Peo v. Miedema

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24CA0618 Peo v Miedema 08-28-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS


Court of Appeals No. 24CA0618
Lincoln County District Court No. 22CR31
Honorable H. Clay Hurst, Judge


The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Mitchell A. Miedema,

Defendant-Appellant.


                            JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

                                  Division V
                         Opinion by JUDGE GROVE
                       Welling and Johnson, JJ., concur

                 NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
                        Announced August 28, 2025


Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Leo T. Nguyen, Assistant Attorney General
Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Molly K. Turner, Deputy State
Public Defender, Castle Rock, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1    Defendant, Mitchell A. Miedema, appeals the judgment of

 conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of a misdemeanor

 harassment charge. We affirm.

                              I.   Background

¶2    Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have

 found the following facts.

¶3    Miedema lived with his romantic partner, N.A., and her two

 children. N.A. loaned a smartphone to Miedema, which he used to

 message his ex-girlfriend. N.A. discovered the messages and

 decided to confront Miedema about them.

¶4    Miedema was still texting his ex-girlfriend when N.A.

 confronted him. N.A. tried to grab the phone out of his hand, and

 in response, Miedema choked her. When he stopped, N.A. retreated

 to her bedroom and locked the door.

¶5    The next morning, N.A. dropped her children off at school and

 then went to Big R, her place of employment. When N.A. arrived at

 Big R, she told a coworker, Josh Furman, what had happened.

 Furman was a state trooper who worked at Big R while off duty. He

 told N.A. that he was a “mandatory reporter” and that she should

 tell the police about the incident.


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¶6    From there, N.A. went to the police, where she described the

 incident to Limon Chief of Police Lynn Yowell and Officer Jacob

 Herrera. Two weeks later, she filed a victim impact statement with

 the Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney’s Office. According to her

 later testimony, N.A. never advised the officers, nor wrote in her

 victim impact statement, that she had been advised by anyone to

 report the incident to the police.

¶7    Miedema was arrested on charges of second degree and third

 degree assault. The prosecution later added another second degree

 assault charge and a harassment charge. The prosecution dropped

 the felony charges before trial, and the jury found Miedema guilty of

 a single count of harassment. He was sentenced to six months in

 jail suspended upon the successful completion of two years of

 supervised probation, running consecutively to his sentence in a

 separate case.

                         II.   Issues on Appeal

¶8    Miedema contends that the district court erred (1) when it

 failed to sanction the prosecution for an alleged Crim. P. 16

 violation and (2) by admitting several out-of-court statements made




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  by Miedema’s ex-girlfriend without calling her as a witness at trial

  in violation of the Confrontation Clause.

                   A.    Alleged Crim. P. 16 Violation

¶9     Miedema first contends that the court erred by declining to

  sanction the prosecution for violating Crim. P. 16 based on its

  allegedly late disclosure that N.A. had told Furman about the

  incident before reporting it to the police. He claims further that the

  delayed notification prevented the defense from effectively preparing

  for trial and that any remedy short of dismissal would have unfairly

  required Miedema to waive speedy trial. We are not persuaded.

                          1.   Additional Facts

¶ 10   On the day that trial began, the prosecutor disclosed to

  Miedema’s attorney that, when N.A. arrived at Big R the morning

  after the incident, she told Furman what had happened. The

  prosecutor also disclosed that Furman was an off-duty state trooper

  and that he had told N.A. that he was a mandatory reporter and

  that she should tell the police about the incident.

¶ 11   Although the prosecution had endorsed Furman as a potential

  witness more than nine months before trial, defense counsel

  contended that the prosecution had nonetheless violated its Crim.
3
  P. 16
discovery obligations by not disclosing the details of the

  conversation sooner and argued that Miedema was prejudiced

  because those details could impact N.A.’s credibility. Defense

  counsel asked the court to dismiss the charges as a sanction

  because granting a continuance to allow the defense to follow up on

  the newly disclosed information would force Miedema to choose

  between his speedy trial right and his right to a fair trial.

¶ 12   The court declined to impose sanctions, finding that there was

  no Crim. P. 16 violation because Furman had been disclosed as a

  potential witness and, in an earlier motion, the defense indicated

  that it planned to interview him. Moreover, there appeared to be no

  written report about the conversation between N.A. and Furman.

  The court also noted that more than a month remained before the

  expiration of Miedema’s statutory speedy trial deadline, and it

  further confirmed that Miedema did not wish to delay the trial in

  order to have the opportunity to investigate the new evidence.

              2.    Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 13   We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

  discretion. Campbell v. People,
2019 CO 66
, ¶ 21. A trial court

  abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary,


                                      4
  unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies the law. People v.

  Williams,
2019 COA 32, ¶ 21
.

¶ 14   In every criminal case, the parties are obligated to disclose

  certain information before trial. See Crim. P. 16. “By permitting

  the prosecution and defense to obtain relevant information prior to

  trial,” our supreme court has explained, “[the discovery rules]

  promote fairness in the criminal process by reducing the risk of trial

  by ambush.” People v. Grant,
2021 COA 53
, ¶ 20 (quoting Lanari v.

  People,
827 P.2d 495, 499
(Colo. 1992)).

¶ 15   As relevant to Miedema’s appellate arguments, Crim. P. 16

  requires the prosecution to disclose “any material or information

  within [its] possession or control which tends to negate the guilt of

  the accused as to the offense charged.” Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(2). The

  prosecution’s disclosure obligation extends to information “in the

  possession or control” of “any others who have participated in the

  investigation or evaluation of the case and who either regularly

  report, or with reference to the particular case have reported,” to

  the prosecution. Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(3); Grant, ¶ 22. The rule requires

  that such information be produced “as soon as practicable but not

  later than 35 days before trial.” Crim. P. 16(I)(b)(3). If a discovery


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  violation occurs, the trial court determines an appropriate sanction.

  People v. Acosta,
2014 COA 82, ¶ 13
.

                               3.   Analysis

¶ 16   Miedema contends that information about N.A.’s conversation

  with Furman was subject to the disclosure requirements of Crim.

  P. 16(I)(a)(2). He also asserts that, because of Furman’s

  employment as a state trooper, Furman’s participation in the

  conversation, as well as Yowell’s alleged knowledge of it, triggered

  the prosecution’s disclosure obligations under Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(3).

  By failing to disclose anything about the conversation until the first

  day of trial, Miedema argues, the prosecution violated the

  disclosure deadline set forth in Crim. P. 16(I)(b)(3).

¶ 17   At the threshold, it is not at all clear that information about

  N.A.’s conversation with Furman would have “tend[ed] to negate the

  guilt of the accused as to the offense charged or would tend to

  reduce the punishment therefor.” Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(2). While

  Miedema asserts that it was “information relevant to the credibility

  of a key witness” — which can be exculpatory, see People v.

  Braunthal,
31 P.3d 167, 174-75
(Colo. 2001) — he also

  acknowledges that “[n]obody knows exactly what [N.A. and Furman]


                                     6
  spoke about” during their interaction at Big R. Moreover, he

  concedes that “it is possible that [N.A.’s] statements to [Furman]

  were entirely consistent with her later statements to police,” and

  that Furman might not have offered “coaching [or] advice about how

  she should file the report.” In other words, Miedema’s assertion

  that information about the conversation had apparent exculpatory

  value and was thus subject to the disclosure requirements of Crim.

  P. 16(I)(a)(2) is entirely speculative. But a “conclusory and

  speculative” claim that withheld evidence has apparent exculpatory

  value is not enough to require disclosure. People v. Eason,
2022

  COA 54
, ¶ 48 (collecting cases).

¶ 18   Regardless, even if information about N.A.’s conversation with

  Furman did have apparent exculpatory value, the prosecution did

  not have any obligation to disclose it under Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(3).

¶ 19   Miedema contends that disclosure was required because

  (1) Furman is a state trooper based in the Eighteenth Judicial

  District, and, in that capacity, he “regularly report[s]” to the District

  Attorney’s office; and (2) Furman “participated in the . . . evaluation

  of the case” when he heard N.A.’s initial statement and told her to

  file a police report. As a Colorado state trooper, however, Furman is


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  employed by a state agency, see §§ 24-33.5-201(2), -212, C.R.S.

  2025, and nothing in the record suggests that Furman “regularly

  reports” to the Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney’s Office. Nor

  does the record suggest that Furman acted as an arm of the

  prosecution team in this case such that the prosecution might be

  considered to be in constructive custody of information concerning

  the conversation between Furman and N.A. See Solano v. Newman,
2024 COA 93M
, ¶¶ 29, 35 (a prosecutor is in constructive custody

  of information from government entities that assisted the

  prosecution with the criminal investigation against a defendant).

¶ 20   Nor does Miedema point us to any statutory, regulatory, or

  department policies that could have triggered a temporary reporting

  relationship, such as Furman’s duty as a mandatory reporter. See,

  e.g., § 19-3-304, C.R.S. 2025 (persons required to report child

  abuse or neglect); § 18-6.5-108, C.R.S. 2025 (persons required to

  report mistreatment of at-risk elders and at-risk adults with

  intellectual disabilities); § 12-240-139, C.R.S. 2025 (requiring




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  certain medical professionals to report domestic abuse).1

  Accordingly, even if Furman “participated in the . . . evaluation of

  the case” when he listened to N.A. and advised her to report the

  incident (and assuming that information about the conversation

  had apparent exculpatory value), the disclosure requirements of

  Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(3) would not have applied.

¶ 21   As to Chief Yowell, Miedema cites no record evidence

  suggesting that Chief Yowell was aware of the initial conversation

  between Furman and N.A. Rather, the record demonstrates only

  that defense counsel speculated that “there [was] a real possibility

  here that Chief Yowell knew this information and that it wasn’t

  disclosed to us, and that’s why the People moved to endorse.” But

  even this speculation is undercut by the record: N.A. testified at

  trial that she never informed the police that she had been advised

  to report the incident.




  1 Although Furman appears to have told N.A. that he was a

  “mandatory reporter” due to his employment as a peace officer, it is
  not clear which, if any, mandatory reporting statute would have
  applied under the circumstances here, and the record does not
  reflect that he ever directly reported the conversation to the police.

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¶ 22   Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the

  district court abused its discretion when it concluded that the

  prosecution had complied with its disclosure obligations.

              B.    Alleged Confrontation Clause Violation

¶ 23   Miedema next argues the district court violated his

  confrontation rights when it admitted text messages between

  himself and his ex-girlfriend. We disagree.

                          1.     Additional Facts

¶ 24   At trial, the prosecution moved to admit the following

  unredacted screenshot of a conversation between Miedema and his

  ex-girlfriend into evidence:




                                     10
                      Text Message Conversation

¶ 25   The prosecution argued that Miedema’s statements — which

  appear on the right side of the text chain — were admissible as

  nonhearsay under CRE 801(d)(2)(A) and that the ex-girlfriend’s


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  statements were admissible under the rule of completeness, CRE

  106. Counsel maintained, however, that the ex-girlfriend’s

  statements included in the screenshot were not hearsay because

  they were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Defense

  counsel objected, claiming that the ex-girlfriend’s messages were

  inadmissible hearsay that violated Miedema’s Confrontation Clause

  rights. The court admitted the statements under CRE 801(d)(2)(A)

  and CRE 106, and rejected Miedema’s Confrontation Clause

  argument.

              2.    Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 26   Appellate review of a possible Confrontation Clause violation is

  de novo. Bernal v. People,
44 P.3d 184, 198
(Colo. 2002).

¶ 27   Hearsay evidence is not admissible except as provided by the

  Colorado Rules of Evidence or other rules or statutes. CRE 802.

  Hearsay is “a statement other than one made by the declarant while

  testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the

  truth of the matter asserted.” CRE 801(c).

¶ 28   CRE 106 provides that “[w]hen a statement or part thereof is

  introduced by a party, an adverse party may require introduction of

  any other part . . . which ought in fairness to be considered


                                     12
  contemporaneously with it. The adverse party may do so over a

  hearsay objection.” See also People v. McLaughlin,
2023 CO 38
,

  ¶ 27 (“[B]y its plain language, CRE 106 contemplates that the

  proponent of the original evidence that creates a misleading

  impression is also the proponent of the additional evidence that

  ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with the

  original evidence.”). Evidence admitted under the rule of

  completeness remains subject to the considerations of relevance

  and prejudice required under CRE 401 and CRE 403. Id. at ¶ 33.

¶ 29   The Confrontation Clause provides that, “[i]n all criminal

  prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted

  with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI; Colo.

  Const. art. II, § 16. Because the provision applies to “witnesses”

  against the accused, the Confrontation Clause is implicated only

  when “testimonial” hearsay statements are at issue. Crawford v.

  Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 51
(2004). A testimonial statement is one

  made “under circumstances that would lead an objective witness

  reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use

  at a later trial.” Nicholls v. People,
2017 CO 71, ¶ 22
(citing

  Crawford,
541 U.S. at 51-53
).


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                              3.   Analysis

¶ 30    Miedema concedes that his own statements in the text chain

  were admissible nonhearsay under CRE 801(d)(2)(A) and that the

  ex-girlfriend’s statements could have qualified for admission under

  CRE 106. But he asserts that, even if the ex-girlfriend’s statements

  were admissible under the rules of evidence, they still should have

  been excluded because they were testimonial and thus violated his

  confrontation rights absent the ex-girlfriend’s appearance to testify

  at trial.

¶ 31    Miedema’s arguments fail on two independent grounds. First,

  even if the Confrontation Clause was triggered, the ex-girlfriend’s

  statements were not testimonial. Statements are testimonial when

  the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no ongoing

  emergency, and that the primary purpose of an interrogation is to

  establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal

  prosecution. Michigan v. Bryant,
562 U.S. 344, 358
(2011). Here,

  there was no police involvement in the text chain at all, see Ohio v.

  Clark,
576 U.S. 237
, 246 (2015) (explaining statements to

  individuals who are not law enforcement officers are much less

  likely to be testimonial than statements to law enforcement officers),


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  and no reasonable reading of the exchange could support a

  conclusion that it was the functional equivalent of an interrogation.

  Accordingly, none of the challenged statements were testimonial

  and their admission did not implicate the Confrontation Clause.

¶ 32   Second, the ex-girlfriend’s statements were not hearsay at all,

  and thus did not raise confrontation concerns. See People v. Abad,
2021 COA 6, ¶ 68
(“Although the admission of testimonial hearsay

  implicates a defendant’s confrontation rights under the Federal and

  Colorado Constitutions, the admission of nonhearsay does not.”).

  When offering the exhibit, the prosecutor argued that the ex-

  girlfriend’s messages provided context for the inculpatory

  statements made by Miedema. In other words, the prosecutor was

  not admitting the ex-girlfriend’s statements to prove the truth of the

  matter asserted. We agree that this is the role that they played;

  accordingly they were not hearsay.

                            III.   Disposition

¶ 33   The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

       JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.




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