Rehn v. City of Seattle

 HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 ELIZABETH REHN, Case No. 3:23-cv-01609-RAJ 10 ORDER Plaintiff, 11 vs. 12 CITY OF SEATTLE, lawful 13 municipal corporation in the State of Washington; RILEY CAULFIELD; 14 YOUNGHUN KIM; SETH WAGNER; JOHN DUUS; AND 15 JASON DRUMMOND, 16 Defendants. 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary 20 Judgment, Dkt. # 37, and Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Opinion of Sue Peters, Dkt. 21 # 41. Plaintiff opposes both motions. Dkts. # 44, 46. The Court has reviewed the 22 motions, the submissions in support of and in opposition to the motions, the balance of 23 the record, and the governing law. The parties request oral argument, but the Court finds 24 that oral argument is not necessary to resolve the pending motions. For the reasons set 25 forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motion 26 1 for Summary Judgment and GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Opinion of 2 Sue Peters. 3 II. BACKGROUND 4 A. Factual Background 5 This case arises from four police officers’ mistaken entry into Plaintiff’s 6 apartment. On November 22, 2020, at approximately 1:29 p.m., a man called 911 7 reporting that he was in crisis, intoxicated on methamphetamine and marijuana, and had 8 felt suicidal the previous night. Dkt. # 38-1 at 2. The initial police dispatch reported the 9 man had knives inside the apartment but was not armed with any, that he was inside the 10 apartment with his wife, and that he requested a mental health response. Id. 11 Officers Wagner, Kim, and Caulfield were dispatched to the caller’s address at 12 3028 1st Avenue, Apt. 404, Seattle, Washington. Dkt. # 38-2 at 4, 11, 14. Officer 13 Drummond self-initiated a response as well. Dkt. # 38-3 at 3. While en route, dispatch 14 provided frequent updates to the officers, including that the man stated he will be suicidal 15 if officers did not get inside, and that dispatch could hear frantic screaming and chaos in 16 the background. Dkt. # 38-1 at 3–4. In addition to the original call, multiple 911 callers 17 reported escalating disturbances, including that someone was being pushed out the 18 window, that a woman could be heard crying and calling for help, and that someone was 19 seen possibly assaulting a female in front of the window. Id. 20 The caller’s apartment building, located at 3028 1st Avenue, is adjoined to a 21 separate apartment building located at 3016 1st Avenue, where Plaintiff lived. Dkt. # 37 22 at 4. Together, these two apartment buildings completely occupy a triangular 23 intersection. Id. Officer Wagner was the first to arrive on the scene. Dkt. # 38-2 at 4; 24 Dkt. #38-5 at 21:42:00–21:43:50. He observed broken glass on one of the blocks of the 25 triangular intersection, and believing there was only one interconnected apartment 26 1 complex in the triangular intersection, he headed for a building entrance located at one 2 of the corners of the intersection. Id. Officers Kim and Caulfield joined him. Id. 3 Unfortunately, this was the entrance to the wrong building. The top right corner of the 4 building entrance displayed the address number “3016,” but the officers did not see this 5 number. Dkt. # 47-8 at 2; Dkt. # 47-1 at 19–20; Dkt. 47-2 at 15. The officers did not 6 take further steps to confirm they were entering the correct building, such as confirming 7 the location with their acting sergeant or dispatch, or looking for an address number on 8 the building before entering. Dkt. # 47-1 at 7–8; Dkt. # 47-2 at 5–6. 9 The officers took the stairs to Apartment 404, where they knocked, announced 10 themselves, and warned that they would breach the door if it was not opened. See Dkt. 11 # 38-5 at 21:43:50–45:20; Dkt. # 38-2 at 4, 11, 14. Plaintiff acknowledged the officers 12 but did not open the door. Id. She testified she was traumatized and unable to move, and 13 she was unsure if someone pretending to be the police was knocking. Dkt. #38-8 at 9– 14 10. Hearing no response, Officer Caulfield kicked the door multiple times until it yielded 15 to the force of his blows. Dkt. # 38-5 at 21:45:20–21:45:35. All officers entered with 16 masks on. Id. Officer Wagner entered Plaintiff’s apartment with his firearm in the “low 17 ready” position, meaning it was angled towards the floor. Dkt. # 38-5 at 21:45:35– 18 21:45:45. Officer Kim held a less-lethal weapon also in the “low ready” position. Dkt. 19 # 38-11 at 21:45:40–21:45:55. Officer Caulfield entered with his firearm out in front of 20 him. Dkt. # 38-10 at 21:45:35–21:46:00. The parties dispute whether Officer Caulfield 21 pointed his weapon at Plaintiff. Based on the Court’s review of footage from Officer 22 Caulfield’s body worn camera,1 it appears Officer Caulfield turned to the opening of the 23 kitchen, where Plaintiff was standing, with his gun still drawn, and the gun was 24 25 1 When there is video evidence, courts “view the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007). 26 1 momentarily pointed in Plaintiff’s direction before Officer Caulfield lowered his weapon. 2 Dkt. # 38-10 at 21:45:35–21:46:00. Officer Drummond joined the other officers as 3 Officer Caulfield was breaching the door. Dkt. # 38-9 at 21:45:15–21:45:45. He did not 4 have a weapon and only briefly entered the apartment for ten seconds without interacting 5 with Plaintiff. Id. at 21:45:45–21:46:00. 6 After realizing they were in the wrong apartment, Officer Kim escorted Plaintiff 7 into the hallway and spoke with her. Dkt. # 37-11 at 21:46:00–21:47:25; Dkt. # 38-2 at 8 11. Plaintiff was visibly sobbing and shaking. Id. Officers Caulfield and Wagner 9 conducted a 45-second sweep of the apartment with their firearms in the low-ready 10 position. Dkt. # 38-5 at 24:45:50–21:46:45; Dkt. # 38-10 at 21:46:00–21:46:45; Dkt. # 11 38-2 at 4, 14. The officers explained their mistake to Plaintiff and left to the correct 12 location. Dkt. # 38-5 at 21:46:40–21:47:25. After securing the scene, Officers Kim, 13 Caulfield, and another officer returned to apologize to Plaintiff and gave her instructions 14 for filing a claim to repair her door. Dkt. # 38-13 at 22:08:10–22:26:55. Plaintiff 15 acknowledged that similar address confusion had occurred before with grocery 16 deliveries. See id. at 22:08:35–22:08:40. Plaintiff claims she sustained psychological 17 harm, including PTSD, as a result of this incident. Dkt. # 46 at 12–14. In support, 18 Plaintiff provides the Court with the expert reports of Dr. Megan Carter and Dr. Andrew 19 Saxon. See Dkts. # 48–49. 20 Based on these events, Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action against the 21 individual officers and the City of Seattle: (1) unconstitutional search in violation of the 22 Fourth Amendment; (2) excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (3) 23 state law negligence. Dkt. # 4 at 4–6. 24 25 26 1 III. MOTION TO EXCLUDE 2 Defendants move to exclude the testimony of Susan Peters, Plaintiff’s police 3 practices expert, because her expert report “lacks any meaningful analysis” and “fails to 4 explain how her experience led to her opinion.” Dkt. #41 at 1, 5. For example, 5 Defendants note that Ms. Peters “fails to identify or discuss any training, practices, 6 policy, or procedure that officers allegedly violated,” and does not “relate her opinion to 7 training, policy, procedures, best practices, or even her own experience.” Id. at 7–8. In 8 response, Plaintiff argues Ms. Peters’s opinion is based on her review of the case 9 materials and her experience in law enforcement. Dkt. # 44 at 5. For the reasons stated 10 below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Exclude. 11 A. Legal Standard 12 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702: 13 A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, 14 or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the proponent 15 demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that: 16 (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 17 issue; 18 (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 19 (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 20 (d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and 21 methods to the facts of the case. 22 Fed. R. Evid. 702. Testimony by a qualified expert “is admissible pursuant to Rule 702 23 if it is both relevant and reliable.” Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 942 (9th Cir. 2007). 24 The trial court’s role is to act as a “gatekeeper” to ensure expert evidence meets these 25 threshold requirements. Id. In doing so, it has broad discretion to admit or exclude expert 26 1 evidence. Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 833 (9th Cir. 1984). The proponent 2 of the expert bears the burden of proving admissibility. Cooper, 510 F.3d at 942. 3 Evidence is relevant if it “logically advance[s] a material aspect of the party’s 4 case.” Id. More critical to this motion, evidence is reliable if it has “a reliable basis in 5 the knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline.” Estate of Barabin v. 6 AstenJohnson, Inc., 740 F.3d 457, 463 (9th Cir. 2014), overruled on other grounds by 7 United States v. Bacon, 979 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 2020). In assessing reliability, the court 8 is concerned “‘not [with] the correctness of the expert’s conclusions but the soundness 9 of [the expert’s] methodology.’” Id. Importantly, “the court cannot conclude that a non- 10 scientific expert’s proffered testimony is reliable unless the expert explains the manner 11 in which her knowledge and experience support her conclusions.” Johnson v. Kelly, No. 12 C16-0635JLR, 2017 WL 1838140, at * 4 (W.D. Wash. May 8, 2017). “If the [expert] is 13 relying solely or primarily on experience, then the [expert] must explain how that 14 experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for 15 the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.” Id. (quoting Fed. 16 R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments). 17 Courts in this district have excluded expert opinions where the expert report fails 18 to connect the expert’s conclusions to their specialized knowledge or experience. See 19 id., at *4–7 (excluding Sue Peters’s testimony because her “expert report does not tie the 20 conclusions she makes therein to her experience in law enforcement”); Avery v. City of 21 Seattle, No. 2:22-cv-00560-LK, 2024 WL 2959541, at *6–7 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 12, 2024) 22 (excluding police expert including because expert report “conclude[ed] without 23 explanation” that action “‘was not consistent with police training, practices, and 24 procedures,’ without identifying any training, practices, or procedures that would counsel 25 different action.”). 26 1 B. Admissibility of Ms. Peters’s Expert Testimony 2 Ms. Peters’s expert report does not satisfy the reliability requirement of Evidence 3 Rule 702 because it does not explain how her knowledge or experience supports her 4 stated opinions. Ms. Peters’s report appears to contain two opinions: (1) “Seattle Police 5 Department officers failed to take necessary investigative steps to verify they were at the 6 correct address of the in-progress crisis event”; and (2) the officers did not follow “basic 7 police practices of address verification.” Dkt. #42-1 at 10. She does not, however, 8 explain what constitutes “necessary investigative steps” based on her experience or 9 generally accepted practices. Therefore, it is unclear how she arrived at her opinion that 10 the officers “failed to take necessary investigative steps.” Similarly, Ms. Peters does not 11 explain what is required to satisfy “basic practices of address verification,” and thus how 12 she arrived at her opinion that the officers did not follow these practices. 13 While Plaintiff claims Ms. Peters’s opinion is based on her law enforcement 14 experience, the critical issue is that her report does not explain how this is the case. For 15 example, it does not explain what Ms. Peters understands is standard practice based on 16 her work in law enforcement, and how the officers’ actions compared to that standard. 17 A single statement in her report that her opinions “are based upon [her] training, 18 experience, and review of discovery material records,” id., is conclusory and fails to meet 19 the requirement of Evidence Rule 702. Moreover, the Court is not persuaded by 20 Plaintiff’s argument that Ms. Peters does not discuss how the officers’ actions violated 21 policy because the Seattle Police Department has no relevant policy. Dkt. # 44 at 6. The 22 issue is not that Ms. Peters does not discuss relevant Seattle Police Department policy, 23 but that she does not analyze any relevant policy, training, or best practice. As a result, 24 there is no support for her opinion that the officers “failed to take necessary investigative 25 steps” and failed to follow “basic police practices.” 26 1 Because the Court finds that Ms. Peters’s expert report does not meet the 2 reliability requirement of Evidence Rule 702, it declines to consider Defendants’ 3 remaining arguments that Ms. Peters’ opinion is not relevant, and that Ms. Peters lacks 4 specialized knowledge. 5 IV. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 6 In their Motion for summary Judgment, Defendants contend: (1) Acting Sergeant 7 Duus and Officer Drummond should be dismissed based on their lack of interaction with 8 Plaintiff; (2) there was no unreasonable search; (3) there was no unreasonable seizure; 9 (4) the individual officers are entitled to qualified immunity; (5) the City of Seattle cannot 10 be held liable under a Monell theory; and (6) Plaintiff fails to prove negligence. Dkt. # 11 37. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART 12 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 13 A. Legal Standard 14 Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, when viewed in the light most 15 favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to 16 any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 17 P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Galen v. City. of L.A., 18 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007). A fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of 19 the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual dispute 20 is “‘genuine’ only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for 21 the non-moving party.” Far Out Prods., Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 992 (9th Cir. 2001) 22 (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248–49). 23 The moving party bears the initial burden of showing there is no genuine issue of 24 material fact and that he or she is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. See Celotex, 477 25 U.S. at 323. If the moving party does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, 26 1 it can show the absence of an issue of material fact in two ways: (1) by producing 2 evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's case, or (2) by showing 3 that the nonmoving party lacks evidence of an essential element of its claim or defense. 4 Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000). 5 Courts are “required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light 6 most favorable to the [non-moving] party.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). 7 Courts may not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations in analyzing a motion 8 for summary judgment because these are “jury functions, not those of a judge.” Liberty 9 Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249–50. Nevertheless, the non-moving party “must do more than 10 simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where 11 the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving 12 party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (internal quotation marks 13 omitted) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586– 14 87 (1986)). “Conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data cannot defeat summary 15 judgment.” Rivera v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 331 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003). 16 Nor can a party “defeat summary judgment with allegations in the complaint, or with 17 unsupported conjecture or conclusory statements.” Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med. Inc., 18 343 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003). 19 B. Acting Sergeant Duus and Officer Drummond 20 The parties agree to dismiss Acting Sergeant Duus as a defendant because he was 21 not involved with the events giving rise to this action. Dkts. # 37 at 9; Dkt. # 46 at 2. 22 Defendants further seek dismissal of Officer Drummond. Dkt. # 37 at 9. 23 Defendants present evidence that Officer Drummond joined the other three officers as 24 Officer Caulfield began to breach Plaintiff’s apartment door, that Officer Drummond 25 26 1 entered the apartment for only ten seconds, was unarmed, and did not interact with 2 Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff’s response brief does not address these arguments. See Dkt. # 46. 3 The Court finds claims against Officer Drummond should be dismissed. Under 4 Ninth Circuit law, “an official whose individual actions do not themselves rise to the 5 level of a constitutional violation may be held liable under section 1983 only if the official 6 is an integral participant in the unlawful act.” Peck v. Montoya, 51 F.4th 877, 889 (9th 7 Cir. 2022) (quotes omitted). A defendant is an “integral participant” if “(1) the defendant 8 knew about and acquiesced in the constitutionally defective conduct as part of a common 9 plan with those whose conduct constituted the violation, or (2) the defendant sets in 10 motion a series of acts by others which the defendant knew or reasonably should have 11 known could cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Id. at 891 (cleaned up). 12 Here, Officer Drummond is not an integral participant because he did not form a common 13 plan or set in motion acts that resulted in the other officers’ mistaken entry into Plaintiff’s 14 residence. Officer Drummond arrived on the scene separately from the other officers, 15 joined them as Officer Caulfield was breaching Plaintiff’s door, and did not interact with 16 Plaintiff. 17 C. Fourth Amendment Claim – Unreasonable Search 18 Defendants argue the officers’ search of Plaintiff’s residence was lawful because 19 it falls within the exigency or emergency exception to the general rule against warrantless 20 home searches, and the officers’ mistake in entering the wrong building was reasonable. 21 22 23 24 25 26 1 Dkt. # 37 at 10–15. Plaintiff argues the reasonableness of officers’ actions is a question 2 for the jury. Dkt. # 46 at 14–18. The Court agrees with Plaintiff. 2 3 The Fourth Amendment is not a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but 4 only against unreasonable searches and seizures. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 5 675, 682 (1985). Warrantless searches of the home are “presumptively unreasonable.” 6 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). To lawfully enter a home without a 7 warrant, there must be either probable cause and exigent circumstances, or an emergency 8 justifying the entry. United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 738 (9th Cir. 2010). The 9 “factual matters underlying the judgment of reasonableness” are generally a “question 10 for the jury.” McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1984). 11 In the context of a mistaken entry into the home, the constitutionality of the search 12 turns on whether the mistake was “objectively understandable and reasonable.” 13 Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88 (1987); see also Hartsfield v. Lemacks, 50 F.3d 14 950, 955 (11th Cir. 1995) (“absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, a 15 warrantless search of a residence violates the Fourth Amendment, unless the officers 16 engage in reasonable efforts to avoid error.”); Alvarado v. City of Philadelphia, 719 F. 17 Supp. 3d 420, 429 (E.D. Pa. 2024) (“Entering the wrong house on a valid warrant violates 18 the Fourth Amendment if the circumstances would alert a reasonable officer to ‘the risk 19 20 2 Plaintiff also argues Defendants’ exigency or emergency argument “has been 21 effectively nullified by this court’s recent Order on Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions for 22 Spoliation of Evidence.” Dkt. # 46 at 10. The Court rejects this argument. The Court’s prior order clearly states it was issuing “a lesser sanction of a permissive jury instruction” 23 and will instruct the jury that “it may presume that the 911 recordings deleted, destroyed, or otherwise rendered inaccessible were unfavorable to the City.” Dkt. 43 at 8 (emphasis 24 added). The Court’s prior order does not mandate a negative inference, nor does it 25 preclude consideration of other non-spoliated evidence that can support an inference that the officers were responding to an emergency. 26 1 that they might be’ in the wrong place.” (quoting Garrison, 480 U.S. at 87)). In assessing 2 the constitutionality of a search, courts recognize “the need to allow some latitude for 3 honest mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult process of making 4 arrests and executing search warrants.” Garrison, 480 U.S. at 87. 5 Several cases illustrate the contours of the reasonableness analysis in the context 6 of mistaken searches. On the one hand, courts have found searches reasonable where 7 law enforcement officers took steps to verify they were searching the correct address and 8 there was no information available to put officers on notice of their mistake. In Garrison, 9 police officers mistakenly obtained and executed a warrant covering the entire third floor 10 of an apartment, not knowing the third floor was split into two units, one belonging to 11 the suspect and another belonging to the plaintiff. Id. at 80. The officer who obtained 12 the warrant concluded there was only one apartment on the third floor after conducting 13 an investigation, “including a verification of information obtained from a reliable 14 informant, an exterior examination of the three-story building [at issue], and an inquiry 15 of the utility company.” Id. At 81. The Supreme Court held the officers’ search was 16 constitutional because the “objective facts available to the officers at the time suggested 17 no distinction between [the suspect’s] apartment and the third-floor premises.” Id. at 88. 18 In Nazarian, the court held an officer did not unreasonably search plaintiff’s 19 apartment when, while responding to a potential emergency, the officer observed glass 20 falling from a window, could not tell if it was coming from the second or third floor, and 21 entered the wrong apartment unit. Nazarian v. City of Beverly Hills, No. 19-4391 DSF, 22 2020 WL 11027732, at *1–2, *4–5. The court found, in part, that the officer’s “estimate 23 that the apartment was on the second or third floor of the building was reasonable under 24 the circumstances.” Id., at *5. 25 26 1 On the other hand, courts have denied summary judgment where officers failed to 2 take steps to confirm they were searching the right location and there was information 3 available to put the officers on notice of their mistake. In Hartsfield, a deputy sheriff 4 obtained a warrant listing the correct address of a suspect, but when executing the 5 warrant, erroneously entered a house further down on the same block. Hartsfield, 50 6 F.3d at 951–52. The Eleventh Circuit found the defendant’s conduct was “not consistent 7 with a reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.” Id. 8 at 955 (quotes omitted). The court gave great weight to the fact that “the numbers on the 9 houses are clearly marked,” “the raid took place during daylight hours,” and “simply 10 checking the warrant would have avoided the mistaken entry.” Id. Moreover, the court 11 noted that the defendant had been to the proper residence the day before, and there were 12 distinguishing features between the correct house and the one defendant mistakenly 13 entered. Id. 14 In Alvarado, detectives obtained a warrant for the “2nd floor rear” of an apartment, 15 but entered through the first floor front door, into plaintiff’s apartment, under the 16 mistaken belief that the door would lead to an interior common area housing doors to 17 both apartment units. Alvarado, 719 F. Supp. 3d at 425–26. In ruling on defendants’ 18 motion for summary judgment, the court emphasized that its “inquiry concerns whether 19 a juror could find [the defendants’] mistaken belief unreasonable in light of the 20 circumstances known to the officers.” Id., at *430. The court found a reasonable jury 21 could find in favor of plaintiff, including because the defendants “knew the warrant 22 specified the building’s ‘2nd floor rear’ apartment but chose to breach the building’s front 23 door instead of the back door.” Id.3 24 25 3 In their reply brief, Defendants argue Alvarado is distinguishable because the officers did not knock and announce, and engaged in egregious conduct after entering the wrong 26 1 Here, a reasonable jury could conclude the officers did not act reasonably to 2 confirm they were at the correct address before breaching Plaintiff’s door. Critically, the 3 officers had access to the correct address, arrived during daylight hours, and the number 4 on Plaintiff’s apartment building was marked. Dkt. # 38-1 at 2; Dkt. # 47-8 at 2. Yet 5 they did not confirm they were entering the right apartment building before proceeding 6 to Plaintiff’s unit. Dkt. # 47-1 at 7–8; Dkt. # 47-2 at 5–6. This is similar to both Hartsfield 7 and Alvarado, where courts denied summary judgment in part because the officers had 8 access to address information that could have alerted them to their mistaken entry. 9 Moreover, taking all facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, when the officers 10 arrived at Plaintiff’s unit and heard no disturbances consistent with the chaotic situation 11 reported by dispatch, they did not pause to confirm they were at the correct address. Dkt. 12 # 38-5 at 21:43:50–45:20. Unlike in Garrison, the officers did not conduct an 13 investigation to confirm their assumption that there was only one apartment building on 14 the block. Unlike in Nazarian, the officers could have confirmed the correct apartment 15 by checking the address, whereas the officer in Nazarian had to determine the correct 16 apartment unit based solely on her assessment of the source of the falling glass. 17 The Court is cognizant that reasonableness “must be judged from the perspective 18 of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight” and 19 includes “allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second 20 judgments – in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Graham 21 v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). An officer’s efforts to verify the correct 22 23 apartment. Dkt. # 51 at 5. However, Alvarado held plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim may proceed based on three separate theories: (1) the mistaken entry; (2) the failure to 24 knock and announce; and (3) detaining plaintiff after realizing their mistake. Alvarado, 25 719 F. Supp. 3d at 425. The distinguishing facts cited by Defendants did not impact the court’s analysis as to liability based on the mistaken entry theory. 26 1 location is not unreasonable “simply because they lead to an error, or because more 2 accurate means of ascertaining the property’s identity were available.” White v. Mclain, 3 648 Fed. App’x 838, 841 (11th Cir. 2016). Here, there are factors indicating the 4 reasonableness of the officers’ actions, including that they were responding to a potential 5 emergency situation; Officer Wagner surveyed the area and observed glass in the road, 6 leading to his conclusion he arrived at the correct building; and the positioning of the two 7 adjoining buildings have led others to make the same mistake in the past. Dkt. # 38-1 at 8 2–4; Dkt. #38-5 at 21:42:00–21:43:50; Dkt. # 38-13 at 22:08:35–22:08:40. However, in 9 light of the countervailing evidence described above, the reasonableness of the officers’ 10 actions is a question for the jury. 11 D. Fourth Amendment Claim – Unreasonable Seizure 12 Defendants next argue the officers did not unconstitutionally seize Plaintiff using 13 excessive force because the officers never pointed a gun at her. Dkt. # 37 at 15–17. 14 Plaintiff argues “the officers’ actions in entering the wrong apartment and using force 15 against Ms. Rehn were not justified under the Fourth Amendment.” Dkt. # 46 at 19. The 16 Court agrees with Plaintiff. 17 Claims that officers used excessive force “in the course of an arrest, investigatory 18 stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment 19 and its ‘reasonableness’ standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). 20 “Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is reasonable under the 21 Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion 22 of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental 23 interests at stake.” Id. at 396 (quotes omitted). “Because the test of reasonableness under 24 the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application . . . 25 its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each 26 1 particular case.” Id. (cleaned up). When an officer’s use of force is based on a mistake 2 of fact, the relevant question is “whether a reasonable officer would have or should have 3 accurately perceived that fact.” Estate of Strickland v. Nevada County, 69 F.4th 614, 621 4 (9th Cir. 2023) (emphasis in original). 5 As discussed above, a reasonable jury could conclude the officers’ mistake in 6 entering the wrong apartment building was not reasonable. Accordingly, a reasonable 7 jury could also find the officers’ ensuing use of force based on that mistake—entering 8 Plaintiff’s apartment with weapons out, and one officer momentarily pointing his gun in 9 Plaintiff’s direction—when in fact Plaintiff posed no threat, was not reasonable. 10 E. Qualified Immunity 11 Defendants argue that even if there was a constitutional violation, the officers are 12 entitled to qualified immunity because the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly 13 established at the time of the incident. Dkt. #37 at 17–21. Defendants’ briefing largely 14 focuses on case law regarding the lawfulness of holding firearms in the “low ready” 15 position during a police encounter. Id. Plaintiff argues that clearly established law 16 prohibited the officers’ warrantless entry into Plaintiff’s home under the circumstances. 17 Dkt. # 46 at 20–46. The Court agrees with Plaintiff. 18 “Qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens 19 of litigation, which, in certain circumstances, shields government officials from civil 20 liability for actions taken in the course of their duties.” Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 21 812 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotes omitted). Officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless 22 (1) the officers’ conduct violated a constitutional right and (2) the right which was 23 violated was clearly established at the time of the violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 24 194, 201 (2001). A right is clearly established if “a reasonable official would understand 25 that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 202. 26 1 It is a “basic principle of Fourth Amendment law” that “searches and seizures 2 inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” Payton, 445 U.S. at 3 586. In 1987, the Supreme Court addressed in Garrison the contours of the Fourth 4 Amendment in the context of a mistaken entry into a home. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79. 5 There, the Court found the officers’ conduct was reasonable because it was “consistent 6 with a reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched within 7 the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 88. Subsequent courts addressing 8 qualified immunity for mistaken home entries have found that under Garrison, it is 9 clearly established law that “absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, a 10 warrantless search of a residence violates the Fourth Amendment, unless the officers 11 engage in reasonable efforts to avoid error.” Hartsfield, 50 F.3d at 955; see also 12 Alvarado, 719 F. Supp. 3d at 431 (“caselaw clearly put beyond debate that police officers 13 violate the Fourth Amendment if they mistakenly enter the wrong home pursuant to a 14 search [] warrant unless that mistake was ‘objectively understandable and reasonable.’” 15 (quoting Garrison, 480 U.S. at 88)). In addition, it is clearly established law that “[w]here 16 an officer’s particular use of force is based on a mistake of fact, we ask whether a 17 reasonable officer would have or should have accurately perceived that fact.” Torres v. 18 City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original). 19 As discussed, a reasonable jury could find that the officers violated Plaintiff’s 20 Fourth Amendment rights by failing to take reasonable efforts to verify they were at the 21 correct address before breaching her door, and by using force based on that mistake. At 22 the time of the incident, clearly established law prohibited these actions. Accordingly, 23 Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims are not precluded by qualified immunity. 24 25 26 1 F. Monell Liability for Failure to Train 2 Plaintiff asserts that the City of Seattle is subject to liability under Monell because 3 the Seattle Police Department’s “lack of specific training or polices . . . regarding address 4 verification before entering a residence . . . establishes a deliberate indifference to the 5 constitutional rights of individuals” Dkt. # 46 at 20. Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to 6 present facts “indicative of deficiencies in training” or facts “capable of establishing 7 deliberate indifference” which typically require a pattern of violations, systematic 8 supervisory or disciplinary problems. Dkt. # 37 at 22. 9 The Ninth Circuit uses a two-part test for Monell claims. First, a court asks 10 whether a constitutional violation occurred; then, it asks whether the “city’s policy caused 11 the constitutional wrong.” Lowry v. City of San Diego, 858 F.3d 1248, 1255 (9th Cir. 12 2017). For purposes of the second prong, causation means the city’s policy had the 13 “‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation.” Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1444 14 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Monell claims are successful in only 15 “limited circumstances,” where officers “so often violate constitutional rights that the 16 need for further training must have been plainly obvious to the city policy makers, who, 17 nevertheless, are ‘deliberately indifferent’ to the need.” Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs. of 18 Byran Cnty., Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997). 19 Plaintiff’s Monell claim fails for multiple reasons. There is no evidence that 20 different training was likely to change the result of the individual officers’ search. See 21 Barajas v. City of Rohnert Park, 159 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (granting 22 summary judgment on the Monell claims in part because of the “absence of evidence 23 showing the likelihood that different training would have changed the search in this 24 case[.]”). Moreover, Plaintiff has not shown that the City of Seattle exhibited “deliberate 25 indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of 26 1 Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). Plaintiff also has not pointed to a “pattern 2 of constitutional violations,” which is “ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate 3 indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 4 (2011) (quotes omitted). Plaintiff has not shown, for example, that any shortcoming in 5 the City of Seattle’s training routinely led to constitutional violations, or that the City’s 6 officers regularly use such tactics. Nor have they shown that any purported deficiencies 7 in the City’s training program were so “patently obvious that a city could be liable under 8 § 1983 without proof of a pre-existing pattern of violations.” Id. at 64. Ultimately, 9 establishing municipal liability—particularly on a failure to train theory—poses a very 10 high bar. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (noting that the deliberate indifference standard 11 creates a “stringent standard”). Plaintiff has not cleared that high bar here. 12 G. Negligence 13 1. Breach, Injury, Causation 14 Defendants do not contest that the individual officers owed a duty to Plaintiff, but 15 argues Plaintiff’s state negligence claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff cannot 16 establish (1) the officers breached a duty of care by entering her apartment; (2) Plaintiff 17 suffered harm; and (3) the officers’ actions caused the harm alleged. Dkt. # 37 at 22–25. 18 Plaintiff argues “[t]he actions of the officers in breaching Ms. Rehn’s apartment door, 19 entering without a warrant, and using force with weapons drawn, fall below the standard 20 of care expected in the performance of their duties” and point to Plaintiff’s experts’ 21 reports to demonstrate causation and harm. Dkt. # 46 at 23. The Court finds summary 22 judgment is inappropriate on this claim. 23 Under Washington law, a plaintiff asserting a negligence claim must show “(1) 24 the existence of a duty to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) a resulting injury, and 25 (4) the breach as the proximate cause of the injury.” Wuthrich v. King County, 366 P.3d 26 1 926, 929 (Wash. 2016). For the reasons discussed above, a reasonable jury could find 2 the individual officers breached their duty of reasonable care to Plaintiff by failing to take 3 appropriate measures to verify they were entering the correct building before breaching 4 her door and entering with weapons out. In addition, Plaintiff produced evidence that 5 she suffered an injury and that the officers’ actions proximately caused her injury. 6 Plaintiff produces two expert reports detailing Plaintiff’s psychological harm, including 7 PTSD, developed as a result of the incident. Dkt. #48, Dkt. # 49. 8 Defendants argue that under Washington law, claims for emotional distress 9 without physical injury may proceed “only where emotional distress is (1) within the 10 scope of foreseeable harm of the negligent conduct, (2) a reasonable reaction given the 11 circumstances, and (3) manifested by objective symptomatology.” Bylsma v. Burger 12 King Corp., 293 P.3d 1168, 1170 (Wash. 2013). The court has little trouble in finding a 13 reasonable jury could conclude these requirements are met. It is foreseeable that four 14 police officers mistakenly knocking down Plaintiff’s door, entering with weapons, with 15 one officer momentarily pointing his gun in her direction, could result in emotional 16 distress; the reaction is reasonable under the circumstances; and Plaintiff has introduced 17 evidence of her objective symptomatology through her experts. In addition, Defendants 18 question the causal link between the incident and Plaintiff’s diagnosis, including because 19 Plaintiff was assessed by mental health providers specially for the purpose of this lawsuit, 20 and her father passed away in the intervening years. Dkt. # 37 at 25. However, these 21 arguments present issues of fact for the jury. 22 2. Assumption of Risk 23 Next, Defendants argue Plaintiff’s negligence claim is barred by the “assumption 24 of risk” doctrine because Plaintiff “chose not to open the door and by doing so, assumed 25 the risk that officers would breach the door. Dkt. #37 at 25–26. The Court rejects this 26 1 argument. “[N]othing requires an individual to answer the door in response to a police 2 officer’s knocking.” Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 765 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff’s 3 failure to answer the door, when she had no obligation to do so, does not preclude her 4 from bringing a negligence claim against Defendants. 5 3. Negligent Training and Supervision 6 Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim against the City of Seattle for 7 negligent hiring, training, and supervision. Under Washington law, a cause of action for 8 negligent supervision applies when “the employee acted outside the scope of his or her 9 employment,” while a cause of action for vicarious liability applies “when an employee 10 commits negligence within the scope of employment.” LaPlant v. Snohomish County, 11 271 P.3d 254, 256–57 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (emphasis in original). Thus, “a claim for 12 negligent hiring, training, and supervision is generally improper when the employer 13 concedes the employee’s actions occurred within the course and scope of employment.” 14 Id. at 257. 15 It appears Plaintiff’s claim for negligence against the City of Seattle is premised 16 on both a negligent hiring, training, and supervision theory and a vicarious liability 17 theory. See Dkt. # 4 at ¶ 6.2 (“The City of Seattle had a duty to take care in the training 18 and supervision of its officers to prevent unnecessary and unjustified violent intrusions 19 into person’s homes”); id. at ¶ 6.4 (“As a result, Defendant City of Seattle is liable for 20 negligence due to the actions of the Seattle police officers under respondeat superior.”). 21 The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff is precluded from asserting a negligent 22 hiring, training, and supervision theory against the City of Seattle because there is no 23 claim that the individual officers acted outside the scope of their employment. 24 Defendants do not seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s negligence claim against the City of 25 Seattle under the respondeat superior theory, so the claim may proceed on that basis. 26 1 4. State Qualified Immunity 2 Finally, Defendants argue they are entitled to state qualified immunity. Dkt # 37 3 at 26–27. In a negligence action, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity when the 4 officer (1) was carrying out a statutory duty, (2) according to procedures dictated to him 5 by statute and superiors, and (3) acted reasonably. McKinney v. City of Tukwila, 13 P.3d 6 631, 640 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds 7 whether the individual officers acted reasonably is a question for the jury. Therefore, 8 Defendants are not entitled to state qualified immunity at this stage.4 9 // 10 // 11 // 12 // 13 // 14 // 15 // 16 // 17 // 18 // 19 // 20 21 22 23 4 In their reply brief, Defendants argue for the first time that Plaintiff “may not base claims of negligence on alleged intentional actions, such as excessive force or unlawful 24 arrest.” Dkt. # 51 at 14. The Court declines to consider this argument. See Zamani v. 25 Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The district court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”). 26 1 V. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART 3 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as follows: 4 (1) the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to claims 5 against Acting Sergeant Duus and Officer Drummond and DISMISSES them 6 from this case; 7 (2) the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Monell 8 liability against the City of Seattle and DISMISSES the first and second 9 causes of action against Defendant City of Seattle; 10 (3) the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 11 Fourth Amendment claims against the remaining individual officers; and 12 (4) the Court DENIES Defendants motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 13 negligence claim against all remaining Defendants. 14 In addition, for the forgoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to 15 Exclude the Opinion of Sue Peters and EXCLUDES Ms. Peters’s testimony at trial. 16 17 Dated this 1st day of July, 2025. 18 A 19 20 The Honorable Richard A. Jones United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26