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Appellate Case: 24-8028 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2025 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS November 10, 2025
Christopher M. Wolpert
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
_________________________________
SEEDX, INC.,
Plaintiff - Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v. No. 24-8028
LINCOLN STRATEGY GROUP LLC;
FORTIFIED CONSULTING LLC;
NATHAN SPROUL,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
KANYE 2020,
Defendant - Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
SEEDX, INC.,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 24-8036
LINCOLN STRATEGY GROUP, LLC;
FORTIFIED CONSULTING, LLC;
NATHAN SPROUL,
Defendants,
and
KANYE 2020,
Appellate Case: 24-8028 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2025 Page: 2
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Wyoming
(D.C. No. 2:23-CV-00142-ABJ)
_________________________________
Earl Landers Vickery of Vickery & Shepherd, LLP, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-
Appellant/Cross-Appellee SeedX, Inc.
John G. Knepper of Law Office of John G. Knepper, LLC, Cheyenne, WY, for
Defendants-Appellees Lincoln Strategy Group, LLC, Fortified Consulting, LLC, and
Nathan Sproul.
Amy M. Iberlin of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, WY, for Defendant-
Appellee/Cross-Appellant Kanye 2020.
_________________________________
Before HARTZ, McHUGH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
MORITZ, Circuit Judge.
_________________________________
SeedX, Inc. is a marketing and e-commerce company on a quest to recover
payment for services it alleges it provided to the Kanye 2020 presidential campaign.
As part of that quest, SeedX sued Kanye 2020, along with Lincoln Strategy Group,
LLC, Fortified Consulting, LLC, and Nathan Sproul (the Lincoln defendants), in
Wyoming district court.
The district court dismissed the claims against Kanye 2020 without prejudice
for failure to state a claim. And finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the
Lincoln defendants, the district court transferred claims against them to district court
in Arizona. Kanye 2020 then moved for reconsideration, arguing that the claims
2
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against it should have been dismissed with prejudice. But the Wyoming court
responded that it no longer had jurisdiction over the case following the transfer to
Arizona. Now, SeedX appeals the transfer of its claims against the Lincoln
defendants and the dismissal of its claims against Kanye 2020, and Kanye 2020
cross-appeals, contending the dismissal of the claims against it should have been with
prejudice.
On SeedX’s appeal, we lack jurisdiction over the interlocutory transfer order,
and we affirm the dismissal of SeedX’s contract claims against Kanye 2020 for
failure to state a claim. On Kanye 2020’s cross-appeal, we hold that the district court
erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over Kanye 2020’s motion for
reconsideration. We thus remand for the district court to consider in the first instance
whether the dismissal of SeedX’s contract claims against Kanye 2020 should be with
prejudice.
Background 1
The relationship between SeedX and the Lincoln defendants sprouted in June
2020. The Arizona-based Lincoln defendants, comprising Sproul and two entities he
created for political consulting and campaign management, reached out to SeedX, a
Nevada company, to discuss working together. By August 2020, SeedX had begun
providing services to one of the Lincoln defendants’ clients. That same month, the
Lincoln defendants asked SeedX if it would be interested in helping with the Kanye
1
Given the procedural posture of this appeal, we accept the facts as alleged in
the complaint. See N. Arapaho Tribe v. Becerra, 61 F.4th 810, 813 (10th Cir. 2023).
3
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2020 campaign. SeedX agreed and asked for a written agreement of the terms, and
the Lincoln defendants repeatedly assured SeedX that the agreement would be
reduced to writing once the scope of the work became clearer.
With no written contract, SeedX began its work for Kanye 2020. Its first
product was a slideshow that included graphic designs and marketing and public-
relations strategies for the campaign. The Lincoln defendants asked SeedX to replace
its name with “Lincoln” on the first slide, and SeedX agreed because the Lincoln
defendants would be making the presentation. SeedX then built a campaign website
and digital storefront for Kanye 2020. While most of SeedX’s contacts up until that
point were with the Lincoln defendants, once the website went live, SeedX also
communicated with the Kanye 2020 campaign. SeedX alleges it “became the hub of a
massive marketing effort, managing the digital storefront, facilitating online orders
for campaign merchandise/donations and gathering/monitoring campaign donor
data.” App. vol. 1, 17.
Ultimately, Kanye 2020 paid more than $13.2 million for campaign services in
2020; about $4.8 million of that went to the Lincoln defendants. But SeedX was
never paid for its work. So it sued Kanye 2020 and the Lincoln defendants in district
court in Wyoming, where Kanye 2020 is based, asserting claims against them for
breach of an implied or oral contract, breach of the implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. 2 SeedX also asserted claims for conversion and
2
SeedX initially sued Kanye 2020 and the Lincoln defendants in Texas, but
the district court there dismissed the action without prejudice for lack of personal
4
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fraud against the Lincoln defendants. The Lincoln defendants moved to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction, while Kanye 2020 moved to dismiss for failure to state
a claim.
The district court found it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Lincoln
defendants. However, instead of dismissing those claims, the district court transferred
them to the District of Arizona—where the Lincoln defendants are based. It did so
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631, which provides that when a district court “finds that
there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer
such action or appeal to any other such court . . . in which the action or appeal could
have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed.” The district court did so out of
concern that the claims, which “appear[ed] to have merit,” would be time-barred if
filed anew in Arizona. App. vol. 2, 312. Next, the district court determined that
SeedX failed to plausibly allege any claims against Kanye 2020, and it dismissed
those claims without prejudice.
Kanye 2020 then moved for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e), asking the Wyoming court to dismiss the claims against it with
prejudice. The district court declined, stating it no longer had jurisdiction because the
case was transferred to Arizona.
jurisdiction. See Basulto v. Sproul, No. 21-CV-592, 2021 WL 8018073 (W.D. Tex.
Nov. 2, 2021) (unpublished), report and recommendation adopted 2021 WL 8018072
(W.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2021) (unpublished).
5
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SeedX appeals in Appeal No. 24-8028, and Kanye 2020 cross-appeals in
Appeal No. 24-8036. 3
Analysis
SeedX contends the district court erred in transferring its claims against the
Lincoln defendants and in dismissing its claims against Kanye 2020. Kanye 2020, for
its part, argues the district court erred by dismissing the claims against it without
prejudice.
I. Jurisdiction
We must first determine which issues we have jurisdiction to reach. See City of
Albuquerque v. Soto Enters., Inc., 864 F.3d 1089, 1091 (10th Cir. 2017) (conducting
jurisdictional inquiry before addressing merits). “We review questions of our
appellate jurisdiction de novo.” Id.
Our jurisdiction typically extends only to final decisions of the district courts.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “[T]o be final, a decision must reflect ‘the termination of all
matters as to all parties and causes of action.’” 4 Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d
1212, 1221 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting D & H Marketers, Inc. v. Freedom Oil & Gas,
Inc., 744 F.2d 1443, 1444 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc)). And crucially for our
3
The Arizona district court stayed litigation of the transferred claims pending
this appeal. See Order, SeedX Inc. v. Lincoln Strategy Grp., No. 24-cv-00933 (D.
Ariz. May 15, 2024).
4
Of course, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) allows a district court to
“direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or
parties” where the court “expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.”
But the district court did not do so here.
6
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purposes, we have recognized that transfer orders are not final because they “d[o] not
finally end the litigation.” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. McGlamery, 74 F.3d 218, 221
(10th Cir. 1996). Additionally, we have determined that transfer orders do not fall
into the collateral-order exception to the finality rule. Id. Thus, we have plainly held
that we lack jurisdiction to review transfer orders. Id.
Despite this clear precedent, SeedX seeks to challenge the district court’s
transfer order. As the appellant, it bears the burden of establishing appellate
jurisdiction. 5 See United States v. Solco I, LLC, 962 F.3d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir.
2020). To do so, SeedX first invokes Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir.
2011). There, we reviewed an order dismissing claims against various defendants for
lack of personal jurisdiction and rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the district
court should have transferred his claims instead of dismissing them. Id. at 1249–50.
In so doing, we noted a “patent impediment” to transferring a case that involved
multiple defendants who resided in different states, such that “no single court” could
exercise jurisdiction. Id. Seizing on this language, SeedX maintains that the district
court’s transfer impermissibly split the action in violation of Shrader because the
entire action could not have been brought in the district of Arizona.
At the outset, we note that SeedX’s Shrader argument is a merits challenge to
the district court’s decision to transfer, not an argument supporting appellate
jurisdiction. Indeed, Shrader says nothing about jurisdiction to review a transfer
5
Kanye 2020 is a cross-appellant, but it does not challenge the transfer order
and thus need not establish our jurisdiction over such order.
7
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order. Moreover, Shrader is easily distinguishable. It speaks to circumstances in
which defendants from multiple states are dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction,
such that “there [i]s no single court to which the action could be transferred with any
assurance that jurisdiction would have been proper.” Id. Here, by contrast, the district
court transferred only a group of defendants who can all be sued in Arizona, and
dismissed the remaining defendants based on plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim
against those defendants.
Next, SeedX suggests that we construe the transfer order as final because
otherwise, what it views as a clearly erroneous order will never be reviewed. We
disagree. To be sure, the Ninth Circuit, where the District of Arizona is located, has
held that transfers are “reviewable only in the circuit of the transferor district
court”—here, the Tenth Circuit. Rigsby v. GoDaddy Inc., 59 F.4th 998, 1004 (9th Cir.
2023) (quoting Posnanski v. Gibney, 421 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2005)). But SeedX
overlooks that it could move in Arizona to retransfer the action to Wyoming. See
Posnanski, 421 F.3d at 980–81. And if that motion were denied, the Ninth Circuit
could then exercise review. Id.; see also McGlamery, 74 F.3d at 221 (finding that
transfer order did not satisfy unreviewability prong of collateral-order exception
because party could move for retransfer in transferee court and then obtain appellate
review); Petersen v. Douglas Cnty. Bank & Tr. Co., 940 F.2d 1389, 1392 (10th Cir.
1991) (suggesting that transferee circuit can adjudicate allegedly erroneous transfer
on review of party’s motion to retransfer). We therefore disagree that the transfer
order is effectively unreviewable.
8
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Last, SeedX invokes the pragmatic-finality doctrine, which allows a court to
“assume jurisdiction where the danger of injustice by delaying appellate review
outweighs the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review.” United States v. Copar
Pumice Co., 714 F.3d 1197, 1209 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Albright v. UNUM Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 59 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (10th Cir. 1995)). We have used this doctrine
when declining jurisdiction would “threaten our ability” to address “important,
serious, and unsettled” issues. Zen Magnets, LLC v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n,
968 F.3d 1156, 1165 (10th Cir. 2020). But we have emphasized that the doctrine
should be invoked “only in truly unique instances . . . to preserve the vitality of
§ 1291.” Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 10 F.3d 746, 752 (10th Cir. 1993) (cleaned up);
see also New Mexico v. Trujillo, 813 F.3d 1308, 1317 (10th Cir. 2016) (“We have
been leery to apply the doctrine.”).
This is not one of those instances. We see nothing overwhelmingly important,
serious, or unsettled in the district court’s decision to transfer the claims against the
Lincoln defendants to Arizona, while in the same order dismissing the claims against
Kanye 2020 for failure to state a claim. Cf. Zen Magnets, 968 F.3d at 1165 (applying
practical-finality doctrine to address constitutional due-process issue in
administrative proceeding). And SeedX’s interest in avoiding piecemeal litigation of
its claims does not overcome the “strong congressional policy against . . . obstructing
or impeding an ongoing judicial proceeding by interlocutory appeals” embodied by
§ 1291. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690 (1974). We therefore reject
SeedX’s practical-finality argument.
9
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The Lincoln defendants, despite being appellees, also seek to establish our
jurisdiction over the transfer order. They first contend that the district court
transferred not just the claims against them but also those against Kanye 2020. And
according to the Lincoln defendants, transferring the Kanye 2020 claims violated
§ 1631 because the Wyoming district court had personal jurisdiction over Kanye
2020 and never analyzed whether the Arizona court would. See § 1631 (mandating
transfer to other court “in which the action or appeal could have been brought at the
time it was filed or noticed”).
As an initial matter, this argument also goes to the merits of the transfer order,
not to whether we have appellate jurisdiction over it. But in any event, the Lincoln
defendants fundamentally misread the district court’s order, which explicitly stated
that “the claims against Kanye 2020 shall not be transferred due to SeedX’s failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” App. vol. 2, 313 (emphasis
added). Therefore, contrary to the Lincoln defendants’ arguments, the district court
did not transfer the Kanye 2020 claims in clear violation of § 1631.
The Lincoln defendants next propose reviewing the transfer pursuant to the All
Writs Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). “The writ of mandamus issues only in
exceptional circumstances to correct ‘a clear abuse of discretion, an abdication of the
judicial function, or the usurpation of judicial power.’” Boughton, 10 F.3d at 751
(quoting Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. Civic Ctr. Theatre, Inc., 333 F.2d 358,
361 (10th Cir. 1964)). For a writ to issue, a party must show there are “‘no other
adequate means to attain the relief,’” the “‘right to issuance of the writ is clear and
10
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indisputable,’” and “the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” Cheney v. U.S.
Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004) (cleaned up) (quoting Kerr v. U.S.
Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976)). The Lincoln defendants fail
to make that exceptional showing—as already explained, the parties can obtain
review of the transfer by seeking to retransfer in Arizona and then appealing any
denial, and there is no clear error in the transfer order under either Shrader or § 1631.
Cf. Hustler Mag., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Wyo., 790 F.2d 69, 70–71 (10th
Cir. 1986) (granting mandamus relief where district court refused to even consider
defendant’s motion to transfer for party and witness convenience under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a)). Moreover, the Lincoln defendants overlook that no party has filed a
petition for a writ of mandamus. See Fed. R. App. P. 21(a)(1) (requiring party
seeking writ to file petition with circuit clerk).
Having rejected both SeedX’s and the Lincoln defendants’ arguments in favor
of jurisdiction over the nonfinal transfer order, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction
to consider that portion of the appeal.
That leaves (1) SeedX’s appeal of the district court’s dismissal of its claims
against Kanye 2020 for failure to state a claim and (2) Kanye 2020’s cross-appeal of
the district court’s refusal to dismiss such claims with prejudice. We agree with
SeedX and Kanye 2020 that we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s order
dismissing SeedX’s breach-of-contract claims against Kanye 2020, even though the
dismissal was without prejudice. See Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d 1271,
1275 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Although a dismissal without prejudice is usually not a final
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decision, where the dismissal finally disposes of the case so that it is not subject to
further proceedings in federal court, the dismissal is final and appealable.”). We
likewise have jurisdiction over the district court’s order denying Kanye 2020’s timely
reconsideration motion. See First Union Mortg. Corp. v. Smith, 229 F.3d 992, 994–
95 (10th Cir. 2000) (explaining that order denying reconsideration is “final” for
jurisdictional purposes when it ends the litigation).
II. Merits
We first consider SeedX’s appeal of the dismissal of its claims against Kanye
2020 for failure to state a claim. We then turn to Kanye 2020’s cross-appeal of the
district court’s refusal to dismiss such claims with prejudice.
A. SeedX’s Appeal
We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo. See N. Arapaho
Tribe, 61 F.4th at 813. We “take as true ‘all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from
conclusory allegations,’ view all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party, and liberally construe the pleadings.” Reznik v. inContact, Inc., 18 F.4th 1257,
1260 (10th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up) (quoting Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1181
(10th Cir. 2002)).
SeedX first maintains that it stated a plausible claim against Kanye 2020 for
breach of an oral or implied contract. A valid contract requires an offer, acceptance,
and consideration. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc. v. Boyd, 403 P.3d 1014,
1024–25 (Wyo. 2017). “Whether a contract has been entered into depends on the
intent of the parties and is a question of fact.” Mantle v. N. Star Energy & Constr.
12
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LLC, 437 P.3d 758, 782 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Hunter v. Reece, 253 P.3d 497, 500
(Wyo. 2011)).
In the absence of a written agreement, as here, Wyoming recognizes oral and
implied contracts. “For an oral contract to exist, its essential terms must be defined
with certainty.” Davidson-Eaton v. Iversen, 519 P.3d 626, 640 (Wyo. 2022); see also
id. (“Courts do not have the power to supply the terms of an agreement, so an oral
agreement is unenforceable unless the contract terms are ‘so certain that the court can
require the specific thing agreed upon to be done.’” (quoting Fowler v. Fowler, 933
P.2d 502, 504 (Wyo. 1997))). And an implied contract “may be created by the
parties’ conduct, ‘but the conduct from which that inference is drawn must be
sufficient to support the conclusion that the parties expressed a mutual manifestation
of an intent to enter into an agreement.’” Shaw v. Smith, 964 P.2d 428, 435–36 (Wyo.
1998) (cleaned up) (quoting Lavoie v. Safecare Health Serv., Inc., 840 P.2d 239, 248
(Wyo. 1992)).
Here, as the district court recognized, the complaint fails to allege the
existence of either an oral or an implied contract between SeedX and Kanye 2020
because it details almost no communications between the two parties. The complaint
alleges that SeedX performed work for the Lincoln defendants for approximately two
months without engaging in any communication with Kanye 2020. It additionally
alleges that after the October 7, 2020 launch of the campaign website, SeedX
engaged in several direct contacts with Kanye West’s personal assistant, West
participated in a call with SeedX to request edits to a campaign video on the site, and
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West then followed up with several text messages. Finally, the complaint alleges that
SeedX sent financial information to a Kanye 2020 attorney who was preparing
reports for the Federal Election Commission. Because these contacts involved no
discussion of terms, much less “essential” ones, SeedX fails to plausibly plead the
creation of an oral contract. Davidson-Eaton, 519 P.3d at 640. Nor can we infer the
“mutual manifestation of an intent to enter into an agreement” required for an
implied contract. 6 Shaw, 964 P.2d at 435–36 (quoting Lavoie, 840 P.2d at 248).
Because SeedX fails to plausibly allege the existence of a contract, it fails to state a
claim for breach of any contract.
Next, SeedX contends that it stated a plausible claim against Kanye 2020 for
unjust enrichment. To state a claim for unjust enrichment in Wyoming, a party must
allege that “valuable services were rendered . . . to the party to be charged” and that
those “services were accepted, used[,] and enjoyed by the charged party . . . under
circumstances that reasonably notified the party being charged that the other party
would expect payment for the services.” Davidson-Eaton, 519 P.3d at 641 (quoting
6
The complaint also states that the Lincoln defendants acted “as agents, either
ostensible or actual, of the Kanye 2020 presidential campaign.” App. vol. 1, 9–10.
But this conclusory statement is not supported by factual allegations that would
support an agency theory; the complaint fails to plausibly allege that the Lincoln
defendants and Kanye 2020 “agree[d] that [the Lincoln defendants] shall act on
behalf of and subject to the control of [Kanye 2020].” Redco Constr. Co. v. Profile
Props., LLC, 271 P.3d 408, 418–19 (Wyo. 2012) (quoting Maverick Motorsports
Grp., LLC v. Wyo. Dep’t of Revenue, 253 P.3d 125, 133 (Wyo. 2011)). Moreover,
SeedX has waived any agency theory on appeal by similarly referring to the Lincoln
defendants as “alleged agent[s]” of Kanye 2020 but providing no underlying factual
support or legal argument. SeedX Br. 15. We therefore decline to consider it further.
See San Juan Citizens All. v. Stiles, 654 F.3d 1038, 1056 (10th Cir. 2011).
14
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Symons v. Heaton, 316 P.3d 1171, 1176 (Wyo. 2014)).
Here, we agree with the district court that the complaint fails to plausibly
allege that Kanye 2020 was “reasonably notified” that SeedX would expect payment
for its work. Id. (quoting Symons, 316 P.3d at 1176). The complaint doesn’t allege
that SeedX ever told Kanye 2020 that it expected payment, that SeedX ever sent
Kanye 2020 a bill, or that SeedX ever identified itself as separate from the Lincoln
defendants. Indeed, the complaint even recognizes that SeedX allowed the Lincoln
defendants to take credit for SeedX’s work by placing their names on SeedX’s
campaign pitch deck. Under these circumstances, we agree with the district court’s
assessment that the allegations in the complaint failed to establish “whether Kanye
2020 even knew that SeedX was a distinct entity from the Lincoln [d]efendants.”
App. vol, 2, 305. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of SeedX’s claims
against Kanye 2020.
B. Kanye 2020’s Cross-Appeal
We turn at last to Kanye 2020’s cross-appeal of the district court’s
determination that it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its “without prejudice”
dismissal of SeedX’s claims against Kanye 2020. “We review a district court’s ruling
on a . . . motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion,” including “verifying that
the district court’s ‘discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.’”
Walker v. BOKF, Nat’l Ass’n, 30 F.4th 994, 1002 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting ClearOne
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Biamp Sys., 653 F.3d 1163, 1178 (10th Cir. 2011)).
Recall that the district court stated it lacked jurisdiction over Kanye 2020’s
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motion because of the transfer of the claims against the Lincoln defendants. To be
sure, once a transfer occurs, “the transferor court loses all jurisdiction over the case,
including the power to review the transfer.” Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country
Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1516–17 (10th Cir. 1991). But as should be clear from
the above discussion, when the district court transferred the claims against the
Lincoln defendants, it did not transfer the claims against Kanye 2020. Rather, it
dismissed those claims without prejudice for failure to state a claim—meaning it
retained jurisdiction over the claims against Kanye 2020. So the district court legally
erred by denying Kanye 2020’s motion for reconsideration based on lack of
jurisdiction.
While Kanye 2020 urges us to decide whether dismissal should have been with
or without prejudice, we are a “court of review, not of first view.” Childers v. Crow,
1 F.4th 792, 801 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 n.4
(2005)). The district court should conduct that analysis in the first instance. So
although we affirm the dismissal of SeedX’s claims, we remand for the district court
to consider whether the dismissal should be with prejudice.
Conclusion
We lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s transfer order, and the
Lincoln defendants fail to make the necessary showing for mandamus review.
Further, the district court did not transfer SeedX’s claims against Kanye 2020 to
Arizona or impermissibly split the action. And although the district court dismissed
SeedX’s claims against Kanye 2020 for failure to state a claim—a conclusion we
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affirm—it erred by concluding it lacked jurisdiction over Kanye 2020’s motion to
reconsider whether that dismissal should be with, rather than without, prejudice. So
we remand for the district court to take up that motion.
17
Case Information
- Court
- 10th Cir.
- Decision Date
- November 10, 2025
- Status
- Precedential