(PS) Memmott v. Dept.of Social Services, Lincoln County

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ORION DOUGLAS MEMMOTT, No. 2:23-CV-2383-DAD-DMC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, LINCOLN COUNTY, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. Pending before the 19 Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 26. Plaintiff filed an opposition, ECF No. 30, 20 and Defendants filed a reply, ECF No. 33. 21 22 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATION 23 This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, which Plaintiff filed 24 as a right. See ECF No. 5. Plaintiff identifies thirty-three potential Defendants, including ten yet 25 to be identified social workers and/or employees of the Lincoln County Department of Social 26 Services in North Carolina (LCDSS). See ECF No. 5, pg. 2. Plaintiff alleges specific actions 27 taken by the following Defendants: (1) the Department of Social Services of Lincoln County, 28 1 North Carolina (“LCDSS”); (2) Bonnie Manning1; (3) LCDSS Social Worker Kelly Pendleton; 2 and (4) LCDSS legal counsel Jessica Fielding Yelverton. See id. Plaintiff claims all other 3 Defendants were “directly involved.” See id. at 25-28. 4 The complaint involves two minors: R.H. and F.H., who were thirteen and six 5 years old, respectively, at the time of the amended complaint. See id. at 5. Plaintiff is the 6 stepfather of the children’s mother, Amanda, and, according to Plaintiff, has acted in loco parentis 7 for R.H. and F.H. since birth. See id. Plaintiff asserts he is a non-relative extended family 8 member, with a kinship bond to the children as he is the only father figure they have ever known. 9 See id. 10 Plaintiff contends that when R.H. was two and a half years old, Amanda signed a 11 document transferring all of Amanda’s parental rights to Plaintiff and his then wife, Donna 12 Harris. See id. at 6. Plaintiff and Donna then formalized that arrangement by seeking 13 guardianship of R.H.; however, because of the age difference between Plaintiff and Donna, 14 Donna became R.H.’s legal guardian. See id. Sometime later, Amanda signed a second document, 15 verifying that Plaintiff had full custody of R.H. and complete authority over decisions relating to 16 R.H.’s medical, educational, and welfare needs. See id. According to Plaintiff, after the couple’s 17 amicable divorce, Donna agreed Plaintiff should maintain care and custody R.H.. See id. 18 At some later date, Donna, Amanda, and the two children moved to North 19 Carolina. See id. at 7. Plaintiff contends that during that time he maintained “long range 20 supervision, with daily virtual contact, and very frequent visits” with R.H. Id. Plaintiff asserts 21 Donna later discovered Bonnie,2 Daniel Koehler, and their attorney, defrauded Donna regarding 22 the North Carolina property she had purchased, leading to conflict. See id. In 2023, in the middle 23 of that conflict, Bonnie’s dog bit F.H. and had to be put down. See id. Plaintiff asserts that this led 24 to Bonnie making a false accusation against Amanda to Defendant Kelly Pendleton, a social 25 worker with LCDSS, alleging F.H. was being neglected and abused. See id. As a result, LCDSS 26 opened a Child Protective Service (CPS) investigation of Plaintiff, Amanda, Donna, and F.H. See 27 1 Plaintiff names Bonnie Manning as Defendant but within the complaint, Plaintiff names Bonnie without any last name. The Court assumes that allegations involving “Bonnie” are referring to Bonnie Manning. 28 2 The Court assumes that “Bonnie” is the named Defendant Bonnie Manning. 1 id. 2 Plaintiff contends that during the investigation, on March 9, 2024,3 and April 3, 3 2024,4 respectively, R.H. and F.H. returned to California where Plaintiff resumed physical 4 custody and care of the two children. See id. at 8. After which, on April 5, Defendant LCDSS 5 confirmed the children had returned to California and were well and safe in Plaintiff’s care via a 6 video call. See id. Plaintiff contends that, at the time, Defendant LCDSS determined no child 7 protective services were necessary and the case would be closed. See id. According to Plaintiff, 8 on April 6, 2023, LCDSS issued a letter stating that after completing the family assessment, no 9 services were needed, and the case would be closed regarding R.H. and F.H.. See id. Plaintiff 10 contends LCDSS’s determination was in accordance with the law because of the children’s 11 kinship bond to Plaintiff. See id. at 8-9. 12 Plaintiff claims that six days after issuing the letter stating that Defendant LCDSS 13 had determined there was no need for CPS services, Defendant LCDSS kidnapped the children 14 from Plaintiff. See id. at 12. Plaintiff further claims that each Defendant caused or participated in 15 the abduction of the children from Plaintiff’s home in California on April 12, 2023, the transfer of 16 the children to North Carolina on April 18, 2023, and the placement of both children in foster 17 homes immediately thereafter. See id. Plaintiff alleges Defendants Hillman, Yelverton, Pendleton, 18 Kelly, Miles, Black, Hauser, Whitesides C. Hoyle, S. Hoyle, Eaddy, Ingram, and Davis conspired 19 to lie and abduct the children. See id. 20 Plaintiff specifically asserts that Defendant LCDSS and conspirators contacted 21 Butte County, California, Department of Social Services (BCDSS), and demanded BCDSS 22 remove F.H. from Plaintiff’s custody. See id. BCDSS then conducted a Field Safety Plan, 23 confirming both children were in Plaintiff’s custody but did not remove the children. See id. 24 Plaintiff claims that after failing to obtain a custody order from a North Carolina 25 court or the assistance of BCDSS, Defendant LCDSS and conspirators then went to the Lincoln 26 County, North Carolina, Sheriff’s Office and made a false accusation that Plaintiff had kidnapped 27 3 Plaintiff states 2024; however, this may be in error as dates that follow are in 2023. 28 4 Plaintiff states 2024; however, this may be in error as dates that follow are in 2023. 1 F.H. See id. at 13-14. Plaintiff further claims Defendant LCDSS and conspirators made this 2 accusation just after they had confirmed the children were both well and safe in Plaintiff’s care 3 and custody earlier that same day via telephone. See id. at 15. Plaintiff asserts that as a result of 4 this accusation, the Lincoln County, North Carolina, Sheriff’s Office issued a false Amber Alert 5 broadcasting that Plaintiff had F.H. See id. 6 Plaintiff then asserts that on April 12, 2024, at about 11:00 pm, Plaintiff, in the 7 presence of approximately fifteen California law enforcement officers, was arrested in front of the 8 children. See id. Plaintiff contends that Defendant LCDSS and other unnamed Defendants lied to 9 social workers of the Colusa County, California, Department of Social Services (CCDSS), 10 resulting in CCDSS’s taking of the children. See id. at 16. Plaintiff contends that Defendant 11 LCDSS then arranged for the children to be brought back to North Carolina while both Plaintiff 12 and Donna were falsely imprisoned. See id. at 17. 13 Plaintiff asserts there was no legal basis for Defendant LCDSS to take R.H. 14 because Defendant Yelverton confirmed that Donna had letters of guardianship for R.H. before 15 sending R.H. to live with Plaintiff. See id. at 17-18. Plaintiff asserts he was never charged with a 16 crime and was released from jail the day after being incarcerated. See id. at 18. Plaintiff further 17 contends that since removing the children, LCDSS has prevented the children from leaving North 18 Carolina and denied Plaintiff any contact. See id. at 19. 19 Plaintiff asserts that as a custodial non-relative extended family member with a 20 kinship bond to the children, Plaintiff is entitled custody of the children and has standing to bring 21 this lawsuit for violation and deprivation of Plaintiff’s statutory and constitutional rights. See id. 22 at 10. Plaintiff further claims that the LCDSS’s determination that the children were well and safe 23 in Plaintiff’s care and custody in California on April 6, 2023, has never been reversed or 24 withdrawn by the LCDSS, nor has the determination been challenged by the LCDSS or any other 25 person or entity in court. See id. According to Plaintiff, there is no on-going action challenging 26 LCDSS’s April 6, 2023, determination and thus, Plaintiff’s legal rights to custody of the children 27 is in full force and effect. See id. at 11. Plaintiff further asserts Butte County, California, 28 Department of Social Services found Plaintiff to be a fit parent entitled to care and custody of the 1 children on April 7, 2023. See id. 2 Plaintiff raises six causes of action. Claim One is intentional infliction of 3 emotional distress on Plaintiff by issuing a false Amber Alert; arresting, booking, and 4 incarcerating Plaintiff; and unlawfully depriving Plaintiff of custody of the children. See id. at 32- 5 38. Claims Two and Three allege that Defendants defamed Plaintiff and cast him in a false light 6 by falsely claiming that Plaintiff abducted the children when they issued the Amber alert. See id. 7 at 38-39. Claims Four and Five allege “Denial of the Right to Due Process” and “Violation of 42 8 U.S.C. § 1983,” respectively. Id. at 40. Claim Six alleges tortious interference with custodial 9 rights based on Defendants’ actions in depriving Plaintiff of custody of the children. See id. at 42- 10 43. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages totaling fifty million dollars ($50,000,000.00) and any other 11 relief to the extent permitted by law that the court deems just and proper. See id. at 43-44. 12 13 II. DISCUSSION 14 Defendants Department of Social Services of Lincoln County, North Carolina, 15 Department of Social Services of Lincoln County, North Carolina, Lincoln County, North 16 Carolina, Chrystal Hoyle, Sherry Hoyle, Jill Eaddy, Daphne Ingram, Cathy Davis, Matt Matthew 17 Hillman; Kelley Miles; Jessica Fielding Yelverton; Kelly Pendleton; Mendie Kelly; Allison 18 Black; Sandy Houser; Lauren Whitesides; April Gullate; Brittany Deal; Jason Hughes; Ashley 19 Wesson; Brenda Kelly-Kerby, and Melinda Carroll Lykins (herein “Defendants”) filed a joint 20 motion to dismiss. See ECF No. 26. Defendants assert that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction 21 over the Defendants and therefore, the action should be dismissed. See id. at 6-9. Second, 22 Defendants contend that the Eastern District is an improper venue, and the Court should dismiss 23 this case for improper venue or transfer the case to the Western District of North Carolina. See id. 24 at 9-12. 25 As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have violated the Federal 26 Rules of Civil Procedure by filing a motion to dismiss on behalf of all Defendants, rather than 27 individual motions for each Defendant. See ECF No. 30, pgs. 31-33. Though Plaintiff did not file 28 a motion to that effect, the Court does not find Defendants violated the Federal Rules of Civil 1 Procedure by filing a joint motion to dismiss and therefore, will consider Defendants’ motion. 2 3 A. Personal Jurisdiction 4 1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 5 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on May 8, 2025. See ECF No. 26. 6 Defendants attach an affidavit from Defendant Hillman in support of the motion to dismiss. See 7 ECF No. 26-1. Defendants assert that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over every Defendant 8 and, even if the Court does have jurisdiction over the Defendants, North Carolina is the proper 9 venue for this suit. See ECF No. 26 at 6. Defendants contend that Plaintiff “cannot establish 10 general or specific personal jurisdiction here.” Id. at 7. Defendants assert that the Court lacks 11 general jurisdiction over every Defendant because none of them are a resident of California and 12 they all work outside of California. Id. at 7-8. 13 As to specific jurisdiction, Defendants contend that the alleged actions were not 14 “purposefully directed” to California. Id. at 8. According to Defendants, the alleged phone call 15 with Plaintiff was the only action that could possibly be considered “aimed at California,” but 16 even that call is insufficient. Id. Additionally, Defendants contend that though Plaintiff’s 17 allegations arise from a North Carolina nonsecure custody order, “defendants did not aim the 18 nonsecure custody order at California.” Id. 19 Next, Defendants contend that “Plaintiff’s claims also do not relate to any 20 California based activity.” Id. at 9. Defendants assert that what Plaintiff calls the “false amber 21 alert,” was really a nonsecure custody order which arose from a dispute in North Carolina. Id. 22 Additionally, Defendants contend that while Plaintiff alleges that he was injured in California, 23 that is insufficient to establish jurisdiction. See id. Finally, Defendants argue it would be 24 unreasonable for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over Defendants, stating: “[t]o force nineteen 25 North Carolina residents to defend actions taken in their home state while working for a county 26 government in a court more than 2,600 miles away is unreasonable.” Id. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 / / / 2 2. Plaintiff’s Opposition 3 Plaintiff filed opposition to the motion to dismiss on June 23, 2025. See ECF No. 4 30.5 Much of the opposition refutes how Defendants characterize the alleged actions and repeats 5 the allegations in the amended complaint. See id. Plaintiff provides some additional facts that 6 speak to personal jurisdiction: 7 Defendants’ improper request to a California agency, the Butte county, California, Department of Social Services, and the Chico, California, Police 8 Department, and the Butte County, California, Sheriff to remove the children from Plaintiff’s care and custody and hold them until the Lincoln County Department of 9 Social Services could come and get them; the defendants’ false accusations against Plaintiff to the California Highway Patrol, the Colusa County, California, Sheriff, 10 and the Williams, California, City Policy Department, which resulted in Plaintiff’s false arrest and Plaintiff’s incarceration in the Colusa County, California jail; the 11 defendants’ improper request, as a sister agency, to the Colusa County, California, Department of Social Services to remove the children from Plaintiff’s care and 12 custody and to hold them until the Lincoln County Department of Social Services could come and get them; the defendants’ petition filed in the Colusa County, 13 California, Superior Court, and the perjury in that court to obtain an order to transfer the kidnapped children to the custody of Lincoln County Department of 14 Social Services; Lincoln County Department of Social Services social workers coming to California to abduct the children and purjure [sic] themselves in the 15 California Superior Court and to transport the children from California to North Carolina; and, of course, the defendants’ actual abduction of the children from 16 Plaintiff, who the defendants had caused to be unjustly arrested in California, and then the transporting of the children from California to North Carolina. 17 ECF No. 30, pgs. 25-26. 18 19 Plaintiff then argues that jurisdiction is proper, and the Eastern District is a proper 20 venue because “every action of the Defendants of which Plaintiff has complained took place in 21 Northern California.” Id. at 30-31. 22 2. Legal Standard 23 A party may move to dismiss a suit for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 24 12(b)(2). To defeat a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of 25 jurisdictional facts sufficient to establish that jurisdiction is proper. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand 26 Tech., Inc. 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, where there is no applicable federal statute 27 5 Plaintiff requested an extension of time to file his opposition since the time for such 28 opposition had passed. See ECF No. 31. The Court granted the extension. See ECF No. 32. 1 governing personal jurisdiction, the Court applies the law of California. Id. Because California's 2 long-arm statute is coextensive with federal due process requirements, the jurisdictional analysis 3 under state law and federal due process are the same. Id. (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 4 410.10). For this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction consistent with due process, the 5 defendant must have “minimum contacts” with this forum “such that the maintenance of the suit 6 does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. 7 Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945) (internal citations omitted). A 8 court may exercise either general or specific jurisdiction over a defendant. Goodyear Dunlop 9 Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919-20, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 180 L. Ed. 2d 796 10 (2011). 11 A court has general jurisdiction over a party whose “continuous operations within 12 a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify a suit against it on causes of action 13 arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318. This 14 is a very exacting standard that requires Defendant's activities in California be “so continuous and 15 systematic as to render [it] essentially at home” in the state. Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 564 U.S. at 16 919. 17 Specific jurisdiction “depends on an affiliation between the forum and the 18 underlying controversy, principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State 19 and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 564 U.S. at 919. The 20 Ninth Circuit uses a three-prong test for determining specific jurisdiction. Schwarzenegger v. 21 Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004). First, the nonresident defendant “must 22 purposefully direct its activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident 23 thereof, or perform some act by which it purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 24 activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Id. Second, “the 25 claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant's forum-related activities.” Id. 26 And finally, “the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair place and substantial justice such 27 that it is reasonable.” Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of the 28 test. Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990). 1 A defendant has the burden to show that, despite the first prongs being satisfied, 2 exercising such jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1114 3 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985)). The Ninth 4 Circuit provides seven factors to determine if exercising jurisdiction is reasonable: 5 (1) the extent of the defendants' purposeful injection into the forum state's affairs; (2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; 6 (3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant's state; (4) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; 7 (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff's interest in convenient and 8 effective relief; and (7) the existence of an alternative forum. 9 Dole Food, at 1114 (citing Caruth v. Int'l Psychoanalytical Ass'n, 59 F.3d 126, 10 128-29 (9th Cir. 1995) 11 3. Analysis 12 The Court finds, for the reasons explained below, that Plaintiff alleges sufficient 13 facts to establish personal jurisdiction but fails to explicitly link named Defendants to these 14 actions. Therefore, the undersigned will recommend Defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted as 15 to personal jurisdiction and Plaintiff be provided leave to amend. 16 a. General Jurisdiction 17 The Court finds that there is no general jurisdiction over Defendants. Defendants 18 are not residents of California, they do not work in California, and Plaintiff does not argue that 19 any Defendant is “essentially at home” in California. 20 b. Specific Jurisdiction 21 First, the Court considers whether Defendants “purposefully avail[ed] [themselves] 22 of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and 23 protections of its laws.” Schwarzenegger, at 802. Defendants argue that none of the actions 24 alleged were targeting California. This Court disagrees. 25 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants contacted Butte County Police and Butte County 26 Department of Social Services (BCDSS), “and demanded that BCDSS remove F.H. from 27 Plaintiff’s custody.” ECF No. 5, pg. 12. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants then contacted 28 social workers in Colusa County and directed those social worked “to take (kidnap) F.H..” Id. at 1 15-16. Additionally, Plaintiff contends that “LCDSS personnel” lied to the Sherriff’s office to 2 induce them to take R.H. as well. Id. at 18. Further, Plaintiff alleges that “On April 12th, 2023, the 3 LCDSS contacted the Amber Alert network and issued an EMA report that Plaintiff had abducted 4 F.H.” Id. at 38. The Amber Alert network functions by sending an urgent message and requires 5 that the alert be sent to specific geographic area. Plaintiff contends that Valerie, a DOE 6 Defendant, and Defendants Hillman and Yelverton had a call with Plaintiff on April 5, 2025. See 7 id. at 8. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants developed contacts within California over the course of 8 the alleged actions – contacts with BCDSS, social workers in Colusa County, and five California 9 law enforcement agencies. See ECF No. 30, pg. 25. 10 Assuming these allegations to be true, as appropriate at this stage, Defendants not 11 only took actions targeted at California, but they also coordinated with and made use of 12 California’s law enforcement and other agencies to take actions within the state. In that way, the 13 actions alleged fall squarely within the first prong, “invoking the benefits and protections of its 14 laws.” Schwarzenegger, at 802. The next consideration is whether the claim “arises out of or 15 relates to the defendant's forum-related activities.” Schwarzenegger, at 802. Plaintiff’s claims all 16 arise from their actions directed at California. Thus, the second prong is satisfied. 17 Finally, the Court must consider if exercising jurisdiction is reasonable, guided by 18 the seven factors provided by the Ninth Circuit. First, the Court finds that Defendants’ 19 “purposeful injection into the forum state's affairs,” is extensive. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 20 directed California state agencies to take actions that expended California resources to arrest a 21 California resident and remove two children from California. See id. at 8. Second, Defendants are 22 correct that this forum is almost 3,000 miles from their residence and therefore, there is a great 23 burden on Defendants to defend here. Third, there exists an obvious conflict of sovereignty in that 24 Plaintiff alleges that custody determinations by different jurisdictions impacted the alleged events 25 and Plaintiff contends that Defendants lied to California agencies to effectuate an arrest by 26 California law enforcement. Fourth, California has a strong interest in adjudicating these claims 27 because of the implications of another state making use of, and coordinating with, California law 28 enforcement and social service agencies to act on their behalf. As to the fifth factor, efficient 1 judicial resolution, this factor weighs in neither direction because it does not appear that this 2 Court would be more or less efficient in resolving this case than another jurisdiction. Sixth, the 3 forum is very important to Plaintiff as it is close to where he lived and where the actions occurred. 4 And finally, this Court does not find there is an alternative forum that would allow Plaintiff to 5 adjudicate these claims. 6 Taken together, this Court finds exercising jurisdiction may be reasonable. 7 Defendants maintain that “all of the events relevant to Plaintiff’s claim happened in North 8 Carolina.” ECF NO. 26, pg. 10. However, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants directed and 9 coordinated action by California law enforcement and social services agencies from North 10 Carolina. See ECF No. 5. Plaintiff repeatedly states that California authorities acted at the request 11 of Defendants. See e.g. ECF No. 30 (California agencies acted “responding to a written request 12 from the LCDSS” pg. 7) (Plaintiff’s arrest and the seizure of R.H. and F.H. “ ‘stemmed from a 13 North Carolina nonsecure custody order;’” pg. 13 quoting Defendants’ affidavit) (“LCDSS 14 arranged with the California law enforcement agencies . . . and with the Colusa County, 15 California, Department of Social Services . . .” pg. 14). Defendants have the burden of showing 16 that exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable and Defendants themselves appear to concede 17 that at least some actions taken by California authorities were at the direction of Defendants. See 18 e.g. ECF No. 26-1, pg. 4 (“LCDSS successfully moved for a nonsecure custody order . . . and sent 19 that order to Butte County, California . . . LCDSS sought the assistance of social service 20 authorities in Butte County, California”); (Defendants Kelly, Jimenez, Pendleton, Yelverton and 21 Hillman had a phone call with Plaintiff where they requested Plaintiff return F.H. to California 22 authorities); (“Plaintiff was arrested by California authorities pursuant to the North Carolina 23 warrant”). 24 Individuals cannot shelter themselves with claims of lack of personal jurisdiction 25 by directing actions by local agencies. As previously stated, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 26 made use of California law and agencies and Defendants appear to concede that point. Such use 27 would make it reasonable for California to exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants. 28 / / / 1 c. Allegations as to Specific Defendants 2 Though Plaintiff generally asserts claims that could give rise to personal 3 jurisdiction over Defendants, Plaintiff fails to specify which actions were taken by named 4 Defendants. This Court finds that is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. 5 Plaintiff makes general assertions about named defendants, such as stating that 6 Defendants “have been directly involved.” ECF No. 5, pg. 27. These vague, general assertions are 7 not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. However, as the previous analysis demonstrates, 8 this Court finds that the allegations are the kind that could give rise to personal jurisdiction, if 9 Plaintiff specified what actions were taken by which Defendants and the facts provided for 10 finding jurisdiction. Thus, the undersigned will therefore recommend Defendant’ motion to 11 dismiss be granted as to personal jurisdiction and Plaintiff be provided leave to amend. 12 B. Venue 13 Defendants argue that the Eastern District of California is an improper venue and 14 therefore, the Court should dismiss this action or transfer the matter to the Western District of 15 North Carolina. Id. at 9-11. According to Defendants, “[a]ll the events relevant to Plaintiff’s 16 claim happened in North Carolina. The “false” amber alert and custodial determinations happened 17 in North Carolina.” Id. at 10. According to Defendants, the only act any Defendant took in 18 California was the April 5, video call that included an LCDSS employee named Valerie. See id. 19 Defendants assert “California authorities arrested Plaintiff and took the children from his 20 custody.” Id. Defendants additionally cite to Colusa County Superior Court Judge Elizabeth 21 Ufkes Olivera’s April 17, 2023, decision to cede jurisdiction over R.H. to North Carolina, 22 explaining it was the “most appropriate forum.” Id. (citing 26-1, pg. 5). 23 As previously stated, Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that Defendants made use of 24 California law enforcement and agencies to effectuate their actions. Plaintiff alleges that 25 Defendants orchestrated the actions of authorities within the Eastern District and therefore, this 26 Court finds that the Eastern District is a proper venue and will recommend Defendants’ motion to 27 dismiss as to venue be denied. 28 1 III. CONCLUSION 2 The Court has recommended that Plaintiff be granted leave to file amended 3 complaint. If the recommendation is adopted and Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended 4 complaint, Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the 5 original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, 6 following dismissal with leave to amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are 7 not alleged in the amended complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th 8 Cir. 1987). Therefore, if Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior 9 pleading in order to make Plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An 10 amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 11 / / / 12 / / / 13 / / / 14 / / / 15 / / / 16 / / / 17 / / / 18 / / / 19 / / / 20 / / / 21 / / / 22 / / / 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / ] If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 2 || conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See 3 || Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 4 | each named defendant is involved and must set forth some affirmative link or connection between 5 || each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 6 || (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff is also warned that 7 || complaint which fails to comply with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with 8 | prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th 9 || Cir. 1981). 10 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends as follows: 1] 1. It is RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 26, 12 || be GRANTED as to personal jurisdiction and DENIED as to improper venue; and 13 2. It is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's first amended complaint be 14 DISMISSED with LEAVE TO AMEND. 15 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 16 || Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days 17 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 18 || objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of 19 || objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See 20 | Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 21 22 | Dated: August 20, 2025 Co 23 DENNIS M. COTA 4 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 25 26 27 28 14