Patricia M. Kozak, et al. v. Edward J. Klikuszewski, et al.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
     FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA                         
PATRICIA M. KOZAK, et al.,        :  CIVIL NO. 4:21-CV-01609              
                             :                                       
     Plaintiffs,              :   (Magistrate Judge Schwab)          
                             :                                       
     v.                      :                                       
                             :                                       
EDWARD J. KLIKUSZEWSKI, et al.,   :                                       
                             :                                       
     Defendants.              :                                      


               MEMORANDUM OPINION                                    

I.  Introduction.                                                         
Patricia M. Kozak (“Patricia”) and Brian D. Kozak (“Brian”) (collectively 
“the Kozaks”) bring the instant suit against Edward J. Klikuszewski       
(“Klikuszewski”) and his employer, Barlow Trucking Lines (“Barlow”), based on 
a motor vehicle collision.  According to the Kozaks, their car collided with the 
tractor-trailer Klikuszewski was driving.  Trial in this matter is set to begin on 
December 16, 2025.  Currently pending are five motions in limine.  For the reasons 
set forth below, we will deny four of the motions in limine and grant the remaining 
motion in limine.                                                         
II.  Background and Procedural History.                                   
On September 17, 2021, the Kozaks began this action by filing a complaint 

over which we have diversity jurisdiction. Doc. 1; see also
28 U.S.C. § 1332
.  
Much has happened over the four years since this case was first filed in this court.  
The below is a summary of only what is relevant for our purposes today.   

The Kozaks allege that on December 18, 2019, during a snow squall,   
Klikuszewski, driving a tractor-trailer pursuant to his employment with Barlow, 
struck and hooked the Kozaks’ car and dragged it down Interstate 80. Doc. 1.  The 
Kozaks allege “substantial, life-altering injuries” as a result.
Id.
The complaint 

lays out five counts based on this incident: (1) Count I against Klikuszewski for 
negligence and recklessness and for negligence per se based on violations of the 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (“FMCSR”); (2) Count II against Barlow 

for vicarious liability; (3) Count III against Barlow for negligent supervision;  
(4) Count IV against both defendants for Patricia’s loss of consortium; and (5) 
Count V against both defendants for Brian’s loss of consortium. Doc. 1.   
After being served, the defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss, which 

then-presiding Chief Judge Brann denied. Docs. 5, 6, 7, 9, 10.  The parties then 
filed an answer to the complaint. Doc. 11.  Later, the parties consented to proceed 
before a magistrate judge pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636
(c), and the case was referred 

to the undersigned. Doc. 15.  We set case management deadlines, which were 
extended multiple times as a result of discovery disputes and for settlement 
discussions. Docs. 20, 30, 34, 38, 41, 51.                                

After close of discovery, the defendants filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment, which we granted in part and denied in part.1 Docs. 53, 54, 55, 61, 62.  
Thus, the following claims remain for trial: (1) Count I against Klikuszewski for 

negligence, recklessness, and negligence per se based on violation of
49 C.F.R.  
§ 392.14
regarding hazardous conditions; (2) Count II against Barlow for vicarious 
liability; (3) Count III against Barlow for negligent supervision; and (4) Counts IV 
and V which contain claims for loss of consortium brought by each plaintiff 

against both of the defendants. Docs. 1, 61, 62.                          
Pursuant to our pretrial order, motions in limine were due on or before 
September 15, 2025. Doc. 65.  The defendants filed five motions in limine and 

briefs in support thereof. Docs. 66–75.  The Kozaks filed briefs in opposition to 
each motion. Docs. 76–80.  The time for filing reply briefs has passed, and the 
motions are thus ripe for review.                                         


1 In their partial motion for summary judgment, the defendants argued that 
they were entitled to summary judgment on the Kozaks’ claims that defendants 
were reckless, claims for punitive damages, and claims that the defendants violated 
the FMCSR. Doc. 53.  After considering the defendants’ arguments and the  
Kozaks’ counter arguments, we granted the partial motion for summary judgment 
only in part. Doc. 61.  Specifically, we granted summary judgment on the Kozaks’ 
claims that the defendants violated the hours-of-service regulations and training 
and knowledge requirements under the FMCSR.
Id.
But we denied the motion in 
all other respects. Docs. 61, 62.                                         
III.  Standard of Review.                                                 
Generally, “a motion in limine is designed to narrow the evidentiary issues 

for trial and to eliminate unnecessary trial interruptions.” Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. 
of Educ.,
913 F.2d 1064
, 1069 (3d Cir. 1990).  “A court may exercise its discretion 
to rule in limine on evidentiary issues ‘in appropriate cases.’” Wilson v. Mahally, 

No. 3:18-CV-1637,
2023 WL 8528661
, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2023) (quoting In 
re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
723 F.2d 238, 260
(3d Cir. 1983), rev’d 
on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 
U.S. 574
(1986)).  “Nevertheless, a ‘trial court should exclude evidence on a 

motion in limine only when the evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential 
grounds.’”
Id.
(quoting United States v. Tartaglione,
228 F. Supp. 3d 402, 406
(E.D. Pa. 2017)).                                                         

“Further, while motions in limine may serve as a useful pretrial tool that 
enables more in-depth briefing than would be available at trial, a court may defer 
ruling on such motions ‘if the context of trial would provide clarity.’” Tobin v. 
Cherry, No. 1:20-CV-02320,
2022 WL 18028150
, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2022) 

(quoting Frintner v. TruePosition,
892 F. Supp. 2d 699, 707
(E.D. Pa. 2012)).  
“Finally, it is important to note that ‘in limine rulings are not binding on the trial 
judge, and the judge may always change [her] mind during the course of the trial.’” 
Bird v. Borough of Moosic, No. 3:18-CV-02289,
2022 WL 584072
, at *2 (M.D. 
Pa. Feb. 25, 2022) (quoting Ohler v. United States,
529 U.S. 753
, 758 n.3 (2000)).  


IV.  Discussion.                                                          
Our jurisdiction over this case is based on diversity. See
28 U.S.C. § 1332
.  

“Federal diversity jurisdiction provides an alternative forum for the adjudication of 
state-created rights, but it does not carry with it generation of rules of substantive 
law.” Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,
518 U.S. 415, 426
(1996).  
Accordingly, “[u]nder the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply 

state substantive law and federal procedural law.”
Id.
Here, the defendants cite to Pennsylvania procedural law in their motions in 
limine. See doc. 67 (citing Pennsylvania rules and case law regarding bifurcation); 

doc. 70 (citing the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence regarding the exclusion of 
evidence); but see doc. 75 (citing the Federal Rules of Evidence regarding 
relevancy).  But federal procedural law applies where, like here, the court sits in 
diversity. See Gasperini,
518 U.S. at 426
.  Thus, we will apply federal procedural 

law herein.                                                               
A.  Motion in Limine to Bifurcate.                                   
In their first motion in limine, the defendants seek to bifurcate the issues of 

liability and damages at trial (“bifurcation motion in limine”). Doc. 66.  They 
argue that “[s]eparating the issues of liability and damages will allow the jury’s 
deliberations to focus on the facts and legal issues pertaining to liability for the 

multi-vehicle collision, rather than feeling sympathy for [the Kozaks] and the 
potential prejudice against the Defendants.” Doc. 67 at 5.  The defendants also 
argue that “bifurcation accomplishes the goal of judicial economy and serves to 
convenience the Court.”
Id.
The defendants cite Pennsylvania caselaw to support 

these arguments.
Id.
at 3–6.                                              
The Kozaks direct our attention to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) to 
govern our bifurcation decision. Doc. 87 at 3.  They cite to cases in this district in 

which the court denied motions for trifurcation and noted the complexity of the 
issue of fault, whether extensive injury caused undue prejudice, and whether “such 
a procedure would create needless waste of the court’s time and resources.”
Id.
at 
3–5.  Confusingly, the Kozaks specifically argue that “trifurcation of the 

proceedings on the issue of liability, compensatory damages and punitive  
damages[,]” “would greatly complicate, confuse, and unduly delay resolution of 
this matter.” Id. at 6.  But, as the Kozaks acknowledge, the defendants have not 

sought such relief in their bifurcation motion in limine. Id.  Nevertheless, the 
Kozaks conclude it is “likely” that the defendants are seeking trifurcation rather 
than bifurcation. Id.                                                     

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b),2 a court may “order a separate 
trial of one or more separate issues for convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to 
expedite and economize.” Wolking v. Lindner, NO. 3:23-CV-806,
2025 WL     

1106080
, *1 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2025).  “The court has wide latitude in deciding 
whether to” bifurcate proceedings. Griffith v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
90 F.Supp.3d 344, 
346
(M.D. Pa. 2014).  “In determining whether bifurcation is appropriate, the court 
considers four factors: (1) ‘whether the issues are significantly different from each 

other; (2) whether they require separate witnesses and documents; (3) whether the 
nonmoving party would be prejudiced by bifurcation; and (4) whether the moving 
party would be prejudiced if bifurcation is not granted.’” Wolking,
2025 WL 

1106080
at *1 (quoting Griffith,
90 F.Supp.3d at 346
).                    
As to whether the issues the defendants seek to bifurcate—namely, liability 
and damages—are “significantly different from each other,” Wolking,
2025 WL 
1106080
at *1, the defendants make only a passing reference to cases “where 

liability and damages issues are not interwoven[.]” Doc. 67 at 4.  Neither the 


2 We apply federal procedural law to the question of bifurcation in this 
diversity case. Cf Simpson v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp.,
901 F.2d 277, 283
(2d Cir. 
1990) (finding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) governs motions to bifurcate in diversity 
cases).                                                                   
defendants nor the Kozaks elaborate on the liability and damages issues here and 
how they differ.  Similarly, neither the defendants nor the Kozaks provide any 

argument regarding whether the liability and damages phases of this trial would 
require separate witnesses or documents. See docs. 67, 76.  The defendants also do 
not address whether the Kozaks would be prejudiced by bifurcation. See doc. 67.  

The Kozaks, however, argue that trifurcating—which they presume the defendants 
are seeking—“would greatly complicate, confuse, and unduly delay resolution of 
this matter.” Doc. 76 at 6.                                               
Finally, we consider whether the defendants would be prejudiced if we do 

not grant bifurcation. The defendants argue that the jury could be “tainted” 
“through sympathy occasioned by knowledge of the severity of the injury.” Doc. 
67 at 4.  The defendants cite Pennsylvania court decisions that posit that plaintiffs 

may resist bifurcation because they “desire to garner sympathy from the jury in 
establishing liability by use of damage evidence.” Id. at 5.  In sum, the defendants 
seek bifurcation “to ensure that the jury will not base its decision regarding liability 
on feelings of sympathy for [the Kozaks].” Id. at 6.  The Kozaks, pointing to 

federal case law, counterargue that even serious injury does not automatically 
qualify as undue prejudice against a defendant. Doc. 76 at 6.             
The Third Circuit has stated—albeit in an unpublished decision—that  

“[b]ifurcating a trial into separate liability and damages sections is the exception, 
not the rule.” Sweigart v. Voyager Trucking Corp., No. 23-2397,
2024 WL   
3565306
, *3 (3d Cir. July 29, 2024).  Moreover, the Third Circuit declined “to hold 

that a trial court abuses its discretion in denying bifurcation just because a case 
involves serious personal injuries” because to do so would be to “flip the 
presumption against bifurcation on its head” and “require courts to grant 

bifurcation any time a case involved serious personal injuries.”
Id.
We are thus not 
required to bifurcate this trial based on the Kozaks’ injuries alone.  And upon 
reviewing the parties’ arguments and the circumstances of the instant case, we find 
that proper jury instructions will be sufficient to avoid any possible prejudice to the 

defendants.                                                               
Accordingly, we will deny the bifurcation motion in limine.          


B.  Motion in Limine to Preclude Allegations of Reckless, Recklessly 
Indifferent, and Grossly Negligent Conduct.                          

In the defendants’ second motion in limine the defendants seek “to preclude 
evidence of reckless, recklessly indifferent, grossly negligent conduct, or” 
evidence that they “acted with wanton and willful indifference” and claims for 
punitive damages (because all of this evidence goes to the punitive damages 
claims, we will hereafter refer to this motion in limine as the “punitive damages 
motion in limine”). Docs. 68, 69.  The defendants argue that the Kozaks have 
“failed to procure evidence that [the] Defendants knowingly operated a tractor 
trailer in a dangerous manner, knew or had reason to know that their actions 
created a high degree of risk, deliberately proceeded in disregard of known risks, 

or were indifferent to any known risks.” Doc. 69 at 5.  Ultimately, citing 
Pennsylvania substantive law, the defendants argue that the Kozaks “have failed to 
plead sufficient facts which would entitle them to punitive damages.”
Id.
Thus, the 

defendants assert that the Kozaks’ claims for punitive damages “should be 
dismissed with prejudice[.]”
Id. at 3
.                                    
In their brief in opposition, the Kozaks counterargue that “this Court has 
already determined that there is sufficient evidence to allow a jury to reasonably 

conclude that [the] Defendants’ conduct rose to the level for which punitive 
damages may be awarded[.]” Doc. 78 at 1–2.  The Kozaks argue that “the Law of 
the Case Doctrine precludes” “relitigating issues that were resolved earlier in the 

litigation.”
Id.
at 2–3.  The Kozaks further argue that “evidence of [the] 
Defendants’ reckless conduct, wanton conduct and reckless indifference is 
crucially relevant to the factual elements for which Plaintiffs must prove in order to 
support an award of punitive damages.”
Id. at 7
.                          

“Unlike a summary judgment motion, which is designed to eliminate a trial 
in cases where there are no genuine issues of fact, a motion in limine is designed to 
narrow the evidentiary issues for trial and to eliminate unnecessary trial 

interruptions.” Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. Of Educ.,
913 F.2d 1064
, 1069 (3d Cir. 
1990) (citing In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation,
723 F.2d 
238, 260
(3d Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. 

Co. v. Zenith Radio,
475 U.S. 574
,
106 S.Ct. 1348
,
89 L.Ed.2d 538
(1985)).   
Here, the defendants are explicitly asking for us to dismiss certain claims with 
prejudice via a motion in limine—claims we have already addressed in our  

decision on the partial motion for summary judgment. Docs. 61, 62.  Accordingly, 
for the same reasons we denied the defendants’ summary judgment motion insofar 
as it sought summary judgment on the Kozaks’ claims for punitive damages, we 
will also deny this motion in limine.3 Cf Cote v. Schnell Industries, No. 4:18-CV-

01440,
2022 WL 16815032
, *14 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2022) (“Although motions for 
summary judgment and motions in limine serve different functions, the instant 
motion seeks the same relief based on the same factual record as Schnell’s 


3 To the extent the defendants invite us to reconsider our summary judgment 
decision via this motion in limine, we also deny this invitation.  The Third Circuit 
“has recognized several ‘extraordinary circumstances’ that warrant a court’s 
reconsideration of an issue decided earlier in the course of litigation.” Pub. Int. 
Rsch. Grp. Of New Jersey, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc.,
123 F.3d 111
, 116–17 
(3d Cir. 1997).  Those extraordinary circumstances “include situations in which: 
(1) new evidence is available; (2) a supervening new law has been announced; or 
(3) the earlier decision was clearly erroneous and would create manifest injustice.” 
Id. at 117.  The defendants do not argue that any of these situations are present 
here. See docs. 69, 69.  And we do not find any such extraordinary circumstances 
apply.  Accordingly, we will not reconsider our earlier decision regarding punitive 
damages.  Because the Kozaks’ punitive damages remain, we also will not bar the 
Kozaks from bringing evidence of allegedly reckless, recklessly indifferent, or 
grossly negligent conduct before the jury.                                
appropriately filed (if ultimately unsuccessful) motion for summary judgment.  
Accordingly, just as Schnell’s summary judgment motion failed, so to[o] must this 

motion in limine.”).                                                      
In sum, we will deny the defendants’ punitive damages motion in limine. 


C.  Motion in Limine to Preclude the Kozaks from Referring to        
Klikuszewski as a “Professional Driver.”4                            

In their third motion in limine, the defendants seek to preclude the Kozaks 
from referring to Klikuszewski as a “professional driver” during trial (the 
“professional driver motion in limine”). Doc. 70.  The defendants argue that under 
Pennsylvania substantive law “there is no professional standard of care for a driver 
of a tractor-trailer[,]” so “[t]here is no valid reason . . . for the [Kozaks] to use the 
term ‘professional driver’ at trial.” Doc. 71 at 2.  The defendants go even further, 



4 In support of their argument in this motion in limine (doc. 71 at 2), the 
defendants cite Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403, which gives the court leeway 
to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of 
one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the 
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence,” 
Pa. R.E. 403.  The Kozaks, however, cite to the corresponding Federal Rule of 
Evidence in their brief in opposition. See doc. 80 at 3.  As discussed above, in 
diversity cases such as the instant case, we apply state substantive law and federal 
procedural law.  We thus will apply Federal Rule of Evidence 403 both here and at 
trial. Cf Schulz v. Celotex Corp.,
942 F.2d 204, 209
(3d Cir. 1991) (applying Fed. 
R.E. 403 in a diversity case).                                            
arguing that “[t]he sole reason to use the term would be to cause unfair prejudice to 
[the] defendant[s], confuse the issues, or mislead the jury.” Id. at 2.   

In their brief in opposition, the Kozaks state that they “do not intend to refer 
to . . . Klikuszewski as a professional driver.” Doc. 80 at 2.  They provide no 
further argument why they should be able to refer to Klikuszewski as a    

professional driver if they so choose.  Accordingly, we will grant the professional 
driver motion in limine as unopposed.                                     
The Kozaks also argue, however, that “evidence of Mr. Klikuszewski’s 
training and experience is admissible to show that he subjectively appreciated the 

risk of harm involved in failing to operate the Barlow trailer with extreme caution 
in hazardous weather conditions.” Id. at 3.  We will not decide whether such 
evidence is admissible at this juncture, however, because we do not construe the 

professional driver motion in limine as requesting that we exclude the evidence the 
Kozaks describe.  The parties should be prepared to discuss at the pretrial 
conference whether, after conferring about the issue, there remains a dispute about 
the evidence identified in the Kozaks’ brief in opposition to the professional driver 

motion in limine (doc. 80 at 3–4).                                        
D.  Motion in Limine to Preclude Corporate Negligence Claims against 
Barlow.                                                              

In their fourth motion in limine, the defendants seek to preclude corporate 
negligence claims against Barlow (the “corporate negligence claims motion in 
limine”). Doc. 72.  The defendants assert that “there is zero evidence that the 
corporation[, Barlow,] was solely negligent in any manner as it relates to this 
incident.” Doc. 73 at 2.  Instead, the defendants argue “[s]hould a jury determine 
the driver acted in a negligent manner, then the corporation would be liable under 

the theory of respondeat superior.” Id. (citing Brezenski v. World Truck Transfer, 
Inc.,
755 A.2d 36
(Pa. Super. 2000)).  The defendants further argue that  
Pennsylvania law does not “allow for claims for negligent entrustment, supervision 

and hiring when an employer defendant concedes an agency relationship with the 
co-defendant agent.”
Id.
(citing Fortunato v. May, No. 04-1140,
2009 WL 703393
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2009)).                                                
In their brief in opposition, the Kozaks argue that they not only have 

“sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Barlow was reckless in its hiring 
and retention of Mr. Klikuszewski” but also that courts do permit negligent 
entrustment claims where punitive damages claims are also brought. Doc. 77 at  

2–3.                                                                      
“[A] majority of courts have dismissed claims for negligent supervision and 
negligent hiring when a supervisor defendant concedes an agency relationship with 
the co-defendant.” Thomas v. Orozco-Pineda, NO. 3:24-cv-288,
2025 WL      
2809346
, *8 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2025).  But “[t]hese courts have recognized an 

exception to this rule where there are viable claims for punitive damages against 
the supervisor defendant.”
Id.
In other words, where, as here, there are punitive 
damages against a supervisor, negligent supervision, hiring, and entrustment 

claims may proceed.                                                       
We note that the defendants cite a Western District case, Fortunato v. May,
2009 WL 703393
, for the proposition that “[a]s a general rule, courts have 
dismissed claims for negligent supervision and negligent hiring when a supervisor 

defendant concedes an agency relationship with the co-defendant.” See doc. 73 at 
2.  But the very next sentences of that opinion acknowledge the relevant exception:  
The courts have recognized an exception to this rule when a          
plaintiff has made punitive damages claims against the               
supervisor defendant.  In such a case, the plaintiff can not         
receive complete relief based upon the primary defendant’s           
negligence, and must also assert a separate negligence claim         
against the supervisor.
Id. at *5
.  It is unclear whether the defendants simply did not read the remaining 
paragraph of the authority they cited or if they intended for the negligent 
entrustment claims motion in limine to be contingent on the granting of their 
punitive damages claims motion in limine.  Giving the defendants the benefit of 
the doubt, we note that because we denied their punitive damages motion in limine, 
we will also deny their corporate negligence claims motion in limine.     
E.  Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Klikuszewski’s Prior     
Citations and Accidents.                                             

In their fifth and final motion in limine the defendants seek to exclude 
evidence of Klikuszewski’s prior traffic citations and accidents (the “citations and 
accidents motion in limine”). Doc. 74.  The defendants argue that Klikuszewski’s 
prior accidents or citations “are completely irrelevant to the jury’s determination of 
whether [ ] he is liable for the accident and injuries at issue.” Doc. 75 at 2.  Further, 
according to the defendants, “summary and minor traffic offenses are not  

admissible in subsequent civil proceedings as evidence of facts underlying the 
conviction.”5
Id.
Finally, the defendants assert that “[t]he only purpose of 
admitting” evidence of Klikuszewski’s prior accidents and citations “is to cause 

Defendants prejudice and confuse the jury.”
Id. at 3
.                     
The Kozaks argue that Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2) “permits the 
introduction of evidence concerning other crimes, wrongs or acts when such 
evidence may be admissible for another purpose[.]” Doc. 79 at 3.  The Kozaks 

assert that evidence of Klikuszewski’s prior citations and accidents while operating 
a tractor trailer “is being offered to establish [the Kozaks’] direct claims of 


5 We note that the Kozaks do not appear to intend to produce evidence of 
Klikuszewski’s prior accidents or traffic citations at trial as evidence of the facts 
underlying those convictions.  Instead, the Kozaks assert that they intend to 
produce evidence of Klikuszewski’s prior accidents or traffic citations to show 
what information about Klikuszewski’s driving record was available to Barlow 
upon the hiring of Klikuszewski. Doc. 79 at 5–6.                          
negligent hiring, retention, entrustment and reckless conduct on the part of 
Barlow.”
Id. at 5
.  In fact, according to the Kozaks, “[i]n order to support a finding 

of direct liability by the jury against Barlow, [the Kozaks] are required to produce” 
evidence that Barlow was negligent in hiring, retaining, and entrusting its tractor 
trailer to Klikuszewski—for example, that he had pre-existing accidents or traffic 

citations.
Id.
at 5–6.  The Kozaks propose that any concerns of prejudicial impact 
of the evidence of Klikuszewski’s prior accidents or traffic citations could be 
assuaged by charging the jury “on the limited purpose for which the evidence is 
being introduced.”
Id. at 6
.                                              

Pursuant to Fed. R. E. 402 and 403,6 relevant evidence—in other words, 
evidence which “has any tendency to make a fact” that is “of consequence in 
determining the action” “more or less probable than it would be without the 

evidence”—is generally admissible.  But “[t]he court may exclude relevant 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or 
more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, 
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. 

E. 403.  Further, under Fed. R. E. 404(b), “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, 
or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a 


6 The parties both correctly identify that we will apply the Federal Rules of 
Evidence when deciding whether to exclude evidence of Klikuszewski’s prior 
traffic citations and accidents.                                          
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”  But under 
Fed. R. E. 404(b) evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts “may be admissible for 

another purpose, such as proving[,]” among other things, “knowledge[.]” Fed. R. 
E. 404(b).  “In order to admit evidence under Rule 404(b), a court must be able to 
articulate a way in which the tendered evidence logically tends to establish or 

refute a material fact in issue, and that chain of logic must include no link 
involving an inference that a bad person is disposed to do bad acts.” Knecht v. 
Balanescu, NO. 4:16-CV-00549,
2017 WL 4883198
, *7 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2017) 
(citing Government of the Virgin Islands v. Pinney,
967 F.2d 912, 915
(3d Cir. 

1992)).                                                                   
The Third Circuit has set forth a “four-prong test to determine the  
admissibility of” evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts: “(1) the evidence must 

have a proper purpose under Rule 404(b); (2) it must be relevant under Rule 402; 
(3) its probative value must outweigh its prejudicial effect under Rule 403; and (4) 
the [district] court must charge the jury to consider the evidence only for the 
limited purpose for which it was admitted.” Becker v. ARCO Chemical Co.,
207 

F.3d 176, 189
(3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in 
original).  Here, the evidence of Klikuszewski’s past traffic citations and accidents 
is relevant to the Kozaks’ claims against Barlow for negligent hiring, retention, and 

entrustment.  The evidence also has a proper purpose under Fed. R. E. 404(b)—
namely, to show what information Barlow had about Klikuszewski’s driving  
record prior to the accident.  And the probative value of the evidence for its proper 

purpose outweighs any prejudicial effect—especially when any prejudicial effect 
of admitting the evidence is mitigated by a charge to the jury to consider the 
evidence only for that limited, proper purpose.                           

Accordingly, we will deny the citations and accidents motion in limine.  The 
parties shall be prepared to discuss proposed mitigating jury instructions at our 
pretrial conference.                                                      


IV.  Conclusion.                                                          
For the reasons set forth above, we will grant the professional driver motion 
in limine (doc. 70).  We will deny the remaining four motions in limine (docs. 66, 

68, 72, 74).  We also expect the parties to be prepared to discuss at our pretrial 
conference (1) whether, after conferring about the issue, there remains a dispute 
about the evidence identified in the Kozaks’ brief in opposition to the professional 
driver motion in limine (doc. 80 at 3–4); and (2) proposed mitigating jury 

instructions regarding the evidence described in the citations and accidents motion 
in limine (doc. 74).  An appropriate order follows.                       
                              S/Susan E. Schwab                      
                              Susan E. Schwab                        
                              United States Magistrate Judge