 
“has no ‘scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge’ that qualifies him as an expert to 
testify as to the two matters on remand.”  Dkt. No. 157 at 10.  Specifically, Noramco contends that 
Dr. Coladangelo lacks “specialized knowledge in legal standards for contract rejection or quality 

assurance protocols” and that his “opinions on marketability and commercial impact exceed his 
expertise.”  Id.  As the party calling Dr. Coladangelo to testify as an expert witness, Dishman bears 
the burden of showing that it is more likely than not that Dr. Coladangelo has the qualifications to 
offer expert testimony on the subjects about which he is called to testify.  See Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
    Dr. Coladangelo’s curriculum vitae states that he is a physician and that from April 2009 
until October 2021, he served as Chief Executive Officer of Rephine Ltd., a global pharmaceutical 
consultancy specializing in quality compliance in manufacturing, and regulatory affairs.  Dkt. No. 
157-7  at  30.    In  that  capacity,  the  entry  notes  that  Dr.  Coladangelo  “led  the  training  and 
development of the staff and consultants, as well as accreditation of specialty staff.”  Id.; see Dkt. 
No. 69-12 at 1.1                                                          

    Based on Dr. Coladangelo’s experience at Raphine Ltd., I find that Dr. Coladangelo is 
qualified to testify as an expert on matters of quality compliance and regulatory affairs in the 
pharmaceutical industry.  However, Dr. Coladangelo’s expertise in the field of pharmaceutical 
quality compliance and regulatory affairs does not qualify him to testify on legal issues or the state 


    1 The record contains four reports from Dr. Coladangelo.  For the purposes of this case on 
remand, I assume that Dr. Coladangelo’s operative expert report is his April 3, 2025 report, Dkt. 
No. 157-1, as supplemented by his May 13, 2025, report, Dkt. No. 157-2.  The record also contains 
a report dated June 15, 2022, Dkt. No. 69-12, and a supplemental report dated October 28, 2022, 
Dkt. No. 157-7.  Except when otherwise noted, references in this opinion are to the 2025 report 
and response.  In addressing the issues in dispute, however, I have also considered information 
contained in the 2022 reports.                                            
of mind of representatives of the opposing party, which are the subjects of much of his expert 
report.                                                                   
    An expert witness “is prohibited from rendering a legal opinion,” because doing so “would 
usurp the District Court’s pivotal role in explaining the law to the jury.”  Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. 
v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 217 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing First Nat’l State Bank of New Jersey v. Reliance 

Elec. Co., 668 F.2d 725, 731 (3d Cir. 1981)); see Fed. R. Evid. 704.      
    In his report, Dr. Coladangelo states that “[t]he supply agreement makes clear that any 
rejection of material must be made within 30 working days of receipt” and that the actions taken 
by Noramco “contravene the terms of the agreement.”  Dkt. No. 157-1 at 7, 8.  Dr. Coladangelo 
lacks the qualifications to provide an opinion interpreting the contract in this case, and even if he 
were qualified to give such an opinion, it would be improper for him to express a legal opinion as 
to whether Noramco failed to comply with the terms of the Supply Agreement, which is an ultimate 
issue in this case.                                                       
    Dr. Coladangelo also will not be permitted to testify as to the state of mind of Noramco’s 

representatives.  “Experts may not testify to a party’s state of mind.”  SEC v. Ambassador Advisors, 
LLC, 576 F. Supp. 3d 250, 261 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (citing Zimmer Surgical, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 365 
F. Supp. 3d 466, 497 (D. Del. 2019)).  Dr. Coladangelo’s report asserts that “after a period of 
delay, and knowing the terms of the supply agreement precisely, [Noramco] informed [Dishman] 
of rejection of the product well beyond the timeframe specified by the agreement.”  Dkt. No. 157-
1 at 8.  His report further states:  “Cleary Noramco was aware of the implication of its actions and 
their consequences.”  Id. at 7.  Both statements claim knowledge of the opposing party’s state of 
mind, which is an impermissible subject for expert testimony.  The first quoted statement also 
draws an impermissible legal opinion.  To the extent Dr. Coladangelo purports to offer legal 
opinions or speculate as to the Noramco representatives’ state of mind, his testimony will be 
excluded.                                                                 
    D.  The Reliability of Dr. Coladangelo’s Testimony                   
    As  in  the  case  of  Dr.  Coladangelo’s  qualifications,  Dishman  bears  the  burden  of 
demonstrating that Dr. Coladangelo’s testimony rests on “good grounds.”  See Daubert, 509 U.S. 

at 590.  A court may not admit testimony that lacks any factual foundation and consists merely of 
ipse dixit assertions on the part of the expert.  See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146; Stecyk, 295 F.3d at 414.  
Upon consideration of the arguments made by the parties and a review of Dr. Coladangelo’s reports 
at Dkt. Nos. 157-1 and 157-2, I am persuaded that Dr. Coladangelo’s reports contain opinions that 
lack sufficient supporting facts or data, or that lack  a  reliable methodology.  Accordingly, 
testimony based on the parts of the reports summarized below will be excluded. 
    First, Dr. Coladangelo’s report contains a list of 24 manufacturers of medicinal THC and 
asserts that “[s]ome of these might have been interested in acquiring the Olivetol batches.”  Dkt. 
No. 157-1 at 5.  Aside from the list of THC manufacturers, the report contains no other facts, data, 

or methodology supporting Dr. Coladangelo’s conclusion that all or some number of the listed 
manufacturers might have been willing to purchase the non-compliant olivetol.  In that respect, 
Dr. Coladangelo’s assertion is similar to that of the experts in Slatowski v. Sig Sauer, Inc., 148 
F.4th 132, 138 (3d Cir. 2025), who gave testimony based on evidence that a particular “design 
could have caused an accident,” but did not testify that it “did cause this accident.”  As in the case 
of the experts in Slatowski, Dr. Coladangelo’s theory that the THC manufacturers might have been 
interested in the non-compliant olivetol appears to lack factual support.  Similarly, in Adkins v. 
Marathon Petroleum Co., 105 F.4th 841, 850 (6th Cir. 2024), the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision to exclude an expert witness because the expert’s conclusory report lacked “rigor 
and detail” in asserting “without any elaboration” that a party’s exposure to a certain chemical and 
fumes caused lung damage.  Dr. Coladangelo’s qualifications allow him to testify as to his expert 
opinion  on  industry  practices  regarding  certain  pharmaceutical  products.    However,  expert 
testimony as to the willingness of the THC manufacturers to buy the non-compliant olivetol 
requires some additional facts or data, or a discussion of a methodology as to which I can assess 

reliability.  I cannot find such a connection based merely on Dr. Coladangelo’s ipse dixit statements 
on those subjects.                                                        
    Second, Dr. Coladangelo’s report points to Noramco’s failure to promptly reject the 
olivetol and its act of sampling the product as causing a reduction in the shelf life and marketability 
of the olivetol.  Dkt. No. 157-1 at 8.  According to Dr. Coladangelo, “[n]on-conformity with the 
proper protocol would make the material unusable by others.” Dkt. No. 157-1 at 4.  But Dr. 
Coladangelo’s report provides no facts or data about what the proper protocol might have been in 
this case—or even the industry standard for such a protocol.  Additionally, the statement in the 
report does not identify for whom the olivetol would be unusable.  It may be the case that the 

marketability of the non-compliant olivetol was reduced by the actions taken by Noramco.  And 
Dr. Coladangelo may have the experience necessary to help the finder of fact understand standard 
industry practice and how actions taken by Noramco did or did not deviate from that practice.  Dr. 
Coladangelo could even rely on his knowledge of industry practices to form an opinion on that 
issue, provided that facts in the record offer support.  See United States v. Leo,  941 F.2d 181, 196–
97  (3d  Cir.  1991)  (noting  expert  testimony  regarding  “business  customs  and  practices”  is 
permitted); Colon v. Mountain Creek Waterpark, 465 F. App’x 186, 192 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding 
that “there was sufficient evidence in the record” to support the expert’s opinion); Ambassador 
Advisors, LLC, 576 F.Supp.3d at 257 (noting that experts may testify to industry custom and 
practice).  But Dr. Coladangelo’s naked assertion that non-conformity would make the olivetol 
unusable by others lacks sufficient support in facts, data, or methodology.  As such, it does not 
pass the threshold requirement of reliability.                            
    Third, Dr. Coladangelo asserts in his report that the non-cGMP compliant olivetol “could 
still be used if a Risk Assessment Analysis (RAA) is undertaken.”  Dkt. No. 157-1 at 3.  In support 

of that assertion, Dr. Coladangelo cites certain guidelines from the EQDM and notes that certain 
other  pharmaceutical  products  have  been  accepted  by  Belgian,  German,  and  Brazilian 
manufacturers following an RAA.  Whether the non-compliant olivetol could be used by others 
after an RAA may be relevant to the issue of mitigation of damages.  Dr. Coladangelo’s report, 
however, lacks additional facts, data, or methodology to say that the non-compliant olivetol could 
be used in the same way as the products listed as examples in his report.  Dr. Coladangelo argues 
that the experience with those other products gives rise to an “implication” that olivetol could have 
been  used  under  the  same  circumstances,  but  an  implication  without  more  lacks  the 
methodological rigor I am required to apply to expert testimony under Daubert and Rule 702.  

Daubert requires more than an implication.                                
    Under Daubert,  I am charged with ensuring an expert’s “reasoning or methodology 
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid” and applicable to the facts of the case.  Daubert, 
509 U.S. at 592–91.  As a point of comparison, Dr. Coladangelo’s October 28, 2022, report 
supplies facts and a methodology to link menthadienol and olivetol by noting that they are “subject 
to the same  regulations” and  “manufactured in the same way  and used in similar finished 
products.”  Dkt. No. 157-7 at 5.  No such methodology is set forth in Dr. Coladangelo’s 2025 
report to show why olivetol can be treated in the same way as bedaquiline, polyquat, and 
thioridazine.  Dkt. No. 157-1 at 3.  Without some reasoning or methodology to connect the use of 
an RAA to the olivetol at issue beyond an “implication” or speculation, Dr. Coladangelo’s 
conclusion regarding olivetol’s potential use after an RAA lacks the scientific support that Daubert 
demands.                                                                  
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26 requires that an expert report contain “a complete 
statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them” as well as 

“the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them.”2  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).  The 
testimony of expert witnesses is limited to the information contained in their expert reports unless 
the failure to disclose is “substantially justified or is harmless.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); see 
Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 637 F.3d 1269, 1286–87 
(Fed. Cir. 2011); Johnson v. Vanguard Mfg., Inc., 34 F. App’x 858, 859 (3d Cir. 2002); Liqwd, 
Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., No. 17-14, 2019 WL 10252611, at *1 (D. Del. June 25, 2019); Parallel 
Networks Licensing, LLC v Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 13-2072, 2017 WL 1405155, at *1–2 (D. 
Del. Apr. 17, 2017); nCube Corp. v. SeaChange Int’l, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 2d 337, 347 (D. Del. 
2011); Stored Value Sols., Inc. v. CardActivation Techs., Inc., No. 09-495, 2010 WL 3834457, at 

*2 n.1 (D. Del. Sept. 27, 2010) (Stark, J.) (“[T]he court will, as I must, limit the expert testimony 


    2 Dr. Coladangelo introduces his role as “an independent expert witness” in his May 13, 
2025, report and notes in his deposition that he is uncompensated and has not been retained.  Dkt. 
Nos. 157-2; 157-6 at 14:20–15:23, 34:7–18.  To the extent that Dr. Coladangelo intends to 
represent himself as a witness not “retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in 
the case,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B), I find the argument unpersuasive.  Dishman brought Dr. 
Coladangelo into the case for his opinion as an expert after litigation commenced.  Dkt. No. 157-
6 at 15:24–17:10; see Downey v. Bob’s Disc. Furniture Holdings, Inc. 633 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2011) 
(“[I]f, however, the expert comes to the case as a stranger and draws the opinion from facts 
supplied by others, in preparation for trial, he reasonably can be viewed as retained or specially 
employed.”); accord Marquinez v. Dole Food Co., No. 12-695, 2025 WL 1504856 at *1 (D. Del. 
May 27, 2025) (Andrews, J.).  Even if he were not regarded as a retained or specially employed 
expert witness, Dr. Coladangelo would still be required to provide “a summary of the facts and 
opinions” to which he intends to testify, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 29(a)(2)(C), and the principles of 
Daubert and Rule 702 would still apply to the admissibility of his testimony. 
at trial to that disclosed in the expert reports.”).  Dr. Coladangelo will therefore be limited to 
testifying only as to the opinions contained in his reports, which includes any reasonable degree 
of elaboration and/or synthesis of the original contents of those reports.  See Power Integrations, 
Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 2d 568, 581 (D. Del. 2008).   
    E.  The Fit of Dr. Coladangelo’s Testimony                           

    Dr. Coladangelo’s testimony must also address the issues in the case so that they “help the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”  Fed. R. Evid. 702(a).  If 
the testimony does not relate directly to an issue in the case, it is neither relevant nor helpful.  See 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.  On remand, there are only two issues remaining in this case: (1) the 
timeliness of Noramco’s rejection and (2) the mitigation of Dishman’s damages.  As such, Dr. 
Coladangelo’s expert testimony must help the trier of fact decide one or the other of those two 
issues.                                                                   
    On the issue of timely rejection, Dr. Coladangelo’s opinions, as expressed in his report, are 
of limited value to the trier of fact.  The timely rejection issue is primarily a question of contract 

interpretation  as  applied  to  the  series  of  events  and  correspondence  that  unfolded  between 
Noramco and Dishman.  The testimony that Dr. Coladangelo is qualified to give on pharmaceutical 
compliance and regulatory affairs does little to help resolve whether Noramco timely rejected the 
olivetol at issue.  Dr. Coladangelo’s qualifications to offer testimony on industry custom and 
practice may enable him to assist the trier of fact in understanding pharmaceutical industry practice 
for rejecting and returning non-compliant products.  See Leo, 941 F.2d at 196.  But his report 
contains only limited references to such practices.  And where it does, the lack of factual support 
or methodology raises the reliability concerns discussed above.  As such, his expert testimony is 
questionable as to the fit with the timely rejection issue.               
    On the issue of mitigation of damages, however, the opinions offered by Dr. Coladangelo 
may offer some  assistance to the  finder of fact in determining whether Noramco’s actions 
constituted  reasonable  steps  to  mitigate  Dishman’s  damages  under  the  circumstances.    Dr. 
Coladangelo may be able to help the finder of fact understand industry customs and practices for 
regulatory compliance testing and for opening and resealing tested materials.  However, any such 

testimony would still need to be (1) addressed to a topic about which Dr. Coladangelo is qualified 
to speak, (2) reliably based on data or methodology, and (3) supported by opinions disclosed in his 
expert report.  Because Dr. Coladangelo’s proffered testimony offers a better fit with the mitigation 
of damages issue than with the timely rejection issue, he will be permitted to testify on that issue, 
but only to the extent that his testimony meets those requirements.       
III.  LIMITATIONS ON TESTIMONY                                            
    Based on the analysis set forth above, I conclude that Dr. Coladangelo will not be permitted 
to testify as to the following subjects set forth in his expert reports.  
      (1)  “On August 19, 2020 Noramco rejected the Olivetol supplied due to GMP non-

        compliance.  Noramco made no effort to mitigate the issue, simply rejecting the 
        Olivetol supplied 3 months later than the agreement allows. This reduced the validity 
        period of the batches by 4 months prior to their expiry date.” Dkt. No. 157-1 at 1–2.  
        That statement is conclusory; it simply restates Dishman’s position on the two legal 
        issues  remaining  in  the  case;  and  it  does  not  reflect  the  application  of  Dr. 
        Coladangelo’s expertise to any fact in dispute in the case.      
      (2)  “The evidence establishes that Noramco understood no later than 17 April 2020 that 
        the Olivetol supplied by [Dishman] would not be GMP compliant, . . . there appears 
        to  be  little  doubt  that  Noramco  considered  using  the  Olivetol  as  originally 
 intended . . . .”  Dkt. No. 157-1 at 7.  That statement speculates as to the state of mind 
 of  Noramco’s  representatives  and  is  not  an  application  of  Dr.  Coladangelo’s 
 expertise.                                                       
(3)  “The Noramco Director of Quality stated that the Olivetol did not need to be GMP 
 compliant for use in further manufacture.”  Dkt. No. 157-1 at 7.  That statement does 

 not qualify as expert testimony and is based on an inaccurate representation of the 
 deposition testimony, as corrected at Dkt. No. 157-5. It is clear from context and the 
 correction made by the witness that the original transcript of the witness’s statement 
 was inaccurate.  The original transcript will not be allowed to be used as a basis for 
 Dr.  Coladangelo’s statement at trial.                           
(4)  “The supply agreement makes clear that any rejection of material must be made 
 within 30 working days of receipt.  Having received the product on 4 April 2020, this 
 deadline would have been 15 May 2020.”  Dkt. No. 157-1 at 7.  That statement sets 
 forth a legal opinion that Dr. Coladangelo is not qualified to provide. 

(5)  “The discovery of a latent defect would have allowed a further 15 days to this period, 
 but Noramco was clear that there was no latent defect.”  Dkt. No. 157-1 at 7. That 
 statement expresses a legal opinion and draws a conclusion from the evidence that is 
 not within Dr. Coladangelo’s expertise.                          
(6)  “Clearly  Noramco  was  aware  of  the  implication  of  its  actions  and  their 
 consequences.”  Dkt. No. 157-1 at 7. That statement consists of impermissible 
 speculation as to the state of mind of Noramco’s representatives and does not reflect 
 an application of Dr. Coladangelo’s expertise.                   
(7)  “It is clear that having received the Olivetol, Noramco took the usual steps necessary 
  to confirm its usability, and having done so paid for the product. However, after a 
  period of delay, and knowing the terms of the supply agreement precisely, [Noramco] 
  informed [Dishman] of rejection of the product well beyond the timeline specified by 
  the agreement.”  Dkt. No. 157-1 at 8. That statement consists of a legal opinion going 

  to  an  ultimate  issue  in  the  case;  it  does  not  constitute  an  application  of  Dr. 
  Coladangelo’s expertise.                                         
(8)  “There are  few manufacturers of Olivetol but  there were many other potential 
  pharmaceutical manufacturer customers who might have been prepared to undertake 
  an RAA and accept the Olivetol.”  Dkt. No. 157-1 at 8. That statement lacks factual 
  support, is speculative, and lacks any indication that Dr. Coladangelo has personal 
  knowledge supporting the asserted opinion.                       
(9)  “Regardless of the GMP status of the Olivetol, the product could still be used if a 
  Risk  Assessment  Analysis  (RAA)  is  undertaken  and  the  results  thereof  are 

  satisfactory.”  Dkt. No. 157-1 at 3. That statement lacks factual support.   
(10)  “Non-conformity with the proper protocol would make the material unusable by 
  others.”  Dkt. No. 157-1 at 4.  That statement lacks factual support.   
(11)  “There are at least 24 Manufacturers of medicinal grade THC. Some of these might 
  have been interested in acquiring the Olivetol batches.”  Dkt. No. 157-1 at 5. The 
  statement that some of the manufacturers of medicinal grade THC might have been 
  interested in acquiring the olivetol is speculative and lacks factual support. 
     (12)  “In any case, the delay by Noramco in deciding or not whether to use the Olivetol 
        further reduced the validity of the batches, or ‘shelf life,’ reducing the value of the 
        product.”  Dkt. No. 157-1 at 8. That statement lacks factual support.   
     (13)  “[T]he  spoiling  of  the  barrel  seals  of  the  Olivetol  also  negatively  affected  the 
        marketability of the material to other potential purchasers.”  Dkt. No. 157-1 at 8. That 

        statement lacks factual support.                                 
     (14)  “The fact that the material has been sampled and is not on the premises of the 
        manufacturer introduces a further impediment to any other potential buyer of that 
        material that would negatively impact the marketability and sale of the resealed 
        product.”  Dkt. No. 157-2 at 1. That statement lacks factual support.   
IV.  CONCLUSION                                                           
    For the reasons stated above, Noramco’s motion to exclude opinions and testimony of Dr. 
Coladangelo is granted-in-part and denied-in-part.  While there are portions of Dr. Coladangelo’s 
report (and, thus, his proposed testimony) that are legitimately within his expertise, much of his 

report reads like the first closing argument for the defendant.  It appears to be an example of the 
increasingly common practice of allowing the presentations of expert witnesses to bleed over from 
expert testimony on discrete factual issues into legal argument on the merits of their proponent’s 
case.  That is decidedly not the role of expert witnesses, and that practice will not be allowed in 
this case.  Counsel for Dishman must exercise care to ensure that Dr. Coladangelo’s testimony at 
trial does not venture into the impermissible areas I have described above and that his testimony 
is within the limits of allowable testimony for an expert witness.  The same rule will be applied to 
counsel for Noramco with regard to any expert witness offered by Noramco. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
SIGNED this 16th day of October, 2025. 

                             WILLIAM C. BRYSON 
                             UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE 

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