Rodriguez v. Warden

                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                           
                 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA                            
                      SOUTH BEND DIVISION                                

ENEDEO RODRIGUEZ, JR.,                                                   

                                    Petitioner,                          

     v.                            CAUSE NO.: 3:25-CV-238 DRL-SJF        

WARDEN,                                                                  

                                   Respondent.                           

                      OPINION AND ORDER                                  
    Enedeo Rodriguez, Jr., a prisoner without a lawyer, challenges his conviction in 
Elkhart County under Case No. 20C01-1611-F2-000031 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF 
2.) He presently moves for a stay of his federal petition and for leave to add new claims 
to his petition. (ECF 19, 20.)                                            
    To understand the motions, it is necessary to delve rather deeply into the facts of 
Mr.  Rodriguez’s  criminal  case  and  his  efforts  on  multiple  fronts  to  overturn  his 
conviction. The Indiana Court of Appeals set forth the facts underlying his conviction as 
follows:1                                                                 
    In 2016, Elkhart County Interdiction Covert Enforcement (“ICE”), working 
    with other state and federal law enforcement agencies, received a tip that 
    Alejandro  Nava  Rodriguez  (“Nava”)  was  dealing  methamphetamine. 
    Investigators began monitoring and conducting hand-to-hand purchases 
    from Nava, and his associates, Luis Jaquez and Jorge Moreida. Investigators 
    suspected that the three men were methamphetamine dealers and that they 
    were  working  with  a  nearby  supplier.  Using  the  “buying  through” 
    technique, investigators placed large orders intended to “force [the dealers] 

1 The court must presume the facts set forth by the state court are correct unless Mr. Rodriguez 
rebuts them with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).   
to go to [their] supplier” and to lead investigators to the source of the 
methamphetamine. Investigators obtained court orders that allowed for 
wiretaps, pen registers, and “pings,” which provided GPS location data for 
each investigative subject’s cell phone.                             

Rodriguez resided in New Paris and owned R & R Auto (“R & R”), an auto 
repair  and  resale  business  in  Elkhart.  Video  surveillance  frequently 
captured Moreida at R & R; he would later testify that he worked there 
occasionally, despite not being on the company’s payroll. Wire surveillance 
also  revealed  that  Moreida  and  Rodriguez  telephoned  each  other 
frequently  and  used  language  that  investigators  believed  to  be  coded 
references to methamphetamine.                                       

On April 18, 2016, investigators conducted a hand-to-hand purchase of 
methamphetamine  from  Nava.  Nava  initially  met  with  an  undercover 
officer to hash out the terms of the deal, drove to Jaquez’s house, and then 
delivered a quarter pound of methamphetamine to the undercover officer. 
In all, investigators conducted five hand-to-hand purchases from Nava and 
two from Jaquez. They “were trying to determine whether Mr. Jaquez . . . 
was above or below Nava” in the drug operation’s hierarchy.          

On June 29, 2016, investigators conducted a hand-to-hand purchase of four 
ounces of methamphetamine from Moreida for $4,000. On August 23, 2016, 
an undercover officer (“UC 3749”) went to Moreida’s house and agreed to 
buy an additional half-pound of methamphetamine for $6,400. Moreida  
told UC 3749 “that he could make it happen; [but that] it would have to be 
later in that day.” Afterwards, wire surveillance revealed that Moreida 
telephoned Rodriguez, drove to meet him in Elkhart, and that the men 
drove together to Rodriguez’s house in New Paris, remaining there only 
briefly. Moreida then dropped Rodriguez off at R & R and delivered one-
half pound of methamphetamine to UC 3749.                            

On September 10, 2016, wire surveillance of Nava and Jaquez’s cell phone 
conversations  revealed  “that  they  were  out”  of  methamphetamine. 
Thereafter, GPS data revealed that Rodriguez drove seventy miles to Fort 
Wayne, remained there for only twenty minutes, and returned to Elkhart. 
While Rodriguez was en route back to Elkhart, investigators overheard 
Jaquez and Moreida saying “that the meth, or the dope, or the onions, or 
whatever they were calling it that day, was coming, [and] it was close. . . .  

Investigators were in concealed positions outside Rodriguez’s house when 
he returned home. They watched as he backed his truck up to his garage, 
removed a cardboard box from the truck bed, and carried the box into the 
garage. Approximately twenty minutes later, Rodriguez replaced the same 
box on his truck bed and covered it with a heavy blanket. An investigator 
followed in an unmarked car as Rodriguez drove to Jaquez's house, backed 
up his truck to Jaquez’s garage, removed the blanket, and carried the box 
into Jaquez’s garage. Rodriguez left within ten minutes. After Rodriguez 
left, the wire surveillance team alerted the on-site surveillance team that 
Nava was now en route to Jaquez’s house. Nava arrived soon thereafter, 
remained onsite only briefly, and then drove to see Juan Rivera, from whom 
investigators  conducted  several  hand-to-hand  purchases  during  this 
investigation.                                                       

On October 22, 2016, UC 3749 conducted a hand-to-hand purchase of    
methamphetamine from Moreida. On October 28, 2016, while he was at R 
& R Auto, Moreida sent a text message to UC 3749 and offered to sell him 
more methamphetamine. For this hand-to-hand purchase, in addition to 
wire  surveillance  and  an  on-site  surveillance  unit,  investigators  also 
enlisted helicopter surveillance support with video recording capacity. On-
site undercover investigators observed as Moreida negotiated with UC 
3749. Rodriguez was present for the negotiation, and both men appear in 
the helicopter surveillance video of the transaction. Moreida and UC 3749 
agreed on an $11,000 price for one pound of methamphetamine.         

Rodriguez and Moreida then drove to Rodriguez’s house, remaining there 
briefly, during which time Rodriguez retrieved an item, believed to be a 
digital scale from a vehicle, before re-entering the house. The men then 
drove to a cell phone store in Elkhart. Rodriguez went into the store, while 
Moreida proceeded to deliver the methamphetamine to UC 3749 at a nearby 
dry-cleaning establishment. Afterwards, Moreida picked up Rodriguez. 

By  now,  investigators  suspected  that  Rodriguez  was  a  major   
methamphetamine  supplier:  Moreida  had  both  called  Rodriguez  and 
received  several  phone  calls  from  Rodriguez  around  the  time  of 
transactions; Moreida had “trip[ped]” to Rodriguez, whose travel patterns 
and conduct suggested that he may be a supplier to Jaquez, Nava, and 
Moreida; and Rodriguez “was physically present or near” at the time of two 
hand-to-hand  purchases  coordinated  by  Moreida.  Investigators  also 
suspected that Rodriguez was transporting methamphetamine in R & R's 
vehicles and conducted surveillance on R & R “for several weeks” during 
the investigation.                                                   
    Investigators executed a federal search warrant2 at Rodriguez’s house on 
    November 2, 2016. Rodriguez, his wife, and a young child were present 
    when the search warrant was executed. The November 2, 2016[,] search 
    yielded a significant quantity of methamphetamine in the basement, along 
    with a measuring cup, two digital scales, two vacuum sealing machines, 
    large, industrial resealable bags, bulk quantities of cellophane, a cutting 
    agent,  and  at  least  six  cell  phones.  Investigators  also  recovered 
    methamphetamine crystals and smoking devices from Rodriguez’s garage 
    and 240 grams of methamphetamine and a large supply of resealable bags 
    from the stereo speaker of a truck that was parked outside Rodriguez’s 
    house.                                                               

Rodriguez v. State, 102 N.E.3d 942 (Table), 2018 WL 294715, 1-3 (Ind. Ct. App. June 13, 
2018)  (internal  citations,  headnotes,  and  footnotes  omitted).  The  state  charged  Mr. 
Rodriguez with dealing in methamphetamine and corrupt business influence. Id. at 3. He 
was found guilty as charged by a jury and sentenced to an aggregate term of 32 years in 
prison. Id. at 9.                                                         
    He appealed, and his conviction was affirmed by the Indiana Court of Appeals. Id. 
at 9-17. The Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer. Rodriguez v. State, 110 N.E.3d 1147 
(Table) (Ind. 2018). In October 2018, he filed a post-conviction petition asserting claims of 
ineffective assistance by trial counsel, including that his trial counsel was ineffective in 
not challenging the search of his residence. Rodriguez v. State, 233 N.E.3d 996 (Table), 2024 
WL 1209050, 2 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2024). The petition was denied following a two-
day evidentiary hearing, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 3-4. His 
petition to transfer was denied without comment by the Indiana Supreme Court in May 
2024. Rodriguez v. State, 235 N.E.3d 136 (Table) (Ind. May 23, 2024).     

2 Magistrate Judge Michael Gotsch, Sr., who issued the warrant, retired from the bench in 2024. 
    In June 2024, Mr. Rodriguez filed a federal habeas corpus petition. Rodriguez v. 
Warden, 3:24-CV-469-TLS-JEM (N.D. Ind. closed Nov. 27, 2024). While the petition was 

pending, he sought leave from the Indiana Court of Appeals to pursue a successive post-
conviction petition asserting new claims of wrongdoing by law enforcement and a new 
ground of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (ECF 16-16.) His request for leave to file 
a successive post-conviction petition was denied in July 2024. (ECF 16-17.) He then sought 
to “withdraw” his federal habeas petition so that he could focus on pursuing additional 
remedies  in  state  court.  Rodriguez,  3:24-CV-469-TLS-JEM,  ECF  19.  This  request  was 

granted, and his federal petition was dismissed without prejudice in November 2024.3 Id. 
    In March 2025, Mr. Rodriguez returned to federal court with a new petition 
asserting the following claims:4 (1) his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because 
law enforcement agents lied in their warrant applications; (2) the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by withholding evidence from him; (3) his trial counsel was ineffective in 

failing to challenge the search warrant under the Fourth Amendment; (4) his post-
conviction counsel was ineffective in litigating his ineffective-assistance of trial counsel 
claim; (5) the search of his residence was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
due to the use of the flash-bang device; (6) the trial judge was biased against him; (7) his 
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated due to delays attributable to the 


3 He was cautioned that a strict one-year limitations period applied to federal habeas petitions 
and was directed to consult the statute to ensure he returned to federal court, if he chose to do so, 
within the limitations period. Rodriguez v. Warden, 3:24-CV-469-TLS-JEM, ECF 19. 

4 He presents his grounds for relief in a rather confusing fashion, and some claims contain various 
subparts. (ECF 2 at 4-6.) The court has attempted to give his petition liberal construction. 
prosecution; and (8) “cumulative error” rendered his trial “fundamentally unfair.” (ECF 
2 at 5-6.)                                                                

    The respondent argues that all of these claims are procedurally defaulted. (ECF 
16.)  Mr.  Rodriguez  has  not  yet  filed  a  traverse  addressing  the  procedural  default 
arguments, and instead filed a motion for a stay of the petition (ECF 19) and a motion for 
leave to add an entirely new claim based on an alleged Confrontation Clause violation 
(ECF 20).                                                                 
    In his motion for a stay, he argues that he “filed a 60(B) Motion in the state court 

based on newly discovered evidence of fraudulent warrant affidavit and constitutional 
violations.” (ECF 19 at 2.) He asks that proceedings in this federal case be stayed until 
that appeal has concluded. (Id.) However, public records reflect that the Indiana Court of 
Appeals dismissed his appeal on August 1, 2025. See Rodriguez v. State, No. 25A-CR-01637 
(Ind. Ct. App. order dated Aug. 1, 2025). The court determined that his “Rule 60(B)” 

motion was actually an “unauthorized successive petition for post-conviction relief.” Id. 
Mr. Rodriguez subsequently moved for an “emergency stay” and other relief, but all of 
his motions have been denied. Id. The court finds no basis to stay the federal case on this 
ground.                                                                   
    He also moves for a stay so that he can exhaust an entirely new Confrontation 

Clause claim in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 
(2024). (ECF 19 at 2.) He relatedly moves to amend his federal petition to add this new 
Confrontation Clause claim. (ECF 20.) Mr. Rodriguez’s motion for a stay does not appear 
to relate to any of the claims in his petition that the respondent argues are procedurally 
defaulted. (See ECF 16, 19.) A federal habeas court has no authority to enter a stay related 
to procedurally defaulted claims. Weisheit v. Neal, __ F.4th __, 2025 WL 2327412, 5 (7th 

Cir. Aug. 13, 2025).                                                      
    For Mr. Rodriguez to assert a new claim at this stage, he must satisfy the threshold 
requirement of timeliness. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) 
contains a strict statute of limitations, set forth as follows:           
    (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of 
    habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 
    court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--          

         (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the          
         conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for   
         seeking such review;                                            

         (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application   
         created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 
         of  the  United  States  is  removed,  if  the  applicant  was  
         prevented from filing by such State action;                     

         (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was     
         initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has     
         been  newly  recognized  by  the  Supreme  Court  and  made     
         retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or      

         (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or     
         claims presented could have been discovered through the         
         exercise of due diligence.                                      

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).                                                      
    Mr. Rodriguez’s conviction became final in December 2018 when the time expired 
for him to seek review in the United States Supreme Court on direct appeal. See Gonzalez 
v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 150 (2012); U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13(1). He already had a state post-
conviction petition pending at that time, so the federal deadline was tolled. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(d)(2)  (“The  time  during  which  a  properly  filed  application  for  State  post-
conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is 

pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.”). 
The federal deadline remained tolled until the state post-conviction proceedings came to 
an end in May 2024, when the Indiana Supreme Court denied his petition to transfer. At 
that point, the one-year federal limitations period began to run.         
    Mr.  Rodriguez  filed  a  federal  petition  in  June  2024  that  was  subsequently 
dismissed without prejudice, but the deadline was not tolled during the time that filing 

was pending. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181–82 (2001) (deadline was not tolled under 
§ 2244(d)(2) during pendency of petitioner’s first federal habeas petition). Nor was it 
tolled during his unsuccessful effort to pursue a successive post-conviction petition in 
state court. See Martinez v. Jones, 556 F.3d 637, 638 (7th Cir. 2009). In other words, the 
federal limitations period ran unimpeded beginning in May 2024 and expired one year 

later in May 2025. His July 2025 motion seeking to add an entirely new claim thus comes 
too late.5                                                                
    Mr. Rodriguez suggests that this claim is timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(C) 
because it is premised on Smith, in which the Supreme Court clarified prior Confrontation 


5  Under limited circumstances, an untimely amendment to a pleading may be deemed to “relate 
back” to an earlier, timely filed pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c); Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655-56 
(2005). This doctrine is narrowly applied in the habeas context in light of the strict deadlines 
imposed by AEDPA. Mayle, 545 U.S. at 662. To relate back, an untimely claim must be based on 
the same “common core of operative facts” as a claim raised in the timely filed petition. See id. at 
660-61. In essence the claims must be based on the same grounds, and it is not sufficient that the 
claims all arise out of the same “trial, conviction, or sentence.” Id. at 664. Mr. Rodriguez’s new 
claim based on an alleged Confrontation Clause violation does not meet this criteria. 
Clause case law as it relates to out-of-court statements by forensic-testing experts. The 
Supreme Court held that “when an expert conveys an absent analyst’s statements in 

support of his opinion, and the statements provided that support only if true, then the 
statements come into evidence for their truth.” Id.                       
    For a claim to be timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C), a petitioner must not only 
demonstrate that he is invoking a new constitutional rule, but also that the Supreme 
Court has made that rule retroactively applicable. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663 (2001) 
(holding that “a new rule is not made retroactive to cases on collateral review unless the 

Supreme Court holds it to be retroactive”). Smith was a direct appeal and there is no 
language in it indicating that it has retroactive application to cases that are on collateral 
review. At least two district courts called to decide the issue have concluded that Smith 
is not likely to be made retroactive to cases that are on federal habeas review. See Hisler 
v. Royce, No. 1:21-CV-3676, 2025 WL 903847, 13 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2025); Garcia v. Cain, 

No. 1:24-CV-52-HSO, 2025 WL 1363109, 5 (S.D. Miss. May 9, 2025) (same). The court finds 
their reasoning persuasive.                                               
    Under Supreme Court precedent, a new rule of criminal procedure ordinarily 
“does not apply retroactively to overturn final convictions on federal collateral review.” 
Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255, 263 (2021). That is because “applying constitutional rules 

not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle 
of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.” Id. (citation 
and quotations omitted). There are only two exceptions. The first is when a new Supreme 
Court case “places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the 
power of criminal law-making authority to proscribe.” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 
(1989). The opinion in Smith, which pertained to admission of certain evidence, does not 

fall into that category.                                                  
    The second exception is where the Supreme Court has announced a “watershed” 
rule of criminal procedure. Edwards, 593 U.S. at 263. This exception is exceedingly narrow. 
Id. (“[I]n the 32 years since Teague underscored that [watershed] principle, this Court has 
announced many important new rules of criminal procedure. But the Court has not 
applied any of those new rules retroactively on federal collateral review.”). Indeed, in the 

Confrontation  Clause  context,  the  Supreme  Court  previously  held  that  Crawford  v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), though certainly seminal, was not a “watershed” case. See 
Whorton v. Bocting, 549 U.S. 406, 421 (2007). Under these circumstances, the holding in 
Smith is inapplicable to Mr. Rodriguez’s collateral attack on his conviction. There is no 
basis to permit him to amend his petition to add this claim or to stay his federal petition 

while he exhausts this claim in state court.                              
    As best as can be discerned, Mr. Rodriguez also asks for a stay so that he can 
exhaust two additional claims in state court: a new ineffective-assistance claim based on 
his trial counsel’s alleged “systematic opposition to [his] client’s constitutional rights” 
and  a  due  process  claim  premised  on  unspecified  “newly  discovered  fraudulent 

evidence.” (ECF 19 at 2.) He appears to invoke the stay and abeyance procedure outlined 
in Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), but Rhines applies to “mixed” petitions, which 
contain both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Id. The claims Mr. Rodriguez wants to 
exhaust are not contained in his petition.                                
    Although Mr. Rodriguez does not formally request leave to add these two new 
claims to his petition, it would be too late for him to do so. As outlined above, the one-

year deadline under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)(A) expired in May 2025. Neither of the two 
claims is premised on a new Supreme Court case made retroactive to cases on collateral 
review so as to implicate 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)(C). The factual basis for a claim based on 
trial counsel’s interactions with Mr. Rodriguez at trial would have been known and 
available for years. He asserts without elaboration that he did not learn the factual basis 
for the due process “fraudulent evidence” claim until April 2024, but that was more than 

one year ago, making 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) inapplicable. He also does not provide 
sufficient details about what this evidence is or what steps he took to uncover it for the 
court to determine that he acted diligently. Villanueva v. Anglin, 719 F.3d 769, 774 (7th Cir. 
2013) (clock starts running under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) “at the time a reasonable 
person would have discovered those facts.”). Nor does he identify any state-created 

impediment  that  prevented  him  from  asserting  these  claims  within  the  one-year 
deadline.6 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B).                                     
    Even if he could timely amend his petition to add these additional claims, a stay is 
warranted only when a petitioner has some avenue left in state court to exhaust. Weisheit 
v. Neal, ---F.4th---, 2025 WL 2327412, 5 (7th Cir. Aug. 13, 2025). Mr. Rodriguez does not 

explain how he would present these claims to the Indiana courts, and it appears his efforts 


6 The relation-back doctrine also does not assist him because the new claims he wants to raise 
involve a different ground of ineffective assistance of counsel that was not previously asserted 
and a due process claim premised on entirely new facts. Mayle, 545 U.S. at 655.  
to challenge his conviction in state court have come to an end. He already pursued a 
direct appeal, post-conviction proceedings, an unsuccessful request to file a successive 

post-conviction petition, and a recent “60(B)” motion that the Indiana Court of Appeals 
rejected  as  an  unauthorized  successive  post-conviction  petition.  It  would  be 
inappropriate to stay the federal petition simply to allow Mr. Rodriguez to file more 
procedurally improper attacks on his conviction in state court. See id.   
    Under these circumstances, a stay of the petition is not warranted. The court also 
does not find a sufficient basis to permit Mr. Rodriguez to amend his petition to add the 

new claims he identifies. His motions will be denied. He asks for additional time to file a 
traverse in the event his motions are denied. (ECF 19 at 3.) This request will be granted, 
and the court will set a new deadline for Rodriguez to file a traverse.   
    For these reasons, the court:                                        
    (1) DENIES the petitioner’s motions (ECF 19, 20); and                

    (2) EXTENDS the deadline for the petitioner to file a traverse to October 15, 2025. 
    SO ORDERED.                                                          
    September 11, 2025            s/ Damon R. Leichty                    
                                  Judge, United States District Court