Schoenefeld v. Schneiderman

11-4283-cv Schoenefeld v. Schneiderman   In the United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit ________________  August Term, 2014  (Argued: June 4, 2015             Decided: April 22, 2016)  Docket No. 11‐4283‐cv  ________________  EKATERINA SCHOENEFELD,    Plaintiff‐Appellee,  —v.—  ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of  New York; ALL JUSTICES OF NEW YORK SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION,  THIRD JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; ROBERT D. MAYBERGER, in his official capacity as  Clerk of New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Judicial  Department; JOHN G. RUSK, Chairman of the Committee on Professional  Standards (“COPS”),    Defendants‐Appellants,  STATE OF NEW YORK; NEW YORK SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD  JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS OF NEW YORK  SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT AND ITS  MEMBERS,    Defendants.  ________________  Before:  RAGGI, HALL, CARNEY, Circuit Judges.  ________________   1  Appeal  from  a  judgment  of  the  United  States  District  Court  for  the  Northern  District  of  New  York  (Kahn,  J.)  declaring  unconstitutional,  under  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause,  a  New  York  law  requiring  nonresident  attorneys to maintain an “office for the transaction of law business” within New  York  State  in  order  to  practice  law  in  that  state’s  courts.    N.Y.  Judiciary  Law  § 470;  see  U.S.  Const.  art.  IV,  § 2.    In  response  to  a  certified  question  from  this  court, the New York Court of Appeals has clarified that § 470 cannot be satisfied  by anything less than a physical office, a decision that does not allow us to avoid  deciding  plaintiff’s  constitutional  challenge.    We  here  conclude  that  § 470  does  not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause because it was enacted not for a  protectionist  purpose  to  favor  New  York  resident  attorneys  but,  rather,  to  provide a means whereby nonresidents could establish a physical presence in the  state akin to that of residents, thereby resolving a service concern while allowing  nonresidents to practice law in the state’s courts.    REVERSED AND REMANDED.   Judge HALL dissents in a separate opinion.  ________________  EKATERINA  SCHOENEFELD,  Schoenefeld  Law  Firm  LLC,  Princeton,  New Jersey, pro se.    2  LAURA  ETLINGER,  Assistant  Solicitor  General  (Barbara  D.  Underwood, Solicitor General; Andrea Oser, Deputy Solicitor  General,  on  the  brief),  for  Eric  T.  Schneiderman,  Attorney  General  of  the  State  of  New  York,  Albany,  New  York,  for  Defendants‐Appellants.    David B. Rubin, Esq., Metuchen, New Jersey, for Amicus Curiae The  New  Jersey  State  Bar  Association,  in  support  of  Plaintiff‐ Appellee.    Leah  M.  Nicholls,  Brian  Wolfman,  Institute  for  Public  Representation, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae New York‐ Licensed Nonresident Attorneys, in support of Plaintiff‐Appellee.  ________________ REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judge:      On  this  appeal,  we  must  decide  whether  New  York  violates  the  Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, see U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, by  requiring  nonresident  members  of  its  bar  to  maintain  a  physical  “office  for  the  transaction  of  law  business”  within  the  state,  when  resident  attorneys  are  not  required to maintain offices distinct from their homes, N.Y. Judiciary Law § 470.   Having now received the New York Court of Appeals’ response to our certified  question  as  to  the  “minimum  requirements  necessary  to  satisfy”  §  470’s  office  mandate, see Schoenefeld v. New York, 748 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 2014); Schoenefeld  v.  State,  25  N.Y.3d  22,  6  N.Y.S.3d  221  (2015)  (holding  §  470  to  require  physical  office),  we  conclude  that  §  470  does  not  violate  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  3  Clause because it was not enacted for the protectionist purpose of favoring New  York  residents  in  their  ability  to  practice  law.    To  the  contrary,  the  statute  was  enacted to ensure that nonresident members of the New York bar could practice  in the state by providing a means, i.e., a New York office, for them to establish a  physical  presence  in  the  state  on  a  par  with  that  of  resident  attorneys,  thereby  eliminating  a  service‐of‐process  concern.    We  identify  no  protectionist  intent  in  that  action.    Indeed,  it  is  Schoenefeld  who,  in  seeking  to  practice  law  in  New  York without a physical presence in the state, is looking to be treated differently  from, not the same as, New York resident attorneys.  Such differential treatment  is  not  required  by  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause.    Accordingly,  we  reverse the judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District  of  New  York  (Lawrence  E.  Kahn,  Judge)  declaring  §  470’s  office  requirement  unconstitutional,  see  Schoenefeld  v.  New  York,  907  F.  Supp.  2d  252  (N.D.N.Y.  2011),  and  we  remand  the  case  with  instructions  to  enter  judgment  in  favor  of  defendants on Schoenefeld’s Privileges and Immunities claim.1    1  Because  Schoenefeld  has  not  appealed  the  district  court’s  February  8,  2010  dismissal  of  her  Equal  Protection  and  Commerce  Clause  challenges  to  §  470,  dismissal of her remaining Privileges and Immunities claim should conclude this  litigation.    4  I. Background  Because  the  facts  and  procedural  history  underlying  this  appeal  are  set  forth in our prior panel opinion with which we assume familiarity, we reiterate  them  here  only  insofar  as  necessary  to  explain  our  decision  to  reverse  and  remand.   A. The  Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause  Challenge  to  N.Y.  Judiciary                Law § 470    Plaintiff  Ekaterina  Schoenefeld,  a  citizen  and  resident  of  New  Jersey,  is  licensed to practice law in New Jersey, New York, and California.  She maintains  an office in New Jersey, but not in New York.  She asserts that she has declined  occasional  requests  to  represent  clients  in  New  York  state  courts  to  avoid  violating N.Y. Judiciary Law § 470, which states as follows:   A person, regularly admitted to practice as an attorney  and  counsellor,  in  the  courts  of  record  of  this  state,  whose  office  for  the  transaction  of  law  business  is  within  the  state,  may  practice  as  such  attorney  or  counsellor, although he resides in an adjoining state.    N.Y. Judiciary Law § 470 (McKinney 2016) (emphasis added).  Schoenefeld seeks  a  judicial  declaration  that  the  office  requirement  imposed  by  §  470  on  nonresident members of the New York bar violates the Constitution’s Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause  by  infringing  on  nonresidents’  right  to  practice  law  in  5  New  York.    The  district  court  agreed  and,  on  the  parties’  cross‐motions  for  summary  judgment,  declared  §  470  unconstitutional.    See  Schoenefeld  v.  New  York, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 262–66.  This timely appeal followed.  B. This Court’s Certification to the New York Court of Appeals  In appealing the district court’s ruling, New York State’s Attorney General,  on behalf of all defendants, initially argued that this case presented no Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause  concern  because  §  470’s  office  requirement  could  be  construed  to  demand  only  “an  address  for  accepting  personal  service,”  which  could be satisfied by a designated agent.  Schoenefeld v. New York, 748 F.3d at  467.    Alternatively,  the  Attorney  General  argued  that,  even  if  §  470  did  treat  nonresident  attorneys  differently  from  resident  attorneys,  it  did  not  violate  the  Privileges and Immunities Clause because the burden imposed on nonresidents  was “incidental” and substantially related to New York’s sufficient state interest  in the service of legal papers.  Id.    Seeking  to  avoid  a  possibly  unnecessary  constitutional  question,  see  Arizonans  for  Official  English  v.  Arizona,  520  U.S.  43,  78–79  (1997)  (explaining  that, in confronting constitutional challenge to statute, court must first determine  if  any  reasonable  construction  “will  contain  the  statute  within  constitutional  6  bounds,”  and  emphasizing  that  “[w]arnings  against  premature  adjudication  of  constitutional questions bear heightened attention” where federal court is asked  to invalidate state statute), but uncertain as to whether New York’s highest court  would,  in  fact,  construe  §  470  as  urged  by  defendants,  see  Schoenefeld  v.  New  York,  748  F.3d  at  468–69  (observing  that  New  York’s  lower  courts  had  never  interpreted  §  470  to  be  satisfied  by  less  than  physical  office  space),  this  court  certified the following question to the New York Court of Appeals:    Under New York Judiciary Law § 470, which mandates  that  a  nonresident  attorney  maintain  an  “office  for  the  transaction  of  law  business”  within  the  state  of  New  York, what are the minimum requirements necessary to  satisfy that mandate?    Id. at 471.  The  Court  of  Appeals  accepted  the  certification  and,  upon  review,  held  that  §  470  “requires  nonresident  attorneys  to  maintain  a  physical  office  in  New  York.”  Schoenefeld v. State, 25 N.Y.3d at 25, 6 N.Y.S.3d at 222.  In so ruling, the  court observed that the statute, initially enacted in 1862, “appears to presuppose  a residency requirement for the practice of law in New York State,” to which “[i]t  then  makes  an  exception,  by  allowing  nonresident  attorneys  to  practice  law  if  they keep an ‘office for the transaction of law business’” in New York.  Id. at 27, 6  N.Y.S.3d  at  223.    The  Court  acknowledged  that  the  1862  statute  had  linked  the  7  office requirement to service of process, so that “service, which could ordinarily  be  made  upon  a  New  York  attorney  at  his  residence,  could  be  made  upon  the  nonresident  attorney  through  mail  addressed  to  his  office.”    Id.,  6 N.Y.S.3d  at  224.    But,  the  two  statutory  parts  were  severed  in  1909,  with  the  office  requirement codified at § 470 making no reference to service.  See id. at 27–28, 6  N.Y.S.3d at 224.  In these circumstances, the Court of Appeals concluded that the  term “office,” as used in § 470, could not be construed to mean only an address  or  agent  sufficient  for  the  receipt  of  service.    Rather,  the  plain  meaning  of  “office,” particularly when joined with “the additional phrase ‘for the transaction  of law business,’” requires “nonresident attorneys to maintain a physical office in  New York.”  Id. at 25, 28, 6 N.Y.S.3d at 222, 224.     The Court of Appeals acknowledged a legitimate state interest in ensuring  that  personal  service  can  be  made  on  nonresident  attorneys  practicing  in  New  York  courts.    But,  in  construing  the  statute,  it  observed  that  the  “logistical  difficulties”  with  service  at  the  time  the  office  requirement  was  enacted  had  largely been overcome by state law authorizing “several means of service upon a  nonresident  attorney,  including  mail,  overnight  delivery,  fax  and  (where  permitted)  email,”  id.  at  28,  6  N.Y.S.3d  at  224  (citing  N.Y.  C.P.L.R.  2103(b)  8  (McKinney 2015)), as well as the court’s own rule conditioning the admission of  nonresident  attorneys  without  full‐time  employment  in  New  York  upon  their  designation  of  “the  clerk  of  the  Appellate  Division  in  their  department  of  admission  as  their  agent  for  the  service  of  process,”  id.,  6  N.Y.S.3d  at  224–25  (citing N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 520.13(a) (2015)).  Thus, the office  requirement could not be construed to require only an address for service.  The  term was properly understood to require a physical premises.   Because the Court of Appeals’ response to our certified question does not  moot Schoenefeld’s constitutional challenge to § 470, we proceed to address her  claim and conclude that it fails on the merits.2    2Our dissenting colleague, Judge Hall, suggests that such a conclusion means it  was  unnecessary—and  therefore  improper—to  certify  the  question  of  §  470’s  minimum requirements to the New York Court of Appeals.  See Dissenting Op.,  post  at  4–5,  6  n.1.    This  court,  however,  has  recognized  certification  to  be  appropriate where a state statute is “fairly subject to an interpretation which will  render unnecessary or substantially modify the federal constitutional question.”   Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 168 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks  omitted)  (certifying  state‐law  questions  of  statutory  interpretation  to  New  York  Court  of  Appeals  that  would  “render  unnecessary,  or  at  least  substantially  modify,  the  federal  constitutional  question”).    That  is  this  case.    As  our  prior  panel  opinion  explained,  New  York’s Attorney  General  there  argued  that  §  470  could  be  read  to  require  only  an  address  for  accepting  personal  service,  under  which  reading  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause  would  not  be  “implicate[d].”    Schoenefeld  v.  New  York,  748  F.3d  at  467;  see  also  id.  at  469  (acknowledging that Supreme Court has “urged the federal courts of appeals to  use certification in order to avoid deciding constitutional questions unnecessarily  9  II. Discussion  A. Standard of Review  We  review  an  award  of  summary  judgment  de  novo,  and  will  affirm  if  “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non‐moving party, there  is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.”  Baldwin v. EMI Feist Catalog, Inc.,  805  F.3d  18,  25  (2d  Cir.  2015)  (internal  quotation  marks  and  citation  omitted).   “Claims turning entirely on the constitutional validity or invalidity of a statute,”  such  as  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  challenge  here,  “are  particularly  conducive  to  disposition  by  summary  judgment  as  they  involve  purely  legal  questions.”    Connecticut  ex  rel.  Blumenthal  v.  Crotty,  346  F.3d  84,  93  (2d  Cir.  2003). or  prematurely”  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted)).    Further,  the  Attorney  General specifically requested certification if this court could not predict whether  the New York Court of Appeals would adopt this reading.  See Allstate Ins. Co.  v.  Serio,  261  F.3d  143,  153–54  (2d  Cir.  2001)  (recognizing  that  “certification  request  merits  more  respectful  consideration”  where,  among  other  things,  request  was  made  by  Attorney  General,  who  advanced  possible  saving  construction  of  state  statute  (internal  quotation  marks  and  brackets  omitted)).   Osterweil v. Bartlett, 706 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2013), cited in the dissent, is not to the  contrary, as we there certified a question of statutory interpretation to the New  York  Court  of  Appeals  where,  as  here,  one  possible  answer  would  resolve  the  litigation, while an alternative statutory construction would require this court “to  decide  the  constitutional  question.”    Id.  at  143.    Nor  is  a  proper  certification  rendered  improper  because  the  state  court  does  not  approve  the  possible  statutory construction that would have avoided or minimized the constitutional  challenge.  10  B. The Privileges and Immunities Clause  The  Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause  states  that  “[t]he  Citizens  of  each  State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several  States.”  U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.  The Clause operates to “place the citizens of  each  State  upon  the  same  footing  with  citizens  of  other  States,  so  far  as  the  advantages  resulting  from  citizenship  in  those  states  are  concerned.”    Paul  v.  Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868); see Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 88 (2d  Cir.  2005),  overruled  on  other  grounds  by  McDonald  v.  Chicago,  561  U.S.  742  (2010).3    In  short,  the  Clause  does  not  demand  that  a  citizen  of  one  State  be  allowed to carry with him into another state the privileges and immunities which  come with citizenship in his state.  Rather, it guarantees “that in any State every  citizen  of  any  other  State  is  to  have  the  same  privileges  and  immunities  which  the citizens of that State enjoy.”  Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436  U.S. 371, 382 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted).  It is toward that end that  the Clause “prevents a State from discriminating against citizens of other States  in favor of its own.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).   3 Although the Privileges and Immunities Clause speaks in terms of citizens, it is  now  well  established  that  “for  analytic  purposes  citizenship  and  residency  are  essentially interchangeable.”  Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 64  (1988).  11  The Privileges and Immunities Clause, however, is “not an absolute” that  precludes  states  from  ever  distinguishing  between  citizens  and  noncitizens.   Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 67 (1988); see Baldwin v. Fish &  Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. at 383 (collecting cases and observing that state  need  not  “always  apply  all  its  laws  or  all  its  services  equally”  to  citizens  and  noncitizens).    To  prevail  on  a  Privileges  and  Immunities  challenge,  a  plaintiff  must  demonstrate  that  the  state  has  burdened  nonresident  activity  that  is  “sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the Nation as to fall within the purview of  the Privileges and Immunities Clause.”  Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487  U.S.  at  64  (internal  quotation  marks  and  alterations  omitted).    Upon  such  a  showing,  the  state  may  defend  its  position  by  demonstrating  that  “substantial  reasons  exist  for  the  discrimination  and  the  degree  of  discrimination  bears  a  sufficiently close relation to such reasons.”  Id. at 67; accord Connecticut ex rel.  Blumenthal v. Crotty, 346 F.3d at 94.  A court necessarily conducts these inquiries  in light of the Supreme Court’s recent admonition that constitutionally protected  privileges  and  immunities  are  burdened  “only  when  [challenged]  laws  were  enacted for [a] protectionist purpose.”  McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1715  (2013).      12  In McBurney, which was decided after the district court ruled in this case,  a  nonresident  plaintiff  challenged  Virginia’s  Freedom  of  Information  Act  (“FOIA”) for hampering his ability to pursue a common calling.  He alleged that  the  law,  by  allowing  only  Virginia  citizens  to  inspect  and  copy  public  records,  abridged  his  ability  to  engage  in  the  business  of  “request[ing]  real  estate  tax  records on clients’ behalf from state and local governments.”  Id. at 1714–15.  The  Supreme  Court  acknowledged  that  the  ability  to  pursue  a  common  calling  is  protected  by  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause.    See  id.  at  1715.   Nevertheless,  it  identified  no  unconstitutional  burden  because  plaintiff  had  failed to “allege,” and “ha[d] offered no proof,” that the statute “was enacted in  order to provide a competitive economic advantage for Virginia citizens.”  Id.  To  the  contrary,  the  statute  was  enacted  with  the  “distinctly  nonprotectionist  aim”  of  allowing  “those  who  ultimately  hold  sovereign  power,”  i.e.,  the  citizens  of  Virginia,  to  “obtain  an  accounting  from  the  public  officials  to  whom  they  delegate  the  exercise  of  that  power.”    Id.  at  1716.    The  Supreme  Court  thus  concluded  that,  even  if  the  statute  had  “the  incidental  effect  of  preventing  citizens of other States from making a profit by trading on information contained  13  in state records,” in the absence of a showing of discriminatory purpose to favor  state citizens, plaintiff could not pursue a Privileges and Immunities claim.  Id.4     We  do  not  understand  McBurney  to  state  any  new  principle  of  law.   Nevertheless, McBurney provides a clarification not available to the district court  at  the  time  it  ruled  in  this  case,  specifically,  that  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause does not prohibit state distinctions between residents and nonresidents in  the  abstract,  but  “only”  those  “enacted  for  the  protectionist  purpose  of  burdening  out‐of‐state  citizens”  with  respect  to  the  privileges  and  immunities  afforded the state’s own citizens.  133 S. Ct. at 1715; see Baldwin v. Fish & Game  Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. at 380–81.    Nor do we understand McBurney to suggest that the disparate effects of a  challenged  state  law  are  completely  irrelevant  to  a  Privileges  and  Immunities  inquiry.    As  the  Supreme  Court  has  recognized  in  other  contexts,  burdensome  effects can sometimes admit an inference of proscribed intent.  Cf. Washington v.  4 While  “incidental”  can  mean  “minor,”  the  context  in  McBurney  suggests  that  the  Supreme  Court  used  the  word  to  mean  something  occurring  “by  chance  or  without intention or calculation.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary  1142  (1986).    Indeed,  the  Court  has  used  the  word  in  this  manner  in  other  discrimination  cases.    See,  e.g.,  Ashcroft  v.  Iqbal,  556  U.S.  662,  682  (2009)  (rejecting equal protection challenge for failure plausibly to plead discriminatory  intent,  observing  that  it  was  “no  surprise”  that  policy  “produce[d]  a  disparate,  incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy was  to target neither Arabs nor Muslims” (emphases added)).    14  Davis,  426  U.S.  229,  241  (1976)  (noting  relevancy  of  disproportionate  impact  to  racially discriminatory intent).  What McBurney makes plain, however, is that it  is protectionist purpose, and not disparate effects alone, that identifies the sort of  discrimination prohibited by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, by contrast,  for example, to the Commerce Clause.  See generally McBurney v. Young, 133 S.  Ct.  at  1720  (separately  analyzing  challenged  law  under  dormant  Commerce  Clause);  cf.  Comptroller  of  the  Treasury  of  Md.  v.  Wynne,  135  S.  Ct.  1787,  1801  n.4 (2015) (observing that “Commerce Clause regulates effects, not motives,” and  does  not  require  court  inquiry  into  “reasons  for  enacting  a  law  that  has  a  discriminatory effect”).5  Thus, consistent with McBurney, a plaintiff challenging  a  law  under  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause  must  allege  or  offer  some  proof of a protectionist purpose to maintain the claim.  In the absence of such a  showing,  a  Privileges  and  Immunities  claim  fails,  obviating  the  need  for  a  tailoring  inquiry.    See  McBurney  v.  Young,  133  S.  Ct.  at  1716  (explaining  that  5McBurney cannot be cabined as Judge Hall urges, to Privileges and Immunities  challenges  to  non‐economic  legislation.    See  Dissenting  Op.,  post  at  9–10.   Although  Virginia’s  FOIA  was  not  an  economic  regulation,  McBurney’s  Privileges and Immunities analysis did not turn on that distinction but, rather, on  the plaintiff’s failure to adduce proof of protectionist purpose.  Indeed, the Court  there  held  that  “the  Clause  forbids  a  State  from  intentionally  giving  its  own  citizens  a  competitive  advantage  in  business  or  employment.”    McBurney  v.  Young, 133 S. Ct. at 1716 (emphasis added).    15  “Clause  does  not  require  that  a  State  tailor  its  every  action  to  avoid  any  incidental effect on out‐of‐state tradesmen”).6  With  these  principles  in  mind,  we  consider  Schoenefeld’s  challenge  to  § 470.  C. Schoenefeld Has Adduced No Proof that § 470 Was Enacted for a  Protectionist Purpose     Schoenefeld  asserts  that  §  470  violates  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause both on its face and as applied.  Insofar as the law, both on its face and as  6 McBurney  did  not  specify  at  what  step  of  the  traditional  two‐step  inquiry  plaintiff  must  carry  this  protectionist‐purpose  burden.    The  Ninth  Circuit  recently  concluded  that  protectionist  purpose  is  properly  considered  at  the  second step of inquiry.  See Marilley v. Bonham, 802 F.3d 958, 964 (9th Cir. 2015).  But the  case  is  now  awaiting  en  banc  review.    See  815  F.3d 1178  (9th Cir.  2016)  (mem.).  In any event, the panel conclusion in Marilley is not obvious because, at  the  second  step  of  inquiry,  the  burden  shifts  to  the  defendants,  see  Supreme  Court  of  Va.  v.  Friedman,  487  U.S.  at  67,  and  McBurney  emphasized  the  nonresident  plaintiff’s  failure  to  plead  or  offer  proof  of  a  protectionist  purpose  for  Virginia’s  FOIA,  see  133  S.  Ct.  at  1715–16;  cf.,  e.g.,  Village  of  Arlington  Heights  v.  Metro.  Hous.  Dev.  Corp.,  429  U.S.  252,  270  n.21  (1977)  (holding,  in  Equal  Protection  context,  that  if  plaintiff  demonstrates  that  challenged  decision  was  “motivated  in  part  by  a  racially  discriminatory  purpose,”  burden  shifts  to  government  to  establish  that “same decision  would  have  resulted  even  had  the  impermissible purpose not been considered”).  For this reason, we cannot readily  assume, as our dissenting colleague does, that the Supreme Court’s discussion of  plaintiff’s  failure  necessarily  occurred  at  the  second  step  of  the  traditional  inquiry.    See  Dissenting  Op.,  post  at  8–9.    However,  we  need  not  here  conclusively  decide  at  what  step  plaintiff  must  adduce  proof  of  a  protectionist  purpose  because,  in  any  event,  Schoenefeld’s  failure  to  carry  this  burden  here  defeats her Privileges and Immunities claim.         16  applied, pertains to the practice of law, the parties agree that § 470 implicates a  privilege protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  See Supreme Court  of  N.H.  v.  Piper,  470  U.S.  274,  283  (1985);  accord  Supreme  Court  of  Va.  v.  Friedman,  487  U.S.  at  65.    The  parties  also  do  not  dispute  that  §  470  imposes  a  physical  office  requirement  on  nonresident  attorneys  that  does  not  apply  to  resident attorneys, who may use their homes as their offices.  See Schoenefeld v.  New  York,  748  F.3d  at  468  (discussing  New  York  precedent  recognizing  that  resident New York attorney may use home as office).        In  some  circumstances,  a  facial  classification  is  enough,  by  itself,  to  manifest a proscribed intent.  This is most apparent where the facial classification  is  based  on  an  invidious  factor,  such  as  race.    See,  e.g.,  Adarand  Constructors,  Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227–36 (1995) (subjecting facial classifications based on  race  to  strict  scrutiny  review).    But  precisely  because  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause  is  not  an  absolute,  not  every  facial  distinction  between  state  residents and nonresidents will admit an inference of protectionist purpose.   See  Supreme  Court  of  Va.  v.  Friedman,  487  U.S.  at  67.    Indeed,  in  McBurney,  the  Supreme  Court  did  not  find  the  Virginia  FOIA’s  facial  distinction  between  residents  and  nonresidents  sufficient  to  admit  an  inference  of  protectionist  17  purpose,  particularly  in  light  of  statutory  text  and  legislative  history  to  the  contrary.  We reach the same conclusion with respect to § 470.      In reaching that conclusion we look, as the McBurney Court did with the  Virginia FOIA, to the purpose of § 470.7  That statute’s office requirement has its  origins  in  an  1862  predecessor  law,  Chapter  43,  see  1862  N.Y.  Laws  139,  which  was enacted to reverse a court ruling that barred a licensed New York attorney  who  had  moved  to  New  Jersey  from  further  practicing  in  New  York  because  it  might be difficult, if not impossible, to serve him with New York legal process.   See Richardson v. Brooklyn City & Newtown R.R., 22 How. Pr. 368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.  Feb.  1,  1862).8    The  month  after  that  decision,  the  New  York  State  legislature  7  Because  the  policy  underlying  the  Virginia  FOIA  was  codified  as  part  of  the  statutory  text,  the  Supreme  Court  relied  on  the  statute’s  plain  language  to  determine its purpose.  See McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. at 1715 (quoting Va.  Code Ann. § 2.2‐3700(B) (2011)). 8  The court in Richardson explained its concerns as follows:  Section 409 of the Code regulates the manner of serving  papers.  It provides that service may be made upon an  attorney  at  his  office,  by  leaving  the  paper  with  the  person  in  charge;  or  if  there  be  no  person  in  the  office,  by leaving it in a conspicuous place in the office; and if  the  office  be  not  open  to  admit  of  such  service,  by  leaving  it  at  the  attorney’s  residence  with  some  person  of  suitable  age  and  discretion.    These  various  provisions, and especially the latter, would be rendered  18  enacted Chapter 43, making clear that such a nonresident lawyer could practice  law in New York, as long as he maintained an office in the state, which office the  law  designated  an  accepted  site  for  service,  thereby  eliminating  the  concern  raised  in  Richardson.    As  this  history  demonstrates,  the  in‐state  office  requirement  was  not  enacted  for  the  protectionist  purpose  of  burdening  nonresident attorneys in practicing law in New York.  Rather, it was enacted to  ensure  that  every  licensed  New  York  lawyer,  whether  a  state  resident  or  not,  could practice in the state by providing a means for the nonresident attorney to  establish a physical presence in the state (and therefore place for service) akin to  that of a resident attorney.  A statute enacted for such a nonprotectionist purpose  is  not  vulnerable  to  a  Privileges  and  Immunities  challenge.    See  McBurney  v.  Young, 133 S. Ct. at 1715.    In  1877,  Chapter  43’s  office  requirement  and  office  service  authorization  were  codified  at  §  60  of  New  York’s  new  Code  of  Civil  Procedure.    See  nugatory if attorneys who resided out of the state were  permitted to practice.  An attorney might keep his office  closed  and  empty,  and,  if  he  had  no  residence  within  the state, might entirely evade the service of papers, and  baffle his adversary and the court.    Id. at 370.         19  Schoenefeld v. State, 25 N.Y.3d at 27, 6 N.Y.S.3d at 224.  In a 1909 recodification,  however,  the  two  provisions  were  divided,  with  the  service  part  remaining  at  § 60,  while  the  office  requirement  became  §  470.    As  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals  observed,  the  latter  requirement  has  remained  virtually  unchanged  to  the  present,  while  state  law  and  court  rules  now  authorize  service  by  various  means in addition to home and office.   See id. at 28, 6 N.Y.S.3d at 224.   But even  if  §  470’s  office  requirement  is  now  largely  vestigial  as  a  means  for  ensuring  service,  the  fact  remains  that  the  law  was  enacted  for  that  nonprotectionist  purpose,  and  Schoenefeld  has  adduced  no  evidence  of  a  protectionist  intent  to  afford some economic advantage to resident New York lawyers.  In  urging  otherwise,  Schoenefeld  argues  that  Chapter  43  must  be  viewed  in  context,  as  an  exception  to  what  was  then  New  York’s  general  ban  on  nonresident  attorneys.    The  argument  fails  because  Schoenefeld  has  not  been  burdened by that general ban, which was invalidated in 1979.  See In re Gordon,  48  N.Y.2d  266,  422  N.Y.S.2d  641  (1979).    Further,  she  offered  no  proof  that  the  office  requirement  was  enacted  to  further  the  general  ban  so  as  to  admit  an  inference of protectionist intent.  Rather, as just noted, the office requirement was  enacted as an exception to the ban, ensuring an in‐state place of service so that,  20  once admitted, nonresident New York lawyers could practice in the state’s courts  on functionally the same terms as resident lawyers.         No  more  can  a  protectionist  purpose  be  inferred  from  the  1877  and  1909  recodifications of the office requirement or from New York’s failure thereafter to  repeal  §  470.    After  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals  struck  down  the  state’s  general  ban  on  the  admission  of  nonresident  lawyers,  see  In  re  Gordon,  48  N.Y.2d  at  269,  422  N.Y.S.2d  at  642–43,  the  legislature  “amended  several  provisions  of  the  Judiciary  Law  and  the  CPLR  to  conform  to  that  holding,”  Schoenefeld  v.  State,  25  N.Y.3d  at  28,  6  N.Y.S.3d  at  224.    Schoenefeld  offers  no  evidence  that  anyone  identified  a  need  to  repeal  §  470  as  part  of  that  process,  much  less  that  the  legislature  thereafter  refused  to  do  so  for  the  protectionist  purpose  of  favoring  resident  attorneys.    See  McBurney  v.  Young,  133  S.  Ct.  at  1715.9  Where a legislature thus manifests its readiness to conform its laws to the  9 As Judge Hall notes, the legislature did propose an amendment to § 470 in 1986  that was not enacted.  See Dissenting Op., post at 20 n.11.  But that amendment  would  still  have  “mandate[d]  that  a  nonresident  attorney  have  a  law  office  in  [New  York]  before  appearing  as  an  attorney  of  record  in  any  action  or  proceeding  in  a  court  [in  the  state].”    J.A.  132.    The  amendment’s  proponents  explained  that  while  New  York  could  not  limit  bar  membership  to  state  residents,  “it  could  act  to  insure  the  quality  of  its  Bar  by  adopting  reasonable  measures  that  would  have  special  regulatory  effect  on  nonresident  attorneys.”   Id.    Insofar  as  Judge  Hall  contends  that  the  amendment  would  have  permitted  nonresident  attorneys  without  an  office  in  New  York  to  practice  in  the  state  so  21  Privileges and Immunities Clause, a plaintiff must point to more than a failure to  amend or repeal a statute enacted for a nonprotectionist purpose to demonstrate  that  the  law  is  being  maintained  for  a  protectionist  purpose.10    The  subsequent  availability  of  other  means  of  service  warrants  no  different  conclusion  because,  in  the  absence  of  some  showing  of  protectionist  purpose,  a  state  need  not  demonstrate that its laws are narrowly tailored to a legitimate purpose.  See id. at  1716  (rejecting  Privileges  and  Immunities  claim  for  failure  to  demonstrate  protectionist purpose without conducting tailoring inquiry).         long as they did not appear as attorneys of record, see Dissenting Op., post at 20  n.11, that conclusion appears grounded not in the amendment’s text, but in pro  hac  vice  rules  existing  to  this  day.    See  N.Y.  Comp.  Codes  R.  &  Regs.  tit.  22,  § 520.11 (2016) (permitting member of bar of another state to be admitted pro hac  vice  provided  that,  inter  alia,  attorney  is  associated  with  member  in  good  standing of New York bar “who shall be the attorney of record in the matter”);  J.A. 133 (explaining that proposed 1986 amendment to § 470 would not “unduly  burden[]”  nonresident  attorney  who  was  “unwilling  or  unable  to  maintain”  an  in‐state  office  because  that  attorney  could  practice  “so  long  as  local  counsel  c[ould] be found to appear as attorney of record”).      10 A recent statutory amendment and a newly‐promulgated rule of the New York  Court of Appeals, cited to us by the parties in Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) letters, further  indicate that New York is not pursuing a protectionist purpose in regulating the  practice of law.  See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2103(b)(2) (McKinney 2016) (approving service  by  mail  “made  from  outside  the  state”);  N.Y.  Comp.  Codes  R.  &  Regs.  tit.  22,  § 523.2  (2016)  (permitting  lawyer  not  admitted  in  New  York  to  engage  in  temporary practice of law within state provided, among other things, that lawyer  is licensed to practice in another state or even “a non‐United States jurisdiction”).  22  Further,  this  is  not  a  case  where  the  alleged  burdensome  effects  of  the  challenged  statute  admit  an  inference  of  protectionist  purpose.11    While  §  470’s  office  requirement  expressly  pertains  only  to  nonresident  attorneys,  the  requirement serves, as we have already observed, to place admitted resident and  nonresident attorneys on an equal footing, not to favor the former over the latter.   To  practice  law  in  New  York,  every  attorney  admitted  to  its  bar  must  have  a  presence  in  the  state  in  the  form  of  a  physical  premises.12    The  fact  that  a  11 The  law  of  the  case  doctrine  does  not  bar  us  from  reaching  this  conclusion  because  contrary  to  our  dissenting  colleague’s  suggestion,  see  Dissenting  Op.,  post  at  3–5,  22–23,  neither  our  prior  panel  opinion  nor  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals’ response thereto conclusively decided the issue.  See DiLaura v. Power  Auth.  of  State  of  N.Y.,  982  F.2d  73,  76  (2d  Cir.  1992).    Our  prior  panel  opinion  decided only to certify the question of § 470’s minimum requirements to the New  York  Court  of  Appeals  in  light  of  a  statutory  construction  then  urged  by  the  Attorney General that might moot Schoenefeld’s constitutional challenge.  In this  context,  our  observation  that,  if  construed  to  require  a  physical  office,  §  470  imposed  a  “significant  expense”  on  nonresident  attorneys,  Schoenefeld  v.  New  York,  748  F.3d  at  468,  is  at  most  dictum  that  does  not  bind  us  here,  see  Schwabenbauer v. Bd. of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of Olean, 777 F.2d 837,  842 (2d Cir. 1985) (concluding that statements in prior opinion in same case were  “not  necessary  to  or  a  part  of”  prior  decision  and  were,  therefore,  non‐binding  dicta).  Meanwhile, the New York Court of Appeals held only that § 470 required  nonresident attorneys to maintain a physical office in the state.  See Schoenefeld  v. State, 25 N.Y.3d at 26–27, 6 N.Y.S.3d at 223.   Thus,  this  case  is  not  akin  to  Friedman  and  Piper,  cited  by  the  dissent.    See  12 Dissenting Op., post at 21, 24 (citing Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S.  at  70  (concluding  that  Virginia  rule  permitting  only  residents  to  be  admitted  to  bar  on  motion,  while  nonresidents  were  required  to  take  and  pass  bar  23  nonresident  attorney  will  have  to  establish  that  presence  by  leasing  an  office,  while  a  resident  attorney  can  use  his  home,  does  not  unduly  burden  the  nonresident.  Not only is the expense of a New York office likely to be less than  the  expense  of  a  New  York  home,  but  Schoenefeld  has  adduced  no  evidence  indicating  that  significant  numbers  of  resident  New  York  attorneys  in  fact  practice from their homes rather than from offices.  Indeed, decisions from sister  circuits suggest otherwise.  Cf. Kleinsmith v. Shurtleff, 571 F.3d 1033, 1038 (10th  Cir. 2009) (observing that, although trust statute would permit Utah attorneys to  use home as requisite place of business within state, it was hardly apparent that  many  would  wish  to  do  so);  Tolchin  v.  Supreme  Court  of  N.J.,  111  F.3d  1099,  1107–08  (3d  Cir.  1997)  (noting  lack  of  evidence  that,  in  New  Jersey,  attorneys  practice from their homes).  Schoenefeld  nevertheless  contends  that  §  470  is  unconstitutional  because  the statute, as applied, requires her to incur the costs of a New York office when  she is already incurring the costs of her New Jersey home and office.  The flaw in  this  argument  is  that  Schoenefeld’s  New  Jersey  expenses  are  not  a  product  of  examination, violated Privileges and Immunities Clause); Supreme Court of N.H.  v.  Piper,  470  U.S.  at  288  (holding  that  New  Hampshire  rule  excluding  nonresidents from bar violated Clause)).  24  New  York  law.    New  York  can  be  held  to  account  under  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause  only  for  the  condition  it  imposes  on  Schoenefeld  to  practice  law  in  the  state,  that  is,  the  leasing  of  an  office.    As  noted,  Schoenefeld  fails  to  show that the burden on a nonresident of maintaining an office in New York is  greater  than  the  burden  on  a  resident  of  maintaining  a  home  (and  frequently  a  home  and  office)  in  New  York.    In  any  event,  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause  “‘does  not  promise  nonresidents  that  it  will  be  as  easy  for  [them]  as  for  residents to  comply with a  state’s  law.’”    Schoenefeld v.  New  York, 748  F.3d  at  467  (quoting  Kleinsmith  v.  Shurtleff,  571  F.3d  at  1044–45  (observing  that  “typically it is harder for a nonresident to conduct a business or a profession in a  state  than  it  is  for  a  resident”)).    It  promises  only  that  state  laws  will  not  differentiate for the protectionist purpose of favoring residents at the expense of  nonresidents.  See McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. at 1715.   The effects resulting  from § 470’s application to Schoenefeld manifest no such protectionist intent.         Indeed, the effects of § 470, as applied, are no different from those of a law  that  on  its  face  requires  all  attorneys  to  maintain  a  physical  presence  in  New  York.  Sister circuits have upheld such statutes against Privileges and Immunities  challenges.    25  For example, Kleinsmith v. Shurtleff involved a Privileges and Immunities  challenge  to  a  Utah  statute  requiring  “all  attorneys  who  act  as  trustees  of  real‐ property trust deeds in Utah to ‘maintain[] a place within the state.’”  571 F.3d at  1035  (alteration  in  original)  (quoting  Utah  Code  Ann.  §  57‐1‐21(1)(a)(i)  (2009)).   Plaintiff  argued  that  the  law  discriminated  against  nonresidents  because  residents  could  use  their  homes  as  the  specified  “place  within  the  state,”  while  nonresidents  would  need  to  lease  offices.    Id.  at  1044.    The  Tenth  Circuit,  however, held that the law was neutral because it equally required all trustees to  have  a  physical  presence  in  the  state.    See  id.  at  1044–47.    In  reaching  this  conclusion,  the  court  relied  on  the  statute’s  lack  of  facial  classification  between  residents and nonresidents.  See id. at 1046.  But insofar as plaintiff complained  of  a  disparate  impact  as  applied,  the  court  held  it  “irrelevant  to  the  [Privileges  and  Immunities]  Clause  whether  the  practical  effect  of  the  maintain‐a‐place  requirement . . . burdens nonresidents disproportionately.”  Id. at 1047.  Similarly,  in  Tolchin  v.  Supreme  Court  of  New  Jersey,  the  Third  Circuit  upheld a New Jersey law requiring all attorneys to maintain a “bona fide office”  within  the  state,  while  recognizing  that  only  resident  attorneys  could  use  their  homes  to  satisfy  the  requirement.    111  F.3d  at  1107–08.    As  in  Kleinsmith,  the  26  court  identified  no  Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause  violation  because  the  law  “similarly  affect[s]  residents  and  nonresidents.    Resident  and  nonresident  attorneys alike must maintain a New Jersey office.”  Id. at 1113.13   While  the  laws  at  issue  in  these  two  cases  did  not  facially  classify  on  the  basis of residence, to the extent Schoenefeld complains of the burdensome effects  of § 470 as applied, facial classification is irrelevant.  The effects of § 470 and the  laws  at  issue  in  Kleinsmith  and  Tolchin  are  virtually  identical.    The  critical  question, then, is whether a law that effectively requires nonresident attorneys to  maintain  a  physical  presence  in  New  York  akin  to  that  already  maintained  by  resident attorneys unduly burdens the former’s ability to practice law.  Like the  13 New  Jersey  has  since  eliminated  its  physical  office  requirement,  while  continuing  to  impose  various  conditions  that  may  most  easily  be  satisfied  through  an  office.    See  N.J.  R.  Ct.  1:21‐1(a)(1)  (2015)  (“An  attorney  need  not  maintain a fixed physical location for the practice of law, but must structure his  or her practice in such a manner as to assure, as set forth in RPC 1.4, prompt and  reliable  communication  with  and  accessibility  by  clients,  other  counsel,  and  judicial  and  administrative  tribunals  before  which  the  attorney  may  practice,  provided  that  an  attorney  must  designate  one  or  more  fixed  physical  locations  where  client  files  and  the  attorney’s  business  and  financial  records  may  be  inspected on short notice by duly authorized regulatory authorities, where mail  or hand‐deliveries may be made and promptly received, and where process may  be served on the attorney for all actions . . . that may arise out of the practice of  law  and  activities  related  thereto.”).    We  need  not  here  consider  whether  New  York might do the same because, absent a protectionist purpose, the conditions  imposed by a state even on nonresidents pursuing a profession within its borders  do not implicate the Privileges and Immunities Clause so as to require tailoring  analysis.  See McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. at 1716. 27  Third  and  Tenth  Circuits,  we  conclude  that  it  does  not.    The  conclusion  finds  further support in dictum in Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, wherein the  Supreme  Court  recognized  that  an  in‐state  office  requirement  could  serve  as  a  nonprotectionist  alternative  to  residency  in  safeguarding  state  interests  respecting  the  practice  of  law.    See  487  U.S.  at  70  (invalidating  residency  condition for admission on motion to bar and observing that office requirement  adequately  protected  state  interest  in  limiting  such  admissions  to  full‐time  practitioners);  see generally Newdow v.  Peterson,  753  F.3d 105, 108  n.3  (2d  Cir.  2014)  (acknowledging  “obligation  to  accord  great  deference  to  Supreme  Court  dicta,  absent  a  change  in  the  legal  landscape”  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted)).14        14Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987), cited by Judge Hall, is not to the contrary.   See Dissenting Op., post at 17 & n.9.  In there concluding that the United States  District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana could not impose an in‐state  office  requirement  for  admission  to  its  bar,  the  Supreme  Court  relied  on  its  supervisory authority over local federal rules and expressly declined to reach the  Privileges and Immunities challenge.  See Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. at 645, 647  n.7  (explaining  that  Court’s  supervisory  authority  permits  it  to  intervene  to  protect  integrity  of  federal  system,  whereas  “authority  over  state‐court  bars  is  limited to enforcing federal constitutional requirements” (emphasis added)); see  also  id.  (stating  that  rules  differentiating  between  resident  and  nonresident  attorneys  are  “more  difficult  to  justify  in  the  context  of  federal‐court  practice  than they are in the area of state‐court practice”).    28  What Schoenefeld in fact seeks through this action is not to practice law in  New York on the same conditions as a resident attorney who by virtue of home  (or home and office) maintains a physical presence in the state.  Rather, she seeks  to  practice  law  on  different  terms,  specifically,  without  maintaining  a  physical  presence in the state.  The Privileges and Immunities Clause proscribes laws that  favor residents  over  nonresidents  in  their  pursuit  of  a  common  calling.    It  does  not  mandate  that  nonresidents  be  allowed  to  practice  law  in  a  state  on  terms  different from those applicable to residents.  Accordingly,  whether  Schoenefeld  challenges  §  470  on  its  face  or  as  applied,  her  Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause  claim  fails  because  she  has  not  demonstrated that the law was enacted for or serves the protectionist purpose of  favoring resident New York attorneys and disfavoring nonresident attorneys in  practicing law in the state’s courts.  See McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. at 1715.   We  therefore  reverse  the  district  court  decision  declaring  §  470  violative  of  the  Privileges and Immunities Clause.  III.  Conclusion  To summarize, we conclude as follows:  1.  The Supreme Court has recently clarified that state laws violate the  Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause  “only  when  those  laws  were  enacted  for  the  29  protectionist  purpose  of  burdening  out‐of‐state  citizens.”    McBurney  v.  Young,  133 S. Ct. at 1715.  2. New  York’s  in‐state  office  requirement  for  nonresident  attorneys  admitted  to  the  state’s  bar,  N.Y.  Judiciary  Law  §  470,  was  not  enacted  for  a  protectionist purpose disfavoring nonresident admitted attorneys but, rather, for  the  nonprotectionist  purpose of  affording  such attorneys a means  to establish  a  physical  presence  in  the  state  akin  to  that  of  resident  attorneys,  thereby  eliminating a court‐identified service‐of‐process concern.  3. Schoenefeld  has  offered  no  proof  of  an  animating  protectionist  purpose,  either  on  the  face  of  the  statute  or  inferred  from  its  effects  as  applied.   Indeed,  the  effect  of  §  470,  as  applied,  is  no  different  from  a  neutral  statute  requiring  all  licensed  New  York  attorneys,  resident  and  nonresident  alike,  to  maintain  a  physical  presence  in  the  state,  which  raises  no  Privileges  and  Immunities concern.  4. Schoenefeld  cannot  point  to  the  expenses  of  her  practice  in  New  Jersey,  not  required  by  New  York  law,  to  pursue  a  Privileges  and  Immunities  challenge  to  §  470  in  the  absence  of  any  proof  that  that  statute’s  in‐state  office  requirement was enacted for a protectionist purpose.  30  Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment invalidating § 470,  and  we  REMAND  the  case  with  instructions  to  deny  Schoenefeld’s  motion  for  summary judgment and to award judgment in favor of defendants.    31  1  HALL, Circuit Judge, dissenting:  2  The majority holds that a New York statute that discriminates, on its face,  3  against nonresident attorneys—burdening them with the expense of maintaining  4  an  office  in  New  York  while  exempting  resident  attorneys  from  the  same  5  requirement—does  not  offend  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause  of  Article  6  IV, § 2 of the Constitution because, in the majority’s view, the plaintiff has failed  7  to  prove  that  the  statute  evinces  a  “protectionist”  intent.    In  doing  so,  the  8  majority injects an entirely novel proposition into our Privileges and Immunities  9  Clause  jurisprudence:  that  a  State’s  explicit  discrimination  against  nonresidents  10  with regard to a fundamental right is constitutionally unobjectionable unless the  11  nonresident makes out a prima facie case of discriminatory intent.  Such a holding  12  reverses  the  State’s  burden  of  demonstrating  that  it  has  a  substantial  interest  13  justifying  the  discrimination  and  that  the  means  chosen  bear  a  close  and  14  substantial  relation to  that  interest.   Even  under the  majority’s  reformulation  of  15  our settled law, however, Schoenefeld has established that the New York statute  16  has  protectionist  aims,  and  the  State’s  proffered  justifications  for  the  17  discrimination fail to survive scrutiny.  I respectfully dissent.  18    1    1  I.  2  The two‐step inquiry to be conducted under the Privileges and Immunities  3  Clause is well established.  First, the court considers whether a State has, in fact,  4  discriminated against out‐of‐staters with regard to the privileges and immunities  5  it accords its own citizens.  See Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Crotty, 346 F.3d 84,  6  94 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of  7  Camden,  465  U.S.  208,  218,  222  (1984)).    “The  activity  in  question  must  be  8  sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the Nation . . . as to fall within the purview  9  of the Privileges and Immunities Clause . . . .  For it is only with respect to those  10  ‘privileges’  and  ‘immunities’  bearing  on  the  vitality  of  the  Nation  as  a  single  11  entity  that  a  State  must  accord  residents  and  nonresidents  equal  treatment.”   12  Supreme  Court  of  Va.  v.  Friedman,  487  U.S.  59,  64–65  (1988)  (internal  quotation  13  marks,  citations  and  alterations  omitted).      Second,  if  the  court  determines  that  14  the  State  has,  in  fact,  discriminated  against  out‐of‐state  residents,  the  burden  15  shifts  to  the  State  to  provide  a  “sufficient  justification  for  the  discrimination,”  16  Crotty, 346 F.3d at 94, by making a showing that “(i) there is a substantial reason  17  for  the  difference  in  treatment;  and  (ii)  the  discrimination  practiced  against  2    1  nonresidents  bears  a  substantial  relationship  to  the  State’s  objective.”      Supreme  2  Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985).    3  On  its  face,  New  York  Judiciary  Law  § 470  discriminates  against  4  nonresident attorneys with regard to the practice of law, long recognized by the  5  Supreme  Court  as  a  “fundamental  right”  subject  to  protection  under  the  6  Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause.    Id.  at  281.    As  we  explained  in  our  prior  7  opinion in this case, Schoenefeld v. New York, 748 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 2014), and the  8  New  York  Court  of  Appeals  unanimously  agreed  after  we  certified  to  it  a  9  question,  Schoenefeld  v.  State,  25  N.Y.3d  22,  6  N.Y.S.3d  221  (2015),  Section  470  10  draws a distinction between attorneys who are residents of New York and those  11  who are not.  The statute imposes no specific requirement on resident attorneys  12  to  maintain  a  bona  fide  office,  thus  permitting  them  to  set  up  an  “office”  on  the  13  kitchen table of their studio apartments if so desired.  Schoenefeld, 748 F.3d at 468.   14  Nonresident  attorneys,  however,  are  required  to  maintain  an  “office  for  the  15  transaction  of  law  business”  within  the  State.    N.Y.  Judiciary  Law  § 470.    We  16  recognized that “[t]his additional obligation carries with it significant expense— 17  rents,  insurance,  staff,  equipment  inter  alia—all  of  which  is  in  addition  to  the  18  expense of the attorney’s out‐of‐state office, assuming she has one.”  Schoenefeld,  3    1  748  F.3d  at  468.    Absent  a  controlling  state  decision  that  an  “office  for  the  2  transaction of law business,” § 470, meant something other than a bona fide office,  3  we concluded that, “as it stands, it appears that Section 470 discriminates against  4  nonresident attorneys with respect to their fundamental right to practice law in  5  the  state  and,  by  virtue  of  that  fact,  its  limitations  on  nonresident  attorneys  6  implicate the Privileges and Immunities Clause.”  Id. at 469.    7    New York argued to us, however, that the statute could be interpreted as  8  requiring  no  more  than  a  P.O.  box  or  designated  agent  for  service  of  process,  9  lessening the burden on nonresident attorneys considerably and making Section  10  470 more likely to survive scrutiny.  Id.  While our own review of New York law  11  indicated  that  a  designated  physical  office  space  was  required,  we  recognized  12  that the question had not been spoken to by the New York Court of Appeals, and  13  we  certified  to  that  court  the  question:  “Under  New  York  Judiciary  Law  §  470,  14  which  mandates  that  a  nonresident  attorney  maintain  an  ‘office  for  the  15  transaction of law business’ within the state of New York, what are the minimum  16  requirements  necessary  to  satisfy  that  mandate?”    Id.  at  471.    In  doing  so,  we  17  represented that the Court of Appeals’ answer would, “in all likelihood, dictate[]  18  the  outcome  of  the  constitutional  privileges  and  immunities  analysis  we  have  4    1  commenced  and  must  complete  as  we  decide  the  appeal  before  us.”    Id.    The  2  Court  of  Appeals  accepted  certification  and  graciously  took  time  away  from  its  3  own  busy  docket  to  unanimously  answer  that  §  470  required  the  nonresidents  4  maintain a physical office space.  Schoenefeld, 25 N.Y.3d at 26, 6 N.Y.S.3d at 223.   5  As we had suspected, maintaining an address or a designated agent for service  6  would not satisfy the requirements of Section 470.  See id.  7  The majority now disregards the New York Court of Appeals’ decision as  8  well as our own prior opinion which, together, constitute the law of the case.  See  9  DiLaura v. Power Auth. of State of N.Y., 982 F.2d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that,  10  absent an intervening change in controlling law, availability of new evidence, or  11  the  need  to  correct  a  clear  error  or  manifest  injustice,  a  court’s  decision  upon  a  12  rule of law “should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in  13  the  same  case”)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    Those  decisions  14  acknowledged  that  Section  470  discriminates  between  in‐state  and  out‐of‐state  15  attorneys solely on the basis of their residency.  Under longstanding precedent,  16  that  determination  disposes  of  the  initial  inquiry;  the  burden  then  shifts  to  the  17  State to provide “sufficient justification for the discrimination.”  Crotty, 346 F.3d  18  at  94.    Departing  from  these  precedents,  however,  the  majority  holds  that  the  5    1  plaintiff  bears  the  initial  burden  of  “alleg[ing]  or  offer[ing]  some  proof  of  a  2  protectionist  purpose”  in  order  to  state  a  claim  under  the  Privileges  and  3  Immunities Clause.  Majority Op., ante at 15.  In the majority’s estimation, if the  4  plaintiff fails to allege a prima facie case of protectionist intent, her “Privileges and  5  Immunities claim fails, obviating the need for a tailoring inquiry.”  Majority Op.,  6  ante at 15.     7  The majority bases its reasoning exclusively on its reading of the Supreme  8  Court’s  decision  in  McBurney  v.  Young,  133  S.  Ct.  1709  (2013).    As  the  majority  9  acknowledges,  that  decision did  not  state any  new  principle  of  law, but merely  10  confirmed  that  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause  forbids  laws  that  abridge  11  the right to pursue a common calling only when those laws “were enacted for the  12  protectionist purpose of burdening out‐of‐state citizens.”1  Id. at 1715.  McBurney                                                 1   The  majority’s  application  of  McBurney,  which  was  decided  before  our  prior  opinion  in  this  case,  is  particularly  striking  given  that  we  did  not  rely  on  McBurney  to  uphold  the  constitutionality  of  Section  470  at  that  time.    See  Schoenefeld,  748  F.3d  at  469.    Instead,  in  apparent  contravention  of  New  York’s  constitutional requirements for certification, this Court certified a question to the  Court of Appeals that was not necessary to our decision.  Cf. Osterweil v. Bartlett,  706 F.3d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 2013) (stating that, prior to certifying a question to the  Court  of  Appeals,  this  Court  must  determine  “whether  the  certified  question  is  determinative of a claim before us” (internal quotation omitted)); Retail Software  Servs., Inc. v. Lashlee, 71 N.Y.2d 788, 790, 530 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (1988) (declining to  6    1  did not disturb the traditional threshold inquiry and two‐step analysis in cases,  2  like  ours, where  the  challenged  law  is  one  that directly  regulates  legal  practice.   3  Rather,  while  acknowledging  that  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause  4  “protects  the  right  of  citizens  to  ply  their  trade,  practice  their  occupation,  or  5  pursue a common calling,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), the Court held  6  that  Virginia’s  distinction  between  state  citizens and  noncitizens  in  its  Freedom  7  of Information Act (“FOIA”) did not “abridge” a noncitizen’s right to pursue his  8  livelihood  “in  the  sense  prohibited  by  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  clause”  9  because  the  effects  on  his  real  estate  business,  which  involved  obtaining  state  10  property records for his clients, were purely incidental.  Id.     11  The majority’s reading that McBurney requires a plaintiff to allege, as part  12  of  a  prima  facie  case,  that  the  law  was  specifically  enacted  for  a  protectionist                                                                                                                                                     answer certified question because it did not satisfy the requirement that it “may  be  determinative”  of  the  pending  action,  as  required  by  the  New  York  Constitution).  As we recognized in our prior opinion, “[t]he constitutionality of  [Section]  470  turns  on  the  interpretation  of  a  provision  of  the  statute  that  implicates  significant  New  York  state  interests  and  is  determinative  of  this  appeal.”   Schoenefeld, 748 F.3d at 467.       7    1  purpose  misconstrues  McBurney’s  invocation  of  the  two‐step  analysis.2    As  an  2  initial  matter,  the  Court  resolved  the  threshold  issue,  whether  a  fundamental  3  right is implicated, by noting that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects  4  the  right  the  plaintiff  claimed  was  violated.3    See  id.  at  1715.    The  Court  then  5  considered  whether  sufficient  justification  existed  for  the  discrimination4;  it  6  determined  that  the  Virginia  FOIA,  as  a  mechanism  for  state  citizens  as  the                                                 2 Rather than unanimously altering the longstanding Privileges and Immunities  analysis  through  dicta  without  acknowledging  as  much  (or  generating  a  single  dissenting opinion), the better reading is that the McBurney decision adhered to  the traditional two‐step analysis.         3  The  Court,  by  contrast,  rejected  the  plaintiff’s  Privileges  and  Immunities  challenge  based  on  the  asserted  “right  to  access  public  information  on  equal  terms with citizens of the Commonwealth” at the threshold by determining that  the Clause did not “cover[] this broad right.”  McBurney, 133 S. Ct. at 1718–19.    4 The majority states that it is “not obvious” under McBurney whether the State’s  protectionist  purpose  is  properly  considered  at  the  first  or  second  step  of  the  inquiry,  noting  that  the  burden  shifts  to  the  defendants  at  the  second  step,  see,  e.g.,  Supreme  Court  of  Va.  v.  Friedman,  487  U.S.  at  67,  whereas  McBurney  emphasized  the  nonresident  plaintiff’s  failure  to  plead  or  allege  proof  that  Virginia’s FOIA was enacted with a protectionist purpose, see 133 S. Ct. at 1715– 16.    Majority  Op.,  ante  at  16.    The  tension  the  majority  perceives  between  Friedman  and  McBurney,  however,  is  due  entirely  to  a  strained  reading  of  McBurney.    The  majority’s  “discriminatory  intent”  requirement,  in  any  event,  remains  novel  to  privileges  and  immunities  jurisprudence  whether  it  is  grafted  onto the first or second step of the inquiry.            8    1  holders of sovereign power to obtain an accounting from public officials, evinced  2  a “distinctly nonprotectionist aim.”  Id. at 1716.  Further, the statute’s distinction  3  between  Virginia  citizens  and  noncitizens  was  justified  because  it  “recognizes  4  that Virginia taxpayers foot the bill for the fixed costs underlying recordkeeping  5  in the Commonwealth.”  Id.  It was within this context that the Court explained  6  that  (1)  the  plaintiff  “does  not  allege—and  has  offered  no  proof—that  the  7  challenged  provision  of  the  Virginia  FOIA  was  enacted  in  order  to  provide  a  8  competitive  economic  advantage  for  Virginia  citizens,”  id.  at  1715,  and  (2)  the  9  statute’s  “effect  of  preventing  citizens  of  other  States  from  making  a  profit  by  10  trading on information contained in state records” is merely “incidental.”  Id. at  11  1716.    In  short,  the  Court’s  reasoning—that  the  plaintiff  failed  to  contradict  the  12  State’s  showing  that  the  discrimination  against  noncitizens  was  justified— 13  conforms precisely to the traditional two‐step inquiry.     14  McBurney  is  distinguishable  from  this  case  for  the  simple  reason  that  the  15  Virginia  FOIA  is  not  an  economic  regulation,  nor  does  it  directly  regulate  the  16  right to pursue a common calling.  Rather, the FOIA provides a mechanism for  17  seeking political accountability, and its effects on the plaintiff’s profession—data  18  gathering  for  profit—were  purely  “incidental.”    Id.    It  is  well‐established  that,  9    1  “[w]hile  the  Clause  forbids  a  State  from  intentionally  giving  its  own  citizens  a  2  competitive  advantage  in  business  or  employment,  the  Clause  does  not  require  3  that  a  State  tailor  its  every  action  to  avoid  any  incidental  effect  on  out‐of‐state  4  tradesmen.”  Id.  Section 470, by contrast, directly regulates the legal profession  5  by  expressly  and  intentionally  placing  practice  requirements  on  nonresident  6  attorneys  like  Schoenefeld  that  it  does  not  place  on  resident  attorneys.    The  7  majority stretches McBurney’s “incidental” language far beyond the facts of that  8  case to support its conclusion that any regulation, even one that directly regulates  9  a “well settled . . . privilege protected by Article IV, § 2,” Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489  10  U.S. 546, 553 (1989), will pass constitutional muster so long as its discrimination  11  against nonresidents can be characterized as “incidental.”  Majority Op., ante at  12  13–14.    13  By requiring plaintiffs to allege a prima facie case of discriminatory intent,  14  the  majority,  in  effect,  relieves  the  State  of  its  burden  to  provide  a  sufficient  15  justification  for  laws  that  discriminate  against  nonresidents  with  regard  to  16  fundamental  rights.    See  Crotty,  346  F.3d  at  95  (explaining  that  States  may  not  17  “treat  residents  and  nonresidents  disparately  in  connection  with  the  pursuit  of  18  commerce,  a  trade,  or  business  venture  where  that  disparate  treatment  is  not  10    1  supported  by  a  sufficient  justification”).    Determining  whether  an  unacceptable  2  purpose, such as economic protectionism, underlies the challenged law is at the  3  core of the analysis engaged in after the threshold determination into whether a  4  right implicated by the Privileges and Immunities Clause has been abridged.  See  5  Piper, 470 U.S. at 284 (“The conclusion that [a State law] deprives nonresidents of  6  a protected privilege does not end our inquiry . . . The Clause does not preclude  7  discrimination against nonresidents where (i) there is a substantial reason for the  8  difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination practiced against nonresidents  9  bears  a  substantial  relationship  to  the  State’s  objective.”).    Examining  the  10  government’s  proffered  reason  for  the  discrimination  and  determining  whether  11  the  challenged  law,  as  enacted,  conforms  to  the  proffered  reason  is  the  method  12  by which courts determine whether the proffered reason is genuine or merely a  13  pretext  for  economic  protectionism.    Crotty,  346  F.3d  at  97  (“Part  and  parcel  to  14  this analysis is determining whether [the State] ha[s] demonstrated a substantial  15  factor unrelated to economic protectionism to justify the discrimination.”).  The  16  majority’s  reasoning  would  reverse  this  burden‐shifting  test  by  requiring  17  plaintiffs to show that a law was enacted for a protectionist purpose, rather than  11    1  requiring  the  State  to  show  that  the  law  was  not  enacted  for  a  protectionist  2  purpose.    3  Tellingly, in support of this proposition the majority draws exclusively on  4  cases  addressing  challenges  under  the  Equal  Protection  Clause,  for  which  5  plaintiffs must plead discriminatory intent as part of a prima facie case.  Majority  6  Op.,  ante  at  13–14  (citing,  e.g.,  Ashcroft  v.  Iqbal,  556  U.S.  662,  682  (2009);  7  Washington  v.  Davis,  426  U.S.  229,  241  (1976)).    The  majority  has  not  cited,  nor  8  does  there  exist,  any  case  suggesting  that  the  requirement  to  allege  9  discriminatory  intent  as  part  of  a  prima  facie  case  under  the  Equal  Protection  10  Clause  also  applies  to  Privileges  and  Immunities  claims.    Indeed,  Virginia  v.  11  Friedman,  487  U.S.  59  (1988),  stands  for  the  opposite  proposition.    In  Friedman,  12  Virginia argued that its residency requirement for admission to the State’s bar on  13  motion did not implicate the Privileges and Immunities Clause on the basis that,  14  because  nonresident  attorneys  could  seek  admission  by  taking  the  Virginia  bar  15  exam, “the State cannot be said to have discriminated against nonresidents as a  16  matter  of  fundamental  concern.”    Id.  at  65  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).   17  The  Supreme  Court  rejected  that  argument  as  “quite  inconsistent  with  our  18  precedents,” stating that “the Clause is implicated whenever . . . a State does not  12    1  permit  qualified  nonresidents  to  practice  law  within  its  borders  on  terms  of  2  substantial equality with its own residents.”  Id. at 65–66.  This language cannot  3  be squared with a prima facie requirement that demands something more than a  4  showing of disparate treatment on the face of the statute.5    5  The  Equal  Protection  cases  cited  by  the  majority,  moreover,  are  6  distinguishable  on  the  ground  that  the  challenged  policies  in  those  cases  were  7  facially neutral but produced racially disparate effects.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682  8  (holding  that  plaintiffs  failed  to  allege  that  detention  policy  that  9  disproportionately  affected  Muslims  and  Arabs  was  motivated  by  a  racially                                                 5  By  comparing  this  case  with  Village  of  Arlington  Heights  v.  Metro.  Hous.  Dev.  Corp.,  429  U.S.  252  (1977),  the  majority  inadvertently  highlights  the  distinctions  between  the  burden‐shifting  tests  that  govern  Equal  Protection  and  Privileges  and  Immunities  claims.    Majority  Op.,  ante  at  16  n.6.    In  Village  of  Arlington  Heights,  an  Equal  Protection  case,  the  Court  explained  that  if  a  plaintiff  demonstrates  that  a  challenged  decision  was  “motivated  in  part  by  a  racially  discriminatory  purpose,”  then  the  burden  shifts  to  the  government  to  establish  that  the  “same  decision  would  have  resulted  even  had  the  impermissible  purpose  not  been  considered.”    Id.  at  270  n.21.    To  state  a  claim  under  the  Privileges and Immunities Clause, by contrast, a plaintiff must demonstrate that  “a  challenged  restriction  deprives  nonresidents  of  a  privilege  or  immunity  protected by this Clause,” Barnard, 489 U.S. at 552, in which case the restriction is  invalid  unless  “(i)  there  is  a  substantial  reason  for  the  difference  in  treatment;  and  (ii)  the  discrimination  practiced  against  nonresidents  bears  a  substantial  relationship to the State’s objective,” id.  The former inquiry requires a threshold  showing of discriminatory intent; the latter plainly does not.      13    1  discriminatory  purpose);  Davis,  426  U.S.  at  244  (concluding  that  facially  neutral  2  employment  test  was  not  racially  discriminatory  simply  because  a  greater  3  proportion of African Americans fared poorly).  The plaintiffs were thus required  4  to  allege  facts  showing  that  an  otherwise‐neutral  policy  was  motivated  by  an  5  impermissible discriminatory purpose.  See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.  6  v.  Doyle,  429  U.S.  274,  283–84  (1977).    Section  470,  by  contrast,  draws  a  facial  7  distinction  between  residents  and  nonresidents  with  regard  to  the  privilege  of  8  practicing law; by its very terms, it imposes burdens on nonresidents that it does  9  not  impose  on  residents.    Because  the  statute,  on  its  face,  discriminates  against  10  nonresidents, no other threshold showing of discriminatory intent is required.6       11  In sum, Section 470 discriminates against nonresidents with respect to the  12  practice  of  law,  a  fundamental  right  long  recognized  as  protected  under  the  13  Privileges and Immunities Clause.  The majority recognizes as much, see Majority  14  Op.,  ante  at  16–17,  but  erroneously  imposes  a  threshold  requirement  that  the                                                 6 Indeed, even a state regulation that “d[oes] not on its face draw any distinction  based on citizenship or residence” may implicate the Privileges and Immunities  Clause where “the practical effect of the provision [is] discriminatory.”  Hillside  Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 67 (2003).  14    1  plaintiff challenging the discrimination prove there is a protectionist intent above  2  and beyond the traditional analysis.    3  II.  4  Plaintiff having established that a fundamental right has been implicated,  5  it is the State’s burden to provide a sufficient justification for the discrimination  6  by  demonstrating  that  “(i)  there  is  a  substantial  reason  for  the  difference  in  7  treatment;  and  (ii)  the  discrimination  practiced  against  nonresidents  bears  a  8  substantial  relationship  to  the  State’s  objective.”    Piper,  470  U.S.  at  284.    “In  9  deciding whether the degree of discrimination bears a sufficiently close relation  10  to the reasons proffered by the State, the Court has considered whether, within  11  the full panoply of legislative choices otherwise available to the State, there exist  12  alternative  means  of  furthering  the  State’s  purpose  without  implicating  13  constitutional concerns.”  Friedman, 487 U.S. at 66.      14  The  State’s  proffered  justifications  for  the  in‐state  office  requirement— 15  effectuating  service  of  legal  papers,  facilitating  regulatory  oversight  of  16  nonresident  attorneys’  fiduciary  obligations,  and  making  attorneys  more  17  accessible to New York’s courts—are plainly not sufficient.  Regarding the issue  18  of service, the Court of Appeals itself observed that, although “service on an out‐ 15    1  of‐state  individual  presented  many  more  logistical  difficulties  in  1862,  when  2  [Section  470]  was  originally  enacted,”  today  there  are  “adequate  measures  in  3  place relating to service upon nonresident attorneys,” including the methods of  4  mail, overnight delivery, fax and (where permitted) email, as authorized by the  5  CPLR,  and  the  requirement  under  22  N.Y.C.R.R.  § 520.13(a)  that  nonresident  6  attorneys designate an in‐state clerk of court as their agent for service of process  7  in  order  to  be  admitted  in  New  York.    Schoenefeld,  25  N.Y.3d  at  28,  N.Y.S.3d  at  8  224–25.  Thus, not only do “there exist alternative means of furthering the State’s  9  purpose  without  implicating  constitutional  concerns,”  Friedman,  487  U.S.  at  66,  10  but those means are already in place.7    11  The  State’s  argument  that  an  in‐state  office  requirement  is  necessary  to  12  regulate  the  behavior  of  nonresident  attorneys  fares  no  better.    The  Court  has                                                 7 As the majority notes, New Jersey has eliminated its physical office requirement  in  favor  of  various  other  less  onerous  conditions.    See  Majority  Op.,  ante  at  27  n.13.    Further,  the  New  York  City  Bar  permits  resident  attorneys  to  maintain  a  “virtual law office” in New York even if their practice is located primarily out of  state, a privilege that is not afforded to in‐state residents.  Assoc. of the Bar of the  City  of  New  York  Comm.  on  Prof.  Ethics,  Formal  Opinion  2014‐2:  Use  of  a  Virtual  Law  Office  by  New  York  Attorneys  (June  2014),  available  at  http://www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics‐opinions‐local/2014opinions/2023‐formal‐ opinion‐2014‐02.    That  such  accommodations  exist  solely  for  resident  attorneys  further  undermines  Section  470’s  nonprotectionist  rationale  and  demonstrates  the existence of less‐restrictive alternatives to the office requirement.        16    1  long  rejected  similar  arguments  in  favor  of  a  residency  requirement  on  the  2  grounds  that  a  “nonresident  lawyer’s  professional  duty  and  interest  in  his  3  reputation should provide the same incentive to maintain high ethical standards  4  as  they  do  for  resident  lawyers,”  and  that  the  State,  in  any  event,  “has  the  5  authority to discipline all members of the bar, regardless of where they reside.”8   6  Piper,  470  U.S.  at  286.    Similarly,  the  Supreme  Court  has  rejected  the  argument  7  that  an  in‐state  office  requirement  is  necessary  to  ensure  the  availability  of  8  attorneys for court proceedings as “unnecessary and irrational.”  Frazier v. Heebe,  9  482  U.S.  641,  649  (1987).9    The  Court  noted  that  resident  lawyers  may  still  10  maintain  their  office  outside  of  the  state,  thus  making  themselves  equally  11  unavailable to the courts, and that “there is no link between residency within a                                                 8 The Supreme Court’s decision in Friedman is not to the contrary.  The Court did  not  hold,  as  the  majority  asserts,  Majority  Op.,  ante  at  28,  that  an  office  requirement  would  provide  a  “nonprotectionist  alternative”  to  a  residency  requirement.    Rather,  in  holding  unconstitutional  Virginia’s  residency  requirement for admission on motion, the Court noted in dicta, without deciding  the constitutionality of that alternative means, that an office requirement would  be less restrictive.  487 U.S. at 70.          9  The  Court’s  holding  was  pursuant  to  its  supervisory  authority  over  the  lower  federal  courts  rather  than  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause,  see  id.,  but  its  reasoning is equally applicable here.    17    1  State  and  proximity  to  a  courthouse.”10    Id.  at  650;  see  also  Barnard,  489  U.S.  at  2  553–54  (holding  with  respect  to  challenge  under  Privileges  and  Immunities  3  Clause  that  unreliable  airline  and  telephone  service  of  Virgin  Islands  did  not  4  support a substantial justification for attorney residency requirement).    5  The  majority,  moreover,  has  not  engaged  in  a  meaningful  analysis  of  the  6  sufficiency  of  the  State’s  proffered  justifications,  underscoring  the  extent  of  its  7  departure  from  the  established  two‐step  inquiry  under  the  Privileges  and  8  Immunities  Clause.    Instead,  the  majority  concludes  that  Schoenefeld’s  claim  9  must fail at the threshold because, in its view, she has failed to prove that Section  10  470 was enacted for a protectionist purpose.  Even if such a prima facie showing is  11  required,  Schoenefeld  has  made  one  out  based  on  the  plain  text  and  history  of  12  Section 470.    13  It is undisputed that, at the time Section 470 was enacted, it was part of a  14  larger  statutory  scheme  designed  to  prohibit  nonresident  attorneys  from                                                 10  For  example,  an  attorney  practicing  in  Princeton,  New  Jersey  would  be  far  more  accessible  to  New  York  City  courts  than  an  attorney  located  in  Buffalo,  New York.  With respect to attorneys who reside a great distance from the State,  the Court in Piper suggested that they could be required to retain a local attorney  for  the  duration  of  court  proceedings  and  to  be  available  to  the  court  on  short  notice.  Piper, 470 U.S. at 287.    18    1  practicing in New York.  See Richardson v. Brooklyn City & N.R. Co., 22 How. Pr.  2  368, 370 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 1, 1862) (noting that the court “ha[d] always required  3  that  an  attorney  should  reside  within  the  state”).    Chapter  43,  the  earliest  4  predecessor  to  Section  470,  provided  a  less  burdensome,  but  still  burdensome,  5  exception  to  the  overall  residency  requirement  as  an  accommodation  to  6  commuters  in  adjacent  states.    Rosenberg  v.  Johns‐Manville  Sales  Corp.,  416  7  N.Y.S.2d  708,  710  (Sup.  Ct.  1979)  (explaining  with  respect  to  Section  470  that  8  “[t]he requirement of residence, as a condition to the continued right to practice,  9  appears to have been ameliorated for attorneys who reside in an adjacent State,  10  but  only  upon  condition  they  maintain  an  office  for  the  practice  of  law  in  this  11  State”); see also Brennan, Repeal Judiciary Law § 470, 62 N.Y.S.B.J. 20, 21 (Jan. 1990)  12  (“The primary purpose of chapter 43 was to carve out an exception to the general  13  rule  that  an  attorney  could  not  practice  in  the  New  York  State  courts  unless  he  14  was  a  resident  of  New  York  State.”).    The  majority  contends  that  this  statutory  15  context is irrelevant because Schoenefeld has not been burdened by the general  16  ban  on  nonresident  attorneys,  which  was  invalidated  under  the  Privileges  and  17  Immunities  Clause  in  1979.   See  Majority  Op., ante  at  20  (citing  In  re Gordon, 48  18  N.Y.2d 266 (1979)).  That a discriminatory and burdensome requirement can be  19    1  stylized  as  an  “exception”  to  an  even  more  discriminatory  and  burdensome  2  requirement,  however,  does  not  render  it  nondiscriminatory  or  render  3  implausible a threshold inference of discriminatory purpose.11    4  The  majority  further  reasons  that  because  the  office  requirement,  like  the  5  general  ban  on  nonresident attorneys,  was  enacted  in  part  to  ensure  an  in‐state  6  place  of  service,  see  Richardson,  22  How.  Pr.  at  370,  it  does  not  exhibit  a  7  protectionist  purpose.    Majority  Op.,  ante  at  18–19.    This  gets  it  backward,  8  however,  for  it  is  the  State’s  burden  to  prove  that  service  of  process  is  a  9  substantial  interest  justifying  the  restriction,  not  Schoenefeld’s  burden  to  prove  10  that  service  of  process  was  not  a  motivating  concern  for  the  statute.    If  the  11  majority’s  rationale  were  sufficient,  then  any  restriction  based  on  residency,  no                                                 11  The  legislature’s  failure  to  amend  or  repeal  Section  470  after  New  York’s  residency requirement was held unconstitutional, see Gordon, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 422  N.Y.S.2d  641,  compounds,  not  alleviates,  the  constitutional  problem,  as  the  Gordon  decision  put  the  legislature  on  notice  that  the  restrictions  it  placed  on  nonresident  attorneys  could  be  constitutionally  problematic.    Indeed,  following  Gordon,  members  of  the  legislature  attempted,  albeit  unsuccessfully,  to  amend  Section 470 to permit nonresidents to practice in New York without an office so  long as they did not appear as the attorney of record.  See J.A. 130–32.  Regardless  of  whether  that  amendment  would  have  effectively  resolved  the  constitutional  issue,  its  proponents  were  compelled  by  the  conclusion  that  “Gordon  and  Piper . . . command elimination  of  residency  requirements  as  a  condition  upon  the right to practice law.”  J.A. 132.     20    1  matter how onerous, would pass constitutional muster so long as the State could  2  point  to  a  nonprotectionist  purpose  for  the  restriction.    Were  this  the  test,  then  3  there  would  have  been  no  basis  on  which  to  invalidate  in‐state  residency  4  requirements for attorneys under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  See, e.g.,  5  Friedman,  487  U.S.  at  68  (rejecting  as  insufficient  State’s  reasons  for  requiring  6  residency  of  attorneys  seeking  admission  on  motion,  including  ensuring  that  7  those  applicants  “have  the  same  commitment  to  service  and  familiarity  with  8  Virginia  law  that  is  possessed  by  applicants  securing  admission  upon  9  examination” and facilitating the full‐time practice of law); Piper, 470 U.S. at 285  10  (rejecting State’s argument that nonresident attorneys “would be less likely (i) to  11  become,  and  remain,  familiar  with  local  rules  and  procedures;  (ii)  to  behave  12  ethically;  (iii)  to  be  available  for  court  proceedings;  and  (iv)  to  do  pro  bono  and  13  other volunteer work in the State”); accord Gordon, 48 N.Y.2d at 274, 422 N.Y.S.2d  14  at  646  (holding  that  State’s  justification  for  residency  requirement,  the  15  “observ[ation]  and  evaluat[ion]  [of]  the  applicant’s  character,”  was  insufficient  16  due to “alternatives which are less restrictive than denial of admission to practice  17  which would further this interest”).12                                                   12   In  none  of  the  above  cases,  moreover,  did  the  courts  dissect  the  legislative  21    1  Finally, the majority concludes that the burdensome effects of Section 470  2  on  nonresident  attorneys  are  not  actually  discriminatory  because,  by  ensuring  3  that every attorney that practices in New York has a “physical premises” in the  4  State, the office requirement serves “to place resident and nonresident attorneys  5  on an equal footing, not to favor the former over the latter.”  Majority Op., ante at  6  23.  Thus, the majority faults Schoenefeld’s supposed failure to demonstrate that  7  Section 470 poses an “undu[e] burden,” Majority Op., ante at 24, because she did  8  not provide evidence to show that significant numbers of New York attorneys in  9  fact  practice  from  their  homes  rather  than  from  offices  or  that  a  nonresident’s  10  burden of maintaining an office in New York is greater than a resident’s burden  11  of  maintaining  a  home  in  New  York.    As  a  factual  matter,  the  majority’s  12  conclusion that the law poses no undue burden on nonresident attorneys directly  13  conflicts  with  our  findings  earlier  in  this  case.    See  Schoenefeld,  748  F.3d  at  468  14  (“This additional obligation [on nonresident attorneys] carries with it significant                                                                                                                                                     history of the pertinent restrictions in order to discern a possible nonprotectionist  purpose, as the majority does in this case.  Rather, upon finding that the State’s  restrictions were discriminatory, the State was required in those cases to explain  why, at that time, the restrictions were justified.  Cf. McBurney, 133 S. Ct. at 1715– 16  (examining  plain  text  of  Virginia  statute  to  determine  whether  distinction  between residents and nonresidents had a protectionist aim).      22    1  expense—rents, insurance, staff, equipment inter alia—all of which is in addition  2  to  the  expense  of  the  attorney’s  out‐of‐state  office,  assuming  she  has  one.”).13   3  More  importantly,  these  imagined  burdens  lose  sight  of  the  governing  legal  4  standard: “whether the State has burdened the right to practice law, a privilege  5  protected  by  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause,  by  discriminating  among  6  otherwise  equally  qualified  applicants  solely  on  the  basis  of  citizenship  or  7  residency.”  Friedman, 487 U.S. at 66–67.  Though the Clause “does not promise  8  nonresidents that it will be as easy for [them] as for residents to comply with a  9  state’s  law,”  Schoenefeld,  748  F.3d  at  467  (internal  quotation  omitted),  a  10  “wholesale  bar  has  never  been  required  to  implicate  the  [Clause],”  Crotty,  346  11  F.3d at 95.  Here, it is enough that Section 470 substantially burdens nonresident  12  attorneys by requiring them, and only them, to maintain separate office premises  13  within the State.                                                               Although  the  majority  brushes  aside  these  findings  as  “dicta,”  Majority  Op.,  13 ante at 23 n.11, the significant burden on nonresidents of maintaining an in‐state  office was central to our determination that Section 470, if interpreted to impose  an in‐state office requirement, “discriminates against nonresident attorneys with  respect  to  their  fundamental  right  to  practice  law  in  the  state  and,  by  virtue  of  that  fact,  its  limitations  on  non‐resident  attorneys  implicate  the  Privileges  and  Immunities Clause.”  Schoenefeld, 748 F.3d at 469.   23    1  The majority asserts that Section 470 places all attorneys on equal footing  2  because the statute is, in effect, no different from a law that requires all attorneys  3  to maintain a “physical presence” in New York.  See Majority Op., ante at 25.  But  4  unlike  the  statutes  upheld  as  constitutional  in  Kleinsmith  v.  Shurtleff,  571  F.3d  5  1033, 1044–45 (10th Cir. 2009) and Tolchin v. Supreme Court of N.J., 111 F.3d 1099,  6  1107–08  (3d  Cir.  1997),  which  require  all  attorneys  to  maintain  a  physical  7  presence  within  the  State,  Section  470  explicitly  draws  a  distinction  based  on  8  residency.    This  case  is  thus  analogous  to  Piper  and  Friedman,  where  states’  9  restrictions on legal practice that applied only to nonresidents were invalidated  10  under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  Friedman, 487 U.S. at 70; Piper, 470  11  U.S.  at  288.    The  Supreme  Court,  moreover,  has  long  rejected  the  notion  that  a  12  State’s  authority  to  pass  a  facially  neutral  law  also  empowers  it  to  pass  a  13  discriminatory law.  Friedman, 487 U.S. at 66–67 (“A state’s abstract authority to  14  require from resident and nonresident alike that which it has chosen to demand  15  from  the  nonresident  alone  has  never  been  held  to  shield  the  discriminatory  16  distinction from the reach of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.”).  That New  17  York could enact some other law that does not distinguish between residents and  18  nonresidents is entirely inapposite to the question before us now.    24    1  III.  2  The  State  of  New  York  has  chosen  to  discriminate  against  nonresident  3  attorneys with regard to their right to pursue a common calling, and it has failed  4  to  provide  a  substantial  justification  for  that  discrimination.    In  holding  to  the  5  contrary,  the  majority  unnecessarily  disturbs  longstanding  Privileges  and  6  Immunities  jurisprudence  and  denies  nonresident  attorneys  their  7  constitutionally‐protected right to practice law “on terms of substantial equality”  8  with  residents  of  New  York.    Piper,  470  U.S.  at  280.    For  these  reasons,  I  9  respectfully dissent.    25    


[by Raggi]

 Judge HALL dissents in a separate opinion. *276 REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judge: On this appeal, we must decide whether New York violates the Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, see U.S. Const, art. IV, § 2, by requiring nonresident members of its bar to maintain a physical “office for the transaction of law business” within the state, when resident attorneys are not required to maintain offices distinct from their homes, N.Y. Judiciary Law § 470 . Having now received the New York Court of Appeals’ response to our certified question as to the “minimum requirements necessary to satisfy” § 470’s office mandate, see Schoenefeld v. New York, 748 F.3d 464 (2d Cir.2014); Schoenefeld v. State, 25 N.Y.3d 22 , 6 N.Y.S.3d 221 , 29 N.E.3d 230 (2015) (holding § 470 to require physical office), we conclude that § 470 does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause because it was not enacted for the protectionist purpose of favoring New York residents in their ability to practice law. To the contrary, the statute was enacted to ensure that nonresident, members of the New York bar could practice in the state by providing a means, ie., a New York office, for them to establish a physical presence in the state on a par with that of resident attorneys, thereby eliminating a service-of-process concern. We identify no protectionist intent in that action. Indeed, it is Schoenefeld who, in seeking to practice law, in New York without a physical presence in the state, is looking to be. treated differently from, not the same as, New York resident attorneys. Such differential treatment is not required by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Lawrence E. Kahn, Judge) declaring § 470’s office requirement unconstitutional, see Schoenefeld v. New York, 907 F.Supp.2d 252 (N.D.N.Y.2011), and we remand the case with instructions to enter judgment in favor of defendants on Schoenefeld’s Privileges and Immunities claim. 1 - , I. Background • Because the facts and procedural history underlying this appeal are set forth in our prior panel opinion with which we assume familiarity, we reiterate them here only insofar as necessary to explain our decision to reverse and remand. A.. The Privileges and Immunities Clause Challenge to N.Y. Judiciary Law § 170 Plaintiff'Ekaterina Schoenefeld, a citizen and resident of New Jersey, is licensed to practice law in New Jersey, New York, and California. She maintains an office in New Jersey, but not in New York. She asserts that she has declined occasional requests to represent clients in New York state courts to avoid violating N.Y. Judiciary Law § 470 , which states as follows: A person, regularly admitted to practice as an attorney and counsellor, in the courts of record of this' state, whose office for the transaction of law business is within the state, may practice as such attorney or counsellor, although he resides in an adjoining state. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 470 (McKinney 2016) (emphasis added). Schoenefeld seeks a judicial declaration that the office requirement imposed by § 470 on nonresident members, of the New York bar violates the Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities Clause by infringing on nonresident^’ right to practice law in New York. The district court agreed and, on *277 the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment,. declared § 470 unconstitutional. See Schoenefeld v. Ne w York, 907 F.Supp.2d at 262-66 . This timely appeal followed. B. This Court’s Certification to the New York Court of Appeals In appealing the district court’s ruling, New York State’s Attorney General, on behalf of all defendants, initially argued that this case presented no Privileges and Immunities Clause concern because § 470’s office requirement could be construed to demand only “an address for accepting personal service,” which could be satisfied by a designated agent. Schoenefeld v. New York, 748 F.3d at 467 . Alternatively, the Attorney General argued that, even if § 470 did treat nonresident attorneys differently from resident attorneys, it did not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause because the burden imposed on nonresidents was “incidental” and substantially related to New York’s sufficient state interest in the service of legal papers. Id. Seeking to avoid a possibly unnecessary constitutional question, see Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 78-79 , 117 S.Ct. 1055 , 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (explaining that, in confronting constitutional challenge to statute, court must first determine if any reasonable , construction “will contain the statute within constitutional bounds,” and emphasizing that “[wjarnings against premature adjudication of constitutional questions bear heightened attention” where federal court is asked to invalidate state statute), but uncertain as to whether New York’s highest court would, in fact, construe § 470 as urged by defendants, see Schoenefeld v. New York, 748 F.3d at 468-69 (observing that New York’s lower courts had never interpreted § .470 to be satisfied by less than physical office space), this court certified the following' question to the New York Court of Appeals: Under New York Judiciary Law § 470, which mandates that a nonresident attorney maintain an “office for the transaction of law business” within the state of New York, .what are the minimum requirements necessary to satisfy that mandate? ■ ■ Id. at 471. The Court of Appeals accepted the certification and, upon review, held that § 470 “requires nonresident attorneys to maintain a physical office in New York,” Schoenefeld v. State, 25 N.Y.3d at 25 , 6 N.Y.S.3d at 222 , 29 N.E.3d 230 . In so ruling, the court observed that the statute, initially enacted in 1862, “appears to presuppose a residency requirement for the practice of law in New York State,” to which “[i]t then makes ah exception, by allowing nonresident attorneys to practice law if they keep ah ‘office for the transaction of law business’ ” in New York. Id. at 27 , 6 N.Y.S.3d at 223 , 29 N.E.3d 230 . The Court acknowledged that the 1862 statute had linked'the office requirement to service of process, so that “service, which could ordinarily be made upon a New York attorney at his residence, could be made upon the nonresident attorney through mail addressed to his office.” Id., 6 N.Y.S.3d at 224 , 29 N.E.3d 230 . But, the two statutory parts were severed in 1909, with the office requirement codified at § 470 making no reference to service. See id. at 27-28 , 6 N.Y.S.3d at 224 , 29 N.E.3d 230 . In these circumstances, the Court of Appeals concluded that the term “office,” as used in § 470, could not be construed to mean only an address or agent sufficient for the receipt of service. Rather, the plain meaning of “office,” particularly when joined with “the additional phrase ‘for the transaction of law business,’ ” requires “nonresident attorneys to, maintain a physical office *278 in New York.” Id. at 25, 28, 6 N.Y.S.3d at 222, 224 , 29 N.E.3d 230 . The Court of Appeals acknowledged a legitimate state interest in ensuring that personal service can be made on nonresident attorneys practicing in New York courts. But, in- construing the statute, it observed that" the “logistical difficulties” with service at the time the office requirement was enacted had largely been overcome by state law authorizing “several means of service upon a nonresident attorney, including mail, overnight delivery, fax and (where permitted) email,” id. at 28 , 6 N,Y.S.3d at 224, 29 N.E.3d 230 (citing N.Y.C.P.L.R. 2103(b) .(McKinney 2015)), as well as the court’s own rule conditioning the admission of nonresident attorneys without full-time employment in New York upon their designation of “the clerk of the Appellate Division in their department of admission as,their agent for the service of process,”' id., 6 N.Y.S.3d at 224-25 , 29 N-E.3d 230 (citing N.Y. Comp.Codes R. and Regs. tit. 22, § 520.13(a) (2015)). Thus, the office requirement could not be construed to require only; an address for service. ' TÍie term was properly understood to require a physical premises. Because the Court of Appeals’ response to our certified question does not moot Schoenefeld’s constitutional challenge, to § 470, we proceed -to address her claim and conclude that it. fails on, the merits. 2 II. Discussion A, Standard of Review We review an award of summary judgment de novo, and will affirm if “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving, party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Baldwin v. EMI Feist Catalog, Inc., 805 F.3d 18, 25 (2d Cir.2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Claims turning entirely on the constitutional validity or invalidity of a statute,” such as the *279 Privileges and Immunities challenge here, “are particularly conducive to disposition by summary judgment, as they involve purely legal questions.” Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Crotty, 346 F.3d 84, 93 (2d Cir.2003). B. The Privileges and Immunities Clause The Privileges and Immunities Clause states that “[t]he Gitizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” U.S. Const, art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. The Clause operates to “place the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those states are concerned.” Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 , 19 L.Ed. 357 (1868); see Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 88 (2d Cir.2005), overruled on other grounds by McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 , 130 S.Ct. 3020 , 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010). 3 In short, the Clause does not demand that a citizen of one State be allowed to' carry with him into another state the privileges and immunities which comé with citizenship in his state. Rather, it guarantees “that in any State every citizen of any other State is to have the same privileges and immunities which the citizens of that State enjoy.” Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 382 , 98 S.Ct. 1852 , 56 L.Ed.2d 354 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is toward that end that the Clause “prevents a State from discriminating against citizens of other States in favor of its own.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Privileges and Immunities. Clause, however, is “not an absolute” that precludes states from ever distinguishing between .citizens and noncitizens. Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 67 , 108 S.Ct. 2260 , 101 L.Ed.2d 56 (1988); see Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. at 383 , 98 S.Ct. 1852 (collecting cases and observing that state need not “always apply all its laws or all its services equally” to citizens and noncitizens). To prevail on a Privileges and Immunities challenge, a plaintiff' must demonstrate that the state has burdened nonresident activity that is “sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the Nation as to fall within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.” Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. at 64 , 108 S.Ct. 2260 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Upon such a showing, the state may defend its position by demonstrating that “substantial reasons exist for the' discrimination and the degree of discrimination bears a sufficiently close relation to such reasons.” Id. at 67 , 108 S.Ct. 2260 ; accord Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Crotty, 346 F.3d at 94 . A court necessarily conducts these inquiries in light of the Supreme Court’s recent admonition that constitutionally protected privileges and immunities, are burdened “only when [challenged] laws were enacted for [a] protectionist purpose.” McBurney v. Young, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1709, 1715 , 185 L.Ed.2d 758 (2013). In McBumey, which was decided after the ' district court ruled in this case, a nonresident plaintiff challenged Virginia’s Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) for hampering his ability to pursue a common calling. He alleged that the law, by allowing only Virginia citizens to inspect; and copy public records, abridged his ability, to *280 engage in the business of “requesting] real estate tax records on clients’ behalf from state and .local governments.”- Id. at 1714-15 . The Supreme Court acknowledged that the ability to pursue a common calling .is protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See id. at 1715 . Nevertheless, it identified no unconstitutional burden because plaintiff had failed to “allege,” and “ha[d] offered no proof,” that the statute “was enacted in order to provide a competitive economic advantage for Virginia citizens.” Id. To the contrary, the statute was enacted.with the “distinctly nonprotectionist aim” of allowing “those who ultimately hold sovereign power,” ie., the citizens of Virginia, to “obtain an accounting from the public officials to whom they delegate the exercise of that power.” Id. at 1716 . The Supreme Court thus concluded that, even if the statute had “the incidental effect of preventing .citizens of other States from making a profit by trading on information contained in state records,” in the absence of a showing of discriminatory purpose to favor state citizens, plaintiff could not pursue a Privileges and Immunities claim. Id. 4 We do not understand MeBumey to state any new principle of law. Nevertheless, MeBumey provides a clarification not available to the district court at the time it ruled in this case, specifically, that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not prohibit state distinctions between residents and nonresidents in the abstract, but “only” those “enacted for the protectionist purpose of burdening out-of-state citizens” with respect to the privileges and immunities afforded the state’s own citizens. 133 S.Ct. at 1715 ; see Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. at 380-81 , 98 S.Ct. 1852 . Nor do we understand McBur-ney to suggest that the disparate effects of a challenged state law are completely irrelevant to a Privileges and Immunities inquiry. As the Supreme Court has recognized in other contexts, burdensome effects can sometimes admit an inference of ■ proscribed intent. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 , 96 S.Ct. 2040 , 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) (noting relevancy of disproportionate impact to racially discriminatory intent). What MeBumey makes plain, however, is that it is protectionist purpose, and not disparate effects alone, that identifies the sort of discrimination prohibited by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, by contrast, for example, to the Commerce Clause. See generally McBurney v. Young, 133 S.Ct. at 1720 (separately analyzing challenged law under dormant Commerce Clause); cf. Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1787 , 1801 n. 4, 191 L.Ed.2d 813 (2015) (observing that “Commerce Clause regulates effects, not motives,” and does not require court inquiry into “reasons for enacting a law that has a discriminatory effect”). 5 Thus, consistent *281 with McBumey, a plaintiff challenging a law under the Privileges and Immunities Clause must allege or offer some proof of a protectionist purpose to maintain the claim. In the absence of such a showing, a Privileges and Immunities claim fails, obviating the need for a tailoring inquiry. See McBurney v. Young, 133 S.Ct. at 17Í6 (explaining that “Clause does not require that a State tailor its every action to avoid any incidental effect on out-of-state tradesmen”). 6 With these principles in mind, we consider Schoenefeld’s challenge to § 470. C. Schoenefeld Has Adduced No Proof that § 470 Was Enacted for a Protectionist Purpose Schoenefeld asserts that § 470 violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause both on its face and as applied. Insofar as the law, both on its face and as applied, pertains to the practice of law, the parties agree that § 470 implicates a privilege protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 283 , 105 S.Ct. 1272 , 84 L.Ed.2d 205 (1985); accord Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. at 65 , 108 S.Ct. 2260 . The parties also do not dispute that § 470 imposes a physical office requirement on nonresident attorneys that does not apply to resident attorneys, who may úse their homes as their offices. See Schoenefeld v. New York, 748 F.3d at 468 (discussing New York precedent recognizing that resident New York attorney may use home as office). In some circumstances, a facial classification is enough, by itself, to manifest a proscribed intent. This is most apparent where.the facial classification is based on an invidious factor, such as race. See, e.g,, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227-36, 115 . S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995) (subjecting facial classifications based on race to strict scrutiny review). But precisely because the Privileges and Immunities Clause is not an absolute, not every facial distinction between state residents and nonresidents will admit an inference of protectionist pur *282 pose. See Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. at 67 , 108 S.Ct. 2260 . Indeed, in McBumey, the Supreme Court did not find the Virginia FOIA’s facial distinction between residents and nonresidents sufficient to admit an inference of protectionist purpose, particularly in light of statutory text and legislative history to the contrary. We reach the same conclusion with respect to § 470. ' In reaching that conclusion we look, as the McBumey Court did with the Virginia FOIA, to the purpose of § 470. 7 That statute’s office requirement has its origins in an 1862 predecessor law, Chapter 43, see 1862 N.Y. Laws 139 , which was enacts ed to reverse a court ruling that barred a licensed New York attorney who had moved to New Jersey from further practicing in New York because it might be difficult, if not impossible, to serve him with New York legal process. See Richardson v. Brooklyn City & Newtown R.R., 22 How. Pr. 368 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Feb. 1, 1862); 8 The month after that decision, the New York State legislature enacted Chapter 43, making clear that such a nonresident lawyer could practice law in New York/ as long as he maintained an office in the state, which office the law, designated an accepted site for service, thereby eliminating the concern raised in Richardson.- As this history demonstrates, the in-state office requirement was not enacted for the protectionist purpose of burdening nonresident attorneys in practicing-law in New York. Rather, it was enacted to ensure that every licensed New York lawyer, whether a state resident or not, could practice in the state by providing a means for the nonresident attorney to establish a physical presence in the state (and therefore place for service) akin to that of a resident attorney. A statute enacted for such a nonprotectionist purpose is not vulnerable to a Privileges and Immunities challenge. See McBurney v. Young, 133 S.Ct. at 1715 . In 1877, Chapter 43’s office requirement and office service authorization were codified at § 60 of New York’s new Code of Civil Procedure. See Schoenefeld v. State, 25 N.Y.3d at 27 , 6 N.Y.S.3d at 224 , 29 N.E.3d 230 . In a 1909 recodification, however, the two provisions were divided, with the service part remaining at § 60, while the office requirement became § 470.. As the New York Court of Appeals observed, theTatter requirement hás remained virtually unchanged to the present, while state law and court rules now authorize service by various means in addition to home and office! See id. at 28 , 6 N.Y.S.3d at 224 , 29 N.E.3d 230 . But even if § 470’s office requirement is now largely vestigial as a means for ensuring service, the fact remains that the' law was enacted for that nonprotectionist purpose, and Schoenefeld *283 has adduced no evidence of a protectionist intent to afford some economic advantage to resident New York lawyers. In urging otherwise, Schóenefeld argues that Chapter 43 must’ be vietved in context, as an 'exception to what was then New York’s general bah on nonresident attorneys. The argument fails because Schoe-nefeld has not been burdened by that general ban, which was'! invalidated in 1979. See In re Gordon, 48 N.Y.2d 266 , 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 , 397 N.E.2d 1309 (1979). Further, she offered no proof that the office requirement was enacted to further the general ban so as to admit an inference of protectionist intent. Rather, as just noted, the office requirement was enacted as an exception to the ban, ensuring an instate place of service so that,, once admitted, nonresident New York lawyers could practice in the state’s courts on functionally the same terms as resident lawyers. No more can a protectionist’ purpose be inferred from the 1877 and 1909 recodifications of the office requirement or from New York’s failure thereafter to repeal § 470. After the New York Court of Appeals - struck down the state’s general ban on the admission of nonresident -lawyers, see In re Gordon, 48 N.Y.2d at 269 , 422 N.Y.S.2d at 642-43 , 397 N.E.2d 1309 , the legislature “amended several provisions of the Judiciary Law and the CPLR to conform to that holding,” Schoenefeld v. State, 25 N.Y.3d at 28, 6 N.Y.S.3d at 224 , 29 N.E.3d 230 . Schoenefeld offers no evidence that anyone identified a need to repeal § 470 as part of that process, much less that the legislature thereafter refused to do so for the protectionist purpose of favoring resident attorneys. See McBurney v. Young, 133 S.Ct. at 1715 . 9 Where a legislature thus manifests its readiness to conform its laws to the Privileges and Immunities Clause, a plaintiff must point to more than a failure to amend or repeal a statute enacted for a nonprotectionist purpose to demonstrate that the law is being maintained’ for a protectionist purpose. 10 *284 The subsequent availability of other, means of service warrants no different conclusion because, in the absence of some showing of protectionist purpose, a state need not demonstrate 'that its laws are narrowly tailored to a legitimate purpose. See id: at 1716 (rejecting Privileges and Immunities claim for failure to demonstrate protectionist purpose without conducting tailoring inquiry). Further, this is not a case where the alleged burdensome effects of the challenged statute admit an inference of protectionist purpose. 11 While § 470’s office requirement expressly pertains only to nonresident attorneys, the requirement serves, as we have already observed, to place admitted resident and nonresident attorneys on an equal footing, not to favor the former over the latter. To practice law in New York, every, attorney admitted to its bar must have a presence in the state in the form of a physical premises, 12 The fact that a nonresident attorney will have to establish that presence by leasing an office, while a resident attorney can use his home, does not unduly burden the nonresident, Not only is the expense of a New York office likely to be less than the expense of a New York home, but Schoe-nefeld has adduced no evidence indicating that significant, numbers of resident New York attorneys in fact practice from their homes rather than from offices. Indeed, decisions from sister circuits suggest otherwise. Cf . Kleinsmith v. Shurtleff, 571 F.3d 1033, 1038 (10th Cir.2009) (observing that, although trust statute would permit Utah attorneys to use home as requisite place of business within state, it was hardly apparent that many would wish to. do so); Tolchin v. Supreme Court of N.J., 111 F.3d 1099, 1107-08 (3d Cir.1997) (noting lack of evidence that, in New Jersey, attorneys practice from their homes). Schoenefeld nevertheless contends that § 470 is unconstitutional because the statute, as applied, requires her to incur the costs of a New York office when she is already incurring the costs of her New Jersey home and office. The flaw in this argument is that Schoenefeld’s New Jersey expenses are not a product of New York law. New York can be held to ac *285 count under the Privileges and Immunities Clause only for the condition it imposes on Schoenefeld to practice law in the state, that is, the leasing of an office. As noted, Schoenefeld fails to show that the. burden on a nonresident of maintaining an office in New York is greater than the burden on a resident of maintaining a home (and frequently a home and office) in New York. In any event, the Privileges and Immunities Clause “‘does not promise nonresidents that it will be. as easy for [them] as for residents to comply with a state’s law.’” Schoenefeld v. New York, 748 F.3d at 467 (quoting Kleinsmith v. Shurtleff, 571 F.3d at 1044-45 (observing that “typically it is harder for a nonresident to conduct a business or a profession in a state than it is for a resident”))^ It promises only that state laws will not differentiate for the protectionist purpose of favoring residents at the expense of nonresidents. See McBurney v. Young, 133 S.Ct. at 1715 . The effects resulting from § 470’s application to Schoenefeld manifest no such protectionist intent. Indeed, the effects of § 470, as applied, are no different from those of a law that on its face requires all attorneys to maintain a physical presence in New York. Sister circuits have upheld such statutes against Privileges and Immunities challenges. For example, Kleinsmith v. Shurtleff involved a Privileges and Immunities challenge -to a Utah statute requiring “all attorneys who act as trustees of real-property trust deeds in Utah to ‘maintainf ] a place within the state.’ ” 571 F.3d at 1035 (alteration in original) (quoting Utah Code Ann. ■§ 57-l-21(l)(a)(i) (2009)). Plaintiff argued that the. law discriminated.against nonresidents because residents could use their homes as the specified “place within the state,” while nonresidents would need to lease offices. Id. at 1044. The Tenth Circuit, however, held that the law was neutral because it equally required all trustees to have a physical presence in the state. See id. at 1044-47. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the statute’s lack of facial classification between residents' and nonresidents. See id. at 1046. But insofar as plaintiff complained of a disparate impact as applied, the court held it “irrelevant to the [Privileges and Immunities] Clause whether the practical effect of the maintain-a-place requirement ... burdens nonresidents disproportionately.” Id. at 1047. Similarly, in Tolchin v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, the Third Circuit upheld a New Jersey law requiring, all attorneys to maintain a “bona fide office” within the state, while recognizing that only resident attorneys could use their homes to satisfy the requirement. . Ill F.3d at 1107-08. As in Kleinsmith, the court identified no Privileges and Immunities Clause violation because the law “similarly affect[s] residents and nonresidents. Resident and nonresident attorneys alike must maintain a New Jersey office.” Id. at 1113. 13 *286 While the laws at issue in these two cases did not facially classify on the basis of residence, to the extent Sehoenefeld complains of the burdensome effects • of § 470.as applied, facial classification is ir-relévant: The effects of § 470 and the laws at issue in Kleinsmith and Tolchin are virtually identical. 'The critical question, then, is whether a law that effectively requires nonresident attorneys to maintain a physical presence in New York akin to that already maintained by resident attorneys irnduly burdens the former’s ability to practice law. Like the Third and Tenth Circuits, we conclude that it does not. The conclusion finds further support in dictum in Supreme Court of Virginia V. Friedman,. wherein the Supreme Court recognized that an in-state office requirement could serve as a nonprotectionist alternative to residency in safeguarding state interests respecting the practice of law. See 487 U.S. at 70 , 108 S.Ct. 2260 (invalidating'residency condition for admission on motion to bar and observing that office requirement adequately protected state interest in limiting such admissions to full-time1 practitioners); see generally Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 105 , 108 n. 3 (2d Cir.2014) (acknowledging “obligation to accord great deference to Supreme Court dicta, absent a change in the legal landscape” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 14 What Sehoenefeld in fact seeks through this action is not to practice law in New York on the same conditions as a resident attorney who by virtue of home (or home and office) maintains a physical presence in the state. Rather, she seeks to practice law on different terms, specifically, without maintaining a physicál presence in the state. The Privileges and Immunities Clause proscribes laws that favor residents over nonresidents in their pursuit of a common calling. It does not mandate that nonresidents be allowed to practice law in a state on terms different from those applicable to residents. Accordingly, whether Sehoenefeld challenges § 470 on its face or as applied, her Privileges and. Immunities Clause claim fails becaúse she has not demonstrated that .the law was qnacted for or serves the protectionist purpose of favoring resident New York attorneys and disfavoring nonresident attorneys in practicing law. in the state’s courts. See McBurney v. Young, 133 S.Ct. at 1715 . We therefore reverse the district court decision declaring § 470 violative of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. III. Conclusion To summarize, we conclude as follows: *287 1. The Supreme Court has recently clarified that state laws violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause “only when those laws were enacted for the protectionist purpose of burdening out-of-state citizens.” McB urney v. Young, 133 S.Ct. at 1715 . 2. New York’s in-state office requirement for nonresident attorneys admitted to the state’s bar, N.Y. Judiciary Law § 470 , was not enacted for a protectionist purpose disfavoring nonresident admitted attorneys but, rather, for the nonprotec-tionist purpose of affording such attorneys a means to establish a physical presence in the state akin to that of resident attorneys, thereby eliminating a court-identified service-of-process concern. 3. Schoenefeld has offered no proof of an animating protectionist purpose,' either on the face of the statute or inferred from its effects as applied. Indeed, the effect of § 470, as applied, is no different from a neutral statute requiring all licensed New York attorneys, resident and nonresident alike, to maintain a physical presence in the state, which raises'no Privileges and Immunities concern. > 4. Schoenefeld cannot point to the expenses of hér practice in New Jersey, hot required by New York' law, to pursue a Privileges and Immunities challenge to § 470 in the absence of any proof that that statute’s in-state office requirement was enacted for a protectionist purpose. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment invalidating § 470, and we REMAND the case with instructions to deny Schoenefeld’s motion for summary judgment and to award judgment in favor of defendants. . Because Schoenefeld has not appealed the district court’s February 8, 2010 dismissal of her Equal Protection and Commerce Clause challenges to § 47Ó, dismissal of her remaining Privileges and Immunities claim should conclude this litigation. . Our dissenting colleague, Judge Hall, suggests that such a conclusion means it was unnecessary — and therefore improper — to certify the question of § 470’s minimum requirements to the New York Court of Appeals. See Dissenting Op., post at 288-89, 289 n. 1. This court; however, has recognized certification to be appropriate where a state statute is “fairly subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary, or substantially modify the federal constitutional question.” Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 168 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (certifying state-law questions of statutory interpretation to New York Court of Appeals that would "render unnecessary, or at least substantially modify, the federal constitutional question”), That is this case. As our prior panel opinion explained, New York’s Attorney General there argued that § 470 could be read to require only an address for accepting personal service, -under which reading the Privileges and Immunities Clause would not be ”implicate[d].” Schoenefeld v. New York, 748 F.3d at 467 ; see also id. at 469 (acknowledging that Supreme Court has "urged the federal courts of appeals- to use certification in order to avoid deciding constitutional questions unnecessarily or prematurely” (internal quotation marks omitted)), Further, the Attorney General specifically requested certification if this court could not predict whether the New York Court of Appeals would adopt this reading, See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Serio, 261 F.3d 143, 153-54 (2d Cir.2001) (recognizing that “certification request merits more respectful consideration” where, among other things, request was made by Attorney General, who advanced possible saving construction of state statute (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). Osterweil v. Bartlett, 706 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.2013), cited in the dissent, is not to the contrary, as we there certified a question of statutory interpretation to the New York Court of Appeals where, as here, one possible answer would resolve the litigation, while an alternative statutory construction would require- this court "to decide the constitutional question.” Id. at 143 . Nor is a proper certification rendered improper because the state court does not approve the possible statutory construction that would have avoided or minimized the constitutional challenge. . Although the Privileges and Immunities Clause speaks in terms of citizens, it is now well established that .“for analytic purposes citizenship and residency are essentially inter.changeable.” Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 64 , 108 S.Ct. 2260 , 101 L.Ed.2d 56 (1988). . While "incidental” can mean "minor,” the context in MeBumey suggests that the Supreme Court used the word to mean something occurring "by chance ór without,intention or calculation.” Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1142 (1986). Indeed, the Court has used the word in this manner in other discrimination cases. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 , 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (rejecting equal protection challenge for failure plausibly to plead discriminatory intent, observing that it was "no surprise” that policy "produce[d] a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims” (emphases added))- . McBurriey cannot be cabined as Judge Hall urges, to Privileges and Immunities challenges to non-economic legislation. See' Dissenting Op., post at 290-91. Although Virginia’s FOIA was not an economic regulation, McBumey's Privileges and Immunities analy *281 sis did not turn on that distinction but, rather, on the plaintiff's failure to adduce proof of protectionist purpose. Indeed, the ' Court there 'held that "the Clause forbids a State from intentionally giving its own citizens a competitive advantage in business or employment.” McB urney v. Young, 133 S.Ct. at 1716 (emphasis added). . McBumey did not specify at what step of the traditional two-step inquiry plaintiff must carry this protectionist-purpose burden. The Ninth Circuit recently concluded that protectionist purpose is properly considered at the second step of inquiry. See Marilley v. Bonham, 802 F.3d 958, 964 (9th Cir.2015). But the case is now awaiting en banc review. See 815 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir.2016) (mem.). In any event, the panel conclusion in Marilley is not obvious because, at the second step of inquiry, the burden shifts to the defendants, see Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. at 67 , 108 S.Ct. 2260 , and McBumey emphasized . the nonresident plaintiffs failure to plead or offer proof of a protectionist purpose for Virginia’s FOIA, see 133 S.Ct. at 1715-16 ; cf., e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 , 270 n. 21, 97 S.Ct. 555 , 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (holding, in Equal Protection context, that if plaintiff demonstrates that challenged decision was "motivated in part by a racially discriminatory purpose,” burden shifts to' government to establish that, "same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered”). For this reason, we cannot readily assume, as our dissenting colleague does, that the Supreme Court’s discussion of plaintiff’s failure necessarily occurred at the second step of the traditional inquiry. See Dissenting Op., post at 290. However, we need not here conclusively decide at what step plaintiff must adduce proof of a protectionist purpose because, in any event, Schoe-nefeld’s failure to carry this burden here defeats her Privileges and Immunities claim. . Because the policy underlying the Virginia FOIA was codified as part of the statutory text, the Supreme Court relied on the statute’s plain language to determine its purpose. See McBurney v. Young, 133 S.Ct. at 1715 (quoting Va.Code Ann. § 2.2-3700(B) (2011)). . The court in Richardson explained its concerns as follows: Section 409 of the Code regulates the manner of serving papers. It provides that service may be made upon an attorney at, his office, by leaving the paper with the person in charge; or if there be no person in the office, by leaving it in a conspicuous place in the office; and if the office be not open to admit of such service, by leaving it at .the attorney’s residence with some' person of suitable age and discretion. These various provisions, and, especially the latter, would be rendered nugatory if attorneys who resided out of the state were permitted to practice. An attorney might keep his office closed and empty, and, if he had no residence within the state, might entirely evade the service of papers, and baffle his adversary and the court. Id. at 370 . . As Judge Hall notes, the legislature did pro- . pose an amendment to § 470 in 1986 that was not enacted. See Dissenting Op., post at 294 n. .11. But that amendment would still have "mandate[d] that a nonresident attorney have a law. office in [New York] before appearing as an attorney of record in any action or proceeding in a court [in the state].” J.A. 132. The amendment’s proponents explained that while New York could not limit bar membership to state residents, "it could act to insure the quality of its Bar by adopting reasonable measures that would have special regulatory effect on nonresident attorneys.” Id. Insofar as Judge Hall contends that the amendment would have permitted nonresident attorneys without an office in New York to practice in the state so long as they did not appear as attorneys of record, see Dissenting Op., post at 294 n. 11, that conclusion appears grounded not in the amendment’s text, but in pro hac vice rules existing to this day. See N.Y. Comp.Codes R. and Regs. tit. 22, § 520.11 (2016) (permitting member of bar of another state to be admitted pro hac vice provided that, inter alia, attorney is associated with member in good standing of New York bar "who shall be the attorney of record in the matter”); J.A. 133 (explaining that proposed 1986 amendment to § 470 would not "unduly burden[]” nonresident attorney who was "unwilling or unable to maintain” an instate office because that attorney could practice "so long as local counsel c[ould] be found to appear as attorney of record”). . A recent statutory amendment and a newly-promulgated rule of the New York Court of Appeals, cited to us by the parties in Fed. R.App, P. 28(j) letters, further indicate that New York is not pursuing a protectionist purpose in regulating the practice of law. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2103(b)(2) (McKinney 2016) (approving, service by mail "made from outside the state”); N.Y. Comp.Codes R. and Regs. tit. 22, § 523.2.(2016) (permitting lawyer not admitted in New York to engage in temporary practice of law within state provided, among other things, that lawyer is licensed to practice in another state or even "a non-United States jurisdiction”). . The law of the case doctrine does not bar us from reaching this conclusion because contrary to our dissenting colleague’s suggestion, see Dissenting Op., post at 288-89, 295-96, neither our prior panel opinion nor the New York Court of Appeals' response thereto conclusively decided the issue. See DiLaura v. Power Auth. of State of N.Y., 982 F.2d 73, 76 (2d Cir.1992). Our prior panel opinion decided only to certify .the question of § 470’s minimum requirements to the New York Court of Appeals in light of a statutory construction then urged by the Attorney General that might moot Schoenefeld’s constitutional challenge. In this context, our observation that, if construed to require a physical office, § 470 imposed a “significant expense” on nonresident attorneys, Schoenefeld v. New York, 748 F.3d at 468 , is at most dictum that does not bind us here, see Schwabenbauer v. Bd. of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of Olean, 777 F.2d 837, 842 (2d Cir.1985) (concluding that statements in prior opinion in same case were “not necessary to or a' part of” prior decision and were,'' therefore, non-binding dicta). Meanwhile, the New York Court of Appeals held only that § 470 required nonresident attorneys to maintain a physical office in the state. See Schoenefeld v. State, 25 N.Y.03d at 26-27, 6 N.Y.S.3d at 223 , 29 N.E.3d 230 . . Thus, this case is not akin to Friedman and Piper , cited by the dissent. See Dissenting Op., post at 295, 296 (citing Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. at 70 , 108 S.Ct. 2260 (concluding that Virginia rule permitting only residents to be admitted to bar on • motion,' while nonresidents were required to take and pass bar examination, violated Privileges and Immunities Clause); Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. at 288 , 105 S.Ct. 1272 (holding that New Plampshire rule excluding nonresidents from bar violated Clause)), . New Jersey has since eliminated its physical office requirement, while continuing to impose various conditions that may most easily be satisfied through an office. See N.J. R. Ct. 1:21 — 1(a)(1) (2015) (“An attorney need not maintain a fixed physical location for ‘ the practice of law, but must structure his or her practice in such a manner as to assure, as set forth in RPC 1.4, prompt and reliable communication with and accessibility by clients, other counsel, and judicial and administrative tribunals before which the .attorney may. practice, prpvided that an attorney must designate one or more fixed physical locations where client files and the attorney’s business and financial records may be inspected on sho'rt notice by duly authorized regulatory authorities, where mail or hand-deliveries may be made and promptly received, and where process may be served on the attorney for '• all actions , . that may arise out of the-practice of law and activities related thereto.”). We *286 • need • not here consider' whether' New York might do the same because, absent, a protectionist purpose, the conditions imposed by a state even on nonresidents pursuing a profession within its borders do not implicate the Privileges and Immunities Clause so as 'to ’■require' tailoring analysis. See McBurney v. Young, 13 3 S. Ct. at 1716. .'. Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 107 S.Ct. 2607 , 96 L.Ed.2d 557 (1987), cited by Judge ■ Hall, is not to the contrary. See Dissenting Op., post at 293 & n..9. In there concluding ■ that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana could not impose an in-state office requirement for admission to its bhr, the Supreme Court relied on its supervisory authority over local federal rules and expressly declined to reach the Privileges and Immunities challenge. See Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. at 645 , 647 n. 7, 107 S.Ct. 2607 (explaining that Court’s supervisory authority permits it to intervene to protect integrity, of federal system, whereas ."authority .over state-court bars is limited to enforcing federal constitutional requirements” (emphasis added)); see also, id, (stating that rules differentiating between resident and nonresident attorneys are "more difficult to justify in the context of federal-court practice than they are in the area of state-court practice”). 


[Dissent by Hall]

 HALL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: - The majority holds that a New York statute that discriminates, on its face, against nonresident attorneys — burdening them with the expense of maintaining an office in New’ York while exempting resident attorneys from the same requirement — does not offend the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2 of the Constitution because, in the majority’s view, the plaintiff has failed to prove that the statute evinces a “protectionist” intent. In doing so, the majority injects an entirely novel proposition into our Privileges and Immunities Clause jurisprudence: that a State’s explicit discrimination against- nonresidents with regard 1 to a fundamental right is constitutionally unobjectionable unless the nonresident makes out a prima facie case of discriminatory intent. Such a holding reverses the State’s burden of demonstrating' that it has a substantial interest justifying the discrimination and that the means .chosen bear a close and substantial relation to that interest. Even under the majority’s reformulation of our settled law, however, Schoenefeld has established that the New York statute has protectionist aims, and the State’s proffered justifications for the discrimination fail to survive scrutiny. I respectfully dissent. I. The two-step inquiry to be conducted under the Privileges and Immunities Clause is well established. First, the court considers whether a State has, in fact, discriminated against out-of-staters ■ with regard to the privileges and immunities it accords its own citizens. See Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Crotty, 346 F.3d 84, 94 (2d Cir.2003) (citing United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 218, 222 , 104 S.Ct. 1020 , 79 L.Ed.2d 249 (1984)). “The activity in question must be sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the Nation .. as to fall within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.... For it is only *288 with respect to those ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ bearing on the vitality of the Nation as a single entity that a State must accord residents and nonresidents equal treatment.” Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 64-65 , 108 S.Ct. 2260 (1988) (internal quotation marks, citations and alterations omitted). Second, if the court determines that the State has, in fact, discriminated against out-of-state residents, the burden shifts to the State to provide a “sufficient justification for the discrimination,” Crotty, 346 F.3d at 94 , by making a showing that “(i) there is a substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State’s objective.” Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 , 105 S.Ct. 1272 (1985). On its face, New York Judiciary Law § 470 discriminates against nonresident attorneys with regard to the practice of law, long recognized by the • Supreme Court as a “fundamental right” subject to protection under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 281, 105 S.Ct. 1272 . As we explained in our prior opinion in this case, Schoenefeld v. New York, 748 F.3d 464 (2d Cir.2014), and the New York Court of Appeals unanimously agreed after we certified to it a question, Schoenefeld v. State, 25 N.Y.3d 22 , 6 N.Y.S.3d 221 , 29 N.E.3d 230 (2015), Section 470 draws a distinction between attorneys who are residents of New York and those who are not. The statute imposes no specific requirement on resident attorneys to maintain a bona fide office, thus permitting them to set up an “office” on the kitchen table of their studio apartments if so desired. Schoenefeld, 748 F.3d at 468 . Nonresident attorneys, however, are required to maintain an “office for the transaction of law business” within the State. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 470 . We recognized that “[t]his additional obligation carries with it significant expense — rents, insurance, staff, equipment inter, alia — all of which is in addition to the expense of the attorney’s out-of-state office, assuming she has one.” Schoenefeld, 748 F.3d at 468 . Absent a controlling state decision that an “office for the transaction of law business,” § 470, meant something other than a bona fide office, we concluded that, “as it stands, it appears that Section 470 discriminates against nonresident attorneys with respect to their fundamental right to practice law in the state and, by virtue of that fact, its limitations on nonresident attorneys implicate the Privileges and Immunities Clause.” Id. at 469. New York argued to us, however, that the statute could be interpreted as requiring no more than a P.O. box or designated agent for service of process, lessening the burden on nonresident attorneys considerably and making Section 470 more likely to survive scrutiny. Id. While our own review of New York law indicated that a designated physical office space was required, we recognized that the question had not been spoken to by the New York Court of Appeals, and we certified to that court the question: “Under New York Judiciary Law § 470, which mandates that a nonresident attorney maintain an ‘office for the transaction of law business’ within the state of New York, what are the minimum requirements necessary to satisfy that mandate?” Id. at 471. In doing so, we represented that the Court of Appeals’ answer would, “in all likelihood, dictate[ ] the outcome of the constitutional privileges and immunities analysis we have commenced and must complete as we decide the appeal'before us.” Id. The Court of Appeals accepted certification and graciously took time away from its own busy docket to unanimously answer that § 470 required the nonresidents maintain a physical office space. Schoenefeld, 25 N.Y.3d *289 at 26 , 6 N.Y.S.3d at 223 , 29 N.E.3d 230 , As we had suspected, maintaining an address . or a designated agent for service would not satisfy the requirements of Section 470, See id. The majority now disregards the New York Court of Appeals’ decision as well as our own prior opinion which, together, constitute the law of the case. See DiLaura v. Power Auth. of State of N.Y., 982 F.2d 73, 76 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that, absent an intervening change in controlling law, availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or manifest injustice, a court’s decision upon a rule of law “should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Those decisions acknowledged that. Section 470 discriminates between in-state and out-of-state attorneys solely on the basis of their residency. Under longstanding precedent, that determination disposes of the initial inquiry; the burden then shifts to the State to provide “suffíciént justification for the discrimination.” Crotty, 346 F.3d at 94 . Departing from these precedents, however, the majority holds that the plaintiff bears the initial burden of “alleging] or offering] some proof of a protectionist purpose” in order to state a claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Majority Op., ante at 280. In the majority’s estimation, if the plaintiff fails to allege a prima facie case' of protectionist intent, her “Privileges .and Immunities claim fails, obviating the need for a tailoring inquiry.” Majority Op., ante at 280. The majority bases its reasoning exclusively on its reading of the Supreme Court’s decision in McBurney v. Young, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1709 , 185 L.Ed.2d 758 (2013). As the majority acknowledges, that decision did not state any new principle of law, but merely confirmed that the Privileges and Immunities Clause forbids laws' that abridge the right to pursue a common calling only when those laws “were enacted for the protectionist purpose of burdening out-of-state citizens,” 1 Id. at 1715 . McBumey did not disturb the traditional threshold inquiry and two-step analysis in cases, like ours, where the challenged law is one that directly regulates legal practice.. Rather, while acknowledging that the Privileges and Immunities Clause “protects the right of citizens to ply their trade, practice their occupation, or pursue a common calling,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), the Court held that Virginia’s distinction between state citizens and noncitizens in its Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) , did not “abridge” a noncitizen’s right to pursue his livelihood “in the sense prohibited by the Privileges and Immunities clause” because the effects on his real estate business, which involved obtaining state property *290 records for his clients, were purely incidental. Id. ■■ The majority’s reading'that McBumey requires a plaintiff to allege, as part of a prima facie case, that the law was specifically enacted for a protectionist purpose misconstrues McBumey’s invocation of the two-step analysis. 2 As an initial matter, the Court resolved the threshold issue, whether a fundamental right is implicated, by noting that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects the right the plaintiff claimed was violated. 3 See id. at 1715 . The Court then considered whether sufficient justification existed for the discrimination 4 ; it determined that the Virginia FOIÁ, as 'a mechanism for state citizens as the holders of sovereign power to obtain an accounting from public officials, evinced’ a “distinctly nonprotectionist aim.” Id. at 1716 . ' Further, the statute’s distinction between Virginia citizens and noncitizens was justified because it “recognizes that1-Virginia taxpayers foot the bill for the fixed costs underlying record-keeping in the Commonwealth.” Id. It was within this context that the Court explained- that (1) the plaintiff “does not allege — and has offered no proof — -that the challenged provision of the Virginia FOIA was enacted in order to provide a competitive economic advantage for Virginia citizens,” id. at 1715 , and (2) the statute’s “effect of preventing citizens of other States from making a profit by trading on information contained in state records” is merely “incidental.” Id. at 1716 . In short, the Court’s reasoning — that the plaintiff failed ■ to contradict the State’s showing that the discrimination against noncitizens was justified — conforms precisely to the traditional two-step inquiry. McBumey is distinguishable from this ease for the simple reason that the Virginia FOIA-is not an economic regulation, nor does it directly regulate the right to pursue a common calling. Rather, the FOIA provides a mechanism for seeking political accountability, and its effects on the plaintiff’s profession — data gathering for profit — were purely “incidental.”. Id. It is well-established that, “[wjhile the Clause forbids a State from intentionally giving its oym citizens a competitive advantage in business or employment, the Clause does not require that a State tailor its every action to avoid any incidental effect on out-of-state tradesmen.” Id. Section 470, by contrast, directly regulates the legal. profession by expressly and intentionally placing practice requirements on *291 nonresident attorneys like Schoenefeld that it does not place on resident attorneys. The-majority stretches McBumey’s “incidental” language far beyond the facts of that case to support its conclusion that any regulation, even one that directly regulates a “well settled . -.. privilege protected by Article IV, § 2,” Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 553 , 109 S.Ct. 1294 , 103 L.Ed.2d 559 (1989), will pass constitutional muster so long as its discrimination. against nonresidents cari be characterized as “incidental.” Majority Op., ante at 279-80. By requiring plaintiffs to allege a pri-ma facie case of discriminatory intent, the majority, in effect, relieves the State of its burden to provide a sufficient justification for laws that discriminate against nonresidents with' regard to fundamental rights. See Crotty, 346 F.3d at 95 (explaining that States may not “treat Residents and nonresidents disparately in connection with the pursuit of commerce, a trade, or business venture where that disparate treatment is not supported by a sufficient justification”). Determining whether an unacceptable purpose, such as economic protectionism, underlies the challenged law is at the core of the analysis engaged in after the threshold determination into whether a right implicated by the Privileges and Immunities Clause has been abridged. See Piper, 470 U.S. at 284 , 105 S.Ct. 1272 (“The conclusion that [a State law] deprives nonresidents of a protected privilege does not end our inquiry ... The Clause does not preclude discrimination against nonresidents where (i) there is a substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State’s objective.”).Examining the government’s proffered reason for the discrimination and determining whether -the challenged, law, as enacted, conforms to the proffered ' -reason -is the method by which courts determine whether the proffered reason is genuine or merely a pretext for economic protectionism. Crotty, 346 F.3d at 97 (“Part and parcel to this analysis is determining whether [the State] ha[s] demonstrated a substantial factor unrelated to economic protectionism1 to justify the discrimination.”). The majority’s reasoning would reverse this burden-shifting test by requiring plaintiffs to show that - a law was enacted for a protectionist .puRpose, rather than requiring the' State to show- that the -law was not enacted for a protectionist purpose. Tellingly, in support of this proposition the majority draws exclusively on cases addressing challenges under the Equal Protection Clause, for which plaintiffs must plead discriminatory intent as part of a prima facie case. Majority Op., ante at 279-80 (citing, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 , 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 , 96 S.Ct. 2040 , 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)). The majority has not cited, nor does there exist, any case suggesting that the requirement to allege discriminatory intent as part of a prima facie case under the Equal Protection Clause also applies to Privileges and Immunities claims. Indeed, Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 , 108 S.Ct. 2260 , 101 L.Ed.2d 56 (1988), stands for the opposite proposition. In. Friedman , . Virginia argued that its residency requirement for admission to the State’s bar on motion did not implicate the Privileges and Immunities Clause ,on the .basis that, because nonresident attorneys could seek admission by taking the Virginia bar exam, “the . State cannot be said to have discriminated against nonresidents as- a matter of fundamental concern.” Id. at 65 , 108 S.Ct. 2260 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court rejected that argument as “quite inconsistent with *292 our precedents,” stating that “the Clause is implicated whenever ... a State does not permit qualified nonresidents to practice law within its borders on terms of substantial .equality with its own residents.” Id, at 65-66, 108 S.Ct. 2260 . This language cannot be squared with a prima facie requirement that demands something more than a showing of disparate treatment on the, face of the statute. 5 The Equal Protection cases cited by the majority, moreover, are distinguishable on the ground that the challenged policies in those cases were facially neutral but produced racially disparate effects. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 (holding that plaintiffs,failed to allege that detention policy that disproportionately affected Muslims and Arabs was motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose); Davis, 426 U.S. at 244 , 96 S.Ct. 2040 (concluding that facially neutral employment test was not racially discriminatory simply because a greater proportion of African Americans fared poorly). The plaintiffs were thus required to allege facts showing that an otherwise-neutral policy was motivated by an impermissible discriminatory purpose. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 , 97 S.Ct. 568 , 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). Section 470, by contrast, draws -a facial distinction betweeri residents and nonresidents with regard to the privilege of practicing law; by its very terms, it imposes burdens on nonresidents that it does not impose on residents. Because the statute, on its face, discriminates against nonresidents, no other threshold showing of discriminatory intent is required. 6 In sum, Section 470 discriminates against nonresidents with respect to the practice of law, a fundamental right long recognized as protected under the Privileges, and Immunities Clause. The majority recognizes as much, see Majority Op., ante at 281-82, but erroneously imposes a threshold requirement that the plaintiff challenging the discrimination prove there is a protectionist intent above and beyond the traditional analysis. II.’ Plaintiff having established that a fundamental right has been implicated,- it is the State’s' burden to provide a sufficient justification for the discrimination by demonstrating that “(i) there is a substantial *293 reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State’s objective.” Piper, 470 U.S. at 284 , 105 S.Ct. 1272 . “In deciding whether the degree of discrimination bears a sufficiently close relation to the reasons proffered by the State, the Court has considered whether, within the full panoply of legislative choices otherwise available to the State, there exist .alternative means of furthering the State’s purpose without implicating constitutional concerns.” Friedman, 487 U.S. at 66 , 108 S.Ct. 2260 . The State’s proffered justifications for the in-state office requirement — effectuating service of legal papers, facilitating regulatory oversight of nonresident attorneys5 fiduciary obligations, .and making attorneys more accessible to New York’s courts — are plainly not sufficient. Regarding the issue of service, the Court -of Appeals itself observed that, although “service on an out-of-state individual presented many, more1 logistical difficulties in 1862, when [Section 470] was originally enacted,” today there are' “adequate measures in place relating to service upon nonresident attorneys,” including 'the methods of mail, overnight delivery, fax and (where permitted) email, as authorized by the CPLR, and the requirement under 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 520.13(a) that, nonresident attorneys designate, an in-state clerk of court as their agent for service of process in order to be admitted in New York. Schoenefeld, 25 N.Y.3d at 28 , N.Y.S.3d at 224-25, 29 N.E.3d 230 . Thus, not only do “there exist alternative means of .furthering the State’s purpose without implicating constitutional concerns,” Friedman, 487 U.S. at 66 , 108 S.Ct. 2260 , but those means are already in place. 7 . The State’s argument that an in-state office requirement is necessary to regulate the behavior of nonresident attorneys fares no better. The Court has long rejected similar arguments in favor of a residency requirement on the grounds that a “nonresident lawyer’s professional duty and interest in his reputation should provide the same incentive to maintain high ethical standards as they do for resident lawyers,” and that the State, in any event, “has -the authority to discipline all members of the bar, regardless of where they reside.” 8 Piper, 470 U.S. at 286 , 105 S.Ct. 1272 . Similarly,' the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that an in-state office requirement is necessary to ensure the availability of attorneys for court proceedings as “unnecessary and irrational.” Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 649 , 107 S.Ct. *294 2607 , 96 L.Ed.2d 557 (1987). 9 The Court noted that resident lawyers may still maintain their office outside of the state, thus making themselves equally unavailable to the courts, and that “there is no link between residency within a State and proximity to a courthouse.” 10 Id. at 650 , 107 S.Ct. 2607 ; see also Barnard, 489 U.S. at 553-54 , 109 S.Ct. 1294 (holding with re-spéct to challenge under Privileges and Immunities Clause that unreliable airline and telephone service of Virgin Islands did not.support a substantial justification for attorney residency requirement). The majority, -moreover, has not engaged in a meaningful analysis of the sufficiency of the State’s proffered justifications, underscoring the extent of its departure from the established two-step inquiry under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Instead, the majority concludes that Schoenefeld’s claim must fail at the threshold because, in its view, she has failed to prove that Section 470 was enacted ■ for a protectionist purpose, Even if such a prima facie showing is required, Schoenefeld has made one out based on the plain text and. history of Section 470. It is undisputed that, at the time Section 470 was enacted, it was part of a larger statutory scheme designed to prohibit nonresident attorneys from practicing in New York. See Richardson v. Brooklyn City & N.R. Co., 22 How. Pr. 368, 370 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Feb. 1, 1862) (noting that the court “ha[d] always required that an attorney should reside within the state”). Chapter 43, the earliest predecessor to Section 470, provided a less burdensome, but still burdensome, exception to the overall residency requirement as an accommodation to commuters in adjacent states. Rosenberg v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 99 Misc.2d 554 , 416 N.Y.S.2d 708, 710 (Sup.Ct.1979) (explaining with respect to Section 470 that “[t]he requirement of residence, as a condition to-the continued right to practice, appears to have been ameliorated for attorneys who reside in an adjacent State, but only upon condition they maintain an office for the practice of law in this-State”); see also Brennan, Repeal Judiciary Law § 470, 62 N.Y.S.B.J. 20, 21 (Jan.1990) (“The primary purpose of -chapter 43 was to carve out an exception to the general rule that an attorney could not practice in the New York State courts unless he was a resident of New York State.”). The majority contends- that this statutory context is irrelevant because Schoenefeld has not been burdened by the general ban on nonresident attorneys,.which was invalidated under the Privileges and Immunities Clause in 1979. See Majority Op., ante at 282 (citing In re Gordon, 48 N.Y.2d 266 , 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 , 397 N.E.2d 1309 (1979)). That a discriminatory and burdensome requirement can be stylized as an “exception” to an even more discriminatory and burdensome requirement, however, does not render it nondiscriminatory or render implausible a threshold inference of discriminatory purpose. 11 *295 - The majority further reasons that because the office requirement, like the gen-' eral ban on nonresident attorneys, was enacted in part to ensure an in-state place of service, see Richardson, 22 How. Pr. at 370 , it does not exhibit a protectionist purpose. Majority Op., ante at 282. This gets it backward, however, for it is the State’s burden to prove -that service of process is a substantial interest justifying the restriction, not Schoenefeld’s burden to prove that service of process was not a motivating concern for the statute. If the majority’s rationale were sufficient, then any restriction based on residency, no matter how onerous, would pass constitutional muster so long as the State could point to a nonprotectionist purpose for the restriction. Were this the test, then there would have been no basis on which to invalidate in-state residency requirements for attorneys under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See, e.g., Friedman, 487 U.S. at 68 , 108 S.Ct. 2260 (rejecting as insufficient State’s reasons for requiring residency of attorneys seeking admission on motion, including ensuring that those applicants “have the same commitment to service and familiarity with Virginia law that is possessed by applicants securing admission upon examination” and facilitating the full-time practice of law); Piper, 470 U.S. at 285 , 105 S.Ct. 1272 (rejecting State’s argument that' nonresident attorneys “would be less likely (i) to become, and remain, famil-r iar with local rules and procedures; (ii) to behave ethically; (iii) to be available for court proceedings; and (iv) to do pro Bono and other volunteer work in the State”); accord Gordon, 48 N.Y.2d at 274 , 422 N.Y.S.2d at 646 , 397 N.E.2d 1309 (holding that State’s justification for residency requirement, the “observation] and evaluation] [of] the applicant’s character,” was insufficient due to “alternatives which are less restrictive than denial of admission to practice which would further this interest”). 12 Finally, the majority concludes that the. burdensome effects of Section 470 on npn-resident attorneys are not actually discriminatory because, by ensuring that every attorney that practices in New York has a “physical premises” in the State, the office requirement serves “to place resident and nonresident attorneys on an equal footing, not to favor the former over the latter.” Majority Op., ante' at 284. Thus, the majority faults Schoenefeld’s supposed failure to demonstrate that Section 470 poses an “undu[e] burden,” Majority Op., ante at 284, because she did not provide evidence to show; that significant numbers of New York attorneys in fact practice from their homes rather than *296 from offices or that a nonresident’s burden of maintaining an office in New York is greater than a resident’s burden of maintaining, a home in New York. As a factual matter,.the majority’s conclusion that the law poses no undue burden on nonresident attorneys directly conflicts with our findings earlier in this case. See Schoenefeld, 748 F.3d at 468 (“This additional obligation [on nonresident attorneys] carries with, it significant expense — rents, insurance, staff, equipment inter alia — all of which is in addition to the expense of the attorney’s out-of-state office, assuming she- has one.”). 13 More importantly, these imagined burdens lose sight of the governing legal standard: “whether the' State has burdened the right to practice law, a privilege protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, by discriminating among otherwise equally qualified applicants solely on the basis of citizenship or residency.” Friedman, 487 U.S. at 66-67 , 108 S.Ct. 2260 . Though the Clause “does not promise nonresidents that it will be as easy for [them] as for residents to comply‘with a state’s law,” Schoenefeld, 748 F.3d at 467 (internal quotation omitted), a “wholesale bar has never been required to implicate the [Clause],” Crotty, 346 F.3d at 95 . Here, it is enough that Section 47Ó substantially burdens nonresident attorneys by requiring them, and only them, to maintain separate office premises within the State. The majority asserts that Section 470 places all attorneys on equal footing because the statute is, in effect, no different from a law that requires all attorneys to maintain a “physical presence”- in New York. See Majority Op., ante at 284. But unlike the statutes upheld as constitutional in Kleinsmith v. Shurtleff, 571 F.3d 1033, 1044-45 (10th Cir.2009) and Tolchin v. Supreme Court of N.J., 111 F.3d 1099 , 1107-08 (3d Cir.1997), which require all attorneys to maintain a physical presence within the State, Section 470 explicitly draws a distinction based on residency.- ‘ This case is thus analogous to Piper and Friedman , where states’ restrictions on legal practice that applied only to nonresidents were invalidated under the Privileges' and Immunities Clause; Friedman, 487 U.S. at 70 , 108 S.Ct. 2260 ; Piper, 470 U.S. at 288 , 105 S.Ct. 1272 . The Supreme Court, moreover, has long rejected the notion that a State’s authority to pass a facially neutral law also empowers it to pass a discriminatory law. Friedman, 487 U.S. at 66-67 , 108 S.Ct. 2260 (“A state's abstract authority to require from resident and nonresident alike that which it has chosen to demand from the nonresident aloné has never been held to shield the discriminatory distinction from the reach of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.”). That New York could enact some other law that does not distinguish between residents and nonresidents is entirely inapposite to the question before us now. III. The State of New York has chosen to discriminate against nonresident attorneys with regard to their right to pursue a common calling, and it has failed to provide a- substantial justification for that discrimination. In holding to the contrary, *297 the majority unnecessarily disturbs longstanding Privileges and Immunities jurisprudence and denies nonresident attorneys their constitutionally-protected right to practice law “on terms of substantial equality” with residents of New York. Piper, 470 U.S. at 280 , 105 S.Ct. 1272 . For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. . The majority’s application of McBumey, which was decided before our prior opinion in this case,'is particularly striking given that we did not rely on McBumey to uphold the constitutionality of'Section 470 at that time. See Schoenefeld, 748 F.3d at 469 . Instead, in apparent contravention of New York’s consti-tutionál requirements for certification, this Court certified' a question to the Court of Appeals that was not necessary to our ■ decision. Cf. Osterweil v. Bartlett, 706 F.3d 139, 142 (2d Cir.2013) (stating that,, prior to certifying a question to the Court of Appeals, this Court must determine “whether the certified question is. determinative of a claim before us”- (internal quotation omitted)); Retail Software Servs., Inc. v. Lashlee, 71 N.Y.2d 788, 790 , 530 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 , 525 N.E.2d 737 (1988) (declining to answer certified question because it did not satisfy the requirement that it "may be determinative" of the pending action, ,as required by the New York Constitu-tioh). As we recognized’in our prior opinion, ”[t]he constitutionality of [Section] 470 turns on the interpretation of a provision of the statute that implicates significant New York state interests and is determinative of this appeal.” Schoenefeld, 748 F.3d at 467 . . Rather than unanimously altering the longstanding Privileges and Immunities analysis through dicta without acknowledging as much (or generating a single dissenting opinion), the better reading is that the McBumey decision adhered to the traditional two-step analysis. . The Court, by contrast, rejected the plaintiffs Privileges and Immunities challenge based on the asserted "right to access public information on equal terms with citizens of the Commonwealth” at the threshold by determining that the Clause did not "cover[] this broad right.” McBurney, 133 S.Ct. at 1718-19 . . The majority states that it is "not obvious” under McBumey whether the State’s protectionist purpose, is- properly considered at the first or second step of the inquiry, noting that the burden shifts to the defendants at the second step, see, e.g., Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. at 67 , 108 S.Ct. 2260 , whereas McBumey emphasized the nonresident plaintiff’s failure to plead or allege proof that Virginia’s FOIA was enacted with a protectionist purpose, see 133 S.Ct. at 1715-16 . Majority Op., ante at 281. The tension the majority perceives between Friedman and McBumey, however, is due entirely to a strained reading of McBumey. The majority’s "discriminatory intent” requirement, in any event, remains novel to .privileges and immunities jurisprudence whether it is grafted onto the first or second step of the inquiry. ■ . By comparing this case with Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555 , 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977), the majority inadvertently highlights the distinctions between the burden-shifting tests that govern' Equal Protection and Privileges and Immunities claims. Majority Op., ante at 281 n. 6, In Village of Arlington Heights , an Equal Protection case,' the Court explained that if a plaintiff demonstrates' that a challenged decision was "motivated in part by a racially discriminatory purpose,” then the burden shifts to the government to establish that the "same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered.” Id., at 270 n. 21, 97 S.Ct. 555 . To state a claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, by contrast, a plaintiff must demonstrate that "a challenged restriction deprives nonresidents of a privilege or immunity protected by this Clause," Barnard, 489 U.S. at 552 , 109 S.Ct. 1294 , in which case the restriction is invalid unless "(i) there is á substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears a 'substantial relationship to the State’s objective,” .id. The former inquiry requires a threshold showing of, discriminatory intent; the latter plainly does not. . Indeed; even a state regulation that "d[oesj not on its face draw any distinction based on citizenship or residence” may implicate the Privileges and Immunities Clause where "the practical effect of the provision [is] discriminatory.” Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 67 , 123 S.Ct. 2142 , 156 L.Ed.2d 54 (2003). . As the majority notes, New Jersey has eliminated its physical office requirement in favor of various other less onerous conditions. See Majority Op., ante at 285 n. 13, Further, the New York City Bar permits resident attorneys to maintain a "virtual law office” in New York even if their practice is located primarily out of state, a privilege that is not afforded to nonresidents. Assoc, of the Bar of the City of New York Comm, on Prof, Ethics, Formal Opinion 2014-2: Use of a Virtual Law Office by New York Attorneys (June 2014), available at http://www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/2014opinions/2023-formal-opinion-2014-02. That such accommodations exist solely for resident attorneys’ further undermines Section 470’s nonprotectionist rationale and demonstrates the existence of less-restrictive alternatives to the office requirement. . The Supreme Court’s decision in Friedman is not to the contrary. The Court did not hold, as the majority asserts, Majority Op., ante at 286, that an office requirement would ' provide a "nonprotectionist alternative” to a residency requirement. Rather, in holding unconstitutional Virginia’s residency require- ■ ment for admission on motion, the Court noted .in. dicta, without deciding the constitutionality of that, alternative means, that an office ■requirement would -be less restrictive.. 487 U.S. at 70 , 108 S.Ct. 2260 . . The Court’s holding was pursuant to its supervisory authority over the lower federal courts rather than .the Privileges and Immunities Clause, see id., but. its reasoning is equally applicable here. . For example, an attorney practicing in Princeton, New Jersey would be far more accessible to New -York City courts than" an attorney located in Buffalo, New York, With respect to attorneys who reside a great distance from the State, the Court in Piper suggested that they could be required to retain a local attorney for the duration of court proceedings and to be available to the court on short notice, Piper, 470 U.S. at 287 , 105 S.Ct. 1272 . .The legislature’s failure to amend or repeal Section -470 after New York’s -residency requirement was held unconstitutional, see Gordon, 48 N.Y.2d 266 , 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 , 397 *295 N.E.2d 1309 , compounds, not alleviates, the constitutional problem, as the Gordon decision put the legislature on notice that the restrictions it placed on nonresident attorneys could be constitutionally problematic. . Indeed, following Gordon , members of the legislature attempted, ■ albeit unsuccessfully, to amend Section 470 to permit nonresidents to practice in New York without an office so long^ as they did not appear as the attorney of record. See J.A. 130-32. Regardless of whether that amendment would have effectively resolved the constitutional issue, its proponents were compelled by the conclusion that “Gordon and Piper .. .‘command elimination of residency requirements as á condition upon the right to practice law.” J.A. 132. . In none of the above cases, moreover, did the courts dissect the legislative history of the pertinent restrictions iri order to discern a possible nonprotectionist purpose, as the majority does in this case. Rather, upon finding that the State’s restrictions were discriminatory, the State was required in those cases to explain why, at that time, the restrictions were justified. Cf. McBurney, 133 S.Ct. at 1715-16 (examining plain text of Virginia statute to determine whether distinction between residents nnd nonresidents had a protectionist aim). . Although the majority brushes aside these findings as "dicta,” Majority Op., ante at 284 n. 11, the significant burden On nonresidents of maintaining an in-state office was central to our determination that Section 470, if interpreted to impose an in-state office requirement, "discriminates against nonresident attorneys with respect to their fundamental right to practice law in the state and, by virtue of that' fact, its limitations on nonresident attorneys implicate the Privileges and Immunities Clause.” Schoenefeld, 748 F.3d at 469 .