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[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"11071797","type":"010combined","part":"opinion","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2381-22
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
NAKIRA M. GRINER, a/k/a
NAKIRA M. JAMES,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Argued January 14, 2025 – Decided June 16, 2025
Before Judges Sumners, Susswein and Bergman.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Cumberland County, Indictment No. 19-06-
0537.
Zachary G. Markarian, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued cause for appellant (Jennifer N.
Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Zachary G.
Markarian, of counsel and on the briefs).
Robert A. Polis, II, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for respondent (Jennifer Webb-McRae,
Cumberland County Prosecutor, attorney; Jeffrey
Krachun, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
This appeal arises from the horrific death of twenty-three-month-old
Daniel Griner, Jr. A jury found defendant Nakira M. Griner, Daniel's mother,
guilty of first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1); second-degree
desecration of human remains, N.J.SA. 2C:22-1(a)(2); fourth-degree tampering
with physical evidence, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(1); second-degree endangering the
welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2); and second-degree false public
alarm, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-3(a)(1). Following merger, defendant was sentenced to
an aggregate life sentence, plus a consecutive seven-year term.
Defendant appeals, arguing:
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING DR.
MAZARI'S CONCLUSION THAT THE MANNER OF
DEATH WAS "HOMICIDE" WHERE THAT
CONCLUSION WAS NOT BASED ON HIS
MEDICAL EXPERTISE BUT DEPENDED
ENTIRELY ON EVIDENCE DIRECTLY WITHIN
THE JURY'S KEN.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
UNRELIABLE EXPERT TESTIMONY REGARDING
THE TIMING OF THE SKELETAL INJURIES
A-2381-22
2
WHERE THE COURT DID NOT FIND – AND THE
STATE PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE
ESTABLISHING – THAT SUCH TESTIMONY WAS
GENERALLY ACCEPTED AS RELIABLE UNDER
FRYE.1
POINT III
THE COURT VIOLATED [DEFENDANT'S] JURY
TRIAL RIGHTS BY DISQUALIFYING JUROR 115
BASED ON A 21-YEAR-OLD CONVICTION FOR A
"CDS CHARGE" WITHOUT DETERMINING IF
THAT CONVICTION ACTUALLY DISQUALIFIED
HIM FROM SERVING OR IF IT HAD BEEN
EXPUNGED.
After considering the parties' arguments, the record, and applicable law,
we affirm defendant's convictions.
I.
A.
Daniel Jr.'s Death
On February 8, 2019, at approximately 6:30 p.m., the Bridgeton Police
Department (BPD) received a distress call from defendant. Police Officer David
Ringer responded to the call, meeting defendant, who had her infant son Jayce2
1
Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923).
2
The parties' briefs and the record also interchangeably spell his name "Jace."
For consistency, we will use "Jayce."
A-2381-22
3
with her, at the intersection of Giles and New Streets. Defendant related that
she was walking from her home to a nearby Walgreens when unknown assailants
pushed her from behind and took her baby stroller carrying Daniel Jr.
After additional officers responded to search the area for Daniel Jr., they
found an empty baby stroller lying on its side with toddler shoes nearby a few
streets away. Approximately fifty police and fire department personnel,
including a K-9 handler with a bloodhound, proceeded to search the area. State
police were contacted to provide a helicopter equipped with a heat-seeking
camera to aid in the search. The police confirmed that Daniel Sr., the baby's
father and defendant's husband, was at work when defendant reported the
kidnapping.
Sergeant Michael Pastirko and Detective Richard Morris went to
defendant's home in case Daniel Jr. returned there. They found it odd that the
house windows were open and a ceiling fan was on because it was "blistering
cold" that night. According to Sgt. Pastirko, the home was tidy but had a "[v]ery
pungent" odor. With defendant's consent, police thoroughly searched the house,
backyard, and adjacent woods but were unable to locate Daniel Jr.
Detective Sergeant Kenneth Leyman, sensing the "chemical" odor was
strongest in the kitchen, looked in the oven and saw a tray of what appeared to
A-2381-22
4
be store-bought cookies. He observed the oven's bottom was clean, but that both
sides were grease-spattered. He found burnt Clorox wipes in the kitchen
trashcan, concluding they were causing the odor in the house. Red and blue
candles were also noticeable in the house.
Outside the house, Sgt. Pastirko spotted a large Hello Kitty purse
weighing ten to fifteen pounds in a shallow hole next to the shed in the backyard.
Upon cursory inspection of the purse, Sgt. Pastirko saw what he thought to be a
piece of cooked meat placed inside multiple white plastic trash bags. Thinking
nothing of it, he put the purse aside.
Around the same time, Detective Mark Yoshioka retrieved surveillance
camera footage from homes along defendant's route to Walgreens showing her
carrying Jayce and pushing an empty stroller prior to the alleged kidnapping.
About twenty minutes later, another surveillance camera captured defendant
walking back the other way without the stroller. After this information was
relayed to the police at defendant's home, Det. Sgt. Leyman and Officer Brent
Bodine reexamined the contents of the Hello Kitty purse. They then realized
that what was originally believed to be a piece of burnt meat was in fact the
burnt, mostly skeletal remains of a child. Dried red and blue candle wax was
found on some of the remains. DNA testing later revealed the remains were of
A-2381-22
5
Daniel Jr. Defendant was subsequently charged with murdering her son and
other related offenses.
B.
Defendant's Explanation of Her Son's Death
Defendant did not testify or present any witnesses at the trial. The State,
however, presented audio of her recorded phone calls from jail with her sister
LaShae Trussell on three separate calls a month after Daniel Jr.'s death; with
Daniel Sr. on March 5; and with a person identified only as Alexis on an
unspecified date. The calls revealed defendant's explanation of how Daniel Jr.
died.
Sergeant Ryan Breslin of the Cumberland County Prosecutor's Office,
with defendant's consent, extracted data from defendant's phone using software
which generated a report of the phone's call/text message logs and internet
browsing history. The report revealed: (1) an eight-day gap in the phone's
internet browsing history between 4:19 p.m. on January 31, 2019 through 2:33
a.m. on February 8, 2019; (2) a gap in the call/text message history between 3:09
p.m. on January 16, 2019 through 6:43 a.m. on February 8, 2019; and (3) certain
files on the phone were "modified" on February 7, 2019.
A-2381-22
6
Sgt. Breslin noted that, on February 8, 2019, the date of Daniel Jr.'s death,
defendant accessed the internet at least ninety-nine times starting at 7:24 a.m.
Her searches included tracking delivery of a package and visiting shopping sites
for purses and shoes. She also searched for information about how to know
when a baby has a chest cold.
In defendant's telephone call with Trussell, defendant said Daniel Jr. fell
down the stairs while reaching for a doll. His breathing initially "sounded a
little weird" but thereafter his breathing and behavior were normal. When he
vomited later that day, defendant attributed it to him eating too much. Defendant
said he seemed tired well before his usual 8:00 p.m. bedtime. When she woke
him up the next morning, he was "gone." She was unable to resuscitate him
using CPR. Upon searching the internet regarding his symptoms and
considering what happened the day before, defendant concluded he may have
died from internal bleeding resulting from his fall. Realizing that Daniel Jr. was
dead, defendant told Trussell she panicked––"all rationality, all common sense,
. . . everything left"––because her son had "bruises on him" from being beaten
by her and Daniel Sr. She thought the police would assume they had beaten
their son to death, and that they would both be arrested and lose custody of
A-2381-22
7
Jayce. She therefore decided to cover up Daniel Jr.'s death to make sure that
Daniel Sr. and Jayce would remain together.
In her telephone call with Daniel Sr., defendant said: (1) she did not kill
Daniel Jr. or do anything to hurt him; (2) she destroyed Daniel Jr.'s remains
because she did not want Daniel Sr. to get in trouble for "what we were doing
to Daniel [that] left marks all over his little butt and all over his legs"; (3) that
things would have been worse for everybody if the authorities had seen Daniel
Jr.'s bruises; and (4) she did what she did so that Daniel Sr. and Jayce could
remain together.
And in defendant's call with Alexis, she claimed that, if she had not
sacrificed herself, "then Jayce w[ould] have nothing and that's the most
important part, like I did it for Jayce because, if Daniel [Sr.] loses everything,
then Jayce loses everything." She said, "Daniel [Sr.] never wanted to hit Daniel
[ Jr.]. He never wanted to discipline him. I made him [do so] because I didn't
wanna be the only one." Because of this, she voiced, "I felt like I had to do what
I did to save . . . [Daniel Sr. and Jayce] from losing everything the same way
that I did."
A-2381-22
8
C.
State's Expert Testimony
Pretrial Motions
Prior to trial, defendant moved to exclude expert testimony from forensic
anthropologist Evan Bird as to whether Daniel Jr.'s skeletal fractures occurred
antemortem (before death), perimortem (around the time of death), or
postmortem (after death). Defendant argued Bird's opinion that Daniel Jr.'s
fractures were perimortem injuries was too vague to support the State's homicide
charge and thus, too prejudicial to be admitted.
During an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing, Bird, who is employed by the Chief State
Medical Examiner's Office and teaches at Rutgers University, discussed his
education and academic honors, and stated he was one of only two forensic
anthropologists in New Jersey. He participated in dozens of bone trauma
analyses involving thermal damage and had previously been qualified as an
expert in forensic anthropology. Bird related that as a diplomat of the American
Board of Medicolegal Death Investigators, he was acquainted with forensic
anthropologists across the country and familiar with research being performed
in his field.
A-2381-22
9
Bird testified he relied upon scientific principles and acceptable methods
used in the anthropological community in performing his forensic analysis of
Daniel Jr.'s remains. He stated, "the entire [analysis] was based on the kind of
standard [f]orensic [a]nthropological examination one would do in a case where
what we refer to as, 'Trauma Anthropology,' is the concern." He detailed the
forensic analysis he performed and explained his conclusions. Following Bird's
testimony and the parties' arguments, the trial court denied defense counsel's
motion. In its oral decision, the court highlighted Bird's professional
credentials, employment history, experience with thermal bone injuries and
prior qualifications as an expert in court. The court discussed Bird's painstaking
analysis of the child's remains and his acknowledgement of certain limitations
of that analysis. The court continued:
And he's drawing his conclusions because this is what
he does for a living, and this is the science behind what
he does. They know the science. They know that these
types of fractures occur in a certain fashion. They know
based on the age that this is what it is.
....
So he described everything that he needed to, and it
seems reliable. I mean, I don't have anything before me
to show me that this type of methodology that he used
is not the proper way that forensic anthropologists
work. I mean, this is what he does for a living. . . .
A-2381-22
10
So[,] the Daubert3 analysis. When a proponent does not
demonstrate the soundness of a methodology –– he
demonstrated the soundness. . . . [I]t's pretty . . . self-
evident, both in terms of its approach to reasoning and
to its use of data from the perspective of others within
a relevant scientific community.
The gatekeeper should exclude the proposed expert
testimony on the basis that it's unreliable. I don't have
that in front of me. I have . . . a very good, sound
scientific method on what it is that he does, and what
the limits are of the science behind what it is. And he
discussed that at length, antemortem, perimortem, and
postmortem, and how it is that they draw their
conclusions.
....
This expert['s] . . . opinion[,] I'm certainly going to
allow in before the jury.
Defendant also moved to bar the State's Medical Examiner and forensic
pathologist Peter Mazari, M.D. from testifying that Daniel Jr.'s death was a
homicide because it would be cumulative to Bird's testimony and unduly
prejudicial as neither Dr. Mazari nor Bird could definitively say that the
fractures occurred prior to Daniel Jr.'s death. Defendant also argued that Dr.
Mazari's opinion was improperly based solely upon the circumstances of the
case, not his medical expertise.
3
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579
(1993).
A-2381-22
11
During the N.J.R.E. 104 hearing, Dr. Mazari detailed his autopsy of
Daniel Jr.'s remains and explained why he needed Bird's findings to determine
whether the fractures occurred antemortem or postmortem. He testified that
based on Bird's findings regarding the timing of the fractures, he concluded that
Daniel Jr. had died from injuries resulting from blunt force trauma and that the
manner of his death was homicide. The trial court denied defense counsel's
motion, ruling: (1) Dr. Mazari's testimony would not be cumulative to Bird's
testimony because they played separate, though related, roles in the
investigation, and each had something different to offer as to the various counts
in the indictment; and (2) the challenges made to Dr. Mazari's opinions went to
the weight rather than the admissibility of those opinions and could be addressed
on cross-examination.
Dr. Peter Mazari's Trial Testimony
At trial, Dr. Mazari testified as an expert involving blunt force trauma and
thermal alteration. He performed an autopsy on Daniel Jr.'s remains four days
after his death without knowing it was Daniel Jr. because the remains were "not
visually identifiable." He explained that most of the skin had been burned away
and that the remaining underlying soft tissue was extremely altered by thermal
A-2381-22
12
damage. Most of the tissue was not recognizable, and what was recognizable
was "severely different than what it would have been in its native state ."
Dr. Mazari identified numerous bone fractures, including seventy-four in
the cranium; several in the right ribs; one in the left ribs; three bones in the left
arm (humerus, radius, and ulna); and three bones in the left leg (femur, tibia,
and fibula). He further noted Daniel Jr.'s left foot was detached at the ankle. He
was unable to determine whether the bone fractures occurred antemortem or
postmortem because of the severe damage to the remaining soft tissue by thermal
alteration. He thus sought assistance from Bird to properly desiccate and
examine the skeletal remains and to opine as to the timing of the fractures and
whether any were caused by thermal exposure.
Based on Bird's findings, Dr. Mazari opined that Daniel Jr.'s stellate right
parietal skull fracture, multiple left-sided rib fractures, and fracture of the left
humerus were "likely perimortem," occurring shortly before, after, or within a
day of, his death. He explained his conclusion was "likely" because that was
Bird's phrasing. He posited the stellate skull fractures were "more common with
inflicted trauma" and "uncommon with any kind of accidental trauma."
According to Dr. Mazari, "injuries that occur at home are usually linear skull
fractures, if there's any skull fracture. Most accidents inside the house for a
A-2381-22
13
toddler don't result in any significant injuries." He surmised there was probably
no blood at the scene because the fracture did not break the skin which was often
the case with blunt injuries.
Dr. Mazari acknowledged that, while he identified the fractures in Daniel
Jr.'s bones in his autopsy, he relied exclusively on Bird's findings regarding the
timing of the fractures. He denied he "predominantly" based his opinion as to
manner of death on Bird's findings. Rather, he stated that the suspicious
circumstances in this case "played a very large role . . . in the ruling of
homicide," in the "absence of another more plausible cause of death ." He
maintained that Bird's findings played "a more predominant role in the cause of
death, but less so in the manner of death," because Bird "put the blunt force
injuries within a proper window of time [so] as to be the potential cause [of
death]."
In sum, Dr. Mazari opined that Daniel Jr.'s death was caused by "injuries
including blunt force trauma" and that the manner of Daniel Jr.'s death was
homicide based upon: (1) the suspicious circumstances of the case, including
the severe damage to his remains and the placement of those remains in the purse
outside the home; (2) the multiple areas of bone fractures, some of which were
determined to be perimortem and, thus, a possible cause of death; (3) the
A-2381-22
14
potentially-fatal nature of the perimortem stellate skull fracture; and (4) the fact
that the stellate skull fracture was not "compatible with a simple fall down
stairs."
Evan Bird's Trial Testimony
Bird performed trauma analyses of skeletons and other hard tissues of the
body. Upon receiving Daniel Jr.'s remains from Dr. Mazari, Bird meticulously
cleaned the bones and rearticulated (reassembled) the skeleton. After taking
forty hours to put just the skull back together, albeit missing some fragments ,
he observed that there were multiple non-thermal blunt force fractures to both
sides and the back of the head. This caused plastic deformity in the cranial
bones, preventing them from fitting perfectly together, while thermal trauma
caused charring. The skull damage was inconsistent with brittle bones, crush
injuries, or a fall from great height.
Bird opined that a stellate fracture was a "red flag" for child abuse because
it was very difficult for a child to accidentally injure themself in this way. He
explained that stellate fractures were usually seen only in car accidents or violent
attacks. He determined the fracture was perimortem, rather than antemortem or
postmortem, because: (1) it showed no signs of healing as an antemortem
fracture would; and (2) the deformation in the bone indicated that the bone tissue
A-2381-22
15
was still alive when the injury occurred. Bird stated that Daniel Jr.'s multiple
left rib fractures resulted from a single blunt force impact and were also
perimortem, with no sign of healing, and the charring to the inside of the ribs
indicated that they were fractured before they were burned. He noted that
postmortem alteration of a bone usually results in the bone having a frayed
appearance or crumbling at the fracture site. Bird also believed the left humerus
fracture was likely perimortem, evidenced by the charring to the inside of the
bone. He acknowledged he could not determine the timeframe of the remaining
fractures to the right-side rib, leg, and arm, although none of them showed signs
of healing indicative of antemortem injury.
D.
Jury Voir Dire & Verdict/Sentencing
Following a colloquy with potential juror 115 during voir dire, the trial
court disqualified the juror under N.J.S.A. 2B:20-1(e) because of his
approximately twenty-one-year-old controlled dangerous substance (CDS)
conviction. Before disqualifying the potential juror, the court declined
defendant's request that he be asked whether his conviction, which the juror
stated resulted in a prison term, was expunged because it believed the inquiry
was impermissible. Individuals with expunged convictions are allowed to serve
A-2381-22
16
on a jury. In re D.J.B.,
216 N.J. 433, 441
(2014). Nevertheless, after advising
the potential juror he was excused, the juror intimated his conviction was not
expunged by asking the court: "Could I ask you one question. Do you offer any
expunge reports, and I know I'm off-base, but do we have any of that in
Cumberland County?" The court responded: "If you . . . contact . . . the trial
court administrator . . . there are seminars being set up at different places
throughout the county."
Defendant was thereafter tried over the course of six days. The jury found
her guilty on all charges: first-degree murder; second-degree desecration of
human remains; fourth-degree tampering with physical evidence; second-degree
endangering the welfare of a child; and second-degree false public alarm.
At sentencing, over six weeks later, after merging the endangering the
welfare of a child conviction into the murder conviction and the tampering with
physical evidence conviction into the desecration of human remains conviction,
the trial court sentenced defendant to: life imprisonment without eligibility for
parole for murder; a consecutive seven-year term of imprisonment on
desecration of human remains; and a concurrent five-year term of imprisonment
on false public alarm.
A-2381-22
17
II.
Defendant's first argument before us is that the trial court erred in allowing
Dr. Mazari to testify that the manner of Daniel Jr.'s death was "homicide"
because it was not based on his medical "judgment or expertise" but "depended
principally, if not entirely, on the circumstances in which Daniel, Jr.'s body was
disposed." Citing State v. Jamerson,
153 N.J. 318, 340-41
(1998), defendant
posits "[t]he jury was 'as competent as' Dr. Mazari to analyze these facts and
reach a conclusion as to the ultimate issue in the case." We are unpersuaded.
Expert testimony is permissible where a jury needs someone with
"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [to] assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue," N.J.R.E. 702, that "is
so esoteric that jurors of common judgment and experience cannot form a valid
judgment," Scully v. Fitzgerald,
179 N.J. 114, 127
(2004) (internal quotation
omitted). Thus, expert testimony is admissible where: (1) the subject matter is
beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the testimony and underlying foundation
are reliable; and (3) the witness has sufficient expertise. State v. Olenowski,
253 N.J. 133
, 143 (2023) (internal citation omitted).
The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Mazari to opine
Daniel Jr.'s death was a homicide. See Townsend v. Pierre,
221 N.J. 36
, 52
A-2381-22
18
(2015) (holding the decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is within the
sound discretion of the trial court). We acknowledge that Dr. Mazari's opinion
relied upon the suspicious circumstances of defendant's false kidnapping
distress call to law enforcement and the horrendous desecration and concealment
of Daniel's Jr.'s body. However, taken as a whole, his ultimate determination
that Daniel Jr. was the victim of a homicide was also based on medical findings
that were well beyond the ken of the jury. For example, the "very large role" of
Bird's findings that the potentially fatal nature of the perimortem stellate skull
fracture, which was not "compatible" with an accidental fall down the stairs,
together with the multiple perimortem bone fractures, were medical findings
outside the jury's ken.
We add that defendant's reliance upon State v. Jamerson is misplaced.
There, the main issue was whether the defendant's driving in a fatal car accident
satisfied the recklessness standard for purposes of a second-degree reckless
manslaughter charge. Jamerson,
153 N.J. at 324
. Over a defense objection, the
medical examiner, who was not an accident reconstructionist, opined the
victim's death was due to vehicular homicide rather than an accidental death
based upon eyewitness statements describing the circumstances of the accident.
Id. at 330-33
. The Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction, ruling
A-2381-22
19
the medical examiner was not qualified as an expert or lay person to assess the
way the defendant drove his vehicle and the cause of the accident, and the
medical examiner's testimony should have been limited to the physiological
cause of the victim's death, including ruling out other possible causes of death.
Id. at 324, 337-42
. Here, in stark contrast to the situation in Jamerson, Dr.
Mazari's opinion focused on the physiological cause of the toddler’s death based
on a painstaking examination of the remains.
Defendant's reliance on several out-of-state cases, State v. Sosnowicz,
270
P.3d 917
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2012), Bond v. Commonwealth,
311 S.E.2d 769
(Va.
1984), People v. Eberle,
697 N.Y.S.2d 218
(N.Y. App. Div. 1999), and State v.
Tyler,
867 N.W.2d 136
(Iowa 2015) is also misplaced. Like Jamerson, those
cases involved medical examiners' testimony that the victim's manner of death
was based solely on non-medical evidence, such as witness statements, that was
equally available to the jury, rather than medical expertise. See Sosnowicz,
270
P.3d at 922-23
; Bond,
311 S.E.2d at 772
; and Eberle,
697 N.Y.S.2d at 219
; and
Tyler,
867 N.W.2d at 144
.
Our review of the record indicates Dr. Mazari's opinion that Daniel Jr.'s
death was due to homicide was based upon medical findings which were beyond
the average ken of the jury. This opinion directly refuted defendant's claim that
A-2381-22
20
Daniel Jr. died from a head injury sustained after accidentally falling down the
stairs, coupled with defendant's desecration and hiding of Daniel Jr.'s remains.
III.
Defendant next argues the trial court erred in admitting Bird's "unreliable"
expert testimony as to the timing of Daniel Jr.'s skeletal fractures. Defendant
insists that, rather than holding the State to its burden, the trial court erroneously
relied upon Bird's credentials, his employment history, and the absence of
anything indicating that his methodology was improper, in determining his
forensic analysis was generally accepted as reliable among forensic
anthropologists. We are unpersuaded.
When the case was tried, admission of expert testimony was controlled by
the standard established in Frye, rather than the standard in Daubert.4 "The Frye
test requires trial judges to determine whether the particular science underlying
the proposed expert testimony has 'gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs.'" State v. Pickett,
466 N.J. Super. 270
, 302 (App. Div.
2021) (quoting Frye,
293 F. at 1014
). Whereas the Daubert test requires a trial
4
Our Supreme Court recently held that, "going forward," the standard for
scientific reliability set forth in Daubert, not the "more restrictive" standard set
forth in Frye, should apply to "the admissibility of expert evidence in criminal
and quasi-criminal cases." Olenowski, 253 N.J. at 139.
A-2381-22
21
judge reviewing a proffer of expert scientific testimony to make "a preliminary
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony
is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly
can be applied to the facts in issue." Olenowski, 253 N.J. at 147 (quoting
Daubert,
509 U.S. at 592-93
).
Based upon our de novo review of a trial court's admission of scientific
evidence, State v. Rochat,
470 N.J. Super. 392
, 436 (App. Div. 2022), we are
satisfied that the methodology used by Bird was generally accepted in the field
of forensic anthropology. The State made a prima facie showing that Bird's
expert testimony was based on well-established scientific theories and tests,
State v. Harvey,
151 N.J. 117, 167
(1997), and defendant did not present
"sufficient evidence to call into question" its admissibility, Rubanick v. Witco
Chem. Corp.,
125 N.J. 421, 426
(1991). Bird's testimony regarding the timing
of Daniel Jr.'s skeletal fractures was supported by his academic credentials,
employment history, and knowledge of nationally accepted forensic
anthropology analytic techniques. Moreover, as the State notes, one of the
articles defendant appended to her motion brief in support of her position
actually confirms that the methodology employed by Bird was widely accepted
A-2381-22
22
in the scientific community at the time of his examination. The trial court did
not err in admitting Bird's testimony.
IV.
Finally, defendant contends the trial court's error in disqualifying the
potential juror without asking him if his CDS conviction was expunged violated
her constitutional right to an impartial jury. The argument requires little
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). As noted, a person with an
expunged conviction can serve as a juror. D.J.B.,
216 N.J. at 441
. However,
defendant fails to point to any legal authority requiring a trial court to ask the
potential juror if his conviction was expunged. The case law defendant cites
does not address whether a trial court must probe further when a potential juror
self-reports that they are disqualified from service due to a prior conviction for
an indictable offense per N.J.S.A. 2B:20-1(e). While the court had the discretion
to ask the juror if his record was expunged, based upon the juror's own question
to the court about expungement, it appears his record was not expunged. Lastly,
defendant proffers no indication how she was prejudiced by the potential juror's
disqualification. Her suggestion that she need not show prejudice in order to
establish her right to an impartial jury was denied is unsupported by any legal
standard.
A-2381-22
23
Affirmed.
A-2381-22
24Case Information
- Court
- N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
- Decision Date
- June 16, 2025
- Status
- Precedential