State of Iowa v. Artell Jamario Young

                           In the Iowa Supreme Court

                                      No. 23–0480

              Submitted November 19, 2024—Filed December 20, 2024

                                     State of Iowa,

                                        Appellee,

                                           vs.

                                Artell Jamario Young,

                                       Appellant.


         Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William P. Kelly,

judge.

         A defendant appeals his convictions for various drug offenses, arguing that

the search of his home by federal probation officers violated article I, section 8

of the Iowa Constitution. Affirmed.

         Mansfield, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which all justices joined.

         Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye (argued),

Assistant Appellate Defendant, for appellant.

         Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven (argued), Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.
                                        2


Mansfield, Justice.

      I. Introduction.

      Two stars keep not their motion in one sphere;
      Nor can one England brook a double reign.

William Shakespeare, Henry IV Part I, act 5, sc. 4, l. 3019–20.

      The genius of our federal system is that it does “brook a double reign.” Our

citizens are governed by two sovereigns: state and federal. This system has

served America well, but it results in considerable work for judges, who must

decide which sovereign’s law to apply when a case involves the acts of both.

      An individual who was under federal supervised release agreed that he

would submit to searches of his person, vehicle, or home if federal probation

officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that those areas contained

contraband or that he had violated the terms of his release. After receiving

information that the individual was illegally dealing drugs and illegally

possessing a firearm, federal probation officers conducted a search of his home,

where they discovered relatively small amounts of crack cocaine, powdered

cocaine, and marijuana. Concluding that this level of criminal activity was more

that of a Falstaff than a Hotspur, the federal authorities turned the matter over

to Iowa authorities. Compare William Shakespeare, Henry IV Part I, act 1, sc. 2,

with id. act 1, sc. 3. Charges were brought, and the individual was convicted of

several aggravated misdemeanor drug offenses. He now appeals, claiming that

the search of his home by federal probation officers violated Iowa constitutional

standards but not claiming that it violated federal standards.

      We conclude that the constitutionality of the search should be evaluated

by the law of the sovereign that initiated and conducted the search—not by the

law of the sovereign that had nothing to do with the search. We therefore reject

the defendant’s claim of an illegal search and affirm his convictions.
                                              3


       II. Facts and Procedural History.

       Artell Young, whose criminal history includes convictions for state

weapons offenses from 2008, 2014, and 2016, was convicted of the federal crime

of felon in possession of a firearm in federal district court in February 2017. See

18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). He received a prison sentence. Following his

discharge     from    prison    in   January      2019,    Young     had    to   undergo     a

thirty-six-month period of supervised release.1 He was assigned to United States

Probation Officer Amy Johnson. A condition of Young’s supervised release

authorized him to be searched by federal probation officers:

              You will submit to a search of your person, property,
       residence, adjacent structures, office, vehicle, papers, computers (as
       defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1)), and other electronic
       communications or data storage devices or media, conducted by a
       U.S. Probation Officer. Failure to submit to a search may be grounds
       for revocation. You must warn any other residents or occupants that
       the premises and/or vehicle may be subject to searches pursuant to
       this condition. An officer may conduct a search pursuant to this
       condition only when reasonable suspicion exists that you have
       violated a condition of your release and/or that the area(s) or item(s)
       to be searched contain evidence of this violation or contain
       contraband. Any search must be conducted at a reasonable time
       and in a reasonable manner. This condition may be invoked with or
       without the assistance of law enforcement, including the U.S.
       Marshals Service.

       In February 2021, Officer Johnson received information from a

confidential source that Young was selling controlled substances. The source

also reported seeing Young in possession of a black handgun on at least two

separate occasions. Reportedly, the gun was owned by Young’s wife, Jasmine

Evans, but the source had observed Young handling it.


       1See United States v. Makeeff, No. 4:14–cr–00081–SMR–CFB, 2015 WL 13284966, at *4

(S.D. Iowa Feb. 6, 2015) (“The Court must first note that this case involves federal supervised
release, not probation or parole. Supervisees, in a sense, enjoy the least amount of privacy in
this context.”), aff’d, 820 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
                                        4


      In September, Young was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while

intoxicated. See Iowa Code § 321J.2 (2021). Then, in November, the same

confidential source informed Officer Johnson that they saw Young receiving

drugs and telling people that he was cooking cocaine.

      Officer Johnson submitted a formal search request to the search

coordinator for the judicial district—United States Probation Officer Justin Song.

The purpose of the search was to look for “[e]vidence of a violation of [Young’s]

conditions which includes evidence of a crime.” Officer Song determined there

was reasonable suspicion to conduct a search in accordance with the search

conditions of Young’s supervised release. Meanwhile, Young failed to appear for

a mandatory random drug test.

      On December 22, Young arrived at the probation office for a scheduled

visit. He was driven by his wife, Evans. Upon arrival, Young was handcuffed and

searched by Officer Song and other probation officers. No contraband was found

on his person. With Young temporarily detained, the probation officers went

outside to make contact with Evans. They searched the car and retrieved Young’s

cellphone. Officer Song asked Evans if she was carrying a firearm. She stated

that she was and consented to a search of her purse. In the purse, a 9mm firearm

and a magazine were found.

      After being informed that the probation officers would be conducting a

search of their home, Young and Evans agreed to let the probation officers drive

them back to the house. Young and Evans helped secure their dogs while the

probation officers conducted the search. About a dozen officers were present.

They searched the home for a period of several hours. The search team

uncovered a 4.7-gram bag of crack cocaine and a 3.4-gram bag of powdered

cocaine inside a child’s shoe in a child’s bedroom. They also found 35.9 grams
                                        5


of marijuana in a kitchen drawer. In addition, they located a digital scale with

white residue and a partial box of 9mm ammunition.

      Officer Johnson, acting as the evidence technician, conducted the search

of Young’s phone and discovered some text messages relating to drug

transactions. On December 5, Young had offered to sell someone fifty “shingles”

for $1,000. In a text exchange on October 26, someone sent Young multiple

pictures of what appeared to be marijuana and asked, “You need more or is them

good?!” Young responded, “Ok I will let me send it out to some of my people.”

      Because the quantities of drugs found were not typical of the weights that

warranted federal prosecution, the officers turned over the results of their search

of Young’s home and cellphone to the Des Moines Police Department. Until then,

no state or local law enforcement personnel had been aware of the search.

      A trial information was filed in the Polk County District Court charging

Young with possession with intent to deliver crack cocaine, possession of a

controlled substance (cocaine) as a second offense, possession of a controlled

substance (marijuana) as a second offense, and failure to possess a tax stamp.

See Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(c)(3), (5); id. § 453B.3.

      Young moved to suppress the evidence found during the warrantless

search of his home, alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. A hearing

on the motion to suppress took place. Officers Johnson and Song testified.

      The district court upheld the search on two grounds. First, it determined

that the “special needs” exception authorized search under both the Fourth

Amendment and article I, section 8. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,
                                         6


875–76 (1987); State v. Brooks, 888 N.W.2d 406, 416 (Iowa 2016); State v. King,

867 N.W.2d 106, 121–22 (Iowa 2015). Specifically, the court stated,

      [H]ere, it was U.S. Probation Officers who conducted the search of
      Defendant’s home in December of 2021, acting upon reasonable
      suspicion Defendant had violated the terms of his probation and
      then he missed a drug test. U.S. PO Johnson testified credibly that
      the search was for the purposes of discovering evidence of violations
      of probation rather than evidence of new criminal activity for new
      criminal charges. Police from DMPD were called after the search.

(Citation omitted.)

      Later, in denying Young’s motion for reconsideration, the district court

provided an alternative ground for its ruling. It determined that even if Iowa’s

version of the special-needs exception did not justify the search under article I,

section 8, that was of no moment because the search was conducted entirely by

federal officers in compliance with federal standards. See State v. Ramirez,

895 N.W.2d 884, 898 (Iowa 2017). As the court put it, “Defendant was not under

state supervision nor did state officers or police officers conduct the search. As

such, the search was entirely justified in the federal justice system.”

      A jury subsequently found Young guilty of three counts of possession of a

controlled substance second offense for the crack cocaine, cocaine, and

marijuana, respectively. It acquitted him of the more serious charge of

possession of crack cocaine with intent to deliver and acquitted him of failure to

possess a drug tax stamp. On March 21, 2023, the district court sentenced

Young to consecutive sentences of imprisonment totaling six years and ordered

him to pay fines and restitution. See Iowa Code § 124.401(5).

      Young has appealed his convictions, arguing that the search of his home

violated article I, section 8. We retained the appeal.
                                        7


      III. Standard of Review.

      “We review the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress based on

deprivation of a constitutional right de novo.” State v. Bauler, 8 N.W.3d 892, 897

(Iowa 2024) (quoting State v. Arrieta, 998 N.W.2d 617, 620 (Iowa 2023)). “We

independently evaluate the entire record and consider the totality of the

circumstances.” Id. “We defer to the findings of fact made by the district court,

‘but we are not bound by them.’ ” Id. (quoting Arrieta, 998 N.W.2d at 620).

      IV. Analysis.

      Young challenges the warrantless search of his home only as a violation of

article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. We believe there is little room for

debate that the search complied with the Fourth Amendment, and Young does

not argue otherwise. We begin by reviewing relevant precedents of the United

States Supreme Court and our court.

      A. The Fourth Amendment Special-Needs Doctrine. In Griffin v.

Wisconsin, the United States Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search of a

probationer’s apartment. 483 U.S. at 880. A probation officer performed the

search under a regulation that authorized any probation officer to search a

probationer’s apartment so long as the supervisor approved and there were

“reasonable grounds” to believe contraband was present. Id. at 870–71. The

Court explained that “[a] State’s operation of a probation system, like its

operation of a school, government office or prison, or its supervision of a

regulated industry, likewise presents ‘special needs’ beyond normal law

enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and

probable-cause requirements.” Id. at 873–74. Thus Griffin gave rise to the

so-called “special needs” exception to the warrant requirement.
                                         8


      Going further, in United States v. Knights, the Court upheld the

warrantless search of a probationer’s apartment conducted by local law

enforcement rather than probation officers. 534 U.S. 112, 114–15, 122 (2001).

The Court recognized that the State has “a dual concern with a probationer.”

Id. at 120. Part of this concern involves “apprehending violators of the criminal

law.” Id. at 121. Citing statistics, the Court explained that “[t]he recidivism rate

of probationers is significantly higher than the general crime rate.” Id. at 120.

Therefore, the Court held that a warrantless search of a probationer—regardless

of its “official purpose”—could be squared with the Fourth Amendment so long

as it was based on reasonable suspicion and a probation agreement that

authorized warrantless searches at any time. Id. at 121–22.

      B. The Special-Needs Doctrine Under Article I, Section 8. Our court

has not followed Knights in interpreting article I, section 8 of the Iowa

Constitution. In State v. Short, we held that a warrantless search of a

probationer’s apartment violated article I, section 8 despite a probation

agreement authorizing the search and even though law enforcement had “good

reason” to conduct the search. 851 N.W.2d 474, 476–77, 502–04 (Iowa 2014).

Plymouth County sheriff’s deputies performed the search based on a warrant

that had the wrong address. Id. at 476. Thus, the search in Short “was not a

probationary search but was instead an investigatory search by law enforcement

related to new crimes.” Id. at 476–77. In overturning the convictions, we

concluded that the warrant requirement has “full applicability” to home searches

of probationers by law enforcement. Id. at 506.

      Subsequent to Short, we held in State v. King that article I, section 8 did

not necessarily bar a warrantless search by a parole officer of a parolee’s home.

867 N.W.2d at 109. The parole search in King uncovered drugs used to prosecute
                                         9


the defendant for a new crime. Id. We discussed the “special needs” doctrine,

observing that Griffin was “the most pertinent federal precedent in the

special-needs area for the present case.” Id. at 115. We noted that “[a] distinction

exists between searches to pursue the purposes of law enforcement and those to

pursue the purposes of carrying out the mission of parole.” Id. at 122. Applying

the special-needs doctrine, we held that the search was lawful. Id. at 126. We

concluded,

      [P]arole officers have a special need to search the home of parolees
      as authorized by a parole agreement and not refused by the parolee
      when done to promote the goals of parole, divorced from the goals of
      law enforcement, supported by reasonable suspicion based on
      knowledge arising out of the supervision of parole.

Id. at 126.

      A year later, in State v. Brooks, we followed a similar approach in a case

involving a probationer. 888 N.W.2d at 408. We decided that no violation of

article I, section 8 occurred when two Iowa probation officers made a warrantless

entry into a probationer’s bedroom. Id. The defendant had previously been

convicted of two methamphetamine-related offenses. Id. The probation officers

received a report that he had relapsed on methamphetamine. Id. The defendant’s

written probation agreement provided that he consented to warrantless searches

on reasonable suspicion and that he agreed not to possess or use drugs. Id.

      We concluded that this probationary search, which yielded the

methamphetamine used to revoke the defendant’s probation, also fell within the

special-needs doctrine as elaborated in King. Id. at 410. The search was

performed by “probation officers carrying out a probation mission.” Id. at 408.

As we put it, “This is not a case like Short, where the probationary status of the

defendant became an after-the-fact justification for a warrantless search of his

residence for independent law-enforcement purposes.” Id. at 415.
                                        10


      C. The Silver Platter Doctrine in Iowa. Finally, a year after Brooks, we

relied on a separate legal doctrine to hold that a federal search should be

evaluated under federal, rather than Iowa, standards, even though the results of

the search had been used as evidence in an Iowa criminal case. That is, we found

no violation of Iowa law when federal agents—having conducted a search of an

apartment pursuant to a form of search warrant that was valid under federal but

not Iowa law—turned the contraband over to state authorities for prosecution.

See State v. Ramirez, 895 N.W.2d at 886–88.

      The case of State v. Ramirez began when agents of the federal Department

of Homeland Security learned that the defendant in Waterloo was due to receive

a package from Mexico that contained methamphetamine. Id. at 886–87. They

obtained an anticipatory search warrant from the federal district court based on

the expected future delivery. Id. at 887. Federal law permits anticipatory search

warrants; Iowa law does not. Id. at 892–93; see also State v. Gillespie, 530 N.W.2d

446, 449 (Iowa 1995) (“[Iowa Code] sections 808.3 and 808.4 plainly do not

contemplate future acts or events as constituting probable cause.”). The federal

agents executed the warrant and seized the methamphetamine, but thereafter

the case was turned over to the Black Hawk County Attorney’s office. Ramirez,

895 N.W.2d at 888.

      In sustaining the search over the objection that it did not comply with Iowa

law, we reasoned,

      When a bona fide federal investigation leads to a valid federal search,
      but the evidence is later turned over to state authorities for a state
      prosecution, we do not believe deterrence or judicial integrity
      necessarily require a reexamination of the search under standards
                                         11


      that hypothetically would have prevailed if the search had been
      performed by state authorities.

Id. at 898. We emphasized that

      [t]he record is devoid of any suggestion that any party was trying to
      circumvent Iowa search and seizure law. . . . It is true that the case
      was ultimately turned over for state prosecution. But there is no
      indication in the record that such a determination had been made
      before the search warrant was obtained and the search was carried
      out.

Id. at 893.

      D. Resolving This Case. The State here argues that the federal probation

officers’ search of Young’s home can be upheld on three independent grounds.

First, it urges that Ramirez applies to this case. In the State’s view, an Iowa court

should not exclude the results of a search performed by federal officers that was

indisputably valid under federal law, regardless of what Iowa law may provide if

the search were conducted by Iowa officers. Second, the State maintains that the

special-needs exception to the warrant requirement as recognized in King and

Brooks would apply here even if the search were measured according to Iowa

constitutional standards. Third, the State argues that Short should, if necessary,

be overruled and Knights should be adopted as the controlling law under article

I, section 8.

      We reach only the State’s first argument, which is dispositive. This case is

like Ramirez in that the search was clearly lawful. Young asks us to evaluate it

as if it had been performed by someone else who didn’t actually perform it. In

Ramirez, we asked, “Should Iowa invalidate a search that would not have been

invalidated under the law of the jurisdiction pursuant to which it was

conducted?” 895 N.W.2d at 894. We answered no. Id. We concluded that

admission of the evidence neither “rewarded unlawful police conduct or

undermined the integrity of our courts”; rather, “it accorded a proper recognition
                                          12


to the bona fide actions of the federal government pursuant to that government’s

lawful authority.” Id. at 898. All that is true here.

      Also, as in Ramirez, there is no “dirty silver platter.” See id. at 893;

Wayne A.    Logan,      Dirty   Silver   Platters:   The   Enduring   Challenge   of

Intergovernmental Investigative Illegality, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 293, 312–13 (2013).

This was purely the activity of a federal probation office dealing with someone

who was on federal supervised release. State and local law enforcement did not

know of the operation. So no suggestion can be made that this was an attempt

to bypass Iowa search and seizure restrictions by enlisting federal officers.

      Further, in Ramirez, we noted that the weight of out-of-state authority

supported our decision to admit the results of a federal search that was lawful

by federal standards:

             Courts in a number of states have concluded that evidence
      lawfully obtained by federal officials, under a federal investigation
      meeting federal standards, may be used in a subsequent state
      prosecution even though state law would not have permitted the
      same type of search. See Morales v. State, 407 So. 2d 321, 329
      (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); People v. Fidler, 72 Ill.App.3d 924,
      29 Ill.Dec. 51, 391 N.E.2d 210, 211 (1979); Basham v.
      Commonwealth, 675 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Ky. 1984); Commonwealth v.
      Brown, 456 Mass. 708, 925 N.E.2d 845, 849–51 (2010); State v.
      Mollica, 114 N.J. 329, 554 A.2d 1315, 1327–28 (1989); State v.
      Toone, 823 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Texas Ct. App. 1992); King v. State,
      746 S.W.2d 515, 519 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Coburn, 165 Vt.
      318, 683 A.2d 1343, 1347 (1996); State v. Dreibelbis, 147 Vt. 98,
      511 A.2d 307, 308 (1986); State v. Bradley, 105 Wash.2d 898,
      719 P.2d 546, 549 (1986) (en banc); State v. Gwinner, 59 Wash. App.
      119, 796 P.2d 728, 731–32 (1990); see also People v. Blair, 25 Cal.3d
      640, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818, 602 P.2d 738, 747–48 (1979) (en banc)
      (finding evidence admissible that had “been legally seized under
      federal law and under the law of Pennsylvania, [even though] the
      seizure would have violated article I, section 13, of the California
      Constitution if it had occurred in this state”).

895 N.W.2d at 895. Several of the cases cited involved searches that would have

violated the state’s constitution if performed by state officials. See Commonwealth
                                        13


v. Brown, 925 N.E.2d 845, 851 (Mass. 2010); State v. Toone, 823 S.W.2d 744,

748 (Tex. App. 1992); State v. Gwinner, 796 P.2d 728, 729 (Wash. App. 1990);

State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1323 (N.J. 1989); People v. Blair, 602 P.2d 738,

747–48 (Cal. 1979) (en banc). We discussed two of them—State v. Mollica and

Commonwealth v. Brown—at length approvingly. See Ramirez, 895 N.W.2d at

895–98.

      Young points out that we were careful to emphasize in Ramirez that the

defendant was claiming only a violation of the Iowa warrant statute; he did not

claim a violation of the Iowa Constitution. See id. at 898 (“While Iowa law would

not have authorized the type of warrant issued, no argument is raised that the

search—if statutorily authorized—would have violated the Iowa Constitution.”).

Indeed, we distinguished some adverse out-of-state authority on that basis:

             It is true that a few state jurisdictions have declined to allow
      evidence seized in a warrantless federal search to be admitted in a
      state proceeding where the search would have violated the state
      constitution. See State v. Torres, 125 Hawai’i 382, 262 P.3d 1006,
      1021 (2011); State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 130 N.M. 386, 25 P.3d 225,
      233 (2001); People v. Griminger, 71 N.Y.2d 635, 529 N.Y.S.2d 55,
      524 N.E.2d 409, 412 (1988). Yet the present case is different.
      Although Ramirez raises article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution
      in his briefing, he does not claim that the search itself would have
      violated the Iowa Constitution. Rather, he maintains only that Iowa
      statutes do not authorize this type of search and, therefore, it would
      violate the Iowa Constitution to admit the results of the search in an
      Iowa court. We disagree with that broad proposition.

Id.

      But we agree with the State that the underlying rationale of Ramirez does

not turn on whether the federal search was alleged to violate Iowa statutory or

Iowa constitutional standards. The critical point in Ramirez was that “the search

was lawful under federal law.” Id. at 894. We said that the out-of-state decisions

upholding such searches were “persuasive,” notwithstanding that several of
                                               14


them involved searches that would have violated state constitutions. Id. at 898.

And we focused on the twin goals of deterrence and judicial integrity, neither of

which would be impaired so long as the search was lawful according to the

standards by which it was conducted. Id.2

       Young urges us to follow the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in State v.

Torres, 262 P.3d 1006 (Haw. 2011). There the court adopted a rule against the

admittance in Hawaii courts of evidence obtained by federal agents under a

search that complied with the Fourth Amendment but would have violated the

Hawaii Constitution. Id. at 1019–21. The decision was in a sense advisory

because the searches in the case were ultimately upheld. Id. at 1023–24.

       In any event, we respectfully disagree with the Hawaii Supreme Court’s

reasoning. We do not believe that by admitting the results of a lawful federal

search, state courts “would necessarily be placing their imprimatur of approval

on evidence that would otherwise be deemed illegal, thus compromising the

integrity of our courts.” Id. at 1019. By that logic, when courts apply the

“inevitable discovery” doctrine, under which illegally obtained evidence can be

admitted when it would have been discovered anyway, see, e.g., State v. Tyler,

867 N.W.2d 136, 171 (Iowa 2015), they are likewise giving an imprimatur to an

improper search. We think not. A court decision stands for what it says, not for

what it might symbolize. Nor do we agree that exclusion of the evidence is

necessary to “deter any federal and state cooperation ‘to evade state law.’ ”

Torres, 262 P.3d at 1020. That goal can be achieved simply by suppressing the




       2One can conceive of an extreme case where evidence was obtained in a jurisdiction whose

legal system did not offer basic human rights protections. We might say that our judicial integrity
would be offended by using that evidence in one of our criminal cases. Obviously, that’s not the
situation here.
                                         15


evidence when the record shows that there was cooperation aimed at evading

state law.

      We are also aware that during the intervening time period since Ramirez

was decided, the Vermont Supreme Court declined to allow “silver platter”

evidence in State v. Walker-Brazie, 280 A.3d 24, 25–26 (Vt. 2021). That 3–2

decision involved a warrantless stop and search of a vehicle near the Canadian

border by federal Border Patrol agents using their “roving patrol” authority. Id.

at 26; see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878–85 (1975).

Controlled substances were found, and the case was turned over to Vermont

authorities for prosecution. Walker-Brazie, 280 A.3d at 26. The court noted, “A

warrantless search of an automobile is per se unreasonable under Article 11 [of

the Vermont Constitution] unless there exists probable cause and a showing of

exigent circumstances, meaning a threat to officer safety or to the preservation

of evidence.” Id. at 29. The court also noted, “The language of Article 11 is broadly

worded—it protects individuals from unreasonable searches or seizures ‘by any

officer or messenger.’ ” Id. at 36. Additionally, the court emphasized the “privacy

rationale” behind Vermont’s exclusionary rule. Id. at 35–37. For these reasons

and others, the court held that “evidence gathered in violation of article 11 by

Border Patrol agents on roving patrol is not admissible in a state criminal

proceeding.” Id. at 37.

      Walker-Brazie is animated by an approach different from the one we have

taken in our constitutional jurisprudence. Article I, section 8—unlike article 11

of the Vermont Constitution—does not purport to apply to “any officer.” Compare

Iowa Const. art. I, § 8, with Vt. Const. ch. I, art. XI. Thus, we have evaluated the

legality of a search conducted entirely by non-Iowa officials according to the

standards of that other jurisdiction. See Ramirez, 895 N.W.2d at 898.
                                        16


Additionally, we have not said that our exclusionary rule exists to protect privacy

per se. Rather, our exclusionary rule serves to remedy constitutional violations.

See State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 289 (Iowa 2000) (en banc), abrogated on other

grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001). Federal

probation officers committed no constitutional violation at the moment they

searched Young’s home under federal authority; Young concedes this point.

      In sum, we conclude that the reasoning and result in Ramirez extend to a

search by federal probation officers that occurred without the knowledge or

involvement of state law enforcement and that complied with federal law but that

is alleged to contravene state constitutional standards. The district court’s ruling

“accorded a proper recognition to the bona fide actions of the federal government

pursuant to that government’s lawful authority.” Ramirez, 895 N.W.2d at 898.

We hold that the motion to suppress was properly denied.

      V. Conclusion.

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Young’s convictions and sentence.

      Affirmed.