Snider v. State of Maryland

                     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
                          DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 

KEVIN E. SNIDER, 
      Petitioner,                                         . 
      V. 
                                             Civil Action No. TDC-20-1910 
STATE OF MARYLAND and 
MARYLAND ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
      Respondent. 

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION 
     Self-represented Petitioner Kevin E. Snider, currently incarcerated at the North Branch 
Correctional Institution (“NBCI’) in Cumberland, Maryland, has filed a Petition for a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which he challenges the validity of his convictions 
and sentence in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Maryland. for second degree rape and 
related charges arising from the sexual abuse of his stepdaughter.  The Petition is fully briefed. 
Upon review of the submitted materials, the Court finds that no hearing is necessary.  D. Md. Local 
R. 105.6; Rules 1(b) and 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District 
Courts.  For the reasons set forth below, the Petition will be DENIED. 
                               BACKGROUND 
1.     Convictions and Sentence 
     On May 6, 2016, a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County found Snider guilty    
one count of second degree rape, three counts of sexual abuse of a minor, one count of second 
degree sexual assault, two counts of second degree sexual offense, two counts of third degree 
sexual offense, three counts of fourth degree sexual offense, and two counts of second degree 

assault.  On direct appeal, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, now known as the Appellate 
Court of Maryland (“the Appellate Court”), found the following facts to have been established as 
trial. 
     At trial, C.M., the alleged victim of these offenses, testified that Snider began sexually 
abusing her when she was four years old.  Snider, who was her stepfather, married her mother in 
2000, when she was three years old.  C.M. lived with her mother, her older sister, and her younger 
brother in a row house in Baltimore County.  In 2000, Snider moved into the home with two of his 
three daughters from a previous marriage.  The first incident of abuse occurred when C.M.’s 
mother was at work and the family’s other children were at school.  While C.M. and Snider were 
watching television in the living room, Snider touched her vagina and played with his penis while 
touching her.  Approximately one or two weeks after the first incident, Snider entered C.M.’s 
bedroom while she was still awake, got under the blankets, and started touching her vagina while 
he touched his penis.  Similar incidents occurred on an approximately weekly basis when no one 
else was home with C.M. and Snider. 
     C.M. testified that at times Snider told her to stay home from school, claiming that she was 
not feeling well, so he could engage in similar sexual activity.  When C.M. was approximately 
seven or eight years old, Snider picked her up early from school, took her home, and had her 
perform oral sex on him, after which Snider told C.M. not to tell anyone what had happened.  C.M. 
testified that Snider put his penis in her mouth frequently, particularly during time periods when 
she was not sharing a bedroom with Snider’s daughters. 
     C.M. further testified that when C.M. was 11 years old, Snider pulled her out of school 
early, took her home, and while in the basement, took her pants off and put his penis into her 
vagina while he held her down and covered her mouth.  Snider told C.M. not to tell anyone what

had happened.  According to C.M., following this incident, Snider touched her and had sexual 
intercourse with her at least once a week. 
     When C.M. was 13 or 14 years old, she and her brother were pulled out of school to be 
homeschooled.  C.M.’s mother testified that   C.M. was homeschooled because she was missing a 
lot of school and not doing well.  At one point, Snider started screaming at C.M. and her brother, 
so they went into C.M.’s bedroom and locked the door, but Snider broke in and started punching 
C.M. in the sides.  When C.M. told her mother what happened, her mother made plans to move 
out and then divorced Snider.  C.M. testified that she did not tell her mother about the sexual abuse 
because she thought her mother would have killed Snider and that she did not want to lose her 
mother. 
     After the divorce, C.M. began attending high school.  She usually walked home with her 
friend, Monica Thomas.  At some point, Snider began following them in his vehicle as they walked 
home, causing CM. to grab her friend’s hand and run home.  Thomas testified that C.M. told her 
that Snider had touched and abused her in sexual ways, that he physically hit her, and that these 
things always happened in her home. 
     C.M.’s mother testified that in the spring of 2011, C.M. was crying a  lot, cutting herself, 
screaming a  lot, and pounding her fists, but she refused to see a doctor and did not want to talk to 
a therapist.  During ninth grade, C.M. dropped out of high school and went to live with her 
biological father in Florida and stayed for approximately two years.  C.M. testified that she moved 
to Florida because Snider had been following her. 
     When she was 16 years old, C.M. moved back to Maryland and lived with her mother, her 
mother’s new husband, and her brother.  She got a job at a local McDonald’s restaurant.  On one 
occasion, C.M. went outside to deliver a drive-thru order to a customer and saw that the customer 

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was Snider.  She threw the food at him, ran back into the restaurant, and began crying.  The 
McDonald’s manager, Sherry Majka, testified that she tried to calm C.M. down, and that C.M. told 
her that the customer was someone who had committed abuse against her. Because Snider returned 
to the McDonald’s on other occasions, C.M. quit her job. 
     While C.M. was still working at McDonald’s, she began experiencing pain in her legs and 
hips.  When she woke up one day unable to sit up or walk, she was hospitalized, diagnosed with 
psychosomatic pain, and referred to a therapist.  C.M. told the therapist about Snider’s abuse of 
her, and the therapist reported it.  C.M. testified that she took medication for post-traumatic stress 
disorder, anxiety, and depression because of what Snider had done to her. 
     After the therapist’s report, C.M. was interviewed by social  services and by Detective 
David Maranto of the Baltimore County Police Department.  C.M. told an interviewer at the Child 
Advocacy Center that, when she was 12 years old, after Snider had been having sex with her three 
to four times per week, she stopped getting her period and thought she was pregnant.  Snider got 
mad at her, hit her, and punched her in the stomach, causing her to bleed for two months. 
     One of Snider’s daughters, J.S., who is about six years older than C.M.., testified for the 
defense.  She testified that she lived with Snider from when she was seven years old until she was 
16 years old; that during that time period, she, her sister, and C.M. shared a bedroom: and that 
every other weekend, Snider’s other daughter also stayed in the girls’ bedroom.  J.S. testified that 
C.M. rarely left school early because she was sick, and that when she did, her mother picked her 
up.  J.S. testified that Snider never picked up C.M. from school and never stayed at home with her 
when she was sick because his work schedule was not as flexible as that of C.M.’s mother. 
     On August 10, 2016, the court sentenced Snider to a total term of imprisonment of 80 years. 
The court informed Snider that he had the right to seek a review of his sentence by a three-judge

panel but noted that because the sentence was not the maximum possible sentence, there was a  risk 
that the sentence would be increased. 
Il.     Direct Appeal 
     Snider filed a direct appeal in which he asserted two errors:  (1) that the trial court excluded 
evidence of the victim’s prior accusations of rape against two other individuals; and (2) that the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction.  On May 8, 2018, the Appellate Court affirmed 
the convictions and sentence. Snider filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland, now the Supreme Court of Maryland.  On August 31, 2018, that petition was denied. 
Ill.    State Post-Conviction Proceedings 
     On September 5, 2018, Snider filed a self-represented State Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (“the Circuit Court”) pursuant to the Maryland 
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. §§ 7-101 to 7-204 (West 
2018).  On April 30, 201 9, Snider, through appointed counsel, filed an Amended Petition for Post- 
Conviction Relief. The Petition as amended (“the State Petition”) asserts that Snider’s trial counsel 
was ineffective based on the following acts or omissions:  (1) failing to properly cross-examine 
the victim at trial;  (2)  failing  to  object to  a comment  by  the  trial judge to the jury  prior to 
deliberations; (3) failing to object to hearsay testimony from four witnesses; (4) failing to object 
to the victim’s lay opinion testimony about the use of drugs; (5) failing to object to testimony 
relating to alleged prior bad acts; (6) failing to object to Juror No.  119; (7) failing to properly 
investigate the allegations against Snider and to present an adequate defense; (8) failing to consult 
with Snider about whether to file an application for review of the sentence by a three-judge panel; 
and (9) committing cumulative errors.

     On July  19, 2019, the Circuit Court held a post-conviction hearing during which Snider 
and his trial counsel both testified.  On December 4, 2019, the Circuit Court denied the State 
Petition.  in its written opinion, the Circuit Court discussed all of the identified issues except for 
the claim based on trial counsel’s alleged failure to cross-examine the victim. 
     On January 6, 2020, Snider filed with the Appellate Court a self-represented Application 
for Leave to Appeal the Denial of Post-Conviction Relief.  On April 14, 2020, the Appellate Court 
summarily denied Snider’s Application. 
                                DISCUSSION 
     Snider has now filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court in which he asserts 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the following actions or inactions by his trial 
counsel:  (1) failing to adequately cross-examine the victim at trial; (2) failing to object to a 
comment made by the trial judge to the alternate jurors prior to deliberations; (3) failing to object 
to apparent hearsay testimony from four witnesses; (4) failing to object to apparent lay opinion 
testimony about the use of drugs; (5) failing to object to testimony relating to alleged prior bad 
acts; (6) failing to object to Juror No. 119; (7) failing to properly investigate the allegations against 
Snider and to present an adequate defense:  (8) failing to consult with  Snider about filing an 
application for review of the sentence by a three-judge panel; and (9) committing cumulative 
errors. 
     In the Answer, Respondents contend that Snider’s claim that his counsel was ineffective 
for failing adequately to cross-examine the victim is procedurally defaulted because he failed to 
include it in the State Petition.  Respondents argue that the remaining claims lack merit and should 
be dismissed.

I.     Legal Standards 
     A.     Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
     A federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus may be granted only for violations of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2018).  The federal habeas statute 
sets forth a highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings, under which state court 
decisions are to “be given the benefit of the doubt.”  Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005); see 
Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997).  A federal court may not grant a writ of habeas 
corpus unless the state court’s adjudication on the merits (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary 
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by 
the United States Supreme Court; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.  28 
U.S.C.  § 2254(d).  A state court adjudication is contrary to clearly established federal law under § 
2254(d) when the state court (1) “arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] 
Court on a question of law”; or (2) “confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a 
relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to  [the Supreme Court’s].” 
Williams  v.  Taylor,  529  U.S.  362, 405  (2000)  (citation  omitted).   ‘Under the  ‘unreasonable 
application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct 
governing  legal principle from  [the Supreme]  Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that 
principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.”  /d. at 413. 
     “[A]  federal  habeas court may not issue the writ simply  because  [it]  concludes in  its 
independent judgment  that  the  relevant  state-court  decision  applied  established  federal  law 
erroneously or incorrectly.”  Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. 
at 411).  The state court’s application of federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.”  □□□

(quoting  Williams,  529 U.S. at 409).  Furthermore, under § 2254(d)(2), “a state court factual 
determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a 
different conclusion in the first instance.”  Wood y. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301  (2010) (citation 
omitted).  The fact that “reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding 
in question” is not enough to deem a  state court’s factual determination unreasonable.  /d. 
     B.     Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
     The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that, “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.” 
U.S. Const. amend. VI.  In Strickland v.  Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court 
held that to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must establish two 
prongs:  deficient performance and prejudice.  /d.  at 692.  First, the petitioner must show that 
counsel’s performance was deficient in that counsel “made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the  ‘counsel’  guaranteed the defendant by the  Sixth Amendment.”  Jd.  at 687. 
Deficiency  exists  when  “counsel’s  representation  fell  below  an  objective  standard  of 
reasonableness” under “prevailing professional norms.” /d. at 688; see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 
510, 521  (2003).  “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential” and 
apply “a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  “A fair assessment of attorney performance 
requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances  of counsel’s  challenged  conduct,  and to  evaluate  the  conduct  from  counsel’s 
perspective at the time.”  /d. 
     Second, the petitioner must show prejudice in that the deficient performance by counsel 
consisted of errors that “were so serious as   deprive the defendant of a fair trial” whose result

was reliable.  /d. at 687.  To establish such prejudice, a petitioner must show that “there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.” Jd. at 694.  A “reasonable probability” is one “sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”  /d.  A  petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief based on 
prejudice where the record establishes that it is “not reasonably likely that [the alleged error] would 
have made any difference in light of all the other evidence of guilt.”  Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 
U.S. 370, 390 (2010). 
Il.     Procedural Default 
     Respondents argue that  Snider’s claim that his trial  counsel was ineffective for failing 
adequately to cross-examine the victim is procedurally barred because he did not exhaust this claim 
in state court, and it is now subject to procedural default.  Specifically, Respondents argue that 
although Snider asserted in his direct appeal that the trial court improperly  limited his cross- 
examination of the victim, he did not present this issue as a claim for ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  In the State Petition, however, Snider asserted a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
based in part on his trial counsel’s failure to “properly cross-examine” the victim at trial.  State 
Record (“S.R.”) 54, Ans. Ex.  1, ECF No.  13-1.  Because this ground for relief was asserted in 
Snider’s State Petition, the Court finds that Snider has sufficiently exhausted state remedies on this 
issue, and an analysis of procedural default is unnecessary.  The Court will therefore address each 
of Snider’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on the merits. 
       Cross Examination of the Victim 
     Snider argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing adequately to cross-examine 
the victim about two previous allegations of rape that she made against two other men.  The Circuit 
Court’s failure to address this claim as part of its review of the State Petition arguably implicates

the Court’s standard of review.  See Johnson v.  Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 292-93, 303  (2013) 
(finding hiss, where the state court addresses some but not all of a petitioner’s claims, there is a 
presumption that the omitted claim was adjudicated on the merits, but this presumption may be 
rebutted by  evidence that the claim was inadvertently  overlooked,  which leads to a de  novo 
review).  Although it is not clear, upon a review of the record, why the Circuit Court did not address 
the merits of this claim, the Court need not determine whether the Circuit Court inadvertently 
overlooked this claim because it fails under either a de novo or deferential standard of review. 
     Before the trial began on May 4, 2016, the State moved for the exclusion of evidence that 
the victim had accused two other men of raping her in Baltimore County.  The trial court granted 
the State’s motion, finding that the evidence was either not relevant or was more prejudicial than 
probative.  The trial court permitted evidence that the victim denied any sexual assault by Snider 
during a prior unrelated criminal investigation but excluded any reference that this investigation 
was related to other rape allegations. 
     On direct appeal,  Snider argued that he was improperly prohibited  from presenting a 
complete  defense  because  he  could  not  cross-examine  the  victim  about  the  other  two  rape 
accusations.  The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
excluding  evidence  of the  prior  rape  accusations  because  there  was  no  evidence  that  the 
accusations  were  false,  the  accusations  were  not  relevant  to  the  victim’s  credibility,  and 
introducing such evidence created a potential for confusion of the issues. 
     The failure of Snider’s trial counsel to cross-examine the victim about her previous rape 
accusations against two  other men did not constitute deficient performance under Strickland. 
Where the trial court specifically prohibited Snider’s trial counsel from questioning the victim 
about this subject matter, the failure to do so cannot be deemed deficient performance. 

                                      10 

     Moreover, to the extent that Snider seeks habeas relief on the same ground asserted on 
direct appeal, that the bar on such cross examination was improper, the Court does not find that 
the Appellate Court’s ruling was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly 
established  federal  law.   See  28  U.S.C.  §  2254(d).  “[T]he  Constitution  guarantees criminal 
defendants  ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Crane v.  Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v.  Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)).  However, 
““[S]tate  and  federal  rulemakers  have  broad  latitude  under  the  Constitution  to  establish 
rules excluding evidence  from  criminal  trials.’°” Holmes v.  South Carolina, 547  U.S.  319, 324 
(2006) (quoting United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998)).  “[WJell-established rules of 
evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain 
other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.”  Jd. 
at 326.  Under the applicable standard of review, the Appellate Court’s determination that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding testimony about the prior rape accusations based on 
the determination that its probative value was outweighed by unfair prejudice or confusion of the 
issues was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See Richardson vy. 
Branker, 668 F.3d 128, 140-41 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating that under the federal habeas standard the 
state court decision is to “be given the benefit of the doubt” (quoting Woodford v.  Visciotti, 537 
U.S.  19, 24 (2002))).  Thus, Snider’s claims based on the failure to cross-examine the victim on 
the prior rape allegations will be denied. 
IV.    Judge’s Comment to the Jury 
     Snider also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to a statement 
by the trial judge made prior to jury deliberations.  On May 6, 2016, after the defense rested, the 

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trial  court proceeded to dismiss the two alternate jurors.  The trial judge made the following 
statement, to which Snider believes his counsel should have objected: 
     I am most appreciative for your service.  I am about to dismiss you.  I would send 
     you back with Kate to get you[r] tablets, cellphones.  Now, you may go about your 
     business and never think about us again and that is okay.  Or you can call me next 
     week I will be happy to tell you how things turned out.  Another option frankly that 
     I have not offered before but I think I will offer today is that if you want to go back 
     with Kate and get your things and wait in my office I will come back and talk to 
     you.  You don’t have to do that.  It is totally okay.  You are like what?  No.  But [ 
     just—this is an emotional matter and | don’t want to send you off without a chance 
     to have a moment with me.  So, however you feel comfortable is the route you 
     should take.  But I do thank you for your time. 
5/6/2016 Trial Tr. at 83, ECF No. 16-3 (emphasis added). 
      Snider contends that the trial judge’s statement that the trial was “emotional,” id., was an 
inappropriate expression of her opinion, reflected her bias, and denied him due process of law.  At 
the state post-conviction hearing, Snider’s trial  counsel testified that he did not hear the trial 
judge’s comment but that he would have moved for a mistrial if he had. 
     As to Snider’s claim that the trial judge’s comment reflected her opinion and bias, the 
Circuit Court denied this claim in its ruling on the State Petition, concluding that the trial judge 
gave no opinion on issues to be decided by the jury, the credibility of witnesses, the truth of any 
matter of fact, the guilt or innocence of the accused, the sufficiency or strength of the evidence, or 
whether the state had met its burden of proof.  The Circuit Court found that the trial judge’s 
comment merely recognized that the subject matter itself was emotional and thus concluded that 
the  trial counsel  was not constitutionally  ineffective for failing to  lodge  an objection to that 
comment. 
     “°(A]  fair trial  in a fair tribunal  is a  basic  requirement of due  process.”  Withrow  v. 
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) (quoting Jn re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).  In order to 
prevail on a claim of bias on the part of the trial judge, a defendant must show “a deep-seated 

                                     12 

favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”  Liteky v. United States, 510 
U.S. 540, 555 (1994).  Given the deference owed to the Circuit Court’s determination, and the high 
threshold for a deprivation of constitutional dimension, the Court finds that the Circuit Court’s 
denial of Snider’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the failure to object to the trial 
judge’s comment was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 
      Hearsay Testimony 
     Snider also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to hearsay 
testimony from four trial witnesses, C.M., Sherry Majka, Detective David Maranto, and Monica 
Thomas, as described below. 
     A.     C.M. 
     Snider argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to testimony 
by C.M. in which she stated that she reported the sexual abuse by Snider to her therapist and her 
friend, Monica Thomas.  On the State Petition, the Circuit Court concluded that the testimony 
qualified for the hearsay exception for a “prior consistent statement” pursuant to Maryland Rule 
5—802.1(b) because the statements to others were made before C.M. reported the abuse to the 
police, which the Circuit Court found to be the point at which any motive to fabricate arose. 
     B.     Sherry Majka 
     Snider also argues that his trial counsel  should have objected to testimony by  Majka, 
C.M.’s manager when she worked at McDonald’s.  On the first day of trial, Majka testified that in 
December 2014,  C.M.  became visibly  upset after seeing  Snider in the drive-thru  area of the 
restaurant.  Majka also testified that   C.M. told her that Snider had abused her.  On the State 
Petition, the Circuit Court found that Snider’s trial counsel had not acted in a deficient manner in 
failing to  object to this testimony  because  it qualified for two hearsay  exceptions  under the 

                                     13 

Maryland Rules of Evidence.  First, the testimony was a prior consistent statement under Maryland 
Rule 5—802.1(b).  Although Snider argued that the statement should not qualify for this exception 
because it did not predate C.M.’s motive to fabricate allegations, the Circuit Court rejected this 
argument and concluded that if there was any motive to fabricate the allegations, it arose at the 
time that  C.M.  reported the abuse to the police,  which occurred  in  February  2015,  after the 
statements to  Majka.  The Circuit  Court also  found that Majka’s testimony  qualified  for the 
“excited utterance” exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to Maryland Rule 5—803(b)(2) because 
it was made under the stress of an emotional situation. 
      C.    Detective David Maranto 
     Snider also asserts that his trial  counsel  should have objected to  Detective  Maranto’s 
testimony recounting how he learned about the sexual abuse from C.M.’s therapist.  On the State 
Petition, the Circuit Court found that the question that elicited the testimony, “And how did you 
come to be involved in that and how was that initiated?,”  was not objectionable, and in any event, 
the testimony that the case was referred to Detective Maranto after C.M. told her therapist about 
the abuse described a  prior consistent statement pursuant to Maryland Rule 5—802.1(b). 
     Snider also argues that his trial court should have objected to the following testimony by 
Detective Maranto: 
     :     And, once C.M. was interviewed, what other steps, if any, did you take? 
     A:     Based  on  her  statements,  her  allegations,  we  identified  Kevin  Snider 
           through several computer databases.  We also—part of her testimony was 
           that—not her testimony—pardon me.  Part of her disclosure to me was that 
           Kevin Snider has removed her from school on several occasions and on one 
           occasion | believe when she was around  14 had brought her home from 
           school early and engaged in sexual abuse with her at that time. 

                                     14 

5/5/2016 Trial Tr. at 169-70, ECF No. 16-2.  Detective Maranto further stated that based on this 
information, he sought a subpoena for school records to seek to corroborate this account.  The 
Circuit Court found that the testimony was not given in response to an objectionable question. 
     D.     Monica Thomas 
     Snider also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony 
by Thomas, C.M.’s friend, who testified that C.M. had told her that she was sexually abused by 
Snider.  On the State Petition, the Circuit Court concluded that because the statement predated 
C.M.’s report of abuse to the police, which was when any motive to fabricate arose, it qualified 
for the prior consistent statement hearsay exception under Maryland Rule 5—802.1(b). 
     E.     Ineffective Assistance Analysis 
     On the State Petition, the Circuit Court concluded that trial counsel’s performance was not 
deficient because the identified testimony of C.M., Majka, and Thomas, as well as one of the 
statements  by  Detective  Maranto,  qualified  for  the  hearsay  exception  for  prior  inconsistent 
statements, so any objections by trial counsel would not have been successful.  Upon review, the 
conclusion that such testimony was admissible under this exception, including the determination 
that the statements occurred prior to any motive to fabricate, was substantially correct and thus 
was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law.  See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 
U.S.   156,   167  (2012)  (“Because  the objection upon  which  his ineffective-assistance-of- 
counsel claim was premised was meritless, [the petitioner] could not demonstrate an error entitling 
him to relief.”). 
     Although the Circuit Court did not identify a specific hearsay exception applicable to the 
second of Detective Maranto’s statements, the  Court agrees that the question that elicited the 
response was not objectionable.  Even if trial counsel erred by failing to object to the response, the 

                                     15 

Court finds that, even though the Circuit Court did not address issue of prejudice, Snider failed to 
show that any such failure resulted in prejudice under Strickland. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534 
(finding  that  courts  do  not  apply  the  deferential   standard  in  evaluating  a  prong 
of Strickland analysis that the state court has not reached).  Here, Detective Maranto’s testimony 
about C.M.’s report that Snider removed her from school early to engage in sexual abuse, offered 
to explain why he sought a subpoena for school records, was cumulative of and consistent with 
the lengthy and detailed testimony about the sexual abuse given by C.M.  See Henh Chu Neo v. 
Holloway, 551 F. App’x 713, 718 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding that trial counsel’s failure to object to a 
detective’s hearsay testimony was not prejudicial to the petitioner because the substance of the 
testimony had already been presented to the jury through other witnesses).  Snider has not shown 
how this specific piece of corroborating testimony on a single point, if excluded, would have 
created  a  reasonable  probably  of a  different  outcome.   See  Strickland,  466  U.S.  at  694. 
Accordingly, the Court does not find that Snider’s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective 
based on the failure to object to Detective Maranto’s testimony. 
    _ Lay Opinion Testimony 
     Snider further contends that his trial counsel should have objected to C.M.’s testimony 
about why  she  was taking certain mental  health medications because it constituted improper 
opinion testimony.  At trial, Snider’s trial counsel asked C.M. whether she was taking mental 
health medications, and she responded that she took several medications, including Cymbalta, 
Celexa,  and  Risperdal,  to  cope  with  depression  and  anxiety.   On  redirect  examination,  the 
prosecutor had the following exchange to which trial counsel did not object: 
     Q:     And you were asked a couple questions about medications you take? 
     A:     Yes. 

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     Q:     And is some of that because of what [Snider] did to you? 
     A:     Yes. 
5/5/16 Trial Tr. at 113.  On the State Petition, the Circuit Court found that Snider’s counsel was 
not ineffective for failing to object to this testimony because he had  opened the door to the 
testimony by asking about medications, and because C.M. had not offered a medical opinion but 
instead had provided a reason for taking the medication that could be admitted as a lay opinion 
based on her personal knowledge and experience under Maryland Rule 5—701. 
     The Court  finds that the Circuit Court  correctly found that the evidence was properly 
admitted.  C.M. was not offering a medical opinion and instead was stating her own reason for 
taking the medication, which was within her personal knowledge.  To the extent that it could be 
characterized as an opinion, the testimony was within the bounds of a lay opinion.  Thus, the Court 
finds no ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to object to this testimony. 
VII.   Other Acts Testimony 
     Snider also argues that his trial counsel should have objected to testimony during direct 
examination, and should not have elicited testimony from Majka during cross examination, about 
an alleged protective order that C.M. had obtained against him.  At trial, Majka testified that she 
told  C.M.  to  bring  to  the  restaurant  a copy  of any  protective orders  against  Snider  so  that 
McDonald’s employees could call the police if he returned.  On cross examination, trial counsel 
asked Majka about the protective order and elicited testimony that C.M. never produced a copy of 
the order.  Snider claims that the testimony referencing the fact that C.M. had a restraining order 
against him  constituted testimony  about a prior bad  act and was thus  inadmissible character 
evidence. 

                                     17 

     During  the  state  post-conviction hearing,  Snider’s  trial  counsel  testified  that  his  trial 
strategy was to show that C.M. was lying, and that his approach to the protective order testimony 
was to advance this strategy by eliciting the fact that while she claimed to have a protective order, 
it never materialized.  The Circuit Court credited the trial counsel’s testimony and found that 
Snider had failed to overcome the presumption that his actions were based on a  legitimate trial 
strategy. 
     “It is a cardinal tenet of the Supreme Court’s ineffective assistance jurisprudence that 
‘strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options 
are virtually unchallengeable.”  Meyer v.  Branker, 506 F.3d 358, 371  (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).  The evidence at trial established that the State’s case rested upon the 
credibility of C.M.  Other than the DNA evidence, no physical evidence was introduced, and there 
were no other witnesses to the abuse.  Accordingly, the Circuit Court’s deference to trial counsel’s 
strategy  to  undermine C.M.’s credibility by  highlighting a possible false statement about the 
existence  of a  protective  order  was  neither  contrary  to  nor  an  unreasonable  application  of 
Strickland.  Thus, Snider’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective based on the testimony 
relating to the protective order will be denied. 
VIII.  Juror No. 119 
     Snider also argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object 
to Juror No. 119, who served as an alternate juror and did not deliberate.  During jury selection, 
Juror No. 119 stated that he was a detective at the Department of Public Safety and worked in the 
warrant apprehension unit.  After Detective Maranto’s testimony, Juror No. 119 submitted a note 
to the trial judge disclosing that he recognized the detective from when he first started working in 
the warrant apprehension unit but did not know him by name and did not recall  having any 

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conversations with him.  The trial judge conducted additional questioning of Juror No. 119, during 
which the juror stated that his recognition of Detective Maranto would not impact his ability to be 
fair.  Neither the prosecution nor the defense asserted any objection to Juror No. 119’s continued 
participation in the trial. 
     During the post-conviction hearing, Snider testified that when Juror No. 119 submitted the 
note to the trial judge, he recognized Juror No.  119 as a police officer on the warrant patrol and 
that the juror was the officer who handcuffed him when he was arrested.  Snider testified that he 
told his trial counsel that he recognized Juror No. 119 as one of the officers who arrested him and 
asked him to seek to strike the juror, but his trial counsel did not do so. 
     In ruling on the issue, the Circuit Court noted that Snider stated in his State Petition that he 
recognized Juror No. 119 for the first time a week after the trial concluded, rather than during the 
trial, so there was no reason for his trial counsel to object to the juror during the trial on this basis. 
The Circuit Court also concluded that Snider could not show prejudice arising from the failure to 
object to Juror No. 119 because he was an alternate juror who did not deliberate. 
     Where the State has not submitted the State Petition as part of the record, the Court cannot 
easily evaluate, even under the highly deferential standard that applies, the Circuit Court’s finding 
of fact that Snider did not recognize Juror No.  119 until  one week after the trial, which was 
apparently based on a  statement in the State Petition that conflicted with Snider’s testimony at the 
post-conviction hearing.  Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the Circuit Court’s conclusion that 
Snider has not demonstrated prejudice from any failure to object to Juror No.  119 because that 
juror was an alternate who did not deliberate.  Accordingly, Snider’s claim that his trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to Juror No. 119 will be denied. 

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IX.    Failure to Investigate 
     Snider  also  contends  that  his  trial  counsel  was  ineffective  by  failing  adequately  to 
investigate the allegations against him and then to present a more robust defense.  At the post-  . 
conviction hearing, Snider testified that his trial counsel should have interviewed C.M.’s therapist, 
interviewed his stepsons about the fact that they were not abused, investigated the two prior rape 
allegations by C.M.  He also asserted that his trial counsel could have gathered more evidence to 
establish false statements by the victim, such as by showing that her claim that he followed her 
home from school in 2014 or 2015  using a particular vehicle was false because he no longer owned 
that vehicle at that time. 
     The Circuit Court concluded that Snider had not demonstrated prejudice because he could 
only speculate that the therapist would have had helpful information, and the fact that his stepsons 
were  not  abused  was  not  relevant  evidence.   The  Circuit  Court  also  noted  that  Snider  had 
abandoned the claim that his trial counsel failed to call certain witnesses at trial but nevertheless 
found that claim to be meritless because Snider’s trial counsel testified at the post-conviction 
hearing that two of Snider’s three daughters were not willing to cooperate and that he investigated 
all witnesses identified by Snider and considered each one. 
     An allegation of inadequate investigation does not warrant habeas relief absent a proffer of 
what favorable evidence or testimony would have been produced.  Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 
932,  940-41  (4th  Cir.  1990).   Here,  Snider  generally  asserts  and  speculates  that  additional 
investigation would have yielded favorable results and, with the exception of possible evidence 
about the timing of his ownership of the vehicle, has not identified favorable evidence or testimony 
   weatl have resulted from a more thorough investigation.  The limited additional facts that he 
identifies are not sufficient to establish a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would 

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have been different.  See Strickland, 466  U.S. at 694.  Accordingly, the Circuit Court’s rejection 
of this argument was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, federal law.  The 
Court will deny Snider’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the failure to investigate. 
X.     Application for a Review of the Sentence 
     Snider further contends that his trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to consult with 
Snider about, and then failed to file, an application for a sentence review by a three-judge panel 
pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. §§ 8-102, 8—103(a).  During the post-conviction hearing, 
Snider’s trial counsel testified that he discussed the possibility of filing an application for a three- 
judge panel review with Snider, but his advice was to proceed straight to a direct appeal because 
the panel could impose a longer sentence.  The Circuit Court credited trial counsel’s testimony that 
he had, in fact, discussed the issue with Snider and determined that trial counsel’s decision not to 
expose Snider to a higher sentence did not constitute deficient performance.  Considering the 
deference owed to both trial counsel’s strategic decision and the Circuit Court’s determination on 
the  State Petition, the Court  finds that the Circuit Court’s conclusion that the trial  counsel’s 
performance on this issue was not deficient was sound and was not an unreasonable application of 
clearly established federal law. 
XI.    Cumulative Errors 
     Finally, Snider contends that the cumulative errors by his trial counsel establish that he 
received  ineffective  assistance  of counsel.   Ineffective  assistance of counsel  claims  must be 
reviewed individually rather than collectively.  Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835, 853 (4th Cir. 
1998).   Moreover,  “legitimate  cumulative-error analysis  evaluates  only  the  effect of matters 
actually determined to be constitutional error, not the cumulative effect of all of counsel’s actions 
deemed deficient.”  Jd. at 852 n.9.  Because the Court has not concluded that Snider’s trial counsel 

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provided deficient performance on any particular issue, much less on multiple issues, a cumulative 
error analysis is inappropriate, and the Circuit Court’s rejection of this claim for the same reasons 
is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. 
XII.   Certificate of Appealability 
     A petitioner may not appeal the dismissal or denial of a federal habeas petition without first 
receiving a certificate of appealability.  28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1).  The Court may issue a  certificate 
of appealability  “only  if the  applicant  has  made  a  substantial  showing  of the  denial  of a 
constitutional right.”  28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).  When, as here, the Court has denied the Petition on 
the merits, a petitioner must “demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s 
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.”  Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 
338 (2003) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)).  Upon a review of the record, 
this Court finds that Snider has not made the requisite showing.  The Court therefore declines to 
issue a certificate of appealability.  Snider may still request that the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit issue such a  certificate.  Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). 
                               CONCLUSION 
     For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus will be DENIED.  The 
Court will decline to issue a certificate of appealability.  A separate Order shall issue. 

Date:  September 27, 2023 
                                            EODORE D. CHU   /¢ 
                                         United States District fides 

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