Robinson 868575 v. Bonn

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                           
              WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN                           
                   SOUTHERN DIVISION                                 
                         ______                                      

SHANE QUANTE ROBINSON,                                                    

     Petitioner,              Case No. 1:24-cv-1120                  

v.                                 Honorable Jane M. Beckering            

DALE BONN,                                                                

     Respondent.                                                     
____________________________/                                             


                        OPINION                                      
This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner under
28 U.S.C. § 2254
. Promptly 
after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of 
the petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits 
annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules 
Governing § 2254 Cases; see
28 U.S.C. § 2243
. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed. 
Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini,
424 F.2d 134, 141
(6th Cir. 1970) (discussing that a district court has 
the duty to “screen out” petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes 
those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual allegations 
that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke,
178 F.3d 434
, 436–37 (6th Cir. 1999). After 
undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court concludes that the petition must be dismissed 
because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim.                    
                       Discussion                                    
I.   Factual Allegations                                                  
Petitioner Shane Quante Robinson is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of 
Corrections at the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Following a 
jury trial in the Berrien County Circuit Court, Petitioner was convicted of one count of carrying a 
concealed weapon, in violation of
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227
, and was sentenced as a fourth-

offense habitual offender,
Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.12
, to 22 to 76 months’ imprisonment. See 
People v. Robinson, Nos. 360935, 360936,
2023 WL 4141162
, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. June 22, 
2023). In a separate jury trial in the Berrien County Circuit Court, Petitioner was convicted of 
assault with intent to murder, in violation of
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.83
; felon in possession of 
a firearm, in violation of
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750
.224f; carrying a concealed weapon, in violation 
of
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227
; and two counts of carrying a firearm during the commission of 
a felony (felony-firearm), in violation of
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750
.22b. See
id.
In that matter, 
Petitioner  was  sentenced,  again  as  a  fourth-offense  habitual  offender,  “to  40  to  80  years’ 
imprisonment for assault with intent to murder, 76 months to 20 years’ imprisonment for felon-in-
possession and carrying a concealed weapon, and two years’ imprisonment for each of the felony-

firearm charges.”
Id.
The felony-firearm sentences “were to be served concurrent to one another 
but consecutive to the other convictions.”
Id.
at *1 n.2.                 
The Michigan Court of Appeals generally described the facts underlying Petitioner’s 
convictions as follows:                                                   
This case arises from the February 16, 2021 shooting of Wesley Jackson. Jackson, 
[Petitioner], and Travis Williams were socializing when [Petitioner] suddenly 
pulled a gun and shot Jackson twice in the back. Jackson was severely injured, but 
survived  the  shooting.  After  the  shooting,  [Petitioner]  and  Williams  fled  in 
[Petitioner’s] SUV. Witnesses identified [Petitioner] as the shooter and [Petitioner] 
was later arrested.                                                  
Jackson and Williams testified at the preliminary examination and each identified 
[Petitioner]  as  the  shooter.  Subpoenas  were  issued  for  both  Jackson’s  and 
Williams’s testimonies at trial. Despite their efforts, police officers were unable to 
complete service on Jackson. Williams was served the subpoena, but informed 
officers he would rather go to jail than testify at trial. The trial court found that these 
witnesses were unavailable under the hearsay exception, MRE 804(a)(5), and their 
testimonies from the preliminary examination were read to the jury. During closing 
argument, the prosecutor encouraged the jury to convict [Petitioner] stating Jackson 
and Williams were truthful and that neither witness had a motive to lie. [Petitioner] 
was convicted and sentenced as noted.
Id.
Petitioner appealed his convictions to the Michigan Court of Appeals, raising two claims 
for  relief.  Petitioner  first  asserted  that  the  trial  court  violated  his  rights  under  the  Sixth 
Amendment’s  Confrontation  Clause  “by  admitting  the  witnesses’  preliminary  examination 
testimonies.”
Id.
Petitioner also argued that the prosecutor erred by “impermissibly bolstering the 
credibility of unavailable witnesses.”
Id. at *3
. The court of appeals rejected Petitioner’s arguments 
and affirmed his convictions on June 22, 2023.
Id. at *1
. On October 31, 2023, the Michigan 
Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s application for leave to appeal because the court was “not 
persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.” People v. Robinson,
996 
N.W.2d 445
(Mich. 2023).                                                  
On August 7, 2024, Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition. The petition raises four 
grounds for relief, as follows:                                           
I.   [Petitioner] was denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses 
     against him when the trial court erroneously deemed the complaining 
     witnesses as unavailable, and therefore permitted their preliminary exam 
     testimony to be read into the record.                           
II.  [Petitioner] was denied a fair trial where the prosecutor made arguments 
     vouching for the complaining witnesses’ credibility, which was improper 
     and unfairly prejudicial and denied [Petitioner] his right to due process 
     pursuant to U.S. Const. amend. XIV, Mich. Const. Art. 1 § 17, 20. 
(§ 2254 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6–7 (capitalization, spelling, and punctuation corrected).)  
II.  AEDPA Standard                                                       
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) “prevent[s] federal 
habeas ‘retrials’” and ensures that state court convictions are given effect to the extent possible 
under the law. Bell v. Cone,
535 U.S. 685
, 693–94 (2002). An application for writ of habeas corpus 
on behalf of a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a state conviction cannot be granted with 

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication: “(1) 
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted 
in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the state court proceeding.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254
(d). “Under these rules, [a] 
state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 
fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Stermer v. 
Warren,
959 F.3d 704, 721
(6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 101
(2011) 
(quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado,
541 U.S. 652, 664
(2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
This standard is “intentionally difficult to meet.” Woods v. Donald,
575 U.S. 312, 316
(2015) 

(internal quotation omitted).                                             
AEDPA limits the source of law to cases decided by the United States Supreme Court.
28 
U.S.C. § 2254
(d). In determining whether federal law is clearly established, the Court may not 
consider the decisions of lower federal courts. Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362
, 381–82 (2000); 
Miller v. Straub,
299 F.3d 570
, 578–79 (6th Cir. 2002). Moreover, “clearly established Federal 
law” does not include decisions of the Supreme Court announced after the last adjudication of the 
merits in state court. Greene v. Fisher,
565 U.S. 34
, 37–38 (2011). Thus, the inquiry is limited to 
an examination of the legal landscape as it would have appeared to the Michigan state courts in 
light of Supreme Court precedent at the time of the state-court adjudication on the merits. Miller 
v. Stovall,
742 F.3d 642, 644
(6th Cir. 2014) (citing Greene, 565 U.S. at 38). 
A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to” clause if the state court 
applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in the Supreme Court’s cases, or if it 
decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has done on a set of materially indistinguishable 

facts. Bell,
535 U.S. at 694
(citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405–06). “To satisfy this high bar, a 
habeas petitioner is required to ‘show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in 
federal  court  was  so  lacking  in  justification  that  there  was  an  error  well  understood  and 
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Woods,
575 
U.S. at 316
(quoting Harrington,
562 U.S. at 103
).                        
Determining whether a rule application was unreasonable depends on the rule’s specificity. 
Stermer,
959 F.3d at 721
. “The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching 
outcomes in case-by-case determinations.” Yarborough,
541 U.S. at 664
. “[W]here the precise 
contours of the right remain unclear, state courts enjoy broad discretion in their adjudication of a 

prisoner’s claims.” White v. Woodall,
572 U.S. 415, 424
(2014) (internal quotations omitted). 
AEDPA requires heightened respect for state factual findings. Herbert v. Billy,
160 F.3d 
1131, 1134
(6th Cir. 1998). A determination of a factual issue made by a state court is presumed 
to be correct, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and 
convincing evidence.
28 U.S.C. § 2254
(e)(1); Davis v. Lafler,
658 F.3d 525, 531
(6th Cir. 2011) 
(en banc); Lancaster v. Adams,
324 F.3d 423, 429
(6th Cir. 2003); Bailey v. Mitchell,
271 F.3d 
652, 656
(6th Cir. 2001). This presumption of correctness is accorded to findings of state appellate 
courts, as well as the trial court. See Sumner v. Mata,
449 U.S. 539
, 546–547 (1981); Smith v. 
Jago,
888 F.2d 399
, 407 n.4 (6th Cir. 1989).                              
Section 2254(d) limits the facts a court may consider on habeas review. The federal court 
is not free to consider any possible factual source. The reviewing court “is limited to the record 
that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster,
563 
U.S. 170, 180
(2011). “If a review of the state court record shows that additional fact-finding was 
required under clearly established federal law or that the state court’s factual determination was 

unreasonable, the requirements of § 2254(d) are satisfied and the federal court can review the 
underlying claim on its merits. Stermer,
959 F.3d at 721
(citing, inter alia, Brumfield v. Cain,
576 
U.S. 305
(2015), and Panetti v. Quarterman,
551 U.S. 930, 954
(2007)).    
If the petitioner “satisfies the heightened requirements of § 2254(d), or if the petitioner’s 
claim was never ‘adjudicated on the merits’ by a state court,
28 U.S.C. § 2254
(d),”—for example, 
if he procedurally defaulted the claim—“AEDPA deference no longer applies.” Stermer,
959 F.3d 
at 721
. Then, the petitioner’s claim is reviewed de novo.
Id.
(citing Maples v. Stegall,
340 F.3d 
433, 436
(6th Cir. 2003)).                                                
III.  Discussion                                                          
A.   Ground I—Confrontation Clause Issue                             
As  his  first  ground  for  relief,  Petitioner  contends  that  his  rights  under  the  Sixth 

Amendment’s Confrontation Clause were violated when “the trial court erroneously deemed the 
complaining witnesses as unavailable, and therefore permitted their preliminary exam testimony 
to be read into the record.” (§ 2254 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) As support for this ground, 
Petitioner relies upon the brief that appellate counsel filed in the Michigan Court of Appeals. (Id.) 
On  direct  appeal,  Petitioner  took  issue  with  the  trial  court  deeming Williams  and  Jackson 
unavailable as witnesses. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.35.) He also argued that his trial attorney “never 
had  the  opportunity  to  cross-examine  either  Mr.  Jackson  or  Mr.  Williams,  as  a  different 
attorney . . . was [Petitioner’s] counsel at the time of the preliminary exam.” (Id., PageID.35–36.) 
Petitioner also averred that during his preliminary examinations, he “was appearing from the Jail 
via [Z]oom and was not in the courtroom [with] counsel during the proceedings.” (Id., PageID.36.) 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment gives the accused the right “to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend VI; Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400
, 
403–05 (1965) (applying the guarantee to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). “The 

central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a 
criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding 
before the trier of fact.” Maryland v. Craig,
497 U.S. 836, 845
(1990). The Confrontation Clause, 
therefore, prohibits the admission of an out-of-court testimonial statement at a criminal trial unless 
the  witness  is  unavailable  to  testify  and  the  defendant  had  a  prior  opportunity  for  cross-
examination. See Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 59
(2004). There are two requirements to 
consider  with  respect  to  the  unavailability  requirement.  First,  a  witness  cannot  be  deemed 
unavailable unless the government has made a good-faith effort to obtain his or her presence at 
trial proceedings. See Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56, 74
(1980). Second, the unavailable witness 

must have given testimony at previous judicial proceedings against the same defendant, and that 
testimony must have been subject to cross-examination by that defendant. See Crawford,
541 U.S. 
at 54
.                                                                    
The Michigan Court of Appeals addressed Petitioner’s claim under the following standard: 
The Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution states: “In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him.” U.S. Const., Am. VI; see also Const. 1963, art. 1, § 20. The 
Confrontation Clause prohibits “the admission of testimonial statements by a 
witness who does not appear at trial unless the witness is unavailable and the 
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.” People v. Dendel,
289 Mich. App. 445, 453
;
797 N.W.2d 645
(2010) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S 36, 53–54 (2004))                                            
Robinson,
2023 WL 4141162
, at *4. Although the state court cited state authority, Dendel 
specifically cites Crawford as the source of the standard. Thus, there is no question that the court 
of appeals applied the correct standard. Petitioner, therefore, can only overcome the deference 
afforded state court decisions if the court of appeals’ determination was based on an unreasonable 
application of Crawford or if the court of appeals’ resolution was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254
(d).                      
     1.   Unavailability                                             
The court of appeals first addressed Petitioner’s argument that the trial court had erred by 
declaring Williams and Jackson unavailable as witnesses. The court of appeals noted that Michigan 
Rule of Evidence 804(a)(5) sets forth a definition of an “unavailable” witness. See Robinson,
2023 
WL 4141162
, at *2. The court of appeals rejected Petitioner’s arguments, concluding that the 
record “demonstrates reasonable efforts to serve Jackson and Williams were made,” noting that 
Rule 804(a)(5) does not require the prosecution to make “all possible efforts.”
Id.
(emphasis in 
original). In making that determination, the court of appeals noted that Jackson successfully evaded 
service of the subpoena and never appeared for meetings that were scheduled with the investigating 

detective.
Id.
Jackson had also provided false addresses to the detective.
Id.
The detective “visited 
various addresses associated with Jackson over 20 times,” including Jackson’s sister’s address, 
and Jackson’s sister told the detective that “she did not know where Jackson lived.”
Id.
Moreover, 
“the detective searched on a daily basis the local jail system and various hospitals in the area to 
confirm that Jackson had not been arrested or admitted.”
Id.
With respect to Williams, the detective 
“testified that he successfully served Williams with a subpoena. However, Williams told the 
detective that he would rather serve time in jail than appear in court.”
Id.
In light of that response, 
at Petitioner’s trial, the trial court granted the prosecution’s request to issue a bench warrant for 
Williams’ failure to appear.
Id.
The extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus lies only for a violation of the Constitution.
28 
U.S.C. § 2254
(a). As the Supreme Court explained in Estelle, an inquiry whether evidence was 
properly admitted or improperly excluded under state law “is no part of the federal court’s habeas 
review of a state conviction [for] it is not the province of a federal habeas court to re-examine 
state-court determinations on state-law questions.” 502 U.S. at 67–68. The decision of the state 

courts on a state-law issue is binding on a federal court. See Wainwright v. Goode,
464 U.S. 78, 
84
(1983); see also Bradshaw v. Richey,
546 U.S. 74, 76
(2005) (“We have repeatedly held that a 
state court’s interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged 
conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.”). Thus, the court of appeals’ conclusion 
that the trial court properly deemed Williams and Jackson unavailable under Michigan Rule of 
Evidence 804(a)(5) is axiomatically correct.                              
It is possible that an evidentiary ruling—even a ruling that is axiomatically correct under 
state law—still violates due process. State-court evidentiary rulings can rise to the level of due 
process violations if they offend some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience 

of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. Seymour v. Walker,
224 F.3d 542, 552
(6th Cir. 
2000) (quotation marks omitted); accord Coleman v. Mitchell,
268 F.3d 417, 439
(6th Cir. 2001); 
Bugh v. Mitchell,
329 F.3d 496, 512
(6th Cir. 2003). This approach accords the state courts wide 
latitude in ruling on evidentiary matters. Seymour,
224 F.3d at 552
(6th Cir. 2000). 
Further, under AEDPA, the court may not grant relief if it would have decided the 
evidentiary question differently. The court may only grant relief if Petitioner is able to show that 
the state court’s evidentiary ruling was in conflict with a decision reached by the Supreme Court 
on a question of law or if the state court decided the evidentiary issue differently than the Supreme 
Court did on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Sanders v. Freeman,
221 F.3d 846, 860
(6th Cir. 2000); see also Stewart v. Winn,
967 F.3d 534, 538
(6th Cir. 2020) (stating that, to obtain 
habeas relief based on an allegedly improper evidentiary ruling, a petitioner must identify “a 
Supreme Court case establishing a due process right with regard to the specific kind of evidence 
at issue”).                                                               
Petitioner has not met this difficult standard with respect to the question concerning 

unavailability. Indeed, in the context of review under the AEDPA, the Supreme Court has 
explicitly  cautioned  against  disturbing  a  state  court’s  reasonable  conclusion  regarding 
unavailability:                                                           
[W]hen a witness disappears before trial, it is always possible to think of additional 
steps that the prosecution might have taken to secure the witness’ presence, see 
[Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56, 75
(1980)], but the Sixth Amendment does not 
require  the  prosecution  to  exhaust  every  avenue  of  inquiry,  no  matter  how 
unpromising. And, more to the point, the deferential standard of review set out in
28 U.S.C. § 2254
(d) does not permit a federal court to overturn a state court’s 
decision  on  the  question  of  unavailability  merely  because  the  federal  court 
identifies additional steps that might have been taken. Under AEDPA, if the state-
court decision was reasonable, it cannot be disturbed.               
Hardy v. Cross,
565 U.S. 65
, 71–72 (2011).                                
Petitioner does not present to this Court any argument regarding this issue other than the 
arguments that he raised in his brief on direct appeal—arguments that have already been rejected 
by the Michigan Court of Appeals. Petitioner, therefore, fails to explain how the court of appeals’ 
analysis is in error. Given the explanations given by the detective regarding his attempts to serve 
Jackson, the court of appeals reasonably determined that the trial court had properly deemed 
Jackson unavailable to testify. Moreover, although the detective had successfully served Williams, 
Williams explicitly stated that he would rather go to jail than testify. Under that circumstance, it 
is difficult to identify what more the detective and the prosecution could have done other than what 
they did, which is request a bench warrant for Williams’ arrest for failure to appear at Petitioner’s 
trial. Thus, the court of appeals reasonably determined that the prosecution had exercised due 
diligence and that both Jackson and Williams were unavailable within the meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause.                                                     
     2.   Prior Opportunity for Cross-Examination                    
The court of appeals then rejected Petitioner’s assertion that he had been unable to cross-
examine Jackson and Williams during his preliminary examinations, stating: 

As an initial matter, the trial court did not err by failing to ensure [Petitioner’s] 
physical presence at the preliminary examination. At the time the preliminary 
examination hearings took place, trial courts across Michigan were subject to 
Administrative Order No. 2020-6. This order required trial courts to make a good-
faith  effort  to  hold  all  proceedings  remotely  in  response  to  the  COVID-19 
pandemic. Thus, there is nothing facially incorrect with [Petitioner’s] remote 
participation.                                                       
Moreover, there is nothing in the record showing [Petitioner] was denied the 
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses during the preliminary examination. 
Indeed,  the  record  shows  vigorous  cross-examination  by  defense  counsel  of 
Jackson and Williams and [Petitioner] was able to discuss cross-examination 
strategy privately with defense counsel during the proceedings. [Petitioner] does 
not explain how his cross-examination of the witnesses would have been different 
had  [Petitioner]  been  physically  present  with  his  counsel  at  the  preliminary 
examination.                                                         
Robinson,
2023 WL 4141162
, at *3.                                         
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has noted that there exists “some 
question whether a preliminary hearing necessarily offers an adequate prior opportunity for cross-
examination for Confrontation Clause purposes.” Al-Timimi v. Jackson,
379 F. App’x 435
, 437–
38 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing, inter alia, Vasquez v. Jones,
496 F.3d 564, 577
(6th Cir. 2007) (doubting 
whether “the opportunity to question a witness at a preliminary examination hearing satisfies the 
pre-Crawford  understanding  of  the  Confrontation  Clause’s  guarantee  of  an  opportunity  for 
effective cross-examination” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, Petitioner’s challenge is 
certainly colorable. However, the Supreme Court has never held that a defendant’s Confrontation 
Clause rights are violated when a witness is unavailable for trial and the trial court admits that 
witness’s preliminary examination testimony. See id. at 438. Thus, for purposes of federal habeas 
review,  the  Sixth  Circuit  has  concluded  that  a  state  court’s  determination  that  preliminary 
examination testimony was properly admitted is not an unreasonable application of clearly 
established Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 438–40; see also Williams v. Bauman,
759 F.3d 630, 
636
(6th Cir. 2014) (citing Al-Timimi with approval and upholding on habeas review the admission 

of testimony from the petitioner's own preliminary examination).          
Furthermore, Petitioner’s arguments regarding the fact that he was not physically present 
in the courtroom during the preliminary examinations and the fact that his trial counsel was not 
the attorney who cross-examined Williams and Jackson do not change this outcome. The Court 
recognizes that a criminal defendant has a right to be present at any stage of his criminal 
proceedings, a right that is rooted in both the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and 
the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. See Kentucky v. Stincer,
482 U.S. 730, 745
(1987) 
(“[A] defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that 
is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.”); Illinois 

v. Allen,
397 U.S. 337, 338
(1970) (“One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the 
Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his 
trial.”).  The Supreme Court, however, has suggested that the Confrontation Clause does not apply 
to pretrial hearings, repeatedly explaining that “[t]he right to confrontation is basically a trial 
right.” Barber v. Page,
390 U.S. 719, 725
(1968); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,
480 U.S. 39
, 
52–53 (1987). In any event, Petitioner does not cite, and the Court has not located, any clearly 
established federal law concluding that a defendant’s Confrontation Clause right is violated when 
he appears remotely at a preliminary examination via videoconferencing. Cf. United States v. 
Benson,
79 F. App’x 813
, 820–21 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the Confrontation Clause does 
not prohibit a witness from testifying remotely so long as the witness is properly sworn, subject to 
full  cross-examination,  and  visible  to  the  defendant  and  the  fact-finder);  United  States  v. 
Rosenschein,
474  F.  Supp.  3d  1203
,  1208  (D.N.M.  2020)  (concluding  that  conducting  a 
suppression hearing via videoconference would not violate the defendant’s Confrontation Clause 
rights). Likewise, Petitioner does not cite, and the Court has not located, any clearly established 

federal law concluding that a change in counsel following a preliminary examination where prior 
counsel was able to cross-examine a witness essentially negates that cross-examination for 
purposes  of  the  Confrontation  Clause  and  the  admission  of  such  preliminary  examination 
testimony later at trial.                                                 
Again, Petitioner does not present to this Court any argument regarding this issue other 
than the arguments that he raised in his brief on direct appeal. Petitioner, therefore, fails to explain 
how the court of appeals’ analysis is in error and fails to explain how the court of appeals’ analysis 
is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of the federal standards set forth above. Petitioner, 
therefore, is not entitled to relief with respect to ground I.            

B.   Ground II—Prosecutorial Misconduct                              
As his second ground for relief, Petitioner contends that he was denied a fair trial where 
the “prosecutor made arguments vouching for the complaining witnesses’ credibility, which was 
improper and unfairly prejudicial and violated Petitioner’s due process rights.” (§ 2254 Pet., ECF 
No. 1, PageID.7.) As support for this ground, Petitioner again relies upon the brief that appellate 
counsel filed in the Michigan Court of Appeals. (Id.) On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the 
prosecutor “improperly vouched for the credibility of both Mr. Williams and Mr. Jackson” during 
closing arguments. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.53.)                              
For a petitioner to be entitled to habeas relief on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct, the 
petitioner must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s improper conduct “so infected the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 168, 181
(1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,
416 U.S. 637, 643
(1974)). “[T]he 
touchstone of due process analysis . . . is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the 
prosecutor.”  Smith  v.  Phillips,
455  U.S.  209,  219
(1982).  In  evaluating  the  impact  of  the 
prosecutor’s misconduct, a court should consider the extent to which the claimed misconduct 

tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the petitioner. See United States v. Young,
470 U.S. 1
, 11– 
12 (1985). The Supreme Court has described the Darden standard as “a very general one, leaving 
courts ‘more leeway . . . in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.’” Parker v. 
Matthews,
567 U.S. 37, 48
(2012). The Parker Court rejected an attempt to graft any additional 
requirements on the “very general” Darden standard.                       
“Claims  of  prosecutorial  misconduct  are  reviewed  deferentially  on  habeas  review.” 
Millender v. Adams,
376 F.3d 520, 528
(6th Cir. 2004) (citing Bowling v. Parker,
344 F.3d 487, 
512
(6th Cir. 2003)). Indeed, “[t]he Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the state courts have 
substantial  breathing  room  when  considering  prosecutorial  misconduct  claims  because 

‘constitutional line drawing [in prosecutorial misconduct cases] is necessarily imprecise.’” Slagle 
v. Bagley,
457 F.3d 501, 516
(6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at, 645). Thus, in order 
to obtain habeas relief on a prosecutorial misconduct claim, a habeas petitioner must show that the 
state court’s rejection of his prosecutorial misconduct claim “was so lacking in justification that 
there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 
fairminded disagreement.” Parker,
567 U.S. at 47
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
The Sixth Circuit has identified two types of objectionable vouching. See United States v. 
Acosta,
924 F.3d 288, 299
(6th Cir. 2019); Johnson v. Bell,
525 F.3d 466, 482
(6th Cir. 2008). But 
see Wogenstahl v. Mitchell,
668 F.3d 307
, 328–29 (6th Cir. 2012) (treating the two aspects of 
vouching as part of a single standard). The first type impermissibly places the government’s 
prestige behind the witness to enhance his or her credibility. See United States v. Francis,
170 F.3d 
546, 550
(6th Cir. 2019); United States v. Carroll,
26 F.3d 1380
, 1388–89 (6th Cir. 1994). The 
second type, also known as bolstering, occurs when the prosecutor invites the jury to believe there 
is other evidence, known to the prosecutor but not introduced into evidence, justifying the 

prosecutor’s belief in the defendant’s guilt. See Francis,
170 F.3d at 551
; United States v. Medlin,
353 F.2d 789, 796
(6th Cir. 1965).                                        
Moreover, a prosecutor may not “offer [his or her] opinions as to credibility of a witness 
or the guilt of a defendant.” Cristini v. McKee,
526 F.3d 888, 901
(6th Cir. 2008). As the Supreme 
Court has noted:                                                          
The prosecutor’s vouching for the credibility of witnesses and expressing his 
personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused pose two dangers: such 
comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but 
known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant and can thus 
jeopardize the defendant’s right to be tried solely on the basis of the evidence 
presented to the jury; and the prosecutor’s opinion carries with it the imprimatur of 
the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government’s judgment rather 
than its own view of the evidence.                                   
United States v. Young,
470 U.S. 1
, 18–19 (1985). However, not every reference to the credibility 
of a witness is objectionable vouching. “[A] prosecutor may ask the jury to draw reasonable 
inferences of credibility from the evidence presented.” Willoughby v. White,
786 F. App’x 506
, 
513 (6th Cir. 2019).                                                      
On direct appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals addressed Petitioner’s prosecutorial 
misconduct claim under the following standard:                            
Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, criminal defendants 
are entitled to a fair trial. U.S. Const., Am. VI. As such, prosecutors have a duty to 
ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial. People v. Farrar,
36 Mich. App. 294, 
299
;
193 N.W.2d 363
(1971). “The test of prosecutorial [error] is whether a 
defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial.” People v. Dobek,
274 Mich. App. 
58, 63
;
732 N.W.2d 546
(2007). “Issues of prosecutorial misconduct are decided 
case  by  case,  and  this  Court  must  examine  the  entire  record  and  evaluate  a 
prosecutor’s remarks in context.”
Id. at 64
. The defendant bears the burden of 
proving that he was denied a fair and impartial trial. See, e.g., People v. Lane,
308 
Mich. App. 38, 62
;
862 N.W.2d 446
(2014).                            
A prosecutor’s remarks are “evaluated in light of defense arguments and the 
relationship they bear to the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether a 
defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial.” People v. Brown,
267 Mich. App. 
141, 152
;
703 N.W.2d 230
(2005). “A prosecutor may not make a factual statement 
to the jury that is not supported by the evidence, but he or she is free to argue the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it as they relate to his or her 
theory of the case.” Dobek,
274 Mich. App. at 66
(citations omitted). However, in 
closing arguments, prosecutors are generally given great latitude and are “free to 
argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence.” People v. 
Mullins,
322 Mich. App. 151, 172
;
911 N.W.2d 201
(2017) (citation omitted). 
For example, a prosecutor may not ask the jury to convict a defendant on the basis 
of the prosecutor’s personal knowledge, or the prestige of his office. People v 
Matuszak,
263  Mich.  App.  42
,  54–55;
687  N.W.2d  342
(2004).  However,  a 
prosecutor  “may  comment  on  his  own  witnesses’  credibility  during  closing 
argument, especially when there is conflicting evidence and the question of the 
defendant’s guilt depends on which witnesses the jury believes.” People v. Thomas,
260 Mich. App. 450, 455
;
678 N.W.2d 631
(2004).                      
Robinson,
2023 WL 4141162
, at *3–4. Although the court of appeals cited to state authority for 
the standard, the standard relied upon is essentially the same as the standards set forth above. 
After setting forth the standard, the court of appeals applied it and rejected Petitioner’s 
argument, stating:                                                        
[Petitioner]  challenges  this  statement  by  the  prosecutor  made  during  closing 
arguments:                                                           
    There is really no doubt that there was an intent to kill here, but the 
    real question is why should we believe Wesley [Jackson] and Travis 
    [Williams]? They’re not here. Right? So why should we believe what 
    they said? First and foremost, there is zero evidence here for any 
    motive for either Wesley or Travis to lie. What benefit do they receive 
    from coming into court at the prior hearing and testifying under oath, 
    under the pains and penalties of perjury, and make up this entire story, 
    pointing blame at someone who didn’t do it? Nothing. They gain   
    nothing from that. They’re telling us the truth.                 
According  to  [Petitioner],  this  statement  amounted  to  improper  vouching  of 
witnesses who did not appear at trial. We disagree. This statement did not provide 
the jury any information it could not discern from the testimony. Rather, it offered 
the  jury  several  considerations  when  evaluating  Jackson’s  and  Williams’s 
testimonies. The prosecutor’s mere suggestion that the jury evaluate the testimonies 
in these terms is not impermissible. Thus, there is no plain error as to this statement.
Id. at *4
.                                                                
Petitioner does not present to this Court any argument regarding this issue other than the 
arguments that he raised in his brief on direct appeal. Petitioner, therefore, fails to explain how the 
court of appeals’ analysis is in error. Moreover, Petitioner does not explain how the court of 
appeals’ analysis is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the general standards set forth 
in Darden or Donnelly.                                                    
This Court’s review of the court of appeals’ determination reveals that it is entirely 
consistent with the clearly established federal law set forth in Darden and Donnelly. Upon review 
of the statement set forth above, the prosecutor did not attempt to vouch for Williams’s and 
Jackson’s credibility during closing arguments. Instead, the prosecutor invited the jury to draw an 
inference that those individuals were telling the truth because they had no reason to lie. Not every 
reference to the credibility of a witness is objectionable vouching. “[A] prosecutor may ask the 
jury to draw reasonable inferences of credibility from the evidence presented.” Willoughby v. 
White,
786 F. App’x 506
, 513 (6th Cir. 2019).                             
The prosecutor’s statements during closing argument did not deny Petitioner a fair trial or 
improperly affect the outcome of the proceedings. Petitioner, therefore, is not entitled to relief with 
respect to habeas ground II.                                              

IV.  Certificate of Appealability                                         
Under
28  U.S.C.  §  2253
(c)(2),  the  Court  must  determine  whether  a  certificate  of 
appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a 
“substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.”
28 U.S.C. § 2253
(c)(2).  
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of a 
certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio,
263 F.3d 466, 467
(6th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 
Rather, the district court must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine 
whether a certificate is warranted.
Id.
Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth 
by the Supreme Court in Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473
(2000). Murphy,
263 F.3d at 467
. 

Consequently, this Court has examined each of Petitioner’s claims under the Slack standard. Under 
Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, to warrant a grant of the certificate, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that 
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable 
or wrong.” Id. “A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists of reason could 
conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-
El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 327
(2003). In applying this standard, the Court may not conduct a 
full merits review, but must limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit 
of Petitioner’s claims.
Id.
The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not conclude that this Court’s dismissal of 

Petitioner’s claims was debatable or wrong. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner a certificate 
of appealability. Moreover, although Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he is in custody in 
violation of the Constitution and has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a 
constitutional right, the Court does not conclude that any issue Petitioner might raise on appeal 
would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States,
369 U.S. 438, 445
(1962).  
                       Conclusion                                    
The Court will enter a Judgment dismissing the petition and an Order denying a certificate 
of appealability.                                                         
Dated:      November 15, 2024       /s/ Jane M. Beckering                 
                              Jane M. Beckering                      
                              United States District Judge