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22CA1870 Peo v Starr 04-03-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 22CA1870
El Paso County District Court No. 21CR4943
Honorable Frances R. Johnson, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Joshua Thomas Starr,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON
Lipinsky and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 3, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jessica E. Ross, Senior Assistant Attorney
General & Assistant Solicitor General, Jacey DeHoyos, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Leah Scaduto, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Joshua Thomas Starr (Starr), appeals his
judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of
two counts of second degree assault (strangulation / substantial
bodily injury), third degree assault, and harassment.
¶2 On appeal, Starr contends that his convictions should be
reversed because the district court erred by (1) admitting the
victim’s statements to two people in violation of CRE 803(3) and
803(4); (2) admitting the victim’s statements to medical staff in
violation of his Confrontation Clause rights; (3) failing to provide the
jury with his self-induced intoxication instruction; and (4) allowing
the prosecutor to engage in misconduct. He also alleges cumulative
error.
¶3 We conclude that the district court erred by admitting, under
the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the hearsay rule,
CRE 803(4), the victim’s statement to a forensic nurse examiner
(also known as a sexual assault nurse examiner or SANE)
identifying her assailant by name. And we conclude that the
district court’s admission of the victim’s statement was not
harmless.
1
¶4 Because Starr’s other contentions are unlikely to arise in the
same manner on remand, if they arise at all, we need not address
them. Accordingly, we reverse Starr’s judgment of conviction and
remand the case to the district court for a new trial.
I. Background
¶5 One night around midnight, Julius Watson (Watson) was
walking home after work when he saw the victim, R.F., crying on
the sidewalk. R.F.’s face was swollen, and she had blood on her
cheek and neck. She asked Watson if she could use his cellphone.
Watson asked her if she was okay. R.F. told Watson that her
boyfriend “beat her up.” Watson then helped R.F. to his apartment
to call the police.
¶6 Officer Cindy Schneider (Officer Schneider) from the Manitou
Police Department was the primary investigator of the assault.
Officer Levi Hoover (Officer Hoover) accompanied Officer Schneider
and assisted with the investigation. At trial, Officer Hoover testified
that he had learned through Officer Schneider that R.F. and the
suspect lived a few blocks away from where Watson had
encountered R.F. R.F. went to a hospital.
2
¶7 At the hospital, several medical professionals spoke with R.F.,
but most relevant to Starr’s appeal, she was treated by physician
assistant Aaron Constantino (Constantino) and a SANE, Erin
Ropelewski (Ropelewski). R.F. reported to Ropelewski that her
boyfriend had strangled her and punched her in the face; and told
her, “I want to die, and if I die, you are going to die with me.”
Ropelewski testified at trial that R.F.’s face was swollen, she had
bruising and red marks all around her body, and she had a
fractured rib.
¶8 In the meantime, Officers Schneider and Hoover attempted to
contact R.F.’s boyfriend at the address R.F. had provided. They
knocked on the apartment door several times, but no one answered.
Office Schneider went to the hospital to obtain a better statement
from R.F. Later in the early morning, Officer Schneider or dispatch
had learned from R.F. (and possibly from R.F.’s mother) that R.F.’s
boyfriend was at the apartment they had visited earlier. The
officers returned there.
¶9 At the apartment, they discovered significant blood splatter on
the carpet and staircase leading to the apartment door and blood
throughout the apartment, including on the back of the front door
3
and a living room couch. While inside, the officers found a man,
who turned out to be Starr, with scratches all over his arms and
blood on his hands and shorts. The officers took photos of the
apartment and Starr. Starr made statements to the officers.
¶ 10 The prosecution charged Starr with two counts of second
degree assault, third degree assault, and harassment, each as an
act of domestic violence. Before trial, the court granted Starr’s
motion to suppress his statements to the officers, reasoning that
the officers had improperly interrogated him while he was in
custody without advising him of his rights under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
¶ 11 Neither R.F. nor Officer Schneider appeared at trial. Because
R.F. was not present at trial, the prosecution sought to prove the
facts underlying R.F.’s assault through Watson, Officer Hoover,
Ropelewski, Constantino, and R.F.’s medical records. Although
Officer Hoover described his observations at the apartment and
Starr’s demeanor at the time, none of Starr’s statements, including
Starr identifying himself to the officers, were admitted due to the
court’s suppression ruling.
4
¶ 12 The prosecution attempted to prove that Starr was R.F.’s
assailant through Ropelewski’s testimony and R.F.’s medical
records. The court admitted most of the medical records, identified
as Exhibit 39. Even though the parties agreed that certain parts of
the medical records needed to be redacted before they were
admitted into evidence, the redaction did not occur.
¶ 13 The jury convicted Starr as charged. The district court
sentenced him to twenty-four months of probation.
II. CRE 803(4) Objections
¶ 14 Starr asserts that Ropelewski’s and Constantino’s testimony
and R.F.’s medical records were inadmissible hearsay, as they did
not fall within the medical diagnosis exception to hearsay, CRE
803(4).
A. Additional Facts
¶ 15 At the hospital, Ropelewski performed a sexual assault
examination on R.F., which included, among other things, R.F.’s
statement of the events resulting in her injuries and visit to the
hospital; a consent form signed by R.F. giving Ropelewski
permission to report the incident to law enforcement; various
5
assessments, such as danger, safety, and fall-risk assessments;
and a psychosocial report.
¶ 16 During Constantino’s and Ropelewski’s testimony, but mostly
the latter, the court admitted over the objections of defense counsel
statements R.F. made to Ropelewski, as documented in the medical
records. The testimony, to which defense counsel objected,
included the following information:
• the date, time, and location of the assault;
• the name of R.F.’s assailant and his relationship to her;
• R.F.’s signature authorizing information to be released to
law enforcement;
• R.F.’s home situation, as found on the psychosocial report;
• R.F.’s relationship with Starr and Starr’s alcohol use;
• a verbatim narrative detailing R.F.’s allegations of what
occurred before and during the assault and her allegation
that Starr was under the influence of drugs at the time;
• R.F.’s references, repeated throughout the medical records,
that her boyfriend physically “assaulted” and “strangled”
her;
6
• her statements given as part of the danger assessment,
which also included the medical professionals’ evaluation of
the likelihood that Starr would kill R.F.;
• R.F.’s statements expressing her feelings of safety in the
home, which included her fear of Starr;
• her description of the manner in which she was strangled,
the pressure applied, the number of times she was
strangled, and her reported symptoms;
• the statements that R.F. made about her symptoms to the
initial providers while describing the assault; and
• her statement that she had not fallen in the last three
months.
¶ 17 Defense counsel further objected to Constantino’s testimony
regarding such information as
• the medical professionals’ certification that R.F. had
suffered a serious bodily injury, as documented in Exhibit
40; and
• R.F.’s statements that she was “assaulted by her boyfriend,”
she was “struck multiple times about the face and also
experienced a strangulation injury although she does not
7
believe she lost consciousness,” and she was experiencing
“facial pain and swelling.”
¶ 18 In overruling most of the objections, the district court applied
People v. Allee, 77 P.3d 831, 834 (Colo. App. 2003), finding that the
prosecution had laid a sufficient foundation for admission of the
statements under the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to
the hearsay rule. The court found that (1) R.F.’s motives for making
the statements were to promote medical treatment and diagnosis;
and (2) the medical professionals reasonably relied on her
statements in diagnosing R.F. and treating her. The court,
however, sustained Starr’s objections to the testimony about the
danger assessment and safety screenings, and in response, the
prosecutor agreed to redact those portions of Exhibit 39. But based
on our review of the record, that exhibit was not redacted.
B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 19 We review the district court’s evidentiary decisions for abuse of
discretion. See People v. Gonzales–Quevedo, 203 P.3d 609, 612
(Colo. App. 2008).
¶ 20 “Hearsay” is defined as “a statement other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
8
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” CRE 801(c).
Such statements are presumptively unreliable because the
declarant is not present to explain the statement in context and to
be cross-examined. Blecha v. People, 962 P.2d 931, 937 (Colo.
1998). Due to their presumptive unreliability, hearsay statements
generally are not admissible. Id.; see CRE 802. But a statement is
not hearsay if it is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
See People v. Cohen, 2019 COA 38, ¶ 12.
¶ 21 A hearsay statement may still be admitted, however, if it falls
within a hearsay exception. See People v. Blecha, 940 P.2d 1070,
1074 (Colo. App. 1996), aff’d, 962 P.2d 931 (Colo. 1998). “The
burden of establishing the preliminary facts to establish the
hearsay exception is on the proponent of the evidence.” People v.
Garcia, 826 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Colo. 1992).
¶ 22 A hearsay statement is admissible under CRE 803(4) if it is
“made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and
describ[es] medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or
sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or
external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis
or treatment.” CRE 803(4); see also Kelly v. Haralampopoulos, 2014
9
CO 46, ¶ 20; People v. Tyme, 2013 COA 59, ¶ 16; King v. People,
785 P.2d, 596, 600 (Colo. 1990). The rule’s rationale is that
statements made to a physician or medical professional are
presumptively reliable because the patient believes that the
“effectiveness of the treatment . . . may depend largely upon the
accuracy of the information provided to the physician.” People v.
Jaramillo, 183 P.3d 665, 669 (Colo. App. 2008); W.C.L. v. People,
685 P.2d 176, 181 (Colo. 1984); People v. Galloway, 726 P.2d 249,
252 (Colo. App. 1986).
C. Medical Diagnosis/Treatment - Identity
¶ 23 Starr makes six arguments in support of his contention that
the court erred by admitting the medical professionals’ testimony
and the medical records: (1) the court did not parse out R.F.’s
statements but rather admitted the medical records wholesale,
except, as mentioned above, the danger and safety screenings; (2)
many of R.F.’s statements to Ropelewski, especially the narrative
about the assault, were not “necessary” for Ropelewski to treat R.F.,
as R.F. had already discussed her injuries with other medical
professionals; (3) R.F. did not identify her assailant for a medical
purpose and, thus, the identification was unnecessary for the
10
medical professionals to diagnose and treat her; (4) R.F.’s consent
to disclosure of the medical records and Officer Schneider’s
presence at the hospital, and possibly in the room during the exam,
made R.F.’s statements more investigatory than for medical
purposes; (5) R.F.’s statements about her injuries for the
strangulation exam were unnecessary because imaging and
diagnosis of R.F.’s injuries were underway before Ropelewski’s
exam; and (6) the medical records were replete with R.F.’s
statements made to other medical professionals.
¶ 24 We agree with Starr on his third contention — the identity of
R.F.’s assailant was unnecessary for medical diagnosis and
treatment and, therefore, was inadmissible hearsay under CRE
803(4). We also conclude that the error was not harmless and,
thus, we reverse his judgment of conviction.
¶ 25 Like the district court, the Attorney General relies on Allee, 77
P.3d at 834, to argue that the assailant’s identity has a medical
purpose because it assists with determining whether the victim
might need resources. The Attorney General further argues that,
unlike in Allee, the record shows that R.F. was provided with a
packet of domestic violence resources at the hospital.
11
¶ 26 Allee held that the identity of a victim’s assailant generally
does not serve a medical purpose. But the division recognized that
an exception exists if a “portion of the statement is itself perceived
by the medical provider as necessary for diagnosis and treatment.”
Id. The division determined that the record in that case did not
“indicate that the identification of defendant as the victim’s
assailant was necessary for or pertinent to the physician’s diagnosis
or treatment or that he made any referral to domestic abuse
resources or took any other action based on that identification.” Id.
Even though the division concluded in Allee that the court erred, it
also determined that the error was harmless. This was because the
physician’s identification of the assailant was cumulative of
testimony given by the investigating officers, whose testimony the
defendant had not challenged. Id. at 835; see also Jaramillo, 183
P.3d at 669 (holding that, while testimony of the victim’s identity of
her assailant through the nurse practitioner was error, it was
harmless because it was cumulative of testimony provided by the
victim and the investigating officer’s testimony).
¶ 27 Like the divisions in Allee and Jaramillo, we agree that
identification of the victim’s assailant may in certain cases further
12
medical diagnosis and treatment purposes and, thus, be admissible
under CRE 803(4). But in this case, we do not see how R.F.’s
identification of her assailant advanced any medical purpose. It
was appropriate for Ropelewski to ask R.F. about the events leading
to her injuries to assist with medical diagnosis and treatment, one
aspect being that R.F. would be safe and was not returning to a
potentially dangerous situation.
¶ 28 Ropelewski knew that R.F.’s assailant was her boyfriend with
whom she lived in an apartment. Based on this information,
Ropelewski was able to set up a safety plan that ensured R.F. did
not return to the apartment, as Ropelewski knew that R.F. was
going home with her mother upon discharge. Ropelewski was also
able to provide R.F. with domestic violence resources.
¶ 29 Missing, though, and critical to our analysis, is any
explanation from Ropelewski, in her testimony or in her medical
notes, about why learning the identity of the assailant was
necessary to further these two objectives. Simply because a victim
identifies her assailant to a SANE or other medical personnel does
not automatically transform that statement into one for medical
treatment or diagnosis. Without more explanation from Ropelewski
13
as to why the assailant’s identity was necessary to medically treat
R.F., we conclude that the identity of the R.F.’s assailant by name
was inadmissible hearsay under CRE 803(4). See People v. Vigil,
127 P.3d 916, 924 (Colo. 2006) (Although dealing with whether a
child’s statements to a SANE were testimonial for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause, the supreme court upheld the district court’s
exclusion of the child’s statement of the assailant by name under
CRE 803(4) “because the identity of the male who penetrated the
child was immaterial to the doctor’s opinion.”).
¶ 30 Although not dispositive, relevant to our inquiry, is that the
police were present at the hospital, appeared at times to be in the
examination room with R.F., and returned to the hospital to obtain
more information from R.F. about the whereabouts of R.F.’s
boyfriend after officers failed to make contact with him at the
apartment. See Tyme, ¶ 17 (noting that, “[w]here the facts and
circumstances surrounding the statements give rise to an inference
that the forensic examination or interview had no medical or
diagnostic characteristic, but was rather purely investigative, the
statements may not be considered trustworthy and thus may not be
admissible”). Under these circumstances, and in the absence of
14
testimony from Ropelewski as to what medical purpose was served
by R.F.’s identification of her assailant by name, we conclude the
court erred by admitting the references to Starr’s identity in R.F.’s
medical records.1
1 Starr also challenged R.F.’s statements identifying her assailant
by name to Ropelewski as testimonial statements implicating the
Confrontation Clause. Because we have already determined the
court erred by admitting R.F.’s statements under CRE 803(4), we do
not address Starr’s Confrontation Clause arguments based on the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance. See People v. Lybarger, 700
P.2d 910, 915 (Colo. 1985) (“Axiomatic to the exercise of judicial
authority is the principle that a court should not decide a
constitutional issue unless and until such issue is actually raised
by a party to the controversy and the necessity for such decision is
clear and inescapable.”).
We acknowledge, however, that the analysis under CRE 803(4)
is similar, in part, to the analysis of whether a declarant’s “primary
purpose” in making a statement implicates the Confrontation
Clause. Statements are testimonial for Confrontation Clause
purposes “when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is
no . . . ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant
to later criminal prosecution.” Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 244
(2015) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)); see
also People v. Phillips, 2012 COA 176, ¶ 114 (quoting Michigan v.
Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 366 (2011)). Despite any similarity in the
analytical frameworks, though, we point to the police presence at
the hospital and the police investigation to support our CRE 803(4)
analysis that Starr’s identity had no medical diagnosis or treatment
purpose. As a result, we take no position on what R.F.’s “primary
purpose” was when she identified Starr by name.
15
D. The Error is not Harmless
¶ 31 Because Starr objected to the court’s admission of Starr’s
identification through R.F.’s medical records, we review under
nonconstitutional harmless error. “Under this standard, reversal is
required only if the error affects the substantial rights of the
parties.” Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 12; see also Crim. P.
52(a). This means that reversal is required only when “the error
substantially influenced the verdict or affected the fairness of the
trial proceedings.” People v. Tevlin, 715 P.2d 338, 342 (Colo. 1986).
¶ 32 We conclude for three reasons that the error was not
harmless.
¶ 33 First, R.F.’s statement to Ropelewski that her boyfriend —
whom R.F. identified as Starr according to her medical records —
assaulted her was the only direct evidence linking Starr to the
16
assault. As mentioned previously, R.F. and Officer Schneider were
not present at trial to testify.2
¶ 34 After R.F. was able to escape her apartment, she encountered
Watson, who helped her call police. Although R.F. told Watson she
had been beaten up by her boyfriend, Watson never testified that
R.F. told him her boyfriend’s name. The record does not reflect the
content of R.F.’s 911 call, nor was the content of the call introduced
into evidence at trial, so we do not know what R.F said to the 911
operator. Although Officer Hoover testified about parts of his
investigation, Officer Schneider was the primary officer who spoke
with R.F. Because Officer Schneider did not testify at trial, none of
R.F.’s statements to the police were admitted into evidence.
Likewise, Officer Schneider wrote a report that might have identified
2 We acknowledge that it is immaterial whether the declarant is
available for purposes of the medical and diagnosis exception to
hearsay exception, CRE 803(4). Regardless, the prosecutor had no
explanation why Officer Schneider was not under subpoena to
testify. And as to R.F., the prosecutor indicated that, although R.F.
had been cooperating, he did not serve her with a subpoena
because his process server was sick. But the prosecutor did not
explain why he could not have retained another process server or
claim that he was unable to serve R.F. because he did not know her
address or because of some other unforeseen challenge.
17
Starr as R.F.’s assailant, but the report was not admitted into
evidence.
¶ 35 And Officer Hoover’s testimony was limited, given he was not
the primary investigating officer and because the court suppressed
Starr’s statements made to him at the apartment. Officer Hoover
testified, “I don’t believe I spoke to [R.F.], that was my partner that
spoke with her. I was just on scene.” Therefore, his testimony was
limited to his collection of evidence at the apartment, including
photographing Starr. And Officer Hoover did not testify that Starr
identified himself as R.F.’s boyfriend or that Starr admitted he lived
in the apartment. Because of the district court’s suppression
ruling, defense counsel objected at trial when the prosecutor
attempted to question Officer Hoover about any statements Starr
might have made at the apartment.
¶ 36 Officer Hoover identified Starr in court, but the officer’s
identification was nothing more than a statement that Starr was the
person he photographed at the apartment. Significantly, Officer
Hoover did not testify that Starr was R.F.’s boyfriend, Starr lived
with R.F., or Starr was the person who assaulted her.
18
¶ 37 The record indicates that the prosecution relied on R.F.’s
statements to medical professionals identifying Starr to link him to
the person in the apartment and to show that he was the person
who assaulted her. When Starr sought a judgment of acquittal, the
prosecutor relied heavily on his attempt to link the person who
attacked R.F. to the person whom Officer Hoover had identified.
The court recognized there was a missing link, however, saying,
“Officer Hoover went to the residence, and he saw Mr. Starr. But
beyond that, we don’t have anything linking Mr. Starr as the
perpetrator of [R.F.]’s injuries.”
¶ 38 In response, the prosecutor referred to Ropelewski’s notes
identifying Starr:
In part of [Ropelewski’s] report on page 10, she
discusses that . . . [R.F.] lives at [address] in
Manitou Springs with her boyfriend, Joshua
Starr. That is everything the Court needs to
link the Joshua Starr that we have, whom the
police identified as the person living at that
very apartment, as the Joshua Starr that he is
her boyfriend. She named him as the
assailant. She named him as his — her
boyfriend. She named him as living at that
apartment.
And all of that is tied to the officer showing up
at the apartment, finding the very same
Joshua Starr who he could point to and say,
19
yes, that is Joshua Starr, and finding all the
evidence that the crime took place there. The
Court has everything in terms of ID and
relationship through what she told
[Ropelewski], as well as the officer’s
investigations.
In denying the motion for judgment of acquittal, the court outlined
the evidence:
[R.F.] left her apartment and said her
boyfriend assaulted her. She was taken to the
hospital but told law enforcement, this is the
address where it happened and it was my
boyfriend, Joshua Starr. Law enforcement
goes there. He’s not at that apartment, so they
go back with her to the hospital. At the
hospital, she tells [Ropelewski], it was my
boyfriend, Joshua Starr. We live at this
address together.
The court further said that, upon returning to the apartment, the
officers found “the Joshua Starr who [R.F.] identified as her
boyfriend there.” The court denied the motion, concluding there
was sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to link the
defendant to the person who was R.F.’s boyfriend and who attacked
her.
¶ 39 Although Starr does not appeal the court’s denial of his motion
for judgment of acquittal, we refer to that ruling to note that the
court misstated the evidence. For example, no testimony in the
20
record indicates that R.F. told the police officers Starr’s name or
that her boyfriend lived with her. That information solely came
from R.F.’s statement to Ropelewski, which Ropelewski repeated at
trial. True, Officer Hoover testified that R.F. gave Officer Schneider
her address, which is how the officers knew where she lived. But
R.F.’s statements to Ropelewski documented in Exhibit 39 are
necessary to make the connection between the boyfriend with whom
R.F. lived and Starr.
¶ 40 R.F.’s statements to Ropelewski linking the individual whom
the police found in the apartment to the person with the same last
name who attacked R.F. were central to the prosecution’s case, as
the prosecutor’s closing argument underscored. The prosecutor
said in closing, R.F. “reported to [Ropelewski] that they lived
together at the address . . . she reported where it happened, that
Joshua Starr, this guy, was her boyfriend.”
¶ 41 Defense counsel stressed during closing argument the
importance of the fact that the police did not conduct an
investigation or produce a report, and that R.F. was not present at
trial, “because a large portion of the Government’s case against Mr.
Starr . . . was conducted . . . through the forensic nurse examiner
21
and not through Officer Schneider, who could have been here to tell
you what happened.” Defense counsel concluded by saying, “the
Government’s attempt at beyond a reasonable doubt in this case is
to provide a backup officer and medical professionals to show what
the results of the entire investigation [were] and what you may have
heard from [R.F.]” Thus, R.F.’s statement to Ropelewski that Starr
was the person who attacked her was the only evidence at trial that
identified her attacker by name.
¶ 42 Second, the prosecution provided no corroborating evidence
that Starr was the attacker. As mentioned above, the 911 call and
Officer Schnieder’s report were not introduced into evidence. The
prosecution presented no physical evidence, such as DNA, from
R.F.’s clothing or blood found in the apartment, to link Starr to the
assault. True, the prosecution introduced Officer Hoover’s
photographs of Starr that showed he had injuries consistent with
being in an altercation. Starr’s injuries were only relevant if his
identity was ascertained, which again came in through R.F.’s
hearsay-filled medical records.
¶ 43 Third, the prosecutor agreed to redact or remove the danger
and safety assessments from Exhibit 39. The record only refers to
22
page 69 of Exhibit 39 and fails to mention the other pages
encompassed by the court’s redaction ruling. Our review of Exhibit
39 suggests that the danger/safety assessments are on pages 15-
17, 48, and 57. Given the many redactions that should have been
made to the exhibit, in addition to the redaction of Starr’s name, we
conclude the error was not harmless. Therefore, we reverse Starr’s
convictions.
III. Conclusion
¶ 44 We reverse Starr’s judgment of conviction and remand the
case to the district court for a new trial.
JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.
23
Case Information
- Court
- Colo. Ct. App.
- Decision Date
- April 3, 2025
- Status
- Precedential