People v. Benson CA2/7

Filed 9/11/25 P. v. Benson CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN


 THE PEOPLE,                                                  B335967

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. NA116416)
           v.

 TYQUAN MARKEITH
 BENSON,

           Defendant and Appellant.


      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, James D. Otto, Judge. Affirmed.
      Janyce Keiko Imata Blair, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Deepti Vaadyala,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                _______________________________
      Tyquan Markeith Benson appeals from the judgment of
conviction entered after a jury trial. The jury found Benson
guilty of the first degree murder of Alejandra Martinez, the
attempted premeditated murder of Nadia Moralez, and other
shooting-related offenses with respect to a shooting at a
Long Beach taco truck on December 4, 2020.
      On appeal, Benson contends the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting statements made by his codefendant,
Jacquise Wright, to a jailhouse informant during a Perkins
operation1 because Wright’s statements were inadmissible
hearsay. Benson relatedly argues the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Benson’s motion for a mistrial based on
admission of the statements. Benson also contends a portion of
the testimony of the prosecution’s forensic firearm examiner
during questioning about her qualifications—that a second
examiner reviews her work for accuracy—violated Benson’s Sixth
Amendment confrontation clause rights. Finally, Benson argues
the court erred in imposing fines and fees absent a showing by
the prosecution that Benson had the ability to pay. We affirm.




1     A police operation in which the police obtain statements
made by a defendant to an undercover law enforcement agent or
paid informant, typically in a jail cell, is referred to as a “Perkins
operation.” (See Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292.)




                                  2
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.     The Prosecution Case2
       1.    The December 4, 2020 shooting
       At around 10:30 p.m. on December 4, 2020, Victor Valdez
drove to a popular taco truck located at the intersection of
Anaheim Street and Magnolia Avenue in Long Beach. He
remained in his car because he was wary of a group of Hispanic
men at the truck who appeared to be gang members. After about
15 minutes, two Black men arrived in a dark-colored sedan and
parked next to Valdez. Valdez saw the men go to pick up food
from the taco truck, but on their return to the sedan, both men
got into an argument with the Hispanic group. Valdez then saw
the man who had carried the food back from the taco truck get
into the driver’s seat of the dark sedan, and the sedan drove
away. The sedan slowed near the taco truck, and Valdez heard
gunshots and saw flashes of gunfire coming from the driver’s side
of the sedan directed toward the taco truck. The sedan then sped
off. Valdez heard five to seven gunshots in total. He could not
see the men’s faces because they were wearing face masks of the
type worn during the COVID-19 pandemic.
       At around 11:00 p.m. on the night of the shooting,
Stephanie Minuez was working as a cashier at the taco truck.
There were around 10 to 12 people waiting in line to order, all of
whom were Hispanic except for two Black males. The two Black
males approached the taco truck to order food, and Minuez told

2      Benson and Wright were tried together before a single jury.
On the last day of the prosecution case, the court granted
Wright’s motion for a mistrial based on the sudden unavailability
of his defense attorney. Wright is not a party to this appeal.




                                3
the men to return in about 15 minutes to pick up the order. The
two men returned about 15 or 20 minutes later in two separate
cars. One of the men returned in a dark sedan; the other
returned in a white sedan. The two men exited their cars and
came to the truck to pick up their food. Both men were tall, thin,
appeared to be in their mid-20’s, had short curly hair and tattoos,
and wore chains. At trial Minuez identified the man who arrived
in the dark sedan as Wright.
       Minuez saw Wright and the other man interacting with the
group of Hispanic people waiting in line. Although she did not
hear the entire interaction, Minuez believed Wright challenged
the Hispanic group, saying “Where are you from?” Minuez saw
Wright return to the dark sedan; she thought the second man got
into the white sedan. Wright, who was sitting in the driver’s
seat, pulled out a small gun and fired “several” shots in the
direction of the Hispanic group. The crowd at the taco truck ran,
and Minuez and her coworkers ducked behind the counter. While
she was crouching down, Minuez heard a car make a turn, and
then she heard more gunshots from the direction of
Magnolia Avenue. When she stood up, both cars were gone.
       Nadia Moralez and a girlfriend walked to the taco truck on
the night of December 4. Moralez was a member of the East Side
Longos criminal street gang. When she arrived at the truck,
Moralez saw several “homies” from the East Side Longos. She
also saw two Black men, both with short dreadlocks, ordering
food from the truck. She identified Benson in the courtroom as
one of the two men. Moralez realized she had dropped some cash
on the ground, and when she moved away from the truck to pick
up the money, the two men were “mad-dogging” her. When she
returned, Benson started “banging” on her, asking her, “Where all




                                4
you [N words] from?” While Moralez was getting her food, she
heard Benson shout, “Fuck Chongos,” and then she fell to the
ground and realized she had been shot in her arms, hip, and
buttocks. She saw that an older woman behind her in line was
bleeding profusely from her throat. Moralez observed two
shooters in different locations: one shooter was initially on foot
and then entered a gray sedan; the other fired gunshots from a
vehicle on Magnolia Avenue. Moralez did not remember whether
Benson discharged a gun.
       Widhny Soto and her cousin, Martinez, were waiting in line
to pick up their food order when Soto heard about four gunshots
coming from the front of the taco truck. Soto ducked down and
tried to hide in the bushes. Soto looked up at Martinez, who was
standing and clutching her upper chest. Soto pulled Martinez
down to the ground and tried to cover her body while Soto heard
several gunshots from a different location. Martinez was taken
in an ambulance to the hospital, and she died two hours later.

       2.     The police investigation
       City of Long Beach (Long Beach) police officers and forensic
specialists secured and processed the crime scene within hours
after the shooting. Investigators recovered four 9-millimeter
cartridge cases, a bullet, and a copper jacket bullet in the parking
lot in front of the taco truck. Another bullet was recovered from
under the truck, two .380 automatic cartridge cases were found
on the back bumper of the truck, and a third .380 automatic
cartridge case was found in a planter box behind the truck. Two
bullet fragments were also found on the other side of the planter
box.




                                 5
      Homicide detectives obtained surveillance video footage
from a gas station directly across Anaheim Street from the taco
truck and from a liquor store located two blocks east on Anaheim
Street. Excerpts were played for the jury. Video footage from the
gas station showed that on the night of the shooting a dark gray
sedan parked in the taco truck parking lot and two men
emerged—one was wearing a white hooded sweatshirt with dark
pants, and the other was wearing a dark shirt with light-colored
jeans. The men walked to the taco truck, then returned to their
car and drove east on Anaheim Street.
      The liquor store surveillance video showed a gray sedan
pulling into the store’s parking lot shortly after 11:00 p.m. Two
men emerged. One of the investigating detectives identified
Benson (whose face was visible) as the individual wearing a
darker shirt and light jeans. The second man wore a white
hooded sweatshirt with a visible brand logo and gray sweatpants.
The men entered the liquor store then returned to their car and
drove off at around 11:07 p.m.
      Later video footage from the gas station showed the
two men returning to the taco truck in separate vehicles.3 First,
a light-colored vehicle pulled into the taco truck parking lot, and
the man in the dark shirt and lighter pants (matching Benson’s
appearance at the liquor store) emerged. Then, the darker sedan
pulled into the parking lot with its hazard lights flashing, and
the man in the white hooded sweatshirt got out. After a short

3     The time index on the gas station video indicated the
two men returned to the taco truck at 23:15. However, there was
no evidence at trial that the time index on the video corresponded
with the time of day, and the percipient witnesses testified the
shooting occurred later.




                                 6
time, both men returned to their respective vehicles with Benson
carrying a food bag. The dark sedan made a three-point turn and
drove out of the parking lot onto Magnolia Avenue. The lighter
vehicle, which had visible damage on the driver’s side door, began
driving northwest through the parking lot.
       At this point the gas station surveillance video
malfunctioned, and the initial shooting was not recorded. When
the video resumed, however, people could be seen running away
from the taco truck, and several people dropped to the ground or
hid by the truck’s wheel well. The darker vehicle could be seen
driving south down Magnolia Avenue in the direction of
Anaheim Street, and flashes emanated from the driver’s side
window. After investigators viewed this footage, a detective
returned to the location where the vehicle was observed and
recovered a single .45-caliber cartridge.
       Long Beach police created a vehicle profile from the
surveillance videos, which showed distinctive damage on the
driver’s side door of the lighter vehicle. In January 2021 a gold
sedan with damage on the driver’s side door matching the vehicle
in the surveillance videos was found abandoned after a traffic
accident in Long Beach. Benson was the registered owner of the
vehicle, a benefits card with his name was found on the
floorboard, and Benson had posted photographs of the vehicle on
social media. Police searched the vehicle and recovered three live
9-millimeter cartridges in a compartment in the driver’s side
door.
       Long Beach detectives obtained a warrant to search
Benson’s social media accounts. Images from these accounts
admitted at trial included a photograph of Benson and Wright
together and several photographs of firearms. On December 9,




                                7
2020 Benson posted on multiple social media accounts, “Blower[4]
for sale,” and he included a photograph of a 9-millimeter
semiautomatic pistol. Benson’s social media posts also indicated
that he frequently spent time in Las Vegas. Long Beach
detectives learned that Las Vegas police had recovered a firearm
in an unrelated shooting incident that was a potential match
(based on a national ballistics database) for one of the weapons
used in the December 4 shooting. Long Beach investigators
examined the Las Vegas firearm, a 9-millimeter semiautomatic
pistol, and determined it matched the ballistic evidence recovered
from the taco truck. The pistol also appeared identical to the one
pictured in Benson’s social media advertisement to sell a
“blower,” and his other social media posts included photographs
of the recovered pistol’s serial number. Benson was arrested on
February 18, 2021.
       Long Beach detectives also searched Wright’s social media
accounts and found photographs of him wearing a white hooded
sweatshirt with a logo matching the one seen in the liquor store
surveillance video. Homicide detectives executed a search
warrant at Wright’s residence on the morning of February 18,
2021, and they recovered a loaded .45-caliber semiautomatic
handgun and multiple .45-caliber cartridges, as well as Wright’s
wallet, driver’s license and credit card. Wright was arrested the
same morning; at the time of his arrest, he was wearing gray
sweatpants with printing consistent with the sweatpants in the
surveillance videos. Police also impounded a gray sedan at the
time of his arrest.


4     The prosecution gang expert testified the terms “blower”
and “burner” refer to a firearm.




                                8
       Long Beach Police Detective Benjamin Hearst testified at
trial as the prosecution’s gang expert.5 Detective Hearst
explained that the Insane Crips are a Black criminal street gang
that claimed territory near the location of the shooting. The
Insane Crips were rivals to all the Hispanic gangs in Long Beach,
including the East Side Longos, who claimed the territory where
the taco truck was located. The Insane Crips used “donkey” and
“Chongo” as derogatory terms for Hispanic gang members.
       At trial, Detective Hearst pointed out multiple tattoos on
Benson’s and Wright’s bodies that could be seen on photographs
displayed to the jury. Detective Hearst opined based on the
tattoos that Benson and Wright were members of the
Insane Crips. Detective Hearst also testified about a note Benson
showed to a female who visited him while he was in pretrial
detention. The note stated, “I need you to book a visit with my
crimy[6] so you can tell him to go self-defense. They got bro [on]
video. The donkeys not coming 3 court. So say he shot because
they was shooting at us.” Detective Hearst interpreted the
message to mean that the Hispanic gang members would not
testify in the trial. Detective Hearst also explained that Benson’s
use of the numeral “3” instead of “2” indicated his loyalty to the
Insane Crips because the numeral “2” was associated with the
Rolling 20s Crips, a rival gang.
       Leanna Kim, a criminalist in the Long Beach Forensic
Science Services Division, served as the crime lab firearms
examiner in the investigation. Kim was responsible for


5     No gang crimes or enhancements were charged in the case.
6    Detective Hearst testified that a “crimy” refers to a fellow
gang member who participated in a crime.




                                 9
identifying projectile and cartridge evidence found at the crime
scene to determine whether one or more specific firearms had
been used. Kim explained how she used a comparison microscope
to examine distinctive characteristics that are “imparted on” a
firearm during the manufacturing process, leaving unique
markers on a cartridge or bullet. Kim examined the three .380
automatic cartridge cases recovered near the taco truck and
concluded they were all fired from the same firearm. She also
examined the .45-caliber cartridge case recovered from the street
and three of the projectiles, and she concluded they were all fired
from the handgun recovered from Wright’s residence. Finally,
she examined the four 9-millimeter cartridge cases recovered
from the taco truck parking lot with several cartridges that had
been test-fired from the pistol seized in Las Vegas, and she
concluded the recovered cartridge cases had been discharged from
the same 9-millimeter pistol.

       3.     Wright’s statements to the Perkins agent
       Benson and Wright were placed in separate jail cells after
their arrests on February 18, 2021, and detectives placed Perkins
agents in each of their cells.
       After the Perkins agent was in place, detectives came into
Wright’s jail cell to take a DNA sample, and they presented him
with some of the inculpatory evidence—including images from
the liquor store surveillance camera—in an effort to stimulate a
conversation between Wright and the Perkins agent. Wright
subsequently conversed with the agent for nearly two hours, and
excerpts of the audio recording of their conversation were played
for the jury.




                                10
        In one excerpt, Wright expressed anger that police entered
his residence when he was not home and found the .45-caliber
handgun. The Perkins agent asked, “But it was your burner?”
Wright responded, “Uh-huh.”
        In another excerpt, the Perkins agent stated the detectives
appeared to be focusing their investigation on surveillance videos
and there were multiple gas stations near the taco truck. He told
Wright, “So it’s cameras all around that motherfucker. What you
got to think about, . . . you sure you didn’t go . . . to the fucken
taco truck that night?” Wright responded, “I did to get food, and I
left. That’s how they caught me on camera at the liquor store.”
        The Perkins agent suggested it was the “donkeys” and
“Chongos” who committed the shooting. Wright agreed and said,
“[W]e was at the taco truck, but we really ordered food. . . . Then
the Mexicans showed up.” Wright explained that “[w]e went to
the store,” then “we came back and got our food, then came back
again,” and “we were in two different cars. So I left out the
parking [lot]. They were shooting at [inaudible]. So I turned off
and got on.” The detective who supervised the Perkins operation
testified that in his experience the term “get on” meant to fire a
gun.
        The Perkins agent then pivoted to Wright’s companion,
telling Wright, “[T]hey know you was with whoever did the
busting. Trust me. Y’all probably was in separate cars, but they
did [their] homework. They followed these . . . cameras . . . . If
you wasn’t doing the busting—don’t go down for the next nigga’s
shit. . . . Because to me it sound like y’all went up there to . . . get
y’all tacos and shit. Donkeys come trippin’, and your boy get off.”
Wright responded, “[T]hat’s what the officer [told] me. He [said],
‘It don’t look like you went to go get in no trouble. It just




                                  11
something happened.’” The Perkins agent pressed the issue
further, stating, “[T]hey know it was either you or your boy who
got off. Who got off?” Wright responded, “Y’all know it wasn’t
me.”
       The Perkins agent asked Wright, “What the fuck was this
nigga shooting with?” Wright responded, “He had a Ghost 9 with
a muffler on” and added that a Ghost 9 was “a gun that was
untraceable.” When the agent asked if the shooter got rid of the
gun, Wright responded, “I’m positive” and emphasized that the
police would not be able to find it.
       Prompted by the Perkins agent’s repeated suggestion that
the Hispanic gang started the shooting, Wright gave a detailed
narrative of the events that night. He explained that “we” went
to get food, and he (Wright) tried interacting with two “Mexican
cats,” but they were rude to him. He added that “[m]y boy” paid
for the food, and the taco truck employee told them to return
later. They sat in the car smoking, but when “a gang of Chongos
[was] walking through the parking lot,” Wright said, “‘Bro, I’m
not about to sit right here just getting food, bro. We gotta go to
the store or something.’” Then “we” left for the liquor store to buy
something to drink and went to “the house.” Wright said he
wanted to “get in a different car, because I don’t want us to pull
back up, and they get to busting on one car. Make it seem like
I’m just another car trying to get something to eat.” Wright got a
different car, and they returned to the taco truck in separate
cars. They then got their food, but by then “the Mexicans is
walking right through the parking lot. So I walk to my car.
They, like, ‘What that Longo—like—like, what that Longo
[inaudible].’ So I’m like, ‘Bro, get the fuck out of here with that
shit.’ I never banged on him. I never said anything. I’m just




                                12
standing at the back of my car looking out. Then when they walk
past my car, I get in the car, and I turn out. I pull up behind the
taco truck, and I look. And then I hear shots. When I heard the
shots, I turn right on Anaheim [Street]. And I got the fuck up out
of there.”
       The Perkins agent asked if the shooter fired from Wright’s
car or from the shooter’s own car, and Wright responded, “his
own car.” The agent suggested the police would nonetheless try
to blame Wright for the shooting because Wright’s car drove off
during the shooting. Wright responded, “Yeah, that doesn’t place
me in no homicide though. That just place[s] me where something
happened.”7

B.   The Defense Case
     Benson presented three witnesses in his defense. His wife,
Yesenia Benson (Yesenia), provided Benson with an alibi for the

7     During the Perkins operation with Benson, the agent asked
Benson, “Was it one motherfucker busting or was it two
motherfuckers busting?” and Benson responded, “Two.” The
agent asked, “Did the—did the nigga get out of the car and bust
or a nigga stayed in the car?” Benson responded, “I was in the
car.”
       The Perkins agent primarily focused on the gun used in the
shooting, and Benson said it was “gone” and “I got rid of it.” The
agent asked if the gun was “dirty,” and Benson responded, “I
bought that motherfucker in Barstow.” Benson also said his
confederate got rid of his gun. Benson told the agent, “The only
shit they really got on me is just my car. That’s it. . . And it’s
gold, and my shit is gold.” Benson volunteered that he later went
back to the location “where this shit happened,” “I didn’t see no
camera,” and the police were lying about having video
surveillance.




                                13
time of the shooting, stating she had messaged him to pick up
food from the taco truck around 11:00 p.m., but he was with her
around the time of the shooting. A defense gang expert testified
that a gang member’s challenge to a rival gang member asking
“Where are you from?” would be intended to provoke the person
believed to be a gang member to react. The expert also explained
the term “crimy,” which Benson used in his jailhouse note, did
not necessarily refer to an accomplice in a criminal act, but
rather, could simply refer to a gang associate. Finally, a forensic
gunshot residue expert testified based on his examination of
nitrate patterns on Moralez’s clothing that she must have been
shot from a distance of only four to six feet.
       The prosecution rebuttal case focused on impeachment of
Yesenia. For example, a homicide detective testified there was no
record that Yesenia messaged Benson on December 4, 2020.

C.     The Verdict and Sentencing
       The jury found Benson guilty of the first degree murder of
Martinez (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1);8 the attempted
willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder of Moralez (§§ 187,
subd. (a), 664; count 2); assault with a semiautomatic firearm
(§ 245, subd. (b); count 3); discharging a firearm from a vehicle
(§ 26100, subd. (c); count 4); and possession of a firearm by a
felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 5). The jury also found true
with respect to counts 1 through 4 that Benson personally used a
firearm in the commission of the offenses (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
Benson waived his right to a jury trial with respect to a prior
conviction for first-degree burglary (§ 459) and admitted he had

8       Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.




                                 14
suffered a prior strike conviction under the three strikes law
(§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12), which was a serious felony under
section 667, subdivision (a). Benson also waived a jury trial on
the alleged aggravating factors, and the trial court found true as
to all counts multiple allegations of circumstances in aggravation
under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a) and (b).
       The trial court sentenced Benson to an aggregate state
prison term of life plus 50 years to life, plus 17 years
eight months.9 The sentence was comprised of 25 years to life on
count 1 for murder, doubled under the three strikes law, plus the
upper term of 10 years for the firearm-use enhancement and a
five-year term for the prior serious felony under section 667,
subdivision (a); a life sentence on count 2 for attempted murder
plus 16 months (one third the middle term of four years) for the
firearm use enhancement, to run consecutive to count 1; and a
consecutive term of 16 months (one third the middle term of
two years, doubled under the three strikes law) on count 5 for
possession of a firearm by a felon. The court imposed and stayed
under section 654 a sentence of six years on count 3 for assault
and five years on count 4 for discharging a firearm from a vehicle.
       The trial court ordered Benson to pay $12,300 in victim
restitution, plus interest. The court also imposed a
$300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a $200 court operations


9     In the oral pronouncement of the sentence, the trial court
stated Benson’s aggregate determinate sentence was 17 years
four months. However, the individual components of the
determinate sentence pronounced by the court at the sentencing
hearing add up to 17 years eight months. Further, the minute
order and abstract of judgment correctly reflect imposition of a
determinate sentence of 17 years eight months.




                                15
assessment (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), and a $150 criminal
conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373). The court imposed
and stayed a $300 parole revocation restitution fine (Pen. Code,
§ 1202.45).
      Benson timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION

A.    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting
      Wright’s Statements to the Perkins Agent
      1.    Trial court proceedings
      In his trial brief, the prosecutor designated portions of the
audio recording of Wright’s statements to the Perkins agent that
he intended to introduce at trial. The prosecutor argued the
statements were admissible as declarations against penal
interest, and because they were nontestimonial, their admission
against Benson did not violate Benson’s confrontation clause
rights under the Aranda-Bruton doctrine.10




10    “The Aranda-Bruton doctrine ‘addresses a specific issue
that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the
out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that
incriminates a codefendant,’ and prevents such a statement’s
admission even if a limiting instruction is given to the jury.”
(People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1194, citing Bruton v.
United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 and People v. Aranda (1965)
63 Cal.2d 518.) In Tran, at page 1195, the Supreme Court
explained that confrontation clause rights under the Aranda-
Bruton had been “narrowed . . . to testimonial statements only.”
(Accord, People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 129 [“‘the
confrontation clause applies only to testimonial hearsay




                                 16
        At a pretrial hearing, Benson joined Wright’s oral Aranda-
Bruton motion to exclude both defendants’ statements in the
Perkins operations and their other jailhouse statements.
Benson’s attorney argued Wright’s statements to the Perkins
agent incriminated Benson in violation of his confrontation
rights. Neither Wright’s attorney nor Benson’s attorney
specifically addressed whether the statements to the Perkins
agent fell within the exception to the hearsay rule for
declarations against interest. However, relying on People v.
Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 335, the trial court found
the statements were nontestimonial, and further, “no statements
. . . are so inculpatory to one defendant and exculpatory as to the
person speaking that would justify” exclusion.11

statements and not to [hearsay] statements that are
nontestimonial’”].)
      Where, as here, a defendant speaks to an agent posing as
an inmate and the defendant does not know the agent is a
government informant, the statements are nontestimonial
because the defendant would not expect the statements could be
used in a future prosecution. (See People v. Almeda (2018)
19 Cal.App.5th 346, 362-363; People v. Gallardo (2017)
18 Cal.App.5th 51, 67-68.) On appeal Benson does not contend
admission of Wright’s statements violated his rights under the
confrontation clause.
11     In People v. Greenberger, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at
pages 314, 337, 340 to 341, the Court of Appeal concluded the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding multiple secretly
recorded statements by individual defendants against their
accomplices were admissible as declarations against penal
interest because the declarants implicated themselves and their
codefendants and there was sufficient indicia of reliability.




                                 17
      2.      The hearsay exception for declarations against penal
              interest
       “Although hearsay statements are generally inadmissible
as evidence (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (b)), California law
recognizes several exceptions to this rule.” (People v. Jasso
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 668 (Jasso).) Evidence Code section 1230
provides a hearsay exception for statements against interest:
“Evidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient
knowledge of the subject is not made inadmissible by the hearsay
rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the
statement, when made, was so far contrary to the declarant’s
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the
risk of civil or criminal liability . . . , that a reasonable man in his
position would not have made the statement unless he believed it
to be true.” (See Jasso, at p. 698; accord, People v. Grimes (2016)
1 Cal.5th 698, 710-711 (Grimes).)
       “‘To demonstrate that an out-of-court declaration is
admissible as a declaration against interest, “[t]he proponent of
such evidence must show that the declarant is unavailable,[12]


       The People argue Benson forfeited his contention that
Wright’s statements to the Perkins agent were inadmissible
hearsay because his attorney did not object. We decline to find
forfeiture because the hearsay and confrontation clause issues
were intertwined, and further, the trial court decided the
statements were not hearsay in finding they were not “so
inculpatory to one defendant and exculpatory as to” the declarant
to fall outside the hearsay exception.
12    Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a)(1), defines
“unavailable as a witness” to mean the declarant is “[e]xempted
or precluded on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning




                                   18
that the declaration was against the declarant’s penal interest
when made and that the declaration was sufficiently reliable to
warrant admission despite its hearsay character.” [Citation.] “In
determining whether a statement is truly against interest within
the meaning of Evidence Code section 1230, and hence is
sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible, the court may take into
account not just the words but the circumstances under which
they were uttered, the possible motivation of the declarant, and
the declarant’s relationship to the defendant.”’” (Jasso, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 668, quoting Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 711.)
       The hearsay exception for declarations against interest
does not apply “‘“to evidence of any statement or portion of a
statement not itself specifically disserving to the interests of the
declarant.”’” (Jasso, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 669; accord, People v.
Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 441.) Even so, “the nature and
purpose of the against-interest exception does not require courts
to sever and excise any and all portions of an otherwise
inculpatory statement that do not ‘further incriminate’ the
declarant. Ultimately, courts must consider each statement in
context in order to answer the ultimate question under Evidence
Code section 1230: Whether the statement, even if not
independently inculpatory of the declarant, is nevertheless
against the declarant’s interest, such that ‘a reasonable man in
[the declarant’s] position would not have made the statement


the matter to which his or her statement is relevant.” “One such
privilege, the exercise of which makes a person unavailable as a
witness, is the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination.” (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 616.) It is
undisputed that Wright was “unavailable as a witness” under
Evidence Code section 1230.




                                19
unless he believed it to be true.’” (Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 716; accord, People v. Smith (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 766, 789.)
      We review a trial court’s decision whether a statement is
admissible under Evidence Code section 1230 for abuse of
discretion. (Jasso, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 669; Grimes, supra,
1 Cal.5th at pp. 711-712.)

      3.     The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
             admitting Wright’s statements as declarations against
             interest
       Benson contends the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting Wright’s statements to the Perkins agent because
“Wright was careful not to provide facts that suggested he
participated in the shooting.” Rather, Wright described an
innocent outing to the taco truck marred by the aggression of the
Hispanic gang, and he implicated his companion as the shooter.
Further, Benson argues the court erred in admitting all of the
statements designated by the prosecution without considering
each statement that implicated Benson separately. The court did
not abuse its discretion.
       Wright’s statements to the Perkins agent were individually
and holistically self-incriminating, particularly in the context of
the Perkins agent’s prompts. Confronted with the suggestion
there could be video surveillance of the taco truck, Wright
volunteered that he and a companion (“we”) went to the taco
truck on the night of the shooting. He admitted he had an
unpleasant interaction with the “Mexican cats” in the taco truck
line, and a “gang of Chongos” were in the parking lot. He and his
companion left the area because of the gang, went to the liquor
store and then Wright’s home, and returned in separate vehicles




                                20
at Wright’s suggestion so the gang would not recognize them.
Wright admitted he was present at the shooting, and he drove off
immediately after the shooting.
        When the Perkins agent posited the Hispanic gang started
things, Wright stated, “They were shooting at [inaudible]. So I
turned off and got on” (meaning Wright fired a gun). Wright also
admitted he owned the .45-caliber handgun found in his
residence. Only after the Perkins agent suggested the police
knew “it was either you or your boy who got off” did Wright
respond, “Y’all know it wasn’t me.” But despite his minimization
of his role, Wright implicated himself as an accomplice in
explaining the shooter used an untraceable
9-millimeter “ghost” gun that the shooter got rid of and never
would be found.
       Nothing in Wright’s statements is substantially
exculpatory from criminal liability. Wright implicated himself as
either an actual shooter or an accomplice in the shooting. He
stated the shooting was gang-motivated. He described a series of
events that suggest planning and premeditation on his part,
including his decision to return to the taco truck in separate cars.
Even his conclusory denials—for example, when he told the
Perkins agent the fact he drove off from the shooting “doesn’t
place me in no homicide”—suggests his rehearsal of a defense
rather than a denial of involvement. In the context of Wright’s
conversation with the person Wright believed was a fellow
inmate, Wright’s statements were reliable, and “‘a reasonable
man in [Wright’s] position would not have made the[se]
statement[s] unless he believed [them] to be true.’” (Grimes,
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 716.)




                                 21
      The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Jasso, supra,
17 Cal.5th at pages 669 to 671 is instructive. In that case, in
which Jasso was convicted of murdering a taxicab driver in
furtherance of a premeditated robbery, the court found the trial
court properly admitted as declarations against interest
statements made by Jasso’s accomplice to a friend. Jasso
contended on appeal that the accomplice’s statements were
inadmissible because they were “overwhelmingly self-serving,”
pointing a finger at Jasso while characterizing the accomplice as
“an innocent bystander who just went along with Jasso’s crime,
denied planning it, and claimed that he was surprised when
Jasso shot [the taxicab driver].” (Id. at p. 669.) On the contrary,
the Supreme Court found, “much of [the accomplice’s] account
was inculpatory.” (Ibid.) The accomplice admitted that although
he did not plan the robbery, he went along with it, kept some of
the stolen money because he needed it, and helped disassemble
and dispose of the murder weapon. (Ibid.) These admissions
exposed the accomplice “to liability for serious crimes, including
both robbery and murder” under theories of felony murder and
accessory after the fact. (Id. at pp. 669-670.) Further, in the
context they were given—to a friend and not to the police in an
attempt to shift blame or curry favor with the authorities—they
carried the indicia of trustworthiness for admissibility under
Evidence Code section 1230. (Id. at p. 670.)
      Benson also argues the trial court erred in admitting all of
the Perkins statements offered by the prosecution without
conducting a line-by-line evaluation of each statement, relying on
our decision in People v. Gallardo (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 51
(Gallardo). In that case the trial court “elected to admit the
entire 40-page transcript” of defendant Gallardo’s conversation




                                22
with two paid jailhouse informants, in which he revealed his
participation in a gang shooting and implicated his codefendants
as the primary perpetrators. (Id. at p. 72.) The trial court
reasoned that “certain details [Gallardo] had provided to the
informants regarding the crime (including his identification of
Garcia as the shooter, his description of the vehicles used and the
route they drove) showed his entire statement was sufficiently
trustworthy to warrant its inclusion as a declaration against
interest.” (Ibid.) We disagreed and concluded the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting the entirety of Gallardo’s
conversation with the informants under Evidence Code
section 1230 without independently assessing whether the
statements implicating his codefendants as the primary
perpetrators were also statements against Gallardo’s interest.
(Id. at pp. 70-77.)
       Gallardo is distinguishable. The record in this case does
not support Benson’s contention the trial court admitted Wright’s
statements wholesale without any scrutiny. Wright’s
conversation with the Perkins agent was nearly two hours long,
and the prosecution submitted excerpts that, when transcribed,
occupy fewer than 10 pages. The prosecution designated these
excerpts before trial, and there were multiple evidentiary
hearings from which it is clear the court considered the scope of
material to be played to the jury. For example, Wright’s attorney
requested additional portions of Wright’s conversation with the
Perkins agent be played for the jury for completeness. The trial
court analyzed and rejected some of the requested portions of the
transcript (as not against Wright’s interest), but the court
granted other requests, including admission of Wright’s




                                23
exculpatory statement that “y’all know it wasn’t me” when the
Perkins agent asked who “got off.”
       Moreover, Gallardo differs from this case in that Gallardo
made essentially all of the self-incriminating statements that he
participated in the shooting before implicating his codefendants:
“He had identified himself as a member of the Largo gang; he had
revealed the police found the gun used to commit the crime; he
had described the make and model of the weapon; he had
admitted he ‘knew what happened’; and he had identified the
victims as ‘Paragons.’” (Gallardo, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 74.)
As we explained, “In light of [Gallardo’s] prior admissions,
identifying Garcia as the shooter and [codefendant] Michael as
the driver of the vehicle from which the shots were fired did little
to increase [Gallardo’s] criminal culpability, and served primarily
to ‘minimize [his] role and place the blame . . . on [his]
accomplice[s].’” (Ibid.)
       Here, Wright did not substantially incriminate himself first
and later shift blame to Benson. Rather, Wright divulged to the
Perkins agent that Benson (although not named) was one of the
shooters as part of Wright’s incriminating account of the entire
evening, during which Wright and Benson were constantly
together. The account included Wright’s interaction with the
rival Hispanic gang that provoked the shooting, his plan to leave
and return in two cars, his flight from the scene, his admission
that he fired the gun that was found in his residence, and his
knowledge about the disposal of the murder weapon. (See Jasso,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 671-672 [“Whether a statement is a
collateral assertion not properly admitted as a declaration
against penal interest depends not on whose actions it describes,
but rather on whether it is an integral part of a statement that




                                24
inculpates the declarant. [¶] . . . [Perez’s] statements about
Jasso’s actions were part and parcel of an overarching admission
to criminal acts.”].)

B.     The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying
       Benson’s Motion for a Mistrial
       After the prosecution presented its case, the court declared
a mistrial as to Wright because his trial lawyer became
unavailable. Benson’s attorney requested the court also declare a
mistrial as to Benson, stating “I think the jury would be
prejudiced based upon what they have heard to the extent in
regards to evidence and testimony applicable to Mr. Wright as it
goes towards Mr. Benson.” The trial court denied the request but
agreed to instruct the jury that a mistrial had been declared as to
Wright because of an emergency involving his lawyer, and the
jurors should not hold the circumstance of Wright’s mistrial
against Benson. On appeal, Benson contends the trial court
abused its discretion in denying the mistrial motion because the
jury heard Wright’s inadmissible statements to the Perkins agent
implicating Benson as the actual shooter and the person who
disposed of the murder weapon.
       “‘“A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of
prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction.
[Citation.] Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial
is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested
with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions.
[Citation.]” [Citation.] A motion for a mistrial should be granted
when “‘“a [defendant’s] chances of receiving a fair trial have been
irreparably damaged.”’”’” (People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401,
497; accord, People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 990.) We




                                25
review a trial court ruling denying a mistrial for an abuse of
discretion. (Clark, at p. 990.)
      Benson has not shown incurable prejudice from
continuation of the trial after the court declared a mistrial as to
Wright. Wright’s statements to the Perkins agent were
admissible against Benson under Evidence Code section 1230 as
statements against Wright’s penal interest, regardless of whether
they were introduced in a joint or separate trial. Benson does not
present any other grounds to exclude the statements or contend
any other trial evidence was admissible only against Wright.
      People v. Turner (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 117, relied on by
Benson, is inapposite. Turner involved a single defendant who
was tried for two unrelated murders after the cases were
consolidated. The trial court granted a motion to sever one of the
murder counts on the ground the evidence against the defendant
on that murder was weak, but the court denied the defendant’s
motion to declare a mistrial on the remaining murder count. (Id.
at pp. 123-124, 128.) The Court of Appeal reversed the
defendant’s conviction, finding the prosecutor failed to show the
evidence on the severed murder charge was admissible with
respect to the remaining charge, and the jury instruction to
disregard the evidence on the severed charge was inadequate to
prevent irreparable harm. (Id. at pp. 127-128.) Here, Benson
and Wright were confederates in a single shooting, the Perkins
evidence was admissible against Benson, and the trial court’s
instruction to the jury prevented any prejudice from the jury’s
speculation about Wright’s absence from the case.




                                26
C.     The Testimony of the Firearms Examiner Did Not Violate
       Benson’s Confrontation Clause Rights
       1.    Trial court proceedings
       As discussed, Long Beach firearms examiner Kim testified
that she examined the guns, cartridges, and projectiles collected
in the investigation and determined, among other things, that
the four 9-millimeter cartridge cases recovered from the taco
truck had been fired by the semiautomatic pistol recovered in
Las Vegas (that was linked to Benson).
       When Kim took the stand, the prosecutor asked her several
questions to establish her qualifications. He asked what her job
was, how long she had been in the position, and what were the
duties of a firearms analyst. He then asked Kim to state her
“background, training, and experience with regard to that work.”
Kim responded: “I received my Bachelors in Chemistry from the
University of California, Riverside. . . . Masters of Science in
Forensic Science from Syracuse University. I have received in-
house training as a firearms analyst that closely parallels AFTE,
the Association of Firearm and [Toolmark] Examiners training
program. I have completed courses offered through the DOJ,
California Criminalist Institute Program in firearms
identification. I have also participated in multiple blind studies
of firearms identification as well. Through accreditation
standards with our lab, I am subjected to annual proficiency tests
in all the areas that I am signed off. All my work is verified by a
second analyst that is also . . . signed off and approved to do so as
well. And prior to today . . . I have testified in courts.” The
prosecutor asked Kim how many times she had qualified as an
expert firearms examiner (answer: 10), then asked substantive
questions about her forensic analysis in this case.




                                 27
      2.     Kim’s initial statement that her work is verified by a
             second analyst was admissible as qualification
             testimony
      Benson contends admission of Kim’s statement that “[a]ll
my work is verified by a second analyst” violated his
confrontation clause rights under the principles enunciated in
People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 668 (Sanchez) because it
introduced hearsay by a nontestifying expert that the second
expert agreed with Kim’s analysis and thus “gave the impression
that Kim’s work was entitled to more weight than it would
otherwise deserve.” There was no Sanchez violation.
      The Supreme Court in Sanchez held, “When any expert
relates to the jury case-specific out-of-court statements, and
treats the content of those statements as true and accurate to
support the expert’s opinion, the statements are hearsay. It
cannot logically be maintained that the statements are not being
admitted for their truth. If the case is one in which a prosecution
expert seeks to relate testimonial hearsay, there is a
confrontation clause violation unless (1) there is a showing of
unavailability and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity for
cross-examination, or forfeited that right by wrongdoing.”13
(Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 686, fn. omitted; see Crawford v.
Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 59; People v. Garton (2018)
4 Cal.5th 485, 505 [county coroner’s testimony conveying the
details and findings of an autopsy performed by her retired
predecessor was hearsay and violated defendant’s confrontation
clause rights under Sanchez]; People v. Nadey (2024) 16 Cal.5th

13     Because we conclude Kim’s testimony was properly
admissible, we do not reach the People’s contention Benson
forfeited his Sanchez objection by failing to object at trial.




                                 28
102, 163 [“‘[a] hearsay problem arises when an expert simply
recites portions of a report prepared by someone else’”].) “Case-
specific facts,” the Supreme Court explained, “are those relating
to the particular events and participants alleged to have been
involved in the case being tried.” (Sanchez, at p. 676.)
      Sanchez reaffirmed the longstanding evidentiary principle
in California courts that an expert witness “may still rely on
hearsay in forming an opinion and may tell the jury in general
terms that he [or she] did so.” (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 685; accord, People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 457.) An
expert may tell the jury “generally the kind and source of the
‘matter’ upon which his [or her] opinion rests,” because the “jury
may repose greater confidence in an expert who relies upon well-
established scientific principles . . . [and] accord less weight to the
views of an expert who relies on . . . a lone experiment whose
results cannot be replicated. There is a distinction to be made
between allowing an expert to describe the type or source of the
matter relied upon as opposed to presenting, as fact, case-specific
hearsay that does not otherwise fall under a statutory exception.”
(Sanchez, at p. 686; accord, People v. Camacho (2022) 14 Cal.5th
77, 128 [in Sanchez the court recognized “an expert may ‘tell[] the
jury the expert relied on additional kinds of information that the
expert only generally describes’”].)
      Kim did not present any “case-specific out-of-court
statements.” (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 686.) Her
statement that her work is verified by a second analyst and is
“signed off and approved” was given in response to the
prosecutor’s request for her background, training, and
experience, and her response addressed in general terms the
quality assurance measures that made Kim’s approach scientific




                                  29
and reliable. Kim went on to testify in detail regarding the
analysis she conducted with respect to the evidence from the
shooting, and in so doing she never described another expert’s
findings, nor did she state that another expert validated her
findings as they “relat[ed] to the particular events and
participants alleged to have been involved in the case being
tried.” (Sanchez, at p. 676.) There is no reasonable reading of
Kim’s qualification statement to mean that a second, unnamed
expert conducted an independent analysis of the firearms
evidence from the taco truck shooting, and that she was relaying
that expert’s opinion.
       People v. Azcona (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 504, 515, relied
upon by Benson, is distinguishable. There, as here, the expert
firearms analyst testified in response to a question about his
“‘procedure’” that “‘[a]ll of my work is reviewed by another
firearms examiner at the laboratory with many . . . years of
experience.’” (Id. at p. 514.) But the expert went on to testify
with respect to his firearm toolmark analysis, “‘It was reviewed
for technical aspects in the report to be sure I had everything
correct in my work and I didn’t transpose anything.’” (Id. at
p. 514.) The prosecution then introduced his report, “which had
been initialed to indicate it was reviewed by two other
examiners,” and “the expert again testified that everything in the
report had been checked and approved by his supervisors.”
(Ibid.) The Court of Appeal found there was a Sanchez error:
“[W]hen the expert told the jury that another examiner had
indicated approval of and agreement with the expert’s
conclusions in this case . . . [t]he prosecution was in effect able to
introduce the opinion of a second expert without exposing that
witness to cross-examination.” (Ibid., italics added.) Here, as




                                 30
discussed, Kim did not testify that another expert analyzed each
aspect of her work and agreed with each of her conclusions “in
this case.”

D.    Benson Did Not Meet His Burden To Show His Inability To
      Pay the Court Fines and Assessments
      Benson contends the trial court’s imposition of statutory
fines and assessments without a determination he was able to
pay them violated his due process and equal protection rights
under this court’s opinion in People v. Dueñas, 30 Cal.App.5th
1157. In Dueñas, we concluded “the assessment provisions of
Government Code section 70373 and Penal Code section 1465.8, if
imposed without a determination that the defendant is able to
pay, are . . . fundamentally unfair; imposing these assessments
upon indigent defendants without a determination that they have
the present ability to pay violates due process . . . .” (Dueñas, at
p. 1168; accord, People v. Belloso (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 647, 654-
655, review granted Mar. 11, 2020, S259755.)
      However, as we subsequently explained in People v.
Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485, 490, “Consistent with
Dueñas, a defendant must in the first instance contest in the trial
court his or her ability to pay the fines, fees and assessments to
be imposed and at a hearing present evidence of his or her
inability to pay the amounts contemplated by the trial court.” In
Castellano, we held that a defendant did not forfeit an
opportunity to request a hearing at which to present evidence of
his inability to pay court fines and assessments because he was
sentenced before Dueñas was decided and his challenge was
“based on a newly announced constitutional principle that could
not reasonably have been anticipated at the time of trial.”
(Castellano, at p. 489.) Accordingly, we remanded to give the




                                31
defendant an opportunity to “demonstrat[e] his inability to pay
the fines, fees and assessments imposed by the trial court.” (Id.
at p. 491.)
       Here, Benson was sentenced several years after Dueñas
was decided, and he forfeited the opportunity to request a
hearing on his ability to pay the fines and assessments by failing
to request the hearing at the time of sentencing. Further, as the
People observe, Benson’s only reference to his ability to pay at
the hearing was his trial attorney’s statement in connection with
the court’s imposition of the minimum restitution fine of $300 as
follows: “Your honor, I would just like it to be noted that my
client is of limited means.” The attorney’s statement was not
substantial evidence of Benson’s inability to pay the fees and
assessments, nor did it constitute a request for a hearing.

                         DISPOSITION

      The judgment is affirmed.




                                          FEUER, J.
We concur:



             MARTINEZ, P. J.



             STONE, J.




                                32