Rock v. Perlow

                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                           
                 WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY                            
                        PADUCAH DIVISION                                 

RON DAVID ROCK                                        PLAINTIFF          

     v.                                       NO. 5:24-cv-181-BJB        

JUDGE PERLOW, ET AL.                                DEFENDANTS           

                           *  *  *  *  *                                 
        OPINION & ORDER ADOPTING REPORT & RECOMMENDATION                 
            AND DENYING MOTIONS FOR EMERGENCY RELIEF                     
    A.  Rock’s Claims                                                    
    In 2021, Judge Perlow presided over a child-custody dispute between Ron Rock 
and  the  mother  of  their  minor  child,  K.R.,  in  Marshall  County  Family  Court.  
Complaint (DN 1) at 7.  According to Plaintiff Ron Rock, who is representing himself 
pro se in this follow-on civil litigation, his relationship with his child “does not exist 
because Judge Perlow enabled [K.R.’s mother’s] rogue behavior without consequence 
or justification.”  Id. at 14.  Among other accusations of illegality, Rock alleges that 
Judge Perlow allowed K.R.’s mother to “kidna[p]” her, “erased” $18,000 of child 
support payments due to him, and restricted Rock’s visitation to see his child.  Id. at 
7–9, 14.  Rock’s allegations against Judge Perlow, though not always clear, assert 
violations of his constitutional rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 9–10.                        
    Rock  further  claims  the  Marshall  County  Attorney  failed  to  “uphold  the 
Parental  Kidnapping  Prevention  Act  ([t]he  enforcement  of  child  custody  across 
states),” and “[f]ailed to use powers and due duties in KRS CH 15, 65, AND 69 
(sic).”  Id. at 11.  The “Child Support Enforcement” agency, he maintains, further 
violated Ky. Rev. Stat. § 403.213 by “fail[ing] to follow the procedure in the calculation 
and removing of a debt owed to [Rock],” apparently because the agency did not correct 
Judge Perlow’s violations.  Id.   And the Administrative Office of the Courts allegedly 
neglected its duty to “overse[e] the conduct of judges and ensur[e] that they uphold 
the constitutional rights of individuals.”  Id. at 12.  The AOC’s neglect, according to 
the Plaintiff, “resulted in significant harm to [Rock]’s parental rights and well-
being.”  Id.                                                              
    B.  Motions Practice                                                 
    Soon after Rock filed his Complaint, the Defendants began filing motions to 
dismiss (DNs 4, 5, and 9).  Rock responded by filing a motion to amend his complaint 
(DN 6), opposition briefs in response to the motions to dismiss (DNs 10, 12, and 25), 
and about two dozen additional motions. The latter category includes three motions 
for summary judgment (DNs 11, 13, 84), an emergency motion for a writ of mandamus 
(DN 34), a motion to expedite a ruling on the emergency motion (DN 36), and five 
more “emergency motions”—one to compel the Court’s ruling on pending motions (DN 
43), two for “miscellaneous relief” (DNs 48, 52), and two to “void” orders from the state 
family-court case (DNs 58, 63).  Rock also filed various motions to strike (DNs, 50, 
80), discovery motions (DNs 38, 42, 65), and a motion to disqualify counsel (DN 66).   
    The Court referred the motion for discovery (DN 38) and motion to compel 
discovery and for judicial oversight (DN 42) to Magistrate Judge King.  See DN 61 
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)).  The same order also asked Judge King to prepare a 
Report and Recommendation regarding the emergency motion (DN 34), motion to 
expedite ruling (DN 36), motion to compel judicial action (DN 43), and motions for 
miscellaneous relief (DNs 48, 52).  See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).         
    Judge King denied the discovery orders (DN 69).  No party objected to his 
ruling on these motions.  Judge King also issued a Report and Recommendation on 
the remaining motions referred to him (DNs 34, 48, 52, 36, 43), recommending they 
all be denied.  See Report and Recommendation (DN 70).  He noted that Rock failed 
to show he was entitled to the “drastic and extraordinary remedy” of mandamus or 
that the Court had jurisdiction to grant the relief he sought (including the initiation 
of criminal proceedings against the Defendant).  Id. at 2.                
    Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court reviews de novo the portions of the 
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation to which a party properly objects.  
See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b).  The Court may 
adopt without review any portion to which no objection is made.  Id.      
    C.  Emergency  Motion  for  Writ  of  Mandamus  (DN  34),  Motion  to 
       Expedite Ruling (DN 36), and Motion to Compel Judicial Action     
       (DN 43)                                                           
    Rock’s “emergency” motion to declare Judge Perlow’s orders void (and request 
for mandamus) asks the Court to declare Judge Perlow’s orders void ab initio for 
allegedly failing to comply with a mandatory custody hearing.  See Emergency Motion 
(DN 34) at 1 (citing Ky. Rev. Stat. § 403.785(3)); but see Objections (DN 71) at 2–3 
(citing  Ky.  Rev.  Stat.  §  620.080  (correct  citation  regarding  mandatory  custody 
hearings)); 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (courts “may issue all writs necessary or appropriate 
in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of 
law”).  He asks the Court to reinstate an earlier custody order in his favor, issue an 
injunction  preventing  interference  with  his  parental  rights,  and  impose  an 
“automatic mandamus trigger” requiring Defendants to produce certified documents 
within  five  days  verifying  that  a  statutory  custody  hearing  occurred  or  else 
acknowledge that no hearing occurred.  Emergency Motion at 3–4.  One week later, 
Rock filed a motion to expedite the Court’s ruling on this emergency mandamus 
request (DN 36).  And shortly thereafter he filed another “emergency” motion to 
compel the Court’s ruling on his first emergency motion (DN 43).          
    The Report and Recommendation correctly concluded that Rock cannot satisfy 
the demanding requirements for mandamus.  DN 70.  Mandamus is a “drastic and 
extraordinary  remedy  reserved  for  really  extraordinary  causes.”    In  re  King’s 
Daughters Health Sys., 31 F.4th 520, 525 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Cheney v. U.S. Dist. 
Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004)).  The remedy requires the movant to show that 
no other remedy is adequate and available, that the right to that relief is “clear and 
indisputable,” and that the writ is “appropriate under the circumstances.”  Id. at 525–
26.  A writ of mandamus is “not intended to substitute for appeal after a final 
judgment.”  See In re Life Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 589 F.3d 319, 323 (6th Cir. 2009).  
    As Judge King correctly noted, Rock does not meet any of those requirements.  
    First, Rock has an adequate alternative with which to challenge the state-court 
proceedings: the state appellate process, which Rock concedes he has used.  See Rock’s 
Response on Motion to Dismiss (DN 10) at 4.                               
    Second, he identifies no “clear and indisputable” right.  In re King’s Daughters 
Health Sys., 31 F.4th at 525.  As Judge King explained, the Kentucky statutes Rock 
cited were misconstrued, misquoted, or irrelevant.  Report and Recommendation at 
3–4.  Rock also cited cases that do not appear to exist.  See, e.g., Motion to Expedite 
Ruling (DN 36) at 2 (citing “Smith v. Smith, 2015-SC-000123” and “Smith v. Smith, 
491 S.W.3d 71 (Ky. 2016),” which, as Judge King noted, do not exist).     
    Finally,  Judge  King  noted  that  Rock  failed  to  show  a  writ  is  “otherwise 
appropriate” under the circumstances. DN 70 at 4;  see also In re Pros. Direct Ins. Co., 
578 F.3d 432, 437 (6th Cir. 2009) (because “mandamus is a discretionary remedy,” 
judges “may decline to issue the writ” even for otherwise entitled petitioners).   
    Even if Rock had satisfied the mandamus requirements, however, the Court 
lacks jurisdiction to void a state-court order, mandamus a state-court judge, or 
effectively review a state-court judgment.  A federal court has “no authority to issue 
a writ of mandamus directing a state court or its judicial officers in the performance 
of their duties” because the Court does not have appellate jurisdiction over state 
courts.  Woods v. Weaver, 13 F. App’x 304, 306 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Haggard v. State 
of Tenn., 421 F.2d 1384, 1386 (6th Cir. 1970)); see also In re Sutton, 652 F.3d 678, 
679–80 (6th Cir. 2011); In re Green, 141 U.S. 325 (1891).                 
    Further, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a federal district court’s “appellate” 
review of state-court judgments.  See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 
544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliot, P.C., 951 F.3d 397, 
402 (6th Cir. 2020).  Rooker-Feldman prohibits federal district courts from exercising 
jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused 
by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced 
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”  Exxon, 544 U.S. 
at 284.  That’s what Rock’s motion asks of this Court: to void the Marshall Family 
Court orders and reinstate new orders in his favor.  Because the injuries Rock seeks 
to redress in his motion arise from orders in the state-court custody case, the Court 
lacks jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See, e.g., VanderKodde, 951 
F.3d at 402 (courts look to the “source of the injury” when determining whether 
Rooker-Feldman applies).                                                  
    At the risk of gilding the lily, Younger abstention may also bar Rock’s motions 
(to the extent the Marshall Family Court case is ongoing).  “A district court may 
abstain  under  the  Younger  doctrine  if  three  conditions  exist:  there  are  state 
proceedings that are (1) currently pending; (2) involve an important state interest; 
and (3) will provide the federal plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to raise his or 
her constitutional claims.”  Nimer v. Litchfield Twp. Bd. of Trs., 707 F.3d 699, 701 
(6th Cir. 2013).   Those ongoing proceedings involve the state’s vital interest in family 
law.  See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) (“Family relations are a traditional 
area of state concern.”).  Although the status of Rock’s constitutional claims in state 
court remains unclear, Rock stated his case was “in appeals,” ostensibly granting him 
adequate opportunity to raise constitutional claims.  See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 
37, 45 (1971).  Federal intervention could well disrupt the ongoing state judicial 
process and undermine principles of comity.                               
    None  of  Rock’s  objections  demonstrate  any  error  in  Judge  King’s 
recommendation.  Rock invoked the Americans with Disabilities Act (Title II (42 
U.S.C. § 12132)) but did not allege any facts identifying any disability, how any public 
entity discriminated against him or denied him access to public services, or how these 
ADA objections relate to his request for mandamus.  Objections (DN 71) at 6.  Rock 
again argued that Judge Perlow’s orders were void, procedurally flawed, and violated 
his constitutional rights.  Id. at 4–9.  He contended that mandamus was appropriate 
because Judge Perlow’s orders were ministerial rather than discretionary.  Id. at 5.  
Carson v. United States Office of Special Counsel, 633 F.3d 487, 495 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(“For a writ of mandamus to be warranted, there must be a mandatory or ministerial 
obligation.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  But as noted above, the 
federal courts lack authority to direct a state judge—even regarding ministerial 
matters, Woods, 13 F. App’x at 306, which Judge Perlow’s orders regarding visitation 
restrictions, child-support calculations, contempt orders, and evidentiary rulings do 
not appear to be in any event.  Conduct is discretionary if it “involves an element of 
judgment or choice.” See generally Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. United States, 106 F.4th 
498, 505 (6th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).   And “[m]andamus is not an appropriate 
remedy if the action that the petitioner seeks to compel is discretionary.” Carson, 633 
F.3d at 491 (citing Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984).)         
    After this Court’s review, therefore, Judge King appears to have correctly 
concluded that mandamus is not appropriate or authorized.  Rock’s objections to this 
recommendation, like many of his filings, correctly recognizes that void orders may 
in many circumstances be set aside.  But an overarching principle that prevents Rock 
from receiving relief on that basis is the separate nature of our federal and state court 
systems: this federal district court is not a court of appeal empowered to review errors 
of state judges.  See VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 402.  In general, that is a function for 
the state courts of appeal—not the federal trial court.                   
    D.   Remaining Motions                                               
    1.  Rock  asked  the  Court  refer  Judge  Perlow  to  the  Attorney  General  for 
prosecution of alleged RICO violations and to impose financial penalties and “RICO 
treble damages” of $333,100,000.  DN 48 at 1, 3.  Rock also seeks compensatory 
damages, including $100,000,000 “for financial losses” and “$470,000 current legal 
fees.”  Id. at 5.  A subsequent emergency motion adds a request for an “Award of 
$30,000,000 in Equitable Relief (good faith and very reasonable).”  DN 52 at 1.  Rock 
also requests summary judgment and default judgment.  DN 48 at 4. He includes 
multiple  overlapping  requests  for  relief  or  prosecution  including  “Qui  Tam 
Enforcement” and recovery under the False Claims Act.  Id. at 4–5.  Rock also asks 
the Court to suspend Judge Perlow pending federal investigation.  DN 52 at 3.  Judge 
King suggested at least some of Rock’s many “emergency” requests were filed “in 
order to swiftly ‘bring the Court’s attention’” to his Motion for Mandamus.  Report 
and Recommendation at 4, quoting DN 43 at 1.  It’s not clear that Rock raised any 
objections to Judge King’s dismissal recommendation with respect to these requests, 
DN 71, which appears correct in any event.                                
    In particular, Rock’s request that this Court initiate criminal prosecution (DN 
48 at 1) is improper because “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in 
the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”  Sefa v. Kentucky, 510 App’x 435, 438 
(6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)).  And as 
Judge King explained, federal courts lack authority to compel criminal investigations 
or prosecutions—certainly with respect to state matters.  See DN 70 at 6; cf. United 
States v. Traficant, 368 F.3d 646, 650 (6th Cir. 2004) (“the Executive Branch [has] 
exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case’) 
(quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974)). 
     2.  The Court also adopts Judge King’s recommendation that Rock receive a 
formal warning “that he risks being deemed a vexatious litigant,” subject to pre-filing 
restrictions, if he continues to file “frivolous and harassing pleadings.”  See DN 70 at 
6.  The Court understands the difficulties facing non-lawyers who attempt to navigate 
the court system on their own—particularly on matters of sensitivity such as child 
custody and family relations.  As a result, the law construes pro se filings liberally. 
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).  But pro se litigants, like all parties, 
are bound by the courts’ jurisdictional limits and procedural rules.  McNeil v.  United 
States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). 
     Some of Rock’s filings include references to caselaw that appears not to exist, 
mislabeled motions,  and other difficult-to-follow arguments.  See,  e.g.,  DN 36 at 2 
(citing “Smith v. Smith, 491 S.W.3d 71 (Ky. 2016),” which does not appear to exist at 
that citation);  DN 48 at 3 (including vague references to “Qui Tam Enforcement” in 
his “Emergency Motion”).  Such filings burden other litigants and place judges in the 
uncomfortable position of recasting arguments and supporting authorities in order to 
make  out  the  parties’  positions.  Rock,  like  other litigants,  must  exercise  care  in 
preparing motions and other filings. 
                                  ORDER 
     For the reasons stated above, the Court overrules Rock’s objections (DN 71), 
adopts Judge King’s Report and Recommendation (DN 70), and denies the Emergency 
Motion to Declare Judge Perlow’s Orders Void and to Issue a Writ of Mandamus (DN 
34), and Emergency Motions for Miscellaneous Relief (DN 48, 52).  The Court further 
denies the Motion to Expedite Ruling on Emergency Motion for Writ of Mandamus 
(DN 36)  and the  Emergency Motion to  Compel Judicial Action on Pending Motion 
(DN 48) as moot.