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[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"11141350","type":"100trialcourt","part":"other","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------x
DINA ROACH, EVELINA CRUZ, ARCHIL
LOMIDZE and ZAKIR HOSSAIN,
Individually and on behalf of all MEMORANDUM & ORDER
others similarly situated, 23-CV-3410 (EK)(PK)
Plaintiffs,
-against-
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, DAVID DO, Chair
of the NYC Taxi and Limousine
Commission, ANDREW RABIN and ANITA
ARMSTRONG,
Defendants.
------------------------------------x
ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:
Plaintiffs Dina Roach, Evelina Cruz, Archil Lomidze
and Zakir Hossain are livery drivers in New York City.1 They
filed this action against the City of New York and several
individual defendants, on behalf of themselves and a putative
class of similarly situated drivers. They claim defendants
violated the federal Constitution and New York state law when
they suspended plaintiffs’ for-hire vehicle licenses before a
hearing. They seek damages, a declaratory judgment that the
City’s license suspension process violates federal and city law,
an injunction prohibiting the City from summarily suspending
1 The individual defendants are David Do, the Chair of the City’s Taxi
and Limousine Commission, and Commission attorneys Andrew Rabin and Anita
Armstrong.
drivers before a hearing, and an injunction against certain
aspects of the post-suspension hearing process.
Defendants — all jointly represented — have moved to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. They argue
that the Second Circuit has already considered and rejected most
of plaintiffs’ due process claims, and that the remaining claims
are meritless as a matter of law. For the reasons set forth
below, the motion to dismiss is granted.
Background
A. Administrative Regime
New York City’s Taxi and Limousine Commission (“TLC”)
regulates local taxicabs and for-hire vehicles. A TLC license
is a required certification for taxicab and for-hire drivers to
operate in the City. Section 19-512.1(a) of the New York City
Administrative Code permits the TLC to “suspend a taxicab [or]
for-hire vehicle license” on a showing of good cause “relating
to a direct and substantial threat to the public health or
safety and prior to giving notice and an opportunity for a
hearing.”
Pursuant to Section 19-512.1(a), the TLC promulgated
an administrative regulation, 35 R.C.N.Y. § 68-15(d). That
regulation allows the TLC to “summarily suspend a License based
upon criminal charges pending against a Licensee if the
Chairperson believes that the charges, if true, would
demonstrate that continued licensure would constitute a direct
and substantial threat to public health or safety.” R.C.N.Y.
§ 68-15(d)(1). The regulation identifies certain charges that
warrant summary suspension, including all felonies and specified
misdemeanors considered to pose a threat to public safety. Id.
§§ 68-15(d)(1)(i)-(ii).
The TLC commonly suspends licenses based upon such
specified charges without a hearing. See First Am. Compl.
(“FAC”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 12. Once his or her license is suspended,
the driver may request a post-suspension hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge in the City’s Office of Administrative
Trials and Hearings. R.C.N.Y. § 68-15(a)(2)-(3). Before the
Second Circuit decided Nnebe v. Daus,
931 F.3d 66
(2d Cir. 2019)
(“Nnebe 2019”), this hearing was “designed to determine whether
(a) the suspended driver ha[d] been charged with a crime, (b)
the charge [was] still pending, and (c) there [was] a nexus
between the charged crime and public health or safety.” Nnebe
v. Daus,
184 F. Supp. 3d 54
, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Nnebe 2016”).2
In Nnebe 2019, however, the Second Circuit held that this
categorical approach violated due process.
931 F.3d at 70, 88
.
The Circuit counseled that due process requires a hearing
officer to consider individualized evidence of a given driver’s
2 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order
accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal
quotation marks.
“ongoing danger to health and public safety” before suspending
his or her license.
Id.
In response to Nnebe 2019, the TLC made its hearing
process more driver-specific. The ALJ continues to assume the
truth of the pending criminal charges, but now looks to the
facts alleged in the individual case. Thus, the TLC must now
“prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the charges
pending against the Respondent, if true, demonstrate that the
continuation of the Respondent’s License during the pendency of
criminal charges would pose a direct and substantial threat to
public health or safety.” R.C.N.Y. § 68-15(d)(5). Both parties
may present evidence related to:
(a) The particular facts and circumstances
underlying the criminal charges, including the
connection between the alleged offense and the
Respondent’s duties and responsibilities as a
driver licensed by the Commission;
(b) The Respondent’s driving record . . . ;
(c) The Respondent’s previous criminal record, or
lack thereof;
(d) The Respondent’s character and standing in
the community; and
(e) Any other evidence relevant to whether
continued licensure of the Respondent during the
pendency of criminal charges would pose a direct
and substantial threat to public health or
safety.
Id. § 68-15(d)(5)(a)-(e).
Upon receiving the ALJ’s recommendation, the TLC
chairperson issues a final decision either accepting, rejecting,
or modifying that recommendation. Id. § 68-15(d)(7). The
Second Circuit has observed that, since Nnebe 2019, the
chairperson has handled recent cases “evenhandedly, consistently
adopting the ALJs’ recommendations.” Nnebe v. Daus, Nos. 21-
173-CV, 21-170-CV,
2022 WL 1220204
, at *1, *3 (2d Cir. Apr. 26,
2022) (“Nnebe 2022”).
B. Factual Background
The following factual allegations are drawn from the
operative complaint. The Court takes all facts alleged therein
as true and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’
favor. See In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig.,
503 F.3d 89, 91
(2d Cir. 2007).
The named plaintiffs are for-hire vehicle drivers.
See FAC ¶¶ 139, 146, 152, 158. Each plaintiff was arrested and
charged with a felony or one of the enumerated misdemeanors.
Id. ¶¶ 17, 22, 27, 32. The TLC summarily suspended their
licenses pursuant to Section 68-15. Id. Each plaintiff
requested a hearing to challenge the suspension. Id. ¶¶ 20, 25,
30, 36. At each plaintiff’s hearing, the TLC presented the
“police report and / or the criminal complaint” to establish the
facts alleged against the specific plaintiff. Id. ¶ 128.
Dina Roach and Evelina Cruz. At the post-suspension
hearings for Dina Roach and Evelina Cruz, the parties presented
the “arrest charges and the pending charges” as well as other
specific facts, such as the “facts underlying the arrest and
[the relevant licensee’s] record[s].” Id. ¶¶ 20, 25, 145, 151.
The ALJs recommended Ms. Roach’s and Ms. Cruz’s reinstatements.
Id. ¶¶ 20, 25. The chairperson accepted those recommendations,
and their licenses were reinstated. Id. ¶¶ 21, 26.3
Archil Lomidze and Zakir Hossain. At the post-
suspension hearings held for Archil Lomidze and Zakir Hossain,
the TLC opposed reinstating their licenses and presented the
pending charges in support. Id. ¶¶ 28, 30, 162. The ALJ
recommended extending their suspensions, and the chairperson
accepted those recommendations. Id. ¶¶ 30, 156, 165. The
pending criminal charges against Mr. Lomidze were eventually
dismissed, though it is not entirely clear from the complaint
whether his license was reinstated. Id. ¶ 31. Mr. Hossain’s
suspension remains in effect and his criminal charges remain
pending. Id. ¶ 36.
3 The plaintiffs whose licenses were reinstated still have standing to
pursue this action (and their claims are not mooted by the reinstatement).
“[A] post-deprivation proceeding cannot remedy an initial failure to satisfy
a requirement that there have been a pre-deprivation hearing.” Gupta v. City
of Norwalk, No. 98-CV-2153,
2007 WL 988692
, at *4 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2007)
(citing Todaro v. Norat,
112 F.3d 598, 599-600
(2d Cir. 1997)); see also
Manza v. Newhard,
470 F. App’x 6, 9
(2d Cir. 2012) (a sufficient post-
deprivation remedy “does not address whether [plaintiff] received sufficient
pre-deprivation process”). The defendants do not argue otherwise.
The plaintiffs seek (1) a declaration that the summary
suspension practice violates the Due Process Clause; (2) an
order enjoining the defendants from suspending TLC licenses
before “meaningful hearings”; (3) an order mandating that any
“unlawfully suspended licenses be reinstated”; (4) compensatory
damages; and (5) punitive damages. Id. ¶ 168.4
Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a
complaint must plead facts sufficient “to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). A claim is facially
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S.
662, 678
(2009). The Court must accept all factual allegations
in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in
the plaintiffs’ favor. See Lundy v. Cath. Health Sys. of Long
Island Inc.,
711 F.3d 106, 113
(2d Cir. 2013). At the same
time, however, the Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at
678
.
4 Plaintiffs also seek a “declaration that the summary suspension
policy, TLC Rule 68-15, and the presumption of guilt policy are in violation
of the NYC Code.” FAC ¶ 168. But considering its decision not to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction, see infra at Part III.C, the Court need not
consider whether the summary suspension policy violates City law.
Discussion
A. Procedural Due Process
The plaintiffs claim that the TLC’s summary pre-
hearing suspension practice (and possibly its post-suspension
hearing procedures) violate their Fourteenth Amendment right to
procedural due process. See FAC ¶¶ 178-181. These arguments
are squarely foreclosed by controlling Second Circuit precedent.
As plaintiffs themselves recognize, see Pls.’ Opp’n
Br. 11, ECF No. 23, Nnebe 2011 bars their challenge to the
summary suspension process.5 There, the Second Circuit
unambiguously held that the City is “not required to grant a
driver a hearing before suspending his license because of an
arrest.” Nnebe 2011, 644 F.3d at 158. The Court therefore need
not go any further. The procedural due process challenge to the
TLC’s summary suspension process is dismissed.
Plaintiffs also seem to allege that the TLC’s current
post-suspension hearing procedures violate procedural due
process, though they do not expound this argument in their
briefing. See FAC ¶¶ 118-132, 178. In substance, plaintiffs
allege that because “hearings are not scheduled automatically,”
the TLC “relies on the police reports and / or the criminal
complaint,” and the ALJ does not assess the truth of the
5 Page numbers in citations to briefs refer to native pagination.
underlying charges, the existing post-suspension procedures are
inadequate. Id. ¶¶ 118, 124, 128.
The Second Circuit has rejected these arguments, too.
Following Nnebe 2019, a neighboring district court reviewed and
upheld the TLC’s revised post-suspension hearing procedures.
See Nnebe 2020, 510 F. Supp. 3d at 187-88, 198. The Second
Circuit affirmed. Nnebe 2022,
2022 WL 1220204
, at *4. And the
instant complaint does not allege that the TLC’s procedures have
changed in any way since that affirmance. In fact, it describes
processes entirely consistent with Nnebe 2020. Here, as in
Nnebe 2020, the complaint alleges that licensees must request a
hearing (rather than have one scheduled automatically), see FAC
¶ 118, and that the TLC relies mainly on the “police report and
/ or the criminal complaint,” along with any prior record. Id.
¶¶ 20, 25, 128. These processes survive constitutional scrutiny
for the same reasons outlined in Nnebe 2020 and later affirmed
by the Second Circuit. See 510 F. Supp. 3d at 188, 192.
Put bluntly, plaintiffs’ counsel has filed procedural
due process claims that are clearly foreclosed by existing
Second Circuit precedent. Indeed, their briefing concedes as
much. Pls.’ Opp’n Br. 11.6 This strategy brings to mind Rule
11, which is implicated when “it is patently clear that a claim
6 Specifically, plaintiffs’ brief “concede[s] that [the procedural due
process] claim is contrary to the Court of Appeals’ 2011 decision,” and
expressly consents to dismissal of that claim. Pls.’ Opp’n Br. 11.
has absolutely no chance of success under the existing
precedents, and where no reasonable argument can be advanced to
extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands.” Eastway
Constr. Corp. v. City of New York,
762 F.2d 243
, 254 (2d Cir.
1985).
To be sure, plaintiffs’ counsel claims that there
might be a basis for modifying Second Circuit precedent
upholding summary suspension, because Nnebe 2011 and its
successors rely on the (supposedly faulty) assumption that the
“fact of an arrest provided sufficient indicia of a threat to
public health and safety to permit an immediate suspension at a
point at which little was known.” Pls.’ Opp’n Br. 11 n.4
(citing Nnebe 2019,
931 F.3d at 82-83
). But this assumption was
operative when Nnebe 2020 (and Nnebe 2022) upheld the TLC’s
post-suspension hearing procedures.
The Court will not further contemplate Rule 11
sanctions here, given that defendants have not moved for them.7
Plaintiffs’ counsel is advised, however, that future attempts to
file similarly foreclosed claims (absent a clearly articulated
basis for modifying or extending existing law, or an arguably
material change in the operative facts) may result in a
different outcome.
7 Generally, district courts do not impose sanctions sua sponte absent
evidence of “subjective bad faith.” Muhammad v. Walmart Stores E., L.P.,
732
F.3d 104, 108
(2d Cir. 2013).
B. Substantive Due Process
Plaintiffs also claim that their license suspensions
violated their substantive due process rights. FAC ¶¶ 4, 182-
84. While the Second Circuit has not directly foreclosed this
claim, it too fails.
Under the substantive due process doctrine, the state
may not infringe on certain “fundamental” liberty interests “no
matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Reno
v. Flores,
507 U.S. 292, 302
(1993). When no fundamental
interest is at stake, a court will find a substantive due
process violation “only when a plaintiff can demonstrate that
there is no rational relationship” between the government action
and a “legitimate legislative purpose.” Sensational Smiles, LLC
v. Mullen,
793 F.3d 281, 284
(2d Cir. 2015); accord Doe v.
Franklin Square Union Free Sch. Dist.,
100 F.4th 86, 94
(2d Cir.
2024).
The first step, therefore, is to determine whether
plaintiffs have alleged an infringement of a fundamental right.
A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that such a right
exists. Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110, 125
(1989). A
fundamental right is one that is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.” Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.,
597 U.S. 215,
231
(2022). And any substantive due process analysis must, in
the interest of judicial restraint, “begin with a careful
description of the asserted right.” Flores,
507 U.S. at 302
.
Plaintiffs have not alleged infringement of a
fundamental right. They argue that the fundamental liberty
interest at stake is their right to “engage in any of the common
occupations of life.” Pls.’ Opp’n Br. 12 (quoting Bd. of
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 572
(1972)).
But this description flouts the Supreme Court’s command, in the
context of substantive due process, to define rights carefully.
Flores,
507 U.S. at 302
. For example, the Flores Court rejected
the respondents’ generalized description of the relevant right
as “freedom from physical restraint.”
Id.
Instead, it
concluded that the relevant right was: “the right of a child who
has no available parent, close relative, or legal guardian, and
for whom the government is responsible, to be placed in the
custody of a willing-and-able private custodian rather than of a
government-operated or government-selected child-care
institution.”
Id.
Thus, an appropriately specific description of the
right at issue here would be: “the . . . right of a taxi driver
who has been arrested and charged with a crime to have the
suspension of his license lifted pending resolution of his
criminal case.” See Nnebe 2016, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 72.8
Plaintiffs identify no authority or other basis to suggest that
such a right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition,” Dobbs,
597 U.S. at 231
, and the Court is aware of
none.
Thus, plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim is
subject to rational basis review. In that context, we begin
with the recognition that while the Due Process Clause assuredly
“includes some generalized due process right to choose one’s
field of private employment,” that right is “subject to
reasonable government regulation.” Conn v. Gabbert,
526 U.S.
286, 291-92
(1999). Moreover, the cases recognizing such a
right deal with “a complete prohibition of the right to engage
in a calling,”
id. at 292
, not with (as is the case here)
regulations reasonably calculated to protect public safety.
See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia,
129 U.S. 114
(1889) (upholding
licensing requirement for medical practitioners). As discussed
above, the plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that the
existing TLC regulations governing license suspensions are
unreasonable or otherwise unlawful. Accordingly, plaintiffs’
substantive due process claim fails.
8 The Second Circuit took no position on this description, writing that
the plaintiffs had “affirmatively disavowed” any substantive due process
claim on appeal. Nnebe 2019,
931 F.3d at 89
.
C. Non-Federal Claims
Having dismissed the federal claims, the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining non-federal claims.
28 U.S.C. § 1367
(c)(3); Motorola
Credit Corp. v. Uzan,
388 F.3d 39, 56
(2d Cir. 2004).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to
dismiss is granted. Plaintiffs’ due process claims are
dismissed with prejudice, given that they do not seek leave to
amend, and amendment would be futile in any case. See Gallop v.
Cheney,
642 F.3d 364, 370
(2d Cir. 2011) (“[N]o court can be
said to have erred in failing to grant a request that was not
made.”); Forman v. Davis,
371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962) (courts may
deny leave to amend based on the “futility of amendment”). The
remaining non-federal claims are dismissed without prejudice.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment
and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Eric Komitee
ERIC KOMITEE
United States District Judge
Dated: September 17, 2025
Brooklyn, New YorkCase Information
- Court
- E.D.N.Y
- Decision Date
- September 17, 2025
- Status
- Precedential