People v. Belen CA2/6

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Filed 9/3/25 P. v. Belen CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX


THE PEOPLE,                                                   2d Crim. No. B335979
                                                           (Super. Ct. No. 20F-02249)
     Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (San Luis Obispo County)

v.

ELDERJAIRUS STOTOMAS
BELEN,

     Defendant and Appellant.


       A jury found Elderjairus Stotomas Belen guilty of one count
of sexual intercourse with a child under 10 years of age (Pen.
Code, § 288.7, subd. (a)) count 1 (Victim L.); two counts of sexual
penetration of a child under the age of 10 years of age (id., subd.
(b)) counts 2 and 3 (Victim J.); and eight counts of lewd or
lascivious acts on a child under 14 years old (id., § 288, subd. (a))
counts 4-11. As to counts 4 through 11, it was further alleged
that the victim was under the age of 14 years old and that there
were multiple victims. (Id., § 667.61, subds. (j)(2) & (e).) The
jury found aggravating factors under California Rules of Court,
rules 4.421(a)(1)-(12) and 4.421(b)(1).
       The trial court sentenced Belen to an aggregate term of 80
years to life in state prison as follows: 1) two consecutive terms of
25 years to life as to counts 1 and 4; 2) two consecutive terms of
15 years to life as to counts 2 and 3; and 3) seven concurrent
terms of 25 years as to counts 5-11. We affirm.
                                FACTS
       The issues raised in this appeal do not require that we
state the facts in detail. A brief summary will suffice.
       Belen lived in a five-bedroom house with Victim J., a minor
child, and Victim J.’s mother. They all occupied one bedroom in
the house. Other bedrooms in the house were occupied by Victim
J.’s relatives, including Victim J.’s cousin, Victim L., also a minor
child.
                               Victim L.
       In June 2013, when Victim L. was five years old, Belen
began sexually molesting her. The molestation began at a rate of
once a month, then twice a week, then every day. He would
touch her breasts and vagina and put his fingers in her vagina.
The molestations included rape when Victim L. was seven years
old. They continued for approximately five years. Victim L.
moved out of the house in February 2018.
       In December 2016, Victim L. complained to her aunt that
Belen was always touching her and tickling her, and she wanted
him out of the house. In March or May 2019, Victim L. told her
friends about what Belen had done to her. Victim L. did not tell
her parents until after she told her friends. In May 2019, the
police conducted a forensic interview with Victim L. Victim L.




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was then 11 years old. She told the interviewer that Belen had
molested and raped her.
                               Victim J.
       Victim J. testified that she lived in the house with Belen
from the time she was in kindergarten in 2015, until at least the
second grade. One time, she saw Belen on top of Victim L., trying
to remove an article of clothing. Victim L. told him to stop, but
he continued. Eventually Belen gave up and let her go.
       In May 2019, when Victim J. was seven years old, the
police conducted a forensic interview with Victim J. She reported
seeing Belen and Victim L. on the floor. Victim L. was struggling
to get away and told Belen to stop. Victim L. looked scared and it
scared Victim J. Victim J. denied Belen did anything like that to
her or made her touch any part of him.
       But in testifying at trial, Victim J. said that Belen would
help her shower and that he showered with her one to three
times a week. Belen would touch her breasts, waist, and vagina,
and put his finger in her vagina. This continued for two or three
years until he moved out.
                          CSAAS Testimony
       Blake Carmichael is a clinical psychologist specializing in
child abuse. He testified about Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS). Carmichael said he did not
know any of the facts of this case.
       Carmichael testified that some children may not react to
being sexually abused as some people might think. Some
children do not appear to be outwardly affected. Children are
often abused by someone they know, trust, or love, someone they
have ongoing contact with. This puts the child in a vulnerable
position. CSAAS has five aspects:




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        1) Secrecy: A child might be told there will be negative
consequences if the child tells anyone about the abuse or the
child might draw that conclusion even without being told.
        2) Helplessness: There is a power difference between the
abuser and the child. The perpetrator might be an important
person in the family or community.
        3) Entrapment and accommodation: A child might feel
entrapped in the sexual abuse component of the relationship and
cope with the abuse in a way that is ineffectual to stop it.
Children usually do not bite or scream. They may freeze and just
let it happen.
        4) Delayed, unconvincing, or conflicted disclosure:
Disclosure is a process. Children will not tell everything the first
time they talk about sexual abuse. A child might feel
embarrassed and let an opportunity to disclose the abuse pass.
Some children will deny the abuse occurred even when directly
asked about it. Some children may not realize they have been
sexually abused until they get older.
        5) Recanting or retraction: A significant number of children
will recant or retract the accusation of sexual abuse.
        Carmichael told the jury that it is not appropriate to use
CSAAS to conclude that a child has been abused. CSAAS only
shows that certain behaviors of children are not inconsistent with
abuse.
                                Defense
        Deborah Davis, a professor of psychology at the University
of Nevada, testified about why people may make false reports.
They may be deliberately lying, subjected to social influence, see
others benefit from false claims, or they may be subject to family




                                 4
pressures, such as wanting someone out of the house. Davis
stated she never met with the victims of this case.
                           DISCUSSION
              CSAAS Evidence and CALCRIM No. 1193
                (a) Admissibility of CSAAS Evidence
       Belen contends that CSAAS evidence was irrelevant and
prejudicial.
       Belen argues that CSAAS evidence was not relevant to the
facts of this case. But CSAAS evidence was relevant to explain
why the children delayed in reporting the abuse and why Victim
J. initially denied having been abused.
       Belen argues that CSAAS evidence is irrelevant because
there are no longer misconceptions to correct. We rejected that
argument in People v. Munch (2020)
52 Cal.App.5th 464
, 468.
Our Supreme Court approved the use of CSAAS evidence in
People v. McAlpin (1991)
53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300-1301
. We are
bound by that decision. (Auto Equity Sales. Inc. v. Superior Court
(1963)
57 Cal.2d 450, 455
.)
       Belen argues that CSAAS evidence does not satisfy the
requirements of Kelly/Frye. 1 We also rejected that argument in
People v. Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pages 472-473.
Kelly/Frye applies to new scientific evidence, the reliability of
which has not been previously accepted in court. The reliability
of CSAAS evidence has been accepted in court for over 30 years.
(See People v.
McAlpin, supra,
53 Cal.3d at pp. 1300-1301.)

      1 “Formerly known as the Kelly-Frye rule, based on the

rulings of People v. Kelly (1976)
17 Cal.3d 24
(Kelly) and Frye v.
United States (D.C. Cir. 1923)
293 F. 1013
, the rule is now the
Kelly rule in California after changes to the Federal Rules of
Evidence that superseded Frye.” (People v. Nieves (2021)
11
Cal.5th 404
, 442, fn. 8.)


                                 5
                       (b) CALCRIM No. 1193
       Belen contends that CALCRIM No. 1193 lessens the
prosecution’s burden of proof by permitting the jury to use
CSAAS evidence to evaluate the credibility of the victim’s
testimony.
       The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 1193 as
follows:
       “You have heard the testimony of Dr. Blake Carmichael
regarding Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome. Child
Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome relates to a pattern of
behavior that may be present in child sexual abuse cases.
Testimony as to the accommodation syndrome is offered only to
explain certain behavior of the alleged victim of child sexual
abuse. Dr. Carmichael’s testimony about Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome is not evidence that the defendant
committed any of the crimes charged against him or any of the
conduct or crimes with which he was not charged. You may
consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not [Victim
L.’s] and [Victim J.’s] conduct was consistent with the conduct of
someone who has been molested and in evaluating–and in
evaluating the believability of their testimony.”
       We also previously rejected Belen’s argument. (People v.
Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 473-474; People v. Gonzalez
(2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 494, 504
.) Under CALCRIM No. 1193, a
juror who believes the CSAAS evidence will find both that the
child’s apparently self-impeaching behavior does not affect her
credibility one way or the other and that the CSAAS evidence
does not show that the child has been molested. (Munch, at
p. 474; Gonzales, at p. 504.) CALCRIM No. 1193 does not
instruct the jury that it should believe the child.




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      Belen contends that CALCRIM No. 1193’s predecessor,
CALJIC No. 10.64, contained “guardrails” that the current
instruction lacks. But CALCRIM No. 1193 has all the
“guardrails” it needs. It accurately describes the proper use and
limitations of CSAAS evidence. CALCRIM No. 1193 has been
consistently held to be proper by many courts, including this one.
                           DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.




                                    GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:


             YEGAN, J.


             CODY, J.




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                  Barry T. LaBarbera, Judge

           Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

                ______________________________

      Nicholas Seymour, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Nicholas J. Webster,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.