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ACCEPTED
01-14-00954-CR
FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
9/11/2015 2:43:57 PM
CHRISTOPHER PRINE
CLERK
NO. 01-14-00954-CR
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS FILED IN
1st COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE HOUSTON, TEXAS
FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS 9/11/2015 2:43:57 PM
HOUSTON, TEXAS CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
RALPH GARCIA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Appealed from the 405TH Judicial District Court
of Galveston County, Texas
Cause No. 12-CR-2430
BRIEF FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS
JACK ROADY
CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY
GALVESTON COUNTY
ALLISON LINDBLADE
ASSISTANT CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY
GALVESTON COUNTY
STATE BAR NO. 24062850
600 59TH STREET, SUITE 1001
GALVESTON, TX 77551
(409) 766-2355, FAX (409) 765-3261
allison.lindblade@co.galveston.tx.us
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED
i
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Presiding Judge Hon. David Garner
Appellant Ralph Garcia
Appellee The State of Texas
Attorneys for Appellant Kendrick Ceasar â Trial
Joseph Salhab â Appeal
Attorneys for State T. Philip Washington â Trial
Allison Lindblade â Appeal
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Identity of Parties and Counsel ii
Table of Contents iii
Index of Authorities v
Summary of the Argument 1
Statement of Facts 2
Sole Issue 10
Whether an out-of-court statement is admissible as non-
hearsay or as an exception to hearsay is within the trial
courtâs discretion. A trial courtâs ruling will be upheld if itâs
reasonably supported by the record and is correct under any
theory of law.
Howâs the Trial Courtâs ruling to admit the statement wrong
when the record supports admitting it as both as a hearsay
exception admission against interest and as a nonhearsay
prior consistent statement?
Argument and Authorities 10
Standard of Review and applicable law 11
Hearsay 12
The Trial Court found the statement was against Alvarezâs penal
interest after hearing the Stateâs evidence 13
People donât usually incriminate themselves unless itâs true 15
Alvarez made the blame sharing statement to Garciaâs cousin
spontaneously without motive to gain favor 17
iii
The Trial Court heard corroborating circumstances in the evidence
that indicated Alvarez was being truthful in her statement to
Clemente 20
Circumstantial evidence corroborated Alvarezâs custodial
Statements to the police, Alvarezâs testimony, and Garciaâs guilt 24
The Trial Court couldâve admitted the statement as a nonhearsay
prior consistent statement 27
Admitting the statement was harmless 30
Conclusion and Prayer 34
Certificate of Service 35
Certificate of Compliance 35
iv
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASESÂ
Beardsley v. State, 738 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) .........................17
Bingham v. State, 987 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). ................. 15, 16, 21
Brito Carrasco v. State, 154 S.W.3d 127, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). ................12
Brooks v. State, 990 S.W.2d 278, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ..............................31
Campos v. State, 317 S.W.3d 768, 779 (Tex. App.âHouston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet.
ref'd) ......................................................................................................................31
Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) ................................12
Chaney v. State, 01-08-00204-CR, 2009 WL 1086952, at *3 (Tex. App.âHouston
[1st Dist.] Apr. 23, 2009, no pet.) .........................................................................24
Chapman v. State, 150 S.W.3d 809, 814 (Tex. App.âHouston [14th Dist.] 2004,
pet. ref'd) ........................................................................................................ 31, 33
Coffin v. State, 885 S.W.2d 140, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). ..............................12
Coleman v. State, 428 S.W.3d 151, 162 (Tex. App.âHouston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet.
refâd). .....................................................................................................................31
Cunningham v. State, 877 S.W.2d 310, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) .........................
...................................................................................................... 11, 14, 15, 20, 21
Davis v. State, 872 S.W.2d 743, 748â49 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) ....... 14, 15, 20, 21
Eby v. State, 165 S.W.3d 723, 735 (Tex. App.âSan Antonio 2005, pet. ref'd). ........
........................................................................................................................ 15, 26
Foxx v. State, 1497-00169-CR, 1999 WL 966651, at *1 (Tex. App.âHouston
[14th Dist.] Oct. 21, 1999, pet. ref'd) ....................................................................17
v
Garcia v. State, 126 S.W.3d 921, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) ..............................31
Hammons v. State, 239 S.W.3d 798, 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) .............................
................................................................................................ 11, 12, 27, 28, 29, 30
Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App.1998) .............................31
Jones v. State, 13-00-087-CR, 2001 WL 1000994, at *2 (Tex. App.âCorpus
Christi Mar. 29, 2001, no pet.) ..............................................................................32
Juarez v. State, 01-08-00010-CR, 2009 WL 41648, at *3-4 (Tex. App.âHouston
[1st Dist.] Jan. 8, 2009, pet. ref'd) .........................................................................17
Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) ................................31
Lester v. State, 120 S.W.3d 897, 901 (Tex. App.âTexarkana 2003, no pet.). ...........
.................................................................................................................. 14, 15, 21
Mason v. State, 416 S.W.3d 720, 733 (Tex. App.âHouston [14th Dist.] 2013 pet.
refâd), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1181, 191 L. Ed. 2d 139 (2015). ................... 14, 21
Mayes v. State, 816 S.W.2d 79, 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ...................................31
Nelson v. State, 405 S.W.3d 113, 130 (Tex. App.âHouston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet.
refâd). .....................................................................................................................30
Orona v. State, 341 S.W.3d 452, 464 (Tex. App.âFort Worth 2011, pet. ref'd) ...14
Rodriguez v. State, 07-09-0145-CR, 2010 WL 4628580, at *4 (Tex. App.â
Amarillo Nov. 16, 2010, no pet.) ....................................................... 15, 21, 26, 27
Smith v. State, 236 S.W.3d 282, 300 (Tex. App.âHouston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet.
ref'd) ......................................................................................................................31
Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 156â58, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574
(1995) ....................................................................................................................28
United States v. Amerson, 185 F.3d 676, 691 (7th Cir.1999) ..................................21
vi
United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 904 (3d Cir.1991) ......................................28
Walter v. State, 267 S.W.3d 883, 891, fn. 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) .......................
.................................................................. 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24
Williams v. State, 14-11-01068-CR, 2013 WL 84903, at *2 (Tex. App.âHouston
[14th Dist.] 2013 pet. refâd) ......................................................... 11, 12, 27, 28, 30
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476
(1994) ....................................................................................................................16
Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)...................................
................................................................................................ 11, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23
Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). ........................ 11, 12
RULESÂ
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a) .............................................................................................32
TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b) .............................................................................................30
TEX. R. EVID. 801(d). ...............................................................................................12
TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(1)(B). .............................................................................. 11, 27
TEX. R. EVID. 802. ....................................................................................................12
TEX. R. EVID. 803(24). ...................................................................................... 12, 13
vii
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
Now comes Jack Roady, Criminal District Attorney for Galveston County,
Texas, and files this brief for the State of Texas.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Ralph Garcia brings a single issue on appeal in order to reverse his murder
conviction. Garcia submits that he was substantially harmed by the admission of
the statement Garciaâs girlfriend, Sarah Alvarez, made to Garciaâs cousin, Officer
Clemente Garcia. The Trial Court admitted the statement as a statement against
penal interest. The record shows that the statement is admissible as both a
statement against penal interest and as a prior consistent statement.
The Trial Court determined that the statement, considering all the
circumstances, subjected Alvarez to criminal liability. The Trial Court heard
corroborating circumstances in the evidence that indicated Alvarez was being
truthful in her statement to Clemente. The record shows that defense counsel made
an express or implied charge of recent fabrication and improper motive during
Alvarezâs examination. State offered the statement Alvarez made to Clemente
because it was consistent with the testimony that Garcia attacked.
For all these reasons, the Trial Court did not err to admit Alvarezâs statement
to Clemente.
1
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Maxie Flowers was murdered on October 13, 2011.1 Ralph Garciaâs
girlfriend, Sarah Alvarez, testified that she had been with Garcia on the night
that Flowers was killed.2 Alvarez told the jury that she and Garcia returned to
Garciaâs house after dinner and a movie.3 Around 2 a.m., they walked down the
street to find some marijuana.4 Garcia and Alvarez went to a two-story house at
55th and Ave L, the âweed houseâ, owned by Christopher Taylorâs family.5
Ernest Wells, also known as Dirk, and Genie Boy, were standing on the upstairs
porch.6 Flowers was there, too.7 Garcia and Alvarez asked if they had any
marijuana.8 Flowers remarked to Garcia how pretty Alvarez was.9 Garcia just
stared at Flowers and didnât say anything in return.10 Garcia and Alvarez didnât
find any marijuana so they left and walked back home.11
Flowers also went down the street to Garciaâs house.12 Flowers stood with
his bike on Garciaâs property and wouldnât leave.13 Alvarez testified that Garcia
1
R.R.V:21, 28.
2
R.R.V:156-157.
3
R.R.V:156-157.
4
R.R.V:18.
5
R.R.V:18, 158-159.
6
R.R.V:18, 158-159.
7
R.R.V:18, 158-159.
8
R.R.V:160.
9
R.R.V:18, 159.
10
R.R.V:159.
11
R.R.V:18.
12
R.R.V:18.
2
was angry that Flowers said Alvarez was pretty and because Flowers was at
Garciaâs house.14
Alvarez testified that she and Garcia went back in the house.15 They went
into Garciaâs room.16 Alvarez testified that she saw Garcia get a shotgun from
underneath his bed.17 Garcia told Alvarez that God put him on this Earth to do
his dirty work.18
Alvarez stated that she and Garcia got into Alvarezâs motherâs truck and
Garcia drove down the street to where Flowers was riding his bike.19 Alvarez
testified that Garcia stopped the truck, took the shotgun from his lap, pointed it
out the window and shot Flowers twice before they took off and headed back to
Garciaâs house.20
The shotgun made a loud blasting noise and woke up the resident in the
house next to where Flowers lay dying on the side of the street at 54th and Ave
L.21 The resident called 911.22
Dirk, Genie Boy, and Christopher Taylor were still standing on the
13
R.R.V:18, 158-159.
14
R.R.V:157-158.
15
R.R.V:18.
16
R.R.V:163.
17
R.R.V:156-157.
18
R.R.V:159.
19
R.R.V:157-158, 188.
20
R.R.V:188-190.
21
R.R.VII:171-172.
22
R.R.VII:171-172.
3
upstairs porch, which was about a half a block away from where Flowers was
murdered.23 When they heard the gunshots, they left in their car.24
Flowers was still alive when the first responders arrived.25 He was taken
to the hospital where he died of multiple gunshot wounds.26
The Police found a bicycle belonging to Flowers in the road.27 The Police
also found two 12-gauge shotgun shells and two shotgun wads in the road.28
Flowers was known as a low level member of the Crips gang.29 The
investigation revealed that Flowers had been involved in at least one fight with
the rival gang, the Bloods, the day before he was murdered.30 However,
Detective Gomez, the lead investigator, testified that he ruled out the rival gang
member suspects. 31
Detective Gomez testified that after he spoke to Dirk, his investigation
was focused on 55th street, the scene of the murder.32 Dirk knew the Garcia
family because he worked for them from time to time and spent Thanksgivings
23
R.R.VI:32, 35, 144-145; Stateâs Exhibit 1 and Stateâs Exhibit 5.
24
R.R.V:191.
25
R.R.VI:18, 221.
26
R.R.VI:18, 221.
27
R.R.V:91.
28
R.R.V:92; 166.
29
R.R.VI:18.
30
R.R.VI:22.
31
R.R.VI:24.
32
R.R.VI:32.
4
with them.33Although Dirk was a reluctant witness at trial, he admitted that he
was at the weed house on the night of the murder and that he saw Flowers riding
his bicycle.34
Detective Gomez testified that he executed a search warrant on Garciaâs
residence just a few months after the murder.35 The search uncovered shotgun
shells of the same caliber as those found at the scene.36 No gun was found.37 No
vehicle was found.38 Garcia was interviewed but he denied any involvement in
the murder.39
Detective Gomez testified that after he learned Alvarez was with Garcia
on the night of the murder, he contacted her.40 Initially, Alvarez told Garcia that
she didnât know anything about the murder.41 Although Gomez attempted to
contact Alvarez again, she was unresponsive until she gave a recorded statement
at the police station on March 22, 2012.42 Gomez told the jury that he believed
Alvarezâs March 22nd statement was false.43
Clemente Garcia, a Galveston Police Officer, and Garciaâs cousin, knew
33
R.R.V:223-225; VIII:61-62.
34
R.R.V:223-231.
35
R.R.VI:98.
36
R.R.VI:99.
37
R.R.VI:152.
38
R.R.VI:113.
39
R.R.VI:38.
40
R.R.VI:48-49.
41
R.R.VI:48-49.
42
R.R.VI:51-52.
43
R.R.VI:51-52.
5
Garcia and Alvarez personally.44 Clemente testified that he saw Alvarez on
September 2, 2012, while he was on duty and that she appeared to be upset.45 He
also told the Trial Court that she appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or
drugs, and that she did not appear to have the normal use of her physical and
mental faculties.46 Alvarez testified that she had been drinking.47 Clemente told
the jury that even though Alvarez had an outstanding arrest warrant for public
intoxication, he was taking her home to her motherâs house.48
Clemente testified that he asked Alvarez what was wrong and if she was
involved in something.49 Clemente testified that Alvarez told him that she
couldnât take it anymore.50 Clemente asked her what she meant.51 Alvarez
responded by saying âI am the key to the whole thing because I was there with
Ralphie. I could⌠I could be charged with murder, too.â52 Alvarez testified that
when she tried to tell Clemente about the murder, he told her she was being
recording so she tried to run.53 After Clemente called dispatch for help, Alvarez
44
RR.VVII:131-132.
45
RR.VVII:126.
46
RR.VVII:118-19.
47
R.R.V:168-169.
48
R.R.VII:112-113.
49
R.R.VII:112-113.
50
R.R.VII:112-113.
51
R.R.VII:112-113.
52
See Stateâs Exhibit 50.
53
R.R.V:169.
6
was found and arrested on a public intoxication warrant.54
While Alvarez was still in jail on a public intoxication warrant, she gave
another statement to Investigator Gomez.55 Detective Gomez testified that
Alvarezâs second statement matched the other details from his investigation.56
When Alvarez testified at trial, she admitted to the jury that her statements
to the police contradicted each other.57 Initially upon direct and cross-
examinations, Alvarez testified that she did not remember what happened on the
day of the murder, she was under the influence that night, and that everything
was a blur.58 Alvarez told the jury that she didnât want to testify.59 Alvarez
explained that she was in a county jump suit because the sheriff arrested her in
order for her to comply with her trial subpoena to testify.60
After Alvarez was allowed to review her video statements, she told the
jury that her first statement wasnât true and that her second statement was true.61
Alvarez also testified that she and Garcia broke up after the murder
around Thanksgiving of 2011.62 Alvarez told the jury that her relationship with
54
R.R.VI:54.
55
R.R.VI:54.
56
R.R.VI:54.
57
R.R.V:156-157.
58
R.R.V:5-6.
59
R.R.V:199.
60
R.R.V:6.
61
R.R.V:156-157.
62
R.R.V:175.
7
Garcia was abusive and that everybody knew how he beat her.63 Alvarez
testified that a few weeks before trial, Garcia started texting her again.64 Alvarez
messaged Garcia in return.65 Alvarez testified that the messages were friendly
and some of them sexual in nature.66 Alvarez testified that fear played a part of
communicating with Garcia.67 Alvarez told the jury that, although Garcia didnât
outright ask her, she didnât know what would happen if she didnât keep her
mouth shut.68
Detective Gomez arrested Garcia for the murder of Flowers in September
2012.69 The jury found Garcia guilty of murder as charged in the indictment.70
Garcia was sentenced to 28 yearsâ imprisonment in the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice.71 This appeal followed.
63
R.R.V:200-201.
64
R.R.V:200-201.
65
R.R.V:200-201.
66
R.R.V:200-201.
67
R.R.V:200-201.
68
R.R.V:200-201.
69
C.R. 39-40.
70
C.R. 185-189.
71
C.R. 185-189.
8
SOLE ISSUE
Whether an out-of-court statement is admissible as non-hearsay or as an
exception to hearsay is within the trial courtâs discretion. A trial courtâs
ruling will be upheld if itâs reasonably supported by the record and is
correct under any theory of law.
Howâs the Trial Courtâs ruling to admit the statement wrong when the
record supports admitting it as both as a hearsay exception admission
against interest and as a nonhearsay prior consistent statement?
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
Garciaâs sole issue contends that the Trial Court erred when it admitted a
statement of Garciaâs girlfriend, Sarah Alvarez, as an admission against interest.
Alvarez told Garciaâs cousin, Officer Clemente Garcia, âI am the key to the
whole thing because I was there with Ralphie. I could⌠I could be charged with
murder, too.â72 The Trial Courtâs decision to admit this evidence wasnât an
abuse of discretion because Alvarez believed that her role in the murder was
important enough that she could be charged with murder.73 In addition,
Alvarezâs statement was a blame-sharing statement and not a blame-shifting
statement.74 Where circumstances do not indicate motives to shift blame or curry
72
Stateâs Exhibit 50 (Clemente Garciaâs patrol car video/audio).
73
See Walter v. State, 267 S.W.3d 883, 891, fn. 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (When the
statement against interest was offered, it became the job of the trial court to determine
whether the declarant was under the impression that the statement was against her interest at
the time she made it.).
74
See Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (finding statement
9
favor, the statement is admissible.75
Moreover, the statement is admissible as a prior consistent statement.76
Alvarez testified and was cross-examined at trial; there was an accusation of
recent fabrication and improper motive; the State offered the statement to rebut
the challenged testimony; and the statement was made before Alvarez appeared
to have motive to lie.77 For all these reasons, the Trial Court did not err to admit
Alvarezâs statement to Clemente.78
Standard of review and applicable law
Whether an out-of-court statement is admissible under an exception to the
general hearsay exclusion rule is a matter within the trial courtâs discretion.79 A
trial courtâs decision to admit or exclude evidence of a statement against penal
interest is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.80 Similarly, a trial courtâs
determination that a prior consistent statement is admissible is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.81
The appellate court only determines whether the record supports the trial
trustworthy where declarant made it to friends without any motive to shift blame or minimize
involvement).
75
Id.
76
See TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(1)(B).
77
Hammons v. State, 239 S.W.3d 798, 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Williams v. State, 14-11-
01068-CR, 2013 WL 84903, at *2 (Tex. App.âHouston [14th Dist.] 2013 pet. refâd).
78
See Woods, 152 S.W.3d at 113.
79
Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
80
Cunningham v. State, 877 S.W.2d 310, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc).
81
Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 806; Williams, 14-11-01068-CR, 2013 WL 84903, at *2.
10
courtâs ruling.82 The appellate court only reverses when âthe trial judgeâs
decision was so clearly wrong as to lie outside that zone within which
reasonable persons might disagree.â83 The appellate court must uphold the trial
courtâs ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct under any
theory of law applicable to the case.84
Hearsay
Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at trial, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.85
For hearsay to be admissible, it must fit into an exception provided by statute or
the Rules of Evidence.86 One exception to hearsay is a statement against
interest.87 A statement against interest is a statement that:
(A) a reasonable person in the declarantâs
position would have made only if the person believed
it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to
the declarantâs proprietary or pecuniary interest or had
so great a tendency to invalidate the declarantâs claim
against someone else or to expose the declarant to civil
or criminal liability or to make the declarant an object
of hatred, ridicule, or disgrace; and
(B) is supported by corroborating circumstances
82
Coffin v. State, 885 S.W.2d 140, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
83
Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 595 (quoting Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 682 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992)).
84
Brito Carrasco v. State, 154 S.W.3d 127, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
85
TEX. R. EVID. 801(d).
86
TEX. R. EVID. 802.
87
TEX. R. EVID. 803(24).
11
that clearly indicate its trustworthiness, if it is offered
in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the
declarant to criminal liability.88
The Trial Court found the statement was against Alvarezâs penal interest after
hearing the Stateâs evidence
Garcia argues this evidence wasnât admissible as a statement against
interest under Texas Rule of Evidence 803(24). Here, it is important to note that
the statement was admitted during the final witness of the State; therefore, the
Trial Court had heard most, if not all, of the Stateâs evidence. Trial Court had
already heard evidence of relevant corroborating circumstances that supported
its ruling.
As stated above, a statement against interest in the criminal context is an
exception to the hearsay rule that tends to subject the declarant to criminal
liability.89 The rule sets out a two-step foundation requirement for
admissibility.90 First, the trial court must determine whether the statement,
considering all the circumstances, subjects the declarant to criminal liability and
whether the declarant realized this when he made the statement.91 Second, the
court must determine whether there are sufficient corroborating circumstances
88
Id.
89
TEX. R. EVID. 803(24); see also Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 890.
90
Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 890.
91
Id. at 890â91.
12
that clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.92 Both statements that
are directly against the declarantâs interest and collateral âblame-sharingâ
statements may be admissible under rule 803(24) if corroborating circumstances
clearly indicate their trustworthiness.93
Whether corroborating circumstances clearly indicate trustworthiness lies
within the sound discretion of the trial court. Appellate courts will conduct this
review by examining pertinent factors, favorable and unfavorable, which are
relevant to corroborating circumstances.94
The appellate court may consider positive and negative indicia of
trustworthiness in reviewing a trial courtâs decision to admit or exclude a
hearsay statement against penal interest.95 However, the appellate court must be
âcareful not to engage in a weighing of the credibility of the in-court witness.â96
âThe overriding consideration is that the requirement of corroboration should be
utilized and construed in such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of
92
Id. at 891.
93
Id. at 896; see also Orona v. State, 341 S.W.3d 452, 464 (Tex. App.âFort Worth 2011,
pet. ref'd); see also Mason v. State, 416 S.W.3d 720, 733 (Tex. App.âHouston [14th Dist.]
2013 pet. refâd), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1181, 191 L. Ed. 2d 139 (2015).
94
Cunningham, 877 S.W.2d at 310.
95
Davis v. State, 872 S.W.2d 743, 748â49 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); see also Lester v. State,
120 S.W.3d 897, 901 (Tex. App.âTexarkana 2003, no pet.).
96
Davis, 872 S.W.2d at 749; see also Lester, 120 S.W.3d at 901; Rodriguez v. State, 07-09-
0145-CR, 2010 WL 4628580, at *4 (Tex. App.âAmarillo Nov. 16, 2010, no pet.) (not
designated for publication).
13
circumventing fabrication.â97
People donât usually incriminate themselves unless itâs true
The Trial Court determined that the statement, considering all the
circumstances, subjected Alvarez to criminal liability.98 Garcia claims that
Alvarezâs statement was not self-inculpatory.99 The Trial Court found the
statement inculpating because Alvarez indirectly claimed that she was involved
in the murder.100
A reasonable person would not normally claim that he committed a crime,
unless it was true.101 The exception for statements against pecuniary, penal, or
social interest stems from the commonsense notion that people ordinarily do not
say things that are damaging to themselves unless they believe they are true.102
This is the guiding principle behind the Texas hearsay exception for statements
against penal interest found in Rule 803(24).103
Statements against penal interest fall into three general categories: Some
97
Cunningham, 877 S.W.2d at 312; Eby v. State, 165 S.W.3d 723, 735 (Tex. App.âSan
Antonio 2005, pet. ref'd).
98
See Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 890â91; see also R.R.V:120-121.
99
Garcia brief, p. 10.
100
See Stateâs Exhibit 50: âI could be charged with murder, too.â
101
Bingham v. State, 987 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
102
See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476
(1994) (discussing the federal counterpart to the Texas exception for statements against penal
interest and noting that âRule 804(b)(3) is founded on the commonsense notion that
reasonable people, even reasonable people who are not especially honest, tend not to make
self-inculpatory statements unless they believe them to be true.â).
103
Bingham, 987 S.W.2d at 56.
14
inculpate only the declarant; others inculpate equally both the declarant and a
third party, such as a co-defendant; still others inculpate both the declarant and
third party, but also shift blame by minimizing the speakerâs culpability.104 A
confession, conversation or narrative, even a short one, might mix together all
three types of statements.105 Where circumstances do not indicate motives to
shift blame or curry favor, the statement may be admissible.106
Here, the statement equally inculpated Alvarez and Garcia. Garcia had not
been charged or arrested at the time Alvarez made the statement to Clemente.
Although indirectly, Alvarezâs statement indicated that she and Garcia were
together and could be charged with murder. Alvarez didnât try to shift the blame
onto Garcia; instead, it could be interpreted that she made herself the decisive
factor in the murder.
Garcia argues that Alvarezâs statement amounts to no more than mere
presence which, alone, is not enough to criminally inculpate someone.107
Alvarezâs statement included more than mere presence. To the contrary, Alvarez
implies she couldâve been a participant.108 She said, âI could get charged with
104
Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 897-99.
105
Id.
106
Woods, 152 S.W.3d at 113.
107
Garciaâs Brief, p. 10-11.
108
See Beardsley v. State, 738 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (Mere presence alone
at the scene of the offense will not support a conviction; however, it is a circumstance which,
combined with other facts, may show that the defendant was a participant.); see also Foxx v.
15
murder, too.â109 Her actions show that she believed what she said. She testified
that when she knew she was being recorded, she ran.110
Alvarez made the blame-sharing statement to Garciaâs cousin spontaneously
without motive to gain favor
The night Alvarez made the statement to Clemente, Clemente was on duty
and responded to a disturbance about a couple arguing in a parking lot.111
Alvarez testified sheâd been arguing with a male friend while drinking that
night, but that Clemente was there on a different call.112 Clemente testified that
when he saw Alvarez she was upset and crying.113 Alvarez testified that she had
been drinking.114 Clemente testified that although Alvarez had an outstanding
arrest warrant for public intoxication, he told the other officers that he knew
Alvarez and that he was going to take her home to her motherâs house.115
State, 1497-00169-CR, 1999 WL 966651, at *1 (Tex. App.âHouston [14th Dist.] Oct. 21,
1999, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication).
109
Stateâs Exhibit 50; see Juarez v. State, 01-08-00010-CR, 2009 WL 41648, at *3-4 (Tex.
App.âHouston [1st Dist.] Jan. 8, 2009, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication)
(Appellant's question to the declarant, in which he asked âhow [she] would feel towards him
if the police said that he had killed the two ladies,â satisfies the first inquiry under rule
803(24). Though hypothetical, the question was self-inculpatory and against appellant's self-
interest.)
110
See Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 891, fn. 26 (âWhenever a statement against interest is offered, it
is the job of the Trial Judge to determine whether the declarant was under the impression that
the statement was against his interest at the time he made it.â).
111
R.R.VII:112-113.
112
R.R.V:168-169.
113
R.R.VII:112-113.
114
R.R.V:168-169.
115
R.R.VII:112-113.
16
Clemente testified that he asked Alvarez what was wrong and if she was
okay.116 Clemente testified that he asked Alvarez if she was involved in
something.117 Clemente testified that Alvarez told him that she couldnât take it
anymore.118 Clemente asked her what she meant.119 Alvarez responded by
saying that she was the key to the whole thing.120 She was there with Ralph
Garcia.121 She could get charged with murder, too.122
At trial, Alvarez testified that she tried to tell Clemente about the murder
that night so he could help Garcia but when Clemente said his in-car video was
recording, she tried to run.123 Clemente testified that after Alvarez ran from his
vehicle, he called for backup because he didnât know if she was going to be in
any danger.124
The record shows that Alvarezâs statement to Clemente was inculpatory
considering Alvarez implied she was involved in the murder, placed herself at
the scene of the murder, and when she found out her statement was being
recorded, she ran.125
116
R.R.VII:112-113.
117
R.R.VII:112-113.
118
R.R.VII:112-113.
119
R.R.VII:112-113.
120
See Stateâs Exhibit 50.
121
See Stateâs Exhibit 50.
122
See Stateâs Exhibit 50.
123
R.R.V:169.
124
R.R.VII:127-128.
125
See Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 890.
17
Alvarezâs flight from the police car suggests that Alvarez wasnât
attempting to gain or curry favor by trying to implicate Garcia.126 To the
contrary, her flight, coupled with her statement, shows that Alvarez reasonably
believed that she could be charged with the murder. Alvarezâs statement was an
equal blame-sharing statement. Alvarezâs statement didnât try to shift blame by
minimizing her culpability or try to implicate Garcia to a greater degree.127
It must be kept in mind that the basis of the statement against penal
interest exception is not that a declarant is in a general âtrustworthyâ frame of
mind.128 The probability of trustworthiness comes only from the statement being
self-inculpatory.129 The out-of-court statements from a co-defendant that are
against the declarantâs penal interest, but also inculpate the defendant, are
viewed with some suspicion.130 That suspicion is lessened when the speaker
makes no distinction between his conduct and that of the defendantâwhere
there is absolute equality.131 Although Alvarez was not charged as a co-
defendant, these principles support the trial court ruling because Alvarezâs
statement was an equal blame-sharing statement.
126
Woods, 152 S.W.3d at 113.
127
See Woods, 152 S.W.3d at 113; see also Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 897-99.
128
Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 897-99.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
18
The Trial Court heard corroborating circumstances in the evidence that
indicated Alvarez was being truthful in her statement to Clemente
The Trial Court impliedly determined that there were sufficient
corroborating circumstances that clearly indicated the trustworthiness of the
statement.132 The determination of whether corroborating circumstances clearly
indicate trustworthiness lies within the trial courtâs sound discretion.133
The corroborating circumstances must be sufficiently
convincing to clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
The focus of this inquiry is on verifying to the greatest extent
possible the trustworthiness of the statement so as to avoid the
admissibility of a fabrication.134
The structure of the rule and its wording demonstrate the
obvious suspicion with which the drafters of the rule regarded a
statement exposing the declarant to criminal liability, but
exculpating the accused. The requirement of corroboration is
therefore construed in such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of
circumventing fabrication.135
While there is no definitive test to determine whether sufficient
corroborating circumstances exist, when analyzing the sufficiency of
corroborating circumstances, a number of factors are relevant: (1) whether the
guilt of the declarant is inconsistent with the guilt of the defendant; (2) whether
132
Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 891.
133
Cunningham, 877 S.W.2d at 313.
134
Davis, 872 S.W.2d at 748â49 (internal quotations omitted).
135
Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 891; Lester, 120 S.W.3d at 901; see generally United States v.
Amerson, 185 F.3d 676, 691 (7th Cir.1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (discussing rationale for
requiring corroboration).
19
the declarant was so situated that he might have committed the crime; (3) the
timing of the declaration; (4) the spontaneity of the declaration; (5) the
relationship between the declarant and the party to whom the statement was
made; and (6) the existence of independent corroborative facts.136 The trial court
may consider evidence which undermines the reliability of the statement as well
as evidence corroborating its trustworthiness.137 The first two factors logically
applies only when the defendant is the proponent of the statement against
interest that tends to exculpate the defendant.138
Here, several factors support a clear indication of trustworthiness. To
begin, Alvarezâs statement to Clemente was made while the investigation was
still pending nearly 11 months after the murder. Alvarezâs statement was
spontaneous and not the result of a custodial interview. The statement was made
to a familiar person that she believed she could confide it.
Alvarez made the statement to Garciaâs cousin, Clemente Garcia.139
Clemente, although also law enforcement, was someone sheâd known personally
through her relationship with Garcia.140 Clemente testified that he treated Garcia
136
Woods, 152 S.W.3d at 113; Davis, 872 S.W.2d at 749; Rodriguez, 07-09-0145-CR, 2010
WL 4628580, at *3.
137
Cunningham, 877 S.W.2d at 312; see also Bingham, 987 S.W.2d at 58; Mason, 416
S.W.3d at 733-34.
138
Woods, 152 S.W.3d at 113.
139
R.R.VII:108.
140
R.R.VII:131-132.
20
like a son.141 Clemente testified that heâd come to know Alvarez through Garcia
while the two were dating.142 Clemente testified that he was somewhat close to
Alvarez, that they would talk, and Alvarez came to him for advice.143 Alvarez
called Clemente by his first name.144 In addition, Clemente testified that he
wasnât involved in the murder investigation and that he hadnât spoken to either
Alvarez or Garcia about it.145
Alvarez likely didnât believe she was making a statement law enforcement
but confiding in someone that was close to the family. Therefore, she did not
have a motive to shift blame to Garcia.146 Statements to friends, loved ones, or
family members normally do not raise the same trustworthiness concerns as
those made to investigating officers because there the declarant has an obvious
motive to minimize his own role in a crime and shift the blame to others.147
Alvarez testified about seeing Clemente that night,
And him being Ralphâs -- you know, Ralph looking up
to him and him looking up to Ralph at the same time, I
thought that -- you know what Iâm saying -- "Man, he
needs to help this kid," you know? Like, that was the
only person close to him that could really get to him.
141
R.R.VII:112-113.
142
R.R.VII:112-113.
143
R.R.VII:111.
144
R.R.VII:112-113.
145
R.R.VII:112-113.
146
See Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 897-99.
147
Id.
21
Q. Right. Did you tell Officer Garcia what happened?
A. I tried to, kind of sort of. Then he said they were
recording. Thatâs when I tried to run.148
Because Alvarez was not being arrested, but escorted home, she did not
have a motive to curry favor.149 Clemente testimony established that Alvarez
made the statement spontaneously to him. The fact that this was a âstreet cornerâ
spontaneous conversation with Garciaâs uncle distinguishes this statement from
custodial statements to the police.150 Thus, the timing, spontaneity, and
relationship between the Alvarez and Clemente (the party to whom the
statement was made) tend to establish the reliability of the statement.151
Circumstantial evidence corroborated Alvarezâs custodial statements to the
police, Alvarezâs testimony, and Garciaâs guilt
Alvarez testified that she and Garcia went down the street to a two-story
house to find some marijuana.152 Alvarez testified that Ernest Wells, also known
as Dirk, and Genie Boy, were standing on the upstairs porch.153 Alvarezâs
testimony was corroborated when Taylor testified that Dirk and Genie Boy were
148
R.R.V:169.
149
R.R.V:169; see also Woods, 152 S.W.3d at 113.
150
See Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 897-99.
151
Chaney v. State, 01-08-00204-CR, 2009 WL 1086952, at *3 (Tex. App.âHouston [1st
Dist.] Apr. 23, 2009, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
152
R.R.V:18.
153
R.R.V:18, 158-159.
22
with him at the house the night of the murder.154 Dirk testified to that he knew
Chris Taylor and Genie Boy.155 Dirk testified that he was at the weed house that
night with Genie Boy.156
Alvarez testified that she had been with Garcia on the night that Flowers was
killed.157 Alvarez told the jury that she and Garcia returned to Garciaâs house
after dinner and a movie.158 Further, Alvarez said she spent the night there after
the murder.159 Alvarezâs testimony was corroborated when Garciaâs mother
testified to the jury that Alvarez stayed at their house a lot.160 Garciaâs mother
did not provide an alibi for him for the night of the murder; instead, she told the
jury that Garcia could have left with Alvarez.161
Alvarez testified that Garcia shot Flowers twice before they took off in the
truck and headed back to Garciaâs house.162 Alvarezâs testimony was
corroborated when the detectives testified that there were 2 shotgun shells found
at the scene that were consistent with the shotgun shells found in Garciaâs
154
R.R.V:208.
155
R.R.V:221.
156
R.R.V:222.
157
R.R.V:156-157.
158
R.R.V:156-157.
159
R.R.V:188-190.
160
R.R.VIII:48.
161
R.R.VIII:59.
162
R.R.V:188-190.
23
bedroom.163 The medical examiner testified that the wounds on the body were
consistent with the shotgun blasts coming from the driverâs side window of a
vehicle.164 Christopher Taylor and a neighbor testified that they heard gun shots
and vehicle travel down the street after the gun shots.165 Garcia lived on the
same street where Flowers was found murdered.166
Alvarez testified that Flowers was riding his bike.167 Alvarez testified that
Flowers came to Garciaâs house on his bike.168 Alvarezâs testimony was
corroborated when Dirk testified that he saw Flowers ride his bike down the
street.169 The detectives testified that Flowersâs body was found near his
bicycle.170
Considering the relevant factors, it appears the corroborating evidence,
even in light of evidence tending to undermine the trustworthiness of Alvarezâs
statements, is sufficiently convincing to indicate trustworthiness.171
Here, the Trial Court was aware of the applicable rule of evidence, and of the
relevant standards for admitting and excluding a hearsay statement against penal
163
R.R.V:91; VI: 42, 96.
164
R.R.VI:216-217.
165
R.R.V:208-209; R.R.VIII:23-24.
166
R.R.VI:33; V:37, 86,
167
R.R.V:157-158, 188.
168
R.R.V:18, 158-159.
169
R.R.V:223.
170
R.R.V:91.
171
See Eby, 165 S.W.3d at 737.
24
interest. The Trial Court did not abused its discretion. The corroborating
circumstances surrounding Alvarezâs statement to Garciaâs uncle clearly
indicated the trustworthiness of the statement.172 Therefore, the Trial Court
properly admitted the statement because its determination that Alvarezâs
statement qualified as a Rule 803(24) statement against interest was within the
zone of reasonable disagreement.173
The Trial Court couldâve admitted the statement as a nonhearsay prior
consistent statement
During Alvarezâs testimony there was an express or implied charge of
recent fabrication and improper motive.174 The State offered the statement to
after Garcia implied Alvarez was lying.175 The statement was made before
Alvarez had a motive to lie.176
Rule 801(e)(1)(B) permits the substantive, non-hearsay admission of prior
consistent statements of a witness âoffered to rebut an express or implied charge
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.â177
Four requirements must be met for prior consistent statements to be admissible:
(1) the declarant must testify at trial and be subject to cross-examination, (2)
172
See Rodriguez, 07-09-0145-CR, 2010 WL 4628580, at *5.
173
See id.
174
Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 806; Williams, 14-11-01068-CR, 2013 WL 84903, at *2.
175
Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 806; Williams, 14-11-01068-CR, 2013 WL 84903, at *2.
176
Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 806; Williams, 14-11-01068-CR, 2013 WL 84903, at *2.
177
Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 804 (quoting TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(1)(B)).
25
there must be an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive of the declarantâs testimony by the opponent, (3) the
proponent must offer a prior statement consistent with the declarantâs challenged
in-court testimony, and (4) the prior consistent statement must be made prior to
the time that the supposed motive to falsify arose.178
The Court of Criminal Appeals has emphasized that rule 801(e)(1)(B)
âsets forth a minimal foundation requirement of an implied or express charge of
fabrication or improper motive.â179 ââ[T]here need only be a suggestion that the
witness consciously altered his testimony in order to permit the use of earlier
statements that are generally consistent with the testimony at trial.ââ180 The trial
court therefore possesses âsubstantial discretion to admit prior consistent
statements under the rule.â181
There is no bright line between a general challenge to
memory or credibility and a suggestion of conscious fabrication,
but the trial court should determine whether the cross-examinerâs
questions or the tenor of that questioning would reasonably imply
an intent by the witness to fabricate.182
The defense opens the door to the admissibility of a prior consistent
statement by an express or implied suggestion that the witness is fabricating her
178
Id. (citing Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 156â58, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574
(1995)).
179
Id.
180
Id. (quoting United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 904 (3d Cir.1991)).
181
Id. at 804â05.
182
Id. at 805; Williams, 14-11-01068-CR, 2013 WL 84903, at *2.
26
testimony in some relevant respect.183 In deciding that question, the trial court
must consider the totality of the cross-examination, not isolated portions or
selected questions and answers.184
Here, the four requirements are met. First, Alvarez testified and was
cross-examined. Second, during cross examination, Garcia implied that Alvarez
lied when she described the murder. Garcia expressly accused Alvarez of not
being credible because she was a jealous, scorned, drug-addicted, suicidal ex-
girlfriend.185 Third, the State offered the statement Alvarez made to Clemente
because it was consistent with the testimony that Garcia attacked.
Fourth, according to Garcia, Alvarez had a motive to lie or for revenge
since she stop dating Garcia. But the record shows that in her March 2012
statement to Gomez, months after her relationship with Garcia ended, she
refused to implicate him in the murder. When she spoke to Clemente in
September 2012, she implicated herself in addition to Garcia. Afterwards, she
made an addition statement to police where she stated Garcia shot Flowers. If
Alvarezâs motive was revenge all along she wouldâve blamed Garcia for the
murder the first time she spoke to Detective Gomez or, at the very least, when
she talked to Clemente in the patrol car. But she didnât.
183
Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 804.
184
Id.
185
R.R.V:50, 57-58, 174-75.
27
Reviewing the record from the totality of the examinations, and giving
due deference to its assessment of tone, tenor, and demeanor, the Trial Court
reasonably could have found that defense counselâs cross-examination suggested
that Alvarezâs testimony that Garcia was the murderer was a recent
fabricationâmade during the trialâin light of her allegedly conflicting
custodial statements.186
Admitting the statement was harmless
Even if this Court were to assume that Alvarezâs statement to Clemente
constituted inadmissable hearsay, the admission of the statement was harmless
because the same or similar evidence was admitted at another point in the trial
without objection.187 The admission of inadmissible hearsay is nonconstitutional
error and will be considered harmless if, after examining the record as a whole,
the error did not affect appellant's substantial rightsâi.e., did not have a
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.188
Moreover, the improper admission of evidence is harmless if the same or similar
186
See Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 808â09; Williams, 14-11-01068-CR, 2013 WL 84903, at *6.
187
See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); see also Nelson v. State, 405 S.W.3d 113, 130 (Tex. App.â
Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. refâd).
188
Garcia v. State, 126 S.W.3d 921, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Johnson v. State, 967
S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App.1998); Campos v. State, 317 S.W.3d 768, 779 (Tex.
App.âHouston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd); Coleman v. State, 428 S.W.3d 151, 162 (Tex.
App.âHouston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. refâd).
28
evidence is admitted without objection at another point in the trial.189
Alvarez testified as the first Stateâs witness and then again after she
reviewed her previous statements. Alvarezâs statement to Clemente came into
evidence during one of the last State witnesses. The statement didnât tell the
jurors anything they hadnât already heard from Alvarezâs testimony.
The statement Alvarez made to Clemente said that she was the key to the
murder, she was there with Garcia, and she could be charged for murder, too.
The jury already heard Alvarez testify that she was with Garcia on the night of
murder. The jury already heard Alvarez say that she was in the truck with Garcia
when he shot Flowers. Alvarez testified that the reason Garcia was upset was
because Flowers commented on how pretty Alvarez was and then came down
the street to Garciaâs house. The jury already heard Alvarez testify about her
personal feelings toward the murder, how it really upset her, and how she was
reluctant to come forward as a witness. There was nothing in that statement that
the jury hadnât already heard in the testimony.
Garcia claims he was harmed by the admission of the statement and the
189
See Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); see also Mayes v. State,
816 S.W.2d 79, 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); see also Brooks v. State, 990 S.W.2d 278, 287
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also Chapman v. State, 150 S.W.3d 809, 814 (Tex. App.â
Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd); see also Smith v. State, 236 S.W.3d 282, 300 (Tex.
App.âHouston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref'd).
29
Stateâs use of the statement during closing arguments.190 Garcia argues that the
statement was used to bolster the credibility of Alvarez. However, Garciaâs
bolstering argument should not be considered as it was not preserved because he
did not object on that basis.191 Additionally, if Garcia was concerned that the
statement affected Alvarezâs credibility in front of the jury, Garcia could have
called Alvarez as a rebuttal witness to attempt to impeach her about her
statements to Officer Clemente.192
Nonetheless, admitting Alvarezâs statement to Clemente into evidence
was cumulative and did not tell the jury anything that wasnât already in
evidence; therefore, the statement didnât have a substantial or injurious effect on
the verdict.
After examining the record, this Court may be reasonably assured that any
possible improper admission of Alvarezâs statement to Clemente did not
influence the jury verdict, or only had but a slight effect, because the same or
similar evidence was admitted without objection elsewhere at trial.193
Garciaâs sole issue should be overruled and the Trial Courtâs ruling
upheld.
190
Garcia brief, p. 15-16.
191
See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); see also Jones v. State, 13-00-087-CR, 2001 WL 1000994, at
*2 (Tex. App.âCorpus Christi Mar. 29, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
192
R.R.VII:124-125
193
See Chapman, 150 S.W.3d at 814.
30
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the State prays that the
judgment of the Trial Court be affirmed in all respects.
Respectfully submitted,
JACK ROADY
CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY
GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS
/s/ Allison Lindblade
ALLISON LINDBLADE
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
State Bar Number 24062850
600 59th Street, Suite 1001
Galveston, Texas 77551
Tel (409)766-2452/Fax (409)765-3261
allison.lindblade@co.galveston.tx.us
31
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned Attorney for the State certifies a copy of the foregoing
brief was sent via email, eFile service, or certified mail, return receipt requested, to
Joseph Salhab, 2018 Buffalo Terrace, Houston, Texas 77019,
josephsalhab@mindspring.com, on September 11, 2015.
/s/ Allison Lindblade
ALLISON LINDBLADE
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Galveston County, Texas
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
The undersigned Attorney for the State certifies this brief complies with Tex.
R. App. Proc. 9.4(i)(3), is a computer generated document, and consists of 6,492
words.
/s/ Allison Lindblade
ALLISON LINDBLADE
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Galveston County, Texas
32
Case Information
- Court
- Tex. App.
- Decision Date
- September 11, 2015
- Status
- Precedential