Protect Democracy Project v. U.S. Office of Management and Budget

[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"11104268","type":"010combined","part":"opinion","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                  FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA



CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND
ETHICS IN WASHINGTON,

              Plaintiff,
                                      Civil Action No. 25-1051 (EGS)
         v.

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, et al.,

              Defendants.




PROTECT DEMOCRACY PROJECT,

              Plaintiff,

         v.                           Civil Action No. 25-1111 (EGS)

U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, et al.,

              Defendants.


                       MEMORANDUM OPINION

     Under the United States Constitution, it is the job of

Congress to decide how American taxpayer dollars are spent,

including how many dollars to spend and on what priorities to

spend them. Once Congress authorizes funding through an

appropriations bill, and the President signs the bill into law,

constitutional responsibility shifts to the Executive Branch to

allocate the funds according to congressional instructions. The



                                  1
decisions about how to allocate funds are called

“apportionments,” and they are used to ensure that the Executive

Branch does not spend more or less than Congress appropriated.

Defendants in this lawsuit are the Executive Branch officials

responsible for apportioning congressionally approved spending.

     To facilitate congressional oversight of the apportionment

decisions of the Executive Branch and provide the public with

insight into the decisions, in 2022, Congress passed, and the

President signed into law, a statute requiring the Executive

Branch to publish its apportionment decisions on a publicly

available online database within two days of the decision.

Thereafter, the Executive Branch created a public database (the

“Public Apportionments Database”) and complied with this law

until late March 2025 when, without notice, it took the database

offline. Defendants argue that this public disclosure law is an

unconstitutional encroachment on the Executive Branch’s

decision-making authority. Relying on an extravagant and

unsupported theory of presidential power, Defendants claim that

their apportionment decisions—which are legally binding and

result in the actual spending of public funds—cannot be publicly

disclosed because they are not final decisions about how to

administer the spending of public funds.

     However, the law is clear: Congress has sweeping authority

to require public disclosure of how the Executive Branch is


                                2
apportioning the funds appropriated by Congress. Under the law,

the decision of the Executive Branch must be made public within

two days of the decision. And if Defendants need to make a new

decision, that new decision must also be made public within two

days. Plaintiffs in this lawsuit monitor these decisions, and

they have the right to report on and re-publish this

information. As explained in this Memorandum Opinion, there is

nothing unconstitutional about Congress requiring the Executive

Branch to inform the public of how it is apportioning the

public’s money. Defendants are therefore required to stop

violating the law!

     Plaintiffs Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in

Washington (“CREW”) and Protect Democracy Project (“Protect

Democracy”) filed these lawsuits against Defendants Office of

Management and Budget (“OMB”) and Director Russell Vought

(“Director Vought”) (collectively, “Defendants”) to challenge

Defendants’ removal of the Public Apportionments Database.

CREW’s two-Count Complaint alleges, among other things, that

Defendants’ actions violate the Administrative Procedure Act

(“APA”) and the Paperwork Reduction Act (“PRA”). Compl., Civil

Action No. 25-1051 (“CREW Compl.”), ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 26-34. 1 Protect




1 When citing electronic filings throughout this opinion, the
Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the original page
number of the filed document.


                                3
Democracy’s six-Count Complaint alleges, among other things,

that Defendants’ actions violate the APA. Compl., Civil Action

No. 25-1111 (“Protect Democracy Compl.”), ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 44—77.

     Pending before the Court are each Plaintiff’s Motion for a

Preliminary Injunction and/or Partial Summary Judgment. 2 See Mot.

for Prelim. Inj. & Partial Summ. J. (“CREW Mot.”), ECF No. 9 in

25-cv-1051; Mot. for Prelim. Inj. or in the Alternative Partial

Summ. J. (“Protect Democracy Mot.”), ECF No. 18 in 25-cv-1111.

At oral argument, the parties agreed that there are no genuine

issues of material fact that would preclude the Court from

considering the merits of their claims. CREW Hr’g Tr., ECF No.

24 at 46:11-12, 97:7-22. Accordingly, Plaintiffs requested that

the Court forego consideration of their requests for a

preliminary injunction and address their requests for partial

summary judgment. 3 Id. at 46:16-19. Both Plaintiffs represented

that if the Court enters partial summary judgment in their favor

and issues the requested injunction, there would be no need for




2 CREW seeks partial summary judgment on its APA claim that
Defendants’ actions are unlawful and contrary to law. Hr’g Tr.,
ECF No. 24 in 25-cv-1051 (May 9, 2025) (“CREW Hr’g Tr.”) at
45:20-25. CREW also seeks summary judgment on its PRA claims.
Protect Democracy seeks partial summary judgment on Count One of
its Complaint. Id. at 44:20-21.
3 Defendants note that were the Court to address the merits, “we

would want to make sure that the Court’s order is consistent
with the relief requested and does not go beyond the partial
motion for summary judgment.” CREW Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 24 at 95:6-
8.


                                4
the Court to address the remaining claims in their respective

Complaints. Id. at 116:24-117:6, 120:10-15. The Court agrees

that there are no genuine issues of material fact that would

preclude ruling on Plaintiffs’ motions for partial summary

judgment at this juncture. Accordingly, the Court will forego

the preliminary injunction analysis and address the merits of

Plaintiffs’ motions for partial summary judgment.

     Upon careful consideration of the motions, responses and

replies thereto, the parties’ oral arguments, and the entire

record herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART CREW’s Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment as to its claims that the Defendants’

removal of the Public Apportionments Database violates the 2022

and 2023 Acts and violates the PRA’s dissemination of

information requirement, and DENIES IN PART CREW’s Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment as to its PRA notice claim. The Court

GRANTS Protect Democracy’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

on its claim that Defendants’ removal of the Public

Apportionments Database violates the 2022 and 2023 Acts. The

Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiffs’ Motions for a Preliminary

Injunction.

I.   Background

       A. Overview of Apportionment Process

     The Appropriations Clause of the United States Constitution

grants Congress the exclusive power to appropriate funds. See


                                5
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the

Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law[.]”).

Congress’s “power of the purse” is an important check on

separation of powers, ensuring that the Executive does not have

“unbounded power.” U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell,
130

F. Supp. 3d 53, 76
(D.D.C. 2015) (citing U.S. Dep’t of Navy v.

Fed. Lab. Relations Auth.,
665 F.3d 1339, 1347
(2012)). “Under

the Appropriations Clause, an appropriation is simply a law that

authorizes expenditures from a specified source of public money

for designated purposes.” Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Cmty.

Fin. Servs. Ass’n of Am., Ltd.,
601 U.S. 416
, 424 (2024).

     To protect and enforce its power under the Appropriations

Clause, Congress has enacted a number of “fiscal control”

statutes. See Sean M. Stiff, CONG. RSCH. SERVS., R46417, CONGRESS’S

POWER OVER APPROPRIATIONS: CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY PROVISIONS (2020).

Relevant here are the Anti-Deficiency Act and the Impoundment

Control Act (“ICA”). The Anti-Deficiency Act “prevents federal

officers from ‘mak[ing] or authoriz[ing] an expenditure or

obligation exceeding an amount available in an appropriation.’”

Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter,
567 U.S. 182, 197
(2012)

(alteration in original) (quoting
31 U.S.C. § 1341
(a)(1)(A)).

Additionally, once Congress appropriates funds, the Anti-

Deficiency Act requires the President to apportion the funds.
31

U.S.C. § 1513
(b)(1). The President has delegated this authority


                                      6
to OMB. See Exec. Order No. 6,166 (June 10, 1933), as amended by

Exec. Order No. 12,608,
52 Fed. Reg. 34617
(Sept. 9, 1987).

       An apportionment is “an OMB-approved plan to use budgetary

resources.” OMB, Circular A-11 § 120.1. Apportionments are

employed to “prevent federal officials from obligating or

expending funds at a rate that would prematurely exhaust the

funds.” Taylor N. Riccard, et al., CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS21665,

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (OMB): AN OVERVIEW (updated June 2023).

Accordingly, apportionments typically “release one part of an

agency’s appropriation . . . followed by one or more subsequent

apportionments releasing the remainder of that appropriation.”

Decl. of Samuel Bagenstos (“CREW–Bagenstos Decl.”), Ex. 3, ECF

No. 9-4 in 25-cv-1051 ¶ 14.

       In 1974, the ICA made it clear that the Executive Branch

cannot use its apportionment authority to withhold

congressionally appropriated funds from agencies or programs

that do not comport with the Executive’s plans or policies. See
31 U.S.C. § 1512
(c) (establishing the only instances in which a

reserve of funds may be created). See generally 2 GAO, PRINCIPLES

OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW (3d   ed. 2006). The ICA requires the

President to notify both Houses of Congress whenever he

determines that appropriated funds will be withheld.
2 U.S.C. §

683
.




                                       7
             1. The 2022 and 2023 Appropriations Acts

     Prior to 2022, the ability of Congress to identify whether

the Executive Branch was withholding or misusing appropriated

funds was limited. It often relied on complaints by

whistleblowers or an agency’s noncompliance with an

apportionment. See Eloise Pasachoff, Modernizing the Power of

the Purse Statutes, 92 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 372 (2024). In

response to growing concerns about the potential abuse of the

apportionment process and misuse of apportioned funds, 4 Members

of the House of Representatives proposed a series of reforms to

strengthen government oversight and accountability. These

efforts included the Protecting Our Democracy Act (“PODA”), a

portion of which would have required OMB to post apportionment

data for the public. See H.R. 5314, 117th Cong. § 2 (2021).

Congress ultimately included the disclosure provision from PODA




4 In 2020 the United States Government Accountability Office
(“GAO”) determined that “OMB withheld from obligation
approximately $214 million appropriated to [the Department of
Defense] for security assistance to Ukraine.” GAO, Withholding
of Ukraine Security Assistance: Decision File B-331564 (Jan. 16,
2020), https://www.gao.gov/assets/b-331564.pdf. The GAO
concluded that the withholding of funds violated the ICA. Id. at
2. These actions were the basis for the first Impeachment of
President Trump during his first term in office and came to the
attention of Members of Congress by means of an August 2019
whistleblower complaint. See e.g., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS RESEARCH GUIDES,
DONALD J. TRUMP, https://guides.loc.gov/federal-impeachment/donald-
trump (last visited July 9, 2025).


                                   8
in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (“2022 Act”) in

March 2022. Specifically, the 2022 Act required OMB to

          implement[] [] an automated system to post
          each document apportioning an appropriation .
          . . including any associated footnotes, in a
          format that qualifies each such document as an
          Open Government Data Asset (as defined in
          section 3502 of title 44, United States Code),
          not later than 2 business days after the date
          of approval of such apportionment[.]
Pub. L. No. 117-103,
div. E, tit. II, § 204(b),
136 Stat. 257
(codified at
31 U.S.C. § 1513
note). 5 In accordance with this

requirement, in July 2022, OMB created the Public Apportionments

Database, located at https://apportionment-public.max.gov, a

publicly available website. See OMB Circular No. A-11 § 120.4.

     In December 2022, Congress made the posting requirement in

the 2022 Act permanent as part of the Consolidated

Appropriations Act, 2023 (“2023 Act”). See
Pub. L. No. 117-328,
div. E, tit. II, § 204(1),
136 Stat. 4459
, 4667 (Dec. 29, 2022)

(codified at
31 U.S.C. § 1513
note). The 2023 Act provided:

          In fiscal year 2023 and each fiscal year
          thereafter . . . [OMB] shall operate and
          maintain the automated system required to be
          implemented by [the 2022 Act] . . . and shall
          continue to post each document apportioning an
          appropriation, pursuant to section 1513(b) of
          title 31, United Sates Code, including any
          associated footnotes[.]

5 “Footnotes appear as textual descriptions on specific tabs in
the apportionment file, and typically provide additional
information or direction associated with one or more lines on
the request.” OMB Circular No. A-11 § 120.34. As such, the
footnotes are part of the apportionment. Id.


                                9
Id.

        B. OMB’s Removal of the Public Apportionments Database

      From July 2022 until its removal, OMB operated and

maintained the Public Apportionments Database. See OMB Circular

No. A-11 § 120.4 (“OMB is required to post all approved

apportionment documents on a public website. Those

apportionments can be found here: https://apportionment-

public.max.gov/.”).

      On or about March 24, 2025, Defendants removed the Public

Apportionments Database from the publicly available website. See

Decl. of Christina L. Wentworth (“CREW–Wentworth Decl.”), Ex. 2,

ECF No. 9-3 in 25-cv-1051 ¶ 23. When accessed now, the website

displays a message indicating “Page Not Found.” See id.; MAX

Homepage, https://apportionment-public.max.gov (last visited

July 16, 2025). On the same day, Members of Congress, including

Democratic leaders on the Senate and House Appropriations

Committees, issued press releases calling attention to the

issue. See CREW Mot., ECF No. 9 at 16 (citing Press Release,

Rosa DeLauro & Patty Murray, What Are They Hiding? DeLauro,

Murray Demand OMB Promptly Restore Access to Website Detailing

Federal Spending Allocations, As Federal Law Requires, DEMOCRATS

APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE (Mar. 24, 2025), https://democrats-

appropriations.house.gov/news/press-releases/what-are-they-

hidingdelauro-murray-demand-omb-promptly-restore-access-website;


                                  10
Press Release, Boyle Demands White House Comply with the Law,

Restore Public Access to Budget Data, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET

(Mar. 24, 2025)).

     Five days later, on March 29, 2025, Director Vought sent a

letter to Republican and Democratic leadership of the Senate and

House Appropriations Committee, some of whom had raised concerns

about the database’s removal, informing them that OMB “will no

longer operate and maintain the publicly available automated

system to which apportionments are posted envisioned in section

204 of division E of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023.”

See Decl. of Kelly Kinneen, Ex. C, Letters from Russell Vought

to Committee on Appropriations (Mar. 29, 2025), ECF No. 18-1 in

25-cv-1051 at 22 (“OMB Letter”). The letter further stated:

          OMB has determined that it can no longer
          operate and maintain this system because it
          requires   the   disclosure    of   sensitive,
          predecisional, and deliberative information.
          By their nature, apportionments and footnotes
          contain   predecisional    and    deliberative
          information because they are interim decisions
          based on current circumstances and needs, and
          may be (and are) frequently changed as those
          circumstances change.

          Such disclosures have a chilling effect on the
          deliberations within the Executive Branch.
          Indeed, these disclosure provisions have
          already   adversely    impacted   the   candor
          contained   in   OMB’s   communications   with
          agencies    and    have    undermined    OMB’s
          effectiveness in supervising agency spending.
          Moreover,    apportionments     may    contain
          sensitive information, the automatic public



                                  11
           disclosure of which may pose a danger      to
           national security and foreign policy.

Id.

        C. The Plaintiffs and Their Interest in the Information

             1. CREW

      CREW is “a non-partisan, non-profit government watchdog

organization based in Washington, D.C.” CREW–Wentworth Decl.,

Ex. 2, ECF No. 9-3 ¶ 4. CREW’s mission is to

           protect[] the rights of citizens to be
           informed about the activities of government
           officials and agencies; monitor[] and inform[]
           the public about key government activities,
           including the executive branch’s use of
           appropriated funds; ensur[e] transparency,
           ethics, and integrity in government; and
           empower[] citizens to have an influential
           voice in government decisions and in the
           government’s decision-making process.

Id. Relying on government records and data made available by

Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests or other statutes

requiring public disclosure, CREW is able to “create public-

facing reports, draft administrative complaints and requests for

investigation, and craft targeted FOIA requests[,]” all of which

CREW makes available to the public via its website. Id. ¶ 5.

      CREW “uses a combination of research, litigation, and

advocacy” to advance its mission of “protecting the rights of

citizens to be informed about the activities of government

officials and agencies,” including how appropriated funds are

used. Id. ¶¶ 4–5. To that end, CREW relies on the information


                                12
uploaded to the Public Apportionments Database “to monitor

apportionments for potential withholdings.” Id. ¶¶ 9, 26, 27.

CREW reports its findings on its publicly available website and

utilizes the information to submit FOIA requests for further

investigation. Id. ¶¶ 19–21. Without access to the apportionment

information on the database, CREW is unable to ensure “[p]rompt

public awareness of any use of the apportionment process to

withhold funds[,]” or alert Congress or the GAO of improper

withholdings, which are critical to CREW’s mission. Id. ¶¶ 12,

14.

             2. Protect Democracy Project

      Protect Democracy is a “nonpartisan, nonprofit organization

dedicated to preventing American democracy from declining into a

more authoritarian form of government.” Protect Democracy Mot.,

ECF No. 18 at 11. The organization works to “educat[e] the

public about democratic norms and conduct[] research, analysis,

and technology developments to promote fact-based debate[,]”

including Congress’s power of the purse. Id. After the creation

of the Public Apportionments Database, Protect Democracy’s work

also included training congressional staff on how to utilize the

database. Id. at 12.

      Given “shortcomings” with OMB’s database, Protect Democracy

launched OpenOMB.org (“OpenOMB”) in October 2024. Id. “OpenOMB

aims to make oversight of OMB’s apportionments easier for


                                13
Congress, the press, and the public by providing easier access

to apportionment files.” Id. Protect Democracy asserts that

OpenOMB’s search is more “user-friendly” because it “allows

users to search for information in and across apportionments.”

Id. To feed its site, Protect Democracy pulled data from the

Public Apportionments Database every day. Id. OpenOMB’s users

include “Congress, litigants, journalists, public policy

organizations, academics, libraries, budget experts, and the

Wikipedia community.” Decl. of William P. Ford (“Protect

Democracy–Ford Decl.”), Ex. 1, ECF No. 18-4 in 25-cv-1111 ¶ 11.

OpenOMB received 41,000 page views between its launch on October

2, 2024, and the removal of the Public Apportionments Database

on March 24, 2025. Id. ¶ 12. At the time the Public

Apportionments Database was removed, Protect Democracy was

developing a “notification feature” set to launch on OpenOMB.

Id. ¶¶ 16–17. Without the apportionment data previously provided

on the Public Apportionments Database, Protect Democracy is

unable to make apportionments available via OpenOMB, thus

“Protect Democracy can no longer provide updated information

about apportionments to Congress, the press, and the public . .

. or otherwise use the site to monitor . . . for potential

violations of law.” Id. ¶ 19.




                                14
       D. Procedural History

     CREW and Protect Democracy initiated actions against

Defendants on April 8, 2025, and April 14, 2025, respectively,

challenging Defendants’ removal of the Public Apportionments

Database. See CREW Compl., ECF No. 1; Protect Democracy Compl.,

ECF No. 1. On April 18, 2025, CREW filed a Motion for

Preliminary Injunction and Partial Summary Judgment, requesting

that the Court schedule a hearing. See CREW Mot., ECF No. 9. On

April 21, 2025, the Court entered a briefing schedule and set a

preliminary injunction hearing for May 9, 2025. Minute Order

(Apr. 21, 2025).

     On April 22, 2025, Protect Democracy filed a Motion for

Expedited Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative a Preliminary

Injunction or a Writ of Mandamus. See Pl.’s Mot. for Expedited

Summ. J., or in the Alternative a Preliminary Inj. or Writ of

Mandamus, ECF No. 13 in 25-cv-1111. The next day, the Court

entered a briefing schedule. Minute Order (Apr. 23, 2025). On

April 25, 2025, Protect Democracy filed an Unopposed Motion to

Coordinate Preliminary Injunction Proceedings. See Mot. to

Coordinate, ECF No. 16 in 25-cv-1111. Protect Democracy

indicated that it “would withdraw its current motion for

expedited summary judgment and instead file a preliminary

injunction motion seeking identical relief as the pending motion

in CREW, limited to the same [APA] claim that both [Plaintiffs]


                               15
advanced in their motions.” Id. at 1. The Court granted the

Motion to Coordinate, and on April 27, 2025, Protect Democracy

filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction or in the

Alternative Partial Summary Judgment. See Protect Democracy

Mot., ECF No. 18 in 25-cv-1111.

     Defendants filed their oppositions to CREW and Protect

Democracy’s motions on April 30 and May 2, 2025, respectively.

See Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. & Partial Summ.

J. (“CREW-Opp’n”), ECF No. 18 in 25-cv-1051; Defs.’ Opp’n to

Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. & Partial Summ. J. (“Protect

Dmocracy-Opp’n”), ECF No. 19 in 25-cv-1111. CREW and Protect

Democracy filed reply briefs on May 4 and May 5, 2025,

respectively. See Reply Mem. of Law in Support of Pl.’s Mot. for

Prelim. Inj. & Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 21 in 25-cv-1051 (“CREW

Reply”); Pl.’s Reply in Support of its Mot. for Prelim. Inj. or

in the Alternative Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 20 in 25-cv-1111

(“Protect Democracy Reply”). Later the same day, Defendants

filed a sur-reply in each case. See Defs.’ Sur-Reply to Pl.’s

Mot. for Preliminary Inj. & Partial Summ. J (“CREW-Sur-reply”),

ECF No. 22 in 25-cv-1051; Defs.’ Sur-Reply to Pl.’s Mot. for

Preliminary Inj. & Partial Summ. J (“Protect Democracy-Sur-

reply”), ECF No. 21 in 25-cv-1111.

     On May 9, 2025, the Court held a hearing on CREW and

Protect Democracy’s Motions. Thereafter, on June 2, 2025, the


                                  16
Court directed Plaintiffs to file supplemental briefing

addressing the type of relief sought if the Court were to forego

a preliminary injunction analysis and rule on their motions for

partial summary judgment. See Minute Order in 25-cv-1051 (June

2, 2025); Minute Order in 25-cv-1111 (June 2, 2025). Plaintiffs

each filed a supplemental memorandum addressing the issue of

relief on June 9, 2025. See Pl.’s Suppl. Br. in Resp. to Court’s

Min. Order (“CREW Suppl.”), ECF No. 28 in 25-cv-1051; Protect

Democracy’s Suppl. Br. (“Protect Democracy Suppl.”), ECF No. 28

in 25-cv-1111. Defendants filed their responses in each case on

June 16, 2025, see Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Suppl. Br. (“Defs.’

Suppl.—CREW”), ECF No. 29 in 25-cv-1051; Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s

Suppl. Br. (“Defs.’ Suppl.—Protect Democracy”), ECF No. 29 in

25-cv-1111; and Plaintiffs filed their replies on June 18, 2015,

see Pl.’s Reply to Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Suppl. Br. (“CREW

Suppl. Reply”), ECF No. 30 in 25-cv-1051; Protect Democracy’s

Reply in Support of Suppl. Br. (“Protect Democracy Suppl.

Reply”), ECF No. 31 in 25-cv-1111. The motions are now ripe for

the Court’s adjudication.

II.   Legal Standard

        A. Administrative Procedure Act

      The APA provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong

because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by

agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is


                                17
entitled to judicial review thereof.”
5 U.S.C. § 702
. The Act

requires courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,

findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law[,]” or “in excess of [the agency’s]

statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of a

statutory right[.]”
Id.
§ 706(2)(A), (C).

       B. Paperwork Reduction Act

     The PRA was enacted in 1980 to “ensure the greatest

possible public benefit from and maximize the utility of

information created, collected, maintained, used, shared and

disseminated by or for the Federal Government,”
44 U.S.C. §

3501
(2); and “provide for the dissemination of public

information on a timely basis, on equitable terms, and in a

manner that promotes the utility of the information to the

public[.]”
Id.
§ 3501(7). Relevant here, the PRA requires each

agency to “ensure that the public has timely and equitable

access to the agency’s public information[.]” Id. § 3506(d)(1).

“Public information” is defined as “any information regardless

of form or format, that an agency discloses, disseminates, or

makes available to the public[.]” Id. § 3502(12). Further, the

Act requires that the agency “provide adequate notice when

initiating, substantially modifying, or terminating significant

information dissemination products[.]” Id. § 3506(d)(3).


                               18
       C. Summary Judgment

     Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for

summary judgment, which are granted “if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). In APA cases, however, “the summary judgment standard

functions slightly differently, because the reviewing court

generally . . . reviews the agency’s decision as an appellate

court addressing issues of law.” Ashtari v. Pompeo,
496 F. Supp.

3d 462
, 467 (D.D.C. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting

Pol’y & Rsch, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,
313 F.

Supp. 3d 62, 74
(D.D.C. 2018)). “[T]he district judge sits as an

appellate tribunal[,] [and] [t]he ‘entire case’ on review is a

question of law.” Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson,
269 F.3d

1077, 1083
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (footnote omitted) (citing Marshall

Cnty. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala,
988 F.2d 1221, 1226
(D.C.

Cir. 1993)).

III. Analysis

     Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are not entitled to

partial summary judgment for two reasons: (1) Plaintiffs lack

standing to challenge the removal of the database; and (2) the

2022 and 2023 Acts are an unconstitutional infringement on

Executive power and privilege. See CREW-Opp’n, ECF No. 18 at 18–




                               19
30. 6 Defendants also argue that CREW lacks standing for its PRA

claim, CREW-Opp’n, ECF No. 18 at 23; and that on the merits,

there was no violation of the PRA because: (1) “the

apportionment documents are interim, deliberative documents that

are exempt from public disclosure,” and (2) “any failure to

provide advance notice [] was harmless error because the letter

notifying Congress was sent a short time afterward,”
id.
at 30-

31.

        A. Standing

      “Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of

federal courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Susan B. Anthony

List v. Driehaus,
573 U.S. 149
, 157 (2014) (quoting U.S. CONST.

art. III, § 2). “‘One element of the case-or-controversy

requirement’ is that plaintiffs ‘must establish that they have

standing to sue.’” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
568 U.S. 398,

408
(2013) (quoting Raines v. Byrd,
521 U.S. 811, 818
(1997));

see Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n,
504 U.S. 555, 560
(1990)

(calling standing “the irreducible constitutional minimum”); see

also Jibril v. Mayorkas, No. 19-cv-2457,
2023 WL 2240271
, at *4

(D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2023) (“One way a court might lack subject-

matter jurisdiction is if a plaintiff lacks Article III


6 Unless otherwise noted, Defendants’ arguments in response to
CREW and Protect Democracy’s motions are substantially
identical. For clarity, the Court only cites to one of the
Defendants’ oppositions.


                                20
standing.” (citing Haase v. Sessions,
835 F.2d 902, 906
(D.C.

Cir. 1987))). The law of Article III standing “is built on

separation-of-powers principles” and “serves to prevent the

judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the

political branches.” Clapper,
568 U.S. at 408
.

     To establish standing, “a plaintiff must show (1) an

‘injury in fact,’ (2) a sufficient ‘causal connection between

the injury and the conduct complained of,’ and (3) a

‘likel[ihood]’ that the injury ‘will be redressed by a favorable

decision.’” Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 157-58

(alteration in original) (quoting Lujan,
504 U.S. at 560-61
).

“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of

establishing these elements.” Lujan,
504 U.S. at 561
(citing

FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,
493 U.S. 215, 231
(1990)). Courts have recognized that plaintiffs can establish

standing based on an informational injury. See Am. Soc’y for the

Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Ent., Inc.,
659 F.3d

13, 22
(D.C. Cir. 2011).

     Under Supreme Court precedent, organizations may have

standing “to sue on their own behalf for injuries they have

sustained.” Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,
455 U.S. 363
, 379

n.19 (1982). “In doing so, however, organizations must satisfy

the usual standards for injury in fact, causation, and

redressability that apply to individuals.” Food & Drug Admin. v.


                               21
All. for Hippocratic Med.,
602 U.S. 367
, 369 (2024) (citing

Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 378–79).

            1. Informational Standing

     “The law is settled that a denial of access to information

qualifies as an injury in fact where a statute (on the

claimants’ reading) requires that the information be publicly

disclosed and there is no reason to doubt their claim that the

information would help them.” Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC,
31

F.4th 781, 783
(D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting Campaign Legal Ctr. &

Democracy 21 v. FEC,
952 F.3d 352, 356
(D.C. Cir. 2020)). To

demonstrate an actionable informational injury, a plaintiff must

show: “(1) it has been deprived of information that, on its

interpretation, a statute requires the government or a third

party to disclose to it, and (2) it suffers, by being denied

access to that information, the type of harm Congress sought to

prevent by requiring disclosure.” Friends of Animals v. Jewell,
828 F.3d 989, 992
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing FEC v. Akins,
524

U.S. 11, 21-22
(1998)); see Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v.

Presidential Advisory Comm’n on Election Integrity,
878 F.3d

371, 378
(D.C. Cir. 2017).

     “The scope of the second part of the inquiry may depend on

the nature of the statutory disclosure provision at issue.”

Jewell,
828 F.3d at 992
. “In some instances, a plaintiff suffers

the type of harm Congress sought to remedy when it simply


                               22
‘s[eeks] and [is] denied specific agency records.’”
Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of

Just.,
491 U.S. 440
, 449–50 (1989)). “In others, a plaintiff may

need to allege that nondisclosure has caused it to suffer the

kind of harm from which Congress, in mandating disclosure,

sought to protect individuals or organizations like it.”
Id.
(citing compare Akins, 524 U.S. at 21–23, and Shays v. FEC,
528

F.3d 914, 923
(D.C. Cir. 2008), with Nader v. FEC,
725 F.3d 226,

230
(D.C. Cir. 2013)).

     “[T]he fact that a number of people could be similarly

injured does not render the claim an impermissible generalized

grievance[.]” Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety

Admin.,
489 F.3d 1279
, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2007). And “[t]he fact

that other citizens or groups of citizens” are also deprived of

the information a plaintiff seeks “does not lessen [a

plaintiff’s] asserted injury, any more than the fact that

numerous citizens might request the same information under the

Freedom of Information Act entails that those who have been

denied access do not possess a sufficient basis to sue.” Pub.

Citizen,
491 U.S. at 449-50
. Even if the statute “entitles the

public generally to the disclosure of” the information, “that

does not mean that the informational injury . . . is not

particular to Plaintiff.” Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Presidential




                               23
Advisory Comm’n on Election Integrity,
266 F. Supp. 3d 297, 311
(D.D.C. 2017).

      CREW and Protect Democracy argue that they have suffered

“quintessential informational injuries” as a result of OMB’s

removal of the Public Apportionments Database. See CREW Reply,

ECF No. 21 at 7; Protect Democracy Reply, ECF No. 20 at 7–11.

Defendants respond that CREW and Protect Democracy fail to meet

either prong of this test as to the 2022 and 2023 Acts, and that

CREW fails to satisfy either prong as to the PRA. CREW-Opp’n,

ECF No. 18 at 22-23, Protect-Democracy-Opp’n, ECF No. 19 at 19-

23.

                  a. Plaintiffs Have Been Deprived of Information
                     That, on their Interpretation, a Statute
                     Requires Defendants to Disclose to Them

      The 2022 and 2023 Acts plainly require OMB to make

apportionment decisions publicly available within two business

days of the approval of such apportionment and in a format that

qualifies as an Open Government Data Asset. See
31 U.S.C. § 1513
note. The PRA plainly requires the public dissemination of an

“agency’s public information.”
44 U.S.C. § 3506
(d).

      Defendants argue that Plaintiffs do not satisfy this prong

for two reasons. First, CREW’s reliance on the FOIA cases it

cites is misplaced because CREW does not allege that it

requested apportionment documents and was denied the documents.

CREW-Opp’n ECF No. 18 at 21. This is a non-sequitur; the


                                24
informational standing precedents do not require a plaintiff to

have specifically requested the information. See supra.

     Second, Defendants argue that neither the 2022 nor the 2023

Acts, nor the PRA as to CREW, require disclosure of information

specifically to CREW or Protect Democracy; rather they “require

the government’s disclosure of information to the public at

large.” CREW-Opp’n, ECF No. 18 at 22; Protect Democracy-Opp’n,

ECF No. 19 at 22. However, Defendants cite no authority for the

proposition that Plaintiffs must show that the laws require the

information to be disclosed specifically to them. See CREW–

Opp’n, ECF No. 18 at 22. And as Plaintiffs point out, the

caselaw indicates that individualized entitlement to disclosure

is not required. See CREW Reply, ECF No. 21 at 9-10 (citing

Campaign Legal Ctr.,
31 F.4th at 790
(finding organization had

informational standing because FECA requires that certain

campaign finance information be made public); Env’t Def. Fund v.

EPA,
922 F.3d 446, 452
(D.C. Cir. 2019) (plaintiff claimed that

the statute at issue required disclosure to it and the public at

large)); see also Protect Democracy Reply, ECF No. 20 at 8-9

(collecting cases). For these reasons, the Court concludes that

Plaintiffs satisfy the first prong: the 2022 and 2023 Acts, and

the PRA as to CREW, require the information to be disclosed to

them as part of the public at large, and Defendants’ removal of

the Public Apportionments Database and failure to make public


                               25
this information deprives Plaintiffs of the information. See

e.g., Akins, 524 U.S. at 20–25 (emphasizing that an “inability

to obtain information” that Congress required to make public

constitutes an injury in fact for Article III); Jewell,
828 F.3d

at 992
(“[T]he existence and scope of an injury for

informational standing purposes is defined by Congress: a

plaintiff seeking to demonstrate that it has informational

standing, generally ‘need not allege any additional harm beyond

the one Congress identified.’” (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins,
578 U.S. 330, 342
(2016))).

                 b. Plaintiffs Have Suffered, By Being Denied
                    Access to the Information, the Type of Harm
                    Congress Sought to Prevent by Requiring
                    Disclosure

     Defendants acknowledge that the type of harm Congress

sought to prevent in the 2022 and 2023 Acts by requiring

disclosure of apportionments was the lack of transparency to the

public at large and to Congress about the Executive Branch’s

apportionment decisions. Citing the legislative history of the

2022 and 2023 Acts, Defendants state that “[t]he 2022 and 2023

Acts are intended to provide the public with insights into

government spending and to enable Congress to oversee the

Executive Branch’s apportionment of appropriated funds.” CREW-

Opp’n, ECF No. 18 at 22 (citing Financial Services and General

Government Appropriations for 2023: Hearings Before the Subcomm.



                               26
on Fin. Servs. & Gen. Gov’t of the H. Comm. on Appropriations,

117th Cong., pt. 5, at 125 (2022) (The 2023 Act “will provide

the public with insight into billions of dollars of federal

spending, while ensuring this committee, and Congress, can

perform its oversight work and ensure the executive branch is

faithfully implementing appropriations law.”)); see also Protect

Democracy Mot., ECF No. 18 at 9–10 (“In a division-by-division

summary of the [2022 Act], Representative Rosa DeLauro (then-

Chairwoman of the House Appropriations Committee)” stated that

the 2022 Act would make “apportionments of appropriations

publicly available in a timely manner.” (quoting Ex. 7, H.R.

2471, Funding for the People: Division-by-Division Summary of

Appropriations Provisions, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, ECF No.

18-10 in 25-cv-1111 at 19)). However, this purpose, Defendants

claim, is distinct from CREW and Protect Democracy’s interests

in acting as “middlemen” or “government watchdogs.” CREW–Opp’n,

ECF No. 18 at 22; Protect Democracy–Opp’n, ECF No. 19 at 23.

     With regard to CREW, Defendants argue that “CREW asserts an

interest in using the database to play a watchdog function, as

part of its [nonprofit] business plan.” CREW Opp’n, ECF No. 18

at 23. “That is an interest that is distinct from providing the

public with the apportionment materials directly, without any

middleman, as Congress did in the 2023 Act, and of course it is

also distinct from Congress’s own interest in oversight.”
Id.
27
The Court concludes that Defendants’ argument is devoid of

merit. CREW has a statutory entitlement to the information, as

does the public at large. Congress did not place restrictions on

what the public can do with the information. That CREW, as a

member of the public, disseminates the information as part of

its advocacy work is not contrary to the type of harm Congress

sought to prevent by requiring disclosure. Rather it is in

furtherance of the purpose for which Congress enacted the 2022

and 2023 Acts. Furthermore, the harm to CREW exists independent

of harm to Congress in not having access to the information.

     With regard to Protect Democracy, Defendants similarly

argue that “the injury Protect Democracy seeks to vindicate is

the injury to its own proprietary interest in OpenOMB. That is

an interest that is distinct from providing the public with the

apportionment materials directly, without any middleman, as

Congress did in the 2023 Act, and of course it is also distinct

from Congress’s own interest in oversight.” Protect Democracy–

Opp’n, ECF No. 19 at 23. Again, the Court concludes that

Defendants’ arguments are meritless. Protect Democracy uses the

information to provide further transparency to the public—and to

Congress—by means of the OpenOMB website. As with CREW, the use

Protect Democracy makes of the information is not contrary to

the type of harm Congress sought to prevent by requiring

disclosure, but in furtherance of Congress’s purpose. And again,


                               28
the harm to Protect Democracy exists independent of harm to

Congress in not having access to the information.

     In summary, CREW and Protect Democracy’s use of the

apportionment information fits squarely within Congress’s goal

of providing increased transparency into the Executive Branch’s

apportionment decisions. Compare Ctr. for Biological Diversity

v. U.S. Int’l Dev. Fin. Corp.,
77 F.4th 679, 686
(D.C. Cir.

2023) (finding plaintiff organization suffered type of harm

Congress intended to prevent with the Sunshine Act where

withheld meeting notices caused plaintiff to miss meetings it

would have otherwise attended), with EPIC,
878 F.3d at 378
(concluding plaintiff organization failed to meet the second

prong of the informational injury test where the underlying

provision was “directed at individual privacy, which [was] not

at stake for [the plaintiff]”). For all these reasons, the Court

concludes that Plaintiffs are suffering the type of harm that

Congress sought to prevent by requiring disclosure of the

apportionment information. 7


7 To the extent the second prong requires Plaintiffs to establish
that “there is no reason to doubt their claim that the
information would help them,” Campaign Legal Ctr.,
31 F.4th at
783
(quotation and citation omitted); there is no reason to
doubt CREW’s claim that the information would help it in its
public education, legislative policy, and litigation work. See
CREW Reply, ECF No. 21 at 10. Nor is there reason to doubt
Protect Democracy’s claim that the information would help it in
its educational, research, and analytical work. Protect
Democracy Mot., ECF No. 18 at 12.


                               29
     With respect to CREW’s dissemination of information claim

pursuant to the PRA, Defendants argue that “the alleged harm to

CREW’s business model is not the type of harm Congress sought to

prevent when enacting the PRA.” CREW-Opp’n, ECF No. 18 at 23.

The Court rejects this argument for the reasons explained above.

With regard to CREW’s notice claim pursuant to the PRA,

Defendants argue that CREW “has not demonstrated any concrete

harm stemming from Defendant’s alleged non-compliance with the

PRA’s notice requirements.”
Id.
CREW failed to respond to this

argument. See generally CREW Reply, ECF No. 21. Accordingly, the

Court considers it conceded. Cf. Hopkins v. Women's Div., Gen.

Bd. of Glob. Ministries,
238 F. Supp. 2d 174, 178
(D.D.C.

2002) (“It is well understood in this Circuit that when a

plaintiff files an opposition to a motion . . . addressing only

certain arguments raised by the defendant, a court

may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address

as conceded.”). CREW has therefore failed to satisfy its burden

of establishing standing as to its PRA notice claim.

                 c. Plaintiffs Have Established Particularized
                    Injuries

     Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing because

their grievance is common to members of the public, thus they do

not have a particularized injury sufficient for Article III

standing. CREW-Opp’n, ECF No. 18 at 9; Protect Democracy Opp’n,



                               30
ECF No. 19 at 9; CREW-Sur-Reply, ECF No. 22 at 2. In support,

Defendants cite United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 175
(1977), where the Supreme Court held that a taxpayer lacked

standing to challenge an alleged “failure of the Congress to

require the Executive to supply a more detailed report of the

expenditures of [an] agency.” Id. at 175.

     The Court concludes that Defendants’ reliance on Richardson

is misplaced. First, the mere fact that all members of the

public have the same injury “does not render the claim an

impermissible generalized grievance.” Pub. Citizen, Inc. 489

F.3d at 1292; see also Pub. Citizen,
491 U.S. at 449-50
; EPIC,
266 F. Supp. 3d at 311
. Second, each Plaintiff has articulated

how their injuries are particularized. See CREW Hr’g Tr., ECF

No. 24 at 19:5-18 (explaining that CREW’s particularized injury

is that by being deprived of the information it “cannot

effectively do its work in monitoring and disseminating to the

public any issues about potential misuses of government

spending”); id. at 17:16-24 (explaining that Protect Democracy’s

particularized injury is that by being deprived of the

apportionment information, it can no longer populate the OpenOMB

website it spent ten months building to make that information

more searchable and user-friendly as part of Protect Democracy’s

core mission to protect the American government from becoming

authoritarian). Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendants’


                               31
argument: Plaintiffs have established that they have a

particularized injury sufficient for Article III standing.

                 d. Informational Standing Does Not Require the
                    Underlying Statute to Provide for a Private
                    Right of Action

     Defendants argue that this case is distinguishable from

other informational standing cases because, unlike here, the

underlying statutes in those cases included an explicit private

right of action or had “hallmarks” indicating that Congress

meant to confer informational standing to potential plaintiffs.

See CREW-Sur-reply, ECF No. 221 at 3; CREW Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 24

at 57:1–14, 60:7–63:10. Thus, Defendants contend, to the extent

that the Acts require public disclosure of apportionment

information, it is merely “ancillary” and “does not rise to the

level of evincing a level of intent to establish a forum in

federal courts to allow private individuals . . . to demonstrate

Article III standing sufficient under the [D.C.] [C]ircuit’s

informational standing test . . . .” CREW Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 24

at 111:8–18.

     The Court concludes that the lack of an express private

right of action in the 2022 and 2023 Acts is not fatal to

Plaintiffs’ claim that they have informational standing.

Defendants have failed to point to any authority suggesting that

the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (“D.C.

Circuit”) requires a public disclosure statute to include a


                               32
private right of action for a plaintiff to establish

informational standing. Rather, courts have concluded that

plaintiffs have informational standing where, as here, the

underlying statute did not include a private right of action.

See Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449–50 (the Federal Advisory

Committee Act (“FACA”)); Ctr. for Biological Diversity,
77 F.4th

at 686
(the Sunshine Act); Env’t Def. Fund v. EPA,
922 F.3d 446
(D.C. Cir. 2019) (Toxic Substance Control Act). Moreover, courts

examining whether plaintiffs had informational standing in

Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) cases—where there is an

express private right of action—focused on whether the statute

conferred a right to information, not a right to sue. See, e.g.,

Campaign Legal Ctr.,
31 F.4th at 790
(concluding plaintiffs

suffered an informational injury where FECA required disclosure

of specific campaign finance data); Ctr. for Resp. & Ethics in

Wash. V. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 22-cv-3281,
2023 WL 6141887
,

at *5–6 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2023) (emphasizing that “FECA creates

an informational right”).

     Further, Defendants’ claim that the disclosure requirement

is “ancillary” because it was a rider in a large appropriations

bill, see CREW Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 24 at 66:5–12; is wholly

without merit. Defendants cite no authority where a court has

ever held a law to be less forceful because it was passed as

part of a larger piece of appropriations legislation. The


                               33
requirement is the law, now codified as part of the Anti-

Deficiency Act. See
31 U.S.C. § 1513
note.

                 e. Plaintiffs Do Not Have an Adequate
                    Alternative Source for Obtaining the
                    Information

     Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have alternative

sources for obtaining the apportionment information such as

submitting FOIA requests, or consulting other government

databases and government reports that contain information about

the Executive’s spending decisions. See CREW-Opp’n, ECF No. 18

at 33. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that these are not

adequate alternatives. Although it is true that “a plaintiff

cannot establish injury based on information that is already

available ‘from a difference source,’ disclosure of which would

only result in duplicative reporting,’” Campaign Legal Ctr.,
31

F.4th at 790
(quoting Wertheimer v. FEC,
268 F.3d 1070, 1075
(D.C. Cir. 2001)); none of Defendants’ proposed alternatives

provide Plaintiffs with timely information on each apportionment

decision in the Open Government Data Asset format required.

     Nor would any of Defendants’ proposed alternatives provide

the information in the required format within a two-day time

frame. For example, the SF 133 Report on Budget Execution and

Budgetary Resources is a quarterly report, see OMB Circular A-11

§ 130.1; and the Financial Report of the United States

government is a PDF document that is issued annually, see Dept.


                               34
of the Treasury, Financial Report of the U.S. Government,

https://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/reports-statements/financial-

report/current-report.html (last visited May 14, 2025).

     Although Defendants point to the statutory deadlines in

FOIA, they fail to acknowledge that those deadlines are rarely,

if ever met, and that it can take months and even years for a

party to actually receive documents. Furthermore, to obtain this

information via FOIA requests, Plaintiffs would need to make

never-ending, recurring FOIA requests, and the information would

be provided in PDF-format documents. Also, given Defendants’

argument that the apportionment information is predecisional and

deliberative, they would likely invoke exemptions that would

result in litigation, further delaying Plaintiffs’ access to the

information. In sum, Congress was well aware of the alternative

sources of information when it enacted the disclosure

requirements in the 2022 and 2023 Acts but chose to require the

establishment of the Public Apportionments Database, thereby

indicating that Congress did not view the alternatives as

adequate.

            2. Protect Democracy is Also Suffering Economic
               Injuries

     Protect Democracy also argues that it is suffering economic

injuries because the removal of the apportionment information

has diminished the value of its investments in the OpenOMB



                               35
database. Protect Democracy Reply, ECF No. 20 at 11-13.

Defendants respond that Protect Democracy “cannot base an

informational injury on its decision to establish a business

around [c]ongressional oversight.” Protect Democracy-Surreply,

ECF No. 21 at 4. However, Protect Democracy contends that this

is an organizational injury, not an informational injury, that

“impacts [its] ability to carry out its core mission” and “is a

direct economic injury based on time and money already spent.”

CREW Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 24 at 10:8-15. Protect Democracy explains

that “OpenOMB is now of considerably less value because it

cannot serve its core function of making it easier to track

OMB’s apportionments.” Ex. A, Supp. Decl. of William P. Ford

(“Protect Democracy–Ford Supp. Decl.), ECF No. 20-1 in 25-cv-

1111 ¶ 2(a). “OpenOMB is now only an archive of apportionments

from a fixed period of time” in the past, id.; rather than

serving the purpose for which Protect Democracy invested

substantial money and resources in it—to “make oversight of

OMB’s apportionments easier for Congress, the press, and the

public” on an ongoing basis, see AboutOpenOMB, OPENOMB,

https://OpenOMB.org/about (last visited May 27, 2025). The Court

concludes that the diminution of the value of the investment in

OpenOMB is a cognizable economic injury. See Village of

Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 262
(1977) (finding cognizable economic injury where a nonprofit


                               36
corporation “expended thousands of dollars” on certain plans,

which would be “worthless” unless the request at issue in the

case was granted).

            3. Plaintiffs Have Established the Requisite Causal
               Connection and Redressability

     Defendants do not contest causal connection or

redressability, both of which are easily met here. Plaintiffs’

injuries are traceable to Defendants’ removal of the Public

Apportionments Database, and a favorable ruling will resolve

Plaintiffs’ injuries by reinstating their access to the

apportionment data. For all these reasons, the Court concludes

that Plaintiffs have established that they have Article III

standing, with the exception of CREW as to its notice claim

under the PRA.

       B. The 2022 and 2023 Acts Do Not Unconstitutionally
          Infringe Upon Executive Power

     “The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of

the new federal government into three defined categories,

legislative, executive and judicial, to assure, as nearly as

possible, that each Branch of government would confine itself

to its assigned responsibility.” Immigr. & Naturalization Serv.

v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 951
(1983). The Constitution vests in

Congress the exclusive power to appropriate funds, see U.S. CONST.

art. I, § 9, cl. 7; and in the Executive the exclusive power to

“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” U.S. CONST. art.


                                37
II, Sec. 3. Pursuant to its appropriations power, “Congress has

plenary power to exact any reporting and accounting it considers

appropriate in the public interest.” Richardson, 418 U.S. at 178

n.11. The President’s constitutional obligation “does not permit

[him] to refrain from executing laws duly enacted by the

Congress as those laws are construed by the judiciary.” Nat’l

Treasury Emps. Union v. Nixon,
492 F.2d 587, 604
(D.C. Cir.

1974).

      Defendants do not dispute that they are not complying with

the 2022 and 2023 Acts: they removed the Public Apportionments

Database from the OMB website on or around March 24, 2025, and

now argue to the Court that the relevant provisions of the Acts

are unconstitutional. At oral argument, Defendants clarified

that their argument is that the 2022 and 2023 Acts are

unconstitutional on the following grounds: (1) they impair the

ability of the Executive Branch to take care that the laws are

faithfully executed and impermissibly interfere with the

Executive Branch’s role; and (2) they require the disclosure of

information that is subject to executive privilege. CREW Hr’g

Tr., ECF No. 24 at 78:16-79:3.




                                 38
            1. The 2022 and 2023 Acts Do Not Impair the Ability
               of the Executive Branch to Take Care That the
               Laws are Faithfully Executed nor Do They
               Impermissibly Interfere in the Executive Branch’s
               Role

     Defendants claim that requiring the disclosure of the

apportionment information “impair[s]” the Executive’s

performance of its duties and interferes with its role for

several reasons. First, they argue that it amounts to Congress

having an active role in the execution of the appropriations

laws. CREW-Opp’n, ECF No. 18 at 24. The Court rejects this

argument. As explained in greater detail below, the 2022 and

2023 Acts require the public disclosure of OMB’s final

apportionment decisions; they do not amount to congressional

involvement in the administration of the appropriation.

     Defendants further argue that requiring the disclosure of

the apportionment information has a “chilling effect on OMB’s

decision-making” in that the 2022 and 2023 Acts require them to:

(1) “omi[t] [] key details regarding the agency action it seeks

prior to making funds available for disbursement”; (2) “remove[]

sensitive information from apportionment documents [resulting

in] imped[ing] OMB’s ability to most efficiently provide

direction to and receive information from agencies”; and (3)

“omit important context that could reveal information about the

Executive Branch’s internal planning and strategy.” Id. at 28

(citations and quotations omitted); see also CREW Hr’g Tr., ECF


                               39
No. 24 at 75:7-15. Defendants further argue that the requirement

to publish the information within two business days

“impermissibly burdens the administration of the apportionment

process” and that as a result of the expedited timeline, they

are “often forced to omit key policy information from

apportionments.” CREW–Opp’n, ECF No. 18 at 28-29. Defendants

point to the FOIA process and the accommodation process for

congressional requests for information and subpoenas as being

preferable to the two-day timeline required by the 2022 and 2023

Acts. Id. at 29.

     The Court concludes that Defendants’ objections are a

policy disagreement with the 2022 and 2023 Acts without a

constitutional foundation. After the 2022 Act was signed into

law in March 2022, the Biden Administration complied with it and

the 2023 Act: OMB’s then-General Counsel, who “participated in

setting up the automated apportionment posting system required

by the statute” and “advised OMB’s budget staff on compliance

with the statute” avers that in his experience, “compliance with

the apportionment transparency law was straightforward, did not

interfere with the President’s constitutional or statutory

responsibilities or OMB’s supervision of the Executive Branch,

and was fully consistent with effective and efficient

governance.” CREW-Bagenstos Decl., ECF No. 9-4 ¶ 7. At bottom,

Defendants are complaining about the extra work the 2022 and


                               40
2023 Acts require. This is a management issue; not a

constitutional one.

     Defendants claim—without citing any authority—that

congressional “[o]versight generally is something that Congress

engages in to inform future legislation” and that the automatic

publication requirement in the 2022 and 2023 Acts is “miles away

from the traditional oversight request or generic reporting

requirement.” CREW Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 24 at 87:9-12, 88:1-2. This

argument is without merit: “Congress has plenary power to exact

any reporting and accounting it considers appropriate in the

public interest.” Richardson, 418 U.S. at 178 n.11. Here,

Congress has determined that OMB’s apportionment decisions

should be publicly available so that, among other things, it and

the public can see whether they are consistent with

congressional appropriations. As such, the 2022 and 2023 Acts

aid Congress’s exercise of its undisputed oversight role. The

Acts do not dictate how OMB should apportion funds, nor do they

establish a congressional management role in the administration

of apportionments. The Acts merely require that the final

apportionment decisions be made publicly available to provide

transparency to Congress and the public.

     For all these reasons, the Court rejects Defendants’

arguments that the 2022 and 2023 Acts impair the ability of the

Executive Branch to take care that the laws are faithfully


                               41
executed or impermissibly interfere in the Executive Branch’s

role.

            2. The Deliberative Process Privilege as a Form of
               Executive Privilege Does Not Apply to the
               Information at Issue, and the Apportionment
               Documents are not Deliberative, Predecisional
               Documents

     “The most frequent form of executive privilege raised in

the judicial arena is the deliberative process privilege; it

allows the government to withhold documents and other materials

that would reveal ‘advisory opinions, recommendations and

deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental

decisions and policies are formulated.’” In re Sealed Case,
121

F.3d 729, 737
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Carl Zeiss Stiftung v.

V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena,
40 F.R.D. 318, 324
(D.C. Cir. 1997)).

“Although this privilege is most commonly encountered in [FOIA]

litigation, it originated as a common law privilege.”
Id.
(citing Wolfe v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,
839 F.2d 768,

773
(D.C. Cir. 1988)). “Two requirements are essential to the

deliberative process privilege: the material must be

predecisional and it must be deliberative.”
Id.
(citing Army

Times Publ’n Co. v. Dep’t of the Air Force,
998 F.2d 1067, 1070
(D.C. Cir. 1993)). “The deliberative process privilege is a

qualified privilege and can be overcome by a sufficient showing

of need.”
Id.
42
      Another form of executive privilege is the presidential

communications privilege, a privilege that was “definitively

established as a necessary derivation from the President’s

constitutional status in a separation of powers regime” arising

out of the “Watergate-related lawsuits seeking access to

President Nixon’s tapes as well as other materials.”
Id.
at 739-

40.

      Defendants assert that the 2022 and 2023 Acts require the

disclosure of predecisional, deliberative information. CREW-

Opp’n, ECF No. 18 at 28. At oral argument, Defendants argued

that this makes the 2022 and 2023 Acts unconstitutional because

the deliberative process privilege is a form of executive

privilege, which, because it is “grounded and rooted in the

separation of powers,” cannot be abrogated by Congress. CREW

Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 24 at 76:12-16. Consequently, according to

Defendants, the 2022 and 2023 Acts are unconstitutional because

they require the disclosure of privileged information. Id. at

78:16-18. Defendants hinted at this argument in their briefing

materials by asserting that “[t]he deliberative process

privilege—the most common executive privilege—is a privilege

grounded in the separations of powers.” CREW-Opp’n, ECF No. 18

at 26. However, the D.C. Circuit case they cite as supporting

this assertion nowhere mentions the deliberative process

privilege as being grounded in separation of powers. See


                                43
generally Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
20 F.4th 49
(D.C. Cir. 2021). Rather, D.C. Circuit authority is clear that

the deliberative process privilege is primarily a common law

privilege. See In re Sealed Case,
121 F.3d at 737
. Defendants’

support at oral argument for their remarkable proposition is

United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683
(1974), a case which

involved presidential privilege (and which they failed to cite

in their briefing materials). See CREW Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 24 at

120:25-121:2. There is no evidence in the record remotely

supporting the notion that the apportionment documents are

presidential communications or are in any way subject to the

presidential communications privilege. Accordingly, the Court

rejects this constitutional claim.

     Aside from their constitutional argument, Defendants argue

that the apportionment information cannot be disclosed because

it is deliberative, predecisional information. The Court also

rejects this argument. The information on the Public

Apportionments Database is neither predecisional nor

deliberative because apportionments, including footnotes, are

final “OMB-approved plan[s]” that are “legally binding.” OMB

Circular No. A-11 § 120.1; see id. § 20.3 (stating that an

“[a]pportionment is a plan, approved by OMB, to spend

resources”). Defendants cite no precedent supporting the

proposition that a legally binding document is predecisional and


                               44
deliberative. Nor do they cite any prior instance in which OMB

has claimed that an apportionment document is privileged. That

Defendants’ current position has never been previously claimed

by OMB is consistent with Mr. Bagenstos’s testimony:

          [Director     Vought’s]      assertion     [that
          ‘apportionments     and    footnotes     contain
          predecisional and deliberative information
          because they are interim decisions based on
          current circumstances and needs, and may be
          (and   are)   frequently   changed    as   those
          circumstances       change’]      fundamentally
          misunderstands     both     the    nature     of
          apportionments and what it means to be
          ‘predecisional.’ Apportionments are not part
          of the give and take that precedes a binding
          legal decision; they are the binding legal
          decisions themselves.

CREW-Bagenstos Decl., ECF No. 9-4 ¶¶ 10-11 (quoting OMB Letter

at 22); see also OMB Circular A-11 § 120.1.

     Defendants also argue that in the Anti-Deficiency Act,

“Congress afforded the President authority to apportion funds as

he ‘considers appropriate,’” and that apportionments are an

iterative process subject to change. CREW-Opp’n, ECF No. 18 at

25 (quoting
15 U.S.C. § 1512
(b)(2)). Consequently, according to

Defendants, the interim apportionment decisions are privileged.

The Court rejects this argument for the same reason as discussed

above—even if an apportionment is later changed, this does not

alter the legally binding nature of the apportionment once it is

made.




                                45
     Similarly, Defendants’ argument that OMB remains free to

change apportionments does not make the information

predecisional and deliberative. No matter how many times an

apportionment changes, each generated apportionment is “legally

binding,” creating administrative and criminal consequences

under the Anti-Deficiency Act. See OMB Circular A-11 §§ 120.1,

145.1. A review of examples of apportionment decisions confirms

that the documents are not deliberative. See OMB Circular A-11,

Ex. 4, ECF No. 18-7 in 25-cv-1111 at 37–58. Nothing within the

apportionment decision shows OMB officials’ discussions or

thoughts about any policy considerations regarding how to

apportion appropriated funds. Id. Finally, there is ample

authority in support of the proposition that because an agency

can change its decision, this does not make the decision any

less final. See e.g., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. v. Sierra Club,

Inc.,
592 U.S. 261
, 271 (2021) (emphasizing that document is a

“final” decision outside the scope of the deliberative process

privilege if it has “real operative effect” leading to “direct

and appreciable legal consequences”); Nat’l Env’t Dev. Ass’ns

Clean Air Project v. EPA,
752 F.3d 999, 1006
(D.C. Cir. 2014)

(“An agency action may be final even if the agency’s position is

‘subject to change’ in the future.”). For all these reasons, the

information at issue is neither predecisional nor deliberative.




                               46
     By removing the Public Apportionments Database, Defendants

have acted contrary to the 2022 and 2023 Acts. For the reasons

explained above, the applicable provisions of the 2022 and 2023

Acts are not unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Court will grant

Plaintiffs’ Motions for Partial Summary Judgment as to their

respective APA claims.

       C. CREW is Entitled to Summary Judgment on its
          Dissemination of Public Information Claim Under the
          PRA

     The Court also concludes that CREW is entitled to summary

judgment on its dissemination of public information claim under

the PRA. Defendants’ removal of the Public Apportionments

Database violates the PRA’s requirement to provide the public

with timely access to the information. See
44 U.S.C. §

3506
(d)(1). As CREW points out, “Defendants do not dispute that

the apportionment information in the database is ‘public

information’ within the meaning of the [PRA], and they do not

dispute that the information’s removal deprives the public of

timely access, as required by that statute.” CREW Reply, ECF No.

21 at 17. Defendants’ only argument in response is that “the

apportionment documents are interim, deliberate documents that

are exempt from public disclosure.” CREW-Opp’n, ECF No. 18 at

31. However, for the reasons explained above, the Court rejects

this argument. Accordingly, the Court will grant CREW’s Motion




                               47
for Partial Summary Judgment as to its dissemination of public

information claim under the PRA.

       D. Remedies

     Given the Court’s conclusion that Defendants’ removal of

the Public Apportionments Database is contrary to law, the Court

turns to the question of remedies. CREW and Protect Democracy

request that the Court: (1) vacate and set aside Defendants’

actions; (2) declare Defendants’ actions unlawful; and (3) enter

a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from removing the

Public Apportionments Database in the future. See CREW Suppl.,

ECF No. 28 at 2; Protect Democracy Suppl., ECF No. 28 at 3.

            1. Declaratory Relief

     Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, a court “may declare

the rights and other legal relations of any interested party

seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or

could be sought.”
28 U.S.C. § 2201
(a). Whether to issue

declaratory relief “always rests within the sound discretion of

the court.” President v. Vance,
627 F.2d 353
, 364 n.76 (D.C.

Cir. 1980). There are many factors relevant to whether

declaratory relief is necessary, but “[i]n the D.C. Circuit, two

criteria are ordinarily relied upon: 1) whether the judgment

will serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at

issue, or 2) whether the judgment will terminate and afford

relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving


                               48
rise to the proceeding.” Glenn v. Thomas Fortune Fay,
222 F.

Supp. 3d 31, 36
(D.D.C. 2016) (citing Vance,
627 F.2d at 364
n.76).

     Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are not entitled to

declaratory relief because the apportionment documents are

predecisional and deliberative, but they fail to address whether

a declaratory judgment would be improper if the Court rules in

Plaintiffs’ favor. See Defs.’ Suppl.—CREW, ECF No. 29 at 2;

Defs.’ Suppl.—Protect Democracy, ECF No. 29 at 2. The Court

rejected Defendants’ predecisional and deliberative arguments

above and concludes that it will exercise its discretion to

award declaratory relief. Declaratory relief clarifies for the

parties—and the public—that Defendants’ knowing violation of the

disclosure requirement in the 2022 and 2023 Acts is not legally

justified by Executive powers or privileges. Importantly, a

declaration provides authority on the central question in this

litigation and guidance on what Defendants must do to comply

with the law.

            2. Vacating and Setting Aside Unlawful Conduct

     Plaintiffs also request that the Court vacate and set aside

Defendants’ unlawful action by ordering Defendants to “restor[e]

the database and mak[e] the apportionment information publicly

available.” CREW Suppl., ECF No. 28 at 3; Protect Democracy

Suppl., ECF No. 28 at 3-4. Defendants assert that vacatur is not


                               49
available here, but provide no argument in support of the

assertion based on the case they cite. See Defs.’ Suppl.—CREW,

ECF No. 29 at 5 (citing United States v. Texas,
599 U.S. 670,

692-93
(2023) (Gorsuch, J. concurring)); Defs.’ Suppl.—Protect

Democracy, ECF No. 29 at 5 (citing Texas,
599 U.S. at 692-93
(Gorsuch, J. concurring)).

     Title
5 U.S.C. § 706
(2)(A) directs courts to “hold unlawful

and set aside agency action” that is “not in accordance with

law[.]”
5 U.S.C. § 706
(2)(A). “[T]o ‘set aside’ a rule is to

vacate it.” Bridgeport Hosp. v. Becerra,
108 F.4th 882, 890
(D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors,
603 U.S. 799
, 830 (2024) (Kavanaugh, J. concurring)). Thus,

“[w]hen an agency’s action is unlawful, ‘vacatur is the normal

remedy.’” Id. (quoting Allina Health Servs. v. Sebelius,
746

F.3d 1102, 1110
(D.C. Cir. 2014)). The D.C. Circuit has held

that remand without vacatur is proper “if an agency’s error is

‘curable.’”
Id.
(citing U.S. Sugar Corp. v. EPA,
844 F.3d 268,

270
(D.C. Cir. 2016)) (emphasizing that remand without vacatur

is an “exceptional remedy”). “Because an agency can’t ‘cure’ the

fact that it lacks authority to take a certain action,” id.; the

Court concludes that vacatur is proper here. As discussed above,

Defendants’ removal of the Public Apportionments Database

clearly violates the 2022 and 2023 Acts, and Defendants have no

legal basis for failing to comply with the Acts. Accordingly,


                               50
the Court will vacate and set aside Defendants unlawful action

pursuant to the APA.

            3. Permanent Injunction

     Finally, Plaintiffs request that the Court permanently

enjoin Defendants from removing the Public Apportionments

Database and the apportionment information required to be

disclosed by the 2022 and 2023 Acts without statutory

authorization. See CREW Suppl., ECF No. 28 at 3-5; Protect

Democracy Suppl., ECF No. 28 at 4-5.

     A court may issue a permanent injunction where, in addition

to establishing that it is entitled to prevail on the merits, a

plaintiff demonstrates:

          (1) that it has suffered an irreparable
          injury; (2) that remedies available at law,
          such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
          compensate   for   that  injury;   (3)   that,
          considering the balance of hardships between
          the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
          equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
          interest would not be disserved by a permanent
          injunction.

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
547 U.S. 388
, 391 (2006). In

determining whether a permanent injunction is a proper remedy,

courts in this district have considered the first two factors

together. See, e.g., Grundmann v. Trump, No. 25-cv-425,
2025 WL

782665
, at *13 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2025); Wilcox v. Trump, No. 25-

cv-334,
2025 WL 720914
, at *15 n.20 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2025);

Ridgely v. Lew,
55 F. Supp. 3d 89, 97
(D.D.C. 2014). And because


                               51
the government is the defendant, “factors (3) and (4) merge.”

Anatol Zukerman & Charles Krause Reporting, LLC v. U.S. Postal

Serv.,
64 F.4th 1354, 1364
(D.C. Cir. 2023) (citing Nken v.

Holder,
556 U.S. 418, 435
(2009)).

     Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot meet the

requirements for a permanent injunction because: (1) they have

failed to establish irreparable harm; and (2) the balance of

hardships in factors three and four tip in favor of the

government “because any injunctive relief in this case would

require unconstitutional infringement upon Executive power.”

Defs.’ Suppl.—CREW, ECF No. 29 at 3-4; Defs.’ Suppl.-Protect

Democracy, ECF No. 29 at 4.

                 a. Irreparable Harm and Inadequate Remedy at
                    Law

     Examining the first two factors together, the Court

concludes that CREW and Protect Democracy have suffered

irreparable harms that cannot be fully repaired absent an

injunction.

     To establish an irreparable injury, a plaintiff must show

that the injury is “both certain and great” and “actual and not

theoretical.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England,
454

F.3d 290, 297
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Wisc. Gas Co. v. FERC,
758 F.2d 669
, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). An organization satisfies

the “irreparable harm” prong “if the actions taken by [the



                               52
defendant] have ‘perceptibly impaired’ the [organization’s]

programs.” League of Women Voters of the U.S. v. Newby,
838 F.3d

1, 8
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fair Emp. Council of Greater

Wash., Inc. v. BMC Mktg. Corp.,
28 F.3d 1268, 1276
(D.C. Cir.

1994)). “If so, the organization must then also show that the

defendant’s actions ‘directly conflict with the organization’s

mission.’”
Id.
(quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. United

States,
101 F.3d 1423, 1430
(D.C. Cir. 1996)).

     The Court concludes that CREW and Protect Democracy’s

inability to continue their work monitoring and reporting on the

Executive Branch’s use of congressionally appropriated funds due

to Defendants’ removal of the Public Apportionments Database is

an irreparable injury. Defendants argue that CREW has failed to

demonstrate that the apportionment information “is indispensable

to its core mission and that impaired access prevents it from

fulfilling its organizational goals.” Defs.’ Suppl.—CREW, ECF

No. 29 at 3-4. The Court disagrees. Without the database, CREW

is unable to evaluate ongoing concerns regarding ICA violations

or provide the public with insight into how the Executive is

spending funds. See Wentworth Decl., ECF No. 9-3 ¶¶ 6-10. As to

Protect Democracy, in addition to the harm to its organization’s

mission of “monitoring and reporting on the Executive Branch’s

compliance with Congress’s directives and making that


                               53
information more accessible to the public,” Protect Democracy

Mot., ECF No. 18 at 23; Protect Democracy’s asserted economic

loss stemming from the inability to maintain OpenOMB constitutes

an irreparable injury.

     When Defendants removed the Public Apportionments Database,

they deprived CREW and Protect Democracy of information to which

they are statutorily entitled, and which they relied on to

monitor government funding, respond to possible legal

violations, and provide transparency to the public. See

Wentworth Decl., ECF No. 9-3 ¶¶ 14-16; Ford Decl., ECF No. 18-4

¶¶ 19-22. The irreparable nature of these injuries is further

supported by the fact that there are ongoing, imminent concerns

of potential Executive Branch withholding or overspending. See,

e.g., GAO, Institute of Museum and Library Services–

Applicability of the Impoundment Control Act to Reduction of

Agency Functions: Decision File B-337375 (June 16, 2025),

https://www.gao.gov/assets/880/878908.pdf. CREW and Protect

Democracy cannot continue their efforts because they no longer

have timely access to apportionment information as required by

the 2022 and 2023 Acts.

     Furthermore, the Court concludes, and Defendants do not

dispute, that remedies at law are inadequate to compensate for

these injuries. Monetary damages would not provide Plaintiffs

with the apportionment information, nor would it allow


                               54
Plaintiffs to fulfill their missions of educating the public and

Congress about how the Executive Branch is allocating

congressionally appropriated funds. Not only does a permanent

injunction ensure that Plaintiffs regain access to the Public

Apportionments Database, but it also prohibits Defendants from

removing the database or failing to comply with the 2022 and

2023 Acts in any other way in the future.

                 b. Public Interest and Balance of Hardships

     Finally, the Court concludes that the public interest and

balance of hardships weigh in favor of issuing a permanent

injunction. Relying on its constitutional arguments that the

2022 and 2023 Acts infringe upon the Executive power, Defendants

argue that these factors weigh against injunctive relief. See

Defs.’ Suppl.—CREW, ECF No. 29 at 4; Defs.’ Suppl.—Protect

Democracy, ECF No. 29 at 4.

     The Court has already considered and rejected Defendants’

arguments that the 2022 and 2023 Acts are unconstitutional. As

explained above, Defendants’ removal of the Public

Apportionments Database violates the law and, contrary to

Defendants’ argument, their conduct is not justified by

Executive power or privilege. Defendants “cannot suffer harm

from an injunction that merely ends an unlawful practice.” Open

Cmtys. All. v. Carson,
286 F. Supp. 3d 148, 179
(D.D.C. 2017)

(quoting Rodriguez v. Robbins,
715 F.3d 1127, 1145
(9th Cir.


                               55
2013)). Moreover, OMB complied with the disclosure requirements

for nearly three years before it removed the Public

Apportionments Database, further diminishing any argument that

complying with the disclosure requirement is overly cumbersome

or places an impossible burden on Defendants.

     A permanent injunction requiring Defendants to maintain the

Public Apportionments Database as required by law directly

serves the “substantial public interest in having government

agencies abide by the federal laws that govern their existence

and operations.” Newby,
838 F.3d at 12
(internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Washington v. Reno,
35 F.3d 1093, 1103
(6th

Cir. 1994)). This interest is also directly advanced by

enforcing the disclosure requirements in the 2022 and 2023 Acts.

As Congress intended when enacting the disclosure requirements,

the Public Apportionments Database provides the public and their

elected representatives with timely insight on how the Executive

Branch is allocating taxpayer dollars. See GAO, Impoundment

Control Act of 1974: Review of the President’s Special Message

of June 3, 2025, B-337581 (June 17, 2025),

https://www.gao.gov/assets/880/878941.pdf (“Restoring [the

Public Apportionments Database] and providing timely access to

the apportionment information we request would enhance

[Congress’s] oversight and [the GAO’s efficiency in supporting

Congress.”). The Public Apportionments Database provides the


                               56
public with information about whether the Executive Branch is

abiding by the laws governing the allocation of public funds,

thereby enabling the public to hold the Executive Branch

accountable if there is a misuse of appropriated funds.

     For all these reasons, the balance of hardships and the

public interest favor granting a permanent injunction.

       E. Plaintiffs’ Remaining Claims

     While Plaintiffs’ Complaints include additional challenges

to Defendants’ removal of the Public Apportionments Database,

see CREW Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 26-29; Protect Democracy Compl.,

ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 51-77; Plaintiffs agree that the Court’s decision

here—granting each form of requested relief—provides Plaintiffs

with complete relief. See CREW Suppl., ECF No. 28 at 5–6;

Protect Democracy Suppl., ECF No. 28 at 8. Accordingly, the

Court exercises its discretion to dismiss without prejudice the

remainder of CREW and Protect Democracy’s claims as prudentially

moot. See City of New York v. Baker,
878 F.2d 507, 509
(D.C.

Cir. 1989) (explaining that “prudential mootness” “does not

concern a court’s power to grant relief, but rather its exercise

of discretion in the use of that power”); Ctr. for Biological

Diversity v. Regan,
729 F. Supp. 3d 37
, 52 (D.D.C. 2024) (“The

practice [of not deciding more than it must] permits courts to

avoid the pointless . . . task of deciding a broad array of

legal and factual issues . . . that, in the parlance of


                               57
mootness, will ‘make [no] difference to the legal interests of

the parties[.]’” (quoting Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. UAL Corp.,
897 F.2d 1394, 1396
(7th Cir. 1990))).

       F. Stay Pending Appeal

     In the event the Court awarded Plaintiffs’ requested

relief, as it has done here, Defendants’ supplemental briefing

requests a stay of any permanent injunction pending appeal. See

Defs.’ Suppl.—CREW, ECF No. 29 at 5. Defendants’ request is

premature because at the time it was made, the Court had not yet

ruled on Plaintiffs’ motions. Accordingly, the Court DENIES

without prejudice Defendants’ request for a stay pending appeal.

If, after considering the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order,

Defendants decide to renew this request, they may make a request

consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8.

     In the alternative, Defendants request that the Court issue

a fourteen-day administrative stay “to allow for the Solicitor

General to determine whether to appeal and seek a stay pending

appeal.” Defs.’ Suppl.-CREW, ECF No. 29 at 6. A court may issue

a brief “administrative stay” to “buy the court time to

deliberate when issues are not easy to evaluate in haste.” Nat’l

Council of Nonprofits v. OMB,
763 F. Supp. 3d 13
, 16–17 (D.D.C.

2025) (quoting United States v. Texas,
144 S. Ct. 797
, 798

(2024) (Barrett, J. concurring) (internal quotation marks

omitted)). “While administrative stays are more common in


                                58
appellate courts, district courts have recognized their

applicability in cases seeking emergency relief under the APA.”
Id.
(citing Order, Texas v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 24-cv-

306, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2024)) (noting that the authority

for an administrative stay stems from the All Writs Act and the

court’s authority to manage its docket). Neither CREW nor

Protect Democracy oppose a brief administrative stay. See CREW

Suppl. Reply, ECF No. 30 at 4; Protect Democracy Suppl. Reply,

ECF No. 31 at 5.

      To allow Defendants time to review the Court’s Memorandum

Opinion and Order, and to allow the parties to properly brief

any forthcoming, procedurally proper motion for a stay pending

appeal, the Court administratively stays the permanent

injunction for three days, until 10:00 am on July 24, 2025.

IV.   Conclusion

      For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART CREW’s

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to its APA claims that

the Defendants’ removal of the Public Apportionments Database

violates the 2022 and 2023 Acts and the PRA’s dissemination of

information requirement, and DENIES IN PART CREW’s Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment as to its APA claim that Defendants’

conduct violated the PRA’s notice requirement, ECF No. 9 in 25-

cv-1051. The Court GRANTS Protect Democracy’s Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment on its APA claim that Defendants’ removal of


                                59
the Public Apportionments Database violates the 2022 and 2023

Acts, ECF No. 18 in 25-cv-1111. The Court DENIES AS MOOT

Plaintiffs’ Motions for a Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 9 in

25-cv-1051 and ECF No. 18 in 25-cv-1111. The Court DISMISSES

WITHOUT PREJUDICE Count One of CREW’s Complaint as prudentially

moot. The Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Counts Two through

Six of Protect Democracy’s Complaint as prudentially moot.

     The Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Defendants’ request for

a stay pending appeal and enters an administrative stay through

10:00 am on July 24, 2025.

     Separate, appropriate Orders for each case accompany this

Memorandum Opinion.

     SO ORDERED.

Signed:   Emmet G. Sullivan
          United States District Judge
          July 21, 2025




                               60