Robert R. Cushing, et al. v. P Sherman Packard, in his official capacity as Speaker of the House for the N.H. House of Representatives

                      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE


Robert R. Cushing, et al.

      v.                                              Civil No. 21-cv-147-LM
                                                      Opinion No. 2021 DNH 039 P
Sherman Packard, in his official capacity as
Speaker of the House for the N.H. House of
Representatives



                                      ORDER

      Seven members of the New Hampshire House of Representatives1

(“Individual Plaintiffs”) and the New Hampshire Democratic Party bring this suit

against the Speaker of the New Hampshire House of Representatives. Each of the

Individual Plaintiffs has one or more serious health conditions that place him or her

at high risk for severe illness or death should he or she contract COVID-19.

Plaintiffs allege that the Speaker’s failure to allow the Individual Plaintiffs to

participate remotely in House sessions violates Title II of the Americans With

Disabilities Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134), Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794), the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution, and Part I, Article 11 of the New Hampshire

Constitution.




      1 The members’ names are Robert “Renny” Cushing, David Cote, Kenneth

Snow, Katherine Rogers, Paul Berch, Diane Langley, and Charlotte DiLorenzo.
Cushing sues in both his individual capacity and as the Minority Leader of the New
Hampshire House of Representatives.
       Presently before the court is plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining

order or preliminary injunction (doc. no. 2) compelling the Speaker to permit the

Individual Plaintiffs and 23 other House members with serious health conditions to

participate remotely in an upcoming session of the House on February 24 and 25,

2021. The court held a hearing on plaintiffs’ motion on February 19, 2021.



                              STANDARD OF REVIEW

       “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy; it is never

awarded as of right.” Granite Trade Sch., LLC v. The N.H. Sch. of Mech. Trades,

Inc., 120 F. Supp. 3d 56, 61 (D.N.H. 2015) (quoting Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674,

689-90 (2008)). A plaintiff seeking a temporary restraining order or a preliminary

injunction must show that: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim; (2)

he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the

balance of equities are in his favor; and (4) injunctive relief is in the public interest.

Id.; see Nw. Bypass Grp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 453 F. Supp. 2d 333, 337

(D.N.H. 2006) (explaining that the standard for granting a temporary restraining

order is the same as the standard for granting a preliminary injunction). Of these

four factors, the first—likelihood of success on the merits—is the most important.

Norris ex rel. A.M. v. Cape Elizabeth Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d 12, 22 (1st Cir. 2020). If

the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he is likely to succeed on the merits, the

request for a preliminary injunction must be denied. Arborjet, Inc. v. Rainbow

Treecare Sci. Advancements, Inc., 794 F.3d 168, 173 (1st Cir. 2015).



                                            2
                                   BACKGROUND

      The following facts are drawn from the parties’ statement of undisputed facts

(doc. no. 19), from the declarations and exhibits attached to their pleadings,2 and

from testimony elicited at the hearing. As noted, Individual Plaintiffs are members

of the New Hampshire House of Representatives and each suffers from one or more

serious medical conditions. Defendant is the Speaker of the House and has served

in that role since December 2020.3

      The House has continued to meet in-person for its full legislative sessions

since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020. In June 2020, the House

convened twice at the Whittemore Center, which is an ice hockey arena at the

University of New Hampshire. The House met at the Whittemore Center again on

September 16, 2020. On December 2, 2020, the House convened a session outside

the Whittemore Center on an athletic field. And on January 6, 2021, the House

held a session in a parking lot at the University of New Hampshire with members

seated in their cars. House committees, however, have met both remotely and in a

hybrid model since the onset of the pandemic and House leadership has researched

various methods to implement remote participation in full sessions since at least

the summer of 2020.




      2 The parties stipulated to the admission of these materials for purposes of

ruling on plaintiffs’ motion. See doc. no. 21.

      3 The Speaker served as the Acting Speaker until formally elected Speaker on

January 6, 2021.

                                           3
      The New Hampshire Constitution states that the House has the power to

“settle [its] rules of proceedings.” N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 22. House Rule 65 sets

forth an order of precedence by which House procedures are determined. See Rule

65: Sources of Authority (N.H.H.R. House Rules 2021-2022).4 House Rule 65 states

that, if a given procedure is not governed by a constitutional provision, another

House rule, or “[c]ustom, usage, and precedent,” the procedure “shall be derived”

from the 2020 edition of Mason’s Manual of Legislative Procedure.5 Rule 786 of the

2020 edition of Mason’s Manual provides that, “[a]bsent specific authorization by

the constitution or adopted rules of the body, remote participation in floor sessions

by members of the legislative body is prohibited.” Doc. no. 17-3 at 2.

      In the fall of 2020, members of the House twice attempted to amend the

House rules to permit remote participation at House sessions. At the December

2020 House session, Representative Bouldin proposed an amendment to the House

rules that would require the Speaker to permit members upon request to

participate remotely in committee meetings and legislative sessions. The House

voted on and rejected this proposal. And at the January 2021 House session,

another amendment to the House rules was proposed that would have explicitly




      4 Available at http://gencourt.state.nh.us/house/abouthouse/houserules.htm.


      5 At a session of the House on January 6, 2021, the House voted 316-4 to

adopt the 2020 version of Mason’s Manual as its parliamentary manual for
purposes of Rule 65. See N.H.H.R. House Journal No. 2, at 5 (Jan. 6. 2021),
available at http://gencourt.state.nh.us/house/caljourns/journals/2021/HJ_2.pdf.

                                          4
permitted virtual meetings of the full House. The House voted on and rejected this

proposal as well.

      Following the Speaker’s announcement that the House session scheduled for

January 6, 2021, would take place in a parking lot at the University of New

Hampshire, each of the Individual Plaintiffs submitted a written request to him

that they be permitted to participate remotely in House sessions. Each Individual

Plaintiff stated in his or her request that he or she suffers from one or more

underlying medical conditions that substantially increase the risk posed by COVID-

19. In addition to Individual Plaintiffs’ written requests, other members spoke

directly with the Speaker’s office regarding remote options for future sessions. And

Plaintiff Cushing sent the Speaker multiple letters requesting that House members

with disabilities be allowed to participate remotely in House sessions.

      However, the Speaker has not granted any members’ request for remote

participation. In a House Calendar dated February 5, 2021, the Speaker stated:

“The House has not adopted a rule which allows it to meet remotely, either wholly

or in part, and until such a time as the members adopt such a rule, we are obligated

to meet in-person.” N.H.H.R. House Calendar Vol. 43, No. 10, at 1 (Feb. 5, 2021).6

In that same February 5 House Calendar, the Speaker announced that the House

would meet at an indoor venue for a session on February 24 and 25. Following this




      6 Available at http://gencourt.state.nh.us/house/caljourns/calendars/

2021/HC_10.pdf.

                                          5
announcement, plaintiffs continued their efforts to secure from the Speaker the

option of remote participation. They were not successful.

      On February 15, plaintiffs filed this action against the Speaker, arguing that

his failure to provide remote access to House sessions for members with underlying

health conditions violated Title II of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the

Federal and State Constitutions. They contemporaneously filed a motion for a

temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction (doc. no. 2) on the basis of

their Title II and Rehabilitation Act claims. Plaintiffs’ motion seeks injunctive

relief that would permit Individual Plaintiffs—together with 23 other named

disabled House members—to participate remotely at the upcoming House session

on February 24 and 25. Due to the time-sensitive nature of the requested relief, the

court ordered expedited briefing and held a hearing on February 19.



                                   DISCUSSION

      As noted, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction or temporary

restraining order the plaintiffs must demonstrate that they are likely to succeed on

the merits of their claims. The Speaker argues that plaintiffs are not likely to

succeed on their claims because House rules prohibit remote participation in floor

sessions, and because his enforcement of those rules constitutes a legislative act for

which he is entitled to absolute legislative immunity. Plaintiffs disagree and argue

both that legislative immunity does not apply and that they are likely to succeed on

the merits of their Title II and Rehabilitation Act claims.



                                           6
      If the Speaker is immune from suit, as he asserts, the court cannot reach the

merits of plaintiffs’ claims. For this reason, the court begins its analysis with

legislative immunity.

      State legislators have an absolute immunity from suit for legislative acts.

Romero-Barcelo v. Hernandez-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1996). The

immunity precludes suits for monetary as well as injunctive relief. Supreme Court

of Va. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 731-34 (1980). Although

legislative immunity for state officials is rooted in common law, it is “essentially

coterminous” with the immunity granted to federal legislators under the Speech or

Debate Clause of the United States Constitution. Nat’l Ass’n of Soc. Workers v.

Harwood, 69 F.3d 622, 629 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at

732-33); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.

      “Although not based on the doctrine of separation of powers, as is the

constitutional immunity accorded Members of Congress, the state legislative

immunity defense nonetheless implicates ‘principles of comity and federalism.’”

Romero-Barcelo, 75 F.3d at 28 (ellipsis omitted) (quoting Agromayor v. Colberg, 738

F.2d 55, 58-59 (1st Cir. 1984)). Legislative immunity “shelter[s] individual

legislators from the distractions and hindrance of civil litigation” so that they can

perform their legislative duties “without undue interference” from federal lawsuits.

Harwood, 69 F.3d at 629-30; accord, e.g., Scott v. Taylor, 405 F.3d 1251, 1256 (11th

Cir. 2005). Indeed, “the time and energy required to defend against a lawsuit are of

particular concern” when considering “the part-time citizen-legislator,” as is the



                                               7
case here. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 52 (1998). Legislative immunity also

operates “to prevent courts from intruding into precincts that are constitutionally

reserved to the legislative branch.” Harwood, 69 F.3d at 628 n.6.

       Whether legislative immunity applies in a particular case does not depend on

the “the official’s identity, or even on the official’s motive or intent, but on the

nature of the act in question.” State Emps. Bargaining Agent Coal. v. Rowland, 494

F.3d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Almonte v. City of Long Beach, 478 F.3d 100, 106

(2d Cir. 2007)); accord Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54-55. Indeed, even members of the

executive or judicial branch may be entitled to legislative immunity for acts taken

in legislative capacities. See Harwood, 69 F.3d at 630; see also, e.g., Bogan, 523

U.S. at 47, 55 (holding that a mayor was entitled to legislative immunity for acts

that were “integral steps in the legislative process”); Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at

734 (holding that chief justice of state supreme court was entitled to legislative

immunity when he “exercise[ed] the State’s . . . legislative power” to promulgate

ethics regulations for lawyers). Furthermore, legislative immunity may be claimed

not only by government officials, but by governmental entities themselves. See

Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 734 (holding that “the Virginia [Supreme] Court . . .

[is] immune from suit when acting in [its] legislative capacity” to regulate the legal

profession); Hall v. Louisiana, 974 F. Supp. 2d 944, 957 (M.D. La. 2013) (concluding

that a state legislature was immune from suit under the doctrine of legislative

immunity).




                                             8
       That said, legislative immunity does not extend to “all conduct relating to the

legislative process.” United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 515 (1972). It applies

to acts that form “an integral part of the deliberative and communicative process by

which [legislators] participate in . . . House proceedings” and consider legislation.

Harwood, 69 F.3d 632 (quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972)).

Legislative immunity also applies to “matters which the Constitution places within

the jurisdiction of either house.” Romero-Barcelo, 75 F.3d at 29 (quoting

Agromayor, 738 F.2d at 59). “It does not cover ‘actions that are only casually or

incidentally related to legislative affairs.’” Id. (quoting Harwood, 69 F.3d at 630);

see, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proximire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 (1979) (holding that legislative

immunity did not apply to legislator’s act of disseminating newsletters and press

releases because they were “primarily means of informing those outside the

legislative forum”); Negron-Gaztambide v. Hernandez-Torres, 35 F.3d 25, 27-28 (1st

Cir. 1994) (concluding that legislators were not entitled to legislative immunity

from suit challenging decision to discharge a librarian).

       In Harwood, a group of organizations sued the Speaker of the Rhode Island

House of Representatives, as well as the House’s head doorkeeper, seeking to enjoin

the enforcement of a House rule. See Harwood, 69 F.3d at 624-25. The House rule

purported to ban lobbyists from the floor of the House while the House was in

session. See id. The First Circuit held that both the Speaker and the doorkeeper

were immune from plaintiffs’ suit under the doctrine of legislative immunity. See

id. at 635.



                                           9
       The Court explained that, because plaintiffs’ suit challenged “a procedural

rule adopted by a house of the legislature as a whole for the management of its own

business,” plaintiffs were entitled to immunity if the rule was “more than ‘casually

or incidentally related’ to core legislative functions.” Id. at 631 n.9 (quoting

Brewster, 408 U.S. at 528). The First Circuit ultimately found it “beyond serious

dispute” that the rule was closely related to core legislative functions. Id. at 632.

By restricting who may enter the House floor during legislative sessions, the rule

“necessarily affects the manner in which the House conducts its most characteristic

legislative functions,” i.e., “debating and voting.” Id. “A rule that colors the very

conditions under which legislators engage in formal debate is indubitably part and

parcel of the legislative process, and the acts of House officials . . . in enforcing it are

therefore fully protected against judicial interference by the doctrine of legislative

immunity.” Id.

       Harwood stands for the proposition that, “[w]here . . . a legislative body

adopts a rule, not invidiously discriminatory on its face, that bears upon its conduct

of frankly legislative business . . . the doctrine of legislative immunity must protect

[officials] who do no more than carry out the will of the body by enforcing the rule as

part of their official duties.” Id. at 631 (citation omitted). This includes rules that

regulate “the very atmosphere in which lawmaking deliberations occur.” Id. at 633

(quoting Walker v. Jones, 733 F.2d 923, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).

       Harwood is binding precedent on this court and compels a finding that the

Speaker is immune from plaintiffs’ suit. According to Rule 786 of Mason’s



                                            10
Manual—which has been adopted by a vote of the House and which is applicable to

House proceedings via House Rule 65—remote participation in floor sessions of the

House is prohibited unless specifically authorized by the Constitution or another

House rule. The plaintiffs have not identified any constitutional provision or House

rule specifically authorizing remote participation in floor sessions, and the court is

unaware of any such provisions or rules. But cf. Opinion of the Justices (Quorum

under Part II, Article 20), 2020 WL 6750797, at *1 (N.H. Nov. 17, 2020) (concluding

in an advisory opinion that remote House sessions would not violate quorum

provision of State Constitution). And although the House has permitted remote

participation by its members at committee meetings throughout the pandemic,

plaintiffs have not identified a “custom” of remote participation in floor sessions of

the House. Indeed, it is undisputed that all House sessions have been in-person

since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. And while Plaintiffs argue that the

House does not strictly enforce House Rule 65 or applicable rules from Mason’s

Manual, it is not the role of this federal court to pick and choose among competing

understandings of the internal rules of a state legislative body. See Starr v.

Governor, 154 N.H. 174, 178 (2006) (concluding that, under Part II, Article 22 of the

State Constitution, the House “has complete control and discretion whether it shall

observe, enforce, waive, suspend, or disregard its own rules of procedure”).

      Like the rule barring lobbyists from the floor of the Rhode Island House of

Representatives that was challenged in Harwood, the at-issue rule prohibiting

remote participation in House sessions regulates “the very atmosphere in which



                                          11
lawmaking deliberations occur.” Harwood, 69 F.3d at 633 (quotation omitted).

Moreover, Rule 786 is “not invidiously discriminatory on its face” as it applies

equally to all members of the House. Id. at 631. In denying Individual Plaintiffs’

requests to participate remotely at House sessions, the Speaker did no more than

enforce a “rule that colors the very conditions under which legislators engage in

formal debate.” Id. at 632. He is therefore immune from plaintiffs’ suit.

       Plaintiffs’ arguments do not persuade the court otherwise. Plaintiffs contend

that the Speaker is not entitled to legislative immunity because he is being sued in

his official capacity (i.e., for injunctive relief), rather than his personal capacity (i.e.,

for damages). However, the First Circuit explicitly stated in Harwood that

legislative immunity applies regardless of whether the plaintiff seeks prospective

relief or damages. See id. at 630 (quoting Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 731). This

statement finds support in Supreme Court precedent recognizing that legislative

immunity applies in official capacity suits seeking injunctive relief, as well as

identical rulings of numerous other circuit courts. See Consumers Union, 446 U.S.

at 731; Church v. Mo., 913 F.3d 736, 754 n.3 (8th Cir. 2019) (“[U]nder Consumers

Union, legislative immunity applies to official-capacity suits.” (citation omitted));

Rowland, 494 F.3d at 88 (holding that “claims for injunctive relief against . . . state

officials, sued in their official capacities, may be barred by the doctrine of legislative

immunity”); Scott, 405 F.3d at 1255 (“[W]e hold that the legislator defendants in the

instant official capacity suit for prospective relief are entitled to absolute

immunity.”); Larsen v. Senate of Commonwealth of Pa., 152 F.3d 240, 244, 254 (3d



                                             12
Cir. 1998) (concluding that state legislators sued in their official capacities “were

entitled to the protections of legislative immunity from suit for [plaintiff’s] claim for

prospective injunctive relief”); Risser v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 549, 551 (7th Cir. 1991)

(“Legislators’ immunity is absolute . . . and extends to injunctive relief as well as to

damages suits.” (citation omitted)); Abick v. State of Mich., 803 F.2d 874, 876-78

(6th Cir. 1986) (holding, in suit for damages and injunctive relief, that justices of

the Michigan Supreme Court had legislative immunity from suit relating to their

promulgation of a challenged court rule regarding service of process).

       Plaintiffs assert a nuanced argument that, as the court understands it, is as

 follows. Plaintiffs argue that cases applying legislative immunity to official

 capacity suits do so when claims are brought against the state (or a state official

 sued in his “official capacity”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil rights

 statute. The case of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), establishes a legal

 fiction applicable to such cases. Broadly stated, the fiction permits the state to be

 sued in one narrow circumstance: where the plaintiff seeks only prospective

 injunctive relief (and not damages). See, e.g., Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v.

 Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 254-55 (2011) (explaining the Ex parte Young doctrine). In

 those cases, the Ex parte Young fiction operates to sever the official capacity

 defendant from the state. That legal fiction is necessary because Congress did not

 abrogate sovereign immunity when it enacted § 1983. See Quern v. Jordan, 440

 U.S. 332, 345 (1979). Thus, the Ex parte Young doctrine permits a lawsuit against

 a state official in that narrow circumstance. Plaintiffs assert that, although the



                                           13
 state (or state officials sued in their official capacities) ordinarily cannot claim

 personal immunities (such as legislative immunity), an official capacity defendant

 can claim legislative immunity when Ex parte Young operates to sever the

 defendant-official from the state.

      Plaintiffs argue that no such severing is necessary here. Rather, plaintiffs

 argue that, unlike § 1983, Congress abrogated sovereign immunity when it passed

 the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-7, 12133; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); see also United

 States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006). And, as to their Rehabilitation Act

 claim, plaintiffs argue that sovereign immunity is not available because, by

 accepting federal funds, the state waived sovereign immunity as to claims under

 that Act. Because, plaintiffs argue, sovereign immunity does not apply in this

 case, plaintiffs eschew reliance on Ex parte Young and assert that the Speaker—

 sued in his official capacity— is the state. Thus, plaintiffs argue that their claims

 under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are qualitatively different

 from claims brought under § 1983, and the defense of legislative immunity as

 permitted in those cases does not apply here.

      The court is not persuaded by plaintiffs’ argument for several reasons. First,

a basic premise of legislative immunity is that it applies to acts, not actors. See,

e.g., Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54-55. “Absolute legislative immunity ‘is justified and

defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it

attaches.’” Romero-Barcelo, 75 F.3d at 29 (quoting Negron-Gaztambide, 35 F.3d at

27); accord Acevedo-Cordero v. Cordero-Santiago, 958 F.2d 20, 21 (1st Cir. 1992)



                                           14
(“[I]t is the nature of the particular act rather than the title of the office which

governs whether immunity attaches.”). As noted, various arms of the state itself—

such as courts and legislatures—may claim legislative immunity for actions taken

in a legislative capacity. See Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 733; Hall, 974 F. Supp.

2d at 957. Thus, even if the Speaker in this official-capacity action is properly

characterized as the state, that would not preclude a claim of legislative immunity

under binding Supreme Court precedent. See Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 733;

see also Rowland, 494 F.3d at 86-87 (rejecting reasoning similar to that advanced by

the plaintiffs and holding that “we are unwilling to ignore the Supreme Court’s

squarely-applicable precedent in Consumers Union because of broadly stated”

pronouncements in other cases regarding personal immunities in official capacity

suits “not specifically referring to legislative immunity”).

      In addition, although plaintiffs are correct that cases applying legislative

immunity to official capacity actions have often involved § 1983, the reasoning in

those cases is not specific to § 1983. Many cases emphasize that applying

legislative immunity to suits for prospective relief furthers a key goal of the

doctrine: protecting those who exercise a legislative function from the distractions

and costs of litigation. See, e.g., Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 733; Scott, 405 F.3d

at 1256. Furthermore, because the legislative immunity afforded state actors is a

creature of federal common law, see Harwood, 69 F.3d at 629, there is no reason to

conclude that it would apply in § 1983 actions but not others—absent abrogation of

legislative immunity by Congress.



                                            15
      Although plaintiffs argue that Congress abrogated legislative immunity for

Title II and Rehabilitation Act claims, they only identify evidence that Congress

intended to abrogate sovereign immunity under these Acts. The court is not

persuaded by Plaintiffs’ argument that an intent to abrogate legislative immunity

can be inferred from an intent to abrogate sovereign immunity. See United States

v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993). And plaintiffs have not provided—nor has the

court located—any case holding that legislative immunity is inapplicable to Title II

or Rehabilitation Act claims. To the contrary, several courts have applied

legislative immunity to bar Title II and Rehabilitation Act claims, some of which

sought injunctive relief. See McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., 2015 WL

1285325, at *23 (D. Md. Mar. 20, 2015); Kobe v. Haley, 2013 WL 4056335, at *1-2,

*4-5 (D.S.C. Aug. 12, 2013) (seeking injunctive relief); Am. Ass’n of People With

Disabilities v. Smith, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1280 n.5, 1295, 1297 (M.D. Fla. 2002)

(seeking injunctive relief).

      In summary, the court concludes that the Speaker is immune from plaintiffs’

suit challenging his enforcement of a House rule that is closely related to core

legislative functions. See Harwood, 69 F.3d at 631-33. For that reason, the court

must deny plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order or preliminary

injunction. See Arborjet, 794 F.3d at 173.




                                          16
                                  CONCLUSION

       Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction

(doc. no. 2) is denied.

       SO ORDERED.



                                       __________________________
                                       Landya McCafferty
                                       United States District Judge



February 22, 2021

cc: Counsel of Record




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