People v. Murphy CA2/7

Filed 7/23/25 P. v. Murphy CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN


 THE PEOPLE,                                                  B330286

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct.
           v.                                                 No. TA152334)

 JAQUAN MURPHY et al.,

      Defendants and
 Appellants.


      APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura R. Walton, Judge. Affirmed.
      The Law Office of J. Blacknell and Kellen I. Davis for
Defendant and Appellant Jaquan Murphy.
      Barhoma Law and Matthew Barhoma for Defendant and
Appellant Markey Lamont Smith.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Thomas C. Hsieh, and
David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
               _______________________________

       Jaquan Murphy and Markey Lamont Smith appeal from
the judgments of conviction entered against them following a
joint jury trial. The jury found Murphy and Smith guilty with
respect to a gang shooting on April 11, 2019 of first degree
murder, five counts of attempted murder, and conspiracy to
commit murder. The jury also found Murphy guilty of two counts
of attempted murder arising from a prior shooting on April 3,
2019.
       On appeal, Murphy and Smith contend the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting irrelevant and cumulative
gang evidence; the prosecutor violated Brady v. Maryland (1963)
373 U.S. 83 (Brady) by failing to disclose exculpatory
information; the accomplice testimony was not supported by
sufficient corroborating evidence; and substantial evidence did
not support the convictions. Murphy also argues the court erred
in admitting Smith’s statements to a jailhouse informant and
detectives during a Perkins operation.1 Murphy also asserts his
trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing
to object to Smith’s incriminating statements made during the
Perkins operation; improperly eliciting prejudicial testimony from
Murphy when Murphy testified in his own defense; and failing to
request a remedy for the Brady violation. We affirm.

1     A police operation in which the police obtain statements
made by a defendant to an undercover law enforcement agent or
paid informant, typically in a jail cell, is referred to as a “Perkins
operation.” (See Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292.)




                                  2
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.     The Prosecution’s Case
       1.    The March 29, 2019 shooting
       On March 29, 2019 Dulce Murphy2 was driving her car
with Smith in the front passenger seat; three of Smith’s friends
were in the rear seats. When they were near Manchester Park,
located at 88th Street and Hoover Street in Los Angeles, a man
on a moped shot at Dulce’s car from the right side, injuring
Smith’s right arm. Dulce’s face was also bleeding, which she
believed was from broken glass. Dulce drove to Centinela
hospital, where Smith was treated for his injury. Dulce testified
at trial that during the 10-minute drive to the hospital, none of
the occupants in the car talked about who had shot at the car or
whether there would be retaliation.
       Los Angeles Police Officer Brett Kaller testified that he
interviewed Dulce and Smith at the hospital on the day of the
shooting. Dulce told Officer Kaller that a male dressed in all
black shot at her car, cracking the front windshield, and that
Smith was the only passenger.3 Smith said he was seated in the
front passenger’s seat and, while he was looking down at a text
message, he was shot. Officer Kaller testified Smith was
uncooperative and did not provide any information about who he
believed shot at him. Smith initially said he did not have a
phone, although there was a cellphone lying next to him on the


2      Dulce Murphy and Murphy were married in August 2020
and had three children together. We refer to Dulce Murphy by
her first name to avoid confusion.
3    At trial Dulce denied she told Officer Kaller that she and
Smith were alone in the car.




                                3
hospital bed. Smith then admitted it was his cellphone but
refused to provide his phone number. Instead, Smith provided
his mother’s phone number. Smith stated he lived in Bellflower
but could not recall his home address.
      Rayshawn Dale, a Hoover Criminals gang member with the
moniker Baby Tre Menace, was a key witness for the
prosecution.4 Dale testified that on March 29 he was “[h]anging
out in the shopping center” on Manchester Avenue and Figueroa
Street with Smith, who went by the moniker “Chip Seven.” Dale
and Smith were in the same set (8 Tre) of the Hoovers. Dale left
Smith to go to a check-cashing store on Manchester Avenue and
Broadway. Dale was at the store when he received a phone call
notifying him that Smith had been shot by a man on a minibike.
When he walked out of the store, Dale saw two men riding by on
minibikes on Manchester Avenue heading eastbound toward
Main Street, away from the 110 freeway. About 20 minutes later
he saw the two minibikes outside an apartment complex in Main
Street Crips territory. Dale then went to Centinela hospital and
Dale saw that the car Smith was in “got shot up.”5 Dale took
photographs of the car, and he sent them to other Hoovers “[t]o

4     Dale testified while in custody under an immunity
agreement with the prosecution, under which he agreed to testify
truthfully at trial, pleaded to a lesser charge than murder, and
was sentenced to 22 years in prison. On July 10, 2020 Dale, who
was serving a sentence for robbery, was transported to a Los
Angeles police station for an interview. Dale cooperated with the
police after he saw Murphy at the police station and believed
Murphy had given information to the police about Dale’s
involvement in a robbery.
5    Dale testified the car belonged to a female named Candy.
He had not heard the name Dulce before.




                                4
let them know what had just happened.” The Hoovers blamed
the Main Street Crips for the shooting of Smith.

       2.    The April 3, 2019 shooting
       On April 3, 2019 Israel Stewart and Deon Outten were
attempting to fix Outten’s car, which was parked outside an auto
parts shop located near the corner of 98th and Main Streets, in
Main Street Crips territory. Outten was in the driver’s seat, and
Stewart was in the front passenger’s seat. Stewart was looking
at his cellphone when he heard Outten say, “Aye, what is you
doing?” Stewart looked up and saw a young black male shooting
at them. Outten was hit once in the arm. Stewart “tried to hop
out the car,” and he got hit in the legs and hip by six bullets.
Stewart fell to the ground and tried to crawl to the back of the
car.
       At approximately 6:22 p.m. Los Angeles Police Sergeant
Keleigh Edwards arrived at the scene in response to a radio call.
Sergeant Edwards observed that Outten had an injury to his left
forearm and Stewart was on the ground with one or more
gunshot wounds to his leg. An ambulance took Stewart to the
hospital, where he stayed for two months and had multiple
surgeries.
       Dale testified that on the day of the April 3 shooting, he
saw some Main Street Crips hanging out near 98th Street and
Main Street, one of the Main Street Crips hangouts. Dale told
other Hoovers what he saw; and he, Murphy, and a gang member
identified as Shady Tre went in two cars to 98th and Main Street.
Murphy stopped his car in an alley on 98th Street, and Shady Tre
“jumped out” of the vehicle, exited the alley, and shot at a man.
Dale, who was in a second car, witnessed the shooting and drove




                                5
off. About a minute later, Dale returned to the scene and saw a
man lying on the ground.
       Police obtained surveillance video footage from the auto
parts shop and a nearby residence, which showed a white or
silver Ford Fusion—with blue tape around the rear window and
damage to the front right side—circling the area twice. Los
Angeles Police Officer Isaac Fernandez testified the fact the car
was circling caught his attention because “[t]ypically that’s what
rival gang members do as they’re looking for a victim to shoot or
commit a crime against.” Prior to the shooting, the Ford Fusion
passed Outten’s car and entered an alley just south of the auto
parts shop. Then the shooter, wearing a white sweater with
black block lettering that said “Nike” on the front, walked
through the alley and approached Stewart and Outten, who were
seated inside the car. The shooter fired numerous rounds into
the car and ran back into the alley. Video footage showed the
Ford Fusion quickly exiting the alley after the shooting.
       Officer Fernandez conducted a police database search and
found that in December 2018 police had stopped a Ford Fusion
driven by Murphy near the area of the April 3 shooting. The
Ford Fusion was registered to Murphy’s brother, Javonn Murphy
(Javonn). Officer Fernandez typed the car’s license plate into a
license plate reader system and saw a March 31, 2019
photograph of a Ford Fusion with its rear window missing and “a
plastic covering around it as if it had been involved in some kind
of accident or possibly been shot out by someone or vandalized by
someone,” as well as damage to the front right side. Officer
Fernandez determined the Ford Fusion from the March 31
photograph matched the vehicle seen in the surveillance camera
footage of the April 3 shooting, based on its collision damage.




                                6
       Officer Fernandez also viewed Murphy’s social media
accounts for possible gang ties “as far as motive” for the shooting,
which occurred in Main Street Crips territory. Officer Fernandez
explained that “9-8 is one of the sets within Main Street” Crips,
named after 98th Street, which is “the epicenter of the 9-8 Main
Street Crips” and where they “hang out.” Another Main Street
Crips set is “the 1-0-4 set,” named for 104th Street, which is “a
few blocks south of 98th Street.” Officer Fernandez grew up and
worked in the area, and he knew of the “violent feud between . . .
the Hoover Criminals and the Main Street Crips.” One
photograph from Murphy’s social media account showed a silver
Ford Fusion with damage to the front ride side of the vehicle.
Another photograph depicted Murphy “wearing that white Nike
sweater with black lettering in front,” similar to the sweater
worn by the shooter. Murphy made hand signs signifying “9-4
Hoovers” and “A-Trey Hoovers.” A third photograph showed
Murphy making a hand sign with another Hoover gang member
in the back of the group picture. In a social media message,
Murphy identified himself as “3bankg tha lok,” which Officer
Fernandez explained meant “Trey Bang,” with “3 pronounced
trey” and “k” following “n” to signify “Neighborhood killer.”
Officer Fernandez added that Hoovers used “tha lok” to mean
“loco” or “crazy.” Murphy also posted messages that disparaged
the Hoovers’ rival gangs, including the Neighborhood Crips and
Main Street Crips.

     3.     The April 11, 2019 shooting
     Shortly after 6 p.m. on April 11, 2019, Latoya West, Glenn
Mitchell, Lautasha Wright, Katherine Love, Dunjae Wynn,
Timothy Terry, and Aaron Pleasant were chatting outside a




                                 7
liquor store on the corner of 103rd and Main Streets. West
described the group as standing around talking, with no one
making gang signs or doing any “crazy stuff.” Terry testified that
he, Mitchell, and Pleasant were members of the Main Street
Crips.
       West saw “a car pull[] up and a girl was hanging out the
window hollering.” As West was heading inside the liquor store,
she got shot in her buttocks and back. Wright, who was seated
on a crate in front of the store, heard multiple gunshots. She saw
two cars pull up, with gunfire coming from either the backseat or
the front passenger seat of one of the cars. As Wright tried to run
inside the store, she fell down, and a bullet hit her elbow. Love
told Wright that she saw the people in the car and the shooter
was in the backseat.6 Terry was talking to “Gangster Glenn”
(Mitchell) when he heard gunshots and got on the ground. Once
the car left, Terry got up and saw that Mitchell had been shot.
Terry and several other people called 911. Mitchell died from a
gunshot wound to his abdomen and had another gunshot wound
to his right forearm.
       Dale testified that on April 11, the day of rapper Nipsey
Hussle’s funeral procession, he and another Hoover gang member
talked about disrupting the procession because Nipsey Hussle
was from a rival gang, the Rollin 60’s Crips. Dale and the other
gang member decided not to go to the procession because older
members of the Hoovers said they should respect the rapper’s
death. Smith joined them about an hour later, and Dale
suggested they go to Main Street (away from the procession).


6     Love, who was not injured, refused to testify at trial
although she was served with a trial subpoena.




                                 8
Dale then drove to the area near Main and 103rd Streets, next to
the liquor store, and he returned to report that he had seen “a lot
of people out” on the street, including “Tiny Red,” a Main Street
Crip. Smith, Murphy, and two other men then discussed going to
the Main Street area, and what guns they should use. Murphy
was initially reluctant to participate in the shooting, but he later
said, “Fuck it. I’ll go.” Smith wanted to join the group because a
Main Street Crip had shot him. Dale had given his gun to
someone else, so the group obtained a gun from another gang
member. Dale and Murphy argued over whether to use Dale’s or
Murphy’s car. Murphy initially did not want to use his off-white
Ford Fusion because it was “beat up,” with damage to the front
end. Murphy ultimately agreed to use his car.
       Dale testified that Murphy drove off with Smith as a
passenger. Dale followed in his car. The two cars took separate
paths once they got onto Main Street. Dale drove by the liquor
store and told Murphy and Smith by cellphone that there were
people gathered in front of the liquor store, but he did not see
Tiny Red. Dale’s and Murphy’s cars passed each other, and Dale
made a U-turn to return to the store. When Dale got to 101st
Street, he saw Murphy’s car slow down in traffic, then Dale heard
the gunshots and saw the car drive off. Dale also heard some
women screaming, and he saw a man lying on the ground. Dale
returned to the Hoovers’ hangout on 84th and Hoover Streets.
Murphy told Dale that he left his car near his Mother’s house
because “they had just [done] the shooting.” Smith was also at
the hangout, “just chillin.” Then someone (unidentified) sent a
text message to Dale, stating, “They got your car on the camera.”
Smith told Dale there were “cameras over there,” and so Dale and
Smith returned to the liquor store in Dale’s car to see if that was




                                 9
true. By that time Main Street was taped off. Dale did not see
any cameras.
       Dale returned to the Hoovers’ hangout. An older Main
Street Crip member called Murphy’s father, Snoop (who Dale
said was a Hoover gang member), and asked whether young
Hoovers had committed the shooting. Snoop asked Dale and
others whether they had gone over to Main Street Crips territory,
and they denied it. The next day, Dale sent a text message to
Smith stating, “And on Hoover, ain’t no cams.” Smith responded,
“Tops big bro.”
       Los Angeles Police Detective Iris Romero went to the crime
scene and recovered a deformed bullet that had been discharged
from a firearm. She also found bullet holes in the concrete wall of
the liquor store. Seven days later, a Los Angeles Police
Department forensic science technician removed two bullets from
the wall. Los Angeles Police Department criminalist Kuang Siu
examined the recovered bullets and determined one bullet was
“consistent with a[n] ammunition design of a nine-millimeter
Luger, .38 special, .38 super auto, and .357 magnum,” and a
second bullet came from a “nine-millimeter Luger or .38 super
auto.” Both bullets could have been fired from a nine-millimeter
Luger.
       Los Angeles Police Detective Nellie Knight obtained
surveillance camera footage from two locations near the liquor
store, in addition to video footage from the Hoover territory
around 84th Street, northwest of the crime scene. The video
footage showed that at 6:15 p.m. on April 11, the Ford Fusion
(with damage to its front right side) travelled to the liquor store.
The Ford Fusion and a second car arrived at the area near the
liquor store, then the shooting took place at approximately




                                10
6:23 p.m.7 Video footage from another surveillance camera
showed West, Wynn (with an injury to his leg), and Wright at
6:30 p.m., shortly after the shooting.
       After reviewing the video footage of the April 3 and 11
shootings, Detective Knight investigated the Ford Fusion and
determined that police had made traffic stops of Murphy while he
was driving the car in December 2018 and April and May 2019.
During the December 9, 2018 traffic stop for a broken front
headlight, Murphy told the police officer that he had purchased
the vehicle from his brother in November 2018. Another police
officer stopped Murphy when he was driving the Ford Fusion on
December 17, 2018. On April 14, 2019 a third police officer saw
the Ford Fusion blocking traffic with the driver’s side door open.
Murphy then ran up to the driver’s side of the car, got in, and
parked it on a nearby street. The officer detained Murphy
because the vehicle had an expired registration and was a vehicle
of interest. The officer noticed the vehicle had damage to the
front-side fender and a cracked windshield. Murphy told the
officer that he owned the car, and he added that he had been
living in the car for the past few days because he had gotten into
arguments with his mother. On April 15, 2019 a police officer
stopped Murphy while driving the Ford Fusion and cited him for
an expired registration and driving with a suspended license. On
May 17 a police officer saw the Ford Fusion parked at a red curb.
Murphy told the officer he got the car from his brother, and he
had driven it to the location. And on May 18 a police officer




7     Dale identified the Ford Fusion in the surveillance footage
as belonging to Murphy.




                                11
stopped Murphy while Murphy was driving the Ford Fusion for
an expired registration.
       On May 29, 2019 police officers arrested Murphy for human
trafficking and pimping. They recovered four cell phones from
the car he was driving, which was a Lexus registered to him. The
data extraction report for one of Murphy’s phones showed that
Smith’s cellphone number was saved under the name “C7.”

       4.    The cellphone location evidence
       Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) special agent
Michael Easter conducted a historical analysis of Murphy’s and
Smith’s cellphone records. Agent Easter created maps showing
where the cellphones were located in relation to the March 29,
April 3, and April 11, 2019 incidents based on each cellphone’s
cell tower usage. Agent Easter explained that a cellphone uses
the tower with the best signal, which is predominantly, but not
always, the closest tower.
       At about 11:30 a.m. on March 29, 2019 Smith’s cellphone
was active in the area of West 84th Street between Vermont
Avenue and Hoover Street. Starting at about 11:49 a.m., Smith’s
cellphone started to use cell towers further west, using a cell
tower in Inglewood at 12:17 p.m. Then at 1:43 p.m. the cellphone
started to use cellphone towers near the Centinela hospital and
stayed in that area until approximately 1:28 p.m. on the following
day.
       On April 3, 2019 Murphy’s cellphone was active in the area
around Manchester Avenue and Broadway between 6:04 and
6:06 p.m. Four minutes later the cellphone showed activity
further south, in the area of 108th Street and the 110 freeway.
At 6:16 p.m. the cellphone activity was consistent with the




                               12
cellphone being in the area of the crime scene, around 98th and
Main Streets. At 6:26 p.m. Murphy’s phone was active in the
area of Vermont Avenue and West 88th Street. Between 6:29
and 6:35 p.m., the phone was active in the area around West
92nd and Hoover Streets. Agent Easter testified that Murphy’s
cellphone activity was consistent with the phone starting a little
north of Manchester Avenue, west of the 110 freeway, then
moving southward and going to the crime scene at around
6:22 p.m., then returning to the area of Manchester Avenue and
Hoover Street.
       On April 11, 2019, between 5:59 and 6:15 p.m., both
Murphy’s and Smith’s cellphones were active around West 84th
Street between Vermont Avenue and Hoover Street. At 6:15 p.m.
Murphy made a call to Dale that lasted over 11 minutes. Around
the time of the call, Murphy’s car and Dale’s car left Hoovers
territory. At 6:22 p.m. Murphy’s cellphone was active in the area
of 107th Street near Main Street (just south of the crime scene).
Two minutes later, Murphy’s cellphone was active in the area of
West 98th Street and Broadway. Between 6:28 and 6:35 p.m.,
both Murphy’s and Smith’s cellphones showed activity in the area
of Manchester Avenue and the 110 freeway. At 6:35 p.m.
Murphy received a call from Dale that lasted 43 seconds.

      5.    Smith’s statements during the Perkins operation
      Smith was arrested on September 15, 2020. The police
placed Smith in a jail cell with an undercover Perkins agent, who
claimed to be a Grape Street Watts gang member.8 While Smith

8     Detective Knight explained that the Perkins agent was not
an actual inmate or employed by or associated with any law




                               13
and the agent were in the cell, Detective Courtney entered and
told Smith the police detectives were coming to talk to him about
a drive-by shooting that had happened in April 2019. After the
detective left, Smith talked to the Perkins agent about the
“bullshit” charge, and Smith stated a “[h]omie went to jail” for a
robbery with a gun, and “now, this nigga doing some bullshit.
Now, the homie’s acting to a snitch.”9 Smith later told the
Perkins agent that the police “said it’s a video from the camera,
but, on Hoover, it just so, like, [shows] the back and side,” but
“that shit happened in front of the store.” When the Perkins
agent asked Smith “what type of strap was on y’all,” Smith
responded, “We had a nine.”10 Smith later told the Perkins agent
that the “homie” has a lawyer and said “[t]hey ain’t got nothing
but pictures of niggas,” but “[t]hey caught his car on camera.”
      After the jail cell conversation, Detective Knight and Los
Angeles Police Detective David Howell interviewed Smith.
Detective Knight advised Smith of his Miranda rights11 before
asking him questions about the April 11 shooting. Smith stated
that on April 11, 2019 he was at home in Bellflower babysitting


enforcement agency. She did not provide any additional details
on the agent other than that he was working undercover. The
prosecutor played the audio recording of Smith’s jail conversation
with the Perkins agent to the jury.
9     Detective Knight testified that at the time of the Perkins
operation, only Murphy had been arrested in connection with the
murder, and therefore Murphy was the only person that Smith
could have been referring to as the “homie” in his conversation
with the Perkins agent.
10    Detective Knight testified “strap” is “a term for firearm.”
11    Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.




                                14
his 12-year-old niece from the morning until nighttime. During
the interview he continued to deny knowing anything about a
murder on April 11.

      6.    Additional gang evidence
      Terry testified he had been a Main Street Crip for 30 years,
and he opined “the young people are wild” because “they don’t
care” and “they do anything.” Terry stated the liquor store where
the April 11 shooting took place was a Main Street Crips
hangout, along with the area of 98th and Main Streets, where the
April 3 shooting took place. The Hoover Criminals territory was
west of the 110 freeway. At one time the two gangs were allied,
and families would have both Main Street Crips and Hoover gang
members in the same family. At some point between 1999 and
2004, however, the two gangs became rivals. Smith’s attorney
asked Terry whether he had been in jail and “heard people in the
holding tank brag about things they did on the streets” or “talk
about a shooting to try to gain credibility with other inmates.”
Terry answered “yes” to both questions.
      Dale testified about gang monikers and demonstrated some
Hoover gang hand signs. The Hoovers’ rivals were the
Neighborhood Crips, the Main Street Crips, and the Denver Lane
Bloods. He stated that until 2008 the Hoover Criminals and
Main Street Crips got along, and it was common for a family to
have members in both gangs. The two gangs’ territories were
adjacent to each other, separated by the 110 freeway. If a rival
gang disrespected the Hoovers, the Hoovers would retaliate,
including by shooting at them. The two gangs would disrespect
each other by calling the other gang derogatory names and spray
painting the derogatory names in the other gang’s territory. Dale




                               15
and other Hoover Criminals had committed burglaries, robberies,
assaults, and other violent crimes. Dale testified Smith had a
“C7” tattoo on his chest. Smith’s brother, called “Pack Rat,” was
a Main Street Crip who had been killed.
       Dulce, who was called as a prosecution witness, testified
she had never heard of the Main Street Crips or Hoover
Criminals. She had never heard anyone call Smith or Murphy by
a nickname, and she had never seen either flash gang hand signs.
Dulce testified Murphy was “very humble, respectful, generous,
and loving.” Dulce also stated Murphy had “never been
aggressive” or violent. Dulce denied Murphy was a Hoover gang
member, stating she had “never seen him” do “any gang-related
stuff.” When the prosecutor showed Dulce photographs from
Murphy’s social media account depicting Murphy making hand
gestures, Dulce testified she had never seen Murphy make those
hand gestures and did not know what they meant or that they
were gang hand signs. With respect to a photograph of Murphy
holding a gun, Dulce stated it could be a BB gun, a water gun, or
an actual gun. She had never seen Murphy holding a gun, and
he did not have access to a gun. When asked whether the social
media photographs changed her opinion that Murphy was not
violent, Dulce responded, “He is not violent. No, he’s not.”

B.    Murphy’s Case
      Murphy, Murphy’s older brother, Javonn, and Murphy’s
father, Javonnie Murphy (Javonnie), testified on Murphy’s
behalf. Murphy testified he was not involved in the April 3 or 11
shooting. He acknowledged he was a current Hoover gang
member with the moniker “Baby Tre Bang.” Javonn first gave
Murphy “custody, control, or possession” of the Ford Fusion in




                               16
2018. Other people in the community also drove the car because
Javonn would leave the key in the car. Murphy denied driving
the car on April 3 or April 11, 2019. He did not know that the
Ford Fusion was involved in a crime until his arrest on July 9,
2020.
       Javonn testified the gray 2007 Ford Fusion was registered
to him, and he had purchased the car sometime between 2010
and 2015. In April 2019 Javonn parked the car on 84th Street
between Hoover Street and Vermont Avenue. He did not live
there, but he had a lot of family in the area. He knew Murphy
drove the car, but he did not authorize anyone else to drive it.
There was only one key to the car, which Javonn kept, but he
sometimes left the key in the car. Javonn received several tickets
for other people who drove the Ford Fusion; he did not know
them. On one occasion, Javonn was at a gas station on Hoover
Street and Manchester Avenue when he saw a person he did not
know drive the Ford Fusion with two strangers as passengers.
Javonn was not affiliated with any gang; however, he knew
members of his family were involved in a gang.
       Javonnie testified he was a former Hoover gang member,
but he stopped being affiliated with the gang 20 years ago, after
he was shot. Javonnie did not like the fact that Murphy joined
the Hoovers. Javonnie knew Murphy used the name “Tre Bang,”
but there were “multiple Tre Bangs.” Javonnie was aware that
Javonn owned the Ford Fusion, and Javonnie had seen Murphy
drive the car. Javonnie also saw multiple people, including Dale,
drive the car. It was common for a gang member to use another
gang member’s car, sometimes without asking. On April 11, 2019
Javonnie’s uncle picked him up on 84th Street, and they went to
Lancaster around 12:00 or 1:00 p.m. and stayed until around




                               17
8:00 p.m. Javonnie did not see or talk with Dale, Murphy, or any
Hoover gang members that day. Javonnie also denied that he
received a phone call from a person associated with the Main
Street Crips on April 11. He likewise denied that he had any
friends or associated with anyone from the Main Street Crips,
other than Smith’s brother, who had died.

C.     Smith’s Case
       Misha Smith (Misha), Smith’s oldest sister, testified on his
behalf. In March 2019 Misha lived with Smith and their mother
in Bellflower. Misha visited Smith at the hospital when he was
shot. She saw that the black Impala that Smith had been in had
bullet holes on the right front passenger side of the car. Smith
had a cast on his right arm, which was removed two weeks later.
Misha explained Smith had tattoos on his face and body because
“he like[d] being an artist,” specifically, a rap artist. Misha did
not know Smith to be a gang member, and she had never seen
him with a gun. She also denied hearing anyone refer to Smith
as “Chip.” The family called Smith “Chucky,” a name their
grandfather gave him.

D.    The Verdicts and Sentencing
      The jury found Murphy guilty with respect to the April 3
shooting of two counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; counts 1 & 2). The
jury further found Murphy and Smith guilty with respect to the
April 11 shooting of willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder
of Mitchell (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 3), five counts of
attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 187,
subd. (a), 664; counts 4-8), and conspiracy to commit murder




                                18
(§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 9). The jury also found Smith guilty of
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 11).
The jury found true with respect to count 2 for Murphy and
counts 3 through 8 for both defendants that a principal was
armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)), but it found not true
the personal-use firearm allegations (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)).
In a bifurcated court proceeding, Murphy (with respect to
counts 1 through 9) and Smith (with respect to counts 3 through
9) admitted the gang allegations (§ 186.22, subd. (b)), the
allegations that a principal personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53,
subds. (d) & (e)(1)), and the allegations that for each count
Murphy and Smith had a prior serious or violent felony
conviction under the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j),
1170.12). Murphy and Smith also admitted the alleged
aggravating factors with respect to all counts.
       The trial court sentenced Murphy to an aggregate state
prison term of 100 years to life plus two life sentences, each with
a 15-year minimum parole eligibility term. The court sentenced
Smith to an aggregate state prison term of 75 years to life plus
one life sentence with a 15-year minimum parole eligibility term,
plus eight months.12 Murphy and Smith timely appealed.

12     The trial court sentenced Murphy on count 1 for attempted
murder to a life sentence with a 15-year minimum parole
eligibility term based on the gang allegation (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)(C)(5)), plus 25 years to life for the firearm
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1).
The court imposed the same sentence on count 2 for attempted
murder (a life sentence with a 15-year minimum parole eligibility
term) but ran the sentence concurrent to count 1 and stayed the




                                 19
                         DISCUSSION

A.     The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting
       the Gang Evidence
       1.    The trial court proceeding
       At a pretrial hearing, Murphy and Smith moved to exclude
or limit the prosecution’s gang evidence. The prosecutor made an
offer of proof that he intended to present evidence that the
defendants were members of the Hoover gang, that the shootings
took place in territory controlled by the Main Street Crips, and
that animus between the gangs resulted in “shootings back and
forth.” The prosecutor argued the evidence was essential to
show the motive for the shootings on April 3 and 11 was to
retaliate for the shooting of Smith by the rival Main Street Crips
on March 29 and to provide context for testimony about the


firearm enhancements. On count 3 for first degree murder the
court sentenced Murphy and Smith to 25 years to life, plus
25 years to life for the firearm enhancement under
section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1). On count 5 for
attempted murder, the court sentenced Murphy and Smith to a
life sentence with a 15-year minimum parole eligibility term, plus
25 years to life, to run consecutive to the other terms (same as
count 1). The court imposed the same life sentence with a 15-
year minimum parole eligibility term on counts 4, 6, 7, and 8 as
to Murphy and Smith, to run concurrent to the sentence on
count 5, but stayed the firearm enhancements. On count 9 for
conspiracy, the court sentenced the defendants to concurrent
terms of 25 years to life. On count 11 for possession of a firearm
by Smith, the court sentenced him to a consecutive term of eight
months (one third of the middle term). (There was no count 10
alleged against Murphy or Smith.) The court struck the alleged
strikes and stayed all remaining enhancements.




                               20
shootings. In addition, the gang evidence was necessary to
explain why Dale (as a Hoover gang member) knew what had
happened during the shootings and why Murphy and Smith
would have shared information with Dale about the shootings.
The prosecutor noted that he did not intend to introduce any
evidence about the primary activities of the gang, predicate
offenses, or other requirements to prove a gang enhancement.
      Smith’s attorney argued the trial court had granted the
defendants’ motion to bifurcate trial on the gang enhancement
allegations, and evidence of the defendants’ gang membership
and gang rivalry was not necessary to prove the charges; rather,
the prosecution should focus on evidence of the defendants’
involvement in the shootings. Murphy’s attorney asserted that
the prejudice from the gang evidence would far outweigh the
probative value and confuse the jury as to what the case was
about.
      The trial court denied the defendants’ motion to exclude the
gang evidence. The court reasoned the April 3 and 11 shootings
were alleged to be in retaliation for the March 29 shooting
committed by the Main Street Crips. Further, the jury
instructions stated the jury may consider motive in determining
whether a defendant committed a crime. Thus, “a limited
amount of gang testimony is admissible for the People to prove
that there was a motive in the case.” In addition, the planning of
the murder as retaliation for the March 29 shooting was relevant
to prove the overt acts for the conspiracy charge. The court
added that the prosecution’s key witness (Dale) was himself a
gang member, and the prosecution would rely on him instead of a
gang expert to describe the gang rivalry and motive for the
shootings.




                               21
       2.    Governing law and standard of review
       “In 2021, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 333
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333), known as the STEP
Forward Act of 2021. (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 1.) Assembly
Bill 333 amended Penal Code section 186.22 by imposing new
substantive requirements relating to gang enhancements and the
criminal offense of gang participation.” (People v. Burgos (2024)
16 Cal.5th 1, 7, fn. omitted.) Assembly Bill 333 also added
section 1109, which provides that a trial court must try a gang
enhancement charge separately from the underlying offense,
upon the request of the defense. (Burgos, at p. 7; § 1109,
subd. (a); Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 5.) “[S]ection 1109 does not
disturb existing case law holding that gang evidence may be
admitted to prove substantive crimes.” (People v. Garcia (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1049; accord, People v. Hinojos (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 524, 549.)
       We recognize, as defendants point out, that in enacting
Assembly Bill 333 and requiring bifurcation of trial on the gang
enhancement under section 1109, the Legislature found that
gang evidence “‘can be unreliable and prejudicial to a jury
because it is lumped into evidence of the underlying charges
which further perpetuates unfair prejudice in juries and
convictions of innocent people.’” (People v. Burgos, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 10.) However, “[t]he People are generally
entitled to introduce evidence of a defendant’s gang affiliation
and activity if it is relevant to the charged offense.” (People v.
Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 31; accord, Burgos, at p. 23 [“in some
instances, the same gang evidence introduced to establish the
elements of a gang enhancement might be admissible at a
bifurcated trial on the underlying charge”].)




                               22
        As the Supreme Court explained in People v. Holmes,
McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 772, “Although
evidence of gang membership carries the potential for prejudice,
it ‘“is often relevant to, and admissible regarding, the charged
offense. Evidence of the defendant’s gang affiliation—including
evidence of the gang’s territory, membership, signs, symbols,
beliefs and practices, criminal enterprises, rivalries, and the
like—can help prove identity, motive, modus operandi, specific
intent, means of applying force or fear, or other issues pertinent
to guilt of the charged crime.”’” (Accord, People v. Ramirez (2022)
13 Cal.5th 997, 1095 [gang evidence “is admissible even when a
gang enhancement is not charged, provided the probative value of
the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect”].)
        We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of gang
evidence for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Ramirez, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 1095; see People v. Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 33 [“‘“The admission of gang evidence over an Evidence Code
section 352 objection will not be disturbed on appeal unless the
trial court’s decision exceeds the bounds of reason.”’”].)

      3.     The probative value of the gang evidence was greater
             than any prejudice
      Murphy and Smith contend the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting excessive gang-related evidence, including
Dale’s testimony about his own involvement with the Hoover
gang, the gang’s hand signs, gang monikers, and rival gangs;
Murphy’s social media account showing him making hand signs
and using offensive language; cross-examination of Murphy and
Javonnie about the “lifestyle” and “mindset” of Hoover gang




                                 23
members; questioning of Murphy as to whether “gang members
need to retaliate” to avoid being weak; questioning of Dulce about
the Hoovers and Main Street Crips and whether she had seen
Murphy or Smith make gang hand signs; cross-examination of
Misha about Smith’s “C7” tattoo and whether the “C” referred to
Hoover gang members called “Chip”; and testimony from Los
Angeles Police Officer Jahaziel Andrade that he conducted a
traffic stop of Murphy in the Ford Fusion based on the fact the
car had been previously involved in “gang crimes.” Smith also
argues the prosecutor improperly focused on gang evidence
during his opening statement, and the focus on gangs in the
opening statement and testimony “made the case about nothing
other than guilt-by-gang-membership.” The court did not abuse
its discretion.
       Officer Fernandez’s testimony about Murphy’s social media
posts showing him making Hoover gang hand signs, his
description of the Hoover and Main Street Crip gang sets, the
historic rivalry between the two gangs, the gangs’ territories, and
the retaliatory shootings the two gangs had committed against
each other were highly relevant to prove Murphy’s and Smith’s
motives, intent to kill, and involvement in the April 3 and
April 11 shootings.13 (See People v. Holmes, McClain and
Newborn, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 772 [“Given the circumstances
of the shootings, which were clearly intended as gang retaliation,
defendants’ membership was highly relevant to prove their
involvement, motive, and intent to kill. The prosecution had a

13    Officer Andrade’s testimony that he stopped the Ford
Fusion that Murphy was driving (with front-end damage)
because of a suspicion it had been involved in “gang crimes” was
relevant to Murphy’s involvement in the two shootings.




                                24
right to present the evidence.”]; People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th
36, 64 [gang evidence was admissible to prove motive because it
“explained defendant’s willingness to shoot a complete stranger
minutes after a verbal spat, along with the apparent coordination
among defendant’s associates to destroy the surveillance tape”];
People v. Huynh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 969, 980-981 [“gang
motives include ‘criminal activity against a rival’” and
“‘retaliation for a prior attack upon a gang member’”].)
       Likewise, Dale’s testimony about his and defendants’
membership in the Hoover gang, the Hoovers’ rivalry with the
Main Street Crips, and related testimony about the gangs was
highly probative of defendants’ motive and intent to kill.
Although Officer Fernandez provided similar testimony, Dale’s
testimony was relevant because it showed he was knowledgeable
about the gangs and could provide credible testimony about the
March and April shootings. Similarly, the photographs of Dale
making gang signs with Murphy and Smith was relevant to his
credibility in describing the events of March 29, April 3, and
April 11 and the involvement of Murphy and Smith in those
events.14 The prosecutor’s cross-examination of Murphy about


14    Murphy also argues the prosecutor’s reference during his
examination of Dale to Murphy and Smith as “Chip” and “Tre
Bang” was improper and prejudicial. Dale testified that he knew
Murphy and Smith by their gang monikers, and it would be
easier for him to testify about them in this manner. The
prosecutor then continued his questioning of Dale by asking
about the actions of Chip and Tre Bang. Neither Murphy or
Smith objected to the prosecutor’s use of their gang monikers in
his questioning of Dale, thereby forfeiting the contention the trial
court abused its discretion in allowing this form of questioning.




                                25
his current Hoover gang affiliation and gang culture was
similarly relevant to his motive for the shootings.
       The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in allowing
the prosecutor to question Javonnie about his gang membership
in light of Javonnie’s testimony on direct examination he had
retired from the Hoover gang 20 years earlier. As discussed, Dale
testified Javonnie was a current Hoover gang member, and an
older Main Street Crip gang member had called Javonnie to
inquire about the April 11 shooting. The prosecutor’s questioning
of Dulce about Murphy’s and Smith’s gang membership (which
she denied) and photographs of Murphy making gang hand signs
was relevant to Dulce’s credibility given her testimony that
Murphy had “never been aggressive” or violent, and Murphy did
not have “it in him” to shoot someone. The questioning of Misha
about Smith’s tattoos and gang membership was likewise proper
impeachment given her testimony that Smith’s “C7” tattoo was
only for artistic purposes. (See People v. Samaniego (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1168 [“Gang evidence is . . . relevant on
the issue of a witness’s credibility.”]; In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th
184, 207 [“‘Once appellant placed his general character in issue,
the prosecutor was entitled to rebut with evidence or argument
suggesting a more balanced picture of his personality.’”].)




(People v. Pineda (2022) 13 Cal.5th 186, 237-238 [defendant
forfeited contention cross-examination about gang membership
was improper given failure to timely object].) The Attorney
General asserts forfeiture as to several other arguments made by
defendants regarding admission of gang evidence, but most of the
testimony at issue was the subject of defendants’ motions in
limine.




                                 26
        Finally, Murphy and Smith contend the trial court abused
its discretion in finding the probative value of the gang evidence
outweighed its prejudicial effect. Under Evidence Code
section 352, “a trial court, ‘in its discretion may exclude evidence
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.’ We
review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence under Evidence
Code section 352 for abuse of discretion, and ‘do not disturb the
trial court’s ruling unless it was arbitrary, capricious, or made in
a “‘patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest
miscarriage of justice.’”’” (People v. Lamb (2024) 16 Cal.5th 400,
424; accord, People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 358.)
“Prejudice under Evidence Code section 352 refers to ‘“‘evidence
which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against [the]
defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on the
issues.’” [Citation.] In this context, ‘“‘“prejudicial” is not
synonymous with “damaging.”’”’ [Citation.] ‘“Evidence is not
prejudicial, as that term is used in a section 352 context, merely
because it undermines the opponent’s position or shores up that
of the proponent. The ability to do so is what makes evidence
relevant. The code speaks in terms of undue prejudice. Unless
the dangers of undue prejudice, confusion, or time consumption
‘“substantially outweigh”’ the probative value of relevant
evidence, a section 352 objection should fail.”’” (Thomas, at
p. 363; accord, Lamb, at p. 425.)
        The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the
probative value of the gang evidence—to prove motive and intent
to kill and to assess witness credibility—exceeded its prejudicial




                                 27
effect. (People v. Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 32 [“‘“‘[B]ecause
a motive is ordinarily the incentive for criminal behavior, its
probative value generally exceeds its prejudicial effect, and wide
latitude is permitted in admitting evidence of its existence.’”’”];
People v. Duong, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 65 [probative value of
gang evidence “was not substantially outweighed by the
probability of undue prejudice”].) Moreover, the court properly
instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1403 that the jury could
only consider gang evidence for limited purposes, including
motive, “the relationship between the parties involved,” and the
credibility of a witness, and not as evidence that “a defendant is a
person of bad character or that he has a disposition to commit
crime.”

B.      Murphy Has Not Established Ineffective Assistance of
        Counsel Based on His Attorney’s Direct Examination
        To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant bears the burden to show (1) his or her “‘“‘counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms’”’” and (2) he or she
“‘“‘suffered prejudice to a reasonable probability, that is, a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’”’”
(People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 653; accord, People v.
Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198 (Mickel); Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-692.)
        Moreover, “[o]n direct appeal, if the record ‘“sheds no light
on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged,”’
we must reject the claim ‘“unless counsel was asked for an
explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply
could be no satisfactory explanation.”’” (People v. Caro (2019)




                                 28
7 Cal.5th 463, 488; accord, Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 198 [“a
reviewing court will reverse a conviction based on ineffective
assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if there is affirmative
evidence that counsel had ‘“‘no rational tactical purpose’”’ for an
action or omission”]; People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 972
[“except in those rare instances where there is no conceivable
tactical purpose for counsel’s actions, claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel should be raised on habeas corpus, not on
direct appeal”].) We presume “that counsel’s actions fall within
the broad range of reasonableness, and afford ‘great deference to
counsel’s tactical decisions.’” (Mickel, at p. 198; accord, People v.
Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 125 [“‘Unless a defendant establishes
the contrary, we shall presume that “counsel’s performance fell
within the wide range of professional competence and that
counsel’s actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of
sound trial strategy.”’”].)
       Murphy contends his trial attorney rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel by eliciting prejudicial testimony from
Murphy when he testified in his own defense. Murphy argues his
attorney inexplicably elicited from him that he was in custody at
the time of trial and had been in custody for two-and-a-half years.
But Murphy later testified that “being in jail for the two years”
led him to change his mindset about being in a gang (to be more
negative) because during the time he was in custody he observed
family and friends who he thought loved him “just changed on”
him. His attorney could have had a tactical reason for eliciting
this evidence to cast Murphy in a more favorable light by
showing he no longer wanted to be involved with the Hoovers.




                                 29
       Murphy also asserts his attorney was ineffective in eliciting
that Murphy spent time in a juvenile hall camp. But Murphy’s
attorney did not ask Murphy about his time in juvenile hall.
Rather, he simply asked Murphy whether he had any education
after he graduated from high school. Murphy answered that he
had studied criminal justice in college for a month. Murphy then
added, without prompting, that he had taken criminal justice
classes while he was in a juvenile hall camp.
       Murphy also criticizes his trial attorney for eliciting
testimony about his being stopped by the police for pimping and
pandering. His attorney asked whether Murphy was aware that
a police officer had implicated him in a pimping and pandering
allegation. Murphy responded that he was aware of the
allegations and still faced the charges. He explained that a police
officer stopped him and pulled him out of the car, stating that he
was under investigation for prostitution and pimping. Murphy
denied that he was a pimp and explained the passenger in his car
was his little cousin, and he gave her rides in exchange for gas
money.
       Murphy’s attorney had a tactical reason to ask Murphy
about the pimping allegation to give Murphy an opportunity to
refute the allegation that he was a pimp and involved in
prostitution, which came out during testimony from Los Angeles
Police Officer Jose Zavala. Officer Zavala had testified during
the prosecution’s case that he stopped Murphy on May 29, 2019
and arrested him for pimping and prostitution, at which time the
officer obtained from Murphy’s vehicle four cellphones, including
one from Murphy that was used for the investigation into where
his cellphone was at the time of the shootings. Officer Zavala
explained he arrested Murphy on May 29 because Murphy had




                                30
dropped off his female passenger in a high prostitution area, and
he and the female in his car had condoms in the car that were
from packaging with the same serial number.
       Murphy’s trial attorney may have also had a tactical reason
for eliciting testimony from Murphy about his being arrested for
the robbery and murder of the rapper Pop Smoke. Detective
Knight’s recorded interview of Dale was played for the jury
during the prosecution’s case. In the interview, Dale implicated
Murphy in the murder of Pop Smoke. Murphy’s attorney asked
Murphy whether he heard in the taped interview that Dale had
implicated him in the Pop Smoke murder. Murphy answered, “I
believe Detective Knight told [Dale] that I was also being
arrested for the Pop Smoke. I think he just asked her, like, oh,
oh, is [Murphy] down for that I think she brought that up to
him.” Murphy’s attorney then asked, “[Y]ou weren’t involved in
that incident, is that correct?” Murphy replied, “No, sir, I wasn’t
charged in the incident.” This was consistent with Detective
Knight’s testimony at trial that at the end of the investigation,
Murphy had not been charged with the Pop Smoke murder.
Murphy’s attorney therefore had a tactical reason to ask Murphy
about his arrest for the Pop Smoke murder so that Murphy could
deny any involvement and cast doubt on Dale’s credibility.
       Finally, Murphy contends his attorney was ineffective by
eliciting testimony that Murphy had “custody, control, or
possession of the Ford Fusion.” Murphy’s attorney had a tactical
reason to have Murphy acknowledge that he drove the Ford
Fusion. Prior to Murphy’s testimony, the prosecutor had
presented testimony from five police officers who had stopped
Murphy while he drove the Ford Fusion. Murphy’s admission
that he drove the Ford Fusion bolstered his credibility. The jury




                                31
was therefore more likely to believe Murphy’s additional
testimony that other individuals in the community drove the
Ford Fusion and that Murphy did not drive the car on April 3 or
April 11, 2019.

C.     Murphy and Smith Forfeited Their Brady Challenge, and
       Murphy’s Trial Attorney Did Not Render Ineffective
       Assistance of Counsel
       “‘“In Brady [v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83], the United
States Supreme Court held ‘that the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt
or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.’ [Citation.] The high court has since held that the
duty to disclose such evidence exists even though there has been
no request by the accused [citation], that the duty encompasses
impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence [citation],
and that the duty extends even to evidence known only to police
investigators and not to the prosecutor [citation]. Such evidence
is material ‘“if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.”’ [Citation.] In order to
comply with Brady, therefore, ‘the individual prosecutor has a
duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others
acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the
police.’”’” (People v. Masters (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1019, 1066-1067;
accord, In re Masters (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1054, 1086-1087.)
“Evidence actually presented at trial is not considered suppressed
for Brady purposes, even if that evidence had not been previously




                                32
disclosed during discovery.” (People v. Mora and Rangel (2018)
5 Cal.5th 442, 467.)
       “For a defendant to obtain relief under Brady, ‘“‘[t]he
evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because
it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must
have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or
inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.’ [Citation.]
Prejudice, in this context, focuses on ‘the materiality of the
evidence to the issue of guilt and innocence.’ [Citations.]
Materiality, in turn, requires more than a showing that the
suppressed evidence would have been admissible [citation], that
the absence of the suppressed evidence made conviction ‘more
likely’ [citation], or that using the suppressed evidence to
discredit a witness’s testimony ‘might have changed the outcome
of the trial’ [citation]. A defendant instead ‘must show a
“reasonable probability of a different result.’”’” (People v.
Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1067; accord, In re Masters,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1087.) We independently review whether
there has been a Brady violation, giving “‘great weight to any
trial court findings of fact that are supported by substantial
evidence.’” (People v. Masters, at p. 1067; accord, In re Masters,
at p. 1087.)
       During trial Detective Knight testified that only Murphy
had been stopped by the police for driving the Ford Fusion. In
cross-examination, Detective Knight acknowledged, after having
her recollection refreshed, that at the preliminary hearing she
was asked whether Travelle Mitchell (whom she described as a
gang member associated with Murphy) had ever been stopped in
the Ford Fusion and given a traffic citation. Detective Knight
stated at trial with respect to that question, “I responded with




                               33
yes when my real answer was, I guess, no.” She added that
section 7 of her evidence book for the case (the “murder book”)
listed the traffic stops that had been made on the Ford Fusion
and did not reflect that Travelle Mitchell had been stopped. But
at the preliminary hearing Detective Knight had referred to a
“database” identifying Travelle Mitchell. Detective Knight also
stated in response to another question that she had no evidence
that a person named Devonte Richardson drove the vehicle.
However, she explained, “In reviewing all of the evidence that I
have recovered throughout my two-and-a-half-year investigation,
the only person that was brought to my knowledge in reviewing
social media account[s] that drove the car is . . . Zaihid
Richardson.” Detective Knight denied this was the same person
as Devonte Richardson.
       Smith contends the prosecutor committed a Brady violation
by failing to disclose to defense counsel the database that
Detective Knight referenced in her preliminary hearing
testimony showing that Travelle Mitchell had driven the Ford
Fusion. Smith also argues the prosecution was required to turn
over the social media records relating to Zaihid Richardson.
Murphy argues the prosecution was required to disclose the
database of all individuals who had driven the Ford Fusion
around the time of the shootings, as well as documentation of
Murphy’s five traffic stops in the vehicle. However, Murphy and
Smith forfeited their Brady arguments by failing to raise them in
the trial court. (People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1284
[defendants forfeited claim “the prosecution withheld
impeachment evidence” in violation of Brady “because it was not
made below”]; People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 714
[Brady claim forfeited where defendant failed to object or request




                               34
appropriate sanctions]; see People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th
386, 411 [forfeiture “‘“applies to claims based on statutory
violations, as well as claims based on violations of fundamental
constitutional rights”’”].)15
       Murphy also contends his trial attorney rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel because he failed to make a
motion to obtain evidence that other individuals drove the Ford
Fusion or to request a remedy for the Brady violation. Murphy
argues this was a critical piece of evidence because there was no
direct evidence of the identity of the driver or shooter, and the
only circumstantial evidence that Murphy was a perpetrator was
that he had access to the vehicle.
       Murphy has not met his burden to show ineffective
assistance of counsel. (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S.
at pp. 687-692; Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 198; People v.
Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 653.) The record does not reflect
why Murphy’s trial attorney elected not to raise a Brady violation
at trial, especially given Detective Knight’s testimony at the
preliminary hearing about the database. Murphy’s attorney
could have had tactical reasons for not requesting discovery
about whether other individuals drove the Ford Fusion.
Murphy’s attorney was able to impeach Detective Knight with
her preliminary hearing testimony in which she stated a
database showed Travelle Mitchell had driven the Ford Fusion.
In addition, although Detective Knight initially denied at trial

15    The Attorney General argues Murphy and Smith failed to
show prejudice because they did not point to any evidence that
there were other drivers of the vehicle. We do not reach the
merits because we find forfeiture and no ineffective assistance of
counsel.




                                35
that anyone other than Murphy had driven the vehicle, Murphy’s
attorney was able to cast doubt on the prosecutor’s theory that
Murphy was the only driver by eliciting from Detective Knight
that social media accounts showed Zaihid Richardson had driven
the Ford Fusion. Murphy’s attorney may have known from
Murphy or his brother Javonn (the car owner) that there were no
other drivers, so it was better tactically to use the preliminary
hearing testimony for impeachment purposes without focusing on
the database prior to trial.

D.    The Aranda-Bruton Rule Does Not Bar Smith’s Statements
      to the Perkins Agent or the Detectives
      Murphy contends the admission of Smith’s unredacted
statements made to the undercover Perkins agent and to
detectives violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation clause
rights under the Aranda-Bruton doctrine. (Bruton v. United
States (1968) 391 U.S. 123; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d
518.) “The Aranda-Bruton doctrine ‘addresses a specific issue
that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the
out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that
incriminates a codefendant,’ and prevents such a statement’s
admission even if a limiting instruction is given to the jury.”
(People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1194; accord, People v.
Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 869, overruled on another
ground in People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104.)
      “[T]he Confrontation Clause is not violated by the
admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession with a
proper limiting instruction when . . . the confession is redacted to
eliminate not only the defendant’s name, but any reference to his
or her existence.” (Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200, 211;




                                36
accord, People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 454, overruled on
another ground in People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 919.)
However, “[w]hen, despite redaction, the statement ‘obviously
refer[s] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant, and
. . . involve[s] inferences that a jury ordinarily could make
immediately, even were the confession the very first item
introduced at trial’ [citation] the Bruton rule applie[s] and
introduction of the statement at a joint trial violate[s] the
defendant’s rights under the confrontation clause.” (Lewis, at
p. 455, quoting Gray v. Maryland (1998) 523 U.S. 185, 196-197.)
        The California Supreme Court in People v. Tran, supra,
13 Cal.5th at page 1195 explained that Crawford v. Washington
(2004) 541 U.S. 36 “narrowed confrontation clause rights under
the Aranda-Bruton doctrine to testimonial statements only.”
(Accord, People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 129 [“‘the
confrontation clause applies only to testimonial hearsay
statements and not to [hearsay] statements that are
nontestimonial’”].) “‘Statements are nontestimonial when made
in the course of police interrogation under circumstances
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.’” (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 688;
accord, People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 168 [“a declarant’s
hearsay statement is testimonial if made ‘with a primary purpose
of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony’”].)




                               37
       Murphy contends the trial court violated his rights under
Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause pursuant to Aranda-
Bruton by admitting in the joint trial Smith’s unredacted
statements made to the undercover Perkins agent. But Smith’s
statements to the agent were nontestimonial because the agent
was not employed by law enforcement, and there is no indication
Smith was aware the agent was not a fellow inmate. (See People
v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1214 [stating with
respect to letters exchanged between codefendants while in jail,
“[p]rivate communications between inmates are not testimonial,
and their admission would not violate the principle laid down in
Crawford that bars the use at trial of testimonial out-of-court
statements as to which no opportunity for cross-examination was
afforded”], overruled on another ground in People v. Rangel
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216; People v. Almeda (2018)
19 Cal.App.5th 346, 362-363 [“‘[S]tatements made unwittingly to
a Government informant’ and ‘statements from one prisoner to
another’ are nontestimonial statements.”], quoting Davis v.
Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813, 825; People v. Gallardo (2017)
18 Cal.App.5th 51, 67-68 [codefendant’s jailhouse statements to
two paid informants posing as inmates were nontestimonial
where “there [was] no evidence indicating [codefendant] knew he
was speaking to police informants, or otherwise anticipated his
statements would ‘“be used prosecutorially”’”].)
       Because Smith’s statements to the Perkins agent were not
testimonial, Aranda-Bruton does not apply. (People v. Almeda,
supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 362 [“‘Bruton is no longer applicable
to a non-testimonial “prison yard conversation” because “Bruton
is no more than a by-product of the Confrontation Clause”’”];
People v. Washington (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 19, 29 [same].)




                               38
       Murphy also contends his confrontation rights under
Aranda-Bruton were violated by admission of Smith’s statements
to the detectives during his police interview in connection with
the Perkins operation. Specifically, Murphy argues, without any
citation to the record, that Smith implicated him in the April 11
shooting because Smith referenced a “driver” in his statement to
detectives. Murphy asserts that even though Smith did not
identify him by name, Smith’s statement “compromised” him
because the prosecution’s theory was that Murphy was the
driver. We have reviewed the transcript of Smith’s police
interview, and we see no reference during the interview to the
driver of the Ford Fusion. Moreover, Smith made no
incriminating statements about himself or Murphy during the
police interview. Detective Knight showed Smith three
photographs of the Ford Fusion, and Smith consistently denied
ever seeing the vehicle or being in it. Detective Knight said to
Smith as to the April 11 shooting, there had to be “a person that’s
driving” and “a person that’s a shooter.” Smith responded, “I
guess. I don’t know. I’m not into that.” Smith repeatedly denied
any involvement in the April 11 shooting. Because Smith’s
statements to the detectives did not “facially incriminat[e]”
Murphy, there was no violation of the Aranda-Bruton rule.
(Richardson v. Marsh, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 207-208; People v.
Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 455; see People v. Ramirez, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 1149 [Aranda-Bruton rule inapplicable where
“[t]here was no joint trial and [codefendant’s] statements were
not facially incriminating of defendant”].)
       Murphy makes the additional argument that Smith’s
denial during the police interview of any involvement in a gang
or the April 11 shooting, combined with Murphy’s similar denials,




                                39
“lent to the inference that Murphy and Smith coordinated a plan
to deny everything if and when they were apprehended.” But
“[t]he class of inferentially incriminating statements under
Bruton is limited to ‘obvious[]’ ones, ‘inferences that a jury
ordinarily could make immediately, even were the confession the
very first item introduced at trial.’” (People v. Montes (2014)
58 Cal.4th 809, 867; accord, People v. Gallardo, supra,
18 Cal.App.5th at p. 80 [defendant’s statements regarding his
driving a specific car “did not ‘facially incriminate’ [codefendants]
nor did the statements create an ‘obvious inference’ that those
codefendants participated in the shooting”].) Here, Smith’s
denial of any involvement in the April 11 shooting did not create
an obvious inference that Murphy participated in the shooting.

E.     The Accomplice Testimony Was Sufficiently Corroborated by
       Other Evidence
       “Penal Code section 1111 provides that an accomplice’s
testimony cannot support a conviction without corroboration by
other evidence ‘as shall tend to connect the defendant with the
commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient
if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the
circumstances thereof.’ The statute defines an accomplice as ‘one
who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged
against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the
testimony of the accomplice is given.’” (People v. Hoyt (2020)
8 Cal.5th 892, 945; accord, People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th
1116, 1155.) “‘“‘“[T]estimony” within the meaning of . . . [Penal
Code] section 1111 includes all oral statements made by an
accomplice or coconspirator under oath in a court proceeding and
all out-of-court statements of accomplices and coconspirators




                                 40
used as substantive evidence of guilt which are made under
suspect circumstances.’”’ [Citation.] ‘“The most obvious suspect
circumstances occur when the accomplice has been arrested or is
questioned by the police.”’” (Hoyt, at p. 946.)
       “[E]vidence corroborating accomplice testimony ‘“need not
independently establish the identity of the victim’s assailant”
[citation], nor corroborate every fact to which the accomplice
testifies [citation], and “‘may be circumstantial or slight and
entitled to little consideration when standing alone.’”’ [Citation.]
But the evidence must nonetheless connect the defendant to the
crime itself, rather than simply connect the accomplice to the
crime.” (People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 421, 452; accord, People
v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 685 [corroborating evidence “‘need
not be sufficient to establish every element of the charged
offense’”; rather, “‘[i]t is “sufficient if it tends to connect the
defendant with the crime in such a way as to satisfy the jury that
the accomplice is telling the truth”’”].) “[A]n accomplice’s
testimony is not corroborated by the circumstance that the
testimony is consistent with the victim’s description of the crime
or physical evidence from the crime scene. Such consistency and
knowledge of the details of the crime simply proves the
accomplice was at the crime scene, something the accomplice by
definition admits. Rather, under section 1111, the corroboration
must connect the defendant to the crime independently of the
accomplice’s testimony.” (People v. Romero and Self (2015)
62 Cal.4th 1, 36; accord, Perez, at pp. 452-453.) “‘The entire
conduct of the parties, their relationship, acts, and conduct may
be taken into consideration by the trier of fact in determining the
sufficiency of the corroboration.’” (Romero and Self, at p. 32;
accord, People v. Rodriguez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1123, 1128.)




                                 41
       Murphy and Smith contend they were improperly convicted
based on Dale’s testimony without sufficient corroborating
evidence. Murphy argues the independent evidence was only
sufficient to show he was a Hoover gang member. He maintains
there was no evidence that identified him or Smith personally as
the perpetrators other than Dale’s statements. Smith asserts the
only corroborating evidence was the cellphone location evidence,
which was flawed because FBI special agent Easter could not
confirm whether Smith’s cellphone was in the area of the April 11
shooting.
       Contrary to defendants’ contentions, Dale’s testimony was
sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence that connected
Murphy to the April 3 shooting and Murphy and Smith to the
April 11 shooting. Officer Fernandez and Terry testified the
Hoovers and Main Street Crips were rival gangs. Murphy
testified he was a Hoover gang member, and Smith told the
Perkins agent that he was from “West Side Hoover.” The April
shootings took place in Main Street Crip territory and occurred
after the March 29 shooting of Smith. Murphy’s and Smith’s
gang membership and motive for the April shootings (to retaliate
against the Main Street Crips for the March 29 shooting)
corroborated Dale’s testimony. (People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d
20, 28 [defendant’s motive to assist his gang in gaining revenge
upon two rival gangs for earlier slaying of fellow gang member
corroborated accomplice’s testimony]; People v. Samaniego, supra,
172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1178 [gang membership and motive
corroborated accomplice’s testimony]; People v. Vu (2006)
143 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1022 [accomplice testimony was
corroborated by defendant’s gang membership and motive to
retaliate against rival gang for killing of fellow gang member].)




                               42
       Further, Murphy was connected to the April shootings
through the Ford Fusion, which was at the scene of both crimes.
Surveillance video showed that prior to the April 3 shooting, the
Ford Fusion passed Outten’s car and entered a nearby alley from
which the shooter emerged and shot at Outten and Stewart. The
shooter then ran back into the alley, and the Ford Fusion quickly
exited the alley. With respect to the April 11 shooting,
surveillance video showed the Ford Fusion and a second car in
the liquor store area just prior to the shooting. In addition, the
surveillance video reflected that the shooting occurred at
6:23 p.m, just a minute after Murphy’s cellphone was active in
the area just south of the crime scene. Police officers stopped
Murphy in the Ford Fusion on five occasions before and after the
April shootings.
       Moreover, Smith’s statements to the Perkins agent
corroborated Dale’s testimony with respect to the April 11
shooting. Smith told the Perkins agent that the police caught
Murphy’s car on camera, the camera video only showed “the back
and side,” but “that shit happened in front of the store,” and he
and Murphy carried a “nine” millimeter firearm. A criminalist
testified that two bullets recovered from the April 11 crime scene
could have been fired from a nine-millimeter Luger. Smith’s
statements connected him to the April 11 shooting and provided
sufficient independent corroborating evidence. (See People v.
Garton (2018) 4 Cal.5th 485, 520 [defendant’s statements in
emails and recorded call provided independent corroboration of
accomplice testimony]; People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 56
[defendant’s statement to detective “alone was sufficient
independent corroboration tying defendant to the crimes”].)




                                43
       In addition, the cellphone location evidence showed that on
April 3, 2019 Murphy’s cellphone was initially in Hoover
territory, then 10 minutes later the cellphone was at the crime
scene in Main Street Crip territory, and seven minutes after that
the cellphone was again in Hoover territory. With respect to the
April 11 shooting, both Murphy’s and Smith’s cellphones were in
Hoover territory prior to the shooting and six minutes after the
shooting. Further, Murphy’s cellphone was active near the crime
scene during the shooting. We recognize that, as Smith points
out, Smith’s cellphone did not have any activity at the time of the
April 11 shooting. Further, FBI Agent Easter acknowledged that
the cell towers have a sector coverage of “around 0.2 to 0.5 miles”;
thus, Smith’s cellphone was either within half a mile of the liquor
store or it stayed in Hoover territory at the time of the April 11
shooting. Nonetheless, the cellphone evidence combined with the
evidence tying Murphy to the Ford Fusion and Smith’s Perkins
statements were sufficient to corroborate Dale’s testimony.
(People v. Perez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 452 [evidence
corroborating accomplice testimony “‘“‘may be circumstantial or
slight and entitled to little consideration when standing alone’”’”];
People v. Romero and Self, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 32 [same].)

F.     Substantial Evidence Supports Murphy’s and Smith’s
       Convictions
       “In considering a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we
review ‘the whole record in the light most favorable to the
judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (People v. Collins




                                 44
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 293, 307; accord, People v. Penunuri (2018)
5 Cal.5th 126, 142 [“‘To assess the evidence’s sufficiency, we
review the whole record to determine whether any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime or
special circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.’”].)
       “‘The standard of review is the same in cases in which the
prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence.’
[Citations.] ‘We presume in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could infer from
the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify
the trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not
warranted simply because the circumstances might also
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.’” (People v.
Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 713; accord, People v. Flores
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 411 [appellate court must “‘accept logical
inferences that the jury might have drawn from the
circumstantial evidence’”].) “We do not question the credibility of
a witness’s testimony, so long as it is ‘not inherently improbable,’
nor do we reconsider the weight to be given any particular item of
evidence.” (People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal. 5th 285, 302; accord,
People v. Reed (2018) 4 Cal.5th 989, 1006.)
       Murphy and Smith contend there was not substantial
evidence to support their convictions for murder, attempted
murder, or conspiracy to commit murder. Murphy argues the
evidence did not tie him personally to the April 3 and 11
shootings. Similarly, Smith contends no surveillance video or
witness placed him at the scene of the April 11 shooting, and
there was no DNA evidence linking him to the Ford Fusion, the
gun, or the bullets. There is substantial evidence.




                                 45
       Dale testified that on April 3, 2019 Murphy was the driver
and another Hoover gang member (Shady Tre) was the shooter.
Surveillance video placed Murphy’s Ford Fusion at the scene of
the crime. In addition, the cellphone location evidence showed
Murphy’s cellphone was initially in Hoover territory, then at the
crime scene around the time of the shooting (6:22 p.m.), then
back in Hoover territory.
       With respect to the April 11, 2019 shooting, Dale testified
Murphy was the driver and Smith was the shooter. Smith
admitted to the Perkins agent that the incident happened in front
of the liquor store and that he carried a nine-millimeter firearm,
which is consistent with evidence that the two recovered bullets
could have been fired from a nine-millimeter Luger. In addition,
surveillance video placed Murphy’s Ford Fusion at the scene of
the shooting at 6:23 p.m. In addition, both Murphy’s and Smith’s
cellphones were in Hoover territory prior to the shooting and six
minutes after the shooting, with Murphy’s cellphone being active
near the crime scene around the time of the shooting (6:23 p.m.).
Moreover, as discussed, the testimony supported a theory that
Murphy and Smith, as Hoover gang members, went to rival Main
Street Crips territory to retaliate for the shooting of Smith on
March 29. Dale’s testimony, the independent corroborating
evidence, and the gang evidence showing motive provide
substantial evidence to support Murphy’s and Smith’s
convictions.




                               46
                         DISPOSITION


     The judgment is affirmed.




                                       FEUER, J.
We concur:



             MARTINEZ, P. J.



             STONE, J.




                               47