People v. Mota CA2/8

Filed 11/14/25 P. v. Mota CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT


 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B336098

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. VA156398
           v.

 IVAN JOSE MOTA,

           Defendant and Appellant.


      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Joseph R. Porras, Judge. Affirmed.
      Sylvia W. Beckham, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Xiomara Costello and Stefanie Yee, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                      ____________________
       A jury convicted Ivan Mota of first degree murder and
being a felon in possession of a gun. Mota argues this result
must be reversed because the trial court erred by admitting his
co-defendant’s statement as a declaration against penal interests
under Evidence Code section 1230 (section 1230). We affirm.
                                  I
       Mota, Damian Leon, and Victor Alonso are all members of
the Florencia 13 gang, known by the monikers Shadow, Terco,
and Tokes or Toker, respectively. Gustavo Venegas was a
member of the Pico Nuevo gang, known by the moniker Villian.
       Surveillance video from the Vagabond Inn in Whittier
shows a light-colored Honda Accord pull into the parking lot a
little after two o’clock one morning. A man later identified as
Mota gets out and goes upstairs. The driver, Leon, pops the hood,
and then moves the car a few spaces over. Mota comes back to
the car with Alonso. Leon and Venegas leave the car and
accompany Mota and Alonso back up to the room. About an hour
later, Leon comes back to the car. A short while later, the other
three men join him. Alonso returns to the room. Venegas and
Mota both get in the backseat; Venegas on the driver’s side, and
Mota on the passenger’s side.
       A few minutes after the car left the parking lot, gunshots
woke Monica Carbone, a resident on California Street, less than a
mile from the motel. Carbone looked out and saw a tan Honda
passing on the street. She got back in bed, then heard a few more
shots.
       Officer Tom Osendorf arrived at the scene a few minutes
later. He found Venegas face down on the street. Venegas had
gunshot wounds to his right cheek, the right side of his neck, and
his forehead. The right cheek shot was fired from about half an




                                2
inch away and the other two also were from a short
distance. The autopsy recovered a .38 caliber slug from
Venegas’s brain. Police found the casing from a .40 caliber
cartridge in front of a house a few doors down from where they
found Venegas’s body.
       The next day police found a tan Honda registered to Leon
on the side of an onramp to the U.S. 101. The car had been set on
fire with gasoline.
       Police arrested Mota about a week later. They placed him
in a cell with an undercover agent: a Perkins agent, so called in
reference to Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292, 294. Police
recorded Mota’s conversations with the agent. The agent
pretended to be an older Florencia 13 gang member. The agent
told Mota he was being held because he had shot a rival gang
member at a gas station. The agent said he had been in and out
of prison since he was 20. After establishing Mota was also from
the agent’s supposed gang, the agent asked Mota what he was in
for and told him he could advise him. Mota told the agent he
thought someone had snitched on him and that it had to be Terco
because he was the only other one there. Mota told the agent he
had used a .38 to shoot someone from another gang three times
from about a foot away. Mota told the agent the victim
disrespected Mota’s homie. Mota told the agent the driver had no
idea that Mota was going to kill the man.
       During a later interview with detectives, Mota told a
different story. Mota said Venegas had two guns when they were
in the backseat of the car. Venegas fired through the moon roof
with one. His expression made Mota nervous, and so Mota
grabbed for the other gun. As they struggled over the gun, it




                               3
went off and accidentally killed Venegas. Mota claimed Leon
came around to open the door to dump Venegas’s body.
       On phone calls Mota made from the jail, Mota’s brother and
mother specifically asked him if he had committed the murder.
Mota did not deny it. Rather, he told his brother the
investigators had all the evidence pointing toward Mota, and
asked “what’s there fucking for me to answer you, fool?” Mota
told his mother someone had snitched on him.
       Police arrested Leon three days later and put him in a cell
with the same undercover agent. Again, the agent pretended to
be an older gang member from Leon’s gang. The agent asked
what Leon was in for and offered to give him advice. Leon
repeatedly told the agent that he had not killed the victim, that it
had been Shadow. Leon told the agent Venegas had been a “good
homie” of his. Leon told the agent after they drove away from the
motel, he test fired his gun, a .40 caliber, out the moonroof a few
times. Immediately after, he heard gunshots in the backseat,
causing his ears to ring. He said Mota opened the car door and
pushed Venegas’s body out of the moving car. Mota told Leon, “I
did it for Toker. Don’t be mad at me. I did it for Toker.” Leon
said he assumed Toker told Mota to do it because Toker had been
stabbed by someone related to the Pico Nuevo gang.
       Leon told the agent after Mota disposed of Venegas’s body,
he pointed his gun at Leon and told him to get them out of
there. Leon drove them to his daughter’s aunt’s house, and they
left the .38 and .40 caliber guns there. Leon later retrieved the
guns and gave them to Alonso, without telling Mota.
       Mota took the car after the murder and left it somewhere.
Leon found it without telling Mota and removed some photos of
his daughter. Mota later showed Leon where it was, and Leon’s




                                 4
dad set the car on fire to destroy evidence. Indeed, an officer
later testified the burning meant they could not retrieve any
evidence from the car.
       A gang expert testified that, if someone disrespected a gang
member, that gang member and other members of the gang
would be expected to retaliate.
       An information charged Mota with murder and being a
felon in possession of a weapon. Leon pleaded guilty to charges of
being an accessory to murder and grossly negligent discharge of a
firearm.
       Mota proceeded to trial. Mota moved in limine to exclude
Leon’s statements to the Perkins agent. Because he had not yet
been sentenced, Leon invoked his Fifth Amendment right, and
the court found him unavailable. The trial court ruled the
statements were sufficiently against Leon’s interests to be
admissible and denied Mota’s motion.
       A jury convicted Mota of first degree murder and being a
felon in possession of a firearm. At a bench trial, the court found
true the aggravating factor that Mota engaged in violent conduct
that showed he is a serious danger to society. The court
sentenced him to 13 years plus 25 years to life in prison.
       Mota appealed.
                                  II
       Mota argues his conviction must be overturned because the
trial court erred in finding Leon’s statement was against his
penal interests and therefore admissible under section 1230. The
trial court’s ruling, however, was correct.
                                  A
       In general, out-of-court statements are inadmissible
hearsay. (People v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 668




                                5
(Jasso).) There are many exceptions to this rule. Section 1230
lays out one, which states (with our emphasis): “Evidence of a
statement by a declarant having sufficient knowledge of the
subject is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness and the statement, when
made, was so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or
proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or
criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a claim by
him against another, or created such a risk of making him an
object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community,
that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
statement unless he believed it to be true.”
      The rationale for the rule is that people have a strong
interest in not being criminally implicated and so they would not
make such a statement unless it were true. We thus presume the
normal dangers attendant on hearsay statements are absent.
(Jasso, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 668.) The proponent of the
declaration must show that the declarant is unavailable, that the
declaration was against the declarant’s interest when made, and
that the declaration was sufficiently reliable. (Ibid.)
Determining whether a statement is truly against the declarant’s
interests is a nuanced and context-specific evaluation. (Ibid.)
The court looks at the effect of the statement as a whole and
considers the circumstances under which the statement was
made, in addition to the words used. (Ibid.)
      Section 1230 makes only statements specifically disserving
to the declarant admissible. This result does not extend to
collateral statements. (People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419,
441.) Temporal proximity to a qualifying statement does not
guarantee the different statement’s veracity. (Williamson v. U.S.




                                 6
(1994) 512 U.S. 594, 599–600 [“that a person is making a broadly
self-inculpatory confession does not make more credible the
confession’s non-self-inculpatory parts”].)
       Our Supreme Court has declined to establish a “rule that
permitted admission of no more of a declarant’s statement than
was necessary to expose him to criminal liability.” Therefore the
court need not “sever and excise any and all portions of an
otherwise inculpatory statement that do not ‘further incriminate’
the declarant.” (People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 716–717
(Grimes) [noting the Leach rule requires a contextual approach].)
       Rather, the court must determine whether each statement,
considered in context, is sufficiently against the declarant’s
interest that a reasonable person would not make it if it were not
true. (Grimes, supra, at p. 716.)
                                  B
       There are three requirements for application of section
1230: the declarant was unavailable, the statement was against
the declarant’s interests when made, and the circumstances show
the statement was reliable. (Jasso, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p.
668.) Our review of the trial court’s finding is deferential. (Id. at
p. 669.)
                                  1
       Mota concedes Leon was unavailable.
                                  2
       The trial court found that Leon’s statements to the agent
passed the test: in context, they were sufficiently against Leon’s
interest that he would not have made them if they were not true.
       Mota argues that portions of Leon’s statements were not
against his penal interests, were not intertwined with
inculpatory statements, and therefore should have been excised.




                                  7
        Although Leon told the agent Mota killed Venega and that
Leon had no idea Mota was going to do so, the net effect of Leon’s
statement was against his self-interest. He placed himself in the
car as the driver. He admitted to shooting his gun through the
moon roof, an action that led to a charge against him of grossly
negligent shooting of a firearm. His statements also implicated
him as an accessory after the fact to the murder. His statements
that Mota killed Venega established Leon knew the
circumstances of the killing. Despite this knowledge, Leon
helped Mota hide or get rid of evidence, including the guns and
the car.
        Mota argues Leon’s actions in getting rid of the guns and
car helped cover Leon’s action, not Mota’s. This point is not well
taken. Before taking those actions of disposing of the guns and
car, Leon was not implicated in the murder. He was taking steps
to conceal the murder Mota committed and in so doing creating
his own liability. Mota emphasizes Leon said Mota had him at
gunpoint, but Leon took the majority of these actions after
getting out of the car.
        The trial court correctly noted this case is analogous to
People v. Wilson (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 271 (Wilson), and People
v. Tran (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1207 (Tran). In Wilson, the court
admitted statements a wife made to police detectives. (Id at. p.
274.) In the statements, the woman said her husband called her,
told her he had shot at people with a gun, where the gun was,
and how to dispose of it. (Ibid.) The woman admitted to the
detective that she had done as her husband asked. (Ibid.) At
trial, the wife invoked the spousal privilege. (Ibid.) The husband
objected to the portion of her statement about the husband
committing murder was not disserving of the wife’s interests and




                                8
should be excluded. (Ibid.) The court disagreed, finding the
wife’s declaration of her knowledge of the murder was against her
interest because it established an element of the crime of
accessory to murder, and the court of appeal affirmed. (Id. at p.
276.)
       Similarly, in Tran, the defendant’s nephew helped the
defendant destroy a car the defendant had used in a murder.
(Tran, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1218.) The court of appeal
affirmed the trial court’s determination that the nephew’s
statements -- that the defendant had done something really bad,
and had shot someone -- were against the nephew’s penal
interests. (Id. at 1218–1220.) This was so because that
knowledge made the nephew an accessory to murder. (Ibid.)
       Mota also argues that Leon’s statements about Mota’s
motivation for the murder should have been excluded because
they were not disserving to Leon and they lacked foundation.
These points are incorrect. Immediately after the shooting, Mota
told Leon, “Don’t be mad. I did it for Toker.” This statement told
Leon that Mota had committed premeditated murder. Leon
admitting this knowledge precludes him from arguing he helped
Mota conceal the guns and car because he thought Mota had
accidentally shot Venegas, or done so in self-defense. This
statement is precisely why Leon is an accessory to murder.
Leon’s statements that he knew Toker had had some problems
with someone from Pico Nuevo cements his knowledge that Mota
committed murder. Contrary to Mota’s assertion, these
statements could not be severed because they were integral to
Leon’s declaration against his penal interests.
       In this respect the case is analogous to People v. Samuels
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 96. There the defendant objected to a




                                9
statement by a third party saying the defendant had paid him to
kill the victim. (Id. at p. 120.) The defendant argued the portion
inculpating her should have been excised because it was not
against the third party’s interest. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court
disagreed, finding a statement that the third party had engaged
in murder for hire admitted to a particularly heinous type of
murder. (Id. at p. 121.) Moreover, that the defendant had paid
the third party for the murder was an integral part of the
statement that could not be excised. (Ibid.)
       The trial court did not err in finding the net effect of Leon’s
statements was against his penal interests.
                                   3
       Finally, we consider whether the circumstances of Leon’s
statement show the statement was reliable. The evaluation of
trustworthiness requires a court to apply its knowledge of how
people actually behave to the facts of the case. In other words,
judges must employ practical judgment. (People v. Chhoun
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 48.) Courts have noted “the least reliable
circumstances” are those where the declarant is under arrest and
tries to curry favor by deflecting blame onto others, while the
“most reliable” are where the declarant is speaking to a friend in
a noncoercive setting. (People v. Greenberger (1997) 58
Cal.App.4th 298, 335.)
       Our situation falls somewhere in the middle. Leon
obviously had no idea the Perkins agent was a cop. Rather, Leon
thought he was speaking to a fellow gang member, a trustworthy
new acquaintance who wanted to help him. Although Leon was
reluctant to share details, at the agent’s urging he admitted to
culpable actions. Nothing in his statement suggests he was




                                  10
trying to boast or show off for this older gang member. The
circumstances of Leon’s statement support admissibility.
                                  4
      Mota argues that the trial court erred in comparing the
substance of Leon’s statement to Mota’s and finding the
similarities supported the reliability of Leon’s statements. We
need not reach this argument because Leon’s statements met the
requirements of section 1230.
                                  C
      We do not reach the question of whether admitting this
statement was harmless error. It was no error at all. But we do
observe Mota’s own statements to the agent supplied virtually
the same information. In practical terms, this appeal is
academic.
                         DISPOSITION
      We affirm.



                                         WILEY, Acting P. J.
We concur:



             VIRAMONTES, J.




             UZCATEGUI, J.*1

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.



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