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WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION JENNA RIES, et al., Plaintiffs, Case No. 1:20-cv-2 v. Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou MCDONALDâS USA, LLC, et al., Defendants. ___________________________________/ OPINION Plaintiffs Jenna Ries, Katlyn Barber, Joanne Bishop, and Emily Anibal bring this action against Defendants for sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and Michiganâs Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2101, et seq. (See Third Am. Compl., ECF No. 142.) Plaintiffs sue McDonaldâs, LLC and McDonaldâs Corporation (collectively, âMcDonaldâsâ) as well as two entities operating a McDonaldâs franchise in Michigan: MLMLM Corporation and M.A.A.K.S., Inc. (collectively, âFranchiseeâ). Plaintiffs are former employees of a McDonaldâs restaurant in Mason, Michigan, operated by Franchisee. They allege that a manager at that location repeatedly harassed them, both physically and verbally. Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment by McDonaldâs (ECF No. 154). Because no reasonable juror could find that McDonaldâs acted as an employer or agent subject to liability under Title VII or the ELCRA, the Court will grant the motion. I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates that âthere is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.â Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Courts must examine the âpleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P 56(c)) (internal quotations omitted). A fact is material if it âmight affect the outcome of the suit.â Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A material fact is genuinely disputed when there is âsufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.â Id. at 249 (citing First Natâl Bank. of Ariz. v. City Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1961)). âWhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party [by a preponderance of the evidence], there is no âgenuine issue for trial.ââ Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting City Serv., 391 U.S. at 289). When considering the facts, the Court must draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. Summary judgment is not an opportunity for the Court to resolve factual disputes. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. II. ANALYSIS A. Title VII Title VII prohibits an âemployerâ from engaging in certain âunlawful employment practices.â 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The term âemployerâ means âa person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such a person[.]â 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). McDonaldâs argues that it is not liable because it did not employ Plaintiffs or control employment matters at the restaurant where Plaintiffs worked. McDonaldâs argues that it is simply a franchisor; Franchisee controlled the conditions of Plaintiffsâ employment, not McDonaldâs. Plaintiffs respond that McDonaldâs is liable for two reasons: (1) it retained sufficient control over their employment conditions to qualify as a âjoint employerâ; and (2) McDonaldâs caused Plaintiffs to believe that Franchisee was an agent of McDonaldâs. 1. Joint Employer âUnder the âjoint-employerâ theory, âan entity that is not the plaintiffâs formal employer may be treated under these doctrines as if it were the employer for purposes of employment laws such as Title VII.ââ Nethery v. Quality Care Invs., L.P., 814 F. Appâx 97, 102-03 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Sanford v. Main St. Baptist Church Manor, Inc., 449 F. Appâx 488, 491 (6th Cir. 2011)). âEntities are joint employers if they âshare or co-determine those matters governing essential terms and conditions of employment.ââ Id. (quoting EEOC v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 550 F. Appâx 253, 256 (6th Cir. 2013)). In determining whether an entity is the plaintiffâs joint employer, âthe major factors include the âentityâs ability to hire, fire or discipline employees, affect their compensation and benefits, and direct and supervise their performance.ââ Id. (quoting Skanska USA, 550 F. Appâx at 256). Put simply, McDonaldâs can be liable as a joint employer if it has âretained for itself sufficient control of the terms and conditions of employment of the employees who are employed by [Franchisee].â Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Book Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990, 993 n.4 (6th Cir. 1997). Here, a franchise agreement between McDonaldâs and Michael Dickerson (the owner of MLMLM and M.A.A.K.S.) governed the relationship between McDonaldâs and Franchisee. (See Franchise Agreement, ECF No. 154-3.) The agreement, which had a 20-year term, expressly states that âFranchisee shall have no authority, express or implied to act as an agent of McDonaldâsâ and that âFranchisee and McDonaldâs are not and do not intend to be partners, associates, or joint employers in any way[.]â (Id., PageID.3019.) More importantly, the agreement did not give McDonaldâs the ability to hire, fire, discipline, or affect the compensation or benefits of Franchiseeâs employees. Dickerson testified that he and Nanette Bitner, his operations manager and the senior supervisor of the Mason restaurant, had authority to hire and fire employees. (Dickerson Dep. 216, ECF No. 154-7.) No one from McDonaldâs played a role in hiring, firing, promoting, disciplining, or setting wages for employees at his restaurants. (Id. at 266-68.) Nor did they play a role in assigning individual employees to their positions or in supervising their day-to-day activities. (Id.) Plaintiffs offer no evidence to the contrary. To be sure, the Franchise Agreement requires Franchisee to abide by a particular method of operating and maintaining a restaurant, called the âMcDonaldâs System.â (Franchise Agreement, PageID.3088.) This system details the retailing of a limited menu of uniform and quality food products, emphasizing prompt and courteous service in a clean, wholesome atmosphere which is intended to be attractive to children and families and includes proprietary rights in certain valuable trade names, service marks, and trademarks, including the trade names âMcDonaldâsâ and âMcDonaldâs Hamburgers,â designs and color schemes for restaurant buildings, signs, equipment layouts, formulas and specifications for certain food products, methods of inventory and operation control, bookkeeping and accounting, and manuals covering business practices and policies. (Id., PageID.3082.) But that system does not set the terms of the relationships between Franchisee and its employees. It is instead a set of prescriptions for branding, operations, and quality control that is common for franchise relationships. Plaintiffs point to the requirement that Franchisee operate the restaurant in a âgood, clean, wholesome mannerâ (id., PageID.3092), but Plaintiffs do not point to any evidence that any party to the Franchise Agreement construed this requirement to mean an absence of sexual discrimination and harassment among Franchiseeâs employees. And even if that is what this requirement means, there is no evidence that it gave McDonaldâs the ability to do anything other than find Franchisee in breach of the Franchisee Agreement and terminate that agreement. Although such a termination would have impeded Franchiseeâs ability to continue operating, control over Franchiseeâs ability to continue business does not amount to control over Franchiseeâs relationship with its individual employees.1 Plaintiffs also rely on the fact that McDonaldâs periodically assessed Franchisee according to its âNational Franchising Standardsâ (âNFSâ). McDonaldâs used these assessments to âidentify those [franchisees] with whom McDonaldâs desires to grow and/or enter into new franchise relationships.â (Bonta Dep. 28.)2 Before the term of a franchise agreement expires, McDonaldâs will review the assessments to determine whether to award a new term to the franchisee. (Id. at 53.) But these standards were not part of the Franchise Agreement; indeed, the standards themselves expressly state that they âdo not create or modify any contract rights or obligationsâ and âdo not necessarily address whetherâ the franchisee is complying with its franchise agreement. (NFS, ECF No. 176-5, PageID.4195.) McDonaldâs plays a âconsulting roleâ with respect to its franchiseeâs compliance with the standards; it cannot require the franchisee to comply with them. (Bonta Dep. 104.) Plaintiffs argue that the NFS gave McDonaldâs substantial control because McDonaldâs frequently3 assessed Franchiseeâs compliance with the NFS and then used those assessments to determine whether to renew a franchise at the end of its term. But gathering data every few weeks or months from each restaurant for the purpose of deciding whether to continue a business relationship with Franchisee at the end of a multi-year term is a far cry from exercising day-to-day 1 For similar reasons, the Court rejects Plaintiffâs argument that the Franchise Agreementâs requirement that Franchisee abide by âfederal, state, and local lawsâ (Franchise Agreement, PageID.3089) gave McDonaldâs control over Franchiseeâs employees. If the Court were to accept Plaintiffsâ argument, then any contract between an employer and a third party containing a similar requirement (such as a loan or license agreement) could subject the third party to liability under Title VII if the contract was necessary for the employer to conduct its business. It is unlikely that Congress intended Title VII to cast so wide a net. 2 Alvaro Bonta testified as the corporate representative of McDonaldâs. Excerpts of his deposition are located at ECF Nos. 154-4, 176-10, and 188-2. 3 McDonaldâs conducted approximately one visit every three months at each of Franchiseeâs eleven restaurants. (Bonta Dep. 159.) supervision and control over Franchiseeâs employees. Plaintiffs do not point to any instance in which McDonaldâs used its assessments to dictate the discipline, promotion, or any other change in the terms or conditions of employment for any particular employee of Franchisee. Although several Franchisee employees testified that scores on these assessments were considered by Franchisee during employee performance reviews (Blakesley Dep. 141-42, ECF No. 210-43), or were used by Franchisee as the basis for awarding employee perks or bonuses (Pyers Dep. 201, ECF No. 210-41; Bitner Dep. 205-08, ECF No. 210-40), there is no evidence that McDonaldâs required Franchisee to use the assessments in this manner. The fact that Franchisee took these assessments into account when exercising its own control does not mean that McDonaldâs co- determined the essential conditions of Plaintiffsâ employment. Cf. Nethery, 814 F. Appâx at 104 n.2 (finding no joint employer relationship where the employer took another entityâs âwishes into account when exercising its own powerâ). Thus, Plaintiffs have not shown that the NFS standards gave McDonaldâs any significant control over Franchiseeâs employees. McDonaldâs also provided an operations and training manual to its franchisees. (Bonta Decl. ¶ 11, ECF No. 154-2.) Amon other things, that manual contains a list of duties and procedures for opening the restaurant and starting a shift. The Franchise Agreement provides that Franchisee must âpromptly adopt and use exclusively the formulas, methods, and policies contained in the business manuals.â (Franchise Agreement, PageID.3084.) However, the manual itself states that franchisees can âchoose to apply or implement any portionâ of it, and that franchisees are âexclusively responsible for complying with all statutes, laws, and regulations applicable to their restaurants.â (2015 Manual Excerpt, ECF No. 154-2, PageID.3079.) A more recent version of the manual does not contain these disclaimers, but it repeatedly instructs employees to âcontact your Owner/Operator for adviceâ about âpractices at your restaurant.â (2017 Manual Excerpt, ECF No. 216-15, PageID.5193, 5195, 5198.) Thus, the manual makes clear that practices will vary according to choices made by the franchisee. Importantly, nothing in the manual excerpts provided by the parties gave McDonaldâs the ability to control the Franchiseeâs relationship with its employees. Plaintiffs also point to a variety of templates and resources that McDonaldâs provided to Franchisee, including: an âEmployee Resourcesâ poster describing employee rights and a sexual harassment policy; a personality test for screening candidates; a website for job postings; job interview guidelines and application templates; software to track employee time and generate disciplinary reports; guidelines for the number and type of employees necessary to run a restaurant; and training programs for certain employees. However, there is no evidence that any of these resources or programs gave McDonaldâs control over the essential terms of employment for Franchiseeâs employees. To the contrary, the evidence shows that Franchisee alone possessed and exercised that control. Plaintiffs put stock in the fact that McDonaldâs purportedly required Franchisee to display the Employee Resources poster. Plaintiffs apparently argue that McDonaldâs effectively required Franchisee to adopt the McDonaldâs policy described on the poster for reporting sexual harassment. However, displaying a policy is one thing. Implementing it is another. There is no evidence that McDonaldâs played any role in implementing or enforcing such a policy. Indeed, the poster states that any harassment is to be reported to employees of Franchisee (e.g., the âRestaurant/General Managerâ or the âOwner Operatorâ). (ECF No. 210-46, PageID.4980.) The poster also contains a blank space for contact information for the manager or owner of the restaurant. The poster provides no information or guidance about reporting misconduct to McDonaldâs. Thus, the poster does not create a genuine issue of fact about whether McDonaldâs retained sufficient control over Franchiseeâs employees to qualify as a joint employer. Finally, Plaintiffs rely on an April 14, 2021, press release by McDonaldâs announcing that, â[b]eginning in January 2022,â it would be applying ânew Global Brand Standardsâ to all of its restaurants; these new standards will apparently âprioritize actionsâ in âharassment, discrimination and retaliation prevention[.]â (Press Release, ECF No. 175-26, PageID.3775.) According to the press release, McDonaldâs intends to assess its restaurants and âhold [them] accountable in accordance with applicable McDonaldâs marketâs business evaluation processes.â (Id.) McDonaldâs rightly notes that the press release has limited relevance to this case because it is forward-looking. It does not apply to the time period at issue in the complaint. Plaintiffs respond that the press release is evidence that McDonaldâs has always had the right to impose personnel policies on its franchisees. But neither the details of the new policy, nor its mechanism of enforcement are laid out in the press release. Nothing in the press release itself indicates that McDonaldâs has had, or will have, control over the conduct of an individual employee of a franchisee. Indeed, the references to McDonaldâs âbrand standardsâ and âbusiness evaluation processesâ suggest that McDonaldâs will implement its new policies in the same manner that it implements the NFS.4 As discussed above, periodic assessments and the power to terminate the franchise relationship are not equivalent to day-to-day supervision and control over the working conditions of a franchiseeâs employees. In short, construing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, there is no genuine dispute that McDonaldâs did not meaningfully participate in employment decisions or possess 4 âBrand Standards Visitâ is a term that McDonaldâs uses in the NFS to describe some of its in-person restaurant assessments. (NFS, PageID.4196.) sufficient control over the terms of Plaintiffsâ employment to qualify as a joint employer. The control that McDonaldâs did have in its relationship with Franchisee was âcontrol over conformity to standard operational details inherent in many franchise settingsâ and âthe power to terminate [the] franchises.â Evans v. McDonaldâs Corp., 936 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir. 1991). As other courts have concluded, that level of involvement in a franchiseeâs business does not suffice to give rise to employer liability under Title VII. See id.; Alberter v. McDonaldâs Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1143-45 (D. Nev. 1999) (finding that personnel policies contained in business manuals provided by McDonaldâs to its franchisee did not establish control by McDonaldâs over employment matters at the franchiseeâs restaurant); McFarland v. Breads of the World, LLC, No. 1:09-cv-929, 2011 WL 801815, at *8-12 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 1, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. C-1-09-929, 2011 WL 801793 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 2011) (noting that âcourts have been nearly uniform in holding that a franchisor should not be deemed to be an âemployerâ for purposes of Title VII when the plaintiff works for an independently owned franchiseâ); accord Baetzel v. Home Instead Senior Care, 370 F. Supp. 2d 631, 640-41 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (citing cases). Plaintiffs rely on cases in which courts denied a franchisorâs attempt to dismiss similar claims against it because the franchisor was involved in creating personnel policies or provided training to the franchiseeâs employees. See, e.g., Johnson v. McDonaldâs, No. 4:20-CV-1867- RWS, 2021 WL 2255000 (E.D. Mo. June 3, 2021); A.H. ex rel. Hunt v. Wendyâs Co., No. 3:18- cv-0485, 2018 WL 4002856 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2018); Parrott v. Marriott Intâl, Inc., No. 17- 10359, 2017 WL 3891805 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2017); Harris v. Midas, No. 17-95, 2017 WL 5177668 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2017); Myers. v. Garfield & Johnson Enters., Inc., 679 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Pa. 2010). Those cases are distinguishable. There, courts concluded that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts in their complaints to state a plausible claim against the franchisor and proceed to discovery. The question facing this Court is a different one. The Court is not assessing the allegations in Plaintiffsâ complaint. At this stage, Plaintiffs must support their allegations with evidence sufficient to demonstrate that they can proceed to trial against McDonaldâs. They have not done so. They have not shown that there is a genuine dispute of fact about whether McDonaldâs was a joint employer with Franchisee. B. Apparent Authority As an alternative to the âjoint employerâ theory, Plaintiffs contend that McDonaldâs can be liable under an âapparent authorityâ theory. As indicated above, Title VII prohibits action by an âemployer,â a term that is defined to mean âa person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such a person.â 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (emphasis added). Thus, employers can be liable under Title VII for the actions of their agents. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 755-65 (1998). Plaintiffs invoke the principle âapparent authority,â which is found in the Restatement (Second) of Agency. According to the Restatement, (1) A master or other principal is subject to liability for torts which result from reliance upon, or belief in, statements or other conduct within an agentâs apparent authority. (2) Unless there has been reliance, the principal is not liable in tort for conduct of a servant or other agent merely because it is within his apparent authority or apparent scope of employment. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 265. Plaintiffs argue that they thought Franchisee was controlled by McDonaldâs and, thus, McDonaldâs is liable under Title VII because Franchisee and its employees were apparent agents of McDonaldâs. The main problem with Plaintiffsâ argument is that it stretches Title VII beyond its textual limits. The statute expressly applies to employers and agents of employers. An âemployerâ is defined as a âperson with fifteen or more employees,â i.e., the plaintiffâs actual or potential employer, and âany agent of such a person.â 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (emphasis added). In other words, the agent must be an agent of the employer. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (noting that, in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), Congress chose âto define âemployerâ to include any âagentâ of an employerâ (emphasis added)); see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758-62 (discussing circumstances where âagency principles impose liability on employersâ (emphasis added)). Title VII does not expressly apply to agents of apparent employers or to an apparent principal of the actual employer. For reasons stated in the previous section, McDonaldâs was not Plaintiffsâ employer, either by itself or jointly with Franchisee, because it did not possess sufficient control over the terms of Plaintiffsâ employment. In addition, McDonaldâs was not an agent of Plaintiffsâ employer. Thus, for purposes of Plaintiffsâ claim, McDonaldâs does not fit within the definition of âemployerâ in Title VII. Furthermore, Sixth Circuit precedent suggests that, without some control over employment decisions, an entity is not liable under Title VII, either as an ostensible employer or as an agent. That court has not comprehensively explained the legal theories by which to identify âemployersâ under the Civil Rights Acts. Instead, we appear to have three lines of cases setting out three theories . . . . First, we have stated in several cases that for the purposes of the ADA and other Civil Rights Acts, an employer/employee relationship is identified by considering: the entire relationship, with the most important factor being the employerâs ability to control job performance and employment opportunities of the aggrieved individual. Second, we have recognized that an agent of an employer may be identified as an employer for the purposes of the Civil Rights Acts if the employer delegated employment decisions to the agent. Finally, . . . we have stated that Title VII does not require a formal employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. Rather, a plaintiff is protected if the defendant is one who significantly affects access of any individual to employment opportunities. These three lines of cases do not seem to recognize one another; although, arguably, the later cases in this court stating the first theory consolidate all three theories under the âcontrolâ concept. Satterfield v. Tennessee, 295 F.3d 611, 617 (6th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added; quotation marks and citations omitted). âThe first and second theories, the employer control theory and the agency theory, seem to be essentially the same in this circuit.â Id. at 617 n.6. Applying the three legal theories mentioned in Satterfield to this case, Plaintiffs cannot proceed to trial with their Title VII claim against McDonaldâs. There is no evidence that McDonaldâs had the ability to control Plaintiffsâ job performance or employment opportunities, that it delegated employment decisions to Franchisee, or that it significantly affected the access of any individual to employment opportunities with Franchisee. The upshot is that McDonaldâs does not face liability under Title VII merely because Plaintiffs wrongly believed that McDonaldâs was their employer or that it could control the conditions of their employment. Indeed, holding McDonaldâs liable under these circumstances would deprive it of a defense to liability because, unlike an actual employer (or an agent acting on the employerâs behalf), McDonaldâs had no means âto prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior[.]â See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (discussing an employer defense to liability for harassment). For instance, McDonaldâs could not supervise Franchiseeâs employees and then discipline them to correct harassing behavior. The undisputed evidence shows that Franchisee alone possessed and exercised that authority. Plaintiffs purport to rely on âagency principlesâ to support their claim, ignoring the foregoing precedent and the text of Title VII, which in its most natural reading (and as construed in Ellerth and Vinson) indicates that the agent must be an agent of the plaintiffsâ employer, not an agent of a third party who had no meaningful ability to control the terms and conditions of the plaintiffsâ employment. Plaintiffs cite only a handful of cases supporting an âapparent agencyâ theory of liability against a principal who has no employer relationship with the plaintiff. None of those cases addresses the tension between that theory and the text of Title VII. Considering the lack of textual and legal support for Plaintiffsâ theory, the Court is not persuaded that it can serve as a viable basis for a claim against McDonaldâs. Another problem with Plaintiffsâ theory stems from agency law. The concept of apparent authority is ill-suited to a harassment or discrimination claim against a third party like McDonaldâs. âAs a general rule, apparent authority is relevant where the agent purports to exercise a power which he or she does not have . . . . In the usual case, a supervisorâs harassment involves misuse of actual power, not the false impression of its existence.â Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759. Furthermore, where an employee concludes that an individual had apparent authority, that conclusion âmust be a reasonable one.â Id. If the employee âknows or has reason to know that an agent lacks authority to take a particular action, the agent does not act with apparent authority.â Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.08 cmt. b. And â[w]hen an agentâs conduct constitutes a tort such as assault . . . , only in unusual circumstances would a third party harmed by the tort believe that the agent acted with actual authority in committing it.â Id. Here, there is scant evidence that Plaintiffs reasonably believed that their managerâs harassing actions were within the authority given to him by McDonaldâs. Plaintiffs cite Miller v. D.F. Zeeâs, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 792 (D. Or. 1998), in which a district court determined there was a triable issue of fact in a Title VII case as to whether a franchisor could be vicariously liable under an apparent agency theory for the actions of the employees of its franchisee. Id. at 805. That opinion is not binding on this Court and it is not persuasive because it relies upon Oregon agency law. Id. at 806. In addition, Miller is distinguishable. There, the court concluded that âthere was no indication in the restaurant that the restaurant was owned by a franchisee.â Id. at 808. In contrast, Franchisee told each of the Plaintiffs at or before the start of their employment that McDonaldâs was not their employer. All but one of the Plaintiffs initialed a document provided by Franchisee which states that The McDonaldâs restaurant you work at is owned and operated by an independent McDonaldâs Franchisee (your âowner/operatorâ). This is your employer. McDonaldâs Corporation is not involved in any way in the employment matters of the independently owned McDonaldâs restaurants. (ECF Nos. 154-19 (Ries), 154-22 (Barber), 154-28 (Bishop).)5 And they all signed a document stating, I acknowledge that I am applying for employment with an independently owned and operated McDonaldâs franchisee, a separate company and employer from McDonaldâs Corporation and any of its subsidiaries. (ECF Nos. 155-1 (Ries), 155-2 (Barber), 155-3 (Anibal), 155-4 (Bishop).) Plaintiffs contend that they did not read these documents or understand them. Nevertheless, they had reason to know that their manager was not acting on behalf of McDonaldâs. See Wright v. Mountain View Law Care, LLC, No. 7:15-cv-00224, 2016 WL 1060341, at *11 (W.D. Va. Mar. 11, 2016) (distinguishing Miller for similar reasons); accord D.L.S. v. Maybin, 121 P.3d 1210, 1214 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (distinguishing Miller and rejecting a theory of apparent agency liability against McDonaldâs). Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, McDonaldâs is entitled to summary judgment in its favor for Plaintiffsâ Title VII claim. C. ELCRA Plaintiffsâ ELCRA claim against McDonaldâs fails for similar reasons. The ELCRA prohibits an âemployerâ from discriminating against individuals âwith respect to employment, 5 Anibal did not initial this document, but it was in her personnel file. In any case, she testified that she understood that she did not work for McDonaldâs, and that McDonaldâs was not involved in employee discipline. (Anibal Dep. 76, 103, ECF No. 154-15.) compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of . . . sex[.]â Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2202(1)(a). âDiscrimination because of sex includes sexual harassment.â Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2103(i). And as in Title VII, the definition of employer includes an âagentâ of the employer. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2201(a). 1. Employer As discussed above, there is no genuine dispute that McDonaldâs was not Plaintiffsâ actual employer. For ELCRA claims, Michigan courts employ a control test similar to the joint employer test described above. That is, McDonaldâs may be liable if Plaintiffs âcan establish that [it] affected or controlled a term, condition, or privilege of [Plaintiffsâ] employment.â McClements v. Ford Motor Co., 702 N.W.2d 166, 174-75 (Mich. 2005). Plaintiffs have not made that showing. McDonaldâs played no role in determining the terms or conditions of their employment and had no meaningful authority to do so. Cf. Whitfield v. McDonaldâs, No. 08-118582, 2010 WL 6593297 (Wayne Cnty. Cir. Ct. July 28, 2010) (finding insufficient evidence that McDonaldâs affected or controlled the terms of employment for its franchiseeâs employees). In addition, under Michigan franchise law, [t]o the extent allocation of employer responsibilities between the franchisor and franchisee is permitted by law, the franchisee shall be considered the sole employer of workers for whom it provides a benefit plan or pays wages except as otherwise specifically provided in the franchise agreement. Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.1504b. Under that statute, Franchisee was the sole employer for the workers at Franchiseeâs restaurants because Franchisee was responsible for paying their wages and benefits. Thus, if § 445.1504b applies to the ELCRA, then McDonaldâs was not an employer subject to suit under the ELCRA. 2. Apparent Authority To the extent Plaintiffsâ claim relies on a theory of âapparent authority,â their claim fails under the ELCRA just as it did under Title VII. The Michigan Supreme Court has said that the definition of employer in the ELCRA, which includes âan agent of that person,â âmean[s] that the Legislature intended to make the agent tantamount to the employer so that the agent unmistakably is also subject to suit along with the employer.â Elezovic v. Ford Motor Co., 697 N.W.2d 851, 857-58 (Mich. 2005) (âElezovic Iâ). In other words, both the employer and an agent of the employer can be liable under the ELCRA. Consequently, an employee-plaintiff can sue her employer as well as the supervisor who sexually harassed the plaintiff. Id. at 861; see Elezovic v. Bennett, 731 N.W.2d 452, 461 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (âElezovic IIâ) (âAgents [under the ELCRA] are persons to whom the employing agency delegates supervisory power and authority over subordinatesâ on things such as âpromotions, bonuses, overtime options, raises, shift and job assignments, and terminations[.]â (emphasis added)). But McDonaldâs was neither Plaintiffsâ âemploying agencyâ nor an agent of such an entity. Plaintiffs fail to cite a case in which a Michigan court permitted a claim under the ELCRA against an âapparentâ employer, i.e., an entity whom the employee mistakenly believed was the one who controlled the terms and conditions of her employment. Indeed, the parties cite only one Michigan state court case that addresses an âapparent agencyâ theory of liability under the ELCRA, and the court in that case rejected it as applied to McDonaldâs. According to that court, âan âagentâ is one to whom supervisory power and authority over subordinates is delegated.â Whitfield, 2010 WL 6593297 (citing Elezovic II, 731 N.W.2d at 458). Because the plaintiff in Whitfield failed to show that there was such an agency relationship between McDonaldâs and its franchisee, the plaintiff could not maintain its claim against McDonaldâs. Id. Similarly, Plaintiffs do not contend, let alone show, that there is an agency relationship between McDonaldâs and Franchisee such that Franchisee was âan agent of the employing entity.â There is no genuine dispute that Franchisee was Plaintiffsâ employer, not McDonaldâs. Accordingly, McDonaldâs is not liable under the ELCRA for the actions of Franchisee and its employees. Therefore, McDonaldâs is entitled to summary judgment in its favor for the ELCRA claim as well. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, McDonaldâs is entitled to summary judgment for the Title VII and ELCRA claims, so the Court will grant its motion. There are no other claims against McDonaldâs, so the Court will dismiss it as a defendant. The Court will enter an order consistent with this Opinion. Dated: December 6, 2021 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou HALA Y. JARBOU UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case Information
- Court
- W.D. Mich.
- Decision Date
- December 6, 2021
- Status
- Precedential