Ollnova Technologies Limited v. Ecobee Technologies, ULC d/b/a/ Ecobee

[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"10670624","type":"100trialcourt","part":"other","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                        
               FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS                         
                      MARSHALL DIVISION                                  

OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED,   §                                        
                                §                                        
         Plaintiff,             §                                        
                                §                                        
v.                              §  CIVIL ACTION NO.  2:22-CV-00072-JRG   
                                §                                        
ECOBEE TECHNOLOGIES ULC d/b/a   §                                        
ECOBEE,                         §                                        
                                §                                        
         Defendant.             §                                        

                MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                             
    Before the Court is the Motion for New Trial Based on the Improper Infringement Question 
in the Verdict Form or, in the Alternative for an Amended Judgment Setting the Appropriate Start 
Date for Prejudgment Interest (the “Motion”) filed by Defendant ecobee Technologies ULC d/b/a/ 
ecobee (“ecobee”). (Dkt. No. 247.) In the Motion, ecobee moves for a new trial on the basis that 
“the verdict form improperly combined the issues of infringement of thirteen claims . . . into a 
single question that asked whether ecobee infringed any claim of any of the four patents.” (Id.) 
Further, ecobee moves to amend the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) so prejudgment interest 
accrues from no earlier than March 8, 2022. For the following reasons, the Court finds that the 
Motion should be DENIED.                                                  
I.   BACKGROUND                                                           
    Plaintiff Ollnova Technologies Limited (“Ollnova”) alleged that ecobee infringes claims 
1, 11, 12, and 20 of
U.S. Patent No. 7,746,887
(the “’887 Patent”); claims 1 and 2 of
U.S. Patent 
No. 7,860,495
(the “’495 Patent”); claims 1, 3, 6, and 21 of
U.S. Patent No. 8,224,282
(the “’282 
Patent”); and claims 1, 5, and 17 of
U.S. Patent No. 8,264,371
(the “’371 Patent”) (collectively, 
the “Asserted Patents”). After a jury trial, the jury returned a unanimous verdict finding that ecobee 
infringed one or more of the asserted claims of the Asserted Patents, and that Ollnova was entitled 
to $11,500,000.00 in a lump sum royalty.                                  
II.  LEGAL STANDARD                                                       
    A.   New Trial                                                       
    Rule 59 provides that a new trial may be granted on all or part of the issues on which there 

has been a trial by jury for “any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an 
action at law in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a). Notwithstanding the broad sweep of Rule 59, 
“courts do not grant new trials unless it is reasonably clear that prejudicial error has crept into the 
record or that substantial justice has not been done, and the burden of showing harmful error rests 
on the party seeking the new trial.” Metaswitch Networks Ltd. v. Genband US LLC,
2017 WL 
3704760
, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2017); Erfindergemeinschaft UroPep GbR v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
276 F. Supp. 3d 629, 643
(E.D. Tex. 2017). “A new trial may be granted, for example, if the district 
court finds the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the damages awarded are excessive, 
the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was committed in its course.” Smith v. Transworld Drilling 

Co.,
773 F.2d 610
, 612–13 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Laxton v. Gap Inc.,
333 F.3d 572, 586
(5th 
Cir. 2003) (“A new trial is warranted if the evidence is against the great, and not merely the greater, 
weight of the evidence”). Furthermore “[u]nless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting 
or excluding evidence—or any other error by the court or a party—is ground for granting a new 
trial . . . the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party’s substantial 
rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 61.                                              
III.  DISCUSSION                                                          
    A.   Whether the Verdict Satisfied the Requirements for a Valid Verdict 
    ecobee argues that the verdict form in this case failed to satisfy the requirements for a valid 
verdict form. (Dkt. No. 247 at 4.) First, ecobee argues that since Ollnova raised four separate 
causes of action for infringement as to four asserted patents, the general verdict form should have 
at least included separate infringement questions for each patent. (Id.) ecobee’s argument is based 
on Ninth Circuit and Tenth Circuit caselaw stating that a general verdict must, at a minimum, 
“announce[] the ultimate legal result of each claim.” Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc.,
339 F.3d 

1020, 1031
(9th Cir. 2003); see Johnson v. ABLT Trucking Co.,
412 F.3d 1138, 1142
(10th Cir. 
2005). ecobee contends that the single infringement question in this case failed to announce the 
result of each of Ollnova’s four distinct claims for infringement and each of ecobee’s four 
counterclaims. (Id.)                                                      
    Second, ecobee argues that the verdict form violated its right to a unanimous verdict. 
According to ecobee, the verdict form “permitted—and, in fact, instructed—the jury to find ecobee 
liable for infringement regardless of whether all jurors agreed that ecobee was infringing the same 
patent claim.” (Id. at 5.) Specifically, ecobee contends that asking whether Ollnova proved that 
ecobee infringed any of the claims would “erroneously require[] an affirmative answer even in a 
situation where all jurors did not agree that the same patent was being infringed.” (Id. at 6.) As 

ecobee interprets the verdict form, “[a]s long as each juror believed some claim of some patent 
was infringed, the jury would have been required to answer ‘Yes’—even if the various jurors 
believed that ecobee was infringing a different asserted patent.” (Id.) ecobee argues that the 
Court’s  references  to  unanimity  in  the  jury  instructions  did  not  remedy  this  alleged  error. 
According to ecobee, the jury could abide by the Court’s instruction that “your answers and your 
verdict must be unanimous,” find different patents infringed, and answer “Yes” as to infringement. 
(Id. at 6-7.)                                                             
    In response, Ollnova contends that these same arguments were advanced and rejected by 
this Court in Optis Wireless Tech., LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 2:19-cv-00066-JRG, Dkt. No. 667 (E.D. 
Tex. Aug. 9, 2021). Further, Ollnova argues that ecobee’s Ninth and Tenth Circuit caselaw are 
inapposite in light of the applicable Federal and Fifth Circuit caselaw that ecobee largely ignores. 
Ollnova notes that both the Federal Circuit and the Fifth Circuit hold that “[t]he specificity of the 
verdict is within the discretion of the trial judge.” (Dkt. No. 260 at 3 (quoting Hoechst Celanese 

Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd.,
78 F.3d 1575, 1581
(Fed. Cir. 1996))). Ollnova argues that the Federal 
Circuit has further confirmed that “a trial court may, with proper instructions, present a patent case 
to a jury for a general verdict encompassing all of the issues of validity and infringement.” (Id. at 
4 (quoting Structural Rubber Prod. Co. v. Park Rubber Co.,
749 F.2d 707, 720
(Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(citation omitted))).                                                     
    Concerning unanimity, Ollnova argues that ecobee waived its arguments by failing to 
object before or during trial that the verdict form would violate its right to a unanimous jury verdict. 
(Id.) According to Ollnova, ecobee simply argued that the single question would be “confusing to 
the jury and incomplete.” (Id. (quoting Trial Tr. at 1212:12)). On the merits, Ollnova argues that 
ecobee’s unanimity arguments fail because the jury was repeatedly instructed that its answers must 

be unanimous, and it was instructed to assess infringement on a claim-by-claim basis. (Id. at 5.) 
Ollnova argues that “[t]he only reasonable way for the jury to understand these instructions is that 
the  jury  was  required  to  assess  each  patent  claim  individually  (‘claim-by-claim’)  and  to 
unanimously agree on which claim or claims were infringed.” (Id.) Finally, Ollnova argues that 
ecobee’s unanimity arguments cannot be squared with its own proposal that the verdict form 
should have a single infringement question about each patent, and not a separate question for each 
asserted claim. (Id.)                                                     
    In reply, ecobee contends that Ollnova never meaningfully disputes its central argument: 
that the verdict form was deficient because it did not announce a result for each individual cause 
of action and counterclaim. (Dkt. No. 265 at 1.) ecobee argues that the fact that its supporting case 
law comes from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is not a reason for its arguments to fail because 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also reiterates the same principles. (Id.)  
    According to ecobee, it did not waive its unanimity objection because it generally objected 

to the verdict form’s inclusion of only a single infringement question that encompassed all four 
asserted  patents.  (Id.  at  2.)  On  the  merits,  ecobee  argues  that  the  mere  use  of  the  words 
“unanimous” and “claim-by-claim” in the jury instructions did not cure the alleged error because 
“neither the instructions nor verdict form required unanimity on the requisite element for liability.” 
(Id.) Further, ecobee contends that its own proposed jury instruction with a question for each 
patent, but not for each claim, “would not have run afoul of the requirement that each cause of 
action and counterclaim be addressed on the verdict form,” since there would be a separate 
question for each count of infringement. (Id.)                            
    In sur-reply, Ollnova notes that ecobee does not dispute that this Court in prior cases has 
rejected substantially similar arguments. Optis, No. 2:19-cv-00066-JRG, Dkt. No. 667; Solas Oled 

Ltd. v. Samsung Display Co., No. 2:19-cv-00152-JRG,
2021 WL 4950308
, at *23 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 
25, 2021). Further, Ollnova argues that ecobee rests its arguments entirely on Ninth and Tenth 
Circuit caselaw involving non-patent cases but fails to cite any Federal Circuit and Fifth Circuit 
cases rejecting forms like the verdict at issue here. (Dkt. No. 272 at 1.) Finally, Ollnova argues 
that ecobee fails to meaningfully rebut that its unanimity arguments are waived and fail on the 
merits. (Id. at 1-2.)                                                     
    The  Court  agrees  with  Ollnova.  ecobee  contends  that  to  comply  with  Rule  48(b)’s 
requirement of jury unanimity, a general verdict must “at a minimum, ‘announce[] the ultimate 
legal result of each claim.’” (Dkt. No. 247 at 4 (citing Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc.,
339 F.3d 
1020, 1031
(9th Cir. 2003)). Zhang—an employment law case from the Ninth Circuit—does not 
state that the jury should return a separate verdict as to each claim, as ecobee contends. Rather, 
Zhang states: “A jury may return multiple general verdicts as to each claim, and each party, in a 
lawsuit,  without  undermining the general  nature  of its  verdicts.”  Zhang,
339  F.3d  at  1031
(emphasis added). ecobee’s Ninth and Tenth Circuit caselaw is inapposite, especially in light of 
the Federal Circuit and Fifth Circuit caselaw that ecobee largely ignores.   
    “The specificity of the verdict is within the discretion of the trial judge.” Hoechst Celanese 
Corp. v. BP Chemicals Ltd.,
78 F.3d 1575, 1581
(Fed. Cir. 1996). Indeed, as the Federal Circuit 
has stated, “a trial court may, with proper instructions, present a patent case to a jury for a general 
verdict encompassing all of the issues of validity and infringement.” Structural Rubber Prods.,
749 F.2d at 720
(emphasis added). It follows that if it is proper to present a case to a jury for a 
general verdict “encompassing all of the issues of validity and infringement,” then presenting a 
single question for infringement is also proper.                          
    Concerning ecobee’s arguments related to unanimity, the Court finds that ecobee has 

waived its objections. During the Court’s formal charge conference with the parties—at which 
time the parties were to lodge all objections they had to the verdict form and jury instructions—
Defendants provided only the following objection to the Court’s infringement question (Question 
No. 1):                                                                   
    ecobee objects to Question No. 1 as presented as confusing to the jury and 
    incomplete in view of the instructions and evidence regarding patent-by-patent 
    analysis. Moreover, Ollnova’s theories, both for infringement and damages, differ 
    amongst the four patents as previously stated. A single question as presented is 
    likely to cause significant prejudice for the parties in post-trial proceedings, 
    including Rule 50(b) motions and appeal, if necessary. ecobee further notes that the 
    parties’  proposed  questions  separately  listed  the  four  asserted  patents. 
    Accordingly,  ecobee  respectfully  submits  Question  1  should  list  each  patent 
    separately.                                                          
Trial Tr. at 1212:11-23. Notably, ecobee did not argue, as they do now that “[t]he verdict form . . . 
deprived ecobee of its right to a unanimous decision.” (Dkt. No. 247 at 6.) It is well-established 
that “a party may not object to an instruction on one ground at trial and then attempt to rely on a 
different ground on appeal.” Wright v. Ford Motor Co.,
508 F.3d 263, 272
(5th Cir. 2007) (citing 

Coastal Distributing v. NGK Spark Plug Co.,
779 F.2d 1033, 1039
(5th Cir.1986)). The same 
applies for motions for new trial, as ecobee seeks here. ecobee’s objection that the verdict form’s 
infringement question should be split into four, separate questions wholly failed to inform the 
Court as to any concerns regarding jury unanimity regarding any given claim. See Palmer v. 
Hoffman,
318 U.S. 109, 119
,
63 S. Ct. 477, 483
,
87 L. Ed. 645
(1943) (“In fairness to the trial 
court and to the parties, objections to a charge must be sufficiently specific to bring into focus 
the precise nature of the alleged error. Where a party might have obtained the correct charge by 
specifically calling the attention of the trial court to the error and where part of the charge was 
correct, he may not through a general exception obtain a new trial.”). Indeed, ecobee’s own 
proposed  verdict  form—proposing  patent-by-patent  instead  of  claim-by-claim  infringement 

questions—would seem to run into the same concerns regarding jury unanimity now raised, further 
underscoring ecobee’s waiver.1 See Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chemicals Ltd.,
78 F.3d 1575, 
1581
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that plaintiff, “by its acquiescence in and indeed by its proposal of 
the verdict form [question disputed on appeal,] waived objection to the verdict form”). As such, 


1 ecobee’s argument that its own proposal “would not have run afoul of the requirement that each cause of action and 
counterclaim be addressed on the verdict form” is not persuasive. (See Dkt. No. 265 at 2.) By ecobee’s logic, even 
submitting the questions of infringement to the jury on a patent-by-patent basis could result in some jurors concluding 
that one claim of a patent was infringed with other jurors concluding that a different claim was infringed—resulting 
in the jurors answering “Yes” for infringement of that patent when the jury did not agree on which asserted claim was 
infringed. Again, given the Court’s instructions, the Court disagrees that this scenario was bound to occur in either 
scenario, whether infringement was presented as a single question or on a patent-by-patent basis. However, following 
ecobee’s logic to its natural conclusion does not avoid the concerns it raises regarding unanimity, thereby highlighting 
that these arguments are both unpersuasive and waived.                    
the Court finds that ecobee has waived the materially broader objection it now brings regarding 
jury unanimity.                                                           
    Even if ecobee has not waived this objection by failing to raise it during trial, the Court 
finds that its concerns regarding the unanimity of the verdict form fail on the merits. It is black-

letter law that “[a] jury always and necessarily makes findings (albeit unwritten) before it reaches 
its general verdict,” and that “a jury necessarily reaches a legal conclusion, presumably in accord 
with the judge’s instructions on the law, before it reaches its general verdict.” R.R. Dynamics, 
Inc. v. A. Stucki Co.,
727 F.2d 1506, 1514
(Fed. Cir. 1984). ecobee completely ignores that the 
jury is presumed to have followed this Court’s jury instructions, which repeatedly make it clear 
that infringement is decided on a claim-by-claim basis and that the jury’s determinations must be 
unanimous.                                                                
    For example, the Court instructed the jury that their verdict had to be unanimous:  
    A verdict form has been prepared for you, and you’ll take this verdict form with 
    you to the jury room. And when you have reached a unanimous agreement as to 
    your verdict, you will have your foreperson fill in the blanks in that form reflecting 
    those unanimous decisions, date it, sign it, and then advise the Court Security 
    Officer that you have reached a verdict. Answer the questions as directed in the 
    verdict form from the facts as you find them to be. Do not decide who you think 
    should win this case, ladies and gentlemen, and then answer the questions to reach 
    that result. Again, your answers and your verdict must be unanimous. 
Trial Tr. at 1220:11-21.                                                  
    Answer each question in the verdict form based on the facts you find them to be, 
    following the instructions the Court has given you on the law. Again, do not decide 
    who you think should win this case and then answer the questions to reach that 
    result. One more time let me remind you that your answers and your verdict in this 
    case must be unanimous.                                              
Trial Tr. at 1303:24-1304:4.                                              
    The Court further instructed the jury that they were to go claim-by-claim and agree as to 
which claims were infringed. Trial Tr. at 1236:8-9 (“Now, you must determine separately for each 
asserted claim whether or not there is infringement”); Trial Tr. at 1232:7-8 (“The coverage of a 
patent  is  assessed  on  a  claim-by-claim  basis”);  Trial  Tr.  at  1237:13-15  (“As  with  direct 
infringement, you must determine whether there has been active inducement on a claim-by-claim 
basis”).                                                                  

    To avoid any reasonable doubt, the verdict form specifically instructed the jury that 
damages could be awarded “ONLY as to any Asserted Claim that you [the jury collectively] have 
found to be infringed . . . AND not ineligible . . . AND not invalid.” (Dkt. No. 226 at 7.) The Court 
provided similar instructions in its charge to the jury:                  
    Now, if you decide that any asserted claim has been infringed and is neither 
    ineligible for patent protection or invalid, you’ll then need to decide what amount 
    of money damages, if any, to be awarded to Ollnova to compensate it for that 
    infringement.                                                        
Trial Tr. at 1229:8-12. Thus, ecobee’s argument that the jury could have answered “Yes” as to 
infringement “as long as each juror individually believed at least one . . . patent was infringed—
absent the required . . . agreement as to the specific infringed patent(s)” is without merit.  
    B.   Whether the Verdict Form Prejudiced ecobee                      
    ecobee also contends that it was prejudiced by the verdict form, and thus it argues that a 
new trial is warranted. (Dkt. No. 247  at 7.) First, ecobee argues that the verdict form obscures the 
basis for the jury’s liability finding, forcing ecobee to approach post-trial arguments without 
knowing which patents formed the basis for the jury’s infringement and damages decisions. (Id.) 
According to ecobee, Ollnova has an  “unfair advantage” in post-trial briefing because it may 
attempt to overturn the jury’s invalidity finding concerning the ’282 Patent with precision, while 
ecobee is forced to address every patent to overturn the infringement finding. (Id. at 7-8.) Second, 
ecobee contends that the verdict form vitiates estoppel protections by failing to identify which 
issues were decided as part of the jury’s infringement finding. (Id. at 8.) For example, ecobee 
contends that the jury might have decided that ecobee infringed the ’495 Patent, but not the ’371 
Patent, in which case, ecobee would be entitled to estoppel, but would not know on which points. 
Finally, ecobee argues that the verdict form violated its Due Process Rights under the Fifth 
Amendment of the Constitution. (Id. at 8-9.) Specifically, ecobee contends that it has been 

deprived  of  its  property  without  notice  because  it  does  not  know  which  acts  constituted 
infringement.                                                             
    In response, Ollnova argues that ecobee fails to identify any prejudice that would warrant 
a new trial. (Dkt. No. 260 at 6.) It argues that Ollnova was not given an “unfair advantage” to 
overturn  the  invalidity  findings  and  further  that  ecobee’s  concern  about  Ollnova’s  “unfair 
advantage” is moot because Ollnova is not seeking to overturn the invalidity of the ’282 Patent. 
Ollnova also asserts that ecobee’s argument is contrary to well-settled law that a general verdict 
will be upheld “if there was sufficient evidence to support any of the plaintiff’s alternative factual 
theories,” on the assumption that “the jury considered all the evidence and relied upon a factual 
theory for which the burden of proof was satisfied.” (Id. (quoting i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp.,
598 F.3d 831, 849
(Fed. Cir. 2010))). In other words, Ollnova argues that ecobee having to address 
all patents in a JMOL motion is not a basis for a new trial. Ollnova also notes that ecobee does not 
identify any authority supporting an award of new trial based on a purported “unfair advantage” 
created by a general verdict. (Id.)                                       
    Ollnova further argues that ecobee does not identify any authority that would support a 
new trial based on a general verdict purportedly undermining collateral estoppel effects or for 
allegedly violating Due Process rights. (Id. at 6-7.) These arguments, according to Ollnova, are 
“novel,” “contrary to the well-settled law approving of general verdicts,” and should be rejected 
for the same reasons as ecobee’s previous arguments. (Id.) ecobee does not address any of these 
arguments in its reply, instead focusing exclusively on its unanimity and prejudgment interest 
arguments.                                                                
    The Court agrees with Ollnova. As explained, “[t]he specificity of the verdict is within the 
discretion of the trial judge,” (Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chemicals Ltd.,
78 F.3d 1575, 1581
(Fed. Cir. 1996)), and it is well-settled that general verdicts may be used in patent cases. First, the 
Court is not persuaded that the verdict form gives Ollnova an “unfair advantage.” ecobee notes the 
differences between validity and infringement on the verdict form but ignores the fact that both 
parties have an incentive to overturn the jury’s validity findings and are both equally “advantaged” 
with respect to the validity question. While the ’282 Patent was found to be invalid, the ’495 Patent 
was not. Further, while ecobee makes its so-called “advantage” argument as to the specificity of 
the validity question concerning the ’495 Patent, Ollnova declines similarly to challenge the 
invalidity of the ’282 Patent. Accordingly, it is unclear exactly how Ollnova has an “unfair 
advantage.” Regardless, ecobee does not provide any legal basis for overturning the verdict and 
requiring a new trial based on “prejudice.”                               

    Next, ecobee fails to support its argument with any legal authority that the Court should 
overturn the verdict in this case on the grounds that it denies ecobee estoppel protections and 
violates its Due Process rights. As previously explained herein, general verdicts like the one used 
in this case may be used in patent cases. The Court finds no compelling reason to order a new trial 
on these grounds.2                                                        
    C.   ecobee’s Remaining Arguments for New Trial                      
    ecobee argues that granting any one of its three JMOL/New Trial Motions (Dkt. Nos. 243, 
244, and 246), in whole or in part, will require a new trial on any surviving infringement and 


2 ecobee’s decision to drop these arguments entirely from its reply brief in the face of Ollnova’s arguments that ecobee 
could not support its arguments with any authority is a testament to the weakness of these arguments. 
damages issues. (Id. at 9.) For example, ecobee argues that “if ecobee were to prevail on JMOL or 
appeal on its patent ineligibility argument for the ’495 patent, but not prevail on its other JMOL 
motions, it would be necessary to conduct a new trial on infringement and damages on the ’887 
and ’371 patents, since it is possible that the jury verdict on infringement was based on the damages 

figure that Ollnova’s expert, Mr. Bergman, presented for the ’495 patent alone. (Id. at 10.) Further, 
ecobee contends that retrying damages alone without retrying infringement would not be possible, 
as the damages jury would not know which patent(s) were infringed. (Id.)  
    In response, Ollnova argues that ecobee is incorrect that a new trial is needed on all issues 
if the Court grants any single issue raised by ecobee. (Dkt. No. 260 at 7.) Since “[t]he critical 
question is whether the evidence, taken as a whole, was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict,” 
see Northpoint Tech., Ltd. v. MDS Am., Inc.,
413 F.3d 1301, 1310-11
(Fed. Cir. 2005), Ollnova 
argues that the Court may uphold the verdict so long as there was sufficient evidence to support a 
finding of infringement of “any” patent. (Id.) Accordingly, Ollnova contends that even if the Court 
were to grant JMOL of noninfringement of any asserted claim, there is substantial evidence to 

uphold the jury’s verdict as to the other asserted patent claims such that a new trial is not warranted. 
(Id. (citing Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co.,
952 F.2d 119, 126
(5th Cir. 1992))). Concerning ecobee’s 
argument that a retrial on damages would require a retrial of infringement, Ollnova argues that its 
damages theory presented at trial based on comparable licenses could be supported even if the jury 
found infringement of just a single patent. (Id.) The parties’ reply and sur-reply briefs do not 
substantially add to these arguments.                                     
    This argument by ecobee is conditioned on the Court granting at least one of its Motions 
for JMOL, at least in part. However, the Court has not granted any of ecobee’s motions for JMOL, 
and this issue is moot.                                                   
    D.   Prejudgment Interest                                            
    Even if a new trial is not granted, ecobee argues that the judgment should be amended to 
set the start date for any prejudgment interest as of March 8, 2022, the filing of Ollnova’s 
complaint. (Dkt. No. 247 at 11.) According to ecobee, damages did not begin to accrue until this 

date. ecobee notes that Ollnova alleged only indirect infringement for the asserted claims of the 
’495 Patent and one asserted claim of the ’371 Patent, and since Ollnova did not provide notice of 
these patents prior to this litigation, its damages for indirect infringement of these claims cannot 
begin to accrue prior to the filing of the complaint. (Id.) Concerning Ollnova’s claims for direct 
infringement, ecobee contends that Ollnova’s failure to mark precludes pre-complaint damages 
and interest.                                                             
    In response, Ollnova argues that the Final Judgment should not be modified because it 
correctly stated that prejudgment interest accrues “from the date [] the infringement began.” (Dkt. 
No. 260 at 8 (quoting Dkt. No. 237 ¶¶ 3, 4)). Ollnova notes that this language from the Final 
Judgment tracks Federal Circuit caselaw. For example, Ollnova notes that in Comcast IP Holdings 

I LLC v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P.,
850 F.3d 1302
(Fed. Cir. 2017), the jury awarded a lump sum 
royalty running from a 2006 hypothetical negotiation, and defendant Sprint complained that, 
because two of the three infringed patents did not issue until six years after the 2006 hypothetical 
negotiation, it was improper to award prejudgment interest starting from 2006. However, the 
Federal Circuit disagreed and considered that the jury of was told to use the book of wisdom, 
“looking forward in time from the date of the first hypothetical negotiation to account for ‘all 
information that would have been relevant to the parties in coming to and arriving at a deal.’”
Id. 
at 1314
. Accordingly, Ollnova argues, the Federal Circuit’s ruling concerning prejudgment interest 
was identical to this Court’s ruling in the Final Judgment: “Prejudgment interest runs from the 
earliest date infringement for any patent issued at the time of the hypothetical negotiation.”
Id. at 
1315
. Ollnova notes that the jury here decided to award the damages in the form of a lump sum 
royalty, meaning that ecobee owed Ollnova $11.5 million as of the April 2012 hypothetical 
negotiation. Since the April 2012 hypothetical negotiation coincides with when infringement 
began, LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc.,
694 F.3d 51, 76
(Fed. Cir. 2012), Ollnova 

argues that interest properly accrues starting in April 2012, when ecobee was to have fully paid 
the lump sum amount of $11.5 million.                                     
    In reply, ecobee argues that Ollnova now seeks interest for periods prior to the statute of 
limitations’  cut-off  (March  8,  2016).  (Dkt.  No.  265  at  4.)  According  to  ecobee,  Ollnova 
overreaches by misinterpreting the Comcast decision. (Id.) ecobee contends that Comcast is 
inapposite because it did not involve any disconnect between the damages period/statute of 
limitations and the hypothetical negotiation (i.e., damages there began accruing within the six 
years prior to the filing of the complaint). (Id.) Since interest runs from the dates that the damages 
started to accrue, ecobee argues that the earliest date from which interest can run is the date that 
damages started to accrue (March 8, 2016). (Id.)                          

    While, the Court finds that it is not necessary to amend the Final Judgment, the Court does 
not embrace fully Ollnova’s interpretation of the relevant authority on damages and interest. The 
Patent Act does not expressly provide the time period for calculating interest. See Transmatic, Inc. 
v. Gulton Indus., Inc.,
180 F.3d 1343, 1347
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that
35 U.S.C. § 284
“only 
prescribes damages and interest as a remedy for patent infringement” and does not state “[w]hen 
interest beings or ends”). Instead,
35 U.S.C. § 284
awards a patentee “damages adequate to 
compensate for the infringement . . . together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.” The 
Supreme Court has held that § 284 thus “gives a court general authority to fix interest and costs.” 
Devex, 461 U.S. at 653. Typically, this general authority should “ensure that the patent owner is 
placed in as good a position as he would have been in had the infringer entered into a reasonable 
royalty agreement.” Id. at 655; see also  Bio-Rad Labs., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp.,
807 F.2d 
964, 967
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (acknowledging that the award of prejudgment interest should be from 
the date of infringement to the date of final judgment, “since only such award will satisfy 

‘Congress’  overriding  purpose  [in  section  284]  of  affording  patent  owners  complete 
compensation’” (quoting Devex, 461 U.S. at 655)). However, the purpose of prejudgment interest 
is to compensate the patent owner for infringement and “can apply only to the actual damages 
portion of the judgment.” Imperium IP Holdings (Cayman), Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., No. 
4:14-CV-00371,
2017 WL 1716589
, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2017) (citing Beatrice Foods Co. v. 
New Eng. Printing & Lithographing Co.,
923 F.2d 1576, 1580
(Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
    Actual patent infringement damages are limited by
35 U.S.C. § 286
. This statute provides 
that “no recovery shall be had for any infringement committed more than six years prior to the 
filing of the complaint or counterclaim for infringement in the action.” Accordingly, the Court 
instructed the jury that the damages in this case began no earlier than March 8, 2016. Trial Tr. at 

1257:1-9. Prejudgment interest cannot extend prior to the damages period. The Court also finds 
that whether or not the jury awarded a lump sum or a running royalty does not control.3  
    Nonetheless, the Court is not persuaded that the Final Judgment should be amended as 
ecobee contends. The Final Judgment provides the following:               

3 Here, and in its response to ecobee’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law of No Damages or, in the Alternative, 
for a New Trial Regarding Damages (Dkt. No. 246), Ollnova seems to argue that the statutory limits to damages under
35 U.S.C. § 286
and 287 somehow do not apply when the jury awards damages in the form of a lump sum. This 
interpretation seems to be born out of the misunderstanding that the jury awards what was “owed . . . as of the [] 
hypothetical negotiation” (Dkt. No. 260 at 9) and that the amount is “not tied to units sold or time frame” (Dkt. No. 
259 at 18). However, the jury’s award of $11.5 million does not necessarily represent the “amount paid at the 2012 
hypothetical negotiation” (id.) as Ollnova contends, but rather is the amount of money “to compensate Ollnova for 
any infringement that [the jury] may find” during the damages period. Further, a lump sum award differs from a 
running royalty in that a lump sum award compensates Ollnova for future damages in addition to past damages. It 
does not allow Ollnova to reach beyond the statutory limits for its past damages, and it does not moot the requirements 
of the marking statute.                                                   
     Pursuant to
35  U.S.C.  §  284
and  Supreme  Court guidance  that  “prejudgment 
     interest shall ordinarily be awarded absent some justification for withholding such 
     an award,” the Court awards pre-judgment interest to Plaintiff to be recovered by 
     Plaintiff from Defendant and applicable to all sums awarded herein, calculated at 
     the five-year U.S. Treasury Bill rate, compounded monthly, adjusting the effective 
     rate with each and every change in said five-year U.S. Treasury Bill rate from the 
     date [] the infringement began; 
(Dkt. No. 237 at § 4.) “[F]rom the date [] the infringement began” does not mean the agreed upon 
hypothetical negotiation date. It refers to the infringement for which the “sums [were] awarded”— 
i.e.,  the  infringement  during  the  applicable  damages  period,  as  instructed  by  the  Court. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that prejudgment interest accrues from March 8, 2016. The Final 
Judgment sufficiently ties the prejudgment interest to the damages accrued in this case. Given this 
language, and the Court’s guidance, there is no need to amend the Final Judgment. 
     Concerning ecobee’s contentions that interest could not have accrued prior to March 2022, 
the  Court  finds that ecobee  merely repeats  arguments that the  Court has  already rejected in 
ecobee’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law of No Damages or, in the Alternative, for  a New 
Trial  Regarding  Damages  (Dkt.  No.  246).  Accordingly,  the  Court will not  amend the  Final 
Judgment on these grounds for the same reasons as stated in the Court’s Order denying that motion. 
IV.    CONCLUSION 
     For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that ecobee’s Motion should be and hereby is 
DENIED. 

    So ORDERED and SIGNED this Sth day of September, 2024. 

                                            RODNEY  GILSTRAP         \ 
                                            UNITED STATES  DISTRICT JUDGE 
                                     16