People v. Sanchez CA2/4

Filed 9/22/25 P. v. Sanchez CA2/4
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                       DIVISION FOUR


 THE PEOPLE,                                                              B340079
                                                                          (Los Angeles County
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                       Super. Ct. No. NA117723)

           v.

 ROBERT SANCHEZ,

           Defendant and Appellant.


      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard M. Goul, Judge. Affirmed.
      The Community Law Group and Mark Stephen Smith, for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Jason Tran, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Herbert S. Tetef, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Defendant and appellant Robert Sanchez crashed his
pickup truck while driving away from a neighborhood park with
his children. The truck flipped several times, killing his
daughter and severely injuring his son. Also injured from the
crash, defendant was taken to a hospital where his blood was
drawn for treatment. Testing by the hospital, and later by the
police, revealed a .17 percent blood alcohol content. Defendant
was convicted of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated
(Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a)),1 driving under the influence
causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)), driving with or
above .08 percent blood alcohol content causing injury (id.,
§ 23153, subd. (b)), and two counts of child abuse likely to
produce great bodily harm or death (§ 273a, subd. (a)).
      In this direct appeal, defendant contends insufficient
evidence supports his conviction for gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated. In addition, he challenges the
admission of blood evidence, the purported exclusion of a defense
witness, and jury instructions and verdict forms. He also raises
more than five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We
affirm.




1       Subsequent unspecified references to statutes are to the Penal
Code.




                                    2
           FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.    Prosecution Evidence
      1.      The Car Accident
      In July 2021, Adriana Rodriguez and defendant were
coparenting their four-year-old children, Robby and Jayda.2
Around 8:00 p.m. on July 9, 2021, defendant crashed his truck
while leaving a neighborhood park with both children. Jayda
died from the crash. Defendant and Robby were critically
injured. Several individuals who witnessed the crash testified.
      Robby testified that while he and Jayda played at the park,
he saw defendant drinking a beer.3 As they were driving away in
defendant’s truck, Jayda began to cry in the back seat.
Defendant continued driving while unbuckling Jayda and moving
her to the front seat.
      Vernell Mosley-Mitchell was about to leave the park when
he heard screeching brakes. He looked up and saw the passenger
side of a burgundy truck and a sedan that “had cut in front of the
truck,” attempting a U-turn. The truck swerved, flipped, and
began to roll. The truck hit a tree, fire hydrant, and pole before
coming to rest on the truck’s driver’s side. Mosley-Mitchell ran to
the truck, where another person had pulled a small boy from a
back seat window. Defendant was in the driver’s seat,
nonresponsive, and holding the legs of a small girl who was
pinned between the driver’s side door and ground.
      Cheryl Nino also saw a purple truck in the street “coming
so fast” it startled her. She watched the truck “go straight and


2     Several witnesses share the same last name. For ease of
reading, we refer to them by their first name. We intend no disrespect.
3     Robby told a social worker defendant drank “‘a big beer.’”




                                  3
veer” across the street before hitting a pole and tree. Nino did
not see another car near the truck.

      2.      Emergency Medical Care
      Paramedics transported defendant, Jayda, and Robby to a
nearby hospital. Jayda died from blunt force trauma to her head.
Robby was hospitalized for six weeks. While at the hospital,
Adriana asked defendant “[w]hy was he drinking and driving
with the kids and why was she [(Jayda)] in the front seat.” He
replied, “‘I’m sorry. I know. I know.’”
      Registered nurse Tannaz Tehranirad attended to
defendant, a trauma patient at the hospital, the night of July 9,
2021. She was present for defendant’s blood draw, and while
unable to confirm if she personally drew his blood, Tehranirad
affirmed “[e]ither [she] or [her] colleagues” drew his blood.
Tehranirad discussed the procedures for drawing blood of all
trauma patients and transmitting samples to the hospital’s
laboratory. Tehranirad reviewed defendant’s medical records
and confirmed his blood was drawn at 9:27 p.m. on July 9, 2021.
      The clinical lab director at the hospital verified registered
nurses are required to draw blood from every critical emergency
patient and submit each sample to the hospital laboratory for
automated testing. The testing machines are overseen by
licensed personnel and maintained through various calibration
processes and quality management systems. The laboratory
holds the collected blood in a refrigerator for six days. The
director confirmed defendant’s blood was kept in the same
manner as all other samples and that quality control measures
did not find any errors in its processing. Records confirmed




                                 4
testing results showed defendant’s blood ethanol level was 197
milligrams per deciliter.

       3.     Subsequent Blood Testing
       Detective Daniel Ramirez obtained a search warrant for
blood drawn at the hospital. On July 12, 2021, his partner,
Officer Andrew Guzman, presented the warrant to a laboratory
manager who placed three vials of defendant’s blood in an
envelope Officer Guzman transported to a police laboratory.
Officer Guzman completed a property report,4 placed the vials in
a clear plastic bag and evidence envelope, and placed the
envelope in a secured refrigerator.
       Around 6:00 a.m. on July 13, 2021, lead criminalist Melissa
Kramer-Sarrett retrieved the envelope for testing. Two vials
inside had come loose and spilled blood inside the evidence bag.
As these vials were compromised, Kramer-Sarrett used the blood
from the remaining vial to conduct two analyses. That vial
contained an anti-coagulant but did not contain a preservative, as
is generally required under Title 17 of the California Code of
Regulations (“Title 17”). Preservatives prevent blood
fermentation, a “very remote” process that can occur if a blood
vial is left unrefrigerated for “well over five days” or refrigerated
longer than 182 days. Because her laboratory and police property
rooms refrigerate all blood samples, Kramer-Sarrett regularly
tests blood vials that do not contain a preservative for “purposes
under Title 17.”
       Kramer-Sarrett used two machines to analyze defendant’s
blood, which reported .171 and .172 percent blood alcohol


4     Officer Guzman listed Jayda’s name on the property report.




                                 5
content.5 Kramer-Sarrett affirmed these tests complied with
Title 17. In a report, Kramer-Sarrett listed Jayda’s name under
a heading entitled, “name associated.” This was not a mislabel
but was the name under which the samples were booked. Using
another document (“a 314”), the lab changed the associated name
from Jayda to defendant.

       4.     Additional Investigation
       Detective Ramirez and other officers investigated the
crash. A broken booster seat was found in the back seat of
defendant’s truck. On the ground around the flipped truck,
officers located an intact child seat, a marijuana grinder, and
beer and vodka bottle caps. Detective Ramirez examined
defendant’s truck at a police tow yard. The front passenger
seatbelt was locked in place, which suggested it was not used
during the crash.
       A collision investigation officer reviewed the truck’s data
recorder and confirmed the driver and front passenger seatbelts
were not in use.6 Five seconds before the crash, the truck was
traveling 51 miles per hour in a posted speed limit of 45 miles per
hour, placing the vehicle in the 85th percentile for speed in the
area. Defendant applied “very slight pressure” to the brakes two

5      This measurement, which is done in grams per deciliter, is
different than the milligrams-per-deciliter measurement used by the
hospital. Kramer-Sarrett testified that 197 milligrams per deciliter of
alcohol in blood serum was “equivalent to a .157 upward to a .179
percent whole blood equivalency.”
6      The officer testified that child car seats require straps to secure
the child and restrain the seat. “This way if there is an event where
the seatbelts do lock, that locking seatbelt will lock the car seat in
place. . . .”




                                     6
seconds before collision and “full brake pressure” one second
before collision.
      A child abuse pediatrician reviewed this evidence and
Jayda’s injuries. Based on the evidence, the pediatrician testified
Jayda was unrestrained and hit her head on the truck or
pavement during the crash.
      Police executed a search warrant for defendant’s Instagram
records. In January 2021, a woman messaged defendant and
said she had been at a bar in Anaheim. Defendant replied, “‘I
don’t remember. Shit. I got a flat on ea [sic] home. . . . I hate
getting too drunk.’” The woman told defendant her friend
“‘crashed on the way home and got a D.U.I.’” He replied, “‘Oh, my
god. See, exactly what I don’t want. I’m so lucky. I gotta stop
drink[ing] n driving.’”

B.     Defense Evidence
       A man who had seen defendant the day of the crash
testified that defendant did not exhibit signs of intoxication. A
traffic collision reconstructionist reviewed the data recordings
and collision reports. Assuming a hypothetical scenario in which
a vehicle made a sudden U-turn in front of defendant’s truck, the
reconstructionist did not believe defendant displayed inattention
or lack of collision avoidance and instead engaged in various
maneuvers to avoid danger. The reconstructionist formed this
opinion despite having no information on the hypothetical
distance between the vehicle and defendant’s truck.

C.    Verdict and Sentencing
      Following trial in May 2024, a jury convicted defendant on
all charged counts (§ 191.5, subd. (a) [count 1]; Veh. Code,




                                7
§ 23153, subds. (a), (b) [counts 2–3]; § 273a, subd. (a) [counts 6–
7]) and found true various enhancement allegations (§§ 12022.7,
subd. (d), 12022.95). Defendant was sentenced to an overall term
of 50 years to life imprisonment.




                          DISCUSSION
A.    Sufficiency of Evidence of Gross Vehicular
      Manslaughter
      Defendant contends insufficient evidence supports the
finding he drove in a grossly negligent manner, as required for
gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. We disagree.

       1.      Governing Law
       Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated requires:
(1) driving a vehicle while intoxicated; (2) when driving,
committing some unlawful act with gross negligence or
committing with gross negligence an ordinarily lawful act which
might produce death; and (3) as a proximate result, another
person is killed. (People v. Batchelor (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th
1102, 1109 (Batchelor), disapproved on another ground in People
v. Hicks (2017) 4 Cal.5th 203.) Gross negligence “‘is the exercise
of so slight a degree of care as to raise a presumption of conscious
indifference to the consequences.’” (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6
Cal.4th 1199, 1204 (Ochoa).) The test to determine gross
negligence is “objective” but may include information the
“defendant knew, including his actual awareness of those
risks. . . . [I]f the evidence show[s] that defendant actually




                                 8
appreciated the risks involved in a given enterprise, and
nonetheless proceeded with it,” the finding of gross negligence is
appropriate. (Id. at p. 1205.)
      With any insufficiency of evidence claim, we must
determine whether a rational trier of fact could find defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Smith (2005) 37
Cal.4th 733, 738–739.) We view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the judgment and presume every fact that can be
reasonably deduced from the evidence. (Ibid.)

      2.     Analysis
      Substantial evidence supports the finding defendant drove
his truck with gross negligence while intoxicated. Defendant
drove with a blood alcohol content of .17 percent and was
speeding—traveling in the 85th percentile of drivers in that
area—while he and Jayda were unrestrained in the front seats.
(See Batchelor, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1110; People v.
Hansen (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1068, 1078).7 Defendant
drove in this manner despite appreciating the dangers of driving
under the influence. (See Ochoa, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 1205–
1208.) These are all circumstances the jury was instructed to
consider. (CALCRIM No. 590.)
      Defendant does not dispute these facts and instead argues
he “functioned as an ordinary person” faced with a sudden, U-
turning car. His argument is insufficient to warrant reversal of
his conviction for several reasons.


7      Subject to various exceptions, “a parent, . . . who transports a
child under eight years of age on a highway in a motor vehicle, . . .
shall properly secure that child in a rear seat . . . .” (Veh. Code,
§ 27360, subd. (a).)




                                    9
       First, defendant cites no portion of the trial record in
support of his argument. (See People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th
764, 793 [it is improper to assume “this court will construct a
theory supportive of [defendant’s] innocence”].)
       Second, defendant’s argument construes the evidence in his
favor. (See People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1204 [that
“‘“circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding does not warrant the judgment’s reversal”’”];
People v. Cardenas (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 220, 228 [it is
insufficient to misfocus on evidence “favorable to his position”].)
       Third, defendant relies on cases that do not support his
argument. These decisions hold “that gross negligence can be
shown by the manner in which the defendant operated the
vehicle, that is, the overall circumstances (rather than the mere
fact) of the traffic law violation” and driving while intoxicated.
(People v. Von Staden (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1423, 1427 (Von
Staden); see People v. McNiece (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1048, 1057,
disapproved on another ground in People v. McFarland (1989) 47
Cal.3d 798; People v. Stanley (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 248, 255
(Stanley) [following McNiece], overruled by People v. Bennett
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 1032.) Contrary to defendant’s suggestion,
however, these decisions do not compel a particular combination
of facts to establish gross negligence; they simply analyzed the
facts before them. (See Von Staden, supra, at p. 1428 [facts
comprised “the overall circumstances”].)
       Defendant’s actions resemble many of the actions deemed
significant in these cases. (See Von Staden, supra, 195
Cal.App.3d at p. 1425 [losing control and crashing car into
telephone pole]; McNiece, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1053–
1054 [driving 5-to-10 miles per hour over speed limit with .15




                                10
percent blood alcohol level]; Stanley, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at
p. 251 [driving three miles per hour over speed limit and
“overcorrect[ing], sending the car into a skid”].) Sufficient
evidence supports defendant’s conviction.




B.    Admissibility of Blood Evidence
      Defendant next contends the admission of blood evidence
violated his right to confront the witnesses against him under the
Sixth Amendment. We disagree.

      1.     Additional Background
      Prior to trial, defendant moved to exclude the results of his
blood alcohol testing for lack of an adequate foundation. He
noted issues with the collection, storage, preservation, chain of
custody, and use of established methods to handle the blood
samples. At a pretrial hearing, the court ruled that “each step is
going to have to be established, chain of custody, through
witnesses as well as the foundation before the court will allow
any testimony” regarding actual testing results. Following
testimony by the hospital clinic director, defendant moved to
strike the testimony for chain of custody issues and testing
methodology. The motion was denied.

      2.    Analysis
      The Attorney General contends defendant forfeited the
confrontation clause argument, as he did not object to the




                                11
evidence on this basis at trial. We agree. (People v. Redd (2010)
48 Cal.4th 691, 730 (Redd).)8
       Even if preserved, we reject the contention on the merits.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant “‘the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’”
(Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 38, 40, 42, 68–69.) Consistent
with this right, “the prosecution may not rely on ‘testimonial’ out-
of-court statements unless the witness is unavailable to testify
and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.” (People v. Lopez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 569, 576
(Lopez).)
       Following Crawford and its progeny, our state Supreme
Court reexamined the meaning of “testimonial” statements in its
own collection of cases. (E.g., People v. Rutterschmidt (2012) 55
Cal.4th 650; Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th 569; People v. Dungo (2012)
55 Cal.4th 608.) We agree with defendant that Lopez is helpful
in guiding our analysis.
       Lopez involved a vehicular manslaughter prosecution in
which a criminalist (Willey) testified that a colleague from his lab
(Peña) who did not testify analyzed a sample of defendant’s blood


8      In reply, defendant argues he preserved this contention by
objecting on foundation grounds. This objection “presented legal issues
different from those underlying an objection that the admission of
testimony would violate the confrontation clause.” (Redd, supra, 48
Cal.4th at p. 730, fn. 19.) The authorities defendant raises in reply do
not persuade us otherwise. (See People v. Williams (2002) 28 Cal.4th
408, 414–417 [discussing foundational requirements for admission of
breath test evidence]; People v. Kocontes (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 787,
861–863 [defendant preserved foundation issue by interposing same
objection and testimonial hearsay objection under Crawford v.
Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford)].)




                                  12
and determined it had a .09 percent blood alcohol content.
(Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 574.) Willey was familiar with the
procedures used by Peña and, “based on his own ‘separate
abilities as a criminal analyst,’ he too concluded that the blood-
alcohol concentration . . . was .09 percent.” (Ibid.) Over defense
objection, Peña’s report and Willey’s testimony was admitted into
evidence. (Ibid.)
       The Court in Lopez distilled “two critical components”
establishing testimonial statements. (Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at
p. 581.) “First, to be testimonial the out-of-court statement must
have been made with some degree of formality or solemnity.”
(Ibid.) Second, the statement’s “primary purpose [must]
pertain[ ] in some fashion to a criminal prosecution, . . .” (Id. at
p. 582.) Applying these components to the facts, the Court found
Peña’s report was not made with “the requisite degree of
formality or solemnity to be considered testimonial [citation].”
(Ibid.) Peña had not signed, certified, or sworn to the truth of the
contents appearing in the report. (Id. at p. 584.) Without any
indicia of formality, the Court found no error in the admission of
Peña’s report or permitting “Willey to testify regarding it.” (Id. at
p. 585.)
       The blood evidence defendant challenges in this case
appears in his medical records. The records reflect the results of
automated testing done on all trauma patients and include a
testing date and laboratory number. The records were not
created at the behest of law enforcement and lack the formality
or solemnity indicative of testimony. (See Lopez, supra, 55
Cal.4th at pp. 581–585 [medical records were “nothing more than
an informal record of data for internal purposes”]; Bullcoming v.
New Mexico (2011) 564 U.S. 647, 663–665; Melendez-Diaz v.




                                 13
Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305, 310–311 (Melendez-Diaz).)
The primary purpose of defendant’s hospital records was not for
criminal prosecution, but for treatment. (See Melendez-Diaz,
supra, 557 U.S. at p. 312, fn. 2 [“medical reports created for
treatment purposes” are not testimonial].) We thus discern no
error in the admission of this evidence.




C.     Exclusion of Defense Witness
       Defendant contends the court erred by excluding Pedro
Ramirez from testifying about witnessing the crash and seeing “a
person named [Ms.] Amezcua attempt a U-turn in front of
another vehicle, causing a crash.” As defendant did not proffer
this testimony below,9 he has forfeited this contention on appeal.
(People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 744; People v. Wallace
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1059.)
       Defendant argues his counsel “did not or could not” offer
this testimony given an “unclear” pretrial ruling regarding
Amezcua. We disagree.
       During a pretrial hearing on motions to exclude evidence,
the court questioned: “How can you completely keep out
percipient names of [ ] witnesses to the event? If there is another

9      Defendant identifies no portion of the trial record in which he
attempted to introduce Pedro Ramirez as a witness. Our own review of
the record reveals the following stipulation made at the preliminary
hearing: “Pedro Ramirez[ ] was at scene the day of the collision.
Ramirez advised that he was parked behind Amezcua. He advised
that he saw Amezcua attempt to make a U-turn in front of vehicle 2
and saw vehicle 2 lose control and crash. He saw Amezcua get out of
the vehicle and say that she was the other car involved.”




                                 14
car involved, it’s part of the facts of the case.” In response, the
prosecution clarified it was not seeking to exclude “the fact that
there was another car involved” but rather the driver’s identity
and the decision not to proceed with criminal charges against
her. The court replied: “In terms of if someone can testify to the
identity of the other driver, the court would allow that. As far as
some questioning regarding why another driver was not charged,
that is not open for questioning.” Before calling his traffic
reconstructionist in defense, defense counsel informed the court
he “wasn’t planning” on eliciting evidence of Amezcua’s name.
The court agreed and stated, “that there was another car
involved, that is already in the evidence before the jury.”10
       Defendant does not show how the trial court’s ruling
prevented him from offering Pedro Ramirez’s testimony about
Amezcua’s U-turn. Defendant has forfeited his contention that
the court erred by excluding Ramirez’s supposed testimony. To
the extent he purports to revive it based on ineffective assistance
of counsel, he does so without any argument. (See People v.
Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 774 [without argument, “we have
no practical basis for second-guessing” counsel’s decision].)




10     The other car’s involvement was established by the testimony of
Robby and Mosley-Mitchell. In closing argument, the prosecution
recognized the “very, very” real possibility another car was involved.
The prosecution argued, however, that “a sober person would have
been able to perceive [it and] put on their brakes. But the defendant
was not a sober driver. So instead he pulled his steering wheel wildly
to the left and rolled his truck.” The “U-turn was a substantial factor
in this crash. . . . But so was the defendant.” (See CALCRIM Nos. 240
[multiple causes], 620 [substantial factor causing death].)




                                  15
D.     Arrangement of Jury Instructions and Verdict Forms
       Defendant contends the court erred by failing to provide
verdict forms for vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated
(§ 191.5, subd. (b)), a lesser-included offense of gross vehicular
manslaughter (§ 191.5, subd. (a)), and by improperly presenting
the related instruction to the jury. He admits the jury was
instructed on this lesser offense but argues the court
“functionally [took it] away” by placing the instruction at “the
very end” of its instructions.
       Defendant’s argument is belied by the record. As
defendant admits, the jury was instructed on gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated (CALCRIM No. 590), as well as
three lesser-included offenses: (1) vehicular manslaughter while
intoxicated; (2) gross vehicular manslaughter; and
(3) misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter. (CALCRIM Nos. 591–
593). These lesser-included instructions were given after the
greater-offense instruction (CALCRIM No. 590) and three related
instructions (CALCRIM No. 595 [speeding laws defined]; Veh.
Code, §§ 27360 [child passenger restraint requirements], 22107
[turning movements and signaling]). They were not separated or
given at the end of the instructions. Moreover, the jury was
instructed on using verdict forms and deliberating “the order in
which you consider the greater and lesser crimes and the
relevant evidence.” (CALCRIM No. 3518.) Those verdict forms,
which do not appear in the clerk’s transcript but do appear in the
trial court file, include forms for the lesser-included offenses.
       The authorities cited by defendant govern the duty to
instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses. (E.g., People v.
Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 480; People v. Eilers (1991) 231
Cal.App.3d 288, 292–293.) They do not address how these




                               16
instructions are to be arranged, nor do they impose a duty to
provide the jury with verdict forms for lesser-included offenses.
“‘It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not
considered.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th
616, 684.)

E.    Ineffective Assistance Claims
      Defendant raises more than five ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. To establish such claims, defendant must
demonstrate: (1) his trial counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) resulting prejudice.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 693–694; In
re Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 584, 602–603.) “Preliminarily, we
note that rarely will an appellate record establish ineffective
assistance of counsel.” (People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79,
122 (Thompson).)

       1.     Suppression Motions
       Defendant contends his counsel was ineffective because he
failed to file a motion to suppress blood evidence for lack of
probable cause (§ 1538.5, subd. (a)(1)(b)(iii)) and for spoliation
and contamination issues (California v. Trombetta (1984) 467
U.S. 479 (Trombetta)). However, defendant does not establish
that there was merit to any such motion. (See People v. Caro
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 489 (Caro) [ineffective assistance claim
must be based on meritorious suppression motion].)
       The record does not disclose a proper basis for filing a
motion to suppress for want of probable cause. Admission of
defendant’s blood draw, which was done by a private hospital for
medical purposes, did not depend on a showing of probable cause.




                                 17
(See Caro, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 498 [“medical personnel acting
independently of law enforcement directives” do not implicate
constitutional rights]; United States v. Wipf (8th Cir. 2005) 397
F.3d 632, 636 [probable cause not required for blood draw by
hospital staff].) The government’s subsequent involvement did
not “retroactively transform the original intrusion into a
governmental search.” (United States v. Sherwin (9th Cir. 1976)
539 F.2d 1, 6.) Even assuming the government was required to
establish probable cause, it met this burden when obtaining a
search warrant for defendant’s blood samples. (See §§ 1523,
1525.)
       Defendant has also failed to establish a Trombetta claim.
“Law enforcement agencies must preserve evidence only if it
possesses exculpatory value ‘apparent before [it] was destroyed,’
and not obtainable ‘by other reasonably available means.’
[Citations.] The state’s responsibility is further limited when the
defendant challenges the failure to preserve evidence ‘of which no
more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests’
that might have helped the defense. [Citation.] In such a case,
unless the defendant can show ‘bad faith’ by the police, failure to
preserve ‘potentially useful evidence’ does not violate his due
process rights.” (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 41–42.)
Here, defendant only speculates that additional testing might
have revealed a lower blood alcohol content and suggests the
police negligently handled the blood vials. He does not show bad
faith. His arguments are insufficient to establish a Trombetta
claim. (See People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 394; People v.
Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1348; People v. Carter (2005) 36
Cal.4th 1215, 1246.)




                                18
      2.    Motion to Dismiss
      “For the same reasons as stated in the above section,”
defendant contends his counsel was ineffective by not filing a
motion to dismiss the information. (See § 995, subd. (a)(2)(B);
Brewer v. Superior Court (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1019, 1023.) As
stated above, we disagree. Defendant has not established merit
to any motion to dismiss based on the collection and handling of
blood evidence.

       3.     Cross-Examination of Kramer-Sarrett
       Defendant contends his counsel was ineffective by failing to
cross-examine Kramer-Sarrett “about the labeling, identification,
and handling of the blood sample” she tested. The Attorney
General contends, and we agree, this ineffective assistance claim
is forfeited for the absence of reasoned legal analysis and citation
to any legal authority. (People v. Davis (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
694, 721 (Davis).)
       On the merits, the topics defendant identifies were
addressed by defense counsel’s cross-examination of Kramer-
Sarrett. That defendant “simply doubts the jury appreciated the
significance” of that cross-examination does not establish
ineffective assistance. (See People v. Williams (2013) 218
Cal.App.4th 1038, 1075 [“There was no reason for defense counsel
to make a duplicative effort in that regard”].)

      4.    Additional Witnesses
      Defendant next contends his counsel should have called
(1) Pedro Ramirez to further support his sudden emergency
defense and (2) Christopher Stellern, a paramedic who responded
to the scene of the accident, to rebut the charge of child abuse




                                19
against Jayda. As before, defendant raises this argument
without any analysis or authority. (See Davis, supra, 75
Cal.App.5th at p. 721.)
      The record sheds no light on counsel’s decision not to call
these witnesses. We do not know if the witnesses might have
provided hostile, unhelpful, or worse, incriminating testimony
against defendant. (See People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th
795, 845.) Defendant only speculates the jury “would have likely
believed” his defenses if these witnesses testified. We cannot
evaluate ineffective assistance claims from speculation. (People
v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 334.)

      5.     Medical Records and Prior Criminal Records
      Finally, defendant contends trial counsel was ineffective for
refusing to challenge the admissibility of his medical and prior
criminal records. Defendant has forfeited this claim (see Davis,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 721) and failed to establish ineffective
representation. (See People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883,
936; see also People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1060–1061
[counsel “may be more realistic and effective by avoiding
sweeping declarations of his or her client’s innocence”].)
      At trial, defense counsel stipulated defendant’s medical
records reflected “a true and accurate portion of the records”
provided by the hospital. This stipulation did not establish, as
contended by defendant, the validity of any information
appearing in those records. As discussed, counsel challenged that
information at trial.
      As to the admission of a certified prior convictions packet
(§ 969b), certified California Law Enforcement
Telecommunications System (CLETS) sheet, amended felony




                                20
complaint, and certified transcript of plea proceedings to prove
defendant’s nine prior robbery convictions at a bifurcated
proceeding, these documents are generally admissible as evidence
of prior convictions. (See People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th
1059, 1071–1072, fns. 5, 6; People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th
106, 116, People v. Ruiz (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1090; People
v. Sohal (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 911, 913, 916.) As such, defense
counsel was not ineffective in failing to object. (See Thompson,
supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 122 [“Counsel is not ineffective for failing
to make frivolous or futile motions”].)

                         DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS



                                               MORI, Acting P. J.
      We concur:



             TAMZARIAN, J.




             VAN ROOYEN, J. **



**    Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California
Constitution.




                                   21