REED v. DAVIS

D.N.J.6/2/2023

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[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"10276872","type":"100trialcourt","part":"other","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
___________________________________
:
ADAM REED, :
:
Petitioner, : Civ. No. 20-11523 (NLH)
:
v. : OPINION
:
BRUCE DAVIS, et al., :
:
Respondents. :
___________________________________:

APPEARANCES:

Adam Reed
313270-C
New Jersey State Prison
PO Box 861
Trenton, NJ 08625

Petitioner Pro se

Grace C. MacAulay, Camden County Prosecutor
Linda A. Shashoua, Chief, Motions and Appeals Unit
Camden County Prosecutor’s Office
200 Federal Street
Camden, NJ 08103

Counsel for Respondents

HILLMAN, District Judge
Pro se petitioner Adam Reed, a state prisoner at New Jersey
State Prison in Trenton, New Jersey, petitions for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254
. ECF No. 1. Reed
challenges his 2013 conviction for 15 separate offenses,
including various counts of drug possession, weapon possession,
and attempted murder. For the reasons below, the petition will
be denied and a certificate of appealability shall not issue.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background1 and Procedural History
On direct appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Appellate Division, summarized the evidence underlying Reed’s

conviction as follows:
On the evening of June 21, 2011, Camden City Police
Acting Sergeant Benito Gonzalez and Acting Sergeant
Christopher Frucci were conducting undercover
surveillance of drug activity in Camden, specifically
“in the area of Newton between Pine and Spruce
Street.” Officer Gonzalez testified that as he and
Officer Frucci were driving down Newton Avenue, he
observed a black male and a female sitting on the
steps of a residence. The two were later identified
as defendant and co-defendant Elizabeth Pitko. The
officers established a surveillance position to
observe defendant and Pitko. From his vantage point,
Officer Gonzalez saw defendant and Pitko leave the
steps, walk to a blue Ford Taurus parked across the
street, and drive off. The officers waited to see if
they would return, which they did about twenty minutes
later, shortly after midnight on July 22, 2011.
A few moments after the pair returned, Officer
Gonzalez observed
a black male wearing a red jacket and blue
jeans walking from Pine Street towards the
vehicle. [The officer] also observed
[defendant] step out of the passenger side
of the vehicle. [Defendant] was on his
cellular phone having a conversation with
someone, at which time the male in a ... red
jacket approached him. They had a
conversation, and then they shook hands.
[Defendant] then went to the back of the

1 Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254
(e)(1), this Court affords deference
to the factual determinations of the State court.
Ford Taurus, opened the trunk, went into the
trunk, retrieved an item out of the trunk,
[and] handed the item to the unknown black
male. The black male had the item in his
hand, manipulated the item, and after a few
seconds, handed [defendant] paper currency
from his pants pocket.
The officer saw defendant place the money in his
pocket. Defendant then returned to the passenger seat
of the running car, with Pitko in the driver’s seat.
After another few minutes elapsed, the officer
observed defendant exit the vehicle and saw another
male approach him. Officer Gonzalez contacted back-up
units that were in the area; however, the back-up
officers advised him they were still a few blocks
away, so he and Officer Frucci moved in, anticipating
their arrival. The officers activated their emergency
lights and drove up behind defendant and the male.
When the officers exited the vehicle with weapons
drawn, defendant had already grabbed a package from
the trunk and was holding it in his right hand.
Defendant put the package in the trunk and his hand in
his jacket pocket. Officer Gonzalez commanded
defendant to put his hands in the air. Instead,
defendant slammed the trunk closed, ran to the
passenger side of the car, entered the vehicle, and
the vehicle sped off. A chase ensued until the Taurus
crashed into parked cars on Clinton Street. Defendant
then exited the vehicle and began to run. Officer
Gonzalez gave chase on foot with his weapon drawn and
continuously ordered defendant to stop. Officer
Gonzalez was injured when he tripped and fell face-
first on the pavement. Nevertheless, he continued to
give chase. Officer Gonzalez
saw [defendant] make a left into a lot, and
then [he] followed behind [defendant]. By
the time [the officer] turned the lot,
[defendant] had made it to the back of the
house, and [the officer] continued to
follow. At this time, [the officer] was
feeling more and more pain in [his] leg.
[The officer] started coming to almost a
limp. At that point, [defendant] stopped at
the back of the house, abruptly turned,
pulled his weapon, and fired one round.
The officer was not struck by the bullet, but
nevertheless fell to the ground. Defendant then
attempted to fire another shot at the officer, but the
gun malfunctioned. Defendant dropped the weapon and
continued to run, but was later apprehended by other
officers after a “brawl” had ensued with the other
officers. A search of defendant’s person uncovered
his driver’s license, Pitko's driver’s license, and
over $1000 in cash; cocaine was found in the Taurus.
State v. Reed, No. A-1074-13T1,
2016 WL 529260
, at *1–2 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 11, 2016) (per curiam) (footnote
omitted; alterations in original).
In September 2013, a Camden County Grand Jury indicted and
charged defendant with fifteen counts, including third-degree
possession of a controlled dangerous substance (“CDS”), N.J.S.A.
2C:35–10(a)(1) (Count One); second-degree possession of a CDS
with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35–5(b)(2) (Count Two);
third-degree possession of a CDS with intent to distribute
within 1000 feet of a school, N.J.S.A. 2C:35–7 (Count Three);
second-degree possession of a CDS with intent to distribute
within 500 feet of a public park, N.J.S.A. 2C:35–7.1 (Count
Four); second-degree resisting arrest/eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29–
2(b) (Count Five); fourth-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A.
2C:29–2(a)(2) (Count Six); first-degree attempted murder,
N.J.S.A. 2C:5–1 and 2C:11–3(a)(1) (Count Seven); second-degree
aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12–1(b)(1) (Count Eight); third-
degree aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:12–
1(b)(2) (Count Nine); fourth-degree aggravated assault by
pointing, N.J.S.A. 2C:12–1(b)(4) (Count Ten); third-degree
resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29–2(a)(3) (Count Eleven); fourth-
degree possession of hollow nose bullets, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–3(f)
(Count Twelve); second-degree possession of a weapon for
unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–4(a) (Count Thirteen); second-
degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–5(b)

(Count Fourteen); and second-degree certain persons not to have
weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–7(b) (Count Fifteen). Reed,
2016 WL
529260
, at *2; ECF No. 7-5 (judgment of conviction). The court
bifurcated the certain persons charge (Count Fifteen). Reed,
2016 WL 529260
, at *2.
Reed was tried before a jury, which, on May 31, 2013,
returned a guilty verdict as to Counts One through Fourteen.
Reed,
2016 WL 529260
, at *2; ECF No. 7-92 at 10–11. On June 3,
2013, the same jury returned a guilty verdict as to Count
Fifteen (the certain persons offense). Reed,
2016 WL 529260
, at
*2; ECF No. 7-93 at 37. Reed was sentenced to an aggregate term

of 66 years’ imprisonment, with 47 years and 3 months of parole
ineligibility. Reed,
2016 WL 529260
, at *2; ECF No. 7-5. The
Appellate Division affirmed in February 2016. Reed,
2016 WL
529260
, at *1. Certification was denied in April 2016, State v.
Reed,
224 N.J. 529
(2016).
Reed petitioned for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) in July
2016. ECF No. 7-16 (notice of PCR petition); ECF No. 7-17
(petition). In August 2017, Reed filed a motion to compel
police personnel files and internal affairs records. ECF No. 7-
20. In November 2017, the PCR judge, who was also the trial
judge, denied the motion. ECF No. 24. The court denied the PCR

petition without a hearing in February 2018. ECF 7-39 (order);
ECF 7-40 (opinion). The Appellate Division affirmed in January
2020. State v. Reed, No. A-5063-17T1,
2020 WL 468320
, at *5
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 29, 2020) (per curiam).
Certification was denied in May 2020. State v. Reed,
241 N.J.
383
,
228 A.3d 848
, 849 (2020).
B. The Habeas Petition
Reed filed his § 2254 petition in August 2020, asserting
the following grounds for relief: (1) the trial court erred when
it (a) “allowed Det. J. Simpson to testify as a surrogate in
place of the actual crime scene investigator” and (b) admitted

“ballistic evidence documentation” pursuant to the business
records exception (ECF No. 1 at 7, 28 (Ground One)); (2) the
State “committed discovery and Brady2 violations when it failed
to disclose to defense computerized dispatched records (CAD) and
information that Sgt. Kevin Martin was a material witness who

2 Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83
(1963).
made statements over the police dispatcher exculpatory to the
defense” (ECF No. 1 at 9, 30 (Ground Two)); (3) petitioner’s due
process rights were violated when Simpson “allowed police radio
dispatch transaction with exculpatory value to be erased” (ECF
No. 1 at 10, 33 (Ground Three)); (4) trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the admission of “ballistic

evidence, documentation, and chain of custody via the business
record exception” (ECF No. 1 at 12, 34 (Ground Four)); (5) trial
counsel was ineffective for “failing to move for an adverse
inference instruction and other defense lever[ag]ing discovery
sanctions when it was realized that the State had violated
defense due process by allowing the radio transmissions evidence
to be destroyed” (ECF No. 1 at 35 (Ground Five)); petitioner’s
due process rights were violated when Simpson “allowed police
radio dispatch transaction with exculpatory value to be erased”
(ECF No. 1 at 37 (Ground Six, which is duplicative of Ground
Three)); trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “impeach

the character of Officer Frucci by using the record of multiple
excessive force claims lodged against him (ECF No. 1 at 39
(Ground Seven)); (8) counsel was ineffective for “failing to
obtain exculpatory and impeachment evidence in the form of
computer aided dispatch (CAD) records although they were
available to him upon request and supported the defense that
Sgt. Gonzalez’s story of ‘attempted murder’ was not true” (ECF
No. 1 at 42 (Ground Eight)); (9) trial counsel was ineffective
for “failing to familiarize[e] himself with the Camden Police
Department communications procedure before cross examin[ing]
Det. Janell Simpson and other officers concerning erased radio
transmissions” (ECF No. 1 at 45 (Ground Nine)); and (10)
petitioner’s conviction must be reversed on the basis of “the

cumulative error that occurred during trial” (ECF No. 1 at 48
(Ground Ten)).
The State answered the petition in November 2020 (ECF No.
7), and Reed replied in February 2021 (ECF No. 13). The matter
is therefore fully submitted and ready for decision.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court “shall entertain an application for a
writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254
(a). A habeas

petitioner must establish entitlement to relief for each claim
in his petition based upon the record that was before the state
court. See Eley v. Erickson,
712 F.3d 837, 846
(3d Cir. 2013);
Parker v. Matthews,
567 U.S. 37
, 40–41 (2012). District courts
must be “highly deferential” to the determinations of state
trial and appellate courts. See Renico v. Lett,
559 U.S. 766,
773
(2010).
If the state courts have adjudicated a claim on the merits,
the district court shall not grant a writ of habeas corpus
unless that adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254
(d)(1)–(2). Federal law is “clearly
established” for these purposes if it is clearly expressed in
“the holdings, as opposed to the dicta” of the United States
Supreme Court. See Woods v. Donald,
575 U.S. 312, 316
(2015).
“When reviewing state criminal convictions on collateral review,
federal judges are required to afford state courts due respect
by overturning their decisions only when there could be no
reasonable dispute that they were wrong.”
Id.
If a petitioner
challenges an allegedly erroneous state court factual
determination, that determination “shall be presumed to be
correct [and the] applicant shall have the burden of rebutting
the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing
evidence.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254
(e)(1).
The relevant state court decision for federal habeas corpus
review is the last reasoned state court decision. See Bond v.
Beard,
539 F.3d 256
, 289–90 (3d Cir. 2008). These standards
apply “even where there has been a summary denial” by the state
court. Cullen v. Pinholster,
563 U.S. 170, 187
(2011).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Failure to Disclose the CAD Report and Preserve the
Radio Calls (Grounds Two, Three, Five, Six, Eight, and
Nine)

Six of Reed’s claims involve the CAD report and the deleted
radio calls. ECF No. 1 at 8-11, 29-33, 34-38, 41-47 (Grounds
Two, Three, Five, Six, Eight, and Nine). Specifically, Reed
asserts that his constitutional rights were violated on the
grounds that: (1) the State failed to disclose the CAD report
(Ground Two); (2) Officer Simpson allowed the radio dispatch
transmissions to be erased (Grounds Three and Six); and (3)
trial counsel was ineffective for (a) failing to secure the CAD
report (Ground Eight), (b) failing to call Sergeant Kevin Martin
as a witness regarding the CAD report (Ground Two), (c) failing
to move for an adverse inference for the loss of the radio
transmissions (Ground Five), and (d) failing to prepare
sufficiently to cross-examine Officer Simpson concerning the
lost transmissions (Ground Nine). As explained below, the state
courts rejected these claims.
The Appellate Division held that Reed’s claim that the
State violated Brady by failing to disclose the CAD report for
the night the crimes took place was meritless because the
disclosure of the report would not have changed the outcome.
The court explained:
The [CAD] report has two entries, the first of which
says “shots fired[,]” and the second of which says
that no shots were fired.
Rule 3:13–3 states that “[d]iscovery shall include
exculpatory information or material.” “It is well-
settled that the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to a defendant violates due process
of law where the evidence is favorable to the defense,
and is material.” State v. Russo,
333 N.J. Super.
119
, 133–34 (App. Div. 2000) (citing
Brady, supra,
373
U.S. at 87
,
83 S. Ct. at 1197
,
10 L. Ed. 2d at 218
).
To establish a Brady violation, defendant must satisfy
a three-prong test: “(1) the prosecution suppressed
evidence; (2) the evidence is favorable to the
defense; and (3) the evidence is material.”
Id. at
134
.
Evidence will be considered material where a
“defendant demonstrates that there is a reasonable
probability that had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.”
Ibid.
The question is whether a
defendant received a fair trial, namely a trial in
which the verdict is “worthy of confidence” even
without the presentation of the undisclosed evidence.
Ibid.
. . .
. . . [D]efendant has failed to establish that if the
evidence had been properly introduced, the result
would have been different.
Russo, supra,
333 N.J.
Super. at 134
. The evidence at trial made clear that
an officer recovered the firearm at the scene and that
the recovered gun misfired, further corroborating
Officer Gonzalez’s story. There was ample evidence in
the record to support defendant’s conviction for
attempted murder, and therefore the result would not
have been different even if the allegedly withheld
evidence was introduced.
Reed,
2016 WL 529260
, at *8–9.
As the Appellate Division recognized, there are three
components of a Brady violation: “The evidence at issue must be
favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or
because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been
suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and
prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene,
527 U.S. 263
,

281–82 (1999). To show prejudice, a petitioner must show that
“there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial
would have been different if the suppressed documents had been
disclosed to the defense.”
Id. at 289
(cleaned up); see also
United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 682
(1985).
Here, in light of the “ample evidence in the record to
support [Reed’s] conviction for attempted murder” -- including
the testimony of several police officers, supported by
corroborating physical evidence of the crimes, including that
the weapon was recovered in a misfired condition, see Reed,
2016
WL 529260
, at **1–2, 9 -- the Appellate Division reasonably

found that Reed has not established that had the CAD report been
disclosed, the outcome of the case would have been different.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Folino,
705 F.3d 117, 129
(3d Cir. 2013)
(“Suppressed evidence that would be cumulative of other evidence
or would be used to impeach testimony of a witness whose account
is strongly corroborated is generally not considered material
for Brady purposes.”); Moss v. DeBalso, No. 19-106,
2021 WL
2952900
, at *17 (M.D. Pa. July 14, 2021) (petitioner failed to
establish prejudice prong of Brady where “the Commonwealth
presented ample and sufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s
convictions”).
On this record, Reed has not established that the Appellate
Division’s rejection of this claim was contrary to or involved

an unreasonable application of Brady and its progeny, or that it
was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented. Accordingly, habeas relief on this
claim will be denied.
The Appellate Division also rejected Reed’s claim that
Officer Simpson violated his due process rights by allowing the
police radio transmissions to be erased and destroyed. The
court analyzed the claim as follows:
Officer Simpson was employed by the Camden City Police
Department on the night of the incident and was asked
to locate the 911 calls and police radio transmissions
involving defendant. Officer Simpson failed to
collect the recordings before they were recycled and
reused.
It is well recognized that “a defendant has a
constitutionally protected privilege to request and
obtain from the prosecution evidence that is either
material to the guilt of the defendant or relevant to
the punishment to be imposed.” State v. Hollander,
201 N.J. Super. 453, 478
(App. Div.), certif. denied,
101 N.J. 335
(1985) (citation omitted). However, this
privilege is not absolute. Ibid. There are
three factors on which a court should focus
to determine whether a due process violation
has occurred when there has been either
suppression, loss or destruction of physical
evidence in a criminal trial: (1) whether
there was bad faith or connivance on the
part of the government; (2) whether the
evidence suppressed, lost or destroyed was
sufficiently material to the defense; (3)
whether defendant was prejudiced by the loss
or destruction of the evidence.
[Id. at 479 (citations omitted).]
Here, defendant fails to point to any evidence of bad
faith or connivance on the part of the State. Rather,
the record suggests that an honest error occurred and
the evidence was lost. At trial, when Officer Simpson
was cross-examined on her failure to retain the radio
calls, she explained she
was new to the shooting and response unit.
[She] had just gotten laid off. [She] got
rehired back, and at that time in the unit,
[she] didn't know [her unit] had to collect
[the radio calls]. [She] thought the Camden
County Prosecutor’s Office would collect
them, and it was a miscommunication on [her]
part.
Moreover, as discussed above, the evidence is of
questionable materiality given the weight of the
evidence in the record supporting defendant’s
conviction. Finally, defendant’s counsel capitalized
on the officer’s failure to preserve the evidence in
his closing arguments, questioning the veracity of
Officer Simpson’s assertion and stating that defendant
was “entitled” to hear the contents of the radio
calls. Thus, as defense counsel was able to
capitalize on the oversight, it is not clear that
defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the loss
of evidence.
Reed,
2016 WL 529260
, at *9–10 (footnote omitted).
To establish a due process violation based on the failure
to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, a defendant must
show: (1) the potentially exculpatory nature of the evidence was
apparent at the time of destruction or loss; (2) there is a lack
of “comparable evidence by other reasonably available means”;
and (3) the government acted in “bad faith.” California v.
Trombetta,
467 U.S. 479, 489
(1984); Arizona v. Youngblood,
488
U.S. 51, 58
(1988).
The Appellate Division’s determination that Officer

Simpson’s failure to preserve the radio calls was “an honest
error” and that there was no evidence of bad faith, Reed,
2016
WL 529260
, at *9–10, is entitled to deference in the absence of
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See
28 U.S.C. §
2254
(e)(1); see also Marshall v. Lonberger,
459 U.S. 422, 434
(1983) (federal habeas courts have “no license to redetermine
credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the
state trial court, but not by them”); Williams v. Ryan, No. 17-
1834,
2020 WL 7022233
, at *4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 27, 2020) (“the
state court's factual determinations concerning the loss of the
recording are entitled to deference, and in any event the loss

of the recording was disclosed to Petitioner in sufficient time
for use at trial -- indeed, the jury was told about the loss”).
Reed has presented no such evidence. Accordingly, he has failed
to establish a due process violation based on the deleted radio
calls. See Youngblood,
488 U.S. at 58
(“[U]nless a criminal
defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure
to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a
denial of due process of law.”); Nguyen v. Pallares, No. 19-
2952,
2021 WL 352069
, at **16–17 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2021)
(denying motion based on Trombetta/Youngblood where petitioner
failed to rebut state court’s factual findings that police who
lost audio recording did not act in bad faith) (citing
28 U.S.C.
§ 2254
(e)(1)). As Reed has not established that the Appellate

Division’s rejection of this claim was contrary to or an
unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, or that it
was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, habeas
relief on this claim will be denied.
Reed’s ineffective assistance claims related to the CAD
report and radio transmissions fare no better. The Appellate
Division found that the claims lacked sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. Reed,
2020 WL 468320
,
at *5. Rather, it affirmed the PCR court for the reasons given
by the PCR judge, adding only that it was “convinced the PCR
judge correctly determined that the record failed to present a

prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel.”
Id.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the “right . . .
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” U.S. Const.
amend. VI; see Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 686
(1984). A claim of ineffective assistance has two necessary
components.
Id. at 687
. First, the defendant must “show that
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness,”
id.
at 687–88, meaning he “must identify the
acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been
the result of reasonable professional judgment.”
Id. at 690
.
Second, a petitioner must establish prejudice, i.e., a
reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have
been different absent the deficient act or omission.
Id. at

687
. Further, “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 697
.
On habeas review, it is not enough that a federal judge
would have found counsel ineffective. Rather, the judge must
find that the state court’s resolution of the issue was
unreasonable, a higher standard. Harrington v. Richter,
562
U.S. 86, 101
(2011). “And while judges may be tempted to second
guess defense counsel’s decisions, we must keep in mind that
‘advocacy is an art and not a science, and . . . strategic

choices must be respected in these circumstances if they are
based on professional judgment.’” Gaines v. Superintendent
Benner Twp. SCI,
33 F.4th 705, 712
(3d Cir. 2022) (quoting
Strickland,
466 U.S. at 681
). In other words, “counsel’s
strategic choices will not be second-guessed by post-hoc
determinations that a different trial strategy would have fared
better.” Rolan v. Vaughn,
445 F.3d 671
, 681–82 (3d Cir. 2006).
As to Reed’s argument that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to request the CAD report in discovery, the PCR
court found that Reed failed to demonstrate prejudice:
Although the Defendant argues that the outcome of his
trial would have been different had his trial attorney
obtained the CAD report “because the jury would not
have been able to convict the Defendant of attempted
murder based upon the information in the CAD report,”
the Defendant has failed to demonstrate that, had
trial counsel introduced the report, the outcome of
the trial would have been different as is required
under the second prong of the Strickland-Cronic test.
. . . The Appellate Division determined that the
introduction of the CAD report into evidence would not
have resulted in a different outcome for the trial. .
. .
Although the Defendant now frames this same argument
in terms of a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the Defendant’s argument is again without
merit, because the Defendant has failed to establish
that, had Defense counsel introduced the CAD report,
the outcome of the Defendant’s trial would have been
different. Thus, even if the Defendant were able to
overcome the strong presumption that counsel exercised
reasonable professional judgment and sound trial
strategy in fulfilling his responsibilities, . . . the
Defendant fails to satisfy the second prong of the
Strickland-Cronic test, because he has failed to
demonstrate that but for Defense counsel’s failure to
introduce the CAD report, the result of the trial
would have been different.
As such, the Defendant has failed to establish a prima
facie showing that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to request and introduce the CAD report at
trial.
ECF No. 7-40 at 23–24 (citations omitted).
The PCR court also found that Reed failed to establish
prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to request an adverse
inference charge prior to trial for the State’s destruction of
the audio dispatch recording:
An adverse inference charge may be appropriate when
the State loses or destroys evidence before trial.
State v. Dabas, 215 N.J. Super, 114, 140 (App. Div.
2017). However, the Appellate Division has held that
an adverse inference charge is not appropriate where
the evidence in question is lost through inadvertence
or technical malfunction, and not the purposeful acts
of law enforcement.
Id.
Here, the Defendant argues that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to request an adverse
inference charged based on “destruction of exculpatory
evidence by the State,” essentially alleging that the
State, in bad faith, destroyed exculpatory evidence by
erasing the dispatch calls from the night in question
in the CAD report. Def. Co. Br. 32.
This Court notes that the in the Defendant’s direct
appeal, the Appellate Division held that, with respect
to this argument, “the Defendant fails to point to any
evidence of bad faith or connivance on the part of the
State. Rather, the record suggests that an honest
error occurred, and the evidence was lost.” Reed,
supra at 24. The Defendant has again failed [to]
allege sufficient facts to demonstrate bad faith on
behalf of the State, or that the loss of the evidence
in question was the result of anything more nefarious
than inadvertence or a technical malfunction. Dabas,
supra.
Additionally, the Defendant has failed to assert what,
if any, exculpatory evidence the audio recordings
would have revealed, and has failed to submit any
affidavits or certifications in support of such
assertions, as is required by [State v. Cummings,
321
N.J. Super. 154, 170
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May
11, 1999)]. As such, the Defendant has failed to
provide any evidence that trial counsel’s failure to
request an adverse inference jury instruction
prejudiced the Defendant.
Accordingly, the Defendant has failed to make a prima
facie showing that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to ask for an adverse inference charge
regarding this issue during the charge conference.
ECF No. 7-40 at 35–36.
Finally, as to Reed’s argument that trial counsel was
ineffective for not calling Sergeant Martin as a witness, the
PCR court found that Reed failed to establish deficient
performance:
With respect to the Defendant’s argument that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to call Sergeant
Kevin Martin as a witness, the Defendant does not
identify any specific acts or omissions that deem
defense counsel’s performance ineffective. Rather,
the Defendant simply asserts that defense counsel was
ineffective for not calling Sergeant Martin as a
witness, who allegedly could have testified as to the
contents of the CAD report. The Defendant then
essentially reiterates his previously-addressed
argument of ineffective assistance of counsel as it
pertains to counsel’s failure to request the CAD
report. This argument has already been held to be
without merit.
This Court also notes that the Defendant has provided
no certifications or affidavits detailing what
Martin’s testimony would have been, had he been called
to testify by trial counsel, as required by
Cummings,
supra,
321 N.J. Super. at 170
. Rather, the Defendant
merely speculates that “it is “inconceivable” that
Sergeant Martin believed that the Defendant attempted
to murder Officer Gonzalez. Thus, the Defendant’s
allegation that “[Martin’s] testimony would clearly
have resulted in a different verdict” is supported by
no evidence, and is therefore a “speculative
deficiency,” insufficient to substantiate an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In short,
the Defendant fails to allege facts sufficient to
demonstrate defense counsel’s substandard performance.
Accordingly, this Court holds that the Defendant has
failed to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel with respect to this argument.
ECF No. 7-40 at 52–53 (citations omitted).
Given the Appellate Division’s finding that the underlying
CAD-report and deleted-radio-transmissions claims lack merit,
Reed has failed to establish that the state courts’ rejection of
the related ineffective assistance claims was contrary to or an
unreasonable application of Strickland and its progeny or an

unreasonable application of the facts. Johnson v. Tennis,
549
F.3d 296, 301
(3d Cir. 2008) (counsel will not be found
ineffective for failing to present an unmeritorious claim or
objection); Turner v. Ransom, No. 20-0197,
2021 WL 2581251
, at
*12 (W.D. Pa. June 23, 2021) (finding state court reasonably
applied Strickland standard to find no ineffective assistance
where evidence was no longer available by the time counsel
requested it, the record suggested that lost materials had been
recycled in the ordinary course, and there was no evidence that
State had acted in bad faith).
Additionally, Reed’s speculation about what Martin would

have said if he had testified, and his blanket assertion that
the outcome of the trial would have been different had Martin
testified, are insufficient to establish that the state courts’
resolution of this issue was contrary to or an unreasonable
application of Strickland and its progeny or an unreasonable
application of the facts in light of the evidence presented.
See Freeman v. Davis, No. 18-8269,
2021 WL 4705009
, at *18
(D.N.J. Oct. 7, 2021) (“Petitioner has not provided any sworn
testimony, affidavit, or certification from either witness.
Petitioner’s mere speculation regarding the potential witnesses’
testimony is insufficient to establish prejudice.”) (citation
omitted).
Finally, given the strong evidence of Reed’s guilt, the

state courts’ finding that he failed to establish prejudice
resulting from counsel’s alleged deficient performance was not
contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland and its
progeny or an unreasonable application of the facts in light of
the evidence presented. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Horn,
485 F.3d
103, 129
(3d Cir. 2007) (“The ample if not overwhelming evidence
of Albrecht’s guilt . . . supports the conclusion that he
suffered no prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient
performance . . . .”); Morales v. Clark, No. 19-4971,
2021 WL
7278923
, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2021) (“The strength of the
prosecution’s case is relevant to determining whether Petitioner

was prejudiced by counsel’s omission. Given these review
principles and the strong evidence of guilt presented at trial,
it is impossible to find that the state court unreasonably
applied Strickland’s prejudice standard.”), report and
recommendation adopted,
2022 WL 622742
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2022);
Cho Lee Lin v. Bartkowski, No. 10-5502,
2012 WL 3201943
, at *35
(D.N.J. Aug. 1, 2012) (“Given the overwhelming evidence of
guilt, this Court finds that the New Jersey courts’ rejection of
Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims for failure to show
prejudice was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of
Strickland and its progeny.”). Accordingly, habeas relief on
these claims will be denied.
B. Crime Scene Testimony and Business Record Admission
(Grounds One and Four)

Reed argues that (1) his right to confrontation was
violated when the trial court allowed Officer Simpson to testify
about crime-scene evidence and chain of custody because she did
not collect the evidence, and (2) trial counsel was ineffective
for not objecting to the admission of the property inventory
form on hearsay grounds. ECF No. 1 at 6, 11-12, 27–29, 33–34
(Grounds One and Four).
The Appellate Division analyzed, and rejected, Reed’s
Confrontation Clause and evidentiary arguments as follows:
Defendant argues that allowing Officer Simpson to
testify regarding the evidence discovered at the crime
scene and the chain of custody of the evidence, when
she herself did not actually collect the evidence,
violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth
Amendment. Defendant also argues that the records
admitted were not business records and should have
been excluded as inadmissible hearsay.
At trial, Officer Simpson testified that she responded
to the “shots fired” call and proceeded to the scene
of both the crash and the shooting. She testified it
was her duty to collect ballistic evidence and that
she directed evidence officers to collect the evidence
found at the scene. She testified that the “weapon
and the projectile” were collected. Officer Simpson
was presented with and recognized “a Camden City
evidence and property inventory form” which detailed
all of the physical evidence discovered at the scene.
She also testified that the “chain of custody form”
tracked the chain of custody of each of the collected
items.
Defense counsel objected to the form being introduced
into evidence because the document indicated that it
was an Officer Rishman who actually picked the weapon
up at the scene. Defense counsel stated that Rishman
should have been the one to testify as to the
collection of the weapon, as he was the one who wrote
the report. The State successfully moved the document
into evidence under the business records exception to
the hearsay rule.
We conclude that defendant’s Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause argument is without sufficient
merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.
2:11–3(e)(2). The Supreme Court has made clear “it is
not the case[ ] that anyone whose testimony may be
relevant in establishing the chain of custody,
authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing
device, must appear in person as part of the
prosecution’s case.” Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts,
557 U.S. 305
, 311 n.1 (2009). Rather, the Court
explained that gaps in chain of custody go to the
weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.
Ibid.
Defendant also objects to the admission of the
documents into evidence, arguing that the forms were
improperly introduced as business records. In
criminal cases, a document is admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule if it is not
testimonial. Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 56
(2004). Business records are not testimonial.
Ibid.
To qualify as a business record:
First, the writing must be made in the
regular course of business. Second, it must
be prepared within a short time of the act,
condition or event being described.
Finally, the source of the information and
the method and circumstances of the
preparation of the writing must justify
allowing it into evidence.
[State v. Matulewicz,
101 N.J. 27, 29
(1985).]
At trial, Officer Simpson testified that the Camden
City Police Department created similar records every
time physical evidence was recovered. The documents
were admitted as business records without objection.
Defendant now contends the records cannot be
admissible business records because they were prepared
in anticipation of litigation. Defendant has offered
no evidence that these records were prepared for
purposes of litigation, and no such evidence appears
on this record. Thus, the judge did not err by
admitting the documents as business records.
Reed,
2016 WL 529260
, at **10–11.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides,
in relevant part, that “in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the . . . right to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. In Crawford v.
Washington, 541 US. 36 (2004), and its progeny, the Supreme
Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of
testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial that are
admitted to establish the truth of the matter asserted in the
statement, unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the
defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.
Id.,
541 US. at 59, 60 n.9 (2004); see also Davis v. Washington,
547
U.S. 813, 823-24
(2006). As the Appellate Division
acknowledged, however, regarding chain-of-custody testimony, “it
is not the case[] that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in
establishing the chain of custody . . . must appear in person as
part of the prosecution’s case.” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Here, the Appellate Division applied the relevant Supreme
Court precedent in determining that Officer Simpson’s chain-of-
custody testimony did not violate Reed’s right to confrontation.
Reed,
2016 WL 529260
, at *10–11 (quoting Melendez-Diaz,
557 U.S.

at 311
n.1). As the Appellate Division noted, gaps in the chain
of custody go to the weight of the evidence, not its
admissibility. Melendez-Diaz,
557 U.S. at 311
n.1.; see also
Symms v. Wingard, No. 15-1384,
2019 WL 426484
, at *10–11 (W.D.
Pa. Feb. 4, 2019) (“to the extent Petitioner’s complaint is a
challenge to the chain-of-custody of the firearms evidence
introduced in his case, such claim is not a confrontation issue
but rather goes to the weight to be afforded to [the firearms
expert’s] testimony”). As such, this is “a run-of-the-mill
state-court decision applying the correct legal rule from
[Supreme Court] cases to the facts of a prisoner’s case”; thus,

it “[does] not fit comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary
to’ clause.” Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 406
(2000).
Further, counsel had the opportunity to explore weaknesses
or gaps in the chain of custody during cross examination of
Officer Simpson. ECF No. 7-83 at 106–115; see also, e.g.,
United States v. Tercier,
835 F. App’x 471
, 483 (11th Cir. 2020)
(“While the government did not proffer its translators as
witnesses, . . . it offered Special Agent Weber as a witness,
who testified to the translation verification process and the
transcript’s accuracy. Because the Confrontation Clause ‘only
insists that testimony be subject to cross-examination’ and
Special Agent Weber was cross-examined, the Confrontation Clause
was not violated”) (quoting United States v. Curbelo,
726 F.3d

1260, 1275-76
(11th Cir. 2013)); United States v. Ortega,
750
F.3d 1020, 1025
(8th Cir. 2014) (“chain of custody alone does
not implicate the Confrontation Clause”); Johnson v. Inch, No.
14-22836,
2020 WL 7130690
, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2020)
(“Analyst Murphy’s testimony [that she received and examined DNA
evidence and it did not appear that the evidence had been
tampered with] did not violate Petitioner's confrontation
rights, nor was his trial rendered fundamentally unfair
resulting from the state’s failure to call [witnesses] to
testify at trial regarding the securing of the DNA samples and
its chain of custody.”), report and recommendation adopted,
2020

WL 7129586
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 4, 2020). On this record, the Court
cannot find that the Appellate Division’s rejection of the
confrontation claim was contrary to or an unreasonable
application of Crawford and its progeny or an unreasonable
application of the facts in light of the evidence presented.
Further, Reed’s claim that the trial court erred in
admitting Officer Simpson’s testimony and the inventory form is
not cognizable on habeas review because federal courts reviewing
habeas claims cannot “reexamine state court determinations on
state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire,
502 U.S. 62, 67-68
(1991). If the state court has found no error in the
evidentiary ruling at issue under state law, a federal habeas
court may only consider whether admitting the evidence at issue

was so prejudicial as to violate due process, rendering the
trial fundamentally unfair. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,
416
U.S. 637, 643
(1974); Spencer v. Texas,
385 U.S. 554, 563-64
(1967); see also Guilfoil v. May, No. 516-291,
2019 WL 1004373
,
at *5 (D. Del. Mar. 1, 2019) (“to the extent Claim One
challenges the trial court's interpretation and application of
Delaware chain of custody law, it asserts an issue of state law
that is not cognizable on federal habeas review”).
The admission of the challenged evidence did not violate
Reed’s due process rights. First, Officer Simpson had an active
role in the collection of evidence at the crime scene, i.e., she

responded to the “shots fired” call as a member of the Camden
City Police Strategic Multi Agency Shooting and Homicide Team
(ECF No. 7-38 at 95–96); she collected the ballistic evidence
from the crime scene (id. at 98 (testifying that she collected
the weapon and a projectile)); and she directed other officers
to collect evidence (id. at 96 (responding “yes” to the
question, “[D]id you point out the location where each piece of
evidence that needed to be collected was?”), 98 (responding
“yes” to the question, “[D]id you direct the collection of each
of those pieces and each of those items that’s listed on [the
property inventory form]?”)). In light of this, the Appellate
Division’s determination that Officer Simpson’s testimony was
properly admitted was not unreasonable.

Second, affording deference to the state courts’ factual
finding that records similar to the inventory form are created
when physical evidence is recovered, see ECF No. 7-83 at 100–
101, and in light of Reed’s failure to establish that the
records were created in preparation for litigation, the
Appellate Division’s finding that the inventory form was
admissible as a business record is also not unreasonable. See,
e.g., Everett v. Long, No. 21-1267,
2021 WL 5895119
, at **6–7
(10th Cir. Dec. 14, 2021) (“Everett’s argument that the evidence
property report and envelope were testimonial evidence because
they were created for use at trial does not overcome the

presumption of correctness of the police officer’s testimony at
trial, which established that a crime scene investigation
technician created the documents following the police
department’s normal course of business in processing and storing
evidence from a crime scene.”). Nor were these rulings so
prejudicial as to violate due process and render Reed’s trial
fundamentally unfair. Thus, as Reed has failed to establish a
constitutional violation resulting from the admission of the
challenged evidence, habeas relief on this claim will be denied.
The claim that counsel was ineffective for not objecting to
the admission of the inventory report on hearsay grounds is also
without merit because the Appellate Division reasonably
concluded that the inventory report was properly admitted as a

business record. See Johnson v. Tennis,
549 F.3d 296, 301
(3d
Cir. 2008) (counsel will not be found ineffective for failing to
present an unmeritorious claim or objection); see also Melendez-
Diaz,
557 U.S. at 324
(“Business and public records are
generally admissible absent confrontation not because they
qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but because --
having been created for the administration of an entity’s
affairs and not for the purpose of proving some fact at trial --
they are not testimonial.”); Johnson v. Inch, No. 19-23494,
2022
WL 17669931
, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2022) (“the state court
did not err in determining that admission of the forensic DNA

report did not violate Petitioner’s confrontation rights, nor
was Petitioner’s trial rendered fundamentally unfair resulting
from the state’s failure to call Dr. Silla to testify at trial
regarding the securing of the specimens and its chain of
custody. Accordingly, Petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice
under Strickland arising from counsel's failure to pursue this
claim”), report and recommendation adopted,
2022 WL 17668214
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2022); Lee-Purvis v. Pennsylvania,
314 F.
Supp. 3d 665, 677
(E.D. Pa. 2018) (“The Superior Court
determined that trial counsel was not ineffective, because the
omitted Confrontation Clause claim lacked merit. This method of
adjudicating an ineffective assistance claim is consistent with
Third Circuit precedent; hence, it is reasonable.”) (citing

Johnson,
549 F.3d at 301
; Fischetti, 384 F.3d at 149.”).
Even if counsel were deficient in failing to object to the
admission of the document as a business record, however, given
the strong evidence of guilt, Reed has failed to establish
prejudice. Accordingly, habeas relief on this claim will be
denied.
C. Cross-Examination of Sergeant Frucci (Ground Seven)
Reed argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to investigate Sergeant Frucci’s alleged history of civil rights
and excessive force complaints. ECF No. 1 at 38-40 (Ground
Seven). The PCR court rejected this argument, finding that Reed

failed to establish deficient performance or prejudice:
. . . [T]o make a prima facie case that trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to properly investigate
the case, the petitioner must “assert the facts that
an investigation would have revealed, supported by
affidavits or certifications based upon the personal
knowledge of the affiant or the person making the
certification.”
Cummings, supra,
321 N.J. Super. at
170
(citing R. 1:6-6).
Defendant argues that he advised trial counsel that
Officers Frucci and Diaz physically assaulted him
during the arrest, that he asked trial counsel to
investigate Officer Frucci’s history regarding
lawsuits against him for the use of excessive force,
and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
do so. This court notes that on August 22, 2017, the
Defendant filed a Motion to Compel Police Personnel
files and Internal Affairs records of Officer Frucci,
based on the very same allegations that Officer Frucci
had previously been the subject of civil rights
lawsuits involving the use of excessive force. With
respect to the disclosure of Officer Frucci’s
personnel and internal affairs files, this Court
denied the Defendant’s Motion, holding in relevant
part:
Despite the fact that at the Certain
Persons’ Trial, the Defendant testified and
made possible allegations of excessive
force, the Defendant presented no further
evidence to bolster his claim that excessive
force was used by Officer Frucci or any
other officer to effectuate the Defendant’s
arrest on June 21, 2011. Despite the
Defendant’s testimony at the Certain
Persons’ Trial, the Defendant was previously
convicted on fourteen out of fifteen counts
at trial without ever testifying as to the
use of excessive force by arresting
officers.
Likewise, despite the fact the Defendant has
presented evidence of his filing a complaint
against the Camden Police Department, the
Defendant’s complaint cannot be
characterized as solely an excessive force
complaint . . . The complaint filed by the
Defendant contains only one sentence
alleging the use of excessive force, and it
does not specifically implicate Officer
Frucci, or any officer, as the aggressor.
Despite the fact Officer Frucci was named in
several unrelated civil rights lawsuits
pertaining to the use of excessive force,
the Defendant has offered no evidence to
suggest that Officer Frucci’s involvement in
those civil rights cases somehow impugns his
credibility as a witness in the present
matter, or otherwise bolsters the
Defendant’s claims, as is required by
Harris.
The Defendant has failed to assert what, if any,
specific facts that any investigation of Officer
Frucci would have revealed, and has failed to submit
any affidavits or certifications in support of such
assertions, as is required by
Cummings, supra
321 N.J.
Super. at 170
. As such, the Defendant has failed to
provide any evidence that trial counsel’s failure to
investigate the history of excessive force complaints
against Officer Frucci prejudiced the Defendant.
Accordingly, the Defendant has failed to make a prima
facie showing that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to investigate Officer Frucci’s history of
civil rights and excessive force cases.
ECF No. 7-40 at 38–39.
A failure to investigate potentially exculpatory evidence
or witnesses may form the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91; see also Brown v.
United States, No. 13-2552,
2016 WL 1732377
, at *4–5 (D.N.J. May
2, 2016). To establish this claim, a petitioner “must make a
comprehensive showing as to what the investigation would have
produced. The focus of the inquiry must be on what information
would have been obtained . . . and whether such information,
assuming admissibility in court, would have produced a different
result.” See Brown,
2016 WL 1732377
, at *5 (quoting United
States v. Askew,
88 F.3d 1065, 1073
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Where a petitioner asks the court to
“speculate both as to whether [a witnesses] would in fact have
testified on his behalf and as to what [the witness’s] testimony
would have been,” rather than presents the court with sworn
testimony, he will not be able to establish prejudice. Duncan
v. Morton,
256 F.3d 189
, 201–02 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing United
States v. Gray,
878 F.2d 702, 712
(3d Cir. 1989)); see also
Freeman,
2021 WL 4705009
, at *17.
Here, the state court reasonably found that, in light of

Reed’s failure to (1) “assert what, if any, specific facts that
any investigation of Officer Frucci would have revealed,” and
(2) “submit any affidavits or certifications in support of such
assertions,” Reed has failed to establish prejudice. ECF No. 7-
40 at 38–39; see also Freeman,
2021 WL 4705009
, at *18.
Accordingly, Reed has not established that the state courts’
rejection of this claim was contrary to or an unreasonable
application of Strickland and its progeny or was an unreasonable
application of the facts in light of the evidence presented.
Habeas relief on this claim will therefore be denied.
D. Cumulative Error (Ground Ten)

Reed argues that the alleged violations of his
constitutional rights cumulatively warrant habeas relief. ECF
No. 1 at 47 (Ground Ten). The Appellate Division rejected
Reed’s cumulative error argument on direct appeal, finding it to
be “without merit in light of [the court’s] conclusion that no
error occurred below.” Reed,
2016 WL 529260
, at *11. The court
also rejected Reed’s cumulative error claim on collateral
review. Reed,
2020 WL 468320
, at *5; see also ECF 7-40 at 54–55
(PCR court rejected the cumulative error argument, finding that:
“the Defendant has not established that any of his claims with
respect to trial counsel’s alleged errors resulted in
prejudice”; “there was ample evidence in the record to support
the Defendant’s conviction, and that the result of the

Defendant’s trial would not have been different even if the
allegedly withheld evidence was introduced, or if the alleged
errors by counsel had been absent”; and “as none of the alleged
errors were prejudicial, . . . the theory of cumulative error is
not applicable to the Defendant’s claims”) (citations omitted).
The Third Circuit has recognized that “errors that
individually do not warrant habeas relief may do so when
combined.” Albrecht v. Horn,
485 F.3d 103, 139
(3d Cir. 2007).
However, a habeas petitioner is not entitled to relief based on
cumulative error unless he can establish actual prejudice.
Id.
(citing Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619
(1993)).

Here, the state courts reasonably found that there were no
errors to aggregate, and that Reed failed to establish
prejudice. On this record, Reed has not established that the
rejection of his cumulative error claim was contrary to or an
unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent or was an
unreasonable application of the facts in light of the evidence
presented. See, e.g., United States v. Herrera-Genao,
419 F.
App’x 288, 296
(3d Cir. 2011) (“Herrera-Genao complains only of
the cumulative effect of the preceding claims; because we have
found no error regarding those claims, Herrera-Genao’s claim of
cumulative error also fails.”); United States v. Tiangco,
225 F.
Supp. 3d 274, 290
(D.N.J. 2016) (“I have considered the
defendant’s claims of error cumulatively. Individually, they do

not raise a substantial possibility of prejudice. Taken
together, they likewise do not suggest any prejudice,
unfairness, or evidentiary insufficiency that would warrant a
new trial or judgment of acquittal.”). Accordingly, habeas
relief on this claim will be denied.
IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2253
(c), unless a circuit justice
or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may
not be taken from a final order in a proceeding under
28 U.S.C.
§ 2254
. A certificate of appealability may issue “only if the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.”
28 U.S.C. § 2253
(c)(2). “A petitioner
satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason
could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his
constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues
presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 327
(2003).
Here, reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s habeas
ruling debatable. Accordingly, no certificate of appealability
shall issue.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Reed’s petition will be denied
with prejudice and no certificate of appealability shall issue.
An appropriate order follows.

Dated: June 2, 2023 s/ Noel L. Hillman
At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

REED v. DAVIS

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