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ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON FRAUD COUNTERCLAIM AUDREY B. COLLINS, Chief Judge. Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs Spin Master, Ltd., Justin Heimberg, and David Gombergâs (collectively âSpin Masterâsâ) motion for summary judgment on Defendants Zobmondo Entertainment, LLC and Randall Hornâs (collectively âZobmondoâsâ) counterclaim for cancellation based on fraud on the Patent and Trademark Office (âPTOâ) pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (3), filed on January 24, 2011. (Docket No. 269.) Zobmondo opposed on January 31, 2011 and Spin Master replied on February 7, 2011. The Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument and VACATES the February 28, 2011 hearing date. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 78; Local Rule 7-15. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Spin Masterâs motion for summary judgment. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In these consolidated suits, the Court had granted summary judgment to Zobmondo on Spin Masterâs (formerly Falls Media, LLCâs) claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition, finding that Spin Masterâs federally registered mark âWould You Rather ... ?â was descriptive and lacked secondary meaning. On that same ground, the Court also granted summary judgment on Zobmondoâs counterclaim for cancellation of the federal registration, U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 2,970,830. After that decision, the Court granted summary judgment to Spin Master on Zobmondoâs counterclaim for damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1120 for fraudulent procurement of a federal registration, finding only that Zobmondo failed to prove actual damages as a result of any fraud. The Court did not decide whether any factual issue existed over whether fraud against the Patent and Trademark Office (âPTOâ) had, in fact, been committed. (Docket No. 145 1 .) The Court then entered final judgment, which included, inter alia, dismissing as moot Zobmondoâs counterclaim for cancellation under 15 U.S.C. § 1064 based on fraud on the PTO because the Court had already cancelled the registration based on descriptiveness. (Docket No. 148 at 2.) *1055 Spin Master appealed the Courtâs adverse summary judgment ruling and order of cancellation on descriptiveness grounds, and the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the markâs character as descriptive and the markâs secondary meaning were matters of disputed fact not amenable to summary judgment. Zobmondo Entmât, LLC v. Falls Media, LLC, 602 F.3d 1108, 1121 (9th Cir.2010). As a natural effect of that ruling, this Courtâs decision cancelling Spin Masterâs federal registration on descriptiveness grounds was also reversed. Id. at 1112 . The Court previously ruled that the Ninth Circuitâs decision also revived Zobmondoâs counterclaim for cancellation pursuant to § 1064(3) based on fraud on the PTO. (Docket No. 265.) This motion seeks summary adjudication of Zobmondoâs counterclaim before proceeding to trial on Spin Masterâs claims of infringement. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2 The facts relevant to the disposition of this counterclaim are undisputed, although the parties disagree as to their import. As explained by the Ninth Circuit, both Zobmondo and Falls Media use the mark âWould you rather ... ?â to identify board games and books that incorporate questions posing humorous, bizarre, or undesirable choices. Zobmondo, 602 F.3d at 1110 . Gomberg and Heimberg conceived of the idea for a âWould you rather ... ?â board game in 1995 while in college after Heimberg published a humor piece discussing funny dilemmas. (SUF 1-3; SAUF 94.) 3 They contemporaneously recorded the idea on a page of handwritten notes inside a notebook of other ideas; based on those notes, the goal of the game would be to predict which of two choices a player would select when presented with a dilemma. (Gomberg Decl., Ex. 1 at 17.) Likewise, Gombergâs notes from 1995 listed âWould you Ratherâ under a heading âWorks in Progressâ and indicated that âThis one could put us over the top.... Think about the format of the book, game/calendar possibilities.â (Supp. Gomberg Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 1.) 4 At first, Heimberg and Gomberg intended to license the game to a game or toy company, rather than creating and manufacturing the game themselves. (SUF 4.) Before seeking registration of the âWould you rather ... ?â mark, Heimberg bought a âhow-toâ book on game making (SUF 82) and, before November 1996, Gomberg printed a list of âManufacturers and Distributorsâ from the website www. gamecabinet.com (SUF 83). Before seeking registration of the mark in July 1997, they discussed the game with a game agent, wrote questions that could be used for the game play, prepared a package to give to their literary agent, 5 and created the www.wouldyourather.com website. *1056 (Ghajar Decl., Ex. E (Heimberg Dep. Tr.) at 121:16-123:10, Ex. J (Mandel Dep. Tr.) at 58:15-59:10; see also Heimberg Decl. ¶ 7.) In 1995, Gombergâs father was a Senior Vice President at Western Publishing Company, a prominent game distributor with titles such as âPictionary,â âOutburst,â and âTaboo.â (SUF 13.) Although Westernâs Golden Games division had been acquired by Hasbro in 1994, Gomberg and Heimberg hoped they could use Gombergâs fatherâs contacts to promote their game concept, and, in fact, he gave them several toy industry contacts in September 1995. (Id.) From November 1995 through December 1999, Gomberg himself worked for a company called Nextoy in developing original game and toy concepts and believed that licensing the âWould you rather ... ?â game was preferable to manufacturing the game themselves. (SUF 6.) Although he could not remember exact dates, while at Nextoy between 1995 and 1999, he pitched the âWould you rather ... ?â game concept to âeveryone from Mattel to Hasbro to Spin Master to Pressman to smaller toy companiesâ; in Gombergâs words, Gomberg and Nextoyâs owner Robert FĂŒhrer met with âevery major toy company in the world, basically.â (Ghajar Decl., Ex. F (Gomberg Dep. Tr.) at 244:20-245:4, 246:6-12.) Of all those pitches, however, Gomberg could only specifically recall speaking with representatives from Hasbro in 1998. (Korn Decl., Ex. B (Gomberg Dep. Tr.) at 203:1-205:10.) On July 31, 1997, Heimberg and Gomberg filed an âintent-to-useâ (âITUâ) application with the PTO indicating that they intended to use the mark âWould you rather ... ?â on two product categories: books and games. Zobmondo, 602 F.3d at 1111 . As part of that application, Heimberg and Gomberg swore that they had a âbona fide intention to use the trademark in commerce on or in connection with the specified goods.â (Korn Decl., Ex. A at 5.) In September 1997, they began selling books at retail containing the âWould you rather ... ?â mark and premise. (SUF 11.) In the summer or fall of 1997, Heimberg and Gomberg also pitched to several production companies an idea for a television game show based on the âWould you rather ... ?â concept, which, according to them, could lead to development and sales of a board game. (SUF 14, 15.) Heimberg believed that the questions and rules developed for the game show could help develop the board game, although there are no documents from that period to indicate that Heimberg and Gomberg were actively trying to adapt the game show elements to the medium of a board game. (SUF 17, SAUF 103.) In February 1998, Paramount bought an option to develop, produce, and sell the âWould you rather ... ?â game show, but the option was never exercised. (SUF 18.) The pitch materials indicated that Heimberg and Gomberg were âexploring board game possibilities as well .... â (Conf. Heimberg Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. B at 33.) On the game front, in a November 1, 1997 letter from Heimberg to Gomberg about the potential content for the âWould you rather ... ?â website, Heimberg stated, âLetâs get our games sold.â (SUF 16.) Nevertheless, Heimberg and Gomberg did not take further action developing the board game until September 1999, when Heimberg and Gomberg developed the rules of play, based on the existing game âScruplesâ and Zobmondoâs similar game called âZobmondo!! That Crazy âWould You Ratherâ Gameâ and âZobmondo!! The Outrageous Game of Bizarre Choicesâ (neither of which yet prominently featured the âWould you rather ... ?â mark on the packaging), 6 in an effort to secure an op *1057 tion agreement with Pressman Toys. (SUF 22; SAUF 104, 105.) Pressman Toys optioned the game in October 5, 1999 for one month for $1,000, but let the option expire without exercising it. (SUF 23, 24.) After Gomberg left Nextoy in 1999, Nextoyâs owner FĂŒhrer discussed the âWould you rather ... ?â game with Hasbro and Mattel in early 2000. (SUF 26; SAUF 108.) 7 FĂŒhrer first contacted Mike Hirtle at Hasbro and informed him of Gomberg and Heimbergâs rights in the trademark âWould you rather ... ?â in an effort to secure a license from Hasbro if it used the term for Zobmondoâs similar game. (SAUF 109.) Hasbro did not take a license, but it did not use the phrase âWould you rather ... ?â on the Zobmondo game. (Korn Deck, Ex. D (FĂŒhrer Dep. Tr.) at 149:18-23.) In contrast, Mattel was âvery interestedâ in the concept, so, in February 2000, Nextoy sent Mattel a letter promoting the âWould you rather ... ?â board game and describing the concept, objectives, components, and game play. (SUF 27.) On the same day, Heimberg sent Gomberg an email stating, âLetâs do what we can to make this board game. We will then have succeeded in our original endeavor.â (Id.) Nextoy created and sent a âprototypeâ of the game to Mattel, which consisted of a plain white box, a simple game board, questions, and playing pieces. (SUF 29; SAUF 110.) Mattel held the prototype until October 2001, at which point it passed on the game. (SUF 36; SAUF 110.) During the time Mattel had the prototype, Heimberg, Gomberg, and FĂŒhrer did not take any additional steps to develop or license the game; at most, Heimberg and Gomberg had meetings with production companies about a possible game show. (SUF 33; SAUF 112, 113, 114.) In fact, in a May 2000 email, Heimberg and Gomberg called their prospects for licensing the game âdubious.â (SAUF 116.) And FĂŒhrer testified that he stopped pitching the game after Mattel returned the prototype in October 2001. (Korn Deck, Ex. D (Fuhrer Dep. Tr.) at 216:9-12.) 8 While these licensing efforts were underway, Zobmondo filed an opposition proceeding in October 1999 against Heimberg and Gombergâs application to register the âWould you rather ... ?â mark. (SUF 25.) In the spring of 2000, Heimberg met with Randall Horn of Zobmondo and told him that they were moving forward with the board game; Heimberg and Gomberg even suggested between the two of them that they might work with Zobmondo. (SUF 31, 32.) That never happened. In any case, Zobmondoâs opposition was dismissed on November 19, 2001 for its failure to respond to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Boardâs (âTTABâsâ) order to show cause why a brief had not been filed. (SUF 25.) On January 8, 2002, the PTO issued a Notice of Allowance for Heimberg and Gombergâs Trademark Application No. 75/333,978. (SUF 38.) Likewise, in 2002, Heimberg and Gomberg began to realize that licensing was an increasingly remote possibility, so they began discussing the possibility of manufacturing the game themselves; they also continued to write new questions, admittedly not specifically *1058 for use in a game, but some of which ended up in the game anyway. (SUF 39; SAUF 118.) Heimberg called FĂŒhrer sometime in 2002 to ask about manufacturers in China. (Korn Deck, Ex. D (Fuhrer Dep. Tr.) at 165:5-19.) Heimberg also met with Horn in the spring of 2002 to once again discuss licensing the âWould you rather ... ?â mark to Zobmondo. (SUF 42.) Also, in April 2002, Gomberg spoke with someone from a company called Winning Moves âabout what goes into making a game.â (Supp. Gomberg Decl, Ex. 3.) On July 2, 2002, Heimberg and Gomberg requested their first extension of time to file their statement of use. (SUF 43.) At that time, they were prepared to file a statement of use of the mark on books, but did not do so because they also wanted to perfect their rights with regard to games and file the statement of use for both categories of goods simultaneously. (SUF 43.) Later in 2002, Heimberg and Gomberg began planning to manufacture the game themselves and in November 2002, they contacted FĂŒhrer about shifting from a licensing business model to a manufacturing model. (SUF 44, 45.) Gomberg also contacted freelance designer Berk Kent in late 2002 about designing a game for them and they brainstormed at that time about colors and design. (SUF 46, 47.) On January 6, 2003, Heimberg and Gomberg filed their second request for an extension of time to file a statement of use. (SUF 48.) To obtain that extension, Heimberg and Gomberg needed to attest to âgood causeâ for the additional time, which they indicated was âin view of delays in marketing arrangements.â (Korn Deck, Ex. H.) Gomberg explained that, from his perspective, the âdelays in marketing arrangementsâ referred to Fuhrerâs inability to find a company interested in licensing the game. (Korn Deck, Ex. B (Gomberg Dep. Tr.) at 345:1-7 (âAs of January 6, 2003, we had not been able to get our game to market because Bob FĂŒhrer was not able to find a company interested in licensing it.â).) From January through June 2003, Berk Kent worked on designing a board game and it eventually took him only ten hours to develop a final draft of the game. (SUF 49; SAUF 131.) Also during that period, Heimberg and Gomberg emailed requests for price quotes for the manufacture of a âsmall quantityâ (250-500) of a âcard-basedâ game without a board and with rules printed on the box. (Conf. Gomberg Deck, Exs. 6, 7.) These emails were sent one day after Heimberg and Gomberg filed their the second extension and Gomberg candidly admitted at his deposition that the timing of their email requests may have had something to do with the fact that they had just filed for another extension. (Korn Deck, Ex. B (Gomberg Dep. Tr.) at 347:9-13.) They also actively worked on developing questions, rules, game format, and board design for a âWould you rather ... ?â board game. (SUF 51.) In fact, on May 1, 2003, Heimberg sent an email to Horn after seeing a new version of Zobmondoâs board game in stores that used the phrase âWould you rather ... ?â and told Horn that he and Gomberg âhave always planned to release a WOULD YOU RATHER ... ? gameâ and that the game was âin the final stages of development and will be finished in the next few months.â (Conf. Heimberg Deck, Ex. M.) Heimberg and Gomberg sought additional extensions from the PTO on June 18, 2003 (SUF 57), December 8, 2003 (SUF 61), and June 15, 2004 (SUF 69). It is undisputed that during this time Heimberg and Gomberg were pursuing the manufacturing of a board game by seeking price quotes from manufacturers; by finalizing the game design, packaging game play, *1059 and content; by receiving the final shipped product; and by selling the game in commerce. (SUF 51-53, 56, 59, 60, 62, 64-68, 70, 74, 75.) 9 In light of the looming January 8, 2005 expiration of the ITU application, Gomberg wrote in a June 30, 2004 email that he had talked with a lawyer, who âstressed that there needs to be interstate commerce, not just us giving a few copies to friendsâ and if they âmiss[ed] the jan [sic] 8 deadline, randy horn [sic] gets priority on the trademark in the event we try to re-apply.â (Conf. Korn Decl., Ex. G.) One day earlier, Heimberg wrote in an email regarding design for the cards used in the board game that the game design âneeds to be our priority, now, or we will lose the whole WYR brand to Randy Hornâ and that they had a âhuge brand to develop here which will be awesome and lead to bigger things. Letâs get moving!â (Conf. Korn Decl., Ex. H.) Consistent with the desire to get the game sold in commerce, Heimberg and Gomberg created a âDecember Plan of Action For Would You Ratherâ that indicated they needed to get â500-1000 units sold over the web or in stores by Jan 8, pref. Jan 1â and they would â[k]eep records of evidence of interstate shipping,â and listed stores where 128 units were already placed for sale. (Conf. Korn Deck, Ex. I.) In an effort to get the game sold, in October 2004 Heimberg and Gomberg sold 36 units to several variety stores in New York and New Jersey, which were owned by Gombergâs father-in-law (SAUF 126), and sold units to other retailers (Korn Deck, Ex. B (Gomberg Dep. Tr.) at 317:9-25). They also offered retailers a discounted price for the month of December 2004. (Conf. Korn Deck, Ex. K.) On November 29, 2004, Heimberg and Gomberg filed their statement of use verifying that the âWould you rather ... ?â mark had been used in commerce on books, board games, and comics. (SUF 76.) In a December 14, 2004 email, they urged friends to buy copies of the game, explaining that they had âdone all [they were] supposed to do to properly register and use the mark,â but, in order to âarmâ them âwith the most ammunition possible to get them [apparently meaning Zobmondo] to stopâ using the âWould you rather ... ?â mark, they âneed[ed] to demonstrate as much interstate commerce for our game by the end of the year.â (Conf. Korn Deck, Ex. J.) The statement of use was approved by the PTO on June 11, 2005 (SUF 77), and the registration issued on July 19, 2005 (SUF 78). LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment shall be granted where âthe pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.â Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A âgenuine issueâ of material fact exists only when the nonmoving party makes a sufficient showing on the essential elements of its claims on which it bears the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). An issue of fact is genuine if it reasonably can be resolved in favor of either party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 . The nonmovantâs evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in the nonmovantâs favor. Id. *1060 at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 . But âmere disagreement or the bald assertion that a genuine issue of material fact existsâ does not preclude summary judgment. Harper v. Wallingford, 877 F.2d 728, 731 (9th Cir.1989). DISCUSSION A. Fraud and the âIntent to Useâ System This case arises at the intersection of two parts of trademark law: the statutory âintent to useâ system and the bar against fraud on the PTO in the registration process. The âintent to useâ registration system allows an applicant to seek registration without using a mark in commerce, so long as the applicant has âa bona fide intention, under circumstances showing the good faith of such person, to use a trademark in commerce.â 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (b)(1). Once a ânotice of allowanceâ for the mark is issued, the applicant has six months to use the mark in commerce. Id. § 1051(d)(1). The applicant may seek an initial six-month extension, and, upon a showing of âgood cause,â may seek up to four additional six-month extensions. Id. § 1051(d)(2). As a result of these provisions, an applicant has up to three years after the notice of allowance to use the mark in commerce, provided that, during that period, the applicant maintains the bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce. Id. The Senate Report on the 1988 amendments that created the âintent to useâ system explained that the âbona fideâ intent to use a mark in commerce was intended to be measured by objective factors. S.Rep. No. 100-515, at *8 (1988), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1988, p. 5577; see also Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans, Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 21 (D.C.Cir.2008) (explaining that âbona fideâ intent includes âboth actual intent to use a mark in commerce and evidence, contemporary with the application, that objectively demonstrate such an intent.â). This may be satisfied by a statement of intent to use a mark on identified products in the future, even if the applicant has not taken concrete steps to create and introduce a new product, provided that the applicant intends to use the mark as claimed. S.Rep. No. 100-515, at *8. For extensions, there may be doubt as to the bona fide intent to use the mark if concrete steps have not been taken to use the mark in commerce. Id. at *11. The Senate Report noted that only the ârare applicantâ would make use of all possible extensions, id. at *18, although Spin Master offered undisputed evidence that, as of 2008, almost 15,000 registrations had been issued after the maximum number of extensions was granted (SUF 90). The lack of bona fide intent must normally be proved by a preponderance of the evidence; that burden can be carried by pointing to a complete absence of any contemporaneous documents reflecting that intent at the time of the application. See Saul Zaentz Co. v. Bumb, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d 1723 , 1727 (T.T.A.B.2010); see also Commodore Elecs. Ltd. v. CBM Kabushiki Kaisha Opp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1503 , 1507 (T.T.A.B.1993). The burden then shifts to the applicant to rebut the prima facie case â âby offering additional evidence concerning the factual circumstances bearing upon its intent to use its mark in commerce.â â Saul Zaentz, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1727. An applicant cannot rebut the prima facie case merely by pointing to a statement of subjective intent to use a mark in commerce. See Lane Ltd. v. Jackson Intâl Trading Co., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1351 , 1355 (T.T.A.B.1994). When dealing with a cancellation claim based on fraud, however, a âbona fideâ intent to use a mark in commerce is only one aspect of the fraud claim. Pursu *1061 ant to 15 U.S.C. § 1119 , the Court has authority to cancel the federal registration of a trademark. One ground for cancellation is that the registration âwas obtained fraudulently.â 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (3). In order to prove fraud on the PTO, the party seeking cancellation must show: âa false representation regarding a material fact, the registrantâs knowledge or belief that the representation is false, the intent to induce reliance upon the misrepresentation and reasonable reliance thereon, and damages proximately resulting from the reliance.â Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 918 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir.1990); see also eCash Techs., Inc. v. Guagliardo, 127 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1079 (C.D.Cal.2000), affâd mem. on other grounds, 35 Fed.Appx. 498 (9th Cir.2002). 10 The burden to prove fraud is âheavy,â Robi 918 F.2d at 1439 , and must be shown by clear and convincing evidence, In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d 1240, 1243 (Fed.Cir.2009). âIndeed, âthe very nature of the charge of fraud requires that it be proven âto the hiltâ with clear and convincing evidence. There is no room for speculation, inference or surmise and, obviously, any doubt must be resolved against the charging party.â â Id. The Federal Circuit has made clear that the falsity and intent prongs are separate, so âabsent the requisite intent to mislead the PTO, even a material misrepresentation would not qualify as fraud under the Lanham Act warranting cancellation.â Id. â[D]eception must be willful to constitute fraud,â id., and â[m]ere negligence is not sufficient to infer fraud or dishonesty,â id. at 1244 . As a result, â[sjubjective intent to deceive, however difficult it may be to prove, is an indispensable element in the analysis.â Id. at 1245 . While intent to deceive may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, â âsuch evidence must still be clear and convincing, and inferences drawn from lesser evidence cannot satisfy the deceptive intent requirement.â â Id. Thus, â[w]hen drawing an inference of intent, âthe involved conduct, viewed in light of all the evidence ... must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive.â â Id. (ellipsis in original). 11 B. Zobmondoâs Claims of Fraud on the PTO Zobmondo spends substantial time in its opposition arguing that Heimberg and Gomberg lacked the âbona fideâ intent to use the âWould you rather ... ?â mark for board games, as required by the Lanham Act. Those arguments, however, address only the falsity prong of fraud; they do not demonstrate the clear and convincing evidence necessary to prove subjective intent to deceive the PTO, which the court in Bose made clear is âindispensibleâ to any fraud cancellation claim. See Bose, 580 F.3d at 1245 . Because âthe lack of a good faith intent to use a mark does not equate to bad faith,â SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Omnisource DDS, LLC, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d 1300 , 1305 (T.T.A.B.2010), in order to survive summary judgment, Zobmondo must offer clear and convincing evidence that would compel a jury to infer that Heimberg and Gomberg subjectively intended to deceive the PTO. It is clear that Zobmondo cannot do so. Through its briefing, Zobmondo has made clear that it is pursuing fraud claims only as to Heimberg and Gombergâs initial ITU application and their first two exten *1062 sions of time. (Oppân 3.) Indeed, the undisputed evidence makes pellucid that, as of the third extension sought in June 2003 and through issuance of the registration, Heimberg and Gomberg had taken significant concrete steps to manufacture and sell a board game themselves (such as by seeking price quotes from manufacturers; finalizing the game design, packaging, game play, and content; receiving the final shipped product; and selling the game in stores), which defeats any subjective intent to deceive the PTO. Thus, the Court addresses only the intent to deceive for the initial ITU application in 1997 and the first two extensions obtained in July 2002 and January 2003. 1. 1997 ITU Application Heimberg and Gomberg offered several pieces of undisputed documentary evidence of their intent to use the âWould you rather ... ?â mark on a board game at or near the time of their filing of the ITU application, which was to be part of an overall strategy to create a âWould you rather ... ?â line of products that would include books, games, and even a television game show. For example, there was a set of notes from 1995 sketching out the idea for the game concept and game play and notes from 1995 mentioning the possibility of âWould you rather ... ?â branded products, including a game. Heimberg also bought a âhow-toâ book on game making and Gomberg printed a list of âManufacturers and Distributorsâ from the website www.gamecabinet.com. They also discussed the game with a game agent, wrote questions that could be used for game play, prepared a package to give to their literary agent, and created the www. wouldyourather.com website. All of this undisputed evidence demonstrates that they were pursuing the creation of a board game, not subjectively intending to deceive the PTO into believing they were pursuing a game when they really were not. Zobmondo cites a series of TTAB cases to argue that this evidence shows only a âvague plan for, or conception ofâ a board game, which is insufficient to demonstrate a bona fide intent to use the âWould you rather ... ?â mark on games in 1997. See, e.g., SmithKline, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1304; Saul Zaentz, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1729-30; Honda Motor Co. v. Winkelmann, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d 1660 , 1664 (T.T.A.B.2009); L.C. Licensing, Inc. v. Berman, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d 1883 , 1891-92 (T.T.A.B.2008). However, those cases are distinguishable because they all were decided in the context of an opposition to registration based on a lack of bona fide intent to use the marks in commerce, not in the context of fraud allegations, as in this case, which requires clear and convincing evidence of subjective intent to deceive. Moreover, in each of those cases, unlike this case, there was a complete dearth of contemporaneous documentary evidence demonstrating bona fide intent. In Smith-Kline, for example, the TTAB sustained an opposition to an ITU application for the mark âAQUAJETTâ on oral irrigators, finding a lack of bona fide intent because the only contemporaneous documents of intent identified by the applicant were minutes from an annual board meeting and patent registrations that did not mention the mark or the goods identified by the mark. 97 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1305. Likewise, in Saul Zaentz, the TTAB sustained an opposition to an ITU application for the mark âMITHRILâ 12 on various types of jewelry, finding a lack of bona fide intent to use the mark based not only on the lack of any contemporaneous documents, but also on the applicant's, admissions that he had no specific plans to develop and sell *1063 any of the products identified in the application. 95 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1728-29. Honda and L.C. Licensing also dealt with similar circumstances. See Honda, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1663-64; L.C. Licensing, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1891-92 . Unlike these cases, there is undisputed documentary evidence showing that, before applying for registration in July 1997, Gomberg and Heimberg were planning to develop a board game bearing the âWould you rather ... ?â mark. Moreover, even if this evidence were insufficient alone to defeat Zobmondoâs fraud claim, because the subjective intent to deceive must be considered in âin light of all the evidence,â Bose, 580 F.3d at 1245 , the Court may consider evidence arising after the application in determining intent, so long as it is âsufficiently contemporaneousâ to the application filing date, Lane, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1356 (finding correspondence created up to eleven months after ITU application showed bona fide intent at time of application). In a November 1997 email, Heimberg urged Gomberg to âget our games sold,â demonstrating an intent to in fact pursue a âWould you rather ... ?â game a mere five months after the July 1997 ITU application. Also, given the strategy to develop a âWould you rather ... ?â brand, it is significant that they successfully launched their âWould you rather ... ?â book in September 1997 and were pitching the âWould you rather ... ?â game show idea to production companies throughout 1997 (culminating in an option from Paramount), which they undisputedly believed would help with both the content and success of a board game. In fact, in the game show pitch materials provided to Paramount only eight months after the ITU application, they indicated that they were âexploring board game possibilities as wellâ as the game show. Gomberg also testified without contradiction that, during this time, he and Heimberg intended to use his fatherâs industry contacts to license their game, and that, while he worked for Nextoy, he spoke with representatives from many companies about the game, although he could only remember his conversation with Hasbro sometime in 1998. While there is no indication of when in 1998 this conversation took place, even assuming it took place at the very end of 1998, it still undermines the claim that they subjectively intended to mislead the PTO in their ITU application. See Lane, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1356. 13 In light of the undisputed documentary evidence surrounding the 1997 ITU application, no reasonable jury could find by clear and convincing evidence that Heimberg and Gomberg subjectively intended to deceive the PTO about developing a game with the âWould you rather ... ?â mark. 2. Activities Between 1999 and the 2002 Notice of Allowance Even though Heimberg and Gomberg were not required to further renew their statement of bona fide intent to use the âWould you rather ... ?â mark on board games while their ITU application was published for opposition before the 2002 Notice of Allowance, Zobmondo nevertheless attacks their intent during this time. But once again, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that, while they might have moved at a snailâs pace during this time *1064 and may even have functioned under a misunderstanding with their game agent, no reasonable jury could find clear and convincing evidence of a subjective intent to deceive the PTO. For example, in September 1999, Heimberg and Gomberg developed the rules of play for the board game, based on the existing game âScruplesâ and Zobmondoâs game, which helped secure a one-month option with Pressman toys. Zobmondo complains that this was âmore than two years after the ITU Application was filedâ (Oppân 16), but, as explained above, other facts indicate that Heimberg and Gomberg were moving forward with the game (albeit slowly) up to that point, and an option like this was a goal of those efforts. When Pressman passed on its option, FĂŒhrer contacted Hasbro in early 2000 about licensing the âWould you rather ... ?â mark on Zobmondoâs game. Hasbro rejected the license but did not use the mark. FĂŒhrer then contacted Mattel, which was âvery interested.â He provided Mattel a prototype in February 2000, which Mattel did not return until October 2001. Zobmondo attacks the lack of activity during the twenty months Mattel had the prototype, but given the undisputed importance of a license to a âlarge toy companyâ like Mattel (SUF 30), it was not unusual that Heimberg and Gomberg would not contact other potential licensees while Mattel considered licensing their game. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that, during the time Mattel had the prototype, Heimberg was pushing forward with the âWould you rather ... ?â game show. Although Heimberg approached Horn during this time about partnering with Zobmondo in part because their licensing leads seemed âdubious,â mere doubt about the prospect of licensing to Mattel does not demonstrate an affirmative intent not to create a game at all. This evidence does not raise a triable issue of fact of a subjective intent to deceive the PTO about their plans to use the âWould you rather ... ?â mark on a board game. Zobmondoâs arguments about the delay during this time are somewhat disingenuous, given that it filed an opposition in October 1999 and did not act on it, resulting in its dismissal over two years later in November 2001. Heimberg and Gomberg could have reasonably chosen to move cautiously during this period of opposition when there existed at least some uncertainty about whether the notice of allowance would issue. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co., 994 F.2d 1569, 1572 (Fed.Cir.1993) (â âSubjecting an intent-to-use application to the opposition process before the applicant makes use of its mark is essential if the system is to achieve its goal of reducing uncertainty before the applicant invests in commercial use of the mark.ââ (quoting Senate Report on 1988 amendments)). 3. Activities Between January 2002 Notice of Allowance and July 2002 Extension Zobmondo attacks Heimbergâs and Gombergâs efforts (or lack of effort) between the issuance of the Notice of Allowance in January 2002 and the request for the first extension in July 2002 by citing allegedly conflicting testimony from Gomberg and FĂŒhrer about who was pitching the âWould you rather ... ?â game and when. Gomberg testified that he was relying on FĂŒhrer to pitch the game in 2002 (SAUF 119), while FĂŒhrer testified that after Mattel passed on the game in October 2001, he stopped pitching it (SAUF 117). On this basis, Zobmondo argues that, during this time, â[t]he entire team points the finger at [one] another as if to say, âhe was supposed to do it,â and in reality, no one was doing anything in a genuine effort to license or manufacture a board game.â *1065 (Oppân 20.) But Heimberg and Gombergâs mistaken understanding of their relationship with FĂŒhrer at most amounts to negligence, which is insufficient to support an inference of a subjective intent to deceive the PTO. Bose, 580 F.3d at 1244 . Even beyond this misunderstanding, there was some undisputed evidence that Heimberg and Gomberg were, in fact, moving forward with the board game during 2002. They continued writing new questions, not specifically for the game, but some of which were used in the game. Heimberg called FĂŒhrer in 2002 to ask about manufacturers in China and met with Horn in the spring of 2002 to once again discuss licensing the âWould you rather ... ?â mark to Zobmondo. And in April 2002, Gomberg spoke with someone from Winning Moves âabout what goes into making a game.â No reasonable fact-finder could conclude that this is clear and convincing evidence of a subjective intent to deceive the PTO leading up to the first extension in July 2002. 4. July 2002 and January 200S Extensions During the time between the first extension in July 2002 and the second extension in January 2003, Heimberg and Gomberg were continuing efforts to create a âWould you rather ... ?â board game. For example, they contacted FĂŒhrer in November 2002 about shifting from a licensing business model to a manufacturing model. Around the same time, Gomberg contacted freelance designer Berk Kent about designing a game for them and they brainstormed about colors and design. Starting in January 2003, 14 Berk Kent worked on designing a board game and Heimberg and Gomberg sought quotes for the manufacture of a âsmall quantityâ of a âcard-basedâ game without a board and with rules printed on the box. 15 They also actively worked on developing questions, rules, game format, and board design for a âWould you rather ... ?â board game. And in May 2003, Heimberg wrote Horn after seeing a new version of Zobmondoâs board game in stores that used the phrase âWould you rather ... ?â and told Horn that he and Gomberg âhave always planned to release a WOULD YOU RATHER ... ? gameâ and that the game was âin the final stages of development.â All of this undisputed evidence defeats any inference of a subjective intent to deceive the PTO. 16 *1066 Zobmondo once again attempts to manufacture a factual dispute that good cause for the second extension was lacking by-pointing to the alleged misunderstanding between FĂŒhrer and Gomberg that the âdelays in marketing arrangementsâ claimed as âgood causeâ for further extensions were based on Fuhrerâs inability to secure a license for the game, even though FĂŒhrer stopped pitching the game after Mattel returned the prototype in October 2001. However, Gombergâs testimony on this point was not necessarily inconsistent with Fuhrerâs statement. (See Korn Deck, Ex. B (Gomberg Dep. Tr.) at 345:1-4 (âAs of January 6, 2003, we had not been able to get our game to market because Bob FĂŒhrer was not able to find a company interested in licensing it.â).) 17 And the other undisputed evidence shows that Heimberg and Gomberg were, in fact, taking steps to shift to manufacturing the game themselves as of January 2003. Because this evidence does not approach the clear and convincing threshold to compel an inference of intent to deceive, it does not create a disputed fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment. 5. Intent to Defraud Starting in June 2008 As noted above, Zobmondo does not challenge that Heimberg and Gomberg had a bona fide intent to use the mark on games beginning with their third request for extension in June 2003 and through the issuance of the registration. Nevertheless, Zobmondo argues that evidence near the time of their statement of use in November 2004, particularly the circumstances surrounding their marketing and sales of the game they eventually manufactured, demonstrates that they intended to âsquat on the markâ when they filed their application over five years prior in 1997. Yet, this evidence is far too attenuated to be clear and convincing evidence of subjective intent to deceive in 1997, especially since Zobmondo has not challenged that Heimberg and Gomberg had a bona fide intent to use the âWould you rather ... ?â mark on games starting in June 2003, during the very time when this evidence arose. Zobmondo also repeatedly argues that there is a negative inference to be drawn from the fact that Heimberg and Gomberg sought and obtained all possible extensions of time to file their statement of use. But absent a subjective intent to deceive the PTO during this time, there is nothing wrong with Heimberg and Gomberg requesting (and being granted) all of the available statutory extensions. Congress created the intent-to-use system and the Court will not treat compliance with statutory procedures as evidence of fraud. Indeed, Heimberg and Gomberg are far from the only ones to have used the full set of procedures created by Congress: as of 2008, almost 15,000 registrations had been issued after the maximum number of extensions was granted. Thus, Zobmondo cannot demonstrate fraud by pointing to the authorized use of the full system of statutory extensions. CONCLUSION The undisputed facts defeat any possibility of Zobmondo carrying its burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that *1067 Heimberg and Gomberg subjectively intended to deceive the PTO at any time during the ITU registration process. The Court therefore GRANTS Spin Masterâs motion for summary judgment on Zobmondoâs § 1064(8) cancellation counterclaim based on fraud on the PTO. 1 . All references to Docket entries are for Case No. CV 06-3459 unless otherwise noted. 2 . The Court has reviewed the objections from the parties and OVERRULES them to the extent they are inconsistent with this opinion. The Court GRANTS Zobmondoâs unopposed request for judicial notice of Spin Masterâs PTO filings. (Docket No. 285.) 3 . "SUFâ refers to Spin Master's "Statement of Uncontroverted Facts,â which also incorporates Zobmondoâs responses and Spin Masterâs replies to each one. "SAUFâ refers to Zobmondoâs "Statement of Additional Uncontroverted Facts,â which also incorporates Spin Masterâs responses. 4 . This document was uncovered after Zobmondo filed its opposition to this motion. (Supp. Gomberg Decl. ¶ 3.) Spin Master produced this document to Zobmondo just one day before filing its reply brief, but it appears that Heimberg was deposed after the documentâs discovery and Zobmondo has not objected to Spin Masterâs filing, so the Court does not see any unfairness in considering it. 5 . Their literary agent Jay Mandel testified that he did not offer his services to represent the game, but he confirmed that Gomberg came to him with the idea as early as 1996. (SAUF 132.) 6 . See Zobmondo, 602 F.3d at 1112 . 7 . Gomberg left Nextoy in November 1999 to work for a company called Bunkl that provided summer camp services. (SAUF 106.) At that time, Heimberg lived in Los Angeles working for a non-profit organization and pursuing a screenwriting career. (SAUF 107.) 8 . In August 2001, Penguin, the publisher of Heimberg's and Gombergâs âWould you rather ... ?â books, also sent a letter to Lagoon games instructing it to stop selling a board game using the "Would you rather ... ?ââ mark, although that letter did not refer to Heimberg and Gombergâs use of the mark on a board game of their own. (SUF 35.) 9 . Heimberg and Gomberg formed Falls Media LLC in October 2004. (SUF 73.) 10 . Here, the parties only dispute the falsity and intent to deceive prongs. 11 . The parties dispute whether Zobmondoâs fraud cancellation counterclaim is equitable and would be tried to the Court, rather than to the jury. Because the Court grants summary judgment to Spin Master, the Court need not decide the issue. 12 . "MITHRILâ is a reference to a mythical precious metal in J.R.R. Tolkien's Lord of the Rings novels. Saul Zaentz, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1726. 13 . Heimberg and Gomberg rely on the TTAB's non-precedential decision in Blair Corp. v. Fassinger, 2008 WL 4674607 , at *1-5, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 581, at *4-14 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 17, 2008), in which the Board found bona fide intent to use a mark in commerce based on the applicant's strategy of creating a series of books bearing the applied-for mark and then using the mark on other goods listed in the ITU application. While factually similar to Heimberg and Gombergâs efforts here, the Court has not relied on this non-precedential decision in rejecting Zobmondo's contentions. 14 . Again, evidence of bona fide intent arising shortly after an ITU application or request for extension can be probative of intent at the time of the application or extension. Lane, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1356 (finding evidence probative even though arising up to eleven months after application). 15 . Although Gomberg candidly admitted at his deposition that the emails seeking manufacturing quotes may have had something to do with the fact that they had just requested another extension, a jury could easily infer from this testimony that the slow pace of shifting to the manufacturing model necessitated the extension, not that the extension prompted the efforts to undertake manufacturing. Heimbergâs equivocal testimony is not the kind of evidence that "must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive,â Bose, 580 F.3d at 1245 , so it does not defeat summary judgment. 16 .Zobmondo argues that the quotes Heimberg and Gomberg sought for manufacturing the game in January 2003 were suspect because they described a card-based game and that Kent Burkâs efforts were suspect because he only spent ten hours in designing the game. (Opp'n 23-24.) Even if the steps to manufacture the game fell short of what Zobmondo would have done, the fact is that they were still steps, inconsistent with a subjective intent to deceive the PTO. Indeed, an equally plausible explanation for the limited scale of Heimberg and Gombergâs efforts may have been to conserve costs since they were shifting from a license-based model (where someone else would pay for the costs of manufacturing) to a manufacturing-based model (where they would pay these costs them *1066 selves). This evidence certainly does not compel an inference of subjective intent to deceive as required by Bose. 17 . The Court rejected this same argument in denying attorneyâs fees to Zobmondo. (Docket No. 209 at 3 (finding that this testimony "could just as easily be referring to actions of the agent leading up to January 6, 2003, i.e., actions in 2000, 2001, 2002, as compared to â as Zobmondo would have it â alleged actions of the agent on January 6, 2003,â which was "hardly definitive proof that Gomberg intended to defraud the patent office by stating that delays in marketing arrangements necessitated an extension.â).)
Case Information
- Court
- C.D. Cal.
- Decision Date
- February 22, 2011
- Status
- Precedential