Peters v. International Paper Company

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                        
            FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE                       
                      WESTERN DIVISION                                  


ROHAN PETERS,                 )                                           
                            )                                           
   Plaintiff,               )                                           
                            )    Case No. 2:22-cv-02132-JPM-atc         
v.                            )                                           
                            )                                           
INTERNATIONAL PAPER                                                       
COMPANY                       )                                           
                            )                                           
   Defendant.               )                                           
______________________________________________________________________________ 

  ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF’S              
               WITNESS, MATTHEW HUGHEY, PH.D.                           
______________________________________________________________________________ 

   Before the Court is Defendant International Paper Company’s (“International Paper’s” or 
“Defendant’s”) “Motion In Limine to Exclude from Trial the Testimony and Report of Plaintiff’s 
Human Resources Expert, Matthew Hughey, Ph.D.[,]” Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of 
their  Motion  to  Exclude,  Plaintiff  Rohan  Peters’  (“Peters’”  or  “Plaintiff’s”)  Response,  and 
Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Response.  (ECF Nos. 65-66, 68, 73-74; see also ECF Nos. 67, 
70-72.)  Defendant moves to exclude Plaintiff’s proffered opinion witness, sociology professor Dr. 
Matthew Hughey, pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
509 U.S. 579
(1993) 
and Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 702.  (ECF No. 65-66.) Also before the Court is Defendant’s 
“Renewed Motion in Limine No. 8 and Incorporated Memorandum to Exclude Any Evidence 
Relating to the Expert Opinion and Testimony of Plaintiff’s Human Resources expert, Matthew 
Hughey, Ph.D.”  (ECF No. 91.)                                             
I.   BACKGROUND                                                         
Plaintiff,  an  African-American  Pilot,  brought  this  action  against  his  former  employer, 
International  Paper,  “for  wrongful  termination  and  retaliation  arising  out  of  Defendant’s 
discrimination based on his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”  (ECF 
No. 1 at PageID 1.)  Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgement on May 31, 2023.  (ECF 

No. 46.)  The Court granted summary judgement in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s racial 
discrimination claims and on Plaintiff’s entitlement to certain categories of damages on December 
28, 2023.  (ECF No. 75.)  This case is set for a jury trial beginning February 20, 2023.    
II.  LEGAL STANDARD                                                     
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 allows opinion testimony to be offered by witnesses who are 
“qualified  as  []  expert[s]  by  knowledge,  skill,  experience,  training,  or  education”  if  their 
specialized knowledge “help[s] the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in 
issue,” their testimony is “based on sufficient facts and data . . . the product of reliable principles 
and methods[,] and” they have “reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the 
case.”   Fed. R. Evid. 702.  In Daubert, the Supreme Court established that district courts have a 

responsibility to serve as a “gatekeeper” in ensuring that scientific evidence be admitted only if it 
is both relevant and reliable.  Daubert,
509 U.S. at 589
.   Daubert established that reliability for 
scientific testimony can be shown by whether 1) the theory is testable scientific knowledge that 
can assist the tryer of fact; 2) the theory has been subjected to peer review or publication; 3) known 
error rates or controlling standards for techniques were used; and 4) there is general acceptance of 
the test in the relevant community.
Id. at 593-94
.  Daubert’s progeny clarified that Daubert’s 
general holding applies not only to scientific testimony, but to other testimony based on specialized 
knowledge.  Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137, 146
(1999).  The Supreme Court 
emphasized in Kumho Tire that a district court’s role includes ensuring that experts “employ[] in 

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the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the 
relevant field,” and that district courts should “consider the specific factors identified in Daubert 
where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony.” 
The proponent of the witness seeking qualification under Rule 702 bears the burden of 

establishing that qualification by a preponderance of the evidence.  Bourjaily v. United States,
483 
U.S. 171
(1987); Fed. R. Evid. 104(a).  Courts determine the reliability of an expert’s opinion 
through evaluation of the methodology and principles that form its basis, and determination of 
whether those methods and principles are reliably applied to facts in the case.  Greenwell v. 
Boatwright,
184 F.3d 492, 497
(6th Cir. 1999); Fed. R. Evid. 702.         
District courts are not required to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data by 
only the ipse dixit of the expert.  General Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136, 146
(1997).  “A court 
may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion 
proffered.”
Id.
(citing Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
959 F.2d 1349, 1360
(C.A.6), 
cert. denied,
506 U.S. 826
,
113 S.Ct. 84
,
121 L.Ed.2d 47
(1992)).         

III.  ANALYSIS                                                          
Defendant argues that Dr. Hughey’s testimony “inappropriate[y] . . . substitute[s] his own 
opinion in place of the jury and instruct[s] the jury on which legal conclusion should be drawn[;]” 
that “Dr. Hughey hardly qualifies [to render an opinion] in workplace discrimination or retaliation 
and an in-depth review of his experience reveals he has very little experience in such issues;” and 
that “Dr. Hughey does not base his opinions on sufficient facts[,]” uses unreliable methodology, 
and fails to apply his principles and methods to the facts of this case.  (ECF No. 66 at PageID 913-
14.)  Defendant further argues that no sources listed on Dr. Hughey’s CV relate to retaliation, that 
Dr.  Hughey’s  typography  errors  reveal  copy-and-paste  analysis  from  prior  cases  without 

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meaningful application to the facts of this one, and that Dr. Hughey’s comparative references to 
the Klu Klux Klan and high-profile incidents of police brutality are unfairly prejudicial.  (Id. at 
PageID 917-919.)                                                          
Plaintiff  counters  that  Defendant  mischaracterizes  Dr.  Hughey’s  report  and  it’s  “final 

conclusion that, in his opinion, ‘racial prejudice was more than likely a factor in Plaintiff[‘s] 
treatment by Defendant[.]’”  (ECF No. 68 at PageID 992 (quoting ECF No. 68-1).)  Plaintiff argues 
that Dr. Hughey’s CV qualifies him to render an opinion on the subjects of “race, racism, and 
racial discrimination.”  (ECF No. 68 at PageID 995.)  Plaintiff further argues, without citation to 
law, that “this is a fact-intensive mater with numerous complex issues that cannot be assessed by 
ordinary laypeople[]” without the assistance of opinion witnesses.  (ECF No. 68 at PageID 1006.)    
Most of Parties’ materials on this issue focus on Dr. Hughey’s proffered testimony on racial 
discrimination.    Dr.  Hughey’s  report  provides  historical  context,  analysis,  and  conclusions 
applicable to the racial discrimination claim in this case.  (ECF No. 68-1.)  Indeed, retaliation is 
only discussed as a basis for Dr. Hughey’s ultimate conclusion that Plaintiff experienced racial 

discrimination. (See, e.g.,
Id.
at PageID 1602.)  Plaintiff’s claims for racial discrimination, 
however, are not before the jury, having been dismissed at the summary judgment stage.  (ECF 
No. 75.)  Given the intervening grant of summary judgment, the remaining relevant opinion 
proffered by Dr. Hughey concerns retaliation.  See Goller v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab & Corr.,
285 F. 
App’x 250, 256
(6th Cir. 2008) (citing E.E.O.C. v. Avery Dennison Corp.,
104 F.3d 858
, 860 (6th 
Cir. 1997)) (establishing required showings for a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, 
which do not include proof of discrimination); Fed. R. Evid. 401 (evidence is relevant only if it 
has a tendency to prove a fact “of consequence to determining the action.”).  Dr. Hughey’s fifty-


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nine (59) page report mentions retaliation only four (4) times.1  Of these, two are recitations of 
Plaintiff’s claims, and the other two are, respectively, a section and a phrase offered in support of 
the conclusion as to racial discrimination.  (ECF No. 68-1 at PageID 1021, 1053-56, 1602.)  The 
four-page section titled “Racial Gaslighting and Retaliation” includes one and one-half pages of 

block quotes, one page summarizing the concept of gaslighting, one and one-half pages of 
summary of facts alleged, and the concluding sentences:                   
A company wishing to avoid conflict of interest and to engage in fair, equitable, and transparent 
employment practices would not have a [] subject of the complaint oversee disciplinary 
measures over the complainant. The action likely sends a message of intimidation with the 
implicit meaning to drop past, and/or avoid future, complaints.         

(ECF No. 68-1 at PageID 1056.)                                            
“[A]n expert’s opinion must be supported by more than subjective belief and unsupported 
speculation and should be supported by good grounds, based on what is known.”  McLean v. 
9880111 Ontario, Ltd.,
224 F.3d 797
, 800-801 (6th Cir. 2000).  Here, Dr. Hughey’s section on 
retaliation provides a single, limited conclusion on retaliation, without citations to support or 
analysis describing the bases, methods, or principles he applied to reach that conclusion.  Dr. 
Hughey’s summary of the facts followed by an ipse dixit conclusion not only creates too wide an 

1 For ease of reference, these mentions are as follows. On Page 9, the report states that “The Plaintiff alleges he was 
terminated because of his race, as well as in retaliation for filing an internal complaint of racial discrimination and 
for filing the EEOC charge.”   (ECF No. 68-1 at PageID 1021.)  Page 41-44 includes the section “Racial Gaslighting 
and Retaliation.”  (Id. at PageID 1053-56.)  Page 41, discussing comparative treatment, states that “The Plaintiff 
alleges he was terminated because of his race, as well as in retaliation for filing an internal complaint of racial 
discrimination and for filing an EEOC charge.”  On Page 50, the report concludes: 

   In sum, based on the presence of the ‘voodoo doll’ in the office—and that it was dismissed as a ‘joke’—
   coupled with the fact that Plaintiff’s complaint about it resulted in a suggestion that he change (via anger 
   management course), that the vague and changing benchmarks for varied ‘plans’ to alter Plaintiff’s 
   behavior and with special reference to his ‘attitude[,]’[] the misuse and cherry-picking of the survey and its 
   results, the assertions that Plaintiff was intimidating and/or causing others to be in fear of him, coupled with 
   the racialized hierarchy and leadership, the gaslighting and retaliation, and the unequal treatment of 
   employees and lack of anti-discrimination training in the culture and structure of Defendant[], leads me to 
   the opinion that racial prejudice was more than likely a factor in Plaintiff[’s] treatment by Defendant[][.] 

(Id. at PageID 1602.)                                                     
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analytical gap between the facts and his conclusion, but fails to address matters beyond the 
common knowledge or experience of the average layperson.  See Jones v. J.B. Hunt Transport, 
Inc.,
2003 WL 25676127
, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. July 21, 2003); see also Curtis v. Oklahoma City 
Public Schools Bd. of Educ.,
147 F.3d 1200
(10th Cir. 1998); Wilson v. Muckala,
303 F.3d 1207, 

1218-1219
(10th Cir. 2002).  As such, Dr. Hughey’s testimony is not properly offered under Rule 
702 and should be excluded.                                               
IV.  CONCLUSION                                                         
The body of Dr. Hughey’s report establishes his opinion on Defendant’s racial discrimination 
claim, which was dismissed through summary judgment. Dr. Hughey’s opinion on retaliation, to 
the extent it exists, does not include analysis or application of any methodology.  For this reason 
and  those  discussed  above,  Defendant’s  Motion  to  Exclude  Dr.  Hughey’s  testimony  is 
GRANTED. Defendant’s Renewed Motion in Limine No. 8 is MOOT.              
   IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of February, 2024.                     
                                 __/s/ Jon P. McCalla_________________  
                                 JON PHIPPS MCCALLA                     
                                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE           









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