State of Louisiana v. Cortney Fitzgerald

                                   Judgment rendered July 16, 2025.
                                   Application for rehearing may be filed
                                   within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
                                   La. C. Cr. P.

                           No. 56,316-KA

                      COURT OF APPEAL
                       SECOND CIRCUIT
                     STATE OF LOUISIANA

                              *****

STATE OF LOUISIANA                                  Plaintiff-Appellee

                                versus

CORTNEY FITZGERALD                                   Defendant-Appellant
TAYLOR

                              *****

                          Appealed from the
                 First Judicial District Court for the
                     Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
                       Trial Court No. 380,953

            Honorable Donald Edgar Hathaway, Jr., Judge

                              *****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT                          Counsel for
By: Edward K. Bauman                                 Defendant-Appellant

CORTNEY FITZGERALD TAYLOR                            Pro Se

JAMES EDWARD STEWART, SR.                            Counsel for
District Attorney                                    Plaintiff-Appellee

JASON WAYNE WALTMAN
ERIC MATTHEW WHITEHEAD
Assistant District Attorneys

                              *****


            Before COX, ROBINSON, and HUNTER, JJ.
HUNTER, J.

       Defendant, Cortney Fitzgerald Taylor, was charged by bill of

indictment with second degree murder, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1.

Following a trial, a unanimous jury found defendant guilty as charged. He

was sentenced to serve life in prison at hard labor without the benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

                                        FACTS

       Defendant, Cortney Fitzgerald Taylor, was involved in a romantic

relationship with Bodicia Grant, and the couple lived together in an

apartment in Shreveport, Louisiana for nearly five years. Defendant was the

father of two of Ms. Grant’s children. In 2020, defendant decided to “move

on” from the relationship with Ms. Grant, and he moved out of the

apartment.

       Two or three months after defendant ended the relationship, Ms. Grant

became romantically involved with Derrick Taylor (“Derrick”), who lived in

the same apartment complex.1 According to Ms. Grant, Derrick would often

come to her apartment and cook meals, but he only stayed overnight on one

occasion. On September 7, 2020, Derrick cooked dinner at Ms. Grant’s

apartment, and thereafter, the couple fell asleep in Ms. Grant’s bed. While

they were sleeping, defendant entered Ms. Grant’s apartment and stabbed

Derrick twice, once in the arm and once in the chest. Derrick died from the

stab wound in his chest. Although Ms. Grant did not witness the stabbing,




       1
         Although defendant and Derrick Taylor shared the same last name, there is no
indication that they were related to each other. To avoid confusion, Derrick Taylor will
be referred to as “Derrick.”
she and one of her neighbors were able to identify defendant from the video

surveillance footage obtained from the apartment complex.

       Ms. Grant’s neighbor, Marcus Young, was outside working on his

vehicle on the evening of the murder, and he saw a gray Infiniti vehicle enter

the parking lot of the apartment complex.2 Young testified he saw the driver

exit the vehicle and walk toward the apartment complex, but he did not see

which apartment the person entered. However, he recognized the person as

Ms. Grant’s former boyfriend. Young stated the person returned to the

vehicle shortly afterwards and left the apartment complex. Young later

viewed a photographic lineup, and he identified defendant as “the girl who

stayed upstairs’ boyfriend.” He stated defendant was the person he saw

entering and leaving the apartment complex on the day of the murder.

       A warrant was issued for defendant’s arrest, but he remained at large

for approximately three months. He was ultimately apprehended in Bossier

Parish in December 2020.

       Defendant was charged by bill of indictment with second degree

murder for the killing of Derrick Taylor, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1.

Prior to defendant’s trial, the State filed a notice of intent, pursuant to La.

C.E. art. 404(B), expressing its intent to use evidence of other crimes at trial,

i.e., defendant’s attempt to evade arrest by firing shots at law enforcement

officers when they attempted to execute the arrest warrant. Following a

hearing, the trial court granted the State’s request, deeming the other crimes

evidence admissible.




       2
           The investigation later revealed defendant’s girlfriend owned a gray Infiniti
vehicle.
                                              2
       During defendant’s trial, Ms. Grant testified as to the nature of her

relationship with defendant and Derrick. She stated she became acquainted

with Derrick through her uncle, and while she was still in a relationship with

defendant, she, defendant, her uncle, and Derrick would sometimes “hang

out.” Ms. Grant testified that on the evening of the murder, she came home

from work to find Derrick cooking and eating in her apartment. She stated

she went to her bedroom and fell asleep, and she was sleeping when Derrick

was stabbed. Ms. Granted stated Derrick awakened her, and stated, “Baby,

I’m hit,” while holding his chest. She also testified Derrick began walking

down the hall, and she noticed he was bleeding heavily from his chest “like a

fire hydrant.” Derrick fell to the floor, and Ms. Grant ran to the door to see

if she could see anyone and called 9-1-1. Emergency medical personnel

transported Derrick to the hospital; however, he died as a result of the stab

wounds. When she was shown a surveillance video from the apartment

complex, Ms. Grant identified defendant as the person depicted entering the

apartment complex driving a gray vehicle, walking in the direction of her

apartment, returning to the vehicle a brief time later, and leaving the

complex.

       Ms. Grant’s neighbor, Marcus Young, testified as to what he

witnessed on the night of Derrick’s murder. Young positively identified

defendant as the person he saw entering and leaving the apartment complex

on the day of the murder.3


       3
          Corporal John Adam Scheen of the Shreveport Police Department (“SPD”)
testified he was working as a patrol officer on the evening of the murder, and he
responded to a call in reference to a stabbing. He stated when he arrived, the fire
department was working on the victim. Cpl. Scheen also testified he saw “lots of blood”
in the hallway, and he spoke to Ms. Grant and Mr. Young and provided their names to the
detectives.

                                          3
       Dr. James Traylor was accepted by the court as an expert in the field

of forensic pathology. He testified Derrick’s cause of death was two

penetrating stab wounds. One stab wound was to the back of Derrick’s

upper right arm. The fatal wound was to the upper chest, measured

approximately 3.75 inches deep, perforated the right ventricle of Derrick’s

heart, and caused significant blood loss. Dr. Traylor classified Derrick’s

death as a homicide.

       A unanimous jury found defendant guilty as charged of second degree

murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without the

benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The trial court

denied defendant’s motions for new trial and post-verdict judgment of

acquittal and his motion to reconsider sentence.

       Defendant appeals.

                                   DISCUSSION

       Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial was

insufficient to find him guilty of second degree murder. Defendant concedes

that “stabbing someone with a knife to the chest may indicate specific intent

to kill or inflict great bodily harm.” However, he argues the fact that

Derrick was stabbed twice does not prove a specific intent to kill.

According to defendant, Derrick also suffered a stab wound to the back of

his right arm, and it was never determined whether the nonfatal wound was



        Detective Peggy Elzie testified she was a crime scene investigator with the
homicide unit of the SPD at the time of the murder. She testified she took photographs at
the crime scene and collected fingerprints and blood samples from the apartment. Det.
Elzie also obtained samples of what appeared to be blood from the gray Infiniti vehicle.

         Katie Traweek, a forensic DNA analyst with the North Louisiana Crime Lab,
testified as an expert in forensic DNA analysis. She testified she tested the samples
obtained from the gray Infiniti and discovered the matter on the swabs was not blood.

                                            4
“defensive or offensive.” Defendant also argues it was reasonable “to

assume” he became enraged and killed Derrick in sudden passion or heat of

blood because he “was startled” by finding Derrick in bed with Ms. Grant.

Therefore, he argues the evidence was only sufficient to prove manslaughter.

Defendant maintains this Court should reverse his conviction, vacate his

sentence, render a judgment of conviction for manslaughter, and remand for

resentencing.

      The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.

Wayne, 55,052 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/28/23), 367 So. 3d 924, writ not cons., 23-

01166 (La. 2/27/24), 379 So. 3d 666; State v. Alexander, 51,918 (La. App. 2

Cir. 4/11/18), 247 So. 3d 981, writ denied, 18-0805 (La. 2/11/19), 263 So.

3d 436. The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or

reweigh evidence. Id.; State v. Bass, 51,411 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/21/17), 223

So. 3d 1242, writ not cons., 18-0296 (La. 4/16/18), 239 So. 3d 830. A

reviewing court accords great deference to a jury’s decision to accept or

reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Wayne, supra;

State v. Haley, 51,256 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/24/17), 222 So. 3d 153, writ

denied, 17-1230 (La. 4/27/18), 241 So. 3d 305.

      Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the

offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S.

14:30.1(A)(1). Specific intent is that state of mind which exists when the

circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed
                                        5
criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1).

Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances and the actions of the

defendant. State v. Wayne, supra; State v. Walker, 51,217 (La. App. 2 Cir.

5/17/17), 221 So. 3d 951, writ denied, 17-1101 (La. 6/1/18), 243 So. 3d

1064. Specific intent can be formed in an instant. State v. Wayne, supra;

State v. Alexander, supra; State v. Washington, 50,424 (La. App. 2 Cir.

3/16/16), 188 So. 3d 350, writ denied, 16-0718 (La. 4/13/17), 218 So. 3d

119. Specific intent to kill may also be inferred from the extent and severity

of the victim’s injuries and the defendant’s use of a deadly weapon to

produce those injuries. State v. Wayne, supra; State v. Alexander, supra.

The determination of whether the requisite intent to kill is present is a

question for the trier of fact. State v. Wayne, supra; State v. Walker, supra.

      Manslaughter is a homicide which would be murder, but the offense is

committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by

provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and

cool reflection. La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1). “Sudden passion” and “heat of

blood” are not separate elements of the offense but are mitigating factors

that may show less culpability than when a homicide is committed without

them. State v. Lombard, 486 So. 2d 106 (La. 1986); State v. Lemons, 38,269

(La. App. 2 Cir. 4/7/04), 870 So. 2d 503, writ denied, 04-1288 (La.

10/29/04), 885 So. 2d 584. Provocation is a question of fact to be

determined by the trier of fact. To be entitled to the lesser verdict of

manslaughter, a defendant is required to prove mitigatory factors by a

preponderance of the evidence. Id.; State v. Mackens, 35,350 (La. App. 2

Cir. 12/28/01), 803 So.2d 454.

      In the instant case, the video surveillance footage depicted defendant
                                       6
parking a gray Infiniti vehicle, walking to Ms. Grant’s apartment, then

exiting the apartment, returning to the vehicle, and driving away. The video

showed defendant entering and exiting the apartment within a span of 23

seconds.

      Derrick was in bed, defenseless, and unarmed when defendant entered

Ms. Grant’s apartment and stabbed him. There is no evidence to support

defendant’s claim that he killed Derrick in sudden passion or heat of blood

because he was startled and “became enraged” when he saw Derrick in bed

with Ms. Grant. The evidence demonstrated defendant was the one who

ended the relationship with Ms. Grant, and the stabbing occurred two or

three months after Ms. Grant became involved with Derrick. Considering

the totality of the record, a rational trier of fact could have concluded

defendant failed to establish the mitigating factors for manslaughter,

provocation and heat of blood, by a preponderance of the evidence.

      Moreover, the evidence was sufficient to establish that a reasonable

trier of fact could have concluded defendant had the requisite specific intent

to kill or inflict great bodily harm. As stated above, Dr. Taylor testified

Derrick suffered one fatal wound to the upper chest, which measured

approximately 3.75 inches. He was also stabbed in the arm, which may have

indicated a futile attempt to defend himself. Moreover, the video evidence

established that defendant entered the apartment, proceeding directly to Ms.

Grant’s bedroom, stabbed Derrick twice, and exited the apartment – all

within a span of 23 seconds. Provided with this evidence, we find a

reasonable jury could have concluded defendant arrived at the apartment

armed with a knife with the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm

upon Derrick.
                                        7
      Defendant also contends the trial court erred in allowing the State to

introduce evidence of other crimes, i.e., firing shots when police officers

attempted to execute the warrant for his arrest for Derrick’s murder. He

argues the events leading to his capture and arrest had nothing to do with the

actual murder and should not have been relayed to the jury. According to

defendant, the evidence of those alleged incident occurred three months after

Derrick was killed and was “highly prejudicial and irrelevant.” Defendant

maintains the evidence of him firing shots at police officers prejudicial

because it portrayed him “as a hardened criminal who went from allegedly

stabbing someone to shooting at police officers.” He also asserts the

probative value of the evidence does not outweigh its prejudicial effect, and

it cannot be seen as harmless error.

      Contrarily, the State argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in allowing evidence of defendant’s other crimes to be introduced at trial.

The State maintains that evidence of defendant’s escape and attempts to

evade arrest constituted admissible res gestae evidence. See, State v. Taylor,

01-1638 (La. 1/14/03), 838 So. 2d 729.

      Generally, evidence of other acts of misconduct is inadmissible

because it creates the risk that the defendant will be convicted of the present

offense simply because the unrelated evidence establishes him or her as a

“bad person.” La. C.E. Art. 404(B)(1); State v. Jackson, 625 So. 2d 146 (La.

1993); State v. Young, 51,101 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/15/17), 216 So. 3d 236.

This rule of exclusion stems from the “substantial risk of grave prejudice to

the defendant” from the introduction of evidence regarding his unrelated

criminal acts. State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126, 128 (La. 1973).



                                       8
      However, evidence of other crimes may be admissible if the state

establishes an independent and relevant reason, i.e., to show motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of

mistake or accident, or when it relates to conduct that constitutes an integral

part of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding. La.

C.E. Art. 404(B)(1); State v. Young, supra; State v. Roberson, 40,809 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 4/19/06), 929 So. 2d 789.

      Evidence of other crimes forms part of the res gestae when said

crimes are related and intertwined with the charged offense to such an extent

that the state could not have accurately presented its case without reference

to it. It is evidence which completes the story of the crime by showing the

context of the happenings. State v. Odenbaugh, 10-0268 (La. 12/6/11), 82

So. 3d 215; State v. Brewington, 601 So. 2d 656 (La. 1992). Evidence of

crimes committed in connection with the crime charged does not affect the

accused’s character because the offenses are committed as parts of a whole.

Id. The inquiry to be made is whether the other crime is “part and parcel” of

the crime charged and is not offered for the purpose of showing that the

accused is a person of bad character. State v. Prieur, supra.

      The res gestae doctrine in Louisiana is broad and includes not only

spontaneous utterances and declarations made before or after the

commission of the crime, but also testimony of witnesses and police officers

pertaining to what they heard or observed during or after the commission of

the crime if a continuous chain of events is evident under the circumstances.

State v. Odenbaugh, supra; State v. Huizar, 414 So. 2d 741 (La. 1982). In

addition, integral act (res gestae) evidence in Louisiana incorporates a rule

of narrative completeness without which the state’s case would lose its
                                        9
“narrative momentum and cohesiveness, ‘with power not only to support

conclusions but to sustain the willingness of jurors to draw the inferences,

whatever they may be, necessary to reach an honest verdict.’” State v.

Colomb, 98-2813 (La. 10/1/99), 747 So.2d 1074, 1076 (quoting Old Chief v.

United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186, 117 S. Ct. 644, 653, 136 L. Ed. 2d 574

(1997).

       In State v. Taylor, supra, the defendant objected to the State’s

introduction of the res gestae evidence, i.e., the other crimes committed

while he and Timothy Taylor were “on the run” after they killed a car

salesman in DeSoto Parish.4 The Supreme Court found the evidence was

admissible, stating:

       Although defendant contends the evidence of other crimes was
       erroneously admitted as res gestae because the crimes involved
       different victims in different states, over a seven-day span, as
       discussed above, the doctrine of res gestae is designed to
       complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its
       immediate context of happenings near in time and place.
                                       ***
       At first blush, defendant seems correct that the events
       happening in far-away Iowa, Kansas, and in Texas at the
       Mexican border, occurring within a seven-day span of time,
       could not possibly qualify under a doctrine meant to place the
       charged crime in its immediate context of happening near in
       time and in place. Clearly, as the state traced the movements of
       defendant and Timothy Taylor, the events detailed by its
       evidence, especially after the bank robbery in Iowa, became
       increasingly remote in time and in place, so much so that it
       would be difficult if not impossible to say the charged crime



       4
         Michael and Timothy Taylor went to a car dealership in DeSoto Parish and
asked to test drive Pontiac Firebird. During the test drive, they shot and killed the car
salesperson, left his body on a bridge, and fled in the Pontiac. The following day,
Michael and Timothy used the Pontiac in a bank robbery, high speed chase, and the non-
fatal shooting of a police officer in Iowa. Officials found the Pontiac abandoned in
Missouri. Michael and Timothy stole another vehicle in Kansas and continued their
flight. Two days later, they were apprehended in Laredo, Texas, after they attempted to
cross the border into Mexico.

                                           10
       gave defendant notice of the truck theft in Kansas or the
       currency reporting violation at the Mexican border.

       However, under the rule of narrative completeness incorporated
       in the res gestae doctrine “the prosecution may fairly seek to
       place its evidence before the jurors, as much to tell a story of
       guiltiness as to support an inference of guilt, to convince the
       jurors a guilty verdict would be morally reasonable as much as
       to point to the discrete elements of a defendant’s legal fault.”

Id., at 742-43 (internal citations omitted).

       In this case, in December 2020, law enforcement officials received a

tip from Crime Stoppers and were able to trace defendant’s location to a

residence on Henderson Street in Shreveport. Seargent Joel Davidson of the

Shreveport Police Department (“SPD”), who was also serving as a member

of the United States Marshals Task Force, conducted surveillance on the

residence. At the hearing, Sgt. Davidson testified he observed defendant and

a woman arrive at the residence, exit a vehicle, and enter the house, so he

called for the rest of the task force and a K-9 unit.5 The officers knocked on

the door of the residence, and the woman answered and verbally denied

defendant was there; however, according to Sgt. Davidson, the woman

silently indicated defendant was inside the residence. The officers obtained

the woman’s consent to enter and search the residence, and two officers and

a K-9 entered the home. The officers began searching the home room by

room, calling defendant’s name along the way. The K-9 gave a positive

alert on a bedroom door, and two gunshots were fired from the bedroom.6


       5
         The license plate on the gray vehicle in the driveway matched the license plate
on the vehicle seen in the surveillance footage the night Derrick was killed.
       6
          Officer Matthew Dixon of the SPD investigated the scene. He found two spent
9 mm casings on the floor and two projectiles in the wall of the back bedroom. Officer
Dixon surmised the bullet went through the door, ricocheted on the ground, and lodged
into the wall. Defendant was charged with two counts of attempted first degree murder
of a police officer, in violation of La. R.S. 14:27(A) and 14:30(A)(2), due to allegedly
                                           11
Sgt. Davidson entered the bedroom and saw defendant jump out of a

window and flee. He testified that the presence of another dog in the

backyard prevented them from using the K-9 to apprehend defendant.

Defendant was captured in Bossier City three days later.

       We find the evidence regarding the events surrounding law

enforcement’s efforts to execute the warrant for defendant’s arrest was

admissible at trial. Defendant fled the scene immediately after he killed

Derrick, and he remained at large for approximately three months.

Thereafter, law enforcement officials received an anonymous tip as to

defendant’s location, and the officers attempted to execute the arrest

warrant. During the officers’ attempt to execute the warrant for defendant’s

arrest for killing Derrick, defendant fired shots at the officers and

successfully evaded arrest. Based on these facts, we find the police officer’s

testimony was admissible under the res gestae exception. This assignment

lacks merit.

                                 CONCLUSION

       For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm defendant’s conviction and

sentence.

       CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE AFFIRMED.




firing two shots at law enforcement officers. The attempted murder charges remain
pending.

                                          12