Nyra Miller-Fields <strong>v</strong>. Ryan Londregan

                 United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 24-3412
                        ___________________________

Nyra Jean Miller-Fields, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate
                                of Ricky Cobb, II

                                     Plaintiff - Appellant

                                        v.

                                Ryan Londregan

                                    Defendant - Appellee

                                   Brett Seide

                                       Defendant
                        ___________________________

                                No. 25-1170
                        ___________________________

Nyra Jean Miller-Fields, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate
                                of Ricky Cobb, II

                                     Plaintiff - Appellant

                                        v.

                                   Brett Seide

                                    Defendant - Appellee
                                   Ryan Londregan

                                           Defendant
                                    ____________

                      Appeal from United States District Court
                           for the District of Minnesota
                                  ____________

                             Submitted: March 18, 2026
                                Filed: July 7, 2026
                                  ____________

Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
                            ____________

KOBES, Circuit Judge.

      Minnesota State Troopers stopped Ricky Cobb, II for driving without his
headlights on. Things escalated when Cobb, who was wanted for violating a
protective order, refused commands to exit his car and instead put the car in drive.
A trooper shot and killed him seconds later. Nyra Miller-Fields, personal
representative of Cobb’s estate, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging unreasonable
seizure and excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Relying on body and dash camera footage, the district court 1 granted the troopers’
motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. We affirm.

                                    I.   Background

      We review de novo the district court’s grant of the motion to dismiss and
accept “as true all factual allegations in the light most favorable to [Miller-Fields].”
Waters v. Madson, 921 F.3d 725, 734 (8th Cir. 2019); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).


      1
      The Honorable Nancy E. Brasel, United States District Judge for the District
of Minnesota.
                                     -2-
When video evidence is “embraced by the complaint” and its authenticity is not
challenged, we may consider it so far as it “blatantly contradict[s]” the alleged facts.
Young v. Keyes, 176 F.4th 573, 577 (8th Cir. 2026) (citations omitted). Miller-Fields
does not dispute the authenticity of the videos, so we accept the complaint’s factual
allegations and view them in the light most favorable to Miller-Fields, except where
the videos “disprove [Miller-Fields’s] account of events.”2 Id.

       Trooper Brett Seide pulled Cobb over around 1:52 a.m. on July 31, 2023.
Right away, Seide received an alert on his in-car computer that Cobb was wanted
for a felony protective order violation in Ramsey County and instructions to “hold
subject and contact Ramsey County Sheriff’s Office.” Seide told non-defendant
Trooper Garrett Erickson, who arrived at the scene at 1:53 a.m., the date of the
protective order and said that it “expires 7-31-2026 . . . that’s today.” He radioed
dispatch and asked them to contact Ramsey County Sheriff’s Office.

       Trooper Ryan Londregan arrived around 2:11 a.m. Seide told him about the
protective order violation and that Cobb was “a little sketchy” and “amped.” Seide
then received the call from Ramsey County. The videos capture Seide’s half of the
conversation, including him saying “we’ll get him arrested” and his questions about
where and under what case number he should book Cobb. After the call, Seide told
Londregan and Erickson that Ramsey County wanted Cobb arrested.

       The three approached Cobb’s car at 2:15 a.m. It was parked on the shoulder
of the interstate with locked doors and the front windows down. Seide went to the
driver’s side, Londregan to the passenger’s side, and Erickson stood near the back
of the car. Seide repeatedly ordered Cobb to step out of the car and give him the
keys. Cobb refused and asked if there was a warrant for his arrest. Seide told him
there was no warrant, but after Cobb failed to comply, he announced “this is now a
lawful arrest.”

      2
       She objects that the videos were improperly produced by a subpoena before
discovery. But the troopers attached the video to their motion to dismiss before a
subpoena was served, so her argument is without merit.
                                        -3-
       On the word “arrest,” Londregan moved his hand inside the passenger-side
door, unlocked it, and started to open it. At the same time, Trooper Seide opened
Cobb’s driver-side door. Cobb put his foot on the brake, moved his hand to the
transmission, and shifted the car into drive. The car jerked forward and Seide and
Londregan moved with it. Seide then leaned into the car, reaching towards Cobb’s
seatbelt buckle. The car stopped and Londregan pulled his gun and ordered, “Get
out of the car now.” In the same instant, at 2:17 a.m., the brake lights went off. The
car moved forward again with Seide’s upper body still fully inside. Trooper
Londregan fired twice into Cobb’s torso.

      The car accelerated, knocking Seide and Londregan to the ground. The
troopers returned to their patrol cars and caught up to Cobb, whose car was moving
slowly along the median about a quarter mile down the interstate. Seide decelerated
and ran into the rear-passenger side while Londregan decelerated and hit the front
passenger side, bringing Cobb’s car to a stop. The troopers pulled an unresponsive
Cobb from the car and unsuccessfully tried to resuscitate him.

                         II.   Qualified Immunity Analysis

       To determine whether the troopers are entitled to qualified immunity on a
motion to dismiss, “we must determine whether the alleged facts demonstrate that
[their] conduct violated a constitutional right, and whether it would be clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”
Groenewold v. Kelley, 888 F.3d 365, 370–71 (8th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). “[T]he
qualified immunity determination is specific to each” trooper. Cannon v. Dehner,
112 F.4th 580, 588 (8th Cir. 2024).

                               A. Unreasonable Seizure

      Miller-Fields alleges the troopers unreasonably seized Cobb when they
extended the stop and decided to arrest him. But since neither of these seizures were


                                         -4-
unreasonable, Troopers Seide and Londregan did not violate a constitutional right
and are entitled to qualified immunity.

       Miller-Fields first argues that both troopers unreasonably seized Cobb by
“unnecessarily extend[ing]” the stop without probable cause. 3 This is the wrong
legal standard. Officers only need “reasonable suspicion of criminal activity” to
extend a stop, United States v. Allen, 43 F.4th 901, 907 (8th Cir. 2022), and Miller-
Fields concedes there was reasonable suspicion that Cobb violated a protective
order, see Compl. at 10 (“Neither Defendant Londregan nor Defendant Seide had
reasonable suspicion that Decedent Cobb had committed any crime other than a
protective order violation.” (emphasis added)). The videos confirm that both
troopers knew about the felony protective order violation and that it was still active,
showing they had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop’s
extension. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985). And they
extended the stop only for the amount of time it took to hear back from Ramsey
County and attempt the arrest. Allen, 43 F.4th at 907 (“[O]fficers may continue the
stop only for the time necessary to attend to the stop’s mission and related safety
concerns.” (cleaned up)).

       Nor did Seide and Londregan “unreasonably seize[] Cobb when they decided
to arrest him.”4 “A warrantless arrest is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if it


      3
        The troopers argue that the complaint did not allege a standalone
unconstitutional-extension claim. But it alleged the length of the stop and claimed
the troopers lacked probable cause. Miller-Fields argued that the stop was
unconstitutionally extended in her opposition to the motion to dismiss, and the
district court addressed that argument in its order. We likewise address it here. See
Cook v. George’s, Inc., 952 F.3d 935, 938 (8th Cir. 2020) (“We must construe the
complaint ‘liberally.’” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Williams, 504
U.S. 36, 42 (1992) (we can consider issues decided “by the court[] below” (citation
omitted)).
      4
      Miller-Fields does not argue on appeal that the troopers’ attempts to pull
Cobb out of his car during the arrest or ramming his car were unconstitutional
                                      -5-
is supported by probable cause.” Borgman v. Kedley, 646 F.3d 518, 522 (8th Cir.
2011). The video evidence shows that Seide knew Cobb violated a protective order.
Miller-Fields argues that if the troopers truly had probable cause they would have
arrested Cobb immediately on receiving the alert because Minnesota is a “shall
arrest” state. See Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subdiv. 14(e). But this is a misreading of
Minnesota’s statute, which only mandates that “[a] peace officer shall arrest without
a warrant and take into custody a person whom the peace officer has probable cause
to believe has violated” a protective order. Id. Failure to arrest Cobb “right then”
did not divest the troopers of probable cause a few moments later.

       Based on the initial alert and instructions from the Ramsey County Sheriff’s
Office, Trooper Seide had probable cause that Cobb had “committed or [was]
committing an offense” by violating the protective order. Willis v. Mills, 141 F.4th
905, 911 (8th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). Trooper Seide asked dispatch to contact
Ramsey County and, minutes later, he received a call. Though the video provides
only one side of the call, the context and Seide’s responses make it clear that Ramsey
County instructed him to arrest Cobb and book him. And Trooper Londregan was
entitled to rely on Seide’s decision to arrest and reasonably did so based on the alert
and what he heard of Siede’s conversation with Ramsey County. See Wolterman v.
Syverson, 164 F.4th 1086, 1092 (8th Cir. 2026) (“An assisting officer may rely on
the probable cause determination and follow the directions of an officer who is
directing the arrest as long as the reliance is reasonable.” (citation omitted)).

                                  B. Excessive Force

       “[R]egardless of whether [Miller-Fields] has articulated a constitutional
violation” by Trooper Londregan for shooting Cobb, Hess v. Ables, 714 F.3d 1048,
1051 (8th Cir. 2013), Londregan is entitled to qualified immunity because Miller-
Fields has not shown that Cobb’s rights in the specific context of this case were

seizures. See Davenport v. City of Little Rock, 142 F.4th 1036, 1040 n.7 (8th Cir.
2025) (claims alleged in the complaint but not addressed on appeal are waived).

                                         -6-
“sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he [was]
doing violate[d] that right,” Jones v. McNeese, 675 F.3d 1158, 1161 (8th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).

       Miller-Fields “bears the burden of proving that the law was clearly
established.” Hess, 714 F.3d at 1051. She points us first to Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1 (1985), which she says clearly establishes that “[a]n officer may not use
deadly force against a fleeing suspect unless the suspect poses an immediate and
significant threat of serious injury.” But this general principle is too broad to clearly
establish a constitutional violation here. See Zorn v. Linton, 146 S. Ct. 926, 930
(2026) (per curiam) (“The relevant precedent must define the right with a ‘high
degree of specificity,’ so that ‘every reasonable official would interpret it to establish
the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.’” (citation omitted)). Garner is not “a
case where an officer acting under similar circumstances was held to have violated
the Constitution.” Id. (cleaned up).

       And cases more factually similar than Garner offer little help. In Molina-
Gomes v. Welinski, 676 F.3d 1149, 1151–53 (8th Cir. 2012), we found that deadly
force was not excessive where a suspect knocked and dragged a police officer while
trying to escape in his car. This was because “[t]he reckless driving by [the suspect]
in his attempt to escape was a danger to the arresting police officers and to any
drivers on the roadway.” Id. at 1152; see also Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th
1159, 1164–65 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that deadly force was not excessive because
officer who was clinging to an accelerating car could reasonably believe that he was
at serious risk of harm). Miller-Fields has not shown it was clearly established that
deadly force violates the Fourth Amendment if used to protect an officer reaching
inside a suspect’s car when the suspect shifts the car into drive and the car begins to
move. See Harmon, 16 F.4th at 1167 (noting that “whether it is unreasonable for an




                                           -7-
officer to use deadly force when he has become an unwilling passenger on the side
of a fleeing vehicle” was not clearly established). 5

       Miller-Fields next says that Wallace v. City of Alexander, 843 F.3d 763 (8th
Cir. 2016), and Moore v. Indehar, 514 F.3d 756 (8th Cir. 2008), hold that officers
may not seize “unarmed, nondangerous suspects by shooting them dead.” Wallace,
843 F.3d at 769 (cleaned up). But “a car . . . may be used as a deadly or dangerous
weapon,” United States v. Yates, 304 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2002), so it was not
clearly established that Cobb was unarmed or nondangerous where his car was
moving with a trooper partially inside. Similarly, Miller-Fields argues that deadly
force is justified only “when the person with the instrument evinces some intent to
use it in a way to cause harm.” She points to cases involving suspects with guns,
arguing we have found force unreasonable against an armed suspect who did not
raise his gun or otherwise appear ready to shoot. See Nance v. Sammis, 586 F.3d
604 (8th Cir. 2009); Wilson v. City of Des Moines, 293 F.3d 447 (8th Cir. 2002).
But those cases do not clearly establish that a reasonable officer could not perceive
Cobb’s actions as evincing an intent to harm the troopers. Cf. Sykes v. United States,
564 U.S. 1, 10 (2011) (cars can “create serious potential risks of physical injury to
others” when used as a means of escape), overruled by, Johnson v. United States,
576 U.S. 591 (2015).

       She also argues it is clearly established that officers must provide a warning
before using deadly force. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12. But Garner did not
establish an absolute rule. Rather, it requires officers to provide a warning “where
feasible.” Id. And we have held that a warning is less likely to be feasible “in a


      5
         Miller-Fields argues whether Cobb was attempting to flee is a question of
fact, alleging that Seide’s attempt to pull Cobb out of the car was what caused him
to take his foot off the brake the second time. “But even if [Cobb’s] motives were
innocent, a reasonable officer on the scene could have interpreted [his] actions as
resistance.” Loch v. City of Litchfield, 689 F.3d 961, 966 (8th Cir. 2012). And she
would still need to provide a case clearly establishing that Londregan’s actions
violated the Constitution.
                                          -8-
high-pressure situation,” like this one, “that requires a split-second judgment.”
Morgan-Tyra v. City of St. Louis, 89 F.4th 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 2024). Without a
case on point, Miller-Fields has not shown that Trooper Londregan violated a clearly
established right if he did not issue a warning before shooting Cobb.

       Finally, Miller-Fields alleges in her Complaint that Troopers Seide and
Londregan violated the Fourth Amendment by using excessive force to “ram[]”
Cobb’s car. She says that “no facts . . . conclusively established that Cobb was ever
fleeing.” But her argument and the complaint’s allegation that the troopers
“ramm[ed] Decedent Cobb’s stopped vehicle” are blatantly contradicted by the
video evidence. The dash camera footage shows that Cobb sped off the shoulder of
the road and turned into traffic. When the patrol cars caught up to him, his car was
still moving forward next to the median. Seide stopped Cobb’s car by decelerating
and bumping into the back corner while Londregan slowed to bump the front corner.

       Relying on Mayard v. Hopwood, 105 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1997), Miller-Fields
argues that Seide knew that Cobb was incapacitated, so his use of force was not
objectively reasonable. But Mayard is inapposite because it involved the use of
force after the plaintiff was already subdued and in police custody. Id. at 1228 (not
objectively reasonable for officer to slap, punch, and demean a fully restrained
suspect). Here, Cobb’s car was still moving forward after having sped away from
the troopers onto a busy highway, so it posed a threat to safety. Seide and
Londregan’s use of force was no greater than necessary to stop Cobb’s vehicle, and
under the totality of the circumstances, it was objectively reasonable. See Westwater
v. Church, 60 F.4th 1124, 1128 (8th Cir. 2023) (totality of the circumstances inquiry
includes “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer
or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.” (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989))).




                                         -9-
                      III.   Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the district court.
                ______________________________




                             -10-