RISIS v. SOLAKIAN

                UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                     DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY                             

     CHAMBERS OF                             MARTIN LUTHER KING         
    ESTHER SALAS                               COURTHOUSE               
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE                   50 WALNUT ST.            
                                                ROOM 5076               
                                              NEWARK, NJ 07101          
                                                973-297-4887            

                        December 6, 2024                                

                  LETTER OPINION AND ORDER                              

   Re:  Risis v. Solakian, et al.                                       
        Civil Action No. 23-4188 (ES) (AME)                             

Dear Parties:                                                             

   Before the Court are various motions for purported emergent injunctive relief by pro se 
plaintiff Daniel Risis (“Plaintiff”).  (D.E. Nos. 76, 82, 861 & 90 (together, “Motions”)).  Defendant 
BUPM NJ Assets LLC (“BUPM NJ”) filed oppositions to three of Plaintiff’s four Motions.  (D.E. 
Nos. 79, 85 & 87).  For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motions. 

I.   PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND                                                

   Plaintiff  previously  requested  similar  emergent  relief  before  the  Honorable  Kevin 
McNulty, U.S.D.J.,2 and accordingly, the Court recounts certain aspects of the procedural posture, 
claims, and allegedly emergent situation from Judge McNulty’s Opinion dated October 12, 2023, 
denying similar requests from Plaintiff for emergent injunctive relief.  (See generally D.E. No. 17).  
The Complaint arises out of commercial mortgage loans to  entities with which Plaintiff is 
affiliated.  (Id. at 1).  The Complaint is brought by Mr. Risis, the sole plaintiff in this action, against 
twenty-one defendants, including banks, companies, individuals, and law firms.  (Id.).  Plaintiff 
alleges a years-long pattern of fraud and criminality and seeks damages of $100 million.  (Id.).  
Evidently, these parties have been embroiled in litigation, including bankruptcy litigation, for 
years.  (Id.).  Adverse judgments have been entered, although the particulars are difficult to glean 
from Plaintiff’s papers.  (Id.).3  Indeed, Plaintiff complains of various alleged frauds in connection 

1    Although not styled explicitly as a motion for injunctive relief, the Court construes Plaintiff’s “Motion for 
Leave to Investigate” (D.E. No. 86) as seeking the same relief as set forth in Plaintiff’s purportedly emergent requests.  
(See id. at 2 (citing case law setting forth the legal standard for granting injunctive relief)). 
2    On November 29, 2023, this action was reassigned from Judge McNulty to the Undersigned.  (D.E. No. 34). 

3    Decisions from certain underlying state court proceedings are recounted by defendant BUPM NJ and attached 
as exhibits to its opposition briefs.  (See D.E. Nos. 79, 85 & 87).  This Court may take judicial notice of these publicly 
filed court documents in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motions on the same subject matter, see McTernan v. City of York, 
577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009), and notes that these decisions largely dispose of identical requests for relief.  (See, 
e.g., D.E. No. 79-5 (October 20, 2023 Order denying request seeking immediate stay of a deed transfer and immediate 
“cease and desist” of BUPM NJ’s entry into “the property located at 1275 Rt 23, Wayne, New Jersey” where final 
with underlying state and criminal matters, which he claims resulted in a deprivation of his due 
process rights and necessitate immediate federal intervention.  (See, e.g., D.E. No. 75 at 1–4).   

   As best as this Court can glean, Plaintiff’s Motions seek a variety of relief in connection 
with a property located at 1275 Route 23 in Wayne, New Jersey (the “Wayne Property”), including 
(i) an order enjoining State court proceedings involving a Writ of Possession of what appears to 
be the Wayne Property owned by Dalex Development Inc.,4 (ii) removal of state court matters to 
federal court, (iii) a federal investigation of allegedly fraudulent and criminal activities, (iv) a stay 
of all matters related to the instant matter, (v) an order enjoining defendant BUPM NJ from 
changing locks and “stealing” Plaintiff’s $10 million in inventory, (vi) a stay of the judgment of 
foreclosure and any further enforcement actions on the Wayne Property, (vii) restoration of title 
and ownership of the Wayne Property to Plaintiff and relatedly, an order rescinding the conveyance 
of the Wayne Property, and (viii) an injunction preventing future sales, transfers, or alterations to 
the title of the Wayne Property until an investigation and final court ruling are complete.  (See 
generally D.E. Nos. 76, 82, 86 & 90).  Moreover, Plaintiff also maintains that he has suffered 
unlawful foreclosure and other actions that have resulted in his loss of property, business, goodwill, 
and community outreach.  (D.E. No. 76 at 9).  As Judge McNulty noted, according to Plaintiff, no 
further proceedings should occur until there is a “proper investigation” of the defendants and their 
various alleged criminal and fraudulent dealings.  (See, e.g., D.E. Nos. 76 & 82). 

II.  LEGAL STANDARD                                                       

   A district court may issue injunctive relief in the form of a temporary restraining order 
(“TRO”).  Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).  A TRO may be issued without notice to the adverse party but 
usually expires after 14 days.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1), (2).  The grant of injunctive relief is an 
“extraordinary remedy, which should be granted only in limited circumstances.”  Instant Air 
Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 1989).       

   In addition to the basic requirement of exigency, courts consider four factors in deciding 
whether a temporary restraining order or other injunctive relief should issue: “(1) a substantial 

judgment had been entered more than three years prior); D.E. No. 87-5 (October 24, 2024 Order denying request for 
reconsideration of the final judgment and writ of execution issued on July 17, 2020 as untimely and unmeritorious)).     
4    “Dalex Development Inc.” is not a party to this action.  Plaintiff curiously named “BUPM NJ Assets LLC 
(Dalex Development)” as a defendant on the civil cover sheet (D.E. No. 1-1 at 2), but uses “BUPM NJ Assets LLC” 
in his filings (see, e.g., D.E. No. 1 at 1); the distinction, if any, between these entities remains unclear.  In any event, 
Plaintiff maintains that he is the sole owner of Dalex Development Inc.  (D.E. No. 82 at 2).  Plaintiff also asks the 
Court to “permit the conversion of Dalex Development Inc. from a corporation to a sole proprietorship.”  (Id.).  He 
claims that “[t]his conversion will allow [him], as the sole proprietor, to represent Dalex Development in this court 
and proceed pro se, in accordance with New Jersey law which permits self-representation for sole proprietors.”  (Id.).  
Plaintiff has not provided—nor has the Court located—any authority that permits the contemplated “conversion” of 
Dalex Development Inc. to a sole proprietorship for the purpose of pro se representation.  Accordingly, the Court 
declines to entertain this aspect of Plaintiff’s request.  As previously warned, to the extent Plaintiff purports to sue on 
behalf of corporations and LLC[s] with which he is affiliated . . . . [s]uch entities, [], must be represented by an attorney 
in federal court.”  (D.E. No. 17 at 3 n.1 (citing cases)).  Notwithstanding the above, however, the Court’s ruling on 
the present Motions does not hinge on Plaintiff’s relationship to, or his purportedly improper pro se representation of, 
Dalex Development Inc.                                                    
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likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is 
denied; (3) that granting preliminary relief will not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving 
party; and (4) that the public interest favors such relief.”  Ace Am. Ins. v. Wachovia Ins. Agency 
Inc., 306 F. App’x 727, 730–31 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 
700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004)).  A party must produce sufficient evidence of all four factors before 
granting injunctive relief.  Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 
1421, 1427 (3d Cir. 1994).5                                               

III.  DISCUSSION                                                          

   As a preliminary matter, although the Court appreciates Plaintiff’s requests for oral 
argument,6 pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this District’s Local Civil Rules, 
the decision to grant oral argument is discretionary and not a matter of right.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
78(b) (“[T]he court may provide for submitting and determining motions on briefs, without oral 
hearings.” (emphasis added)); see also L. Civ. R. 78.1(b).  The Court exercises its discretion to 
resolve the present Motions without oral argument in accordance with the Federal and Local Rules. 

   Plaintiff continues to make broad and vague allegations of white-collar crime, dishonesty, 
fraud, and other wrongdoing, much of it unrelated to the issues raised in the Complaint, which 
appear to relate to loans Plaintiff borrowed from Mariners Bank and grievances born out of 
Plaintiff’s bankruptcy.  (See D.E. No. 1 ¶¶ 23, 42–43 & 52).  Much like before, Plaintiff’s Motions 
are rife with conclusory accusations of fraud and criminality that are untethered to any concrete 
facts in the Complaint or elsewhere in the record.  (See, e.g., D.E. No. 76 at 2 (claiming that “Judge 
Covello’s oversight in [another state court matter] has demonstrated a bias and potential complicity 
in fraud, mirroring issues in the Mariners Bank case overseen by the very same judge”)).  It remains 
true that the Complaint asserts mainly state-law claims on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, which 
Judge McNulty previously found this Court lacked for purposes of Plaintiff’s prior requested 
TROs.7  (See D.E. No. 17 at 3–4 (finding no diversity jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims 
and disregarding other counts invoking federal-question jurisdiction as inapplicable to private 
parties or the alleged wrongdoings alleged in Plaintiff’s prior requests for emergent relief)).  In 
addition, and relevant here, the Court remains skeptical that Plaintiff has properly invoked federal-
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  (See id. at 5–6 (finding that Plaintiff failed to “relate 

5    In addition, for a TRO to issue, the movant must provide “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint 
[that] clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse 
party can be heard.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A); see also L. Civ. R. 65.1 (providing that “[n]o order to show cause 
to bring on a matter for hearing will be granted except on a clear and specific showing by affidavit, other document 
complying with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or verified pleading of good and sufficient reasons why a procedure other than by 
notice of motion is necessary”).                                          

6    See, e.g., D.E. Nos. 76 at 11 & 91.  In addition, as Judge McNulty previously noted, despite Plaintiff’s pro 
se status, he curiously continues to write to the Court “on stationary bearing the heading ‘Pierce Bainbridge.’  The 
reasons for this are not apparent.  There is, or was, a law firm by the name of Pierce Bainbridge Beck Price & Hecht 
LLP.”  (D.E. No. 17 at 3 n.1).  It remains, however, that Plaintiff is not represented by counsel.     
7    There are multiple pending motions to dismiss the Complaint that will be addressed by this Court in due 
course.   At this time, the Court does not rule on the various motions to dismiss or express any view as to the ultimate 
viability of Plaintiff’s Complaint, whether in its current form or in any potential forthcoming amended form. 
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any specific factual allegation to the elements of any federal cause of action over which this court 
has jurisdiction”)).                                                      

   To the extent Plaintiff continues to complain about adverse rulings in other state court 
matters, “[r]es judicata doctrines and New Jersey’s entire controversy rule, for example, would bar 
re-litigation in this Court of matters that were decided in the prior litigations.  The effect of adverse 
rulings cannot be avoided by claims that one’s arguments were ‘ignored’ by the prior court.”  (Id. 
at 4 n.3); see Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
precludes  lower  federal  courts  “from  exercising  appellate  jurisdiction  over  final  state-court 
judgments” because such appellate jurisdiction rests solely with the United States Supreme Court); 
Grossberger v. Superior Ct. Essex Cnty., No. 22-5484, 2022 WL 4449379, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 
2022) (“Plaintiff improperly seeks to have this Court review and overturn the ruling of the Superior 
Court of New Jersey, Essex County.”).                                     

   Relevant here, a federal claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine when it was either 
“actually litigated in a state court prior to the filing of the federal action” or “inextricably 
intertwined with the state adjudication, meaning that federal relief can only be predicated upon a 
conviction that the state court was wrong.”  In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573, 580 (3d Cir. 2005).  The 
Third  Circuit  has  clarified  that  a  federal  claim  is  “inextricably  intertwined”  with  an  issue 
adjudicated by a state court when “(1) the federal court must determine that the state court 
judgment was erroneously entered in order to grant the requested relief, or (2) the federal court 
must take an action that would negate the state court’s judgment.”  In re Madera, 586 F.3d 228, 
232 (3d Cir. 2009).  Notwithstanding whether Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of any 
viable federal claim he purports to assert, the majority of the relief he requests in the present 
Motions  would  run  afoul  of  the  Rooker-Feldman  doctrine  as  it  appears  that  much  of  the 
complained-of conduct has already been adjudicated in state court.  Indeed, there is no authority 
for this Court to interfere with state court proceedings, including the future or past foreclosure of 
property.  See, e.g., Albert v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 19-0074, 2020 WL 865435, at 
*2 (D.N.J. Feb. 14, 2020) (“[T]his Court denied [p]laintiff’s application for emergent injunctive 
relief, finding that his request to enjoin the foreclosure sale of his property was prohibited by 
Rooker-Feldman.”).  Thus, this Court cannot engage in further review of those state-court matters.        

   Moreover, as with Plaintiff’s prior requests before Judge McNulty, he has not explained 
“why the usual procedures for appealing or otherwise challenging judgments of state courts have 
not been pursued or would not suffice for correction of error.”  (D.E. No. 17 at 6).  As previously 
warned, “[t]he federal district courts do not generally sit in review of state-court, state-law 
proceedings,” and Plaintiff’s continued request for emergent relief do not “set forth an adequate 
basis to believe that he will succeed on any claim that this Court has the power to hear.”  (Id.).  
Thus, to the extent Plaintiff’s Motions seek this Court’s review of any state court judgments or 
proceedings, those requests are denied as not properly before this Court. 

   Next, Plaintiff’s requests for removal of other state court actions to this Court are without 
merit on their face.  Plaintiff provides no bases for the timely removal of other state court matters 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); nor is it apparent that this Court would have jurisdiction over the 
claims raised in the other state court actions.  In a similar vein, this Court may not institute a 
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blanket stay of other matters—whether in federal or state court.          

   To the extent Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to 
prevent defendant BUPM NJ from changing locks and stealing Plaintiff’s inventory, Plaintiff has 
not shown that he is entitled to such extraordinary relief.  “The decision to grant or deny . . . 
injunctive relief is an act of equitable discretion by the district court.”  eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 
LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).  Injunctive relief remains “an extraordinary remedy never awarded 
as of right.”  Groupe SEB USA, Inc. v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC, 774 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008)).  Plaintiff has failed to 
present any legal theory under which he seeks relief from this Court and has not explained the 
ultimate likelihood of success on the merits of his purported claims; nor can the Court discern any 
legal theories that would entitle Plaintiff to the relief he seeks.       

   Finally, with respect to Plaintiff’s repeated requests for federal investigations, “[t]he 
Supreme Court has observed that the executive branch ‘has exclusive authority and absolute 
discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.”’  Stolt–Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 
177, 183 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974)).  “The 
prosecutorial discretion retained by the Attorney General and United States Attorneys to enforce 
the Nation’s criminal laws is broad.”  Soobzokov v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 515 F. App’x 98, 100 (3d 
Cir. 2013).  However, the Third Circuit has acknowledged the well-established principle “that an 
agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a 
decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”  Id. at 100–01 (quoting Heckler 
v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985)).  Indeed, “[t]his recognition of the existence of discretion is 
attributable in no small part to the general unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions to 
refuse enforcement.”  Id. at 101 (quoting Heckler, 470 at 831).  Accordingly, this Court does not 
have the authority to order a federal criminal or civil investigation.    

   Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motions (D.E. Nos. 76, 82, 86 & 
90) are DENIED.                                                           

   SO ORDERED.                                                          


                                      s/ Esther Salas                   
                                      Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.            
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